The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent, by committing the felony of armed trespass while employed as a deputy sheriff, failed to fulfill his duties and responsibilities as an employee of the Petitioner, and, if so, whether the termination of the Respondent's employment was consistent with applicable disciplinary policy.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was employed by the Petitioner as a deputy sheriff. The Respondent had been employed for 12 to 13 years as a law enforcement officer prior to his employment with the Petitioner. He was employed by the Petitioner for more than six years prior to the termination at issue in this proceeding. In September 2009, two undercover law enforcement officers, one of whom was the Respondent, went from a public alleyway through a privacy fence and into the private backyard property of a Pinellas County citizen. The entry occurred at night. The alley and backyard area were unlit. The Respondent was dressed in shorts and a t-shirt and was armed with a gun. The officers had no search warrant authorizing their entry onto the private property. The Respondent's entry into the private backyard was an act of trespass. The commission of a trespass while armed constitutes a third degree felony. The Respondent did not report the trespass to any superior officer within the Petitioner's chain of command. The Respondent has asserted that he was merely following the other officer's lead on the night when the trespass occurred and did not think that he had acted improperly. During a deposition for an unrelated criminal case, the Respondent was questioned about whether he had observed another officer engage in a similar trespass. The Respondent resisted answering the question, sought legal advice from an assistant state attorney, and then declined to answer the question. Even after being questioned about the issue during the deposition, the Respondent still failed to report the incident to any superior officer within the chain of command. After a complaint of misconduct was filed against the Respondent, the Petitioner commenced an administrative investigation. During the investigation, the Respondent acknowledged the trespass, but attempted to minimize his participation in the incident and to assign responsibility for the trespass to the other law enforcement officer. Bob Gualtieri, the sheriff of Pinellas County, Florida, is responsible for operation of the Petitioner and is authorized to impose discipline on the Petitioner's employees who violate rules or regulations adopted by the Petitioner in accordance with a Civil Service Act. The Petitioner has adopted General Order 3-1 to establish a standard of conduct for the Petitioner's employees and has categorized misconduct into disciplinary levels based on the severity of a transgression. "Level 5" violations reflect serious misconduct. The Respondent's participation in the felony trespass and his failure to report the incident to his superiors constitute separate level 5 violations. The Respondent violated Rule 5.4, which requires that employees be aware of their assigned duties and responsibilities and take prompt and effective action in carrying them out. The Respondent violated Rule 5.5, which requires that employees observe and obey all laws and ordinances and report violations by written memorandum upon their first duty shift following a violation. The Petitioner has adopted General Order 10-2 to establish a point system to be followed by the Petitioner's Administrative Review Board for the imposition of discipline based on adopted guidelines. The Respondent has accumulated 75 disciplinary points, 60 of which are based on the trespass incident underlying this proceeding. Termination from employment is within the range of discipline established by the Petitioner's rules and procedures applicable to the facts of this case. The Respondent has asserted that the sheriff's exercise of discretion in terminating his employment was severe and unreasonable. There is no credible evidence to support the assertion. The basis for the Respondent's termination was the Respondent's commission of the felony of armed trespass and his failure to inform any superior officer within the chain of command of the incident. The sheriff's decision to terminate the Respondent from employment was clearly warranted. There is no evidence that the sheriff inappropriately applied the Petitioner's rules and procedures or that any similarly-situated employee has been subjected to lesser discipline by Sheriff Gualtieri for comparable conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a final order terminating the Respondent from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Grant Rozelle, Esquire Pinellas County Sheriff's Office 10750 Ulmerton Road Largo, Florida 33778 Carole Sanzeri, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street, Sixth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Robert F. McKee, Esquire Kelly and McKee Post Office Box 75638 Tampa, Florida 33675
The Issue Whether Petitioner (the School Board) has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment on the grounds alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges.
Findings Of Fact The School Board is a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the School District of Miami-Dade County, Florida. See Article IX, Florida Constitution, and Section 230.03, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the School Board employed Respondent as a classroom teacher pursuant to a professional service contract and assigned her to teach at Mae M. Walters Elementary School. Respondent began her employment with the School Board in 1993. While on traffic detail on August 10, 2000, Officer Calicchio stopped a car with an expired tag. At the time pertinent to this proceeding the car, a convertible, had its top down. The driver, a male, and Respondent, the front seat passenger, were the only occupants of the car. After the car pulled off the road, Officer Calicchio parked his patrol car behind the stopped vehicle, approached the vehicle, and asked the driver for his license and registration. The driver responded that he did not have his driver's license on his person and gave his name and date of birth to Officer Calicchio. Respondent informed Officer Calicchio that the vehicle belonged to her and gave him her license and the car's registration. Officer Calicchio returned to his patrol car to verify the information that had been given to him and to determine whether the driver had a valid license. While he was doing that, Officer Gomez appeared at the scene as backup for Officer Calicchio. Officer Gomez observed marijuana particles on the driver's shirt and in the car. After Officer Gomez related his observations to Officer Calicchio, the two officers took the driver into custody and placed him in the backseat of Officer Calicchio's patrol car. Officer Calicchio returned to the vehicle and observed marijuana particles in the vehicle. Officer Calicchio asked Respondent if he could search the vehicle. She consented and got out of the vehicle. After he completed his search, Officer Calicchio asked Respondent if he could search the large purse she was carrying. She consented and began pulling objects out of the purse and placing them on the hood of Officer Calicchio's patrol car. When Respondent slid her purse back up on her arm, Officer Calicchio asked if her purse was empty. Respondent answered in the affirmative. Officer Calicchio asked if he could look inside her purse. Respondent responded by leaning the purse towards him so he could look inside. Officer Calicchio observed two yellow envelopes in the bottom of the purse. Respondent consented to Officer Calicchio retrieving the two envelopes and opening them. The envelopes contained a green, leafy substance. When Officer Calicchio showed Respondent the contents of the envelope and asked what the substance was, Respondent fled on foot. Officer Calicchio, immediately followed by Officer Gomez, pursued Respondent. As she was fleeing, both officers observed Respondent reach into the front of her pants and pull out a plastic bag. As she was attempting to throw the bag into some bushes, Respondent slipped and fell to the ground. The plastic bag fell to the ground, landing next to the Respondent. The two officers recovered the bag and took Respondent into custody. The plastic bag contained a white-yellowish substance that Officer Calicchio field-tested using a Valtox field test. The substance tested positive for cocaine. Officer Calicchio also performed a field test on the green, leafy substance that was taken from the envelopes in Respondent's purse. The substance tested positive for cannabis. Subsequent tests by John Gall, a forensic chemist employed by the Broward County Sheriff's Officer, confirmed that the substance in the plastic bag was cocaine. The cocaine taken from the plastic bag weighed 35.2 grams. Respondent's conduct was sufficiently notorious to bring both Respondent and the educational profession into public disgrace or disrespect. Respondent's misconduct impaired her service in the community. On December 13, 2000, the School Board voted to suspend Respondent's employment and begin proceedings to terminate her employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order that upholds the suspension of Respondent's employment and terminates her professional service contract. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2001.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2008),1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Rodriguez was certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida by the Commission on May 18, 2004, and was issued Correctional Certification No. 240475. On or about February 10, 2009, officers from the Kissimmee Police Department and St. Cloud Police Department participated in an undercover police operation geared to targeting individuals that intend to commit crimes involving narcotics or prostitution. They created a false advertisement for prostitution services on the website, Craigslist. The advertisement consisted of photographs and an undercover phone number to contact for sexual services. The advertisement did not indicate that it was an undercover operation. On or about that same date, Mr. Rodriguez placed a phone call using the same number on the advertisement. At the time Mr. Rodriguez placed the call, he was unaware that the advertisement was part of an undercover operation. During the phone conversation, Mr. Rodriguez communicated with Detective Takeya Close (Detective Close), an undercover agent who posed as a prostitute. Detective Close did not identify herself to Mr. Rodriguez as an undercover agent. Mr. Rodriguez communicated to Detective Close that he desired sexual services from her in exchange for money. Detective Close informed Mr. Rodriguez that the price for sexual services ranged from 50 to 80 dollars. A “quickie” service consisted of 15 minutes or less of sexual activity and cost 50 dollars. A “full service” consisted of a half-hour of sexual activity and cost 80 dollars. Mr. Rodriguez told Detective Close that he wanted a “full service” and was willing to pay her either price for her sexual services. Detective Close then provided Mr. Rodriguez a meeting location, a residential house at 4903 Newton Court in St. Cloud, Florida. Law enforcement used the residential house as part of the undercover operation. They agreed to meet at 8:45 p.m. Mr. Rodriguez arrived at the agreed time at the St. Cloud residential house that was part of the undercover operation. Detective Close, posed as a prostitute, greeted Mr. Rodriguez at the front door. Once Mr. Rodriguez entered the house, law enforcement officers arrested and detained him. During a search of Mr. Rodriguez incident to his arrest, law enforcement officers discovered his cellular phone, which contained the undercover phone number in the call history log, and 50 dollars cash. Detective Close’s credible testimony was that, on or about February 10, 2009, Mr. Rodriguez communicated with her, agreed to pay her money for her sexual services, and arrived at the St. Cloud undercover residential house attempting to engage in prostitution. Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony that the purpose of his communication with Detective Close and his arrival at the St. Cloud residential house was to receive a massage was not credible. His cellular phone showed that he had called the undercover number and that he went to the St. Cloud undercover house at the agreed time. On or about April 12, 2009, Mr. Rodriguez was driving a white SUV. Devon Littlejohn (Ms. Littlejohn), a prostitute, was standing on the corner of Wakulla and Orange Blossom Trail, an area known for prostitution activity. When Mr. Rodriguez drove past where Ms. Littlejohn was standing, Ms. Littlejohn waived at him. Mr. Rodriguez made a U-turn and drove up to Ms. Littlejohn. Ms. Littlejohn approached Mr. Rodriguez while he was in his vehicle and engaged in conversation with him. Ms. Littlejohn solicited sexual services to Mr. Rodriguez by asking him if he wanted a “date.” Mr. Rodriguez answered affirmatively and then asked Ms. Littlejohn if she had a room. Ms. Littlejohn answered yes. Mr. Rodriguez then asked Ms. Littlejohn about the price for her sexual services, and she informed him that “full service” costs 80 dollars. Mr. Rodriguez agreed to pay Ms. Littlejohn 80 dollars in exchange for her sexual services. Ms. Littlejohn entered the passenger side of Mr. Rodriguez’s vehicle. Mr. Rodriguez then drove off with Ms. Littlejohn inside his vehicle. On April 12, 2009, Law Enforcement Sheriff Deputy Scott Bearns (Deputy Bearns) of the Orange County Sheriff’s Office was patrolling the Orange Blossom Trail area when he drove pass Mr. Rodriguez’s vehicle. Deputy Bearns conducted a traffic stop on Mr. Rodriguez’s vehicle for having an illegal window tint. Mr. Rodriguez pulled his vehicle over at a parking lot across the street from the place where Ms. Littlejohn was originally standing. Deputy Bearns recognized Ms. Littlejohn as a prostitute in the local area and observed her and Mr. Rodriguez in the vehicle. Mr. Rodriguez informed Deputy Bearns that he worked as a correctional officer. Deputy Bearns then escorted Ms. Littlejohn outside of Mr. Rodriguez’s vehicle and Mirandized her. Ms. Littlejohn revealed to Deputy Bearns that Mr. Rodriguez had agreed for her to perform sexual services in exchange for 80 dollars. Ms. Littlejohn provided Deputy Bearns a written statement to that effect. Deputy Bearns arrested Mr. Rodriguez for assignation to commit prostitution. Ms. Littlejohn was not arrested. Incident to the arrest, another deputy conducted a search of Mr. Rodriguez’s vehicle and discovered a total of 102 dollars cash. Ms. Littlejohn’s credible testimony was that Mr. Rodriguez communicated with her, agreed to pay her money for her sexual services, and allowed her to enter his vehicle in an attempt to engage in prostitution. Mr. Rodriguez’s testimony that Ms. Littlejohn jumped in his vehicle without his consent and was hanging out of the vehicle with the door open was not credible.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Jose R. Rodriguez violated sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7) and rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b) and revoking his certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2011.
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case were undisputed by the individuals having personal knowledge of the incidents and may be summarized in narrative form. Three young road guard inspectors including Respondent Aaron Alderson, occupied Inspection Station 9A on I-75 during the early morning hours on September 30, 1977. Little traffic had passed during the preceding 2 or 3 hours and idleness and exuberant youth brought forth ideas for diversion. Earlier in the evening salt had been sprinkled on Alderson. Around 4:00 a.m. Perry, one of the men in Station 9A, removed his belt and gun before going to the toilet. While he was in the toilet Alderson, as a practical joke, removed the cylinder from Perry's revolver and replaced the revolver in its holster. When Perry came out and put on his belt and gun, Alderson immediately commented to Perry that he would have a hard time firing his gun. Perry then looked at his gun, saw the cylinder missing and he and Alderson replaced the cylinder thus restoring the weapon to operation. Shortly thereafter Alderson and Perry began friendly bumping into each other and then decided to go outside where there was more room for exercise. They removed their belts and guns, leaving them in the station, and went to the side of the building where they began friendly tussling. During this time the other occupant of Station 9A, Hudson, remained in front of the station keeping a lookout for trucks. When a truck entered the ramp, the horseplay was stopped until after the truck had departed. The occupant of Station 9B across the highway from Station 9A was also out in front of his station and could see Alderson and Perry in the lights from Station 9A. After 10 or 15 minutes of horseplay consisting of friendly grappling and tussling, Anderson and Perry had expended sufficient energy to return to the more sedentary chore of waiting for approaching trucks. At all times involved in these incidents, both parties were in uniform, the sun lacked several hours of announcing the approach of day, little, if any, traffic passed Station 9A on the I-75 and the uniforms of Alderson and Perry were neither dirtied nor mussed. As a result of the above incidents, Perry was suspended from duty without pay for 5 days and Alderson was suspended from duty without pay for 10 days. Apparently no appeal was taken by Perry but Alderson's suspension cost him his biweekly salary of $292.63, less withholdings. In 1976, legislation was passed authorizing the arming of road guard inspectors and they were first armed, after completing Police Standards Training, in late 1976. At the time they were authorized to carry arms, they were issued a copy of the Firearms and Ammunition section from the Department of Agriculture's Policy Manual and told to become familiar with it. A copy of this instruction was admitted as Exhibit 1. Respondent acknowledged that he was given a copy of the instruction offered as Exhibit 1 at the time he was authorized to carry a weapon but denies that he read paragraph E thereof with full understanding. Alderson appears to have been employed in 1975, as a road guard inspector and received his first employee performance review dated 11/05/75. Two additional evaluations dated 6/14/76 and 4/10/77, were admitted into evidence with the initial evaluation as a composite exhibit 5. It is noted that Respondent's performance scores, prepared by his supervisor, have increased with each subsequent evaluation. In his latest evaluation Alderson was rated as exceptional and one of the most knowledgeable inspectors in the division. During Alderson's testimony he was open, forthright and responded to all inquiries with composure and decorum. He freely admitted the facts as noted above and acknowledged he now realizes the seriousness of tampering with a weapon as a practical joke. His primary concern with this no appeal was his conviction that the punishment was not commensurate with the offenses and that he had not been given an opportunity to state his side of the case to the superior who actually recommended the punishment before it was approved and awarded. The road guard inspector, who inadvertently disclosed the incident to Roger Pittman, the assistant chief, Road Guard Bureau, who appears to have been the prime mover in the punishment awarded, testified that he felt so bad about the incident he thought about resigning from the road guard. The demeanor of all witnesses leads the undersigned to conclude that the manner in which this incident was handled was detrimental to the morale of the inspectors in the road guard bureau.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer having been certified by the Commission on August 5, 1983 and issued certificate number 43-86-017-01. Respondent had previously been certified as a law enforcement officer by the Commission in December 1974 but that certificate expired while Respondent was attending college. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a deputy sheriff by the Osceola County Sheriff's Office. However, Respondent began his employment as a law enforcement officer in 1974 when he worked for the Windermere Police Department in Orange County, Florida, and since July 1990 has worked part-time for the Davenport Police Department. Respondent has been employed full-time as a financial consultant with Merrill Lynch since February 1990. Respondent is licensed in Florida under Chapter 517, Florida Statutes to conduct securities transaction and licensed under Chapter 626, Florida Statutes to conduct business in annuities, life insurance and health insurance. Licensure under both Chapter 517, Florida Statutes and Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, requires, among other requirements, that the licensee be of good moral character. On September 29, 1989, Respondent was on duty as an Osceola County Sheriff's Department deputy assigned to the southwest portion of Osceola County. At approximately 1800 hours, Respondent was dispatched to a residence in the community of Poinciana to talk to the parents of two minor females (ages fourteen and sixteen) who were allegedly provided alcoholic beverages by three adult males earlier in the day. The juveniles, who had skipped school, advised Respondent that the three males had taken them to a lake and allowed them to drink beer and go swimming. The three males involved were pointed out to Respondent, who then went to the males and questioned them. During this questioning, a "field contact card" was completed on each male. The time of completion of the cards is indicated on the cards to be 1830 hours (6:30 p.m.). By reason of the completion of the cards, Respondent identified the names of the three males (Robert Miller, William Troy, and Clayton Daniel Worley), their ages (27, 26, and 19 years, respectively), their addresses, phone numbers, physical descriptions, social security numbers, and, for Miller and Worley, drivers license numbers. Worley was identified as owner of the red pickup truck on the scene. After completing the contact cards, Respondent returned to the victims. One victim, J.B., age 14, reported that while she was in the water, Robert Miller started feeling her breasts and that Clayton Worley also grabbed her and started fondling her breasts. According to J.B., she told Miller and Worley to leave her alone, and she went ashore. J.B. then related that William Troy then asked her to go for a walk and that during the walk, Troy grabbed J.B. and tried to kiss her, than pulled his penis from his pants and forced her hand into it. J.B. indicated she pulled away but Troy grabbed her again and tried to force her to touch his penis. J.B. indicated Troy repeatedly asked her to perform various sex acts and she refused. According to J.B., the three males agreed to take the girls home and, when the truck stopped at an intersection, J.B. jumped from the truck and sought help. By the time Respondent learned of the breast fondling and penis exposure allegations, the males had left the scene. Respondent contacted his supervisor then-Sergeant Robert Hansell who talked with him about probable cause to arrest the three suspects. Hansell further contacted the on-call investigator Detective Andy Strecker who agreed with Hansell that there was probable cause to effect arrests for lewd and lascivious acts committed in the presence of a minor. Strecker contacted Respondent by phone, instructed him to send the parents and juveniles to the Sheriff's Office for sworn taped statements and to effect the arrest of all three suspects, if possible, on the felony charge of lewd and lascivious acts. Neither Hansell nor Strecker advised Respondent to charge sexual battery at that time, although Respondent still considered it a probable charge. After leaving the victim's home, Respondent attempted to locate the three males. During this attempt, he identified the red pickup truck and made a traffic (felony) stop of the vehicle at the intersection of San Remo Court and Deauville Court in Osceola County. Respondent recognized the driver as one of the three males who had been questioned by Respondent in conjunction with the "field contact cards" earlier, and knew the driver was not the vehicle owner, Clayton Worley. The traffic (felony) stop was indicated to the Osceola Sheriff dispatcher by Respondent at approximately 204658 (two seconds before 8:47 p.m.). Respondent exited his patrol car and ordered Miller to get out of the truck. When Miller reached the front of the patrol car Respondent ordered him to place his hands on the hood of the patrol car. As Miller placed his hands on the hood of the patrol car, Respondent stepped up behind Miller and advised him he was under arrest. At this time Respondent noticed a bulge in Miller's right rear pocket that was not there earlier when Respondent had asked for identification. Before Respondent could secure the handcuffs, Miller began acting belligerently by raising his hands and turning around and asking why he was being arrested. Respondent pushed Miller back onto the hood of the patrol car, advised him he was under arrest again, and told Miller to place his hands behind his back. Miller did not comply but spun around bumping into the Respondent. At this point, Respondent felt a hit against his weapon and a pull on his gunbelt causing Respondent to think that Miller was attempting to get his weapon. As a result, Respondent pushed Miller away and swung his gunside away from Miller. As Respondent recovered his balance, he turned toward Miller who was on his hands and feet in the roadway beside the driver's side of the patrol car. Respondent grabbed for Miller, but Miller jumped up and ran counter clockwise around the patrol car, west on San Remo Court to Deauville Court, a distance of about 35 feet. Respondent pursued Miller on foot as Miller turned south on Deauville Court. Other than Respondent's flashlight, the only light in the area was a street light at the southeast corner of San Remo Court and Deauville Court. As Respondent chased Miller away from the street light the area of the chase became less illuminated, and required Respondent to depend more on his flashlight. Since Respondent had failed to switch his flashlight from wide beam to narrow beam the flashlight did not provide sufficient light for Respondent to clearly observe Miller's actions during the chase. After the Respondent had chased Miller about 77 feet, Miller suddenly stopped about 30 feet from Respondent. Miller then turned toward Respondent with both hands somewhat extended and held close together in front of his body about waist level in what Respondent considered an offensive position. Miller made no effort to raise his hands as to give up. Since Miller had escaped before Respondent had been able to determine what the bulge was in his rear jeans pocket, Respondent believed that Miller had a weapon and was preparing to shoot him. Because they had moved away from the street light into a less illuminated area during the chase, the Respondent was unable to determine if Miller had a gun in his hands. Under the circumstances the Respondent feared for his life, and therefore, pulled his weapon, aimed and fired once. Miller then turned and ran south on Deauville Court again with Respondent pursuing him. Miller ran another 40 or 50 feet, suddenly stopped and pivoted toward Respondent, again holding his hands together low and in front of his body similar to that used to hold a handgun at low port. When Miller continued to hold his hands in an offensive position, the Respondent, again in fear for his life, fired three rounds. Apparently, Miller turned to run while Respondent was still shooting since Miller was hit in the lower right side of his back just above the hip through the Levi-Strauss patch on his jeans by one of the bullets. Although Respondent thought he had hit Miller, he began to have doubts that he had hit him when Miller started running again without staggering. Miller ran a short distance further south on Deauville Court before turning right (southwest) into an area of tall grass and ducked out of sight. Respondent followed Miller a short distance into a wooded area but retreated when he realized he might be shot from ambush because at this point Respondent still assumed that Miller was possibly armed. At approximately 8:49 p.m., Respondent requested a K-9 unit for searching the area. Respondent made this call for the K-9 unit from his hand- held radio while he was still near the area where Miller had entered the woods. This call was made approximately two minutes after Respondent indicated to the dispatcher that he was making the traffic (felony) stop. Upon returning to his patrol car, Respondent and Deputy Larry Dodson who had responded to Respondent's call for assistance removed Clayton Worley, the vehicle's owner, from the truck. Worley was unconscious from alcohol consumption but otherwise okay. Respondent explained to Dobson what had transpired and Dobson called Sergeant Hansell and secured the perimeter until the K-9 unit arrived. K-9 officer, Deputy Lisa Bowen arrived at approximately 9:07 p.m., and although not advised by Respondent that Miller might be armed and dangerous or that Respondent had fired shots at Miller, Bowen had heard the call for assistance and the shots-fired dispatch. Deputy Bowen proceeded to search the area in accordance with proper procedures, and eventually found Miller and placed him under arrest. Deputy Cutcher who had also responded to the call for assistance handcuffed Miller. Miller advised the deputies that he had been shot and could not move. Deputy Bowen found one bullet entry and requested paramedics and ambulance at approximate 9:48 p.m. Miller was identified from his wallet which had been taken from his pocket by Deputy Cutcher. When Sergeant Hansell, who had arrived on the scene, learned that Miller had been shot and was possibly armed, he directed the 9MM "spent" shell casings to be secured, that all law enforcement officers be advised that Miller may be armed, and directed Respondent to sit in his patrol car and not to discuss the incident with anyone. No firearm was found on Miller, and no firearm was found at the scene other than the service firearm secured from Respondent. Four 9MM "spent" casings from Respondent's service firearm were found at the scene. One "spent" 9MM casing was found in the area where Respondent first fired at Miller and three "spent" 9MM casings were found in the area where Respondent fired at Miller the second time. No other "spent" bullet casings were found at the scene. The shot that wounded Miller was fired by Respondent using his service firearm. Miller was admitted to Humana Hospital in Kissimmee at 11:15 p.m. where the bullet was surgically removed from the abdominal area by Dr. Antonio Ramirez. Miller's blood alcohol content was determined to be 0.18 percent. Evidence of Benzodiazepine (a class of tranquilizer which includes valium), cannabnoid, and cocaine metabohite were found by a urine drug screen. The arrest history for Miller indicates two arrests for resisting arrest; one dismissed and one with no disposition, and one charge of battery on a police officer which was dismissed. Subsequent to the night of the incident, Investigator Ryan, with the assistance of Deputy Bowen and Detective Webster, conducted an experiment at the scene to determine what the Respondent could have observed in regards to Miller's action under the same conditions as on the night of the incident. Notwithstanding the results of this experiment, the most credible evidence of what the Respondent may have seen or thought he saw during the chase of Miller was Respondent's testimony in this regard which is set out in the above Findings of Fact. While I understand Ryan's effort in this regard, none of those involved in the experiment had to make decisions on what they saw while chasing a person who had just escaped and who may possibly be armed. Respondent did not enjoy this luxury on the night of September 29, 1991 while chasing Miller who, Respondent had reason to believe, might be armed. Stewart R. Hudson, a special agent with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement investigated possible criminal charges against Respondent for aggravated assault concerning the shooting of Miller by Respondent on September 29, 1989. Hudson's investigative report, dated October 9, 1989, was submitted to the State Attorney's Office, Ninth Circuit, and to Sheriff Jon Lane. On November 7, 1989, the State Attorney's Office presented to the Grand Jury Hudson's investigative report. Agent Hudson, Sergeant Hansell and Major Magnaght testified before the Grand Jury regarding the shooting. The Grand Jury voted No True Bill, apparently finding the shooting to be justifiable use of force pursuant to Section 776.05, Florida Statutes. On October 11, 1989, an Osceola County Sheriff's Office Investigator interviewed Respondent regarding the shooting of Miller. Subsequently, the investigator asked Respondent to take polygraph examinations on October 19 and October 27, 1989. Each of the exams showed that Respondent was truthful regarding his fear for his life on September 29, 1989, and truthful in answering Sergeant Ryan on October 11, 1989. 2/ Nevertheless Sergeant Ryan indicated that Respondent was untruthful regarding whether Respondent struggled with Miller and whether Miller was facing him with his hands in a threatening manner when Andrews shot him. When Ryan told Respondent and impressed upon him he did not believe him after the polygraph examinations on October 19 and 27, 1989, Respondent changed his account of the two points which Ryan said showed deception and tried to comport his testimony with what he had been told the polygraph examinations showed. Respondent then requested to be polygraphed again on those questions to prove that he had been truthful in the interview of October 11, 1989, in his incident report and in his interview with Agent Hudson. Ryan indicated that he could not do another polygraph and reported that Respondent had given false information during the internal investigation with the intent to mislead the investigators. At the meeting when Respondent was dismissed on November 6, 1989, Andrews stood by his report and explained the changes in the October 27, 1989 interview with Sergeant Ryan. When he had finished, Commander Croft asked if Respondent was allowed or given the opportunity to be polygraphed after he changed his account of the shooting. Ryan indicated that they had already discussed this and told Respondent, "Don't go muddy up the water." Respondent's employment with the Osceola County Sheriff's Office was terminated November 6, 1989. Notwithstanding that Respondent changed his story to comport with the alleged results of the polygraph examinations of October 11 and 27,1989 that he was being untruthful concerning the matter set out above, the more credible evidence concerning the events of the night of September 29, 1989 which led up to the shooting of Miller is Respondent's testimony at the hearing which comports in almost every detail with the Offense Incident Report which was completed and filed by Respondent shortly after the incident occurred. Respondent's reason for changing his story concerning Miller's action was that he was aggravated by the investigation, and thought that by giving the "changed answers" to the same questions on another polygraph examination would indicate that he was also being untruthful with the "changed answers" and hopefully, this would clear up those areas on the two previous polygraph examinations. There was sufficient substantial competent evidence to establish that Respondent was in fear in his life, on both occasions, when he shot at Miller on September 29, 1989, and that Respondent's reasons for changing certain statements about the incident was done neither with the intent to mislead the investigation nor to accomplish some unlawful purpose.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, accordingly recommended that the Administrative Complaint, as amended at the hearing, filed against the Respondent be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1991.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for the administration of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, including the licensure of Class "D" Security Officers. Petitioner applied for licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer. Pending the processing of that application, Petitioner became employed as a security guard for approximately five months. By letter dated February 21, 1996, Petitioner was notified by Respondent that his application for a Class "D" license was, subject to his due process rights, going to be denied based on his conviction of battery in St. Lucie County in September 1993. Respondent asserted that the conviction was of a crime directly related to the business for which the license is sought within the meaning of Section 493.6118(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Respondent also asserted that the facts relating to that conviction establish that Petitioner had committed an act of violence or used force on another person which was not for the lawful protection of himself or another within the meaning of Section 493.6118(1)(j), Florida Statutes. On September 14, 1993, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of a misdemeanor count of battery. The victim of the battery was Thomas Coburn. Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 15 days in the county jail, one year probation, and 50 hours of community service. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Thomas Coburn was employed by the City of Port St. Lucie, Florida, as a city code enforcement officer. The code enforcement division is administered by the City of Port St. Lucie Police Department. Mr. Coburn was not a sworn law enforcement officer. On Sunday, May 16, 1993, Mr. Coburn was acting in his official capacity as a city code enforcement officer. He was wearing a badge, name plate, and collar pins with the initials P.S.L. He was in an official uniform that had patches with the inscription "Port St. Lucie, Fla. Police." He was driving a marked vehicle that reflected he was with the city code enforcement department. Shortly after noon on May 16, 1993, Mr. Coburn went to the personal residence of the Petitioner for the purpose of serving upon Petitioner a notice to appear pertaining to several alleged code violations. Petitioner was home with his wife, his teenage stepson, and his five year old son. When Mr. Coburn arrived, Petitioner was about to begin a barbecue. When the stepson came to the door in response to Mr. Coburn knock on the door, Mr. Coburn asked to speak to Petitioner. The teenage stepson went inside to get the Petitioner. Mr. Coburn did not see the stepson or another member of Petitioner's family after the Petitioner came to the door. When Petitioner came to the door, Mr. Coburn identified himself as a code enforcement officer and told Petitioner he was there to deliver the notice to appear. Mr. Coburn's vehicle was parked on the street so that Petitioner could see the markings on the vehicle. Petitioner became irate and shouted profanities at Mr. Coburn. Petitioner told Mr. Coburn that he could not serve official papers on a Sunday and ordered him off his property. There is a conflict in the evidence as to what next occurred. Petitioner testified that Mr. Coburn bumped him in the chest as the two of them argued. Mr. Coburn testified that he backed away from Petitioner and began to leave the premises. The more credible version of the events is that given by Mr. Coburn. Consequently, it is found that there was no physical contact initiated by Mr. Coburn. As he was backing away and preparing to leave the premises, Mr. Coburn placed the notice to appear on the barbecue grill that was in the area where the two men were standing. After he placed the notice to appear on the barbecue grill, Mr. Coburn turned to walk away. Petitioner then kicked Mr. Coburn in the buttocks. It was Petitioner's act of kicking Mr. Coburn that resulted in his subsequent arrest and conviction. There was no one else in the area around Petitioner's front door at the time of this incident. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Petitioner was acting in defense of himself or of others when he kicked Mr. Coburn. Petitioner has not been convicted of any other crime. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was an approved process server within the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. Petitioner worked as a security guard for the five months preceding the denial of his application. There were no incidents of violence during that five month period.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that the final order deny Petitioner's application for a Class "D" license. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Michele Guy, Esquire Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station No. 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Edward B. Galante, Esquire 789 South Federal Highway, No. 103 Stuart, Florida 34994 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, the Respondent, Darrell B. Daniels, was certified as a Law Enforcement Officer by the Criminal Justice standards and Training Commission having been issued certificate number 02- 34831, on December 2, 1983. At approximately 10:30 PM on July 31, 1985, seventeen year old Marta Stowell was picked up from work at a Tampa shopping center by her boyfriend, twenty-two year old Terry Hickock, and the two drove to a public beach located along the Courtney Cambell Causeway, in Tampa, in her car, arriving at approximately 11:00 PM, and parking behind some bushes in a wooded area of the beach. They then began necking which escalated into heavier contact and as a result, the parties moved into the back seat and disrobed. A short time later, they heard the approach of a car which stopped a short distance behind their vehicle. A few moments later, an individual with a flashlight came up to the car door and shined the light through the closed window on them. The person also tapped on the window and said, "Hello, there." The individual with the light appeared to be a uniformed police officer and the car he was driving was a police car. This individual, who the parties identified as Respondent, instructed them to open their car door and they complied. He then advised them that because they were nude, they were committing an illegal act in a public place. Respondent asked them their ages and when Ms. Stowell told him she was seventeen, he told them he was going to have to arrest her boyfriend for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He also indicated he might have to place Ms. Stowell in a juvenile detention center and inform her mother of her conduct. Ms. Stowell was very upset at this prospect and began crying and begging Respondent not to arrest her boyfriend. In response to her pleas, Respondent told the couple, who had not yet been permitted to get dressed, that he felt sorry for them and thought he might be able to think of a way to get them, "off the hook." Respondent then walked over to his police car for a moment and then returned, kneeling at the open door, approximately an arm's length from Ms. Stowell. He told them he would let them go if they would "embarrass" themselves in his presence, and advised them to continue what they had been doing before he interrupted, while he watched. At the Respondent's direction, Ms. Stowell and Mr. Hickock then resumed the oral sex in which they had been involved when interrupted, for approximately eight to ten minutes, switching positions after a few minutes, while Respondent watched the entire time from a few feet away. While this was going on, Ms. Stowell felt degraded by being required to commit the act in front of a stranger and participated in it against her will only to prevent Respondent from arresting her boyfriend and from notifying her mother. While the couple was engaged in oral sex, Respondent, according to Ms. Stowell, touched her thigh, put his hand in her crotch area, and penetrated her vagina with his finger, all without her consent. Respondent then advised the couple he wanted them to engage in intercourse and when they told him that they had never done that before, he advised them that their choice was either to do as he said or he, Respondent, would have intercourse with Ms. Stowell. As a result, the parties tried to engage in an act of intercourse while Respondent watched but were unsuccessful. Respondent again threatened to have intercourse with Ms. Stowell but, apparently, decided against it. Though she had not previously engaged in intercourse with Mr. Hickock, Ms. Stowell agreed to attempt the act with him because she was fearful of the threat by Respondent to engage in intercourse with her if she did not perform with Mr. Hickock. When it became obvious that Stowell and Hickock were not going to be successful, Respondent took down Stowell's and Hickock's names, phone numbers, and home addresses. He then warned them not to tell anyone what had happened and not to acknowledge that they had seen him. He advised them that if they told anyone of what had happened, he would arrest Mr. Hickock. Respondent then got back in his patrol car and left the area. Between 7:00 and 8:00 AM the following morning, Ms. Stowell received a phone call at home from Respondent. He told her something had gone wrong with her tag number and that she must meet him to talk about what could be done about it. He said he would be in his civilian clothes driving his personal car, and she agreed to meet him at a local shopping mall she suggested. She did not show up, however, because she was afraid of being raped by him. Instead of meeting with Respondent, Ms. Stowell told her parents about the beach incident the night before and, thereafter reported the matter to the Tampa Police Department. The case was assigned to Detective Jerry Herren, who, during the course of his investigation, took a sworn statement from Mr. Hickock about the incident. Approximately two months later, Mr. Hickock was killed in a traffic accident. A few days after taking this statement, and based on information discovered during the investigation, on August 8, 1985 Herren arrested Respondent for the offenses outlined in the complaint. Subsequent to the arrest, Herren advised Respondent of his rights against self incrimination and took a statement from him in which Respondent admitted to having contacted Stowell and Hickock at the causeway on July 31, 1985, and having contacted Ms. Stowell the next day to ask her to meet him when he was off duty. He denied, however, that he had in any way threatened her or that he had touched her. His denial, however, was somewhat weakened by the statement of Gail Perry, who complained that on July 19, 1985, she had been involved in an incident with Respondent similar to that alleged by Ms. Stowell. In the Perry case, there was no touching, but there was an offer by Respondent to "forget about" Ms. Perry's lascivious misconduct if she would perform an act of fellatio on him. In the Perry case, as in the Stowell case, Respondent secured his victim's home phone number and the following morning, called in an attempt to obtain a date. Respondent thereafter admitted to Herren that he contacted Ms. Perry both while she was with her boyfriend and again, by phone. Respondent declined to testify or present any evidence in his own behalf. He made an argument, or summation, which contained statements of apparent fact, but, since the information was not produced under oath as evidence, it cannot be considered as evidence in opposition to the matters presented by the Petitioner. Consequently, the testimony of Ms. Stowell and that of the police officers who investigated her complaint is uncontradicted and it is found that, as alleged, Respondent committed a sexual battery on Ms. Stowell and used his position as a police officer in an improper manner in an effort to get her and Mr. Hickock to engage in sexual activity in his presence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of February, 1989 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Daryl McLaughlin Executive Director P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Rodney Gaddy General Counsel P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Dept. of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Darrell B. Daniels P.O. Box 310683 Tampa, FL 33680
The Issue The issue in this case is whether policies of Respondent which are utilized in the course of investigations of Respondent’s law enforcement officers constitute rules subject to requirements of Chapter 120 Florida States; and, if so, whether such rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority contrary to requirements of Section 120.56 and Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts The parties have jointly stipulated to the following factual statements set forth in paragraphs numbered 1-10. Petitioner Schluter has been employed by Respondent’s Division of the Florida Highway Patrol, serving the past eight years as an airplane pilot. A career service employee with permanent status, Schluter grieved his September 1996 dismissal from Respondent’s employment under collective bargaining agreement procedures existing between the State of Florida and the Florida Police Benevolent Association. A final decision has not yet been reached. In August 1995, Schluter was informed by Respondent that a complaint had been filed against him and that an investigation of the complaint was being conducted by Respondent. To facilitate Respondent’s investigation, the following conditions were imposed upon Schluter at the time he was placed on administrative duty: Schluter was not informed of the nature of the complaint filed against him, nor provided a description of the charges, nor provided a copy of the complaint. However, at the time of his administrative interview, Schluter was provided the written statements of all witnesses, including the person making the initial complaint. Schluter was removed from his duties as an airplane pilot and assigned to remain in his home during his duty hours each day. Schluter was specifically assigned his home as his duty station, was required to be available to contact on his home telephone, and was forbidden to leave his home without permission from his superiors. The change in work site was communicated to Schluter by memorandum dated August 23, 1995, assigning him to administrative duties at the Bradenton Station, and September 5, 1995, reassigning him to administrative duties at his residence. Schluter was denied the right to work off-duty police employment during his non- duty hours during the pendency of the investigation. He was not denied the right to work off-duty in non-police employment. The conditions on Schluter remained in place during the duration of the investigation which continued for approximately one year. Respondent has a policy of removing law enforcement officers under investigation, in certain circumstances, from their normal duties, and assigning them indefinitely to remain in their own residences as a duty station. Officers subject to this directive are permitted to leave their residences during duty hours only with the permission of their agency superiors. This policy has not been adopted as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Application of this policy to Petitioner Schluter was based upon the circumstances of his case and policy guidelines of the Florida Highway Patrol. Respondent has a policy of ordering its law enforcement officers who are under investigation, in certain circumstances, to have no contact with any person who may be a witness in the investigation. This policy has not been adopted in substantial compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Respondent rationalizes this policy as an effort to comply with Section 112.533, Florida Statutes. Respondent has a policy of prohibiting law enforcement officers under investigation, in certain circumstances, from earning extra compensation by working in police off-duty employment. This policy has not been adopted as a rule in substantial compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Respondent’s rationale for the policy is that police off-duty employment is not possible after Respondent has removed an officer’s gun, badge, police vehicle, and other indicia of authority. Law enforcement officers employed by Respondent have the right by virtue of a contract between the Florida Police Benevolent Association and the Florida Department of Management Services, acting as agent for the Governor of Florida to work in police off-duty employment. Article 16 of the current collective bargaining agreement provides for employment outside state government, including police employment. Respondent has a policy of denying public records access to records and information gathered during the course of an investigation of a law enforcement officer which are not related to a written complaint against the officer. This policy has not been adopted in substantial compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Respondent’s rationale for this policy is that it is undertaken pursuant to Section 112.533, Florida Statutes, and FHP guidelines. To persons whom she interviewed, the primary investigator specifically identified Petitioner Schluter as the subject of the investigation. She identified him as the object of her investigations to employees of Respondent, to his private friends and associations, to other private persons, to his bank and to merchants in the community. Respondent contends Schluter was identified only where it was necessary to do so to effect the investigation and pursuant to investigative procedures and Section 112.533, Florida Statutes. Respondent has a policy of providing every witness from whom an investigator seeks information with the identity of the person under investigation. This policy has not been adopted in substantial compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Respondent’s rationale for the policy is that an officer under investigation may be revealed during the course of the investigation in order to conduct a witness interview and with confidentiality maintained in the context of the overall investigation. Other Facts The Florida Association of State Troopers, Inc., (FAST) is a non-profit Florida corporation, composed of Florida Highway Patrol active troopers, reserve and retired troopers, and auxiliary troopers. Approximately 1000 members of FAST are law enforcement officers currently employed by Respondent. The primary purposes of FAST are to provide representation of its members, to advance the interests of its members with the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) and to improve treatment of its members employed by the FHP. An additional purpose of FAST is to promote the enforcement of laws protecting law enforcement officers. FAST provides legal representation to its members in matters directly relating to their employment with the FHP and to members for matters occurring off-duty which are related to their employment. Both FAST and Petitioner Schluter have standing to bring this proceeding With regard to Respondent’s policy of assigning those officers who are under investigation to indefinitely remain in their own residences as a duty station, the criteria for imposition of that policy is set forth in the FHP Policy Manual and specifically FHP Policy 8.01-9. While the term “home duty” is not specifically mentioned in FHP Policy 8.01-9, the same criteria are utilized in making a home duty assignment. These include circumstances involving physical or psychological fitness for duty evaluations of an employee; investigations of criminal allegations; investigations of policy violations by an employee for which dismissal is a penalty; instances where it has been determined that an employee would interfere with an investigation; instances where on-duty status of the employee would result in damage to property or be detrimental to the best interest of the state; and instances where there is possibility of injury to the employee or others if permitted to remain in an on-duty locale. Testimony offered by Respondent at the final hearing that promulgation of FHP Policy 8.01-9 as a rule is impracticable, is not credited in view of the existence of the policy and its enumerated criteria, its general applicability to a class of persons, and its effect upon substantial and personal interests when an individual is required to use his personal home as a work station i.e., Petitioner Schulter had no choice, other than insubordination, except to comply with the home assignment, use his home as his work station ,and thereby incur increased home operating expenses. As stipulated by the parties, Respondent has an policy, not promulgated in accordance with requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, of ordering law enforcement officers under investigation to have no contact with any potential witnesses. Petitioner Schluter received two directives or orders requiring his compliance with this policy. Respondent’s enforcement of this policy deprived Petitioner Schluter of most of his social contacts and affected his substantial interest since his social contacts were generally FHP troopers and other Respondent employees. Schluter was virtually cut-off from most social contacts as a result. Every citizen has a strong personal interest in personal and private associations. Respondent presented no creditable or persuasive evidence that it would be impractical to develop a rule governing whether a “no contact” order should issue to an employee, or that Respondent’s ability to grant a waiver from such a published rule would not mitigate any practicality problems that could be otherwise encountered. Similarly, Respondent’s Patrol Policy 5.10, also not promulgated in compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, documents Respondent’s off-duty police employment policy for members assigned to administrative leave in the course of an on-going investigation. The policy prohibits off-duty police employment for FHP members assigned to administrative leave in conjunction with an on-going investigation. As established by testimony at the final hearing, this policy encompasses the same criteria as that used in determining whether to place an employee on administrative or home duty. Schluter was substantially affected by Respondent’s off-duty police employment policy in that he was relieved from all law enforcement and aircraft duties with Respondent, inclusive of all indicia of his law enforcement authority (badge, gun and motor vehicle) with a resulting loss of approximately $1,000 per month in additional, private income. Respondent maintains that the off-duty police employment policy for members assigned to administrative leave ought not be promulgated as a formal administrative rule because of the ever-changing environment regarding off-duty employment and need for constant change in such policies. Contrary to Respondent’s position, the impracticability of promulgation of this policy is not credited in view of testimony by Respondent’s witness at hearing that prohibition of off-duty police employment for employees on administrative leave is not likely to change in the future. In the course of an investigative interview on November 10, 1995, Petitioner Schluter was denied access to lists of persons interviewed or written statements of persons interviewed, contrary to provisions of Section 112.532(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Respondent’s admitted policy of denying public access to records and information gathered during the course of an investigation of a law enforcement officer affects individual rights to access of such information and denies access to accused officers of an information avenue which may be utilized in preparation of a defense to charges Respondent may level against an officer. Additionally, Respondent’s blanket prohibition of access ignores those exceptions to confidentiality of such information set forth in Section 112.533(2), Florida Statutes; exceptions which permit access to review of certain investigation records. The investigation of Petitioner Schluter was initiated without a written complaint and his substantial interests were affected by Respondent’s no access policy. The impracticability of a rule addressing access, as well as providing prior notice to individuals like Schluter and others who may be similarly situated, of written investigation records within the scope of statutory limitations has not been demonstrated by Respondent. It is Respondent’s admittedly unpromulgated policy to identify the individual person who is the subject of the investigation to every witness interviewed in the course of an investigation. There is no statement of this practice in the FHP manual. The practice affects the substantial interest of individuals such as Petitioner Schluter by identifying him to his social and work contacts as a person under investigation. While maintaining that rule-making on the topic of when to identify the subject of an investigation in an interview in the course of an investigation is impractical, testimony by Respondent’s witness at final hearing establishes that investigations of the type involving Petitioner Schluter generally require that the investigation subject’s identity be disclosed to the interviewee. Consequently, testimony that promulgation of this policy is impractical is not credited. Respondent has an unwritten policy of refusing to allow the legal representative of a law enforcement officer to speak on the record during the course of an administrative or investigative interview with an officer, or to permit a consultation between an employee and counsel prior to the employee’s answer to a question. Any information or argument counsel for an employee desires to place on the record must be presented through the employee. Such a policy affects the substantial interest of officers who are the subject of investigation by impinging upon their right to counsel, statutorily codified in Section 112.532, Florida Statues, and impedes the effectiveness of counsel. The policy is applied in all such interviews. Impracticability of a rule addressing the role of counsel representing an employee in an administrative interview has not been creditably addressed by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent held Class "D" Security Officer License Number D00-26960 and Class "DI" Security Officer Instructor License Number DI89-00304. Both licenses were duly issued by Petitioner pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Respondent has held his Class "D" license since 1976 and has held his Class "DI" license since 1989. Respondent has no previous record of a felony or misdemeanor offense and was, at the time of the formal hearing, working at an adult community condominium complex as a security guard. Officer Charles Wharton is a detective with the Fort Pierce Police Department who was, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, assigned to the juvenile division. T.G. is a female who was eleven years of age as of July 1993. F.S. 1/ is a female who was fourteen years of age as of July 1993. Both F.S. and T.G. were described by Officer Wharton as appearing their stated ages. Both of these girls were from what Officer Wharton referred to as "Fort Pierce's ghetto" and both were described by Officer Wharton as being "street wise". On or about July 1, 1993, Respondent paid T.G. and F.S. to have sexual relations with him at his house in Fort Pierce. The sex with F.S. included the penetration of her vagina with his penis. The sex with T.G. included her having oral contact with his penis. Officer Wharton questioned Respondent and read to him his Miranda rights. Respondent waived his Miranda rights and admitted to Officer Wharton that he had paid these two girls to have sex with him as described above. Officer Wharton referred this matter to the State Attorney's Office, which subsequently dismissed all charges against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained herein, imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000, suspends Respondent's licensure for a period of three months, and thereafter places Respondent's licensure on probation for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1994.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent, while a member of the Quincy City Commission, violated Subsection 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by corruptly using, or attempting to use his official position as a Quincy City Commissioner in private meetings with Quincy City officials for the purpose of improperly influencing decisions at the Quincy Police Department to secure a special benefit for himself or others; and if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Glendell Russ (Respondent), was elected to the City Commission for the City of Quincy in Gadsden County, Florida, in 1997 and served in that capacity from April 1997 until February 22, 1999. By virtue of his position as a City Commissioner for the City of Quincy, Respondent was subject to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees (Code of Ethics). While serving as a City Commissioner for the City of Quincy, Respondent was subject to the provisions of the Quincy City Charter. In 1995, there was a car accident in Gadsden County, Florida, that resulted in the death of two people, one of whom was Respondent's cousin. Officer Jim Corder, a police officer with the Quincy Police Department, was involved in the accident. Respondent had several concerns related to the aftermath of the 1995 fatal car accident. First, Respondent believed that Corder was intoxicated at the time of the accident but was escorted from the accident scene by Officer Glenn Beach, another officer with the Quincy Police Department, prior to a blood alcohol test being administered. Second, Respondent was disturbed because he thought that Officer Robert Barkley of the Quincy Police Department, who arrived at the accident scene after the on-the-scene investigation was completed, seemed nonchalant about the accident, despite the fact that there were two fatalities. Finally, Respondent was convinced that the Quincy Police Department wanted to cover up the facts surrounding the accident. Respondent was dissatisfied with the manner in which the police department handled the investigation of the 1995 fatal car accident. As a result thereof, he was a continuously outspoken critic of the Quincy Police Department, including Robert Barkley. Respondent's decision to run for City Commissioner was motivated, in part, by his concern with the way the Quincy Police Department had handled the investigation of the 1995 fatal car accident involving the death of his cousin. During Respondent's tenure on the Quincy City Commission, he was persistent in his efforts to have an independent investigation of the 1995 car accident. Eventually, after Respondent was elected as a City Commissioner, the Quincy City Commission authorized that an independent investigation be conducted. However, the investigation was never completed because police officers failed to cooperate with the investigators. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Robert Barkley was employed as a police officer with the Quincy Police Department. While so employed, Barkley also was grant coordinator and had oversight responsibility for a truancy program operated by the Quincy Police Department. Anthony Powell worked as a coordinator of the truancy program for approximately three years and, during that entire time, was supervised by Barkley. During an approximate three-month period of time in early 1998, Barkley, as Powell's supervisor, disciplined Powell at least three times. These disciplinary actions resulted in Barkley's suspending Powell and issuing several written reprimands to him. According to Barkley, he took the disciplinary action because of Powell's failure to follow proper procedures. Two of the three disciplinary actions taken by Barkley against Powell involved Respondent and occurred while Respondent was a City Commissioner. In 1998, but prior to May 19, 1998, Barkley disciplined Powell for allowing Respondent on the premises of the truancy center and using profane language in the presence of students. Barkley was concerned that Respondent's conduct was disruptive to the students and also believed that Respondent should not have been on the premises because of certain things in his background. Prior to Barkley's disciplining Powell for allowing Respondent on the premises of the truancy center, Barkley had written a note to Powell directing him to not allow Respondent in the truancy center. Respondent learned of Barkley's directive and, thereafter, went to the center and confronted Barkley and accused him of taking that action because he disliked Respondent. Again, in early 1998, Barkley disciplined Powell for transporting a student from the truancy center to a house owned by a friend of Respondent and having the youth retrieve a dead cat from under the house. Respondent was with Powell when this incident occurred. After Barkley learned about this incident, he suspended Powell for several days and issued a written reprimand, which was placed in Powell's personnel file. Powell never denied that the "cat incident" occurred but believed that Barkley's written report or reprimand describing the incident was not completely accurate and contained lies. Powell expressed his disagreement with Barkley and the then-police chief about the report. However, there is no indication that the report or written reprimand was changed to address Powell's concerns. On May 19, 1998, the then-Quincy City Manager Ken Cowens appointed Robert Barkley as interim police chief of the Quincy Police Department. Barkley served as interim police chief from May 19, 1998, until about May 29, 1998, when City Manager Cowens named Barkley as permanent police chief of the Quincy Police Department. Pursuant to the Quincy City Charter, the City Commission appoints the City Manager and the City Manager has sole authority to hire and fire department heads. Among the department heads that the City Manager is authorized to hire and to terminate is the Quincy Police Department's chief of police. At or near the time Barkley was appointed interim police chief, the Commission had been presented with and/or had approved a resolution to remove Ken Cowens as city manager. At or near this time, it was also widely rumored that Anthony Powell would be the next City Manager of Quincy. Respondent and Powell were good friends and Respondent supported Powell's appointment as City Manager. Barkley had heard the rumor that Powell would be the next Quincy City Manager and believed that if Respondent could have his way, Powell would, indeed, become the next City Manager. On or about May 19 or 20, 1998, after Barkley was named interim police chief, he called Respondent and requested that Respondent meet with him. On May 20, 1998, after Respondent called the City Manager and got permission to speak with Barkley, he went to the police department to meet with Barkley. The meeting was also attended by Powell, who like Respondent, had been contacted by and asked to meet with Barkley. Later, Auburn Ford, joined the meeting. Auburn Ford is the son of Quincy City Commissioner Carolyn Ford and had been Respondent's campaign manager for Respondent's successful bid to become a Quincy City Commissioner in 1997. Barkley called the May 1998 meeting, attended by Respondent, Powell, and Ford, in an effort to "bury the hatchet." This "bury the hatchet" meeting called by Barkley was an effort to gain support for him to become permanent police chief. When Barkley called the May 20, 1998, meeting, he was aware that Powell was widely rumored to become the next Quincy City Manager; that Powell and Respondent were friends; and that Respondent had spoken openly about Powell's becoming the next City Manager. Moreover, Barkley knew that the City Manager had the authority to hire and fire the Quincy police chief. In light of the three disciplinary actions Barkley had taken against Powell in 1998, it would have been reasonable to assume that Powell's appointment as City Manager would likely jeopardize Barkley's chances of being named permanent police chief. There was friction between Respondent and Barkley that may have resulted from various factors or circumstances. For some time, Respondent had openly criticized the Quincy Police Department, including Barkley, for what Respondent perceived as a cover-up of the events surrounding the investigation of the 1995 fatal car accident. Also, in early 1998, Respondent had confronted Barkley after Barkley directed Powell not to allow Respondent on the truancy center premises. Finally, Respondent believed that, in the past, Barkley had lied and made false accusations against him. During the May 1998 "bury the hatchet" meeting, Barkley urged Respondent to let "bygones be bygones." However, Respondent rejected that suggestion and stated that as far as he was concerned, it was "war" between the two of them. Also, during the May 20, 1998, meeting, Barkley volunteered to remove disciplinary information from Powell's personnel file. Powell did not respond to Barkley's offer because he believed that such action was legally impermissible. Respondent never requested, directed, or suggested that Barkley fire or take any other disciplinary action against Officer Corder or any other police officer. The May 1998 meeting ended with no agreement among Respondent, Powell, and Barkley to put their past disputes behind them. Powell was appointed interim City Manager of Quincy in June 1998. Shortly thereafter, the City Commission appointed Powell as City Manager for a one-year term. The City Manager is empowered to appoint the chief of police for the City of Quincy, who is subject to the direction and supervision of the Quincy City Manager. About a week after Powell's appointment as City Manager, he removed Barkley as chief of police. Powell's decision to remove Barkley was within the authority granted to him by the Quincy City Charter. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Section 2.04(b) of the Quincy City Charter prohibited the City Commission or Commissioners from dictating the appointment or removal of city administrative officers or employees whom the City Manager or any of his subordinates is empowered to appoint. That section also provides that the City Commission may express their views and discuss with the City Manager anything pertaining to the appointment and removal of its officers and employees in City Commission meetings. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Section 2.04(c) of the Quincy City Charter required that the Commission or its members deal with city officers and employees who are subject to the direction and supervision of the City Manager solely through the City Manager. That section also prohibits the City Commission or its members from giving orders to such officers or employees either publicly or privately. During Powell's tenure as City Manager, he had an "unwritten policy" that allowed City Commissioners to meet with and talk to city department heads in the presence of the City Manager. This procedure was based on Powell's interpretation of the Quincy City Charter. Auburn Ford, a long-time friend of Powell and Respondent, had aspirations of serving with the Quincy Police Department as chief of police. Prior to Powell's being appointed City Manager, both Powell and Respondent were aware of Ford's desire to become the police chief. Although Respondent personally supported Ford in his desire to become police chief, he never attempted to influence City Manager Powell to appoint Ford to that position. Notwithstanding his "100 percent" support of Ford, Respondent realized that the City Manager had the sole authority and discretion to make that decision. Accordingly, Respondent neither directed nor attempted to influence the City Manager to hire Ford as police chief. Despite City Manager Powell's friendship with Ford, in June 1998, after Powell removed Barkley as chief of police, he appointed Rodney Moore, not Ford, as the chief of police for the Quincy Police Department. On June 24, 1998, soon after Moore was appointed police chief, he promoted Glenn Beach of the Quincy Police Department from the rank of captain to major. Later that day, someone from the police department called and advised Respondent of Beach's promotion. Respondent then immediately called Powell to inquire about the promotion and was told that Powell knew nothing about Beach being promoted. Later, on June 24, 1998, at about 5:30 p.m., Chief Moore and City Manager Powell met in the Powell's office to discuss Beach's promotion. Powell explained that he had no problem with the promotion of Beach. However, he told Moore that the promotion had to be rescinded because proper procedures had not been followed. The position to which Beach was being promoted was a new position that was not currently included in the City of Quincy's organizational structure. Powell's interpretation of applicable policy was that before a person could be hired to a new position within the City of Quincy, the position would have to be approved and included in the City's budget. In this instance, the position had not been approved by the City Commission or included in its budget. Based on his interpretation of the City's applicable policy, Powell directed Moore to rescind Beach's appointment until the Commission approved the position and included it in the budget. Powell's decision to direct Chief Moore to rescind Beach's promotion and, thereby, reject the promotion was within his authority. Chief Moore agreed with City Manager Powell and rescinded Beach's promotion. A memorandum rescinding the promotion was prepared by Chief Moore the next day. Beach was promoted two years later, after the City Commission approved the position and included it in the City's budget. On June 24, 1998, Respondent came to City Manager Powell's office while City Manager Powell and Chief Moore were meeting, but after Powell and Moore had already discussed and resolved the matter related to Beach's promotion. Nonetheless, Respondent was angry that consideration was being given to promoting Captain Beach. Respondent told City Manager Powell that the promotion of Captain Beach seemed inappropriate in light of the City Commission's recent decision to have an independent investigation conducted of the 1995 car accident. Respondent believed that Captain Beach was part of the focus of the independent investigation because allegedly he had escorted Officer Corder, the police officer involved in the 1995 accident, from the accident scene before a blood alcohol test could be performed. Respondent argued that Beach should not be considered for a promotion until the independent investigation was completed. With the Commission's recent appointment of Powell as City Manager, Respondent had expected positive changes in the City of Quincy. However, Respondent did not view the proposed promotion of Beach as a step in that direction. Respondent told City Manager Powell that if things were going to continue as they had in the past, the former city manager and the former police chief should be brought back. Respondent also told Powell that "things might not work out" for Powell, thereby implying that Powell's contract might not be approved when it came up to the City Commissioner for a final vote. Powell, who had been friends with Respondent for about 15 years, knew that Respondent was very angry at the time he made the comments and did not perceive Respondent's comments as a threat to his job. Even though Chief Moore was in the City Manager's office when Respondent made the comments described in paragraphs 46 and 47, the comments were directed to City Manager Powell, and not to Chief Moore. Russ never directed or attempted to influence City Manager Powell or Chief Moore to rescind the promotion of Beach. At or near the time Moore was appointed chief of police, Ford applied for a position with the Quincy Police Department as a reserve officer. A reserve officer must be a certified law enforcement agent, and service as a reserve officer with a law enforcement agent counts toward maintaining law enforcement standards. Reserve officers with the Quincy Police Department work on an as-needed basis, typically eight hours a month. They work either on a voluntary basis or at an hourly rate of about $11.00 an hour. The reserve officer position applied for by Auburn Ford was for eight hours per month and was essentially for Ford to maintain his credentials and not for pay. Chief Moore had some reservations about hiring Ford because Ford's mother, Carolyn Ford, was a member of the City Commission and because of concerns related to Ford's employment history. City Manager Powell met with Chief Moore regarding Ford's possible employment with the police department. After reviewing the matter, Powell advised Chief Moore that if Ford met all the prescribed state standards, there was no reason why he could not be hired. Respondent was an advocate for Auburn Ford's getting a job with the Quincy Police Department and was persistent in making inquiries about Ford's application for a reserve officer position. Ford never asked Respondent to call City Manager Powell or Chief Moore about hiring him as a reserve officer. However, Respondent recalled that Ford told him that he had called the police department almost daily to inquire about his application and had been told by Moore or someone in that office that the application had not been processed. Apparently, some time after Ford submitted his application, Respondent contacted City Manager Powell and Chief Moore regarding the status of Ford's application. During the summer of 1998, after Ford submitted his application to the Quincy Police Department, Respondent "mentioned" the application of Ford to Powell a couple of times a day for about a month. Powell considered and interpreted Respondent's numerous inquiries about Ford's pending application to be a concern about the application review process and not demands that Ford be hired by the Quincy Police Department. Several weeks after Ford's application had been submitted to the Quincy Police Department, Respondent also made inquiries or comments to Chief Moore about Ford's application. Except in one instance, these inquiries or comments were made outside the presence of the City Manager. Respondent made two such inquiries of Moore when both men were at the local recreation center. In another instance, immediately after a City Commission meeting, Respondent asked Chief Moore about the delay in processing Ford's application. Finally, on July 20, 1998, during two separate telephone conversations, Respondent asked and/or made comments to Chief Moore about Ford's application. During the summer of 1998, Respondent went to the recreation center on a regular basis. Sometimes when Respondent was at the center and saw Chief Moore and Marcus Dixon, a friend of Moore's, in the weight room, he would stop and talk to them. Once Respondent asked Chief Moore about the status of Ford's application. In a second conversation, Respondent asked why the application review process was taking so long. Respondent further commented that he believed someone had "dropped the ball" on the processing of Ford's application and that if he found out that had happened, "heads were going to roll." In the conversations between Respondent and Chief Moore at the recreation center, Respondent's inquiries and comments focused on the processing of Ford's application. The credible testimony of Dixon, who heard both conversations, was that Respondent's questions and comments about Ford's application focused on the length of time it was taking the police department to process the application and Respondent's belief that it was unfair to "stall" or purposely delay the processing of Ford's application. During the conversations Respondent had with Chief Moore at the recreation center, Respondent never directed or tried to influence Chief Moore to hire Ford. Neither did Respondent threaten to have Chief Moore fired if Ford were not hired or promise anything to Chief Moore if Ford were hired. In the summer of 1998, after a City Commission meeting, Respondent approached Chief Moore and asked why Ford's application had not been processed. At that time, Chief Moore was going to the scene of a disturbance and did not have time to discuss the matter with Respondent. As a result, this encounter lasted about "a split second." During this very brief conversation between Respondent and Chief Moore after the Commission meeting, Respondent never directed Chief Moore to hire Ford nor did he threaten to fire Chief Moore if he did not hire Ford. On July 20, 1998, at about 1:40 p.m., about one month after Ford applied for the position of reserve officer, Respondent made two telephone calls to Chief Moore. In the first telephone conversation, Respondent asked Chief Moore what the "hold up" was on Ford's application. Respondent also told Moore that "he had problems" because Ford's application had not been processed in a timely manner. Finally, Respondent told Chief Moore that the application should be processed as any other application and urged Moore to "just get it done." During this conversation, Respondent also told Chief Moore that he was very upset because he had just been fired from his job for no apparent reason. Respondent's comments regarding Ford's application and described in paragraph 65 were made in the context and tone of a "casual conversation." The telephone conversation was short, and most of Respondent's comments focused on his being upset about getting fired from his job earlier that day. Chief Moore did not interpret Respondent's inquiries or comments concerning Ford's application as a demand that he hire Ford. Moreover, Chief Moore did not perceive that Respondent was threatening his job if he did not hire Ford. Respondent telephoned Chief Moore a second time on July 20, 1998, at about 4:40 p.m., from Commissioner Carolyn Ford's office, where he had been working as a volunteer to set up a computer lab. Respondent began asking Chief Moore about the police department's application process and Ford's application. As Chief Moore began explaining the process and the need for a background check, Respondent told Chief Moore to hold on and talk to Commissioner Ford about her son's application. By the first week in August 1998, Respondent believed that Ford's application had been pending for about two months with no action by the Quincy Police Department. At Respondent's request, a meeting was held that week with City Manager Powell, Chief Moore, and Respondent. The meeting was held in the City Manager's Office and comported with Powell's "unwritten policy" that commissioners could meet with department heads if the City Manager were present. In the August 1998 meeting, Respondent made several complaints to City Manager Powell about the police department. Respondent expressed concern that black police officers within the department were not being promoted. He also questioned why Ford's application was not being processed in a more timely manner. Finally, Respondent complained about how long it took the police department to give him an incident report. The incident to which Respondent was referring involved someone "bleaching" the convertible top of his car on July 16, 1998, while it was parked in front of the Quincy City Hall. Respondent indicated that despite his making numerous requests for the incident report, the police department did not give him the report until August 3, 1998, more than two weeks after the incident occurred. At the August 1998 meeting described in paragraphs 68 and 69, Chief Moore, who had been police chief for not more than two months, felt intimidated by the manner and tone that Respondent communicated his concerns about the police department. Even though Respondent made the comments in the presence of both Chief Moore and City Manager Powell, Moore believed that Respondent's comments were directed to him since he was responsible for all the hiring, firing, and promotion decisions of the police department. Ford was Respondent's long-time friend and campaign manager as well as a constituent of Respondent, as he lived in the district that Respondent represented on the City Commission. Respondent acknowledged that he advocated for Ford as he would have for any of his constituents. In this case, Respondent was concerned about the time it took the police department to process the application and inform the applicant of its decision, irrespective of whether that decision was to hire or not hire the person. Respondent's inquiries and advocacy regarding Ford's application related to the application process. Although not necessarily true, Respondent believed that Ford's application was being unfairly delayed and thought that the application could and should be processed in a more timely manner. In this case, Respondent simply believed that the application review process took too long and that it was unfair not to let Ford know whether he was going to be hired. Respondent did not direct or attempt to influence Chief Moore or City Manager Powell to hire Auburn Ford. Moreover, Respondent never threatened the job of Chief Moore or City Manager Powell by conditioning their continued employment on hiring Auburn Ford. Mere inquiry by a City Commissioner to a city department head regarding the status of someone's application for a job within that department, or even a recommendation by a City Commissioner for the hiring of an applicant is not, per se, improper. In fact, it was not unusual for City Commissioners to be listed as references on individuals' employment applications for positions with the City of Quincy. Ford was eventually hired based upon Chief Moore's recommendation to City Manager Powell.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order and public report be entered finding that Respondent, Glendell Russ, did not violate Subsection 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Sheri L. Gerety, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James H. Peterson, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry K. White, Esquire Larry K. White, P.A. 1100 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
