The Issue The issue in this case is whether an amendment to the City of Hallandale's comprehensive plan adopted in Ordinance No. 1999-12 is "in compliance" as defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Mickey Biss, is an individual who resides in Miami, Dade County, Florida. Respondent, City of Hallandale (hereinafter referred to as the "City"), is a municipal corporation located within Broward County, Florida. The City is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. Respondents, Ocean Marine Yacht Club, Inc. and Security Management Corporation (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Ocean Marine"), are corporations organized under the laws of Florida and Maryland, respectively. Intervenor, the Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with responsibility for, among other things, the review of local government comprehensive plans and amendments thereto pursuant to Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Standing. Mr. Biss owns a condominium, unit No. 2109, located at 2030 South Ocean Drive, Hallandale, Broward County, Florida. Mr. Biss' parents reside in the condominium unit. Mr. Biss made oral and written comments to the City during the adoption of the amendment at issue in this case. Ocean Marine and Security Management own parcels of property located at 1935 and 1945 South Ocean Drive, Hallandale, Broward County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"). The Subject Property is the subject of the plan amendment at issue in this proceeding. All of the parties proved that they are "affected persons" as those terms are defined in Section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes. All of the Parties have standing to participate in this proceeding. The City and Its Comprehensive Plan. General The City is located in Broward County, Florida. Broward County is a charter county with county-wide powers over land use planning. The City has adopted the City of Hallandale Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "City's Plan"). The City's Plan has been determined to be "in compliance" as those terms are defined in the Act. The City's Plan includes a Future Land Use Element (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUE") and Future Land Use Maps (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUM"), a Coastal Management Element, a Capital Improvements Element, and other elements required by the Act. Among the land use categories allowed pursuant to the FLUE are residential "High Density" and residential "High Density-2." Residential property designated High Density is subject to a "maximum density of twenty-five (25) dwelling units per net acre." The residential High Density-2 land use category was created by an amendment to the City's Plan adopted by the City on February 5, 1998, through Ordinance No. 1998-3. Residential property designated High Density-2 is subject to a maximum density of 50 dwelling units per net acre. This new land use category was also added to the FLUM. The amendment to the City's Plan to add High Density-2 as a land use category was found to be "in compliance" by the Department. It was also found to be consistent with the Broward County Comprehensive Plan. The High Density-2 land use category is subject to the following limitation: Dwelling units and accessory structures subject to a maximum density of fifty (50) dwelling units per net acre, provided however that any density over 25 dwelling units per net ace may only be permitted by the City Commission on site specific properties by assignment of Flexibility Units in accordance with the Flexibility Rules of the Administrative Rules Document, Broward County Land Use Plan. The High Density-2 land use category of the City's Plan is consistent with the Broward County Comprehensive Plan, which contains a "High (50) Residential" land use category allowing up to 50 dwelling units per acre. The City's Urban Infill Area and Transportation Concurrency Exception Areas The FLUE of the City's Plan establishes an Urban Infill Area in the City. The Urban Infill Area is delineated on the FLUM. The following Objective and Policies concerning the Urban Infill Area are included in the City's Plan: OBJECTIVE 1.17: Establish criteria which encourage development of urban infill and urban redevelopment area(s) to promote economic development, increase housing opportunities, and maximize the use of existing public facilities and services. POLICY 1.17.1: Increase economic development and employment opportunities within urban infill and urban redevelopment area(s). POLICY 1.17.2: Adequate housing opportunities necessary to accommodate all segments of present and future residents shall be provided within urban infill and urban redevelopment area(s). The City's Plan also designates Urban Infill Areas as Transportation Concurrency Exception Areas. FLUE Policy 1.17.4 of the City's Plan provides the following: Designated urban infill and urban redevelopment area(s) shall be excepted from transportation facilities concurrency requirements consistent with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes; however, application will be subject to providing a traffic analysis consistent with the Traffic Circulation Element and potential improvements to minimize impacts. Coastal High Hazard Area The City's Plan includes a Coastal Management Element addressing, among other things, hurricane evacuation from the City's coastal high-hazard area and participation in the development of evacuation plans by Broward County. The FLUE of the City's Plan also includes Policies providing for protection of the City's coastal high-hazard area. The City's Plan, prior to the adoption of the Challenged Amendment, allowed the designation of property located anywhere in the City, including the coastal high-hazard area, as High Density-2. This fact must be considered in interpreting the provisions of the Coastal Management Element and the FLUE of the City's Plan dealing with development within the coastal high hazard area. Flexibility Units. The Broward County Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "County's Plan") includes an Administrative Rules Document. The Administrative Rules Document was adopted to assist local governments, among others, in interpreting the County's Plan. The FLUE of the City's Plan adopts by reference the Administrative Rules Document as they relate to flexibility units. The Future Land Use Maps of the County's Plan divide Broward County into 125 geographic areas designated as "flexibility zones." The number of flexibility units available within each zone is determined by subtracting the number of dwelling units permitted within a flexibility zone by a local government's plan from the number of dwelling units permitted within the same flexibility zone by the County's Plan. Local governments are allowed to, within certain specified limits, rearrange land uses, including residential densities, within flexibility zones located within the local government's jurisdiction. The City is divided into two flexibility zones: Flex Zones Nos. 93 and 94. The FLUE of the City's Plan contains a table on pages 2-28 and 2-32 which sets out the number of flexibility units available in Flex Zone Nos. 93 and 94. The City's Plan allows the use of flexibility units anywhere within either Flex Zone of the City, including areas within the coastal high hazard area. A "Summary" included with the table provides, in pertinent part, that flexibility units may be "assigned to any particular site within the Flexibility Zone to allow for increased residential densities above the amount permitted under the Hallandale Land Use Plan map. . . ." The flexibility units are available for transfer without the need to amend the City's Plan. At the time that the Challenged Amendment was adopted, there were a total of 2,429 flexibility units available within Flex Zone No. 93. The Subject Property. The Subject Property consists of approximately 5.75 acres of land. The parcel of the Subject Property located at 1935 Ocean Drive is vacant. The parcel of the Subject Property located at 1945 Ocean Drive is developed. The developed parcel has an 80-unit motel on it. The motel located on the Subject Property was constructed in 1956. The buildings on the Subject Property are in substantial decay. The Subject Property is surrounded on three sides by property used for high density multi-family residences. The property to the north, Chelsea Hall, has been developed at a density of 54 units per acre. The properties to the east, Malage Towers, Biltmore Mansions, Taromina Apartments, and Hemispheres Ocean, have been developed at densities of 75, 19, 45, and 117 units per acre, respectively. The property to the south, Hemispheres, has been developed at a density of 85 units per acre. Densities in the area surrounding the Subject Property averaged approximately 86 units per acre. The Subject Property lies totally within the City's Urban Infill Area. The Subject Property is, therefore, also considered to be located totally within a Transportation Concurrency Exception Area. The Subject Property also lies within the coastal high-hazard area. The Subject Property is located within the City's Flex Zone No. 93. The Subject Amendment. On June 1, 1999, the City passed Ordinance No. 1999-12, amending the City's Plan by changing the FLUM land use designation for the Subject Property (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Amendment"). The Challenged Amendment changed the land use designation of the Subject property from residential High Density to residential High Density-2. The Challenged Amendment was adopted pursuant to the procedures allowed for "small scale" development amendments set forth in Section 163.3187 of the Act. Pursuant to this provision, the City decided that it would elect to have the Department review the Challenged Amendment. The change in land use designation on the Subject Property increased the allowable development of the Subject Property from a maximum of 25 units per acre to a maximum of 50 units per acre through the use of "flexibility units." The Challenged Amendment assigns 143 flexibility units out of the 2,429 available within Flex Zone No. 93 to the Subject Property and specifically provides " . . . the applicant agrees the assignment of 143 Flexibility Units to the parcel is a maximum and agrees the use of density above 25 units per acre will be determined by the City Commission upon review of a future major development plan." Mr. Biss' Challenge. Mr. Biss filed a Petition for Hearing to Challenge Compliance of a Small Scale Development Amendment with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Mr. Biss alleged generally that the Challenged Amendment is not "in compliance" for the following reasons: The Challenged Amendment is not a small scale amendment pursuant to Section 163.3187(1)(c) of the Act because the density of the Subject Property is more than ten units per acre and the Subject Property is not vacant; The Challenged Amendment is contrary to the State Comprehensive Plan. Chapter 187, Florida Statutes (1997). In particular, Mr. Biss alleged that the Challenged Amendment is contrary to Section 187.201(7)(b)22., Florida Statutes (1997), which requires the following: 22. Require local governments, in cooperation with regional and state agencies, to prepare advance plans for the safe evacuation of coastal residents. The Challenged Amendment, by increasing densities in the coastal high-hazard area, increases the dangers from hurricanes contrary to Coastal Element Goals 2 and 3, and Objective 2.2 of the City's Plan, and FLUE Policies 1.9.5 and 2.7.2 of the City's Plan; The Challenged Amendment degrades the level of service standard of Hallandale Beach Boulevard contrary to FLUE Element Policy 1.12.4 and Section 9.3.2.1 of the Transportation Element of the City's Plan; There is insufficient data and analysis to demonstrate that the possible additional 143 residential units in the coastal high-hazard zone will not negatively impact the City's ability to evacuate the coastal high-hazard area; and The Challenged Amendment fails to consider the impacts on public schools contrary to the County's Plan. Qualification as a Small Scale Amendment. The Subject Property is located within the Urban Infill Area and a Transportation Concurrency Exception Area. Therefore, the Challenged Amendment may involve a residential use with a density of more than ten units per acre and still qualify as a small scale amendment. Mr. Biss failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment is not a small scale amendment pursuant to Section 163.3187(1)(c) of the Act. I. The State Comprehensive Plan. The City has prepared plans for evacuation of coastal residents as required by Section 187.201(7)(b)22., Florida Statutes (1997). Mr. Biss failed to prove that the requirements of Section 187.201(7)(b)22., Florida Statutes (1997), concerning the preparation of evacuation plans, apply to the Challenged Amendment. Density Increase in the High-Hazard Area; Coastal Management Element Goals 2 and 3, and Objective 2.2 of the City's Plan, and FLUE Policies 1.9.5 and 2.7.2 of the City's Plan. The Coastal Element of the City's Plan includes Goals 2 and 3, and Objective 2.2 pertaining to the City's high hazard area: GOAL 2: The City of Hallandale Shall Protect Human Health and Safety in the Coastal Area. . . . . OBJECTIVE 2.2: The City shall direct populations away from High-Hazard Areas in concert with the established hazard mitigation strategies developed by Broward County . . . . GOAL 3: The City Shall Discourage or Limit Development in Areas Subject to Destruction by Natural Disasters. The evidence failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment is inconsistent with these Goals or the Objective of the Coastal Management Element of the City's Plan. These Goals and the Objective were intended to provide broad planning guidelines and were not intended to apply specifically to a small scale amendment such as the Challenged Amendment. The Goals and the Objective of the Coastal Management Element relied upon by Mr. Biss must be evaluated with other provisions of the City's Plan. In particular, those provisions which allow the transfer of residential dwelling unit densities through flexibility units anywhere within the City, including the coastal high-hazard area. Because of these existing provisions the Challenged Amendment does not increase densities within the coastal high-hazard area or increase the danger from hurricanes anymore than already allowed by the City's Plan. Although not required by Coastal Management Element Goals 2 or 3, or Objective 2.2 of the City's Plan, even a consideration of the impact of the Challenged Amendment on actual hurricane evacuation times does not support Ms. Biss' challenge. The City's projected hurricane evacuation time for roads which would be impacted by increased density on the Subject Property are less than seven hours. The addition of up to 143 dwelling units will not significantly impact that evacuation time. Ongoing road improvements will even mitigate any such impacts. Mr. Biss failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment is inconsistent with the Coastal Management Element of the City's Plan. FLUE Policy 1.9.5 of the City's Plan provides: POLICY 1.9.5: The City shall direct populations away from High-Hazard Areas, to the extent legally feasible, through the establishment of redevelopment regulations for High-Hazard Areas by 1998. The City has complied with this Policy by adopting redevelopment regulations. Mr. Biss failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment is inconsistent with this Policy. FLUE Policy 1.9.3 of the City's Plan provides the following: POLICY 1.9.3: Encourage development and redevelopment in the coastal high hazard area to include hazard mitigation measures for beach and beachfront property protection to minimize loss of life and property against beach erosion. This Policy has no relevance to the Challenged Amendment. Mr. Biss failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment is inconsistent with the Policy. The City's Plan does not include a Policy 2.7.2. The FLUE of the City's Plan includes a "Section 2.7.2" which describes the following "Natural Conditions Affecting Development" as part of the description of the dangers from flooding in the City: The danger from hurricanes can be somewhat controlled by limiting future allowable densities in high hazard areas. This subject is more fully addressed in the Coastal Management and Conservation Elements of the Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Biss failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment is inconsistent with Section 2.7.2 of the City's Plan. Impacts on Traffic. FLUE Element 1.12.4 of the City's Plan establishes a level of service standard "D" for City roads. Section 9.3.2.1 of the Transportation Element of the City's Plan recognizes existing traffic circulation problems within the City, including roads impacted by the Challenged Amendment. This Section is not, however, a goal, objective, or policy of the City's Plan. Mr. Biss has argued that the Challenged Amendment degrades the level of service standard for the City on roads which may be impacted by the Challenged Amendment and further exacerbates the traffic circulation problems recognized by Section 9.3.2.1 of the Transportation Element of the City's Plan. The evidence failed to support this argument. While the addition of 143 dwelling units will naturally increase traffic in the area surrounding the Subject Property, Mr. Biss failed to prove the extent of that impact. More importantly, Mr. Biss failed to prove that the impact will be so great as to be considered inconsistent with the City's Plan. Data and Analysis. Mr. Biss has argued that the City did not have sufficient data and analysis to demonstrate that an additional 143 residential units will not negatively impact the City's ability to evacuate the coastal high hazard area. Mr. Biss failed to prove this allegation. Hurricane evacuation times for roads which may be impacted by the Challenged Amendment are well below acceptable hurricane evacuation time standards. An additional 143 dwelling units will not significantly impact those evacuation times. Data relied upon by the City indicated that, after ongoing road improvements, hurricane evacuation times, even with the Challenged Amendment, will decrease. Mr. Biss failed to prove that the City did not have adequate data and analysis to support the Challenged Amendment. Impacts on Public Schools. Mr. Biss failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment did not consider the impacts on public schools contrary to the County's Plan. The Challenged Amendment is not required to be consistent with County's Plan until it is reviewed for "recertification" by the Broward County Planning Council. At the time of recertification, the Challenged Amendment will likely be considered exempt from school concurrency pursuant to Policy 13.01.10 of the County's Plan. Mr. Biss failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment is inconsistent with any provision of the City's Plan dealing with public schools. Mr. Biss also failed to prove that the impact on public schools by the Challenged Amendment will be more than the addition of nine students. Finally, the evidence failed to prove that the Challenged Amendment is inconsistent with Coastal Management Element Policy 3.1.1 of the City's Plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order finding the Challenged Amendment to be a small scale amendment and that it is "in compliance" as defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ORDERED this 19th day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Kent Harrison Robbins, Esquire 1224 Washington Avenue Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Clifford R. Steele, Esquire John C. Hanson, II, Esquire Steele & Hanson, P.A. Museum Tower, Penthouse 150 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Barbara Hall, Esquire Greenberg, Taurig, et al 515 East Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1500 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Richard Kane, City Attorney City of Hallandale 400 South Federal Highway Hallandale, Florida 33009 Karen A. Brodeen, Assistant General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 315 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Arnold Lanner, Mayor City of Hallandale City Hall 400 South Federal Highway Hallandale, Florida 33009 Steven M. Seibert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs Suite 100 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs Suite 315 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
The Issue The issues to be decided in this case are those associated with the question of whether the Respondent is required to have a permit for the connection of his business property to State Road 206 or is exempt from that requirement. See Section 335.187, Florida Statutes. If he is required to have a permit the issue becomes the acceptability of his current drive, i.e., does it comply with the commercial use design criteria contemplated by Chapter 335, Florida Statutes, and further described in the Florida Department of Transportation "Policy and Guidelines for Vehicular Connections to Roads on the State Highway System," February, 1985, which was recognized and incorporated by reference through Rule 14- 15.013, Florida Administrative Code. These issues are raised through an alleged violation of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code set out in the Notice to Show Cause which was forwarded to Respondent from Petitioner leading to the formal hearing. The date of that Notice to Show Cause was July 18, 1989. Within the statement of violations there were also allegations concerning irregular signs as alleged under Section 479.11(8), Florida Statutes, associated with the commercial activities by Respondent and the unauthorized parking on the right-of-way at State Road 206 in violation of Section 337.406, Florida Statutes. These latter allegations were conceded by the Respondent at hearing and are resolved through those concessions.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the hearing Respondent operated a roadside fruit and vegetable stand at property adjacent to State Road 206 in St. Johns County, Florida. In addition to fruits and vegetables, by local ordinance of St. Johns County, Florida, he is allowed to sell poultry and fish. There is no indication that he has taken advantage of that opportunity other than to sell fresh shrimp from a cooler during 1989. In addition to these products he sells honeys, jellies, and jams. He also sells soft drinks from a dispensing machine. A mainstay in his business is peanuts which he sells fresh. Another product sold is pork skins. The drink machine that is described was added in March, 1989. Before that time he sold fountain drinks and cold drinks that were dispensed from a cooler. He has always had soft drinks available from the inception of his operation of the roadside stand. That began in March, 1985. At the time the Respondent purchased the property there was an operation ongoing whereby fruit was being sold on two tables. Respondent replaced those structures with a portable trailer which was anchored to the lot, and display and sell of fruit on a 16-foot table and use of an 8-foot table upon which tomatoes were displayed and sold. The trailer was used to store his products over night. The trailer described was a pop-up camper trailer. The principal products being dispensed at that time were peanuts, vegetables, and tomatoes. Through Ordinance No. 86-68, passed by St. Johns County, a copy of which may be seen as Respondent's exhibit No. 1, the property was recognized as C1, commercial intensive, with the conditions that the property would be limited to outdoor sale of produce, vegetables, fruit, poultry, and fish. It was also stated that there would be no access/egress to United States Highway 1, which is also known as State Road 5. This property is located at the intersection of State Road 5 and State Road 206. Present access/egress to the property is from State Road 206 and that has been the situation since Respondent purchased the property. The ordinance described dates from August 12, 1986. Over time Respondent has taken a number of steps to improve his business. In March, 1988, Respondent obtained permission from St. Johns County to place a storage shed on his property. In August of that year he obtained permission to install a metal awning or carport of dimension 18 feet by 45 feet which is anchored to the ground. At that same time he placed the body from an old milk truck on the property for purposes of cold storage. In March, 1988, he had received an electrical permit from St. Johns County. Prior to that time he did not have electricity. In the spring of 1989, a well was drilled to provide running water. Prior to that time Respondent used bottled water. Respondent's composite exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence describes various permits obtained from St. Johns County. If Respondent was required to remove the structures on his property it could be done in three days. This goes to identify the nature of the structures and to demonstrate that they are not permanent fixtures to the realty. According to Respondent, whose testimony is accepted, the business that he is experiencing at present has remained fairly constant in dollar amounts. He does not sell as many peanuts as he did before. Concerning traffic, Respondent indicates, and his testimony is accepted, that the number of cars that are located at his business would be a maximum of 12 on a busy Sunday afternoon and that at most times there are one or two cars. The hours of the business are from 8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. in the winter time and somewhat longer in the summer time. The business is open seven days a week. A rough description of the nature of the property by design may be found in the documents contained in Respondent's exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The property is approximately 280 front feet and 280 feet at the rear with 41 feet on each side. The frontage runs approximately east-west on State Road 206 and one of the sides abuts State Road 5. The basic design of the driveway entrance from State Road 206 is also set out in those drawings. As Marshall W. Sander, engineer in the permit department for Petitioner in its St. Augustine, Florida, maintenance office, explains the driveway is an unimproved dirt shell connection. This is the same driveway that was there at the time that Respondent purchased the property and has remained in that state since that time. Notwithstanding Mr. Sanders' concern that the driveway is not up to current commercial business criteria for access/egress, there have been no accidents as a result of access/egress from the business. There are two turnouts or turn- ins into the property. Mr. Sander believes that at least one paved driveway is needed leading into the property. The dimensions of that drive would be 24-foot wide which allows a 12-foot wide lane in and a 12-foot wide lane out. This impression of Mr. Sander is drawn in the face of the Respondent's presenting himself at the office of Petitioner in St. Augustine, Florida, with an application and plan showing the intention to improve the property to include restrooms, a beer and wine cooler with parking on site. Under those circumstances Mr. Sander felt it necessary to improve the drive connection. At hearing there was no suggestion that restrooms are available on the premises or will be in the near future, nor was there any indication that a beer and wine cooler would be installed. Therefore it cannot be said that the basic nature of the business has changed from its inception to the present. Mr. Sander concedes that within the records of the Petitioner there are no indications that the business has increased by way of records concerning traffic flow or otherwise. His remarks about increased traffic at Dupont Center is not specific enough to gain a useful impression of that circumstance. Mr. Sander relies upon the observations of the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the St. Johns County Public Health Unit as were testified to by George L. Sigman, Environmental Health Director II for that organization. He also spoke to certain records of the health unit which may be found as Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. Nothing about his testimony or that exhibit identifies a noteworthy change in the basic nature of the business from Respondent's establishment of the roadside stand in March, 1985 until the present. Throughout the existence of his business Respondent has operated without the benefit of a driveway permit issued by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and in view of the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: By way of disposition of the Notice to Show Cause, that a Final Order be entered which recognizes the concessions made by the Respondent concerning the sign in question, calling for its removal if still in existence and his acknowledgment of the problem of parking on the right-of-way and which absolves the Respondent of any necessity to obtain a driveway permit. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning proposed facts. Petitioner' s Facts Paragraphs 1 and 2 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence in Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is contrary to facts found. The third sentence is subordinate to facts found. Sentences 4 and 5 depict testimony as opposed to suggesting fact finding. However, the last sentence in that paragraph is one upon which facts were found in the Recommended Order. Respondent' s Facts Paragraphs one and two pertain to withdrawal of the request for hearing concerning signs and parking and are not part of fact finding. The first sentence in paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The remaining sentence is legal argument, as are paragraphs 4 and 5. Paragraphs 6-11 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 12 is not relevant. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Leo O. Myers, Esquire Post Office Box 1621 Jacksonville, FL 32201 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security illegally rejected Petitioner's bid as nonresponsive.
Findings Of Fact Fred Boozer, Sr., (Boozer), the Petitioner, owns Boozer Properties, a family business which includes a building at 2235 South Babcock Street, Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida. The building is currently occupied by staff of the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security (LES) and other tenants. In south Brevard, LES staff also occupies another building in Palm Bay. Because of staff expansion and the need to co-locate its offices, LES issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for Lease No. 540:0904 on January 28, 1992. The RFP had been previously advertised but was successfully challenged on issues unrelated to the issues in this proceeding. The January 1992 RFP sought approximately 11,474 to 11,818 square feet of office space. The RFP also specified that 95 off-street parking spaces be provided for the exclusive use of LES employees and clients. The spaces were to be suitably paved and lined, and under the control of the bidder. The RFP advertised a pre-proposal conference on February 4, 1992. No bidder attended, and no objections to the RFP were filed. Six responses were received on the February 28th deadline, one of which was immediately determined to be nonresponsive. The remaining bid proposals were evaluated, and Boozer's bid, offering his Babcock Street site, and 95 parking spaces, received the highest points from the evaluation committee. During a recent LES bidding process for office space in West Palm Beach, a problem arose with a bidder's ability to provide the required parking spaces. Cognizant of this, the LES leasing manager contacted the City of Melbourne to determine whether the apparent bid winner, Boozer, could meet his obligation to provide 95 spaces. The written response dated March 20, 1992, from Dominic Mauriello, a Melbourne city planner, provides his estimation that, for the various uses in the Babcock Street building, 207 parking spaces would be required. The memo states that a site plan on file at the city planning office reflects that there are 165 spaces. The site plan attached to Boozer's bid proposal submitted to LES indicates that 175 spaces are available. LES staff person, Lynne Mobley, telephoned Fred Boozer on March 24, 1992, informing him of the memorandum from the city. He responded with a request that he be allowed twenty-four hours to provide additional information. By March 27, 1992, the LES leasing office had not received further information from Boozer. The RFP had advertised a 30-day deadline for the bid award, which deadline fell on a weekend. The agency considered that it needed to make the award on Friday, the 27th. After contacting the City of Palm Bay to assure that the next highest rated response could deliver the requisite parking spaces, a letter was sent notifying Woodlake S.W. No. 1, Ltd., (Woodlake) of its award. In a letter dated March 27, 1992, LES notified Boozer that its bid was determined nonresponsive based on the outcome of investigation and consultation with the city regarding his inability to produce the required 95 exclusive spaces. In the meantime, Fred Boozer had contacted Peggy Bray, the City's Planning and Zoning Administrator, who provided an amended estimation stating that 190 spaces would be required for the Babcock Street site, and that the site currently includes 184 parking spaces. Ms. Bray's letter, dated March 27, 1992, states that in order to provide 95 spaces for the Department of Labor, 1800 square feet of office space would need to remain vacant. The Bray letter was immediately sent by facsimile transmission to LES, and was received the afternoon of March 27th, after the award and rejection notices were sent. Boozer's building is approximately 39,000 square feet. Several tenants are month to month lessees, and another tenant is expected to move prior to the beginning of the LES lease term. Boozer is willing to keep vacant the 1800 square feet and contemplated that necessity when he submitted his bid proposal. He did not include this agreement in his written bid response, but neither did LES specifically ask, either in the bid form or at the time of the committee's site walk-through prior to the bid award. Boozer contends that he responded on the bid proposal that he would provide 95 exclusive spaces and he remains willing to provide those spaces. At hearing, Boozer disclosed that 20 additional parking spaces are located adjacent to the subject property and are available for use by HRS' County Health Services, another tenant in the Babcock Street building. The spaces would reduce by 20 the spaces required by the city code, but their existence was not disclosed in the bid proposal as they are not part of the attached site plan. Boozer's onsite parking spaces range from one-half to one foot short of the eleven-feet width required by the city code. No evidence was presented with regard to any pending or contemplated enforcement action, and LES did not base its decision on this defect. LES did base its decision on a good-faith reliance on the communication by a member of the City of Melbourne planning staff. Even when that initial communication was corrected by the planning administrator, the number of spaces available were still less than needed for LES purposes and to comply with the City's code. LES did not anticipate, nor was it informed prior to bid award, of Boozer's ability and willingness to keep space vacant to comply with his commitment to provide 95 parking spaces to LES.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner's protest of intended bid award. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2372BID The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. Adopted in paragraphs 4 and 9. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 7. Rejected as unnecessary. The testimony of Ms. Mobley is that she did not receive the message. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraphs 8 and 9. Adopted in paragraphs 10 and 13. Rejected as unnecessary. 10-13. Adopted in paragraph 11. Rejected as unsubstantiated by competent evidence. Adopted by implication in paragraph 5. Rejected as irrelevant, except as to Intervenor's spaces, which is adopted in paragraph 8. 1718. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in paragraph 3. 2. Adopted in paragraph 1. 3. Adopted in paragraph 2. 4-5. Adopted in paragraph 4. 6-7. Adopted in paragraph 5. 8. Adopted in paragraph 6. 9. Adopted in paragraph 7. 10-11. Adopted in paragraph 8. 12. Adopted in paragraph 10. 13. Adopted in paragraph 12. 14. Adopted in paragraph 9. Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-2. Adopted in substance in paragraph 3. 3. Rejected as unnecessary. 4-5. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 9. 15-16. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Preliminary Statement. 19-28. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard M. Swerbilow, Esquire Post Office Box 541271 Merritt Island, FL 32954-1271 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, FL 32399-2189 Jack Spira, Esquire 5205 Babcock Street N.E. Palm Bay, FL 32905 Alan Taylor Elizabethan Development Corporation 245 Avenue O S.W. Winter Haven, FL 33880 Frank Scruggs, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152
Findings Of Fact Ramchandra Jakhotia and Rashmi Jakhotia, his wife, acquired the King Cole Motel at 401 East Shore Drive, Clearwater, Florida in 1983 and have owned the property since that time. At the time of acquisition and for some time prior thereto the property included a commercial marina with 22 slips. In 1985 the City of Clearwater revised its Development Code effective October 13, 1985 and, incident thereto, effective July 7, 1988, enacted Section 114.05, Live-Aboard Vessels as Ordinance 4597, Clearwater City Code. That enactment provided, in part, that: Prohibited; exceptions: It shall be unlawful for any person to moor any live-aboard vessel at any location within or upon the navigable waters in the City for any period of time in excess of seventy-two (72) hours, except as follows: At a marina facility for which conditional use approval has been obtained, or a marina facility in existence as of October 13, 1985 for which conditional use approval would otherwise be required;... In January 1986 a survey was taken of all marinas within the City of Clearwater to determine the number of live aboard vessels coming within the purview of the revised Development Code. At this survey eight live aboard vessels were occupying berths at the King Cole Motel marina and this was the number determined to be grandfathered for which no conditional use approval would be required. In 1988 King Cole Motel applied for conditional authorization to utilize 14 additional berths for live aboard vessels. This conditional use was approved subject to the applicant installing a pump-out facility and meeting the parking requirements. Although the parking requirements for a commercial marina, i.e., 0.5 parking space per slip, is the same as the parking requirement at marinas for live aboard vessels, the latter generally place a greater demand on parking spaces than does non-live aboard vessels. To change the approved use from commercial marina without live aboards to live aboards is a change in the use and requires conditional use approval. Before conditional use approval can be granted the applicant must comply with all code requirements, such as required parking spaces, at the time of the change in use. At the time Appellant acquired the King Cole Motel the 22 commercial slips were grandfathered as an authorized use without any parking being provided. Accordingly, as a 22-slip commercial marina Appellant did not have to provide parking. When the eight slips used for live aboards were counted in 1986 they too were grandfathered in without the need for parking spaces. However, when Appellant applied in 1988 for authorization to use 14 other slips for live aboard vessels, the code required the applicant to provide seven parking spaces. To his credit Appellant obtained the use of seven parking spaces down the road from the marina but those spaces were not contiguous to Appellants' marina as required by the code. Therefore, Appellants' use of the additional slips for live aboards did not meet the parking requirement in his conditional use approval. In 1992 Appellant applied for a variance of the seven parking spaces required to allow the use of these additional slips by live aboard vessels. This hearing was held before the Development Code Adjustment Board on February 11, 1993 and it is from the denial of this variance that this appeal is taken. The Board denied the variance requested because the Appellant failed to demonstrate that the standards established by Section 45.24 Land Development Code were met. In these proceedings Appellant presented no additional evidence to support the variances requested than was submitted to the Board.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns Lot 67 Countryside, Tract 60, which fronts on Atwood Court, with a small side (approximately 45 feet) facing Landmark Drive. Landmark Drive is a main thoroughfare with heavy traffic expected to increase as the area continues to grow. Landmark Drive is a non-addressed street on which a property owner would be permitted to erect a four-foot high fence on the property line. If Petitioner moved the fence 25 feet back from the property line the zoning regulations would permit the erection of a six-foot high fence. Moving the fence this far would place the fence some 50 feet from the right-of-way of Landmark Drive and would take up so much of Petitioner's property that his future plans to install a swimming pool would be thwarted. In the one and one-half mile stretch of Landmark Drive in the vicinity of Petitioner's property only two fences have been erected which required variances and those encroach only one or two feet into the setback line. At the same time Petitioner's request for variance was denied the board granted a variance to another owner in the same subdivision who had put up a fence without getting a variance. There, the board found it would constitute a hardship to require that landowner to remove or relocate his fence since a swimming pool was also involved. Other applications for variances to erect fences on property fronting on Landmark Drive have been denied in the past.
The Issue The issue is whether Franklin County (County) has given reasonable assurance that it satisfies all requirements for an after-the-fact permit authorizing the construction of a rock revetment seaward of the coastal construction control line (CCCL) on Alligator Drive, also known as County Road 370.
Findings Of Fact The Nature of the Dispute The origins of this dispute date back a number of years. In short, the County currently has two adjoining revetments seaward of the CCCL on County Road 370 (Alligator Drive) located on Alligator Point in the southeastern corner of the County.1 County Road 370, situated immediately adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico, is a vulnerable structure and eligible for armoring. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.002(64). The old revetment is permitted; the new revetment is not. Pursuant to a Department enforcement action directed at both revetments, the County applied for an after-the-fact permit to authorize the construction of the new revetment. See Case No. 12-3276EF. The two revetments, totaling around 2,800 feet in length, abut County Road 370 and join near the intersection of Alligator Drive and Tom Roberts Road. The road itself is around 50 or 60 feet from the edge of the revetments. The old revetment extends around 2,000 feet west of the intersection while the new revetment extends 800 feet east of the intersection. There is a curve in the road at the intersection, and at that point the road elevation drops two or three feet for an undisclosed distance. The revetments, however, run in a straight line. There is no beach and dune system in front of the old revetment, while a small amount of exposed sand is located on the far eastern end of the new revetment. Due to storm events over the years, unauthorized debris has been placed on top of the old revetment by the County. Under the terms of the enforcement action, the County is required to remove the debris. This will reduce the height of the old revetment by several feet below its original height of nine feet National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD).2 Where the two revetments join, however, the height differs by only around a foot. The Bank owns property across the street from the old revetment and alleges that, for several reasons, the site and design of the new revetment, coupled with the reduction in height of the old revetment, will cause erosion of the shoreline around the old revetment and expose County Road 370 and the adjacent upland Bank property to erosion. Although the current design and location of the old revetment have been finalized through prior agency action, the Bank has asked that the permit be denied unless the County relocates rock boulders from the new to the old revetment and raises its height back to nine feet NGVD. The County asserts that the Bank's real aim here is to require the County, at taxpayer expense, to reconstruct the old revetment to its original height. Otherwise, the Department will not waive the 30-year erosion control line restriction and allow the Bank to fully develop its property that is seaward of the CCCL. See § 161.053(5)(b), Fla. Stat. The Old Revetment Since the late 1970s, the County has owned and maintained that portion of County Road 370 that is the subject of this dispute. In May 1986, the Department of Natural Resources, which was later merged with the Department, issued to the County CCCL Permit No. FR-204 for the construction of the old revetment, then 1,500 feet long. The revetment was located approximately 350 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-211 to approximately 150 feet west of the Department Reference Monument R-213. In November 1994, the Department issued to the County CCCL Permit No. FR-446 for the re-construction of the old revetment, as well as a 500-foot extension of the eastern limits of the structure with granite boulders. The revetment, as extended, is located approximately 540 feet west of Department Reference Monument R-212 to approximately 140 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-213. The permit did not authorize placement of any construction debris within the revetment. With the extension, the total length of the old revetment is now approximately 2,000 feet. After an application for a joint coastal permit to conduct a beach and dune restoration project was filed by the County in September 2006, a Department site inspection revealed the presence of concrete debris and other debris material stacked on top of the old revetment. A debris removal plan was formulated by the Department, which was intended to be incorporated as a special condition in the joint coastal permit. In May 2011, the joint coastal permit was approved and included a debris removal plan. Because of financial constraints, however, the County did not undertake and complete the work relating to the beach and dune restoration plan or the debris removal plan. In January 2012, another inspection was conducted by the Department to document how much debris was in the old revetment and where it was located. The inspection revealed the presence of a significant amount of concrete debris and other debris material scattered throughout the revetment and continuing eastward. That same month, largely at the urging of the Bank, the Department issued a one-count Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that after a storm event in July 2005, the County placed unauthorized construction debris and other debris material in the old revetment seaward of the CCCL, and that the debris still remained within the footprint of the revetment. See Case No. 12- 3276EF. (The Bank unsuccessfully attempted to intervene in the enforcement action.) As corrective action, the County was required to remove all debris, seaward of the CCCL, from and adjacent to the footprint of the old revetment no later than 60 days after the end of the hurricane season. That work has not yet been performed, probably because the work on both revetments will take place at the same time. After the debris is removed, the height of the old revetment will vary from between five and eight feet NGVD rather than the original nine-foot height. This was not the relief that the non-party Bank desired in the enforcement action. Instead, the Bank has always wanted the old revetment to be reconstructed to the nine-foot NGVD standard authorized in the original construction permit. Even so, the enforcement action is now final, as no appeal was taken by the County. Except for the unauthorized debris, the old revetment meets all Department standards. The New Revetment Under emergency circumstances, between September 2000 and July 2005 the County placed material, including granite rock boulders and debris material, in a location east of the old revetment, seaward of the CCCL. The construction activity is located approximately 140 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-213 to approximately 80 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-214 and is around 800 feet in length. However, the County did not obtain a permit for the temporary structure within 60 days after its construction, as required by section 161.085(3), Florida Statutes. In July 2005, Hurricane Dennis made landfall in the Florida Panhandle causing damage to the shoreline along Alligator Drive. As an emergency measure after the storm event, the County placed rock boulders that had been displaced back into the new revetment seaward of the CCCL. The County also placed other unauthorized concrete debris and debris material within the footprint of the rock revetment seaward of the CCCL. Again, no timely authorization for this work was obtained by the County. In August 2012, the Department issued an Amended NOV in Case No. 12-3276EF adding a second count, which alleged that the County had failed to obtain a permit for the placement of the rock boulders and unauthorized debris. On April 18, 2013, the Department issued a Final Order in Case No. 12-3276EF. As to Count II, it gave the County two options for corrective action: (a) that the County submit "a complete permit application for a rigid coastal armoring structure located between Department reference monuments R-213 and R-214 that complies with all applicable Department permitting rules and statutes"; or (b) that "the County remove all material placed seaward of the CCCL pursuant to a Department approved debris removal plan[,]" leaving that portion of County Road 370 without a revetment. 2013 Fla. ENV LEXIS 16 at *16. Desiring to protect its infrastructure, the County opted to apply for an after-the-fact permit. The Permit Application In March 2013, the County filed an application for an after-the-fact permit for the construction of the new revetment. As directed by the Department, the County proposes to construct a new revetment located between Department Reference Monuments R- 213 and R-214. The height of the new revetment will be around nine feet NGVD, while its slope will be one vertical to three horizontal. The old revetment is not quite as steep, having a slope of one vertical to two horizontal. The application includes a debris removal plan for the removal of construction debris as well as other debris scattered through the new revetment. Construction debris occupies a large portion of the new revetment and largely appears to be associated with storm damaged concrete sidewalk. All derelict concrete and asphalt material that is located water ward of Alligator Drive and landward of the mean high water line is to be removed. Both the County and its engineering consultant will monitor the work at the project. After reviewing the application, the Department proposed to issue after-the-fact CCCL Permit FR-897. The Bank then filed its Petition, as later amended. Petitioner's Objections As summarized in its PRO, the Bank alleges that the County did not give reasonable assurance that the following statutory and rule provisions have been satisfied: section 161.053(1)(a), which provides that special siting and design considerations shall be necessary seaward of the CCCL "to ensure protection of . . . adjacent properties"; rule 62B-33.005(2), which requires that the applicant provide the Department with sufficient information to show that adverse impacts associated with the construction have been minimized and that construction will not result in a significant adverse impact"; rule 62B-33.005(3)(a), which requires that the Department "[d]eny any application for an activity which either individually or cumulatively would result in a significant adverse impact including potential cumulative effects"; rule 62B-33.0051(2), which provides that armoring "shall be sited and designed to minimize adverse impacts to the beach and dune system, marine turtles, native salt-tolerant vegetation, and existing upland and adjacent structures"; and rule 62B-33.0051(2)(a), which requires armoring to "be sited as far landward as practicable to minimize adverse impacts . . . on existing upland and adjacent structures." See PRO, pp. 16-17. A common thread in these regulatory citations is that a revetment should be constructed in a manner that does not cause adverse impacts on "adjacent property." Except for the above cited provisions, no other permit requirements are contested, and the County's prima facie case satisfied those other requirements. The Bank's odd-shaped property, acquired in a foreclosure proceeding, abuts that portion of Alligator Drive immediately adjacent to the old revetment. The eastern boundary of the Bank's property is at least 300 feet west of the new revetment and extends westward along County Road 370 until it intersects with Harbor Circle. The entire tract is separated from the old revetment by County Road 370, a two-lane paved road. The property was once used as a KOA campground; however, the predecessor owner acquired development rights for a Planned Unit Development, which apparently cannot be fully developed unless the old revetment is raised back to its original height by the County or some other acceptable form of erosion protection is provided by the Bank at its own expense. The essence of the Bank's complaint is that the new revetment, as now sited and designed, will expose the old revetment to a higher rate of erosion, and ultimately accelerate the erosion of its property across the street. The Bank asserts that this will occur for three reasons. First, the removal of construction debris from the old revetment will lower its height, weaken the structure, and create a "discontinuity in height and composition between the revetments," resulting in increased exposure to erosion. Second, the toe of the new revetment (at the western end of the structure) will extend ten feet further seaward than the old revetment, creating a discontinuity and placing the old revetment at higher exposure to erosion. Finally, the Bank contends a discontinuity already exists between the two revetments due to the curved shape of the road at the intersection, causing the western end of the new revetment to extend further seaward than the old revetment. The Bank argues that the discontinuity will amplify the wave action on the shoreline during a severe storm event and eventually cause a breach of the old revetment. In sum, the Bank is essentially arguing that unless the two revetments mirror each other in height and slope, and consist of the same construction materials, the after-the-fact permit must be denied. The Bank's expert, Mr. Chou, a coastal engineer, was employed shortly before the final hearing and made one visit to the site. Regarding the removal of unauthorized construction debris from the old revetment, Mr. Chou was concerned that, while not ideal, the debris offers a degree of shoreline protection. He recommended that if removed, the debris be replaced with boulders comparable to the design standard of the new revetment. However, the record shows that when the loose and uneven debris is removed from the old revetment, the existing rocks will be moved to an interlocking or "chinking" configuration that actually enhances the stability and integrity of the structure.3 The Bank is also concerned that the height and slope of the two revetments differ. Mr. Chou testified that there exists the increased potential for erosion as a result of what he described as a discontinuity, or a difference of characteristics, between the two revetments. He opined that the protective function of the old revetment will be compromised by the removal of the granite boulders, which will lower the overall height of the revetment between two and four feet. According to Mr. Chou, if the new revetment suffers a direct hit by a major storm, i.e., one capable of dislodging the armor, he would "expect damage, significant damage, right next to it." Mr. Chou conceded, however, that if a permit is not approved, and the County elects to remove the new revetment, it could result in a significant adverse impact to property located along Alligator Drive. Mr. Chou further acknowledged that there will be no significant adverse effect on the old revetment during "everyday" winds, waves, and currents. Finally, he agreed that if the toes of the new and old revetments are essentially the same, as the certified engineering plans demonstrate they are, it will "minimize" the discontinuity that he describes. Notably, in 2005, Hurricane Dennis actually caused accretion (an increase in sand) on the Bank property, rather than erosion. While there are some differences in height and slope between the two revetments, no meaningful differences from an engineering perspective were shown. Through the County's coastal engineer, Mr. Dombrowski, who over the years has visited the site dozens of times and worked on a number of major projects in the area, it was credibly demonstrated that the old and new revetments will, in effect, form one continuous armoring structure that will provide shoreline protection along Alligator Drive. In terms of toe, slope, height, and construction material, there will be one continuous and straight revetment along the road, with a "fairly consistent elevation and slope going from one end to the other." If a major storm event occurs, the impacts to both revetments will likely be the same. In any event, there is no requirement that the County construct a revetment that is storm proof or prevents severe storm damage. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the new revetment is consistent with the siting and design criteria in rule 62B-33.0051(2). The design of the new revetment is consistent with generally accepted engineering practice. The new revetment is sited and designed so that there will be no significant adverse impacts, individually or cumulatively, to the adjacent shoreline. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.005(3). The County has provided the Department with sufficient information to show that adverse and other impacts associated with the construction are minimized, and the new revetment will not result in a significant adverse impact to the Bank's property. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.005(2). The new revetment should toll erosion – which now occurs on Alligator Point at the rate of five feet per year -- and provide shoreline protection. Finally, the construction of the new revetment will not cause an adverse impact to the old revetment. For all practical purposes, the two revetments have existed side-by-side since 2005. The Bank failed to offer any credible evidence that the new revetment has had a significant adverse impact on the old revetment over the last nine years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order approving the County's application for after- the-fact permit number FR-897. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2014.
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact are made based upon a stipulation entered into by all parties on the record: S & L Property Managements, Inc., Intervenor, was the lowest bidder for lease number 590:1651 by between approximately $84,000 and $105,000, exclusive of moving costs, over the basic five year term of the lease. There is no evidence that Intervenor's facility (Howard Building) is structurally unsound, and in fact the Department of Health and Rehabilitative services, Respondent, procured an engineering report which showed Intervenor's facility to be structurally sound. Both Intervenor's and Southmark Management Corporation's, Petitioner's, bids on this lease met all bid requirements. Both were qualified bidders for award of this leased except for Petitioner's objection and contention that bidders were required to include present value calculations with their bids, which Petitioner did but Intervenor did not. Intervenor agreed with Respondent that if it received this award, it would renovate the leased space in its facility to meet Respondent's reasonable requirements. There is no issue regarding the conformity of Intervenor's bid with handicap design requirements. Preaward documents, memoranda and correspondence from Respondent only recommended that Petitioner be awarded this lease and did not advise Petitioner it had been awarded the lease. Robert Brady, Respondent's Director of General services, was the person who was to make the final decision concerning the award of this lease. Prior to the award of the lease to Intervenor, Brady determined that the Department of Corrections, present tenant in Intervenor's facility was satisfied with its occupancy, and also that the leased space would meet bid specifications. Petitioner chose to leave its bid open, even though it could have withdrawn its bid after the expiration of the thirty day period following the bid opening. Both Petitioner and Intervenor took actions and expended sums of money in the expectation of being awarded the lease. Intervenor acted after being advised it had been awarded this lease. There is no allegation by Petitioner that the award of this lease to Intervenor was made on the basis of any improper influence exerted upon or by Respondent by any of the bidders, or by any other person. Respondent delayed the award of this lease beyond thirty days after the bid opening. The following findings of fact are made based upon the evidence presented: Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted bids in response to Respondent's Invitation to Bid on lease number 590:1651 which was for 12,312 square feet of space for the Office of Disability Determination in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. The Office of Disability Determination had been a tenant in Petitioner's facility for six years, and continues to occupy space in Petitioner's facility until this bid protest is resolved. Since approximately October 1984 Respondent has not had a written lease with Petitioner for its present space despite repeated efforts by Petitioner to obtain an executed lease from Respondent. Bids which were received were evaluated by a three person committee composed of Respondent's employees familiar with the space needs of the Office of Disability Determination. The evaluation criteria, or award factors, were set forth in the Invitation to Bid. Rental rate over the basic term of the lease was weighted twice as heavily as any of the other eleven (11) criteria. Upon its initial review, the committee recommended that the award be made to Petitioner, and Leonard Polinsky, Property Manager for Petitioners was informed of this recommendation. Based upon a 100 point scaled Petitioner's initial evaluation was from .2 to 2 points higher than Intervenor's. Polinsky assumed that the actual award was a mere formality, and therefore expended approximately $700 for preliminary architectural sketches of lease space renovations. This initial evaluation committee recommendation was based, in part, on its concerns about the structural soundness and maintenance of Intervenor's facility. Petitioner did not know who would actually make the award on behalf of Respondent or what the authority of the evaluation committee was. Petitioner did not object to Respondent's delay of this award beyond the thirty-day time period called for in the Invitation to Bid, and suffered no harm as a result of this delay. The delay was caused by Respondent's investigation of the structural soundness of Intervenor's facility, as well as the experience of its present tenants. Following completion of this investigation, the evaluation committee met again, reevaluated the bids, and recommended Intervenor be awarded this lease. Respondent, through Robert Brady, determined that the award should be made to Intervenor after completing its investigation, reviewing the committee's reevaluation of bids, and being satisfied that this award would be in the best interests of the state. This decision was based primarily on the following factors: After investigation, no structural or maintenance problems were found to exist, which had been initial concerns of the committee. Intervenor was low bidder for the lease over the five year term of the lease. Both bids were responsive and met all bid requirements. Intervenor's facility was shown to be structurally sound and suitable for Respondent's needs. Intervenor's failure to include present value calculations of the rental rate in its bid did not disqualify it since bidders were not required to include these calculations. Respondent routinely did its own calculations of present value on each bid.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order awarding lease number 590:1651 to Intervenor. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of November 1985, at Tallahassee Florida. Hearings Hearings DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 15day of November 1985. APPENDIX (DOAH Case No. 85-3158BID) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Rejected as a Finding of Fact but included in introductory material. Rejected as simply a statement of position. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 14. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 12, 16. 8-9. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 13, otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 10-11. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 14, otherwise rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 14. 14-16. Rejected as simply a statement of position and argument in support of Petitioner's position. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 18-19. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 14, but rejected in part in Finding of Fact 17. Rejected as simply a statement of position and argument thereon. Rejected in Findings of Fact 14, 17 and otherwise not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 2, 8 but otherwise rejected as simply a statement of position and argument thereon. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 2-3. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary in light of Findings of Fact 6, 7, 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. 8-12. Rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and cumulative. 13. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 14. 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Rulings on Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Rejected as a conclusion of law and otherwise unnecessary. 3. Adopted, as to the first sentence; in Finding of Fact 17, otherwise rejected as simply a statement of position. 4-5. Rejected as simply a statement of position. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-12 with the exception of proposed finding 6(k) which the transcript does not reflect as part of the stipulation, but which is adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 15, 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 8-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Rejected as simply a summary of testimony. Rejected as simply a summary of testimony, and otherwise cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. 16-18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 19. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 20-21. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 17, but otherwise rejected as cumulative. 22-26. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: William E. Powers, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 11240 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 David P. Gauldin Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee Florida 32301 Joseph A. O'Friel Esquire 100 Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee Florida 32301
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent Department of Transportation enter a final order denying the application of petitioner V. J. Allen, d/b/a The Seafood Shack, for a sign permit. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of January, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 1985.
Findings Of Fact On May 20, 1986, Petitioners submitted a request for two variances concerning property located at 761 Bruce Avenue, Mandalay Subdivision, Block 24, Lot 7 in the City of Clearwater. The property is zoned RS-8 (single family residential). The variances requested were for the construction of a garage 4.8 feet from the rear set-back line, rather than the required set-back of ten feet, and 4.2 feet from the side set-back line, rather than the required set-back of five feet. On June 12, 1986, the Development Code Adjustment Board granted the variance of the side set-back requirements, but denied the requested rear set- back line variance. The Petitioners own the property in question and also own the property directly behind the subject property which backs up to the rear property line. There is presently a one story frame house on the property, as well as a small cottage to the rear of the property. The cottage is 12.7 feet wide by 16.5 feet deep. Petitioners want to construct a garage next to the cottage on an existing concrete slab. The dimensions of the garage shown in their application are 12 feet wide by 16.5 feet deep. At one time a garage was attached to the cottage but now only the concrete slab remains. If the rear set-back line variance is granted, the Petitioners will be able to construct the garage with rear and front walls attached to, and flush with, the cottage. If the rear set-back variance is not granted, the garage will have to be moved forward on the property and will only partially connect to the cottage. The Petitioners will not be prevented from building the garage if the variance is denied, but will simply have to move it forward rather than attaching it fully to the cottage. It is the Petitioners' intent to use the garage primarily for storage. Yvonne Ulfers denied any intention of expanding the existing cottage, or using this variance to add another room on the cottage. If the rear set-back line variance is denied, Yvonne Ulfers testified that she would construct the garage anyway, but would move it forward on the property and would also make it deeper than the 16.5 feet proposed in her application. She stated repeatedly that she would deepen the garage by extending it all the way down the side line of her property toward the frame house in the front. The Petitioners offered no evidence concerning conditions unique to this property, or hardship that would result if the variance is not granted. There is also no evidence that this variance is the minimum necessary to construct the garage on the subject property. To the contrary, there is no dispute that the garage can be built without the rear set-back line variance.
Findings Of Fact Mary G. Realty owns Lots 57-63 and the north 10.25 feet of Lot 64, Clearwater Beach Park, which occupy the southwest corner of Mandalay Avenue and Baymont Street on Clearwater Beach. For many years this property was operated as a gasoline service station until the death of the owner-operator and its purchase by Mary G. Realty in December, 1983. The property is zoned CG and has been so zoned for many years without change to the present. The gasoline station building is still located on the property and the proposed development will include use of that structure, which is approximately 40 feet by 60 feet. Applicant proposes to construct and operate a two-story office/retail store building with three large apartments on the second floor. The proposed addition would add 16 feet to the south side of the existing building extending 80 feet eastward from the west line of this building, with the eastern 40 feet of this extension 25 feet wide. It is also proposed to add an additional 70.7 feet to the north side of the existing building. As proposed, the first floor would occupy 6,680 square feet and the second floor would contain 5,878 square feet. Variances approved by the zoning board include a 3.5 foot setback on the rear property line to allow the property additions to follow the line of the existing structure; a 6-foot setback on the south property line; a 15-foot setback on 25 feet of the proposed addition from Mandalay Avenue; no buffer zone between parking and street right-of-way on both Mandalay Avenue and Baymont Street; and a variance of 32 parking spaces. Applicant's proposal approved by the board is to provide 25 parking spaces, a variance of 32 in the parking space requirement for the structure proposed. Petitioner's property abuts the property owned by Mary G. Realty and the structure on that property, which was built before the present zoning laws became effective, is nonconforming with the zoning regulations. In its application for the variances here under review Mary G. Realty requested a zero setback from the north property line, which was withdrawn; a 3.5-foot setback at the rear of the property in lieu of the 10-foot requirement for commercial general, and the board approved 3.5 feet; a one-foot setback on south property line in lieu of the 10 feet required, and the board approved a 6- foot setback; a 15-foot front setback in lieu of 20 feet required by the code, and the board approved 15 feet; a variance of 48 parking spaces, which was reduced by applicant's withdrawal of zero setback for north property line, resulting in a smaller size structure requiring less parking spaces and the addition of parking spaces from this same reduction, and the board approved a variance of 32 parking spaces; and a zero buffering requirement abutting Mandalay Avenue and Baymont Street, which the board granted. This property is unique only in that it is located in an area in which a large percentage of the buildings are nonconforming. The property is a trapezoidal shaped parcel having the following dimensions: south property line 100.47 feet, west property line 167.52 feet, north property line 100.77 feet, and east property line 178.55 feet. One of the principal factors at issue here is the requested variance in parking spaces required. Applicant purchased the property due to the pending expiration of its existing business lease and intends to move its business to the new location and provide additional office and shop space with apartments on the second floor, thus having a combined commercial and residential structure. There are no shopping facilities on Mandalay Avenue north of State Road 60; the area is mostly built up with motels, hotels, apartments, and restaurants; and the shopping customers are generally the same people who walk along Mandalay. Accordingly, there is less need for parking to accommodate a shop in this area than would be required in another part of Clearwater, although the magnitude of this difference has not as yet been determined. Witnesses testified to the need for additional shopping facilities north of State Road 60; to the fact that few people in automobiles shop on North Clearwater Beach; and, while functioning as a service station, no parking spaces were provided on this property. This property was purchased by Mary G. Realty for $295,000 and evidence was presented that less building space than proposed would not make the purchase economically feasible. However, insufficient evidence was presented to support this conclusion. This factor is given little weight because the purchaser knew, or should have known, of the zoning restrictions before the property was purchased. Most of the property in the vicinity was developed long before the current zoning regulations were adopted and the structures thereon are generally nonconforming both with respect to setbacks and parking, even though they offer rooms to transients who arrive in automobiles. These nonconforming structures result in some of the buildings in the vicinity being built right to the property line.
