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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs. CHARLES L. DALE, 86-002005 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-002005 Latest Update: Aug. 08, 1986

The Issue The issue in this matter is whether the certificate of Charles L. Dale should be revoked for failure to maintain good moral character under Section 943.1395(5), Florida Statutes (1985) and Section 943.13(7), Florida Statues (1985).

Findings Of Fact Charles L. Dale is certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida under a certificate issued March 14, 1984 (Tr. 35) 1/ Charles L. Dale married Cynthia Dale and together they had two children. Mr. and Mrs. Dale separated and Mr. Dale was required by court order to make child support payments to Mrs. Dale (Tr. 10). After he fell behind in those payments he had been ordered to bring them current and a date was set by which he was to produce evidence of having made the payments.(Tr. 12). In July of 1985, the day before the date on which Mr. Dale was to produce receipts for having made the past due payments he met Cynthia Dale and drove her to the courthouse. While they were in the car he asked her to sign a receipt for the child support, but she would not sign because it has not been paid (Tr. 12). When she refused to sign the receipt, Mr. Dale put a gun to Cynthia Dale's head to get her to sign the receipts, because he did not want to be jailed for failure to make the child support payments (Tr. 13). Cynthia Dale was in fear that she would be shot if she did not sign the receipt (Tr. 13-14). Mr. Dale ultimately gave up his threats in frustration when Cynthia Dale would not sign the receipt (Tr. 14). Shortly after the incident, Mrs. Dale reported the matter to Officer Kathy Kilpatrick of the West Palm Beach Police Department (Tr.18). The report in this matter resulted in a communication from the police department to the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office where Mr. Dale was employed (Tr.19). The matter was investigated by William Martin of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office for violation of departmental rules on improper use of firearms by Mr. Dale (Tr. 22-23). During the investigation by Deputy Martin, Mr. Dale denied that he had pulled his gun, pointed his gun or even touched his gun while with Cynthia Dale, and denied attempting to force her to sign a receipt for child support, although he did admit there had been a dispute regarding back child support payments. (Tr. 26). Detective Martin performed a polygraph examination upon Mr. Dale and during the post-test interview discrepancies in Mr. Dale's statement he believed the examination had disclosed (Tr.28). In that post-test interview, Mr. Dale admitted that he had pointed his gun at Cynthia Dale for about three minutes, after which time he opened the cylinder on the gun thus removing the bullets from the chamber where they could be fired (Tr. 30). The next day Mr. Dale resigned from the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department (Tr. 31).

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the certification of Charles L. Dale be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 1986.

Florida Laws (2) 943.13943.1395
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. WILLIE J. WHITTINGTON, 89-000743 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000743 Latest Update: Jul. 07, 1989

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made. At all times material to this case the Respondent, Willie Whittington, was licensed as a certified general contractor in the State of Florida, holding license number CG C006966. At all times material to this case the Respondent was the sole qualifying agent for Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. On May 15, 1987, Edwin W. Brown and Sandra J. Brown, husband and wife, contacted Respondent, in response to Respondent's advertising, to discuss the construction of a log house and an outbuilding on a lot owned by the Browns in Palm Beach County, Florida. The outbuilding was to be used as a combination garage and barn. During this initial meeting, the Browns described the project to Respondent. At the conclusion of the meeting on May 15, 1987, the Browns gave Respondent a $2,000.00 deposit to get started on the project. Respondent was to use that deposit to have plans drawn for the two buildings and to secure the necessary building permits. On June 23, 1987, Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. entered into two contracts with the Browns, one for the house and the other for the outbuilding. Respondent signed both contracts on behalf of Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. Both contracts were clear and unambiguous as to the work that was to be performed, as to the price that was to be paid for the work, and as to the schedules by which the construction draws would be made. The price for the house was set at $73,506.00. The price of the outbuilding was set at $11,665.00. Both contracts provided that construction would be completed within 130 days. On June 23, 1987, the Browns paid to Respondent the sum of $6,871.60 as required by the two contracts. Sandra Brown began keeping a log of her contacts with Respondent as of August 4, 1987, because she had experienced difficulty reaching Respondent by telephone and because no progress was being made on the project. Around August 4, 1987, Respondent told the Browns that he needed an additional $175.00 to pay to the architect to complete the plans. Because this was not provided for by their contracts, the Browns refused Respondent's request for this additional sum of money. On August 7, 1987, the Browns paid to Respondent the sum of $3,822.90 that Respondent was to use to order the logs. The building permits were not obtained until October 9, 1987. The permits were not obtained earlier than that date because Respondent did not diligently pursue his obligation to get the permits. As of early November 1987, the only work that had been done was the preparation of the lot for the foundation. On November 7, 1987, Respondent requested that the Browns advance him $5,000.00 so he could proceed with the construction. Respondent was financially unable to proceed because the Internal Revenue Service had garnished the account in which Respondent had placed the Browns' deposits. The Browns refused to advance Respondent this additional sum of money, but they remained willing to pay Respondent according to the draw schedules of the contracts. In December 1987 the Browns received a notice to owner form from Rinker Materials. In response to this notice, the Browns paid to Rinker Materials the sum of $2,664.77 and asked that no further materials be delivered on a credit basis to the job site. The Browns received a release of lien from Rinker Materials on December 28, 1987, for the materials Respondent had previously ordered on credit. In the middle of December 1987, the Browns learned that Respondent had neither ordered the logs for the construction nor determined the quantity of logs that would be required. On or about December 18, 1987, the foundation for the house was poured. Little work was done on the project between that date and January 4, 1988, the date Respondent told the Browns that his back was hurt and he could not work. The Browns filed a written complaint with the Palm Beach County Contractors Certification Board on January 8, 1988. As of January 13, 1988, Respondent was unable to account for the funds the Browns had deposited with him. At a meeting on January 19, 1988, among Respondent, the Browns, and a representative of Palm Beach County Contractors Certification Board, Respondent agreed to furnish receipts and an accounting of the construction funds by the next meeting on January 27, 1988. Respondent also agreed, during the meeting of January 19, 1988, to perform certain work on the project before the next meeting. At the next meeting, Respondent did not provide the Browns with receipts or with an accounting of the construction funds. Instead Respondent submitted a non-itemized bill in the amount of $18,131.20 for labor and materials supposedly expended by Respondent through January 27, 1988. The Browns refused to pay this bill. Respondent had worked only approximately 16 hours on the project between January 19 and January 27 and had not completed the additional work he had promised to have done January 27, 1988. The Browns fired Respondent and his company on January 27, 1988. At that time, Respondent had completed approximately 10% of the project `whereas it should have been approximately 60-70% completed. The delays by Respondent throughout his association with this project were not justified. After the Browns fired Respondent, they were forced to pay a materialman, MacMichael Lumber Company, to prevent the foreclosure of a lien against the property. This lien resulted because Respondent did not pay for certain materials he had ordered on credit before the Browns fired him. On February 4, 1988, Respondent agreed to repay the Browns the sum of $4,200.00. As of the date of the final hearing, Respondent owed the Browns $1,400.00. A subsequent contractor completed the project without undue delay in June 1988 for an additional $74,000. This price reflects changes the Browns made after the subsequent contractor began his work. Petitioner is the state agency charged with the regulation of contractors in the State of Florida. The Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner against Respondent alleges, in pertinent part, the following: Respondent failed to perform in a reasonably timely manner, and or abandoned said job(s), in violation of 489.129(1)(m),(k). There was financial mismanagement and/or misconduct in connection with this matter, attributable either to Respondent directly, or to Respondent's failure to properly supervise, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(h) & (m), as generally exhibited by, but not limited to, the following: Subject double billed Customer on several occasions; failure to pay subcontractors and suppliers; and failure to buy materials. There was no allegation in the Administrative Complaint or evidence presented at hearing that Respondent has been the subject of prior disciplinary action. Respondent has been licensed as a certified general contractor by the State of Florida since 1973. Following receipt of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent denied the violations and timely requested a formal administrative hearing.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which finds Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(h), Florida Statutes and which imposes a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,500 for such violation and which further finds Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes and which imposes a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,500 for such violation so that the total fine to be imposed against Respondent is $3,000. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX CASE NO. 89-0743 The proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner are addressed as follows. Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 27. Addressed in paragraph 3. 4-5. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in paragraph 6. Rejected as being unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 7. Addressed in paragraph 8. Addressed in paragraph 9. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 10. 14-15. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 12. Addressed in paragraph 17. Rejected as being unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 14. Addressed in paragraph 15. Addressed in paragraph 15. Addressed in paragraph 16. 22-26. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 17. Addressed in paragraph 19. Addressed in paragraph 23. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 24. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 22. 34-35. Rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Willie Whittington 342 Walker Street Greenacres City, Florida 34974 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.57489.129
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE vs JAMES M. STILLS, 92-005725 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Sep. 24, 1992 Number: 92-005725 Latest Update: May 17, 1993

Findings Of Fact Mr. Stills filed a sworn application for eligibility to sit for the licensure examination for limited surety agents with the Department of Insurance on February 24, 1992. The application contains these questions: Q: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or pleaded guilty of no contest to a crime involving moral turpitude, or a felony, or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory or county, whether or not a judgment or conviction has been entered? What was the crime? Where and when were you charged? Did you plead guilty or nolo contendere? Where you convicted? Was adjudication withheld? Please provide a brief description of the nature of the offense charged: If there has been more than one such felony charge, provide an explanation as to each charge on an attachment. Certified copies of the Information or Indictment and Final Adjudication for each charge is required. Mr. Stills answered "no" to the main question and filed no response to subquestions a through f. Discharging a firearm - 1973 Mr. Stills had been charged with the misdemeanor of discharging a firearm within city limits on September 10, 1973, a violation of Section 790.15, Florida Statutes (1973). The incident occurred in Pensacola, Florida. Mr. Stills accidently discharged a shotgun in an incident involving his father. Mr. Stills had been called to his father's home because of a dispute his father was having with a neighbor. His father met him on the back porch, with a shotgun in his hand. Mr. Stills calmed his father, and was able to get him to give him the shotgun. The shotgun was an old one, and as Mr. Stills attempted to unload it, the hammer slipped and the gun accidently discharged. The neighbor called the police, and the charge was filed, and Mr. Stills paid a small fine. Second degree murder - 1984 On May 31, 1984, Mr. Stills was arrested and charged with second degree murder, in violation of Sections 775.087(2) and 782.04(2), Florida Statutes (1983). The arrest arose from an argument which Mr. Stills had with the decedent. On May 24, 1980, Mr. Stills and the decedent had an argument in which the decedent threatened to kill Mr. Stills. Mr. Stills then left. Later that afternoon, the decedent approached Mr. Stills at another location, and appeared to reach for something. Out of fear generated by the decedent's earlier threat Mr. Stills had already armed himself, and when the victim made a threatening movement, Mr. Stills shot him out of fear for his own safety. He was arrested, charged with second degree murder, but acquitted in a jury trial on March 21, 1985 based on his plea of self defense. Firearms chares - 1987 Mr. Stills was charged on April 15, 1987, in an Information with the felony of carrying a concealed firearm, in violation of Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1987), and the misdemeanor of improper exhibition of a firearm, in violation of Section 790.10, Florida Statutes (1987). On that date, Officer John Gonzalez responded to a request for police assistance; the call said a man was displaying a firearm in a threatening manner. Officer Gonzalez arrived at the location given to him, and saw Petitioner, who generally fit the description of the man allegedly waiving a firearm about. Mr. Stills was then seated in an automobile. He was not waiving a gun about or threatening anyone. Officer Gonzalez approached him from the passenger side of the car, where he observed a revolver sitting on the passenger seat; the gun was loaded. He then arrested Mr. Stills. The charge of carrying a concealed firearm was dismissed by the court. Mr. Stills entered a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor of exhibiting a firearm on July 20, 1987. After exchanging correspondence with the Department, Mr. Stills amended his application, disclosing the charges and sending the necessary backup information required by the application form. He stated he had misread the question as requiring only information on felony convictions, and he had none. When the Department denied Mr. Still's application it gave these specific reasons: He had been charged with discharging a firearm within the City of Pensacola on September 17, 1973. He had been charged with second degree murder on May 21, 1984, but had been found not guilty on March 21, 1985. On April 15, 1987, he had been charged with carrying a concealed firearm and improper exhibition of a firearm, that he had pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge and been placed on three months probation yet Mr. Stills had failed to acknowledge any of these charges on his application. The Department relied on Section 648.32(2)(f), Florida Statutes, and 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, to deny his application.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order finding Mr. Stills eligible for licensure as a limited surety agent, and permitting him to sit for the licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 31st day of March 1993. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March 1993. APPENDIX The following constitute my rulings on findings proposed by the Department as required by Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted, as modified in Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Cassidy, Esquire 6121 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Suite 403 West Palm Beach, Florida 33409-0223 Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 The Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (9) 120.57648.27648.34648.45775.087782.04790.01790.10790.15
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RICHARD S. WEINSTEIN vs. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 79-001826 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001826 Latest Update: Jan. 14, 1980

Findings Of Fact In May 1979, Respondent issued invitation for bids for office space in West Palm Beach, Florida, for the purpose of establishing a combined claims, tax, and appeals unemployment compensation office in the West Palm Beach area. The lease on the present office in West Palm Beach expires in December, 1979. Two prior invitations for bids on the required office space had failed to result in the receipt of any bids. The invitation for bids provided that Respondent reserved the right to reject any and all bids and to make the award deemed to be in the best interests of the State of Florida. (Testimony of Bradner, Exhibit 15) On May 30, 1979, Petitioner Richard S. Weinstein submitted the sole bid in response to the May 1979 invitation. He proposed to lease his building located at 1814 North Dixie Highway, West Palm Beach, and to meet all bid specifications and requirements. At the time of bid submission, Petitioner was leasing the building in question to a tenant who operated a used furniture store on the premises. In order to meet the specifications of the bid, the property required considerable renovation and improvement which Petitioner agreed to accomplish. (Testimony of Petitioner, Exhibit 2) A bid selection committee composed of four departmental employees in Respondent's Tallahassee headquarters was appointed to consider Petitioner's bid and arrive at appropriate recommendations. On June 7, 1979, one of the committee members, accompanied by several officials of the West Palm Beach Office, inspected Petitioner's building and the surrounding area to determine its suitability for the proposed unemployment compensation office. Based upon statements made by those officials and the building's tenant that the area was unsafe and subject to frequent vandalism and theft, the committee member thereafter recommended to the selection committee that the bid be rejected and that the Department should readvertise for new bids. The committee unanimously accepted the recommendation and, on June 13, 1979, Petitioner was advised in a letter from the Respondent's support services director that his bid had been rejected based on the "inability of the building to meet our programmatic needs." Petition thereafter protested the decision and, as a result, the Secretary of the Department, Wallace E. Orr, directed the entire committee to make an on-site evaluation of the property and surrounding area. Thereafter, on July 18, 1979, the committee visited the site. At this time, each committee member, together with one of the officials of the local office, inquired of various businessmen in the surrounding area as to local criminal activity and solicited their opinion as to safety and security problems. One of the committee members also telephoned a city police desk sergeant concerning crime statistics in the area. (Testimony of Petitioner, Lowhorn, Orr, Bradner, Exhibits 3-4, 12) Petitioner gave the committee members a petition from a number of local businessmen supporting his bid, and a letter from the nearby Good Samaritan Hospital advising that it may construct a medical office building adjacent to the hospital in the future. Letters were also sent to the Department by the manager of an apartment building adjacent to Petitioner's premises stating that the area was safe and that there had been no break-ins in more than four years, and from the Mayor of West Palm Beach to the Secretary of the Department describing the area and asserting that it was making a resurgence in character as a result of city improvements and that it was no more unsafe than most of the areas of the city. Another letter, dated July 20, 1979, was sent to the Department from the West Palm Beach Downtown Development Authority Executive Director stating that the area was growing, new buildings were being developed, and that the downtown area generally was becoming a "hub" for governmental facilities. Upon return to Tallahassee, each member of the bid committee rendered a report and recommendations concerning Petitioner's bid. They applied weighted criteria in its consideration, and concluded that the bid was unacceptable because it failed to meet the two criteria of "condition of immediate vicinity of location" and "security of the facility." In these respects, they basically found that (a) the various businesses in the area were essentially "fortified" against burglary and vandalism, (b) the proposed office would be subjected to break-ins and possible loss of valuable office equipment and unemployment compensation checks, (c) the local departmental employees would be fearful of working in an unsafe area and (d) an office located at Petitioner's premises would be "depressing" to members of the public who utilized the departmental services. No mention was made in the various reports of the petition or letters sent to the Department by civic officials. The committee again recommended rejection of the bid and, by letter of August 1, 1979, Petitioner was advised of this fact and that new calls for bids would be made in the near future. Secretary Orr had viewed the premises himself and agreed with the committee recommendations that the site was unsuitable for the establishment of a local office. He felt that placement of the office in the area where Petitioner's building was located would be inconsistent with departmental goals to upgrade their state offices and improve their "image." He had not been made aware of most of the various letters and the petition provided to the committee, but had considered the letter of the West Palm Beach Mayor prior to arriving at his decision. (Testimony of Butler, Frisch, Radner, Baker, Orr, Lowhorn, Renfroe, Quigg, Petitioner, Exhibits 6-10, 11-12, 16) The street on which Petitioner's building is located is commercial in nature, although it is on the fringe of a residential community. It is an older part of the city and, until about five years ago, was in a rundown and depressed condition. In recent years, however, there has been an upgrading of the character of the downtown area of West Palm Beach which extends northerly to encompass the businesses in Petitioner's vicinity. The establishment of governmental facilities in the downtown and adjacent areas have been encouraged and a state office building is located in the area. A Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services "halfway house" has been erected approximately two blocks from Petitioner's building. Additionally, a branch banking facility, professional offices, several quality restaurants, and other modern business establishments are in the near vicinity. A laundry plant is across the street from Petitioner's building and at the present time presents an unsatisfactory appearance. It is intended, however, by the owners to expand and remodel the building in the near future. The City of West Palm Beach has the second highest crime incident rate in the state based on population. The city is divided into ten zones for police purposes, and during 1978, the zone in which Petitioner's building is located was average from the standpoint of crime statistics. In the opinion of the City Chief Police Inspector, it is typical of the various commercial areas located along U.S. Federal Highway No. 1, and as safe an area in the daytime as any in the city. He is of the further opinion that a burglar alarm would be a sufficient security precaution for nighttime safety, and that with such protection, a building would have adequate security. The highest crime rate in the city is located in the zone where the city hall, police station and other governmental buildings are located. Although business and professional individuals in the area near Petitioner's building have experienced minor vandalism and occasional illegal entries in the past, they uniformly are of the opinion that the area is safe with normal security precautions, such as a burglar alarm. A local boat sales establishment has a fence around the premises and a watch dog, but no burglar alarm. These precautions are designed to protect the expensive boats which are located out- side the building. The apartment building next to Petitioner's premises has not experienced break-ins in recent years although some of its elderly patrons have been exposed to occasional purse snatching on the street. The laundry plant across the street from Petitioner's building experiences various window breakage by youths on the weekends, and had a break-in recently in the nighttime through a poorly secured door in the rear of the premises. (Testimony of Lowhorn, Stackhouse, Hauser, Hodges, Lee, Lunney, Eddy, Ring, Eaton, DeSanti, Witt (Deposition - Exhibit 1), Exhibits 12-14).

Recommendation That Petitioner's bid be accepted by Respondent and recommended for approval to the Department of General Services. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John C. Moyle, Esquire 707 North Flagler Drive Post Office Box 3888 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Kenneth H. Hart, Jr. and Chad J. Motes, Esquires Department of Labor and Employment Security 2561 Executive Center Circle E. Suite 131 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 255.25
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs JEAN-ANTOINE PIERRE, 13-002264PL (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jun. 18, 2013 Number: 13-002264PL Latest Update: Apr. 06, 2025
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs GLEN H. THURLOW, 93-002593 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida May 10, 1993 Number: 93-002593 Latest Update: Jul. 25, 1995

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Glen Thurlow (Thurlow), was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission) on June 15, 1982, and was issued Certificate Number 02-3128. Thurlow has been employed by the West Palm Beach Police Department (WPBPD) for the last eight years. On the evening of November 24, 1990, Thurlow was assigned as a police officer to the WPBPD Criminal Apprehension Team (CAT), which is a street crimes unit. That evening Thurlow was partnered for the first time with Lee Rollins (Rollins), a fellow police officer on CAT. Thurlow and Rollins were assigned as plain clothes officers in an unmarked police vehicle, an old, gold Cadillac. Thurlow had on a black T-shirt, combat pants, black combat boots, duty leather and underneath his shirt a bullet-proof vest with a trauma plate. Rollins was dressed in a black T-shirt and jeans. He was not wearing duty leather, but was wearing a utility belt fastened with velcro. Both officers wore their police badges on a chain underneath their shirts. Around 10:30 p.m., near the end of their duty shift, they were returning to the police station. Thurlow was driving south on South Dixie Highway headed toward the Belvedere Road intersection. As they approached the intersection, the officers saw a man, later identified as Robert Jewett (Jewett), dressed in cut-off jeans, a T-shirt, and a cap standing near the middle of the south bound lanes on South Dixie Highway past the Belvedere Road intersection, near the Palm Beach Post Building. The officers continued through the Belvedere Road intersection toward Jewett. As they approached Jewett, he stuck out his left hand in a "hitchhiking gesture." Thurlow pulled over to the side of the road near the parking lot of the Palm Beach Post Building. When Thurlow pulled over, Jewett ran up to the car and got in the back seat. Rollins showed Jewett his police badge, told Jewett that he was a police officer, and requested Jewett to step outside the car. Jewett complied. Rollins exited the Cadillac and Thurlow remained inside. Rollins asked Jewett for his driver's license, which Jewett gave him. Rollins radioed the police dispatcher with the information on the driver's license in order to determine whether there were any outstanding warrants on Jewett. Rollins advised Jewett that he was going to charge him with hitchhiking, but that if there were no warrants against Jewett that he would be given a Notice to Appear and released at the scene, rather than being taken down to the police station. Rollins told Jewett to place his hands on top of the car and spread his legs so that Rollins could search him for weapons. Jewett complied. Thurlow, still sitting in the driver's seat, was monitoring the conversation between Rollins and Jewett. Rollins began the weapons search at Jewett's shoulder and continued down to his left pocket. Finding nothing, he started to search the right pocket. At that time Jewett brought his right arm down from the top of the car. Rollins caught his arm, put it back on top of the car, and told him to keep his hands on the top of the car. As Rollins proceeded to search Jewett's right pocket, Jewett brought his right arm down and stuck it in his pocket. At the same time he came around with his left elbow and hit Rollins on the left side of his chest, knocking him around. Rollins pulled Jewett's hand out of his pocket and they began to struggle. Rollins pulled his flashlight from his back pocket and tried to hit Jewett on his left forearm. Jewett tried to kick Rollins in the groin and Rollins grabbed Jewett's T-shirt. Their feet tangled, the men went down and Rollins fell back toward the car, hitting his head on the back door. Rollins was stunned from the blow to his head. Thurlow felt the Cadillac rock as if someone had bumped against the car. Rollins called to Thurlow to give him some assistance. Thurlow exited the car and came around to the passenger side, where he saw Rollins sitting on the ground with his back to the car, and Jewett straddling and leaning over Rollins with his arms raised as if he were preparing to hit Rollins. Thurlow ran up behind Jewett and put his arm below Jewett's Adam's apple in Jewett's upper chest area in order to pull Jewett back from Rollins. Jewett began to fight and had Thurlow on the balls of his feet. They went towards the front of the car. Jewett went down on his knees with Thurlow's arm still around him. Jewett stood up with Thurlow on his back and they both went backwards, and as a result Thurlow's arm slipped up towards Jewett's chin. Rollins, seeing Jewett put his right hand in his pocket, ran over to Jewett and tried to grab his right hand. The three men fell to the ground and rolled backwards landing in a grassy area. Thurlow still had his arm around Jewett's neck. Thurlow was on the bottom, Jewett in the middle and Rollins on top. Thurlow released his hold on Jewett and slipped out from under Jewett. Thurlow was on Jewett's left side and Rollins was sitting to Jewett's right, about, waist-high facing away from Jewett. Jewett was grabbing at his right pocket. Rollins saw a metal object in the area of Jewett's right pocket. Rollins took his flashlight and swiped at the metal object, sending both the flashlight and the metal object flying off in an easterly direction. Rollins told Jewett to quit struggling. Jewett grabbed the butt of Rollins' gun. Rollins hollered to Thurlow that Jewett had his gun. Rollins hit Jewett in the groin three to four times. Thurlow got up and threw a punch at Jewett connecting at Jewett's left eye. At that point Jewett quit fighting. Thurlow held Jewett's arm over the curb and told Rollins to handcuff Jewett. Having lost his handcuffs in the struggle, Rollins used Thurlow's handcuffs and cuffed Jewett's hands behind his back. All three men were breathing hard and sweating. Rollins told Thurlow that he had lost his flashlight and that something had been thrown out of Jewett's hand during the struggle. Thurlow left Rollins with Jewett and went to look for the lost items. At the time Thurlow left Rollins and Jewett, Jewett was breathing. During the struggle, Rollins' handcuffs, radio, and ammo pouch came off his belt. Rollins found his radio and called the dispatcher at 22:35:52 hours to report the incident. He then went to look for the rest of his missing equipment and was gone approximately one to one and a half minutes. Rollins returned to Jewett and started to pick him up; however Jewett was limp. Rollins put him back on the ground and tried to take his pulse. Because Rollins was still in an excited state from the fight, he could not tell whether he was getting a pulse from Jewett. He tried to take Jewett's pulse again but still could not determine whether he was getting a pulse. Thurlow, having found the flashlight in the grass and an open pocketknife on the sidewalk, walked back over to Rollins and Jewett. Thurlow asked Rollins if something was wrong with Jewett, and Rollins replied that Jewett did not look well. At 22:39:54 hours Thurlow radioed for the paramedics. At 22:43:35 hours, Thurlow again radioed for the paramedics to hurry and get to the scene. Rollins again checked for a pulse but could not determine whether there was a pulse. A few minutes later firefighters, responding to a medical call, arrived on the scene. One of the firefighters checked Jewett's pulse and breathing and determined that Jewett was not breathing and did not have a pulse. Jewett was pale with some discoloration and swelling about the face. Within several seconds, the rescue team arrived. The rescue team got Jewett uncuffed and began to administer advanced life support. Jewett was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. Both Thurlow and Rollins were trained to administer CPR; however the unmarked police vehicle did not contain rubber gloves or a bag which are used in administering CPR to protect the person administering CPR from diseases such as AIDS which could be transmitted by bodily fluids. Additionally, Jewett appeared to be breathing, which would mean that he was not a candidate for CPR. At the time of the incident, Joseph Huffman and his girlfriend were traveling north on South Dixie Highway in a van. The van had windows on the rear doors and on the passenger and driver doors. As Mr. Huffman approached the Palm Beach Post parking lot, he saw two men scuffling on the hood of the gold Cadillac. He began to slow down to watch the fracas. He observed the fight for approximately 20 to 30 seconds, during which time he looked over to the El Cid Bar to see if anyone was watching. His girlfriend observed that Huffman tried to look at the fight through his side mirror but couldn't see so he stuck his head out the driver's window and glanced back once or twice, looking forward to check the approaching traffic. Huffman recalled seeing a third man strike Jewett at least 20 times in the groin with a flashlight; however the medical evidence does not support Mr. Huffman's assertion. Having judged the credibility of the witness, I find that Mr. Huffman's recollection is not credible. An autopsy was performed on Jewett by the Palm Beach County Medical Examiner, Dr. James Benz. The autopsy revealed that Jewett had a black eye, markings on the forehead and neck area, minor bruises and abrasions on the right forearm, abrasions on the knees, and abrasions on the right wrist. Jewett suffered fractured ribs and bruising of the left lung underlying the rib fractures. There was a "blow out" of the heart. There was hemorrhaging underneath the Adam's apple and an irregular fracture in the lamana below the Adam's apple. The hyoid bone, which sits above the voice box, was fractured. There were no injuries to the upper thighs, penis or lower abdomen. There was a mild bruise in the testicle area and hemorrhaging in the left testicle. The injuries to the testicles are not consistent with Jewett's being hit between 10 to 20 times with a flashlight in the groin. The "blow out" of Jewett's heart is called a cardiac tamponade. Most probably as a result of the impact to Jewett's chest when he, Rollins, and Thurlow fell to the ground, a thin area of Jewett's heart blew out forming a small hole in Jewett's heart. The heart pumped blood through the small hole into the pericardial sac. As a result of the blood flowing into the pericardial sac, the heart could not expand and death occurred. The cardiac tamponade did not occur after Jewett died nor did it occur in a peri-mortem, near-death state. The cardiac tamponade did occur while Jewett was alive and death occurred some time later. Based on the testimony of Dr. Charles Petty, an expert in forensic pathology, I find that the injuries to Jewett's neck occurred as a result of forceful application of force to the neck, which is consistent with a fall across a rounded object such as a forearm rather than police carotid holds and choke downs. The Use of Force Matrix from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement is the state standard concerning the use of force by law enforcement officers. The matrix lists the resistance levels of a subject and indicates the appropriate level of force to be used by an officer in responding to the various levels of resistance. An aggressive physical resistance is defined as overt, hostile attacking movements which may cause injury, but are not likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. Aggravated physical resistance is when the subject makes overt, hostile, attacking movements with or without a weapon, with the intent and apparent ability to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. The resistance level of Jewett when he was straddled and leaning over Rollins as Rollins was up against the fender of the Cadillac and Jewett's actions at the front of the car with Thurlow constitutes aggressive physical resistance. The matrix guidelines indicate that an officer may use all levels of force with the exception of deadly force in dealing with aggressive physical resistance. When Thurlow grabbed Jewett from behind to remove Jewett from his position of standing over Rollins, Thurlow was not using deadly force. His arm was not under Jewett's chin but was lower, nearer the upper chest area. The resistance level of Jewett when he was trying to get Rollins' gun constitutes aggravated physical resistance. The matrix guidelines for force to counter aggravated physical resistance include among other things, counter moves, incapacitation, and deadly force. Deadly force includes techniques that may result in imminent or serious injury, unconsciousness or permanent disfigurement, such as impact weapon strikes to the head or use of firearms. Thus, Thurlow's punch to Jewett's face was within the matrix guidelines.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Glen H. Thurlow. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2593 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1-3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance with the exception of the word "allegedly" which is rejected. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 10-12: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance; however it should be noted that it appeared to Thurlow that Jewett was about to strike Rollins. Paragraph 17: The first and second sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The evidence established that Thurlow jumped across Jewett's back, placing his arm across Jewett below Jewett's Adam's apple. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: Accepted that Thurlow and Jewett continued to struggle. Rejected that Thurlow continued to maintain a choke hold on Jewett. The greater weight of the evidence established that Thurlow's arm did not slip up under Jewett's chin until Jewett and Thurlow began to fall backward. Paragraph 19: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20: Accepted in substance with the exception of "continued to hold Mr. Jewett in a choke hold." The evidence established that Thurlow's did not have a choke hold on Jewett until they fell backwards and that the choke hold was not an intentional action but rather resulted from the struggle between Jewett and Thurlow and Rollins running into them. Paragraph 21-22: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 23: Accepted in substance except to the extent that such finding implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett at the time that Huffman saw them. Paragraphs 24-26: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that Huffman's testimony concerning the repeated striking of Jewett in his groin not to be credible, particularly considering the medical evidence and the fact that Huffman was driving down the street while he was trying to look at the fight and keep track of traffic both in front of and behind him. Paragraph 27: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 30: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett the entire time that they were struggling. The evidence established that Thurlow did not start out with a choke hold but that during the struggle, Thurlow's arm slipped underneath Jewett's chin. Paragraphs 31-35: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: Accepted in substance to the extent that at one point in time while Jewett was supine on the ground his head was turned toward Thurlow and he grabbed Thurlow's shirt but rejected to the extent that it implies that during the entire time Jewett was on the ground he was looking at Thurlow and grabbing Thurlow's shirt. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: Accepted in substance to the extent that Thurlow did hear Rollins shout that Jewett had grabbed his gun and to the extent that Thurlow did not see Jewett actually grab the gun. Rejected to the extent that the word "claiming" implies that Rollins may not have shouted to Thurlow that Jewett had his gun and rejected to the extent that the last part of the sentence could be construed to mean that Thurlow did not see Jewett's right arm reach in the direction of Rollins' holster. Paragraphs 39-40: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 41: Accepted in substance with the exception of the word "allegedly." Paragraphs 42-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: The portion relating to rendering medical assistance is accepted in substance. The portion relating to never checking on the well being of Jewett is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Thurlow did inquire of Rollins concerning the condition of Thurlow before he called for the paramedics. Paragraph 47: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 48: Accepted in substance to the extent that Rollins did not render any first aid but rejected to the extent that Thurlow always had an unobscured view of Jewett. The evidence established that Thurlow was looking for the knife and the flashlight during a portion of the time . Paragraph 49: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 50-51: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 52-53: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 54: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 55: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 56: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 57-59: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 60-73: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 74: Accepted in substance to the extent that Jewett was lying on the ground, was bloody, and was not moving. In light of the testimony of Mr. Cook that Jewett's skin was pale and there was discoloration about his face, I do not find Mr. Bouchillion's testimony that Jewett was turning blue to be credible. Paragraph 75: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 76-77: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 78-86: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 87: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 88: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 89: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 90-96: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 97: Having considered the opinions of Dr. Benz and Dr. Petty, I reject the finding to the extent that it implies that the fractures resulted from a choke hold applied prior to Thurlow, Jewett, and Rollin falling down and rolling into the grassy area. Paragraph 98: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 99: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 100: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 101: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 102: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 103: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 104: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 105-109: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 110-111: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 112: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 113: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 114: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 115: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 116-117: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 118: Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 119: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Thurlow had a choke hold on Jewett from the time there were at the rear of the Cadillac until they fell backwards. The evidence established that Thurlow did not have Jewett in a choke hold when Thurlow grabbed Jewett from behind. Paragraph 120: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 121-125: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 2-3: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 4: The first and last sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 5-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The portion of the second sentence relating to Thurlow being able to hear is accepted but the portion that Thurlow could see everything is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The last sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that Thurlow thought that he needed to monitor the traffic but the greater weight of the evidence established that the Cadillac was not in the lane of traffic while it was parked. Paragraphs 10-27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28-30: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 31: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 32: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn P. Whitehurst, Esquire Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Gene "Hal" Johnson, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Scott N. Richardson, Esquire Atterbury, Goldberger & Richardson One Clear Lake Center, Suite 1400 250 Australian Avenue, South West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5012 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (6) 120.57776.05776.07784.03943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.0011
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION vs DEZI BAKSAY, 01-003539 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Sep. 07, 2001 Number: 01-003539 Latest Update: Apr. 06, 2025
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RALPH D. TURLINGTON, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs. HENRIETTA FORBES, 81-001756 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001756 Latest Update: Jul. 06, 1982

Findings Of Fact Respondent holds Florida teaching certificate number 380391, Post Graduate, Rank II, valid through June 30, 1986, covering the areas of math and junior college. Respondent was employed in the public schools of Palm Beach County as a math teacher at Lake Shore Middle School for the 1979-1980 school year. During the first few weeks of school, Respondent summoned her students into the classroom by shouting an obscenity at them and staged a funeral ceremony for a dead rat in her math class. Students reported these incidents to the principal and to the assistant principal for administration at Lake Shore Middle School. Respondent told another teacher in her carpool that she had found herself in the emergency room of a hospital and did not know how she had gotten there or why she was there. She further admitted being under the care of a psychiatrist. On October 12, 1979, Respondent was seen outside chasing students in an attempt to get them into her classroom, including students that did not belong there. Later, Assistant Principal Davis took Respondent out of her classroom and sent her to the teachers' lounge since she was unable to maintain control over her students in the classroom. Respondent later became subject to alternating outbursts of laughing and crying, without apparent reason. Respondent was driven home by the members of her carpool. Respondent did not return to Lake Shore Middle School. She was absent without leave from October 13, 1979, until her written resignation was accepted by the Palm Beach County School Board on December 3, 1979. On June 18, 1979, Respondent was arrested for possession of marijuana. She elected to participate in the Palm Beach County Pre-Trial Intervention Program. On November 8, 1979, Respondent was again arrested for possession of marijuana. Respondent was not prosecuted pursuant to the first arrest because of her participation and completion of the Pre-Trial Intervention Program. The record in this cause contains no evidence as to the disposition of Respondent's second arrest. The Petition for the Revocation of Teacher's Certificate dated July 29, 1980, was mailed by certified mail to Respondent at her last-known address. This and all subsequent mailings to her at her last-known address were returned marked "Unclaimed." Notice of Action was published in The Post, a Palm Beach County newspaper. Respondent's present whereabouts is unknown to each of the Petitioner's witnesses.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered revoking the teaching certificate of Henrietta Forbes, certificate number 380391. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Woods, Johnston, Carlson & Sanford 1030 East Lafayette Street Suite 112 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Donald L. Griesheimer Executive Director Education Practices Commission 125 Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ms. Henrietta Forbes 1812 "B" Road Loxahatchee, Florida 33470

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs MARY MALONEY, 15-007092PL (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Dec. 16, 2015 Number: 15-007092PL Latest Update: Apr. 06, 2025
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