The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent’s license to practice as a medical doctor based on allegations that he violated sections 458.331(1)(t), (m), and (q), Florida Statutes (2008-2010), as alleged in Petitioner’s Amended Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the testimony presented at the final hearing, exhibits accepted into evidence, admitted facts set forth in the pre-hearing stipulation, and matters officially recognized. The Parties and the Origin of This Litigation The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to chapter 456, Florida Statutes (2006-2017). At all times relevant to the instant case, Dr. McKenzie was a Florida-licensed physician having been issued license ME 93485. Dr. McKenzie is also licensed to practice medicine in Alabama. Dr. McKenzie is board-certified in internal medicine with sub-specialties in pulmonary disease and sleep medicine. Dr. McKenzie earned his medical degree at the University of South Alabama (“USA”) in May of 2000. Over the next three years, Dr. McKenzie completed an internship and a residency in Internal Medicine at USA. By June of 2005, Dr. McKenzie had left USA after completing a fellowship in “Pulmonary & Sleep Medicine, Critical Care.” Dr. Victor Ortega has a medical practice in Panama City, Florida, known as Pulmonary Associates, and Dr. McKenzie began working for Dr. Ortega on approximately July 1, 2005. Dr. McKenzie had no ownership interest in Pulmonary Associates. He was an employee of Dr. Ortega. Therefore, Dr. Ortega owned the medical records for the patients Dr. McKenzie treated at Pulmonary Associates. Dr. McKenzie worked at Pulmonary Associates until July of 2006, and the separation was acrimonious. Dr. McKenzie elected to leave Pulmonary Associates after learning that the compensation system instituted by Dr. Ortega unfairly enriched him at the expense of his associates.1/ Dr. McKenzie began practicing at Bay Clinic, Inc. (“Bay Clinic”), in Panama City in July 2006, and continued there through May 2009. At Bay Clinic, Dr. McKenzie shared office space and administrative expenses with Dr. Jesus Ramirez. Dr. McKenzie had no ownership interest in Bay Clinic. The record is unclear as to whether Dr. McKenzie had an employment contract with Bay Clinic. In May of 2009, Dr. McKenzie opened his own practice at The Lung and Sleep Center in Panama City. Dr. McKenzie owns The Lung and Sleep Center, and he owns the medical records for the patients he treats there. In addition to his practice at The Lung and Sleep Center, Dr. McKenzie is a staff physician at Bay Medical Center, Select Specialty Hospital, and Health South in Panama City. Since August of 2015, Dr. McKenzie has been a clinical instructor for the nurse practitioner program at USA. Because Dr. McKenzie has been practicing in close proximity to Pulmonary Associates, Dr. Ortega sued Dr. McKenzie in 2011 in order to enforce a non-compete agreement.2/ During the course of that litigation, Dr. Ortega’s attorney asked Dr. McKenzie during a deposition whether he had ever treated a current or former employee with narcotic medications at Pulmonary Associates. Because Dr. McKenzie had rendered such treatment to K.D., he responded affirmatively. On January 28, 2011, Dr. Ortega wrote the following letter to the Board of Medicine: A deposition with Dr. McKenzie took place and is enclosed. Dr. McKenzie acknowledged under sworn statement that he had prescribed controlled substances for employees at Pulmonary Associates of Bay County. That person, of course, was [K.D.]. Dr. McKenzie’s attorney opposed any further questioning alleging privacy violations, etc. Since [K.D.] was our employee and he was under contract and under the privacy and umbrella of our corporation, that record keeping was by contract to be kept under our protection. As I understand it, this is a criminal occurrence and violation of the prescription of controlled substances. I am forwarding all this to the law enforcement agency and to the state with the hope that you will proceed accordingly with prosecution and stop this practice as soon as possible. I recognize that the problem of illegal use, abuse, and prescription of controlled substances is a significant issue throughout the United States. This represents one more way in which drugs are being diverted from their legal and appropriate use. To this day I am certain that this illegal prescription practice continues with different individuals. The rapid check of prescriptions at the local pharmacies for controlled substances, particularly Lortab, Dilaudid, etc., by this physician will reveal a number of individuals which I am sure will not have corresponding medical record entries to justify the use of pain control medication by appropriate evaluation, diagnosis, and treatments as required by law. (emphasis added). Dr. Ortega ultimately identified A.W., R.W., and K.D. to the Department as patients who received inappropriate prescriptions from Dr. McKenzie. However, the Department and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s (“FDLE”) investigation began due to a confidential informant observing Dr. McKenzie disposing of pill bottles at a car wash. FDLE investigated the matter, but limited resources led to FDLE referring the case to the Department for administrative action. The Department’s allegations pertaining to A.W., R.W., and K.D. will be separately addressed below. Was Dr. McKenzie’s Treatment of A.W. Below the Standard of Care? A.W. has been a Florida-licensed nurse since April of 2007 and has worked at Bay Medical Center since 2005. She was in nursing school when her employment at Bay Medical Center began. A.W. and Dr. McKenzie were co-workers at Bay Medical Center. While Dr. McKenzie was married and A.W. was engaged, they began a romantic relationship in 2005 that continued until 2006 or 2007. When A.W. learned that Dr. McKenzie’s wife was pregnant, their relationship ended, and A.W. did not have any meaningful communication with Dr. McKenzie for the next year. Even though she was already treating with a general medicine practitioner who she considered to be her primary care physician, A.W. began treating with Dr. McKenzie in approximately April of 2009 because she was experiencing “really severe headaches,” anxiety, and abdominal pain. Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab, the brand name for an opioid pain medication consisting of acetaminophen and hydrocodone. Under section 893.03(3), Florida Statutes (2008-2017), hydrocodone, in the dosages found in Lortab, is a Schedule III controlled substance. From April of 2009 through October of 2010, Dr. McKenzie prescribed 90 Lortab pills a month to A.W. A.W. was to take one pill every six hours as needed for pain. When A.W. began treating with Dr. McKenzie, they resumed having a personal relationship. While A.W. describes their relationship at that time as being friendly rather than romantic, A.W. and Dr. McKenzie were having sex while Dr. McKenzie was writing prescriptions for her. A.W.’s first documented treatment with Dr. McKenzie at The Lung and Sleep Center occurred on July 22, 2009, and she presented with several issues. For instance, A.W. was experiencing anxiety, and Dr. McKenzie noted on the medical record that A.W. needed to see a psychiatrist. A.W. was also experiencing pain from multiple sources. Migraines were one source of pain, and Dr. McKenzie recommended continuing with Lortab and discussed obtaining a neurology consult. A.W. also had abdominal pain, and Dr. McKenzie discussed obtaining a colonoscopy and consulting with a gastroenterologist. In addition to migraines and abdominal pain, A.W. was experiencing pain from pleurisy. Pleurisy is inflammation of the lining of the lungs, and its symptoms include chest and back pain. It is characterized by a sharp pain that worsens with deep breaths. Pleurisy is treated with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (“NSAIDs”) such as Motrin, Aleve, and ibuprofen. If NSAIDs have no effect, then, narcotics can be used. A.W.’s next documented treatment at The Lung and Sleep Center occurred on December 9, 2009. Dr. McKenzie noted in the medical record associated with that office visit that A.W. had gastroesophageal reflux disease, i.e., GERD. In order to treat that condition, Dr. McKenzie prescribed over-the-counter Prilosec and advised A.W. to avoid NSAIDs because they can aggravate heartburn. If a patient cannot take NSAIDs, then Lortab is a reasonable alternative. By the time of her next documented office visit at The Lung and Sleep Center on July 22, 2009, A.W. was still suffering from anxiety, abdominal pain, and pleurisy. A.W. had neglected to obtain any of the consultations recommended by Dr. McKenzie. Dr. McKenzie testified that it can be difficult to get patients to obtain consultations: So a lot of times, it’s hard to get people to be compliant. Nobody wants to go and have scopes in both ends, but especially when something flares up and goes away, because every time you see – it’s like taking your car to the mechanic, when you take it to the mechanic, it quits knocking. So a lot of these people come in, well, it’s not that bad. And they they go home and it will be bad. So a lot of times it’s hard to get them to be compliant with these. Because the [esophagogastroduodenoscopy] and the colonoscopy, I don’t know if anybody has had one, but they can be unpleasant, at best. Because A.W. is a nurse, Dr. McKenzie assumed that she would eventually obtain the consultations: [O]ne thing about A.W. is she’s a nurse. And so you kind of put more weight, because a normal patient, when they say, well, I’m going to call psychiatry, or I’m going to get this down or this done, you know, then you may push them a little harder. But if you have a medical professional, when they tell you that, well, I’ll call this and I’ll do that, you kind of put more weight to that. And so, you know, she did – you know, and she was told, and she said, well, I’ll call psychiatry. And then she would call – was going to call GI and she was going to call neurology. And she eventually did, of course. When asked about prescribing narcotics for a year to a patient who was not obtaining the recommended consultations, Dr. McKenzie testified as follows: So you give people the benefit of the doubt. And her symptoms would come and go. And then she said – like I said, she kept saying, well, I’m going to go see this person, see this person. She worked nights. She had a lot of compounding issues that would make it harder for her to follow up and be compliant. Dr. McKenzie did not have an office visit with A.W. every time that he wrote a prescription for her. The next documented visit by A.W. to The Lung and Sleep Center occurred on December 9, 2009. The medical record notes that A.W. continued to have stomach pain. As a result, she was to continue avoiding NSAIDs, and she was supposed to consult with a gastroenterologist. A.W. was still suffering from pleurisy, anxiety, and migraines. A.W.’s next documented treatment at The Lung and Sleep Center occurred on May 5, 2010. A.W. still had not obtained the consultations mentioned above, and Dr. McKenzie recognized that doing so would be difficult because A.W. was working nights. A.W.’s last documented treatment at The Lung and Sleep Center occurred on October 11, 2010. She still had not obtained the consultations previously recommended by Dr. McKenzie. Dr. McKenzie notified A.W. during this office visit that he would not prescribe any more pain medication until she obtained the psychiatry, neurology, and gastroenterology consultations they had discussed. A.W. then treated with Dr. Mariusz J. Klin, a gastroenterologist, on November 24, 2010. Dr. Klin performed an endoscopy on A.W. and discovered that she was suffering from “severe gastritis from NSAIDs and a 2 centimeter hernia.” Dr. McKenzie testified that severe gastritis is painful. A lot of people call the ambulance, you know, they get all kinds of heart workup and all kinds of pulmonary workup and they did a lot of workup because of the severe pain. And it’s episodic. You can have episodes where you won’t have any issues and then you’ll have flare-ups and have issues. Dr. McKenzie testified that a hiatal hernia can be painful: It can be. A lot of times your – what causes a hiatal hernia is your stomach and your esophagus are above the diaphragm. And your esophagus fits into your diaphragm like a lock and key. And so if your esophagus is in the right place, it helps close off the stomach so the acid can’t come out. Well, when you have a hernia, it pulls the lock and key in the wrong direction to be optimal, so now the stomach acid can leak out and cause more of a problem. Dr. Francisco Calimano, the Department’s expert witness, reviewed A.W.’s medical records and provided expert testimony on the Department’s behalf. Dr. Calimano is licensed to practice medicine in Florida and is board-certified in internal medicine, pulmonary medicine, and critical care medicine. Dr. Calimano testified that the amount of Lortab prescribed to A.W. by Dr. McKenzie was “excessive.” However, Dr. Calimano’s objection was directed more toward the length of time that Dr. McKenzie prescribed 90 Lortab pills a month, rather than the monthly amount of Lortab prescribed. Specifically, Dr. Calimano testified that he would do no more than a two to three month Lortab prescription for a patient with migraines, anxiety, and abdominal pain: In my opinion, you know, in my professional opinion, you know, at least in the scope of practice that I have, which I am not a pain specialist, I wouldn’t go for this length of time prescribing this amount of narcotics. I will feel uncomfortable doing that. So I think that I would refer to the pain management specialist. I would have been, you know, up to the point I said, you know, usually what I tell my patients is I give you a prescription, because you are having acute pain. I might give a second prescription if the pain is not resolved or so with the understanding that he needs to get that addressed. Before I give him that second prescription, I tell him I no longer will prescribe you these medications. And so before she runs out of that prescription, she knows in advance that it’s a no, the answer is no. That she needs to get some help, professional help. Because I think if not I would be doing a disfavor. Dr. David Hart Goldstein provided expert testimony on Dr. McKenzie’s behalf. Dr. Goldstein is licensed to practice medicine in Florida, and he practices internal, pulmonary, and hospital medicine at Sarasota Memorial Hospital. In addition, Dr. Goldstein currently works as an Assistant Clinical Professor of Internal, Pulmonary, and Hospitalist Medicine at Florida State University’s School of Medicine. Dr. Goldstein rendered a different opinion regarding Dr. McKenzie’s treatment of A.W. and the Lortab prescriptions: Q: Does anything appear remarkable to you in terms of the dosage? A: The dosages are on the high side. But when a patient has severe pain sometimes you need a higher dose. It seems that Dr. McKenzie was managing this patient for a long period of time. There was no pain specialist involved at that time. Q: From your review of the record, did it appear that patient A.W. had significant gastric distress? A: Yes. In fact, it appears from the record and the note by Dr. Klin that she tried other methods to relieve the pain. The reasons I say that is his diagnosis was severe gastritis related to the use of NSAIDs. Meaning that she tried using things like Advil. So that caused the issue. So NSAIDs would be prohibited. And this would be consistent with a person who has, according to the record, significant headaches, abdominal pain, which was [caused] by gastritis and pleurisy. Q: So from your review of the records, particularly Dr. Klin’s clinical records, would it be appropriate if NSAIDs were not effective to step up to a Lortab prescription? A: If that was the only way the patient’s pain could be managed, yes. * * * Q: So taking all of these records together, did you see anything clinically inappropriate as to either the medical care or the prescribing that Dr. McKenzie offered to patient A.W. during this timeframe? A: The only thing is as I mentioned – I think I mentioned it in my deposition also. There are a lot of prescriptions for Lortab. The medical record documents that she has a lot of pain. I think there might have been better documentation of the fact that this was failing or this was working. So I am not that impressed with the documentation, but the record is consistent with symptoms that can be treated and are often treated with narcotics such as Percocet or Lortab. Q: Dr. Goldstein, did you see anything that appeared to you to be a practice beneath the standard of care? A: Just as I mentioned, I don’t think the records were great, but I don’t believe that’s a deviation of the standard of care. I just think that’s poor recordkeeping. As for the length of time that Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab to A.W., Dr. Goldstein testified that, “I would not prescribe it for a year unless I was comfortable that this patient had made attempts to see a neurologist and had migraines and was not abusing this medication.” Because A.W.’s gastric issues prevented her from taking NSAIDs, Dr. Goldstein opined that it was appropriate to treat A.W.’s headache pain, abdominal pain, and pleurisy with Lortab. With regard to the fact that Dr. McKenzie wrote prescriptions for A.W. without a corresponding office visit, Dr. Calimano acknowledged that “you don’t absolutely need a face-to-face contact with the patient if you have established a diagnosis and you are sure of what you are treating and so on.” Nevertheless, Dr. Calimano objected to Dr. McKenzie not doing more to treat the sources of A.W.’s pain, and the Department takes Dr. McKenzie to task because A.W.’s medical records do not set forth a treatment plan, objectives, etc. However, A.W. was a difficult patient because she did not obtain the consultations requested by Dr. McKenzie until he threatened to discharge her as a patient. Such consultations would be an essential prerequisite to formulating an effective treatment plan for A.W. If A.W. had obtained those consultations when she had been directed to do so, then her illnesses might have resolved much sooner. While Dr. McKenzie probably should have threatened to discharge A.W. sooner, he believed that A.W., as a medical professional, would eventually obtain the consultations, and he recognized that A.W.’s night shift work made it difficult for her to obtain those consultations. In sum, even Dr. Goldstein acknowledged that Dr. McKenzie’s recordkeeping for A.W. could have been better. However, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Dr. McKenzie’s treatment of A.W., under these particular circumstances, fell below the standard of care.3/ Did Dr. McKenzie Falsify A.W.’s Medical Records and Use Her to Illegally Obtain Lortab? Contrary to the medical records described above, A.W. asserts that she has never sought treatment at The Lung and Sleep Center. While she acknowledges visiting The Lung and Sleep Center, she asserts that she was only there as a friend of Dr. McKenzie and to assist her father with obtaining treatment.4/ A.W. testified that Dr. McKenzie never determined the cause of her headaches, her anxiety, or her abdominal pain. A.W. testified that Dr. McKenzie never performed a physical exam on her or discussed a treatment plan with her. A.W. also denies that she received any treatment from Dr. McKenzie at Bay Clinic, but she acknowledges visiting him there as a friend. As noted above, A.W.’s Lortab prescriptions enabled her to obtain 90 Lortab pills a month. As a result, she could take one pill every six hours. A.W. testified that she could not tolerate taking that amount of Lortab. The medicine made her drowsy and upset her stomach. A.W. also testified that she never had to take four Lortab pills in a single day in order to control her pain. After the first month of her treatment with Dr. McKenzie, A.W. testified that she continued to fill the Lortab prescriptions but gave a large majority of the pills to Dr. McKenzie. A.W. testified that she kept a few pills for those times when she would experience severe headaches or abdominal pain, and one pill a day was enough to keep her pain under control. As for why she gave large portions of her Lortab prescriptions to Dr. McKenzie, A.W. testified that she did so “[b]ecause he was my friend, and he had told me he was going through a lot, and he was embarrassed to go see a physician in town. He asked me if he wrote me a script could I give him some back or give it back to him.” During the time in question, Dr. McKenzie was experiencing marital difficulties and opening his own practice. A.W. testified that she would fill the Lortab prescriptions at a CVS Pharmacy in Panama City and then meet Dr. McKenzie in a parking lot so that she could give him the medication. A.W. and Dr. McKenzie’s personal relationship ended again in 2011 when A.W. became pregnant. At some point in 2011, A.W. was contacted by investigators from the Department and the Drug Enforcement Agency. A.W. then alerted Dr. McKenzie to the aforementioned agencies’ investigation. A.W. testified that she assisted Dr. McKenzie with fabricating medical records demonstrating that she had treated at The Lung and Sleep Center and that the Lortab prescriptions were medically necessary. She testified that she did so because Dr. McKenzie was her friend and she wanted the investigation to “go away.” Moreover, A.W. testified that she was worried that she could be charged with impaired nursing. When asked why she fabricated medical records, A.W. testified as follows: Because he was my friend and I didn’t want him to get in trouble for all of this, and I wanted it to be done with. I was worried about being a nurse and being a part of this. And I had been – the whole impaired nursing thing had been brought up, and I figured if I did this everything would just go away. A.W. learned of the Administrative Complaint when Dr. McKenzie showed it to her during a 2014 visit to his apartment. A.W. visited Dr. McKenzie’s apartment “quite a few times” and their last sexual encounter probably occurred in 2015. Despite testifying that she and Dr. McKenzie had been friends, A.W. testified against Dr. McKenzie at the final hearing and claimed that she was doing so because she felt it was the right thing to do and did not “want this over [her] head anymore.” Medical records from Dr. Klin and a Dr. Elzawahry memorialize treatment rendered to A.W. in October and November of 2010. However, those records, which were in the possession of The Lung and Sleep Center, bear a facsimile timestamp of March 1, 2011, and March 2, 2011. Those dates are four months after A.W.’s treatment dates. Also, the facsimile timestamps are seven days after the Department served Dr. McKenzie with a subpoena for A.W.’s medical records. While concerning, the facsimile timestamps do not conclusively demonstrate that Dr. McKenzie fabricated the records pertaining to A.W.’s treatment at The Lung and Sleep Center. While the undersigned has doubts about Dr. McKenzie’s credibility, there are reasons to question A.W.’s credibility. A.W. and Dr. McKenzie had a complicated relationship, and Dr. McKenzie is currently seeing another nurse employed at Bay Medical Center. The undersigned cannot ignore the possibility that A.W. and Dr. McKenzie’s prior relationship did not end on good terms. As noted above, Dr. Ortega brought A.W., R.W., and K.D. to the Department’s attention. The January 28, 2011, letter from Dr. Ortega to the Board of Medicine is suspicious because Dr. Ortega confidently states (without stating the basis for his assertions) that there are other patients who have received illegal prescriptions from Dr. McKenzie. Given the January 28, 2011, letter and the acrimony between them, one of Dr. McKenzie’s defenses to the Amended Administrative Complaint is that Dr. Ortega persuaded or coerced A.W., R.W., and K.D. to provide false testimony against him. It is possible that Dr. Ortega could be in a position to exercise some sort of leverage over A.W. due to the fact that Dr. Ortega works as a pulmonary doctor at Bay Medical Center and A.W. is a pulmonary nurse. During the hearing, A.W. acknowledged that she is taking 14 medications such as Latuda for psychosis; Ativan for anxiety; Prozac for depression; Nuvigil for Attention Deficit Disorder (“ADD”) and narcolepsy; Adderall for ADD; Fioricet for migraines; Metoprobol for hypertension; Lamictal for bipolar disorder; Carafate to coat her stomach; Prilosec for indigestion, gastric reflux, and gastritis; and Rispedal, a mood stabilizer associated with bipolar disorder. The fact that A.W. is currently receiving treatment for psychosis and bipolar disorder does not cause the undersigned to discredit her testimony. However, the undersigned cannot ignore the fact that there was no testimony as to what extent (if any) the aforementioned conditions affected her during the time period relevant to the instant case. In sum, there is evidence indicating that Dr. McKenzie used A.W. to obtain Lortab. Nevertheless, the evidence taken as a whole does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab to A.W. outside the course of his professional practice. Was Dr. McKenzie’s Treatment of R.W. Below the Standard of Care? R.W. was a Florida-licensed respiratory therapist from approximately 2000 to 2012. R.W. met Dr. McKenzie sometime between 2005 and 2006 when both of them were employed at Gulf Coast Medical Center. Dr. McKenzie and R.W. often worked together. While R.W. considered Dr. McKenzie to be a friend, they did not spend time together outside the hospital. Since his first marriage ended in 1993, R.W. had been taking Ativan in order to alleviate anxiety resulting from his divorce. Ativan is the brand name for Lorazepam and is prescribed for anxiety. According to section 893.03(4), Lorazepam is a Schedule IV controlled substance. Approximately one year after meeting Dr. McKenzie, R.W. inquired about becoming Dr. McKenzie’s patient. R.W. had become heavily dependent on Ativan and admits that he was engaging in “doctor shopping” in order to obtain more Ativan prescriptions. Other doctors had declined to treat R.W. because they believed he was taking too much Ativan: Q: So my question was about Dr. McKenzie and how did you begin treating as a patient with Dr. McKenzie. A: I was taking large amounts of Ativan. After that many years, you build up a tolerance to it. I [did] what was called doctor shopping. I had asked a couple of other physicians if they would follow me for my Ativan. Because generally I am healthy. And I had become dependent on it and was taking pretty large amounts of it and approached him about that, if he would prescribe it for me. Q: Did the other physicians you had asked to follow you begin following you and providing you with Ativan? A: No. Q: Why not? A: They said I was taking an incredibly large dose of it. They didn’t think I should be on that much. Q: Did they offer to take you as a patient and prescribe you alternatives? A: No. Q: They wouldn’t follow you altogether? A: They wouldn’t follow me altogether. They wanted to know who had been prescribing me that much. I guess it was because I wasn’t getting the answer I was wanting, I just didn’t pursue it any further. Q: So what did you do to get it after that? A: I approached Dr. McKenzie. Q: Was Dr. McKenzie aware that any other practitioners wouldn’t give it to you? A: I don’t know. I don’t believe I made that – I don’t know. Q: Do you recall how you approached Dr. McKenzie about the Ativan? A: Yeah. We were at the hospital. I approached him. I said, look, I am on Ativan. Explained the reason I was on it. I am on large doses of it. I need someone to follow me for this, is that something you could do. The first documented treatment occurred on November 2, 2007, when R.W. presented at Bay Clinic. A patient intake form indicates that R.W. placed notations on the form indicating that he was suffering from “anxiety/stress” and “problems with sleep.” A follow-up note dated November 20, 2007, lists Ativan as R.W.’s current medication and states that he will continue with Ativan. The note records the following: The patient follows up today. He is complaining of chest pain. He states that he has had chest pain in the center of his chest which radiated into both arms for about 15 minutes. He has had no further episodes of this. The patient had a normal stress test last year. We will try to obtain the results. The patient does have a smoking history. Today we did an EKG which showed no significant abnormalities. The patient states that he has been under a lot of stress. He continues to take his Ativan. The patient is an avid kick boxer[5/] and exercises often. Lab work was obtained. The patient knows to seek immediate medical attention for any worsening of his condition. The next documented treatment occurred on August 29, 2008, at Bay Clinic. The medical record reports the following: The patient follows up today. States that he has had no further chest pain. The patient does have significant anxiety. The patient has been on Ativan for several years. Risks, benefits, and alternatives [to] Ativan were explained to patient and patient voiced understanding. The patient does not want to decrease the Ativan. Does not want to change the Ativan. The patient denies suicidal or homicidal ideation. The patient jogs several miles each day. The patient exercises. The patient is a respiratory therapist, and I have contact with [the] patient every day. The patient is compliant with his medications. Does use it at the same pharmacy. The patient is under a narcotic contract here. If the patient violates his contract[6/], the patient knows that he will be discharged immediately. The patient knows to seek immediate medical attention for any worsening condition. The medical record notes that Dr. McKenzie will continue R.W. on Ativan. On January 24, 2009, R.W. was injured in an automobile accident. Another vehicle traveling 40 mph rammed into the back of R.W.’s Corvette. According to R.W., the other vehicle was traveling [f]ast enough to knock me from a red light. I was at a red light. I was in a Corvette. Fast enough to fold the tail end of my Corvette under and knock me across the intersection to the railroad tracks. Pretty hard. When asked if the accident was “significant,” R.W. responded by testifying that his car had been “totaled.” On February 9, 2009, R.W. received a prescription from Bay Clinic for Lortab, but no refills were authorized. On April 3, 2009, R.W. received a second prescription from Bay Clinic for Lortab. Again, no refills were authorized. The next documented treatment occurred at Bay Clinic on May 1, 2009. R.W. presented with anxiety and some depression. Dr. McKenzie discussed R.W. treating with a psychiatrist and prescribing Luvox, an antidepressant. This record notes that R.W. was still experiencing pain from the motor vehicle accident and that Dr. McKenzie “will try NSAIDs.” The next documented treatment occurred on July 23, 2009. With regard to R.W.’s anxiety, Dr. McKenzie wanted R.W. to see a psychiatrist, but R.W. refused. Dr. McKenzie noted in the medical record that he was going to begin decreasing R.W.’s Ativan dosage and replacing it with a short-acting benzodiazepine. Dr. McKenzie explained that he wanted to wean R.W. off of Ativan because: He had been on Ativan, as he testified, for 25 years before I met him. And the goal was to try to get him off the Ativan. And so, we were going to change him from a long- acting benzodiazepine Ativan to a short- acting one, Xanax. And so what you try to do is wean his Ativan down and then wean him to the short-acting, and it’s easier for people to get off the short-acting. But, somebody that’s been on benzodiazepines or like Ativan for 25 years, it does the same thing to your brain that alcohol does. And so abruptly withdrawing benzodiazepines can put people in DT’s, delirium tremens and with a 25 percent mortality, being that one in four people could die if you just took somebody off those medications. Given R.W.’s 25-year use of Ativan, slowly weaning R.W. from Ativan and to a less harmful anxiety drug was certainly a reasonable goal. The medical record indicates that R.W. was still experiencing back pain from the motor vehicle accident and had “failed NSAIDs.” The record notes that Dr. McKenzie and R.W. discussed obtaining x-rays. At that time, Dr. McKenzie began prescribing at least 90 Lortab pills per month to R.W. The next documented treatment occurred on November 20, 2009. R.W. was continuing to take Lortab for chronic back pain, and Dr. McKenzie was still in the process of weaning R.W. from Ativan. This record notes that R.W. refused a psychiatric consult. In February of 2010, Dr. McKenzie increased the Lortab prescription from 90 to 120 pills a month. The next documented treatment occurred on March 10, 2010. R.W. was still experiencing chronic back pain and anxiety. Dr. McKenzie noted that R.W. needed an MRI and consultations with an orthopedist and a pain management specialist. There is a notation in the record indicating that R.W. needed x-rays. However, R.W. reported that he needed to “check his funds” before obtaining the x-rays. In addition, there is a notation that Dr. McKenzie “will stop Lortab soon.” The next documented treatment occurred on August 12, 2010. R.W. was still experiencing chronic back pain, and Dr. McKenzie wanted R.W. to consult with an orthopedist and a pain management specialist. R.W. was aware that Dr. McKenzie wanted MRIs taken. R.W. was still experiencing anxiety, but the medical record notes that Dr. McKenzie was only going to prescribe one more refill of his medication. Dr. McKenzie noted on the record that R.W. stated, “I will get you. This is bullshit.” R.W. testified that his faith has enabled him to stop taking any medication other than BC headache powder. There is no dispute that Dr. McKenzie did not require an office visit from R.W. each time he wrote a prescription. With regard to whether that practice was appropriate, Dr. McKenzie testified as follows: Ideally we did but, like I said, sometimes patients would come in and pick up a prescription. And it’s kind of the rule that they have one each time but, like I said, that’s sometimes rules can’t be ideal. I mean, if you know the patient, and you know what the issues are, I don’t think there was any law or statute that said they need to be seen every single time. With regard to whether Dr. McKenzie’s treatment of R.W. fell below the standard of care, Dr. Calimano explained that a physician should begin treating a patient complaining of back pain by taking the patient’s history and performing a physical exam. The physical exam would be followed by imaging studies such as an MRI. If there is nothing pressuring the patient’s spine, then treatment options include physical therapy and NSAIDs. If the patient’s pain is very severe, then the physician could prescribe narcotics for a short period of time. If the patient’s condition does not improve, then the physician would refer the patient to the appropriate specialists, such as ones dealing with the spine and pain management. With regard to R.W.’s anxiety, Dr. Calimano stated that he would have attempted to refer R.W. to a psychiatrist. Dr. Calimano was of the opinion that Dr. McKenzie’s medical records do not justify the amount of Lortab and Ativan prescribed to R.W. However, his testimony did not sufficiently address the notations regarding R.W.’s pain from the violent motor vehicle accident. His opinion appeared to focus on the notations regarding chest pain. With regard to the Xanax and Lortab Dr. McKenzie prescribed to R.W. between November 20, 2009, and August 12, 2010, Dr. Goldstein testified as follows: Q: Anything about the dosing or the frequency for the Xanax prescriptions that looks remarkable to you? A: Xanax, one milligram. You know, it can be given up to four milligrams a day. So one milligram [four times a day] is on the higher end, but it’s not above the prescribing recommendations. Lortab is being given continuously. Patient has continuous pain. And it’s documented that the doctor wanted to send this patient to a pain specialist, to an ortho doctor and to rehab. So there is a lot of documented pain medicine there. Again, the only thing I mention is there might have been better documentation as to why he needed to continue it. But there is nothing remarkable about the dosages. Q: So, Dr. Goldstein, based upon all the medical records that we’ve been through regarding R.W. and the medication administration record on page 39, could you offer an opinion to the Court as to whether or not you perceive that Dr. McKenzie’s treatment or prescribing of R.W. during the time period at issue to be beneath the acceptable standard of care? A: The fact that the patient was referred to a psychiatrist. The fact that Xanax was given and it was documented on that last note we mentioned, that the patient was not suicidal, which is important if you are prescribing that. The fact that the patient was referred to an orthopedic doctor, a rehab doctor and a pain specialist, I believe it was within the standard of care. I don’t think the documentation is great, but I can’t see anything that says this is beneath the standard of care. The Department takes Dr. McKenzie to task for not doing more to address R.W.’s anxiety, such as recommending behavior modifications and/or psychotherapy. The Department also takes issue with Dr. McKenzie’s not doing more to treat R.W.’s chronic back pain. However, the medical records indicate that Dr. McKenzie attempted several times to have R.W. treat with a psychiatrist, but R.W. refused. It appears from the medical records that R.W. was not compliant with Dr. McKenzie’s request for x-rays. Dr. McKenzie did not offer a reason why he maintained R.W. as a patient when R.W. would not obtain the recommended consultations and tests. But, Dr. McKenzie noted during his testimony regarding A.W. that he gives more leeway to medical professionals when it comes to obtaining recommended consultations. Given R.W.’s refusal to pursue the recommended consultations and tests, it probably would have been appropriate for Dr. McKenzie to have ended the prescriptions much sooner. Nevertheless, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that R.W. was a difficult patient who was resistant to obtaining the consultations desired by Dr. McKenzie. If he had been more compliant in obtaining those consultations, then Dr. McKenzie may have been more successful in treating R.W.’s anxiety and chronic pain. In sum, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Dr. McKenzie’s treatment of R.W. fell below the standard of care given the circumstances associated with R.W. Did Dr. McKenzie Falsify R.W.’s Medical Records and Use Him to Illegally Obtain Lortab? R.W. testified that any pain from his motor vehicle accident only lasted two days, and he denies experiencing any chronic/long-term pain following the accident. R.W. testified that Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab and asked him to transfer the medicine to him. R.W. testified that he returned pain medication to Dr. McKenzie on a monthly basis over the course of approximately one year. The transactions would occur at the hospital or in parking lots at a Wal-Mart or a service station. R.W. testified that he would typically give 90 to 100 pills to Dr. McKenzie and retain 10 to 20 for his own use. R.W. denies being addicted to Lortab but acknowledges that he was a recreational user and that he “abused” Lortab and Percocet. As for why Dr. McKenzie engaged in this practice, R.W. testified that: As in my deposition, Dr. McKenzie had a corneal abrasion. And I understand, maybe I don’t understand, that physicians, I guess, it’s looked down upon if they are taking medications. So he had a corneal abrasion and asked if I would get him a prescription filled for the pain for his corneal abrasion. When asked why he agreed to divert drugs to Dr. McKenzie, R.W. stated that, “I don’t have a good answer for that. Stupidity I would assume.” As for why he stopped diverting drugs to Dr. McKenzie, R.W. stated that, “Again, when it stopped, my life, it was falling apart. It was a mess.” When asked why he stopped treating with Dr. McKenzie, R.W. testified as follows. A: I don’t even recall. My life was blowing up there. It was a total mess there near the end of my tenure with Gulf Coast. I mean, it was a train wreck. Q: What does that mean? A: I was taking a lot of Ativan. I was taking Lortab. I was drinking heavily. It was a wreck. Q: So the question is why did you stop treating with Dr. McKenzie? A: I left employ – you know, I don’t recall other than we just parted ways and I went my way and that is that. I don’t recall. Q: Did Dr. McKenzie ever have any discussion with you about terminating you as a patient of his? A: He may have. I don’t recall. I am not going to say he didn’t. The Department argues that Dr. McKenzie fabricated the medical records discussed in the previous section because R.W. claims that he only received treatment from Dr. McKenzie at The Lung and Sleep Center on two occasions. Moreover, R.W. claims that he never received treatment from Dr. McKenzie at Bay Clinic.7/ As for why he testified against Dr. McKenzie, R.W. stated the following: A: Well, first of all, I was subpoenaed here. You answer a subpoena. This has been going on for many, many years. Too many for me. I don’t want to be here today. And that is just a fact. Several years ago, I think it was during a – I don’t think, I know. During a fit of anger, withdrawals, all the above, I contacted your department and asked that this be investigated. And I believe the lady’s name was [] Ms. McBride, [and she] came to my residence in Mexico Beach and said that she was going to follow- up and I never heard back. When I heard from you, I was floored that it had taken that long. I figured, well, maybe my – it was a – maybe my suspicions were unfounded when I didn’t hear anything back from her. Q: What do you mean maybe your suspicions were unfounded? A: Maybe I was [the] one off. He was – maybe he was helping me out. Maybe we were helping each other out. I don’t really know. All I know is that I had brought it to your office’s attention a long time ago and nothing was ever done about it. Q: Did anyone ever offer you anything for your testimony today? A: No. Other than the $8.42 check I got from the State for gas I believe. It was delivered to me with my subpoena. Q: Are you referring to [the] witness fee? A: Yes. That I tore up. As was the case with A.W., Dr. McKenzie argues that Dr. Ortega somehow influenced or coerced R.W. into falsely testifying that Dr. McKenzie received Lortab from R.W. Dr. McKenzie testified that Dr. Ortega supervised R.W. at Bay Clinic when R.W. was employed as a respiratory therapist. Therefore, if R.W. held a grudge against Dr. McKenzie for cutting off his Ativan supply as indicated in the August 12, 2010, medical record, it is certainly possible that Dr. Ortega could have learned of that circumstance and sought to take advantage of it. As noted above, the undersigned has doubts about Dr. McKenzie’s credibility. However, R.W.’s statements about engaging in “doctor shopping” for years in order to obtain Ativan, abusing Lortab, and being a “train wreck” when he stopped treating with Dr. McKenzie cast substantial doubt on R.W.’s credibility. Indeed, it appears that R.W.’s difficulties may be the reason why he is no longer a respiratory therapist. Moreover, given R.W.’s own description of the severity of his car accident, it is surprising that he would testify that he experienced little or no pain afterwards. That is especially true given the fact that his car was struck from behind and totaled. Finally, given R.W.’s longstanding dependency on Ativan, R.W. certainly had a motive for filing a false report with the Department after Dr. McKenzie cut off his Ativan supply. In sum, the evidence taken as a whole does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab to R.W. outside the course of his professional practice. Was Dr. McKenzie’s Treatment of K.D. Below the Standard of Care? K.D. began working at Pulmonary Associates in 2007 and was employed there at the same time that Dr. McKenzie worked there. K.D. considered Dr. McKenzie to be her primary care physician, and she treated with him from some point in 2006 at least until August of 2009. K.D. treated with Dr. McKenzie at Gulf Coast Medical Center, Bay Medical Center, Pulmonary Associates, and Bay Clinic. However, K.D. usually treated with Dr. McKenzie at Gulf Coast Medical Center. As her primary care physician, Dr. McKenzie was typically K.D.’s attending physician when she was admitted to either Bay Medical Center or Gulf Coast Medical Center. K.D. primary health problem was intractable pain originating from her hips and one of her knees. K.D.’s knee pain resulted from two knee surgeries and appears to have been aggravated by a car accident. During the course of her treatment with Dr. McKenzie, K.D. was often admitted into hospitals for treatment of her pain. A medical record from Bay Medical Center dated January 22, 2008, describes K.D.’s general condition during the treatment with Dr. McKenzie: This patient is a 37-year-old female who has had long standing problems with chronic pain, particularly involving the right lower extremity. Her history is extensive in that she has been previously diagnosed with torn meniscus in the right knee. She has undergone 2 previous orthoscopic procedures. Also, she has been treated for chronic pes anserinus bursitis. She has had a plethora of complaints over recent years including chronic pain syndrome, migraine headaches, asthma, fibromyalgia, anxiety, depression, and recurrent pain in the right knee and occasionally in the right hip. She was in a motor vehicle accident about a year or so ago, which resulted in no significant abnormalities on workup, but aggravated her chronic pain. She also had a fall and an MRI of the right hip was carried out at the end of 2006, and a partial tear of the gluteus medius was noted. All of her MRIs of the knee demonstrate minimal degenerative change, and previous meniscal pathology. * * * She has been diagnosed previously with chronic pain syndrome and has been utilizing up to 12 mg a day of oral Dilaudid for quite a few months. This is on the basis of chronic migraine headaches and fibromyalgia. From January 2007 through July 22, 2009, Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab and Dilaudid on a monthly basis for K.D.’s pain. Dilaudid is a brand name for hydromorphone. Dilaudid is an opioid pain medication that is four times stronger than Lortab. Under section 893.03(2), hydromorphone is a Schedule II controlled substance. For several months in 2008, K.D. was receiving a 120-pill supply of Lortab intended to last 15 days and a 120-pill supply of Dilaudid intended to last 10 days. He also prescribed Xanax for anxiety and Ambien for sleep. The Department takes issue with Dr. McKenzie prescribing two short-acting narcotics, Lortab and Dilaudid, to K.D. between January 2007 and July 22, 2009, without medical records supporting those prescriptions. According to the Department, there is no justified medical purpose for prescribing Lortab and Dilaudid together. Dr. Calimano testified as follows: I’m a pulmonologist, so anything that depress[es] or repress[es] your respiratory drive is always a concern with me. Plus they are all habit forming, so I will be concerned. Going back to the use of narcotics, sometimes you can use a combination of narcotics. But when you are using narcotics on a chronic basis for, like, terminally ill patients and so on, the combination will be you do a long-term or long acting narcotic. You know, there are some preparations, Morphine, and so on and so forth that will last 12 hours. And then you use preparations for breakthrough pain, like short acting ones and so on. But if you have two narcotics that are both, like, will give you the hit quickly, but will disappear three or four hours later, I am not sure, you know, what the advantage would be. In contrast, Dr. Goldstein testified that prescribing two short-acting narcotics is appropriate in order to treat “breakthrough pain:” Q: Is Dilaudid a short acting narcotic? A: Yes. It’s considered an immediate release with a half life of two to three hours. Q: Is Lortab a short acting narcotic? A: Yes. Two to three hours. The answer is yes. Q: In your practice, have you ever prescribed a combination of both Lortab and Dilaudid? A: Yes. But never to be used, as I said in my deposition, at the exact same time. You could use one and another for breakthrough. In other words, you wouldn’t say to the patient take a Dilaudid and a Lortab at the same time for pain. You would say take a Dilaudid on the scheduled basis. And then you may use Lortab for breakthrough. Lortab is not as strong as Dilaudid. And it would be better to use Lortab for breakthrough than Dilaudid for breakthrough. Q: Why would you prescribe a patient two short acting narcotics as opposed to one long acting narcotic such as Fentanyl or Morphine with a short acting narcotic for breakthrough pain? A: Yes. As a matter of fact, the recommendations for pain control, and you can check it [is] up-to-date, are to reserve the long acting pain medications like Oxycontin and Fentanyl for people who have severe chronic pain like cancer. And that should not be the first thing. That should be the last thing you should do. In other words, we try to get away with short acting and try to stay away from the long acting ones. In other words, the long acting one is progression. That’s something you go to next, not before. If the long acting pain medications, for patients, for example, who have cancer and are on hospice, those are the ones we give Fentanyl patches to or Oxycontin. And that’s currently what a lot of the pain management doctors are doing with severe pain. The short acting ones are not as effective. Dr. McKenzie explained why he prescribed two short- acting narcotics as follows: Well, I mean, that your – the goal for the patient is to get them off narcotics. And just like Dr. Goldstein testified that, you know, once you put people on long-acting narcotics, they’re kind of stuck there. And so, you know, what you – cancer patients and terminally ill patients, you put them on long-acting, you know, morphine, long-acting Oxycontin and then for the breakthrough pain, you add a short-acting [narcotic]. Well, that’s not the goal with [K.D.]. The goal is to get her off these medications. And so the medications that I had her on were two short-acting and, yes, you have to use caution with two short acting medications but, again, the goal was to get her off the medication, not advance her to a higher level where she’s – it’s a lot harder to get her off. Once you get somebody on a long-acting narcotic, pain medications to wean them off and that’s the perpetual state that she was in, trying to get her off the narcotics, not keep going up. The Department also takes issue with the lack of medical records supporting the prescriptions written between February 26, 2008, and July 22, 2009. According to the Department, Dr. McKenzie should have had a treatment plan with objectives to assess the success of K.D.’s treatment. In addition, the Department asserts that Dr. McKenzie should have documented recommendations for referrals to other physicians. For the vast majority of the time between February 26, 2008, and July 22, 2009, Dr. McKenzie’s non- hospital practice was based at Bay Clinic, and Dr. McKenzie testified that K.D. had office visits with him in 2008 at Bay Clinic. Therefore, it is possible that Dr. McKenzie treated K.D. at Bay Clinic between February 26, 2008, and July 22, 2009, and that the lack of medical records is attributable to him retaining no ownership over the corresponding records. The Department has presented no persuasive evidence conclusively establishing that Dr. McKenzie owned or should have owned the medical records associated with the patients he treated at Bay Clinic. While K.D. testified that she only visited Bay Clinic on two occasions, Christen Tubbs, a former medical assistant at Bay Clinic, testified that K.D. visited Bay Clinic frequently and that there were many medical records pertaining to K.D. at Bay Clinic.8/ For reasons discussed in detail below, Ms. Tubbs’ testimony on this point was more credible than K.D.’s. As a result, medical records pertaining to K.D.’s treatment at Bay Clinic were created but unavailable for the final hearing. Without those medical records, it is impossible to evaluate whether Dr. McKenzie practiced below the standard of care with regard to not having a treatment plan with objectives to assess the success of K.D.’s treatment. The lack of medical records makes it extremely difficult to evaluate whether Dr. McKenzie practiced below the standard of care by prescribing Lortab and Dilaudid to K.D. in the quantities at issue. The Department presented no sufficiently persuasive evidence demonstrating that the quantities of Lortab and Dilaudid prescribed to K.D. were per se below the standard of care given the circumstances associated with K.D.’s treatment.9/ In sum, the Department has not presented clear and convincing evidence that Dr. McKenzie’s treatment of K.D. fell below the standard of care. Did Dr. McKenzie Use K.D. to Illegally Obtain Lortab? Rather than ingesting the Lortab prescribed for her, K.D. testified that she would fill the Lortab prescriptions and give the pills to Dr. McKenzie in a mall parking lot or her home. According to K.D., Dr. McKenzie would usually give her $40 to $100 for the Lortab. K.D. testified that she would not have taken Lortab because she is allergic to it. K.D. explained that she had her tonsils removed at 16 and was given hydrocodone, an ingredient in Lortab. The hydrocodone caused her to have an itchy, swollen throat. Medical records from Bay Medical Center and Gulf Coast Medical Center note that K.D. was allergic to Lortab. Dr. McKenzie pointed out that he authored a July 16, 2007, medical record, which stated K.D. was allergic to Lortab. However, that same record notes that K.D. “states it makes her nose itch, but has no significant abnormal affect.” Dr. McKenzie testified as follows: And so that, as far as I’m concerned, that she was not, you know, she was not allergic to Lortab. Plus, she had over 80 different independent medical exams because she had been in the hospital 20, 30 different times where she didn’t tell physicians, at that time, or nurses, that she was allergic to Lortab. So that’s not on there. So she would pick and choose who she would tell she was allergic to Lortab and who she wasn’t. And you would say, well, is that a red flag, well, I didn’t know that. And so I don’t go back and look. She was my patient. She told me she wasn’t allergic to Lortab. That’s what I document. And so I would prescribe Lortab for her. Even in the hospital, they did a – and it’s in the records, we can find the Bates number, they got tired of her saying Lortab or not, and there’s a whole section where they went through and viewed every single allergy she had, and they deemed her not to be allergic to Lortab. So, I don’t see how her telling one physician that she’s allergic to Lortab and one physician that she’s not, that that’s – that’s a red flag or that’s anything that I would even notice if I was to go back and look at these medical records. There are aspects of K.D.’s testimony that cause the undersigned to consider Dr. McKenzie’s testimony to be more credible. Rather than testifying during the final hearing, K.D. was deposed on August 9, 2017, at the Gadsden Correctional Facility where she was serving a 36-month sentence for recruiting patients to obtain prescriptions by fraud. K.D. agreed that the aforementioned offense was a “felony conviction.” K.D.’s own testimony suggested that she had a motive to provide false testimony against Dr. McKenzie. Specifically, K.D. testified that she became addicted to pain medication and asserts Dr. McKenzie knew of her addiction. K.D. stated that pain medication “destroyed” her life and was the reason why she was in prison. While K.D. did not directly state that she blamed Dr. McKenzie for her difficulties, one could easily infer from her testimony that she holds a grudge against him. As is the case with A.W. and R.W., there is a connection between K.D. and Dr. Ortega. K.D. testified that she was forced to resign from Pulmonary Associates because she was suspected of embezzlement. Dr. Ortega brought charges against her, but those charges were dismissed after K.D.’s father paid restitution. While K.D. denies that Dr. Ortega offered to drop the charges against her if she gave testimony against Dr. McKenzie, this circumstance must be taken into account when evaluating K.D.’s credibility. The Department has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab to K.D. outside the course of his professional practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2018.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent Agency must be reimbursed by the Petition for purported overpayments regarding Medicaid claims, as delineated in the Respondent's Final Agency Audit Report of December 12, 2003, related to the audit period of July 1, 2000 through July 31, 2002.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. The Agency is thus charged with a duty to recover overpayments to medical service providers enrolled in that program. The term "overpayment" means any amount not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program, whether paid as a result of inaccurate reporting or improper reporting of costs, improper claims, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or by mistake. See § 409.913.(1).(d), Fla. Stat. The Petitioner, Maria Lourdes Burgos, M.D., is a pediatrician duly licensed in the State of Florida, practicing as an authorized Medicaid provider for purposes of the relevant portions of Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, at times pertinent hereto. During the period July 1, 2000 through July 31, 2002, (the audit period) the Petitioner had a valid Medicaid provider agreement with the Respondent Agency. During the period of the audit the Petitioner provided services to Medicaid recipients or patients and submitted claims for those services and was compensated for those services. This case is a result of the Agency's attempt to recover purported overpayments from Dr. Burgos. In choosing to become a Medicaid provider, a physician such as Dr. Burgos must assume the responsibilities enumerated in Section 409.913(7), Florida Statutes (2004), which provided generally that such a provider had an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of such services and be responsible for the preparation and submission of claims. The claims are required to be true and accurate, the services are required to actually have been furnished to the recipient by the provider submitting the claim; the services are required to be medically necessary, of a comparable quality to those furnished to the general public by the provider's peers; and to have been provided in accordance with all applicable provisions of Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies. They must be in accordance with federal, state, and local law. Additionally, the provision of medical services are required to be documented by records made contemporaneously with the provision of the services, demonstrating the medical necessity for them and the medical basis and specific need for them must be properly documented in the recipient's medical record. The "audit period" involved in this proceeding is July 1, 2000 through July 31, 2002. The Medicaid program reimbursed Dr. Burgos in excess of $43,238.57 in payments pursuant to the Medicaid program during that audit period. The Final Agency Audit Report is in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit One and the calculations pertaining to the overpayment amount are included in that report as part of Respondent's Exhibit One in evidence. The Agency contends that $43,238.57 is an overpayment and subject to recoupment because of Medicaid policy, as alleged in the Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR). Medical records reveal that some services billed, and for which payment was received, were not documented and that documentation provided supported a lower level of office visits than the one for which the Medicaid program was billed and for which payment was received by the Petitioner; and, because payments can be made only for those services listed in the provider handbook, that the Petitioner billed and received payments for services not covered by Medicaid as overpayments. The Agency furnishes all authorized Medicaid providers a manual entitled The Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook). The Handbook contains the requirements demanded of Medicaid providers and it and the procedure code manual (CPT) manual that was in effect during the audit period is in evidence in this proceeding. The handbook has been incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.230. This handbook sets forth Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.230 and sets forth pertinent applicable Medicaid policies and claims processing requirements applicable to this proceeding. Upon convening of the audit procedure, the Agency requested certain records from the Petitioner and the Petitioner fully complied with the relevant requirements of Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, submitting copies of all records dealing with the recipients who where the subject of the audit. See Exhibit Eight in evidence. The Petitioner, in effect, does not dispute the statistical methodology employed by the agency, but does dispute the manner in which it was applied to certain procedure codes (CPT codes) and the result of the overpayment calculations. Additionally, for every office visit that the Petitioner had with Medicaid patients, she personally made an individual judgment about the level of service that she provided and accordingly billed for that level of care and treatment provided. She was consistent in this in her billing practices as to both Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients. In some instances, regarding the audited Medicaid patient/recipient records, it was demonstrated by the Petitioner that the patient presented with somewhat more complexity as to medical condition that the CPT code, postulated by the Agency as applicable, represented that thus she billed for the higher code (as for instance a "99215" instead of a "99213) or "99214"). Some of these medical judgment calls made by the Petitioner were shown to be appropriate and justified and some where shown by the Respondent's evidence, chiefly the testimony of Dr. Larry Deeb, the Respondent's expert, to be not really appropriate and that they should have been coded and therefore billed at a lower level. In any event, based upon the testimony of Dr. Larry Deeb, as well as the Petitioner's testimony, the submission of both a "well child" checkup billing and a "sick office visit" billing was appropriate and consistent with good medical practice under the circumstances demonstrated by the Petitioner's testimony and her records. Thus it was inappropriate for the Agency to automatically claim an overpayment due for those billings, based upon only its policy interpretation. Additionally, based upon Ms. Mocks testimony, it is apparently an Agency policy or practice in conducting audits, and in recouping overpayments, that when errors are discovered in the audit or in the billing records which happen to be in favor of the practitioner (the Petitioner) that the Agency does not provide a credit applied to any alleged overpayment. It would seem that fundamental fairness dictates that both credits and overpayments be weighed against each other in calculating the ultimate amount of any overpayment, if one exists. In any event, based upon Dr. Deeb's testimony and the Petitioner's testimony, with regard to the random sample of patients and their medical records submitted, reviewed and involved in this dispute, the evidence demonstrates that the Petitioner was not overpaid as to the following amounts and patients/recipients: Recipient Date of CPT Disallowed/ Number Service Billed and Paid Adjusted Amount 1 12/05/00 99215 $37.59 09/05/01 99215 $60.95 2 03/05/01 99214 $15.11 3 09/19/00 99215 $13.01 4 04/04/01 99215 $60.95 5 09/15/00 99214 $15.11 05/10/01 W9881 $22.70 6 01/14/02 99215 $14.52 8 11/08/01 99214 $15.11 9 05/03/01 99205 $87.24 10 05/03/01 99205 $87.241/ 11 04/04/02 90669 $ 0.002/ 04/04/01 W9881 $37.81 04/04/01 99214 $46.42 12 10/18/01 99214 $15.11 01/18/02 99215 $29.63 01/30/02 99215 $14.52 05/20/02 99214 $15.11 13 08/14/00 99215 $13.01 14 01/31/01 99214 $15.11 08/27/01 99214 $15.11 05/13/02 99214 $24.58 15 10/17/00 99356 $50.94 Recipient Date of CPT Disallowed/ Number Service Billed and Paid Adjusted Amount 10/19/00 99233 $12.53 16 10/13/00 99215 $57.14 17 05/10/01 99215 $60.95 12/11/01 W9881 $37.81 12/11/01 99214 $46.42 20 12/22/00 99205 $17.02 22 11/19/01 99223 $42.04 11/20/00 99239 $11.53 23 03/27/02 W1998 $ 0.003/ 04/03/02 99356 $49.72 04/22/02 99215 $ 0.004/ 04/29/02 99214 $13.86 05/10/02 99215 $ 0.005/ 24 08/12/01 99356 $ 0.006/ 08/15/01 99239 $12.06 25 09/30/01 99223 $22.71 10/01/01 99233 $12.66 26 12/03/01 99356 $49.257/ 12/06/01 99239 $12.06 12/14/01 99205 $18.12 01/16/02 99215 $29.63 01/23/02 99215 $29.638/ 28 10/13/01 99431 $ 0.009/ Recipient Number Date of Service CPT Disallowed/ Billed and Paid Adjusted Amount 10/14/02 99233 $12.66 10/15/01 99239 $12.06 29 02/28/02 99356 $ 5.4210/ 03/01/02 99233 $13.80 03/02/02 99239 $13.66 03/06/02 99205 $18.67 29 03/13/02 99215 $14.52 11. The Petitioner in its Proposed Recommended Order has agreed that other than the above (Proposed Recommended Order paragraph 10 patients and amounts) that the Petitioner agrees with the Agency's review and the overpayment calculations on a per office visit basis. Additionally, however, as referenced above, there were additional health insurance claim forms which were, or should have been, submitted to the Agency, representing claims for payment for dates of service that clearly fall within the relevant audit period, that were never compensated by the Agency's contracted agent. The alternative is that the claim forms for some reason were not actually submitted. Unfortunately, neither the Petitioner's records and testimony nor the Agency records can clearly show whether the claim forms were actually submitted or not. It is apparently not possible to retrieve that information from the Agency's claim filling and payment-related computer programming system, for reasons not understood by either party or the judge. There is thus no clear explanation of record concerning why these claims were not paid earlier, even though they fall within the audited period. It is clear, however, that the additional claims referenced in the Petitioner's Exhibit Seven, admitted as a late exhibit herein, do relate to that audit period and represent medical services provided by the Petitioner within that audit period. Since that audit period and the claims referenced in evidence are the subject of a "proceeding" and are pending a "court or hearing decision . . ." or, alternatively and admittedly somewhat speculatively, could be subject of a "system error on claim that was originally filed within (12) months from date of service," it appears patently apparent that fundamental fairness dictates that these health insurance claim forms related to the same audit period should be considered and a determination made as to whether and how much of those claims should be reimbursed to the Petitioner for the medical services they represent. Thus, especially as to exception (2) to the twelve- month filing requirement listed in the above-reference handbook, Exhibit Seven has been admitted into evidence and the claim forms represented therein should be considered and the amounts payable to the Petitioner should be credited against the resultant overpayment amounts calculated as a result of these Findings of Fact.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, re-calculate the amount of overpayment in a manner consistent with the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, excluding from the amount of overpayment those amounts determined above to have not constituted overpayments. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Respondent calculate the amount of reimbursement not provided pursuant to the recently submitted or re-submitted (but never paid) Exhibit Seven health insurance claim forms, and as for the reasons indicted in the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and credit that additional amount of reimbursement against the overpayment calculation amount in arriving at the new overpayment due from the Petitioner to the Respondent. The Petitioner shall repay the Respondent the re-calculated monetary amount of overpayment within a reasonable period of time and by reasonable installment payments, agreed to by both parties, but shall not be obligated to pay other costs or fees related to this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has been convicted of a crime directly related to the practice of nursing, in violation of Section 464.018(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was born on September 27, 1963, in Havana, Cuba. She is now a United States citizen and is married with three children. Since 1985, Respondent has been a licensed registered nurse, holding license number RN 1643122. She has not previously been disciplined. In 1991, Respondent separated from, and later divorced, her then-husband. She was under considerable financial pressure, caring as a single parent for her children, who were then newborn, 18 months old, and four and one-half years old. Respondent was then employed by St. Johns Home Health Agency, Inc. Respondent served as a nurse who performed admissions and follow-up care. Pressured for money, Respondent agreed to participate in a scheme in which she prepared false notes concerning patient care. Specifically, Respondent would see her patients and appropriately record accurate vital signs once weekly. For her more involved patients, such as diabetics or patients undergoing wound care, Respondent would see them as often as indicated and duly record their vital signs. However, for less involved patients, Respondent would document other visits during the week that did not take place and record fictitious vital signs. Respondent understood that the purpose of this fraudulent activity was to induce the federal government to pay her employer unearned Medicare monies, part of which the employer then paid Respondent. Although no patients were harmed by Respondent's fraud, she continued this practice for over one year and perhaps as long three and one-half years. Some days, Respondent falsified over 20 patient visits. On December 17, 1998, the grand jury returned an indictment against 26 defendants, including Respondent, for Medicare fraud and various related crimes. By Judgment entered March 23, 1999, Respondent pleaded guilty of one count of conspiracy to submit false claims to the United States, in violation of 18 United States Code Section 286. Respondent played a minor role in a massive case of Medicare fraud pursued with diligence and careful, coordinated planning by several entities, not just Respondent's employer. The indictment alleges a total of $25 million in fraudulent Medicare claims arising from unperformed home visits and extensive money laundering and racketeering by the principal perpetrators of this fraud. The prosecutors credit Respondent with early cooperation, even at the grand-jury stage, that was instrumental in obtaining guilty pleas from over 20 defendants. Respondent's testimony at trial was "extremely valuable" against two of the three defendants who went to trial--and received "significant prison terms." As the prosecutors describe the assistance of Respondent and one other defendant, they "did all that they could do from the earliest time to help undo the wrongdoing in which they had been involved." The judge initially sentenced Respondent to 18 months' imprisonment and ordered her to pay the United States Department of Health and Human Services $20,000 as partial restitution for the estimated $300,000 of loss attributable to Respondent's fraud. Later, due to Respondent's cooperation and at the request of the prosecutors, the judge reduced the sentence from 18 months' imprisonment to five years' probation. Respondent has since paid the $20,000 in restitution. The United States Department of Health and Human Services excluded Respondent from Medicare for ten years. After an administrative hearing and pursuant to the recommendations of the Administrative Law Judge, the agency reduced this penalty to five years. At present, Respondent serves as a recovery room nurse at two South Florida cosmetic surgery centers. Respondent expresses heartfelt remorse and displays deep shame for her past criminal behavior. She recognizes that her financial circumstances did not justify her fraudulent acts. However, revocation or a long suspension would cause considerable financial hardship upon Respondent and the three children, who are now 11, 13, and 15 1/2 years old and, as much as is possible for children of these ages, planning on attending college. Petitioner has consistently sought revocation in this case. In past cases, Petitioner has not always sought revocation for licensees convicted of Medicare fraud, but it appears that Petitioner has altered its policy in this regard.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 464.018(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and reprimanding her license, placing her license on probation for five years, imposing an administrative fine of $10,000, and assessing costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruth R. Stiehl, Ph.D., R.N. Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4080 Woodcock Drive, Suite 202 Jacksonville, Florida 32207-2714 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Reginald D. Dixon Senior Attorney Department of Health Bureau of Health Care Practitioner Regulation--Legal Division of Medical Quality Assurance 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Lawrence R. Metsch Metsch & Metsch, P.A 1455 Northwest 14th Street Miami, Florida 33125
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Insurance should discipline the Respondent on charges contained in the Administrative Complaint filed June 1, 1994. The Administrative Complaint charges that the Respondent failed to accurately disclose certain aspects of the true physical condition of two applicants for health insurance and failed to disclose to the applicants the existence of certain deductibles and a six-month waiting period for preexisting conditions.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Blair John Reuther, is eligible for licensure and is licensed in Florida as an insurance agent. At the times referred to in this case, the Respondent was licensed to solicit health insurance on behalf of National States Insurance Company (National States). Some time prior to April, 1993, National States solicited health insurance from Earl and Jessie Lane, an elderly couple who lived in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and invited them to return a postcard in order to express their interest in more information about health insurance policies National States had to offer. They sent in the postcard, and their names were referred to the Respondent. Without an additional contact with the Lanes, the Respondent went to their home during the week preceding April 3, 1993, and asked to be permitted to talk with them about National States health insurance policies in which they had expressed an interest. The Lanes invited him in, and the Respondent discussed their existing coverage. At the time, the Lanes had a Level A Medicare Supplement policy, which carried the standard deductibles for such a policy. After some additional discussion, the Respondent promised to return with his proposals and with applications. On Saturday, April 3, 1993, the Respondent returned to the Lane home and proposed to sell each of them a National States Level A Medicare Supplement policy and a limited benefit medical expense policy. It is found, contrary to the Lanes' testimony, that the Respondent did not tell the Lanes that the National States policies would "cover everything," that the Respondent told the Lanes that the National States Medicare Supplement policies had deductibles (just like their previous Level A Medicare Supplement policies), and that there was a six-month waiting period for preexisting conditions under the National States limited benefit medical expense policies. (There was no waiting period for preexisting conditions under any of the Medicare Supplement policies.) After discussing the proposal, the Lanes decided to apply for the National States policies being proposed by the Respondent. It is found that the Respondent went over the applications for the National States policies with the Lanes and filled out the applications in accordance with the information given to him by the Lanes. As to the medical questions on the applications, it is found that the Respondent read the questions aloud and recorded the answers given to him by the Lanes. Specifically, question 5 on the Medicare Supplement applications asked, in pertinent part: Does the Applicant have or had within the past 5 years any of the following: (Underline condition) Tumor, cancer, malignancy or growth of any kind? * * * c. High or low blood pressure, varicose veins or disorder of the heart or circulatory system? * * * Amputation, because of sickness, paraplegia, disease of the back or spine? Disease of the rectum or intestine, stomach, kidney, prostate, urinary bladder, liver, gall bladder? Question 6.b. asked, "Has the Applicant been confined in a hospital in the last five years? The Lanes answered, "no," to all of the questions set out in the preceding paragraph. They also signed the applications, which state in part: "I agree that all answers above are true and complete to the best of my knowledge." Effective April 14, 1993, National States issued the limited benefit medical expense policies for which the Lanes had applied; the Medicare Supplement policies were issued with effective dates of April 18, 1993. All four policies were delivered on April 22, 1993. The Respondent returned to the Lane home on April 30, 1993, to go over the policies with the Lanes and answer any questions they had. During the review of the policies after delivery, the Lanes never expressed to the Respondent any dissatisfaction with any of the policies. To the contrary, they both signed a statement that they had reviewed their policies with the Respondent, who had explained them in full. Jessie Lane contends that she told the Respondent that she "had had a heart problem, a small heart problem." She testified that, at the time of her deposition, she had a pace maker but that, at the time of the application, she "wasn't that bad . . . I was just having--missing heart beats." She also testified that she has: "a light case of arthritis. . . . Not bad." She also testified that she had been hospitalized during the five years preceding the applications: "That's when I had my heart problem too." Earl Lane contends that he told the Respondent that he had a back injury that required hospitalization several times, but he did not testify that he told the Respondent that he was hospitalized, or that he continued to have back problems, within the five years preceding the application. He testified that he had a swollen prostate that required surgery, but he did not testify that the surgery was within the five years preceding the application. He testified that he had skin cancer "at one time," but that it "was successfully treated" and "didn't amount to nothing." He did not testify that the cancer or the treatment was within the five years preceding the application. He contended for the first time in his deposition testimony that he had a "rupture," but not that he had it within the five years preceding the application. He testified during his deposition: "I've been in the hospital in the last five years." Later during his deposition, he was asked: "How many times have you been in the hospital in the last five years?" He answered: "Just once, I guess, before he was here." He did not clearly testify that he had been hospitalized within the five years preceding the application. Earl Lane also contended for the first time in his deposition testimony that he told the Respondent that he had varicose veins, but he did not testify that they were not surgically removed or that he still had them within the five years preceding the application. The Lanes also filed a complaint listing other alleged violations by the Respondent: (1) that the Respondent misrepresented that the National States policies covered dental and eyeglasses; (2) that these coverages duplicated policies the Lanes already had; (3) that the National States policies were more expensive than policies the Lanes already had; (4) that the National States policies did not pay skilled nursing; and (5) that the Respondent tricked the Lanes into signing a bank draft agreement. The Department chose not to charge those alleged violations, presumably either because there was insufficient evidence that they were true or because they were not violations. It appears that someone helped the Lanes draft their requests for refunds from National States and their initial list of complaints against the Respondent. Although the evidence was not clear who helped, it may well have been the insurance agent whose Medicare Supplement policies were replaced by National States and who was trying to recover the business. In response to the Lanes' request, dated May 7, 1993, to cancel the policies, National States cancelled the Medicare Supplement policies as if the request had been made within the 30 day cancellation period and refunded all but 5 percent of the premium, which was retained as a processing fee. In their cancellation request, the Lanes' alleged: "Our health conditions were not accurately written on the applications by agent Blair Reuther and we will not take any chances on not being paid on future medical bills for misrepresentations by this agent." Nonetheless, National States refused to cancel the limited benefit medical expense policies. They remained in full force and effect until they lapsed a year later for failure to pay the premium when next due. There is no evidence that National States investigated the Lanes' true health status. During the year that the National States limited benefit medical expense policies were in effect, National States paid out more in claims under the policies than the Lanes paid in premiums.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in this case. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the Department's proposed findings of fact (the Respondent not having filed any): 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated; however, the Respondent was responding to a "lead" given to him by his employer after the Lanes returned a postcard expressing interest. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. (It was not clear from the evidence what the Respondent was told.) Accepted and incorporated; however, it is not clear from the evidence whether the Respondent should have answered the medical history questions on the application differently based on the information given to him by the applicants. First sentence, rejected as not proven. Second sentence, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected as not proven that there were health conditions that should have been disclosed; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Last sentence, accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Blair John Reuther 8535 Blind Pass Drive, #202 Treasure Island, Florida 33706 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent overprescribed controlled substances and failed to maintain legible medical records as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Health, through its Board of Osteopathic Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine in the state of Florida, pursuant to section 20.43, and chapters 456 and 459, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Richard D. Vitalis was a licensed osteopathic physician in the state of Florida, holding license number OS 4823. Respondent’s current address of record is 3774 China Grove Mews Lane, Fairfax, Virginia 22025. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was practicing as an osteopathic physician at All Family Medical in North Lauderdale, Florida, a licensed pain management clinic. On or about January 27, 2011, L.N., a 29-year-old female, and a resident of Biloxi, Mississippi, presented to Respondent at his Fort Lauderdale office with complaints of back pain. Between January 27, 2011, and August 3, 2011, L.N. presented to Respondent on seven occasions. L.N. indicated that she had previously been prescribed oxycodone 15 mg, oxycodone 30 mg, and Xanax 2 mg. She also indicated that she was dependent on her prescriptions, that she needed them every few hours, that she expected to need them the rest of her life, and that they were not helping resolve her medical problems. L.N. underwent a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study on January 27, 2011. The MRI diagnostic images showed that L.N.’s spine had no evidence of pathological disease. There was a normal alignment of the vertebral bodies without evidence of compression or spondylolisthesis. There was normal signal throughout the vertebral bodies and within the visualized spinal cord. There was no significant disc disease, evidence of spinal stenosis, or exiting nerve root impingement at L1-2, L2-3, L3-4, or L5-S1. Although the MRI depicted some annular disc bulging at L4-5, there was no spinal stenosis or neural foraminal stenosis. There was no pathology shown on the MRI, and it was, in general, “a normal MRI.” As such, the MRI would not provide support for a conclusion that L.N. would have been in pain. There were no diagnostic images in L.N.’s file to contravene the medical conditions shown in the MRI. The only evidence of anything requiring treatment was L.N.’s complaint of low back pain. Such a complaint would call for muscle relaxers, physical therapy, hot/cold packs, or ultrasound, rather than narcotic pain medications. There was no evidence in the medical records that L.N. exhibited signs of nerve root impingement with pain radiating down the leg. The records did not demonstrate that Respondent performed a comprehensive medical examination of L.N., or that Respondent performed any type of objective testing of L.N., including straight leg raises, checking for deep tendon reflexes, or palpation of the area of concern for spasms. The records did not contain an adequate medical history of L.N., including height, weight, temperature, pulse, respiration, blood pressure, age, date of birth, and medication lists, nor did they contain an assessment of L.N.’s chief complaint or plan of treatment. The intake from L.N.’s first visit to Respondent indicated that she was taking opioids and benzodiazepines, though there was no evidence of prescriptions or prescribing physicians for those substances. The records did not demonstrate that Respondent obtained records of prior treating physicians, nor was there any evidence of an effort to do so. The records do not demonstrate that Respondent consulted with any other physician which, in the case of treatment resulting from an MRI review, would fail to meet the standard of care. The records do not demonstrate that Respondent recommended alternative interventions for L.N.’s pain complaints, including physical therapy, which would have been appropriate, and within the standard of care given the normal MRI results. The only alternatives noted were “heat” and “massage” on January 27, 2011, and “heat” on June 23, 2011. Although it is possible that other alternative interventions were recommended, the illegibility of the intake forms prevents such a finding. The failure to recommend alternative interventions was a failure to meet the standard of care. On L.N.’s first visit to Respondent on January 27, 2011, a urine drug screen was performed. The drug screen tested positive for opioids and benzodiazepines. Subsequent to that first visit, Respondent performed no other drug tests. Such tests can confirm that the patient is taking prescribed medications, and not diverting them, and that the patient is not taking other non-prescribed medications. It is the medical standard of care to perform follow-up drug tests of patients when prescribing high doses of controlled substances, including opioids. The failure to closely monitor L.N. when prescribing high doses of opioids and benzodiazepines was a failure of the standard of care. Respondent did not communicate with L.N.’s pharmacy to ensure that she was not getting prescribed medicines from other doctors. Such information was, in 2010 and 2011, available from pharmacies. It was, during that period, the medical standard of care to communicate with the dispensing pharmacy. Respondent failed to meet that standard of care. There was no evidence to the contrary. Despite the fact that L.N. presented to Respondent with a stated history of opioid use and a positive drug screen, Respondent did not record L.N.’s medication history for the period up to her first visit with Respondent. The failure to take a medication history to substantiate the need and justification for the prescription of high-dose opioids is contrary to the 2010-2011 medical standard of care. Oxycodone was, during the relevant period, a Schedule II controlled substance with a high potential for abuse, and an accepted but severely restricted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of oxycodone may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. § 893.03(2), Fla. Stat. Roxicodone is a brand name for oxycodone hydrochloride. It is a short-acting opioid that is rapidly absorbed. Short- acting opioids have a greater potential for abuse. Furthermore, prescription of short-acting opioids, such as Roxicodone, would not be within the standard of care for long-term, chronic pain such as that described by L.N. Xanax is the brand name for alprazolam and is prescribed to treat anxiety. Alprazolam was, during the relevant period, a Schedule IV controlled substance, with a low potential for abuse, and an accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of alprazolam may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence. § 893.03(4), Fla. Stat. At L.N.’s initial January 27, 2011, visit, Respondent prescribed medications including 210 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 30 mg, 120 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 15 mg, and 90 tablets of Xanax Oral 2 mg. The prescribed doses and amounts were consistent with L.N.’s self-reported medications that she was then taking, presumably prescribed by “Dr. Sanchez” in Biloxi. Respondent’s plan of treatment listed the medications L.N. requested and recommended follow-up in one month. The records contain no individualized treatment plan. Respondent’s examination notes are entirely illegible. Respondent’s records lack copies of prescriptions issued to L.N. on January 27, 2011. A patient agreement and informed consent form was included in L.N.’s patient file, but was not signed by L.N. L.N. next presented to Respondent with complaints of chronic lower back pain on February 22, 2011. The intake form is largely illegible, though “overall feels well” is discernable. At that visit, Respondent prescribed 210 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 30 mg, 120 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 15 mg, and 90 tablets of Xanax Oral 2 mg. Respondent’s plan of treatment was medication refill and follow-up in one month. Again, there was no individualized treatment plan, and the examination notes were largely illegible. L.N. presented to Respondent with further complaints of chronic lower back pain on March 22, 2011. The intake form is largely illegible, though “overall feels well” is discernable. Respondent again prescribed 210 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 30 mg, 120 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 15 mg, and 90 tablets of Xanax Oral 2 mg. Respondent’s plan of treatment was medication refill and follow-up in one month. Again, there was no individualized treatment plan, and the examination notes were illegible. L.N. presented to Respondent on April 21, 2011. The intake form is largely illegible, though “overall feels well” is discernable. Respondent renewed L.N.’s previous prescriptions. L.N. next presented to Respondent with complaints of chronic lower back pain on May 19, 2011. The intake form is entirely illegible. Respondent prescribed 210 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 30 mg, 120 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 15 mg, and 90 tablets of Xanax Oral 2 mg. Respondent’s plan of treatment was medication refill and follow-up in an illegible timeframe. There was no individualized treatment plan. Respondent’s examination notes were illegible and minimal. On June 23, 2011, L.N. presented to Respondent. The intake form, though largely illegible, appears to state that “pt feels good pain solved with meds.” The treatment prescribed by Respondent apparently having the desired effect, Respondent renewed L.N.’s prescription for 210 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 30 mg (though in two separate prescriptions for 180 tablets and 30 tablets, respectively), 120 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 15 mg, and 60 tablets of Xanax Oral 2 mg. The prescription originally called for 150 tablets of Xanax, but Respondent struck 90 of those. Respondent’s plan of treatment was medication refill and follow-up at the next appointment on July 23, 2011. A monthly medication dosage evaluation was completed for the June visit, as was a pain management treatment plan medical record. Those records provided little individualized information regarding L.N.’s plan of care. The pain management treatment plan form indicated that drug testing was completed; however, there were no results. L.N.’s final visit to Respondent occurred on August 3, 2011. She indicated, in what appears to be her handwriting, that she had used a “hot bath,” “heat,” and “some exercise.” Her treatment objective continued to be “complete resolution of pain with medication.” At that visit, Respondent prescribed 150 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 30 mg, 120 tablets of Roxicodone Oral 15 mg, and 60 tablets of Xanax Oral 2 mg. Respondent’s plan of treatment included only a list of medications. The pain management treatment plan form indicated that drug testing was completed; however, there were no results. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of Dr. Porcase, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is found that Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment recognized in general law as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances in his treatment of L.N. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of Dr. Porcase, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is found that Respondent prescribed excessive and unnecessary amounts of Roxicodone and Xanax without a justifiable basis to do so, especially since the January 27, 2011, MRI report did not support a determination that L.N. was experiencing back pain so as to justify Respondent’s course of opioid treatment for L.N. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of Dr. Porcase, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is found that Respondent failed to create and maintain adequate and legible records supporting the course of treatment for L.N., or records documenting performance of a comprehensive physical examination of L.N. proportionate to her diagnoses. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of Dr. Porcase, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is found that Respondent failed to adequately monitor L.N.’s use of opioid therapies. The findings set forth herein are the result of Dr. Porcase’s undisputed expert testimony regarding the standard of care as it existed in 2010-2011, as well as the undersigned’s independent review of the record. Whether Respondent could have produced evidence to support his treatment of L.N. will remain a mystery, since Respondent essentially abandoned this proceeding. Despite challenging the Department’s Administrative Complaint, Respondent minimally and incompletely responded to written discovery, failed to meaningfully participate in Dr. Porcase’s deposition, twice refused to appear for his own deposition, despite personal service of the notice, and failed to make an appearance at the final hearing. In the absence of any testimony or evidence to counter that of the Department, the evidence presented by the Department, including the testimony of Dr. Porcase, was clear and convincing as to the matters set forth herein. Despite Respondent’s failure to actively contest the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, it must be recognized that the allegations concern a single patient over a total period of scarcely more than 6 months. There was no pattern of misconduct. Furthermore, Dr. Porcase acknowledged that the practices regarding the prescription of opioids in 2010-2011 were far different from those that exist today. Rather, “there was no standards that you were -- individualized your treatment to the pathology on imaging studies and patient’s complaints and their ability to function on medicine.” As to a doctor’s actions to rule out a patient’s drug-seeking behavior, he testified that “[i]t would be the individual physician having to make that determination based on his experience and diagnostic testing . . . and physical exam.” While the undersigned believes and gives weight to Dr. Porcase’s opinions regarding the standard of care, his testimony is equally compelling that the standard was not as clear-cut in 2010-2011 as it is in 2018. Though not affecting the ultimate findings regarding violations of law, it does affect the nature of the penalty that is warranted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Osteopathic Medicine, enter a final order: determining that Respondent violated sections 459.015(1)(x), 459.015(1)(t), and 459.015(1)(o); imposing an administrative fine of $2,000; issuing a letter of reprimand against Respondent’s license to practice osteopathic medicine; and awarding costs incurred in the prosecution of this case to the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Ann L. Prescott, Esquire Philip Aaron Crawford, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Richard D. Vitalis, D.O. 230 Caddie Court DeBary, Florida 32713 Richard D. Vitalis, D.O. 3774 China Grove Mews Lane Fairfax, Virginia 22025 Kama Monroe, Executive Director Board of Osteopathic Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-06 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3257 (eServed) Nichole C. Geary, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to additional compensation under the Agreement with Respondent?
Findings Of Fact On August 1, 1986, Respondent issued ,Invitation to Bid Number 87-2, which was titled, "Invitation to Bid for Providing Financial Services Related to the Payment of State Employees' Group Health Self Insurance Claims: (Invitation to Bid). Under the terms of the Invitation to Bid, the winning bidder would agree to provide banking services for two interest bearing accounts. One account (Prescription Drug Account), was to be used to transfer funds from the Respondent to Paid Prescriptions, Inc., the administrator of the prescription drug component of the State Employee's Group Health Self Insurance Plan (Plan). The other account (Health Claims Account) was to be used to pay drafts issued by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., to participants and providers for payment of all health claims, except prescription drugs. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., was the administrator of the Plan, except for Prescription drugs. For both accounts, the Invitation to Bid required that all fees and charges of the winning bidder must be offset by "the required minimum daily balance." The required minimum daily balance was an amount of money which Respondent would have to maintain deposited in the account with Petitioner. Interest earned by the winning bidder on the required minimum daily balance amount would compensate the winning bidder for providing the services required by Respondent. In addition, funds deposited in the accounts in excess of the required minimum daily balance would earn interest credited to the account each month. Responses to the Invitation to Bid were to be evaluated based on the amount of required minimum daily balances and the amount of interest Respondent would earn on funds on deposit in excess of the required minimum daily balance. Appendix 1 to the Invitation to Bid, was titled "Prescription Drug Account Activity" and contained the following information: Estimated number of deposits per month 2 Estimated number of wire transfers per month 2 Average amount per transfer from February 1986 through May 1986 $480,000 Appendix 2 to the Invitation to Bid was Titled "Heath Claims Account Activity" and contained the following information: The following data was collected from the Period May 1, 1985 through April 30, 1986. Average number of drafts paid per month $40,568 Average daily amount of drafts paid $395,398 Average number of deposits per month 8 Average number of stop Payments per month 19 In preparing its response to the Invitation to Bid, Petitioner based its calculations on the number of transactions set forth in the Appendix. Petitioner determined that, to cover its costs plus a 20 percent profit margin, it would need to receive 13.7 cents per draft handled on the Health Claims Account. By using the 13.7 cents per draft, the average number of drafts per month listed in Appendix 2, and by assuming that it could earn 6.3 percent interest on the required minimum daily balance, Petitioner determined that it needed to ask for a required minimum daily balance of $1,059,000, if the funds were to be maintained in a Demand Deposit Account. Before petitioner submitted its response, Mr. Dale Thompson, an employee of Petitioner's, contacted Mr. Andrew Lewis, Respondent's contact for the invitation to bid, to ask a few questions, and make sure Petitioner understood what it was doing. During this conversation, Mr. Thompson asked Mr. Lewis if he had any reason to expect that the average number of drafts listed in Appendix 2 would increase. Mr. Lewis responded that the number reflected what it had been over the last period and that he had no expectation that it would increase. Petitioner submitted a response which asked for a required minimum daily balance of $0.00 for the Prescription Drug Account, contingent upon having the Health Claims Account of $961,216, if funds were to be maintained in a zero interest Certificate of Deposit, $1,059,522, if funds were to be maintained in a Demand Deposit Account. Also, the amounts on deposit in excess of the required minimum daily balance would earn interest based on the current month's auction average of the ninety-day U. S. Treasury Bill Discount Rate, but not less than 4 Percent. Based on Respondent's analysis of the bids submitted by five firms, Petitioner was selected as having submitted the best bid. Thereupon, Petitioner and Respondent entered into and Agreement whereby Petitioner agreed to provide the services set forth in the Invitation to Bid and pay the interest set forth in Finding of Fact 13, supra, in exchange for Respondent's maintaining a required minimum daily balance of $1,059,522 in a Demand Deposit account with Petitioner. Nowhere in the Agreement is there mention of the average number of drafts listed on Appendix 2. Page 6 of the Agreement contains the following language: SECTION VI - ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS Invitation to Bid Number 87-2, mailed August 1, 1986 and Capital City's Response to Invitation to Bid Number 87-2 are incorporated herein by reference, except where there is a conflict between this Agreement and the Invitation to Bid shall take precedence over Capital City's Response to the Invitation to Bid. Petitioner began performing services under the Agreement on November 8, 1986, and continued to do so until December 31, 1987, when the agreement expired. Immediately after beginning to perform services, the number of drafts being processed in the Health Claims Account exceeded the number Petitioner had anticipated. This continued for the entire period of the Agreement, during which Petitioner processed the following number of drafts: Nov. 8 - Nov. 30, 1986 38,291 December 55,313 January, 1987 59,887 February 73,309 March 74,468 April 68,654 May 67,911 June 81,065 July 86,838 August 74,337 September 82,846 October 85,624 November 74,474 December 76,374 Monthly Average 72,217 On April 21, 1987, Petitioner, requested that Respondent pay additional compensation to Petitioner based on 13.7 cents per draft for the number of drafts which were being processed in excess of the number reflected on Appendix 2 of the Invitation to Bid. By letter dated May 25, 1987, Respondent denied Petitioner's request, stating that the "unpredictable fluctuations in the volume of drafts was a business risk agreement." Petitioner's Exhibit 4.. After further oral communications between the parties, Petitioner requested an administrative hearing regarding its request for additional compensation. The number of drafts paid from Respondent's, account during May, 1985 through April 1986, which formed the basis for the average number of drafts listed on Appendix 2 were: May 1985 32,783 June 28,045 July 32,697 August 32,822 September 34,923 October 41,430 November 41,491 December 39,136 January 1986 53,103 February 51,390 March 50,775 April 48,176 Total $486,811 Additionally, the number of drafts paid in May, June and July, 1986 were 44,020; 45,123; and 53,095; respectively. At the time Mr. Lewis was working on the Invitation to Bid and had the conversation with Mr. Thompson described in Finding of Fact 12, supra, he was not aware that the number of drafts paid per month had been increasing over the prior three months. In preparing the Invitation to Bid, Mr. Lewis had asked someone in his office to give him an average for the past 12 months and the number he received is the number reflected in Appendix 2.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED, that Respondent issue a final order denying Petitioner's request for additional compensation. Done and ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX The parties submitted proposed findings of fact which are addressed below. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Ruling and Paragraph Number in of Fact Number Recommended Order Accepted. RO1, 2. Accepted, generally. RO3, 4 Accepted, generally. RO5 Accepted. RO9 Irrelevant Accepted. RO12 Accepted. RO11, 13 First sentence, accepted. RO14, 15. Second sentence, generally accepted, except to the extent it indicates that the number of items was limited by the Agreement. RO16, 17 and last paragraph of Conclusions of Law. Generally supported by the evidence, but irrelevant. The fact that Respondent had this information in its records does not mean that it had a duty to inform bidders when, at the time, it did not know its significance. Accepted. RO19 Accepted, except for parenthetical on incorporation by reference. RO19 Supported by competent evidence but not necessary for the decision reached 13-15. Rejected as argument Respondent's Proposed Finding's of Fact Proposed Finding Ruling and Paragraph Number in of Fact Number Recommended Order 1-3. Irrelevant 4,5. Accepted RO3, 4, 5, 13, 15 6. Accepted 7. Accepted generally. RO12 8. Accepted generally. RO12 9. Accepted 10. Accepted. RO5 11-13. Accepted. RO20 14. Supported by the evidence, but unnecessary to the decision. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Beasley, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether Petitioner is entitled to repayment for alleged Medicaid overpayments to Respondent; and, if so, the amount of the overpayment to be repaid; (2) the amount of any fine to be imposed against Respondent; and (3) the amount of any investigative, legal, and expert witness costs to be assessed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is the agency responsible for administering the Medicaid program in the state of Florida, including overseeing the integrity of that program. § 409.913, Fla. Stat.1/ Respondent is a board-certified family practice physician. During the Audit Period,2/ Respondent was an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered medical services rendered to Medicaid recipients.3/ Respondent provides medical services in a rural area to an underserved population. A substantial proportion of his patients are poor and are Medicaid recipients. The Audit As part of Petitioner's duties in overseeing the integrity of the Medicaid program, it investigates and audits Medicaid providers for services rendered to Medicaid recipients. In what is commonly referred to as the "pay-and-chase system," Medicaid providers bill Petitioner for medical services rendered to Medicaid recipients and Petitioner pays these bills, which are referred to as "claims." Thereafter, Petitioner audits those claims. The audit is conducted to determine whether the medical services rendered were appropriate for the condition being treated, whether the amounts billed for services are correct based on documentation provided, and whether Medicaid covers the services provided. If Petitioner determines that the provider was paid for services that did not comply with the Medicaid program requirements, it seeks reimbursement from the provider of the payments made for noncompliant claims. Here, Petitioner audited Respondent's medical records to verify that claims paid by Medicaid during the period from January 1, 2012, through June 30, 2014 (the "Audit Period"), qualified for payment under the Medicaid program. During the Audit Period, Respondent submitted a total of 7,093 claims for billable services rendered to a total population of 854 Medicaid recipients, for which Medicaid paid a total of $448,314.06. Rather than examine the medical service provision records of all 854 recipients Respondent served during the Audit Period, using a computer program, Petitioner randomly selected a sample comprised of 35 recipients from the total population of recipients. Respondent submitted 245 claims for the 35 recipients in the sample population. Once these 35 recipients were identified, Petitioner requested that Respondent provide the Medicaid services records for the claims submitted for these recipients. Upon receiving the Medicaid services records from Respondent, Petitioner, through its nurse consultant, Karen Reynolds, and its peer reviewer, Dr. Lisa Jernigan,4/ reviewed the claims for these 35 recipients. Reynolds' review of Respondent's records consisted of identifying the claims for which Respondent provided insufficient or no documentation, as required by the 2008 and 2012 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbooks ("Handbooks"), to support the claims. When she determined that insufficient documentation had been submitted to support a claim, Reynolds made notations on a worksheet created for that particular recipient, regarding the insufficiency of the documentation. Reynolds made her notations on the worksheets in light red ink. After Reynolds completed her review, the records were transmitted to Dr. Jernigan for a substantive review of each claim to determine whether the documentation submitted in support of a claim complied with the pertinent standards in the Handbooks for payment of the claim. Based on her substantive review, Dr. Jernigan determined, for each claim, whether the claim should be approved, adjusted, or denied.5/ Dr. Jernigan's notations regarding approval, denial, or modification of payment for each claim, as well as the basis of her determination for each claim, were made on the worksheets in green ink and in darker red ink. After Dr. Jernigan completed her review of the claims, Reynolds went back through the worksheets and made additional notations, such as "NMN" for "not medically necessary," summarizing Dr. Jernigan's substantive review, in light green ink. For each claim that Dr. Jernigan determined should be adjusted or denied, Reynolds wrote the disallowed amount in the "dis-amt" space on the worksheet for that claim.6/ Based on the competent, substantial, and persuasive evidence, the undersigned determines that the audit was properly conducted. Dr. Jernigan engaged in the peer review of Respondent's records, and Reynolds merely served as an assistant whose role was confined to the ministerial tasks of determining whether Respondent had submitted the documentation requested by Petitioner for purposes of determining compliance with the Handbooks, and, after Dr. Jernigan completed her substantive peer review of each claim, summarizing Jernigan's determinations, as appropriate, and calculating the disallowed amounts for claims that Dr. Jernigan had determined should be adjusted or denied.7/ On the basis of this review process, Petitioner determined that Respondent had been overpaid in the amount of $4,867.97 ($19.86832653 per claim) for the 245 claims in the 35- recipient sample population. Using the statistical formula for cluster sampling,8/ which extrapolates the overpayment determined from the sample population across the total population of 7,093 claims, Petitioner determined that Respondent had been overpaid the total amount of $104,951.05. Petitioner informed Respondent of this preliminary overpayment determination through its Preliminary Audit Report ("PAR")9/ issued on November 10, 2015, and gave him the option of submitting further documentation in support of the claims that had been preliminarily identified as ineligible for payment by the Medicaid program.10/ In response to the PAR, Respondent provided additional documentation, which was reviewed by Dr. Jernigan. Based on the review of the additional records Respondent provided, Petitioner issued a FAR, dated August 8, 2016. The FAR determined that Respondent had been paid an overpayment of $4,637.45 ($18.92836735 per claim) for the 245 claims in the 35-recipient sample population. As with the PAR, Petitioner employed the statistical formula for cluster sampling to determine the alleged probable overpayment for the total population of 7,903 claims paid during the Audit Period. This analysis yielded a probable overpayment of $97,121.42, with a 95-percent probability that the actual overpayment is equal to or greater than that amount. Petitioner also sought to impose a fine of $19,424.28 as a sanction for violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G- 9.070(7)(e), and to require Respondent to pay $1,708.08 in investigative, legal, and expert witness costs, as authorized by section 409.913(23), Florida Statutes. Subsequent to issuance of the FAR, Petitioner and Respondent conducted a peer-provider meeting. As a result of that meeting, as well as subsequent discussions between the parties, Respondent was afforded several opportunities to submit additional documentation to support his claims. As a result of the documentation Respondent provided, Petitioner has further reduced the alleged overpayment amount to $72,084.43, which is now the amount at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner also seeks to impose a fine consisting of 20 percent of this overpayment amount, or $14,416.89. Additionally, if Petitioner prevails in this proceeding, it seeks to recover its investigative, legal, and expert witness costs. Grounds Stated in FAR for Denial or Reduction of Claims The FAR states four grounds, or "Findings," for Petitioner's determination that Respondent was overpaid by Medicaid for certain medical services he provided, based on cited provisions in the 2008 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook ("2008 Handbook"), 2012 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook ("2012 Handbook"), 2010 Physician Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook ("2010 Handbook"), 2012 Practitioner Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, and 2014 Practitioner Services and Limitations Handbook ("2014 Handbook").11/ The FAR does not allege that Respondent committed any Medicaid fraud or abuse in this proceeding. Finding No. 1 Finding No. 1 in the FAR alleges that Respondent provided incomplete records, as defined in the 2008 and 2012 Handbooks, for some claims for which he billed and was paid, such that any payments for which incomplete records were submitted constitutes an overpayment that Petitioner is entitled to recover. The 2008 and 2012 Handbooks, "Provider Responsibility" section, states, in pertinent part: When presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of, and be responsible for, goods and services claimed to have been provided, to supervise and be responsible for preparation and submission of the claim, and to present a claim that is true and accurate and that is for goods and services that: Have actually been furnished to the recipient by the provider prior to submitting the claim; * * * Are provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with federal, state and local law; and Are documented by records made at the time the goods or services were provided, demonstrating the medical necessity for the goods or services rendered. Medicaid goods or services are excessive or not medically necessary unless both the medical basis and the specific need for them are fully and properly documented in the recipient’s medical record. The 2008 and 2012 Handbooks, "Requirements for Medical Records" section, states in pertinent part: Medical records must state the necessity for and the extent of services provided. The following requirements may vary according to the service rendered: Description of what was done during the visit; History; Physical assessment; Chief complaint on each visit; Diagnostic tests and results; Diagnosis; Treatment plan, including prescriptions; Medications, supplies, scheduling frequency for follow-up or other services; Progress reports, treatment rendered; The author of each (medical record) entry must be identified and must authenticate his entry by signature, written initials or computer entry; Dates of service; and Referrals to other services. The 2008 and 2012 Handbooks, "Record Keeping Requirement" section, states: Medicaid requires that the provider retain all business records as defined in 59G- 1.010(30) F.A.C., medical-related records as defined in 59G-1.010 (154) F.A.C., and medical records as defined in 59G-1.010 (160) F.A.C. on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. Records can be kept on paper, magnetic material, film, or other media including electronic storage, except as otherwise required by law or Medicaid requirements. In order to qualify as a basis for reimbursement, the records must be signed and dated at the time of service, or otherwise attested to as appropriate to the media. Rubber stamped signatures must be initialed. The records must be accessible, legible and comprehensible. The 2008 Handbook, "Incomplete Records" section, states that "providers who are not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies described in this chapter may be subject to administrative sanctions and recoupment of Medicaid payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation or appropriate signatures will be recouped." The 2012 Handbook, "Incomplete or Missing Records" section, similarly states: "Incomplete records are records that lack documentation that all requirements or conditions for service provision have been met. Medicaid shall recover payment for services or goods when the provider has incomplete records or does not provide the records." The following claims, which are in dispute in this proceeding, were denied on the ground stated in Finding No. 1: Recipient 2, claim nos. 2 and 21; Recipient 6, claim nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4; Recipient 8, claim no. 6; Recipient 9, claim no. 4; Recipient 10, claim no. 10; Recipient 13, claim no. 3; Recipient 16, claim nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 41, 43, 54, and 57; Recipient 18, claim nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5; Recipient 24, claim no. 1; Recipient 33, claim no. 9; Recipient 34, claim nos. 4 and 7; Recipient 35, claim nos. 5 and 6.12/ A total of 47 claims are in dispute on the ground stated in Finding No. 1. Finding No. 2 Finding No. 2 in the FAR alleges that the medical necessity of some services for which Respondent billed and was paid were not supported by the documentation he provided. The 2008 and 2012 Handbooks, in the section titled "Provider Responsibility," state in pertinent part: When presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of, and be responsible for, goods and services claimed to have been provided, to supervise and be responsible for preparation and submission of the claim, and to present a claim that is true and accurate and that is for goods and services that: * * * Are Medicaid-covered goods or services that are medically necessary[.] Additionally, as noted above, the 2008 and 2012 Handbooks, "Provider Responsibility" section, state, in pertinent part: When presenting a claim for payment under the Medicaid program, a provider has an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of, and be responsible for, goods and services claimed to have been provided, to supervise and be responsible for preparation and submission of the claim, and to present a claim that is true and accurate and that is for goods and services that: * * * Are documented by records made at the time the goods or services were provided, demonstrating the medical necessity for the goods or services rendered. Medicaid goods or services are excessive or not medically necessary unless both the medical basis and the specific need for them are fully and properly documented in the recipient’s medical record. The following claims, which are disputed in this proceeding, were denied on the ground stated in Finding No. 2: Recipient 2, claim nos. 11, 13, 19, and 21; Recipient 16, claim nos. 15, 17, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 39, 41, 43, 45, and 47; Recipient 24, claim no. 1; Recipient 34, claim nos. 4 and 7; and Recipient 35, claim no. 4. A total of 20 claims are disputed on the ground stated in Finding No. 2.13/ Finding No. 3 Finding No. 3 in the FAR states that some services that Respondent provided to established patients were billed and paid as having been rendered to new patients. The 2010, 2012, and 2014 Handbooks, "Established Patient Visit" section, defines an "established patient" as "one who has received professional services from a physician or another practitioner of the same specialty who belongs to the same provider group, within the past three years." These Handbooks define a "new patient" as "one who has not received any professional services from a physician or another practitioner of the same specialty who belongs to the same provider group, within the past three years." The following claims, which are disputed in this proceeding, were denied on the ground stated in Finding No. 3: Recipient 21, claim no. 1; Recipient 23, claim no. 1. A total of two claims are disputed on the ground stated in Finding No. 3. Finding No. 4 Finding No. 4 in the FAR states that the level of service for some claims for which Respondent billed and was paid was not supported by the documentation submitted to support the claim. The 2010 Handbook, "Medically Necessary" section, states in pertinent part: Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary and do not duplicate another provider’s service. In addition, the services must meet the following criteria: * * * Be individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the recipient’s needs; * * * Reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide[.] The 2012 and 2014 Handbooks, "Medical Necessity" section, state in pertinent part: Medicaid reimburses services that are determined medically necessary and do not duplicate another provider’s service. Rule 59G-1.010 (166), F.A.C. defines "medically necessary" or "medical necessity" as follows: The medical or allied care, goods, or services furnished or ordered must: (a) Meet the following conditions: * * * 2. Be individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient’s needs. * * * 4. Reflect the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide. The following claims, which are disputed in this proceeding, were denied on the ground stated in Finding No. 4: Recipient 8, claim no. 4; Recipient 9, claim no. 2; Recipient 10, claim no. 3; Recipient 13, claim no. 1; Recipient 16, claim nos. 29, and 52; Recipient 17, claim no. 1; Recipient 21, claim no. 2; Recipient 22, claim no. 2; Recipient 30, claim no. 3; Recipient 32, claim no. 2; Recipient 35, claim no. 1. A total of 12 claims are disputed on the ground stated in Finding No. 4. In sum, a total of 69 claims are disputed on the grounds set forth in Finding Nos. 1 through 4. Medical Record-Keeping Purpose and Requirements Medical records should consist of a simple, complete, organized record that documents the patient's medical condition, needs, and the medical services rendered, so that the physician preparing the record, as well as any other physician——whether or not familiar with the patient or the record-keeping system, including an electronic health record ("EHR" system) used——is able to follow the patient's course of health and treatment. Additionally, medical records must be sufficiently complete and clear for purposes of billing, and in the case of Medicaid, for payment. For claims for services provided to Medicaid recipients to be payable under the Medicaid program, the medical records must meet the requirements set forth in the pertinent Medicaid Handbooks. As discussed above, among these requirements are that the records be true and accurate; demonstrate the medical necessity of, and level of service for, the services provided; contain certain specified components, such as a description of what was done during the visit, the patient's medical history, physical assessment of the patient, the patient's chief complaint on a particular visit, diagnosis, and treatment plan; and be comprehensible, individualized, specific, and consistent with the symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury treated. Dr. Jernigan opined, persuasively, that in the medical context, the term "comprehensible" means that the medical records are sufficiently intelligible and understandable such that another physician or other medically-trained individual could read the record and have a solid picture of the patient's medical history and general condition, as well as the treating physician's specific physical findings and reasons why a particular treatment or service was provided to the patient. Dr. Jernigan testified, credibly and persuasively, that when a medical record contains conflicting or inconsistent information, it is incomprehensible. If the medical record is incomprehensible, it cannot be determined to support the billed service, in which case, the claim for that service must be adjusted or denied. The Intergy EHR System During the Audit Period, Respondent used the "Intergy" EHR system to prepare and keep his medical records for his patients, including the Medicaid recipients he treated and whose claims he billed under the Medicaid program. Dr. Jernigan does not use the Intergy EHR system in her own practice. However, the components of the Intergy EHR system are the same or similar to the components of other commonly-used EHR systems with which she is familiar.14/ Dr. Jernigan explained the purpose of each component of the Intergy EHR template used to compile the medical records for a patient. The purpose of the first component of the Intergy template, "Reason for Visit," is to document the reason why the patient is seeking medical services. The second component, "History of Present Illness," serves to provide a chronological description of the issues surrounding the patient's chief complaint and the reason for the visit. In essence, this portion of the medical record documents the commencement of the patient's medical complaint; the length of time the patient has experienced that condition; its progression; effective and ineffective treatments; the specific location of the condition on or in the patient's body, including whether it is on the left or right side of the body, or both; and other information regarding the temporal and physical aspects of the patient's medical condition. The purpose of the "Past Medical/Surgical History" component is to document the patient's past medical or surgical history relative to the patient's current condition at the time of the particular visit. The purpose of the "Social History" component is to document the patient's social history or habits as related to the patient's medical condition presented at the visit.15/ The "Family History" component is to enable the provider to document any family history that may be relevant to diagnosing and treating the patient's condition.16/ The purpose of the "Review of Systems" component is to document the patient's medical condition at the time of the visit. This component includes a review of body systems involved in the patient's complaint, to determine and document whether there may be other health issues that could present with the same symptoms. This component enables the provider to document relevant information regarding the involvement of other body systems that may affect the diagnosis or treatment for the primary complaint or reason for a particular visit. The "Physical Findings" component is the portion of the medical record in which the provider documents the information regarding his or her findings resulting from a physical examination of the patient. The "Assessment" component is where the provider documents his or her conclusion, or diagnosis, as to the nature, identity, or cause of the patient's condition. The "Therapy" component enables the provider to describe and document the chosen course of treatment for the patient. The "Counseling/Education" component enables the provider to describe and document the matters discussed with the patient, such as the nature of the patient's medical condition and prognosis, the provider's chosen course of treatment or therapy, recommendations regarding the patient's actions to assist in treating the condition, and instructions provided to the patient. The "Plan" component describes the course of treatment for the medical condition and the reasons for choosing this course of treatment. The "Practice Management" component is included to implement certain meaningful use regulatory requirements. The Intergy EHR system has time-saving features, such as a "carry-forward" feature, which allows patient information from previous visits to be "carried forward," or copied and pasted, into the records for subsequent visits. Dr. Jernigan opined, credibly, that although the "carry-forward" feature is convenient, improper use or overuse of this feature can result in the records for a patient's subsequent visits containing all of the information from previous visits, rather than only the information pertinent to the particular subsequent visit. This may render the medical records outdated and inaccurate with respect to the patient's medical condition in subsequent visits. Additionally, carrying forward information from previous visits can render the records for subsequent visits incomprehensible, in that the patient's reason for that particular visit, the symptoms exhibited at that visit, and the specific treatment provided in that visit cannot be determined from the mass of comprehensive information that was carried forward from previous visits and included in the record for that particular visit. Here, the competent, credible evidence shows that Respondent was not trained in, and experienced difficulty in using, the Intergy EHR system. The competent, credible evidence shows that Respondent frequently used Intergy's "carry-forward" feature in preparing his medical records, and this was the likely cause for many of the records for his Medicaid patients including extensive carried-forward information from visit to visit——to the point that in numerous cases, it was difficult to identify which, if any, additional medical conditions, physical findings, treatments, or other services were provided to patients in their subsequent visits. The competent, credible evidence also shows that the Intergy EHR system has numerous flaws that render it difficult to use and not optimally functional in producing electronic medical records that are sufficiently accurate or comprehensible to be used for Medicaid billing purposes. As a result of the Intergy EHR system's flaws, as well as Respondent's apparent overuse of the system's "carry-forward" feature, his medical records were, in many cases, redundant, outdated, contradictory, and inaccurate with regard to documenting a patient's medical condition, physical findings, treatment, basis for services provided, and other key information for a particular visit. This rendered those records untrue, inaccurate, and incomprehensible, and, therefore, not in compliance with the Handbooks' requirements regarding documentation of services sufficient to support billed claims. Overpayment Determinations Rather than presenting evidence on each of the 69 total claims denied or adjusted on the grounds stated in Finding Nos. 1 through 4, the parties presented testimony and related evidence on selected representative claims for each Finding. The parties stipulated, with respect to Finding Nos. 1, 2, and 4, that Dr. Jernigan's analysis of Respondent's medical records, and her opinions regarding whether those records complied with the pertinent standards in the Medicaid Handbooks for payment purposes, applied to all claims for which the grounds in a particular Finding were cited as the basis for denial or modification of payment of that claim. It is important to note that Petitioner did not stipulate to the correctness of Dr. Jernigan's analyses and opinions——only that her analyses and opinions applied to all of the disputed claims denied on the grounds set forth in Finding Nos. 1, 2, and 4 in the FAR. Due to the small number of claims (two) that were denied or adjusted on the grounds cited in Finding No. 3, the parties presented testimony on each of those claims. Finding No. 1 – Insufficient Documentation to Support Claim For Finding No. 1, Dr. Jernigan testified, and Petitioner presented related evidence on, the following representative claims: Recipient 6, claim nos. 1 through 4; Recipient 8, claim no. 6; Recipient 16, claim nos. 3, 6, 15, 18, and 21. Recipient 6 Claim No. 1 Based on Dr. Jernigan's review, Petitioner denied Recipient 6, claim no. 1, for services provided by Respondent on February 29, 2012, on the basis of insufficient documentation to support the claim. The Reason for Visit noted that the patient was visiting due to "increased pains," but the documentation did not describe the location or nature of the pain, so was incomplete. The History of Present Illness component for this claim consisted of a bullet-point list of complaints, rather than a discussion of the development of those complaints over time. Additionally, this component contained incomplete and contradictory information. Specifically, this component contained a notation stating that the patient was suffering from hand pain and a range of other joint pain, without specifying which hand and joints (i.e., on the right side, left side, or both sides of the body) were painful. Additionally, the notation stated "no musculoskeletal symptoms," which conflicts with the notations regarding the existence of hand and other joint pain. The Review of Systems component for this claim also contained conflicting or contradictory notations. For example, there were conflicting descriptions of the patient's state of malaise, and conflicting notations documenting both the presence and the absence of night sweats. The Physical Findings component for this claim also contained contradictions and insufficient information. For example, the notations state both "wheezing was heard" and "no wheezing was heard"; that vomiting was observed and that the patient is to call the provider if vomiting develops; and that muscle spasms and tenderness in the back, as well as numerous trigger points, were observed, but that there was an overall finding of "normal" for the musculoskeletal system. Further, the notes did not identify whether these findings applied to the left or right side of the body, or both. The Assessment component consisted of a wide-ranging list of conditions, likely due to the carry-forward of all or much of the information from previous visits. Many of the conditions listed in this component were not supported by the information recorded in the History of Present Illness, Review of Systems, or Physical Findings components. For example, the assessment states that the patient suffers from hyperlipidemia, testicular dysfunction, viral syndrome, and upper respiratory infection, none of which are sufficiently supported by the information documented in any other component in the patient's medical history. The Therapy component states that Respondent provided pain management counseling and pain management by medication; however, the medication prescribed for the patient was not identified or documented in the medical record. The Counseling/Education component lists numerous matters on which counseling ostensibly was provided, including use of tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drugs, none of which were supported by any findings or notations in the patient's medical record. The Plan component for this claim diagnoses the patient as suffering from impotence of organic origin and suggests referring the patient to a urologist. Dr. Jernigan credibly testified that this diagnosis is not supported by the information documented in the other components of the patient's medical record, thus highlighting the point that if this diagnosis is accurate, the medical records for this claim are incomplete because they do not sufficiently document the basis for this diagnosis and course of treatment. Taking these deficiencies into account, Dr. Jernigan credibly opined that the medical records submitted to support claim no. 1 for Recipient 6 were internally inconsistent and contradictory, and lacked sufficient documentation to support the treatment provided, and, thus, were incomplete and incomprehensible. Dr. Jernigan credibly and persuasively opined that as a result of these deficiencies, the medical records submitted to support claim no. 1 for Recipient 6 did not comply with the pertinent standards in the Handbooks. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that claim no. 1 for Recipient 6 should be denied. Claim No. 2 Claim no. 2 is a follow-up visit for the same patient that took place on August 3, 2012. Dr. Jernigan credibly testified, and a review of the medical record for that visit confirms, that the documentation for this claim suffers from most of the same deficiencies as did the documentation for claim no. 1. Specifically, the Reason for Visit was incomplete because it failed to document and describe the location or nature of the "increased pains." The History of Present Illness component consisted of the carried-forward information recorded in that EHR component for the previous visit, and, as such, suffered from the same deficiencies. Specifically, it did not provide a chronological history of the presentation of the medical condition or its progression or treatment, but instead contained the same series of descriptive bullet points. Further, as previously discussed, several of the conditions described in these bullet points were contradictory. The Review of Systems component also appeared to carry-forward the same information contained in the same component from the previous visit, so suffers from the same deficiencies. Additionally, this component is inaccurate because it did not accurately reflect the patient's current medical condition at the time of the follow-up visit. The Physical Findings component also contained mostly carried-forward information from the same component in the record of this patient's previous visit, so contained the same inconsistencies and contradictions as the records submitted in support of claim no. 1. The Assessment component also appeared to be a carry- forward of all or much of the information from the previous visit, so it also suffered from the same deficiencies as the Assessment for claim no. 1. As discussed in detail above, many conditions listed in this component were not supported by the information documented in the other components of the medical record. In the Plan component for this claim, the urological diagnosis was deleted; however, the Plan did not specifically address or prescribe any treatments specific to the medical conditions identified in other components of the medical record for this visit. Taking these deficiencies into account, Dr. Jernigan credibly opined that the medical records submitted to support claim no. 2 for Recipient 6 were internally inconsistent and contradictory, and lacked sufficient documentation to support the treatment provided, and, thus, were incomplete, untrue and inaccurate, and incomprehensible. Dr. Jernigan credibly and persuasively opined that as a result of these deficiencies, the medical records submitted to support claim no. 2 for Recipient 6 did not comply with the pertinent standards in the Handbooks. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that claim no. 2 for Recipient 6 should be denied. Claim No. 3 Claim no. 3 is a follow-up visit for Recipient 6 that took place on August 15, 2012. Dr. Jernigan credibly testified, and a review of the medical record for that visit confirms, that the documentation for this claim suffers from several of the same deficiencies as did the documentation for claim nos. 1 and 2. The Reason for Visit component for this claim was incomplete because although it referenced that one of the reasons for the visit was a "medication refill," the medical record for this visit did not contain any documentation regarding the medication prescription being refilled. Additionally, as before, this component did not document and describe the location or nature of the "increased pains" also listed as a reason for the visit. As before, the History of Present Illness component consisted of carried-forward information, so continued to suffer from some of the previously discussed deficiencies. This component did not provide a chronological history of the presentation of the medical condition or its progression or treatment, but instead consisted of a series of descriptive bullet points, some of which contained contradictory information. The Review of Symptoms component also appeared to consist mostly of carried-forward information that contained the same contradictory information as with the previous claims. In addition, new contradictory provisions documented the presence of "no sore throat" and "[s]ore throat," "no cough" and "cough causing vomiting," and "[a]nxiety" and "[n]o anxiety." The Physical Findings component also contained carried-forward information from the same component in the record of this patient's previous visit, so some of the previous contradictions in the notations, such as "wheezing was heard" and "no wheezing was heard," continued to be included. Additionally, the record still did not identify the specific location——i.e., left or right side of the body——of the musculoskeletal and neurological conditions noted, so was incomplete. The Assessment component also appeared to be a carry- forward of all or much of the information from the previous visit, so suffered from the same deficiencies as the Assessment for claim nos. 1 and 2. As discussed above, many conditions listed in this component were not supported by the information documented in the other components of the medical record. Taking these deficiencies into account, Dr. Jernigan credibly opined that the medical records submitted to support claim no. 3 for Recipient 6 were internally inconsistent and contradictory, and lacked sufficient documentation to support the treatment provided, and, thus, were incomplete, untrue and inaccurate, and incomprehensible. Dr. Jernigan credibly and persuasively opined that due to these deficiencies, the medical records submitted to support claim no. 3 for Recipient 6 did not comply with the pertinent standards in the Handbooks. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that claim no. 3 for Recipient 6 should be denied. Claim No. 4 Claim no. 4 is a follow-up visit for Recipient 6 that took place on November 21, 2012. Dr. Jernigan credibly testified, and a review of the medical record for that visit confirmed, that the documentation for this claim suffered from several of the same deficiencies as claim nos. 1, 2, and 3. The Reason for Visit component for this claim was incomplete because although it referenced that one of the reasons for the visit was a "medication refill," the medical record for this visit did not contain any documentation regarding the medication prescription being refilled. This component also failed to describe the location or nature of the "increased pains" that are listed as a reason for the visit. As before, the History of Present Illness component consisted of the carried-forward information, so continued to suffer from some of the previously discussed deficiencies. As before, this component did not provide a chronological history of the presentation of the medical condition or its progression or treatment, but instead consisted of a series of descriptive bullet points. New information regarding the patient's self- monitoring of blood glucose was added, but the blood glucose levels observed at various times of the day were not listed, rendering this notation incomplete. Additionally, this component continued to be incomplete due to lack of information regarding precise location of musculoskeletal and neurologic conditions. The Current Medication component, added into the medical records for this patient on this follow-up visit, was incomplete because it did not list the medications the patient is taking. The Review of Symptoms component also appeared to consist mostly of carried-forward information that contained the same contradictory information as with the previous claims. In addition, new contradictory provisions documented the presence of "no sore throat" and "[s]ore throat," "no cough" and "cough causing vomiting," and "[a]nxiety" and "[n]o anxiety." The Past Medical/Surgical History component stated "Pediatric: Failure to thrive." Because this patient is a 73-year-old adult rather than a pediatric patient, this information is inaccurate. As before, the Review of Symptoms component contained carried-forward information from this patient's previous visits, so perpetuated contradictions previously noted, such as "night sweats" and "no night sweats," and "no wheezing" and "wheezing worse during upper respiratory infection." The Physical Findings component still did not identify the specific location—i.e., left or right side of the body——of the musculoskeletal and neurological conditions noted. Additionally, necessary information, such as vital signs and lab testing results, was not documented. The Assessment component again appeared to be a carry- forward of all or much of the information from the previous visit, so suffered from the same deficiencies as the Assessment for claim nos. 1, 2, and 3. As previously discussed, many conditions listed in this component, such as "adult failure to thrive," "vascular dementia," and "chronic fatigue syndrome," were not supported by the information documented in the other components of the medical records. The Therapy Component noted that the patient's pain was being managed by medication, but there was no notation regarding the type of medication prescribed. Additionally, the patient was directed to perform a "self-examination" with no detail regarding what part of the body was to be examined, and the "addiction counseling" notation was unsupported by any other mention of addiction in the medical record. The Counseling/Education component continued to contain extensive carried-forward information, and also contained an extensive list of newly-added counseling notations that were not supported by other components of the medical record. Taking these deficiencies into account, Dr. Jernigan credibly opined that the medical records submitted to support claim no. 4 for Recipient 6 were internally inconsistent and contradictory, and lacked sufficient documentation to support the treatment provided, and, therefore, were incomplete, untrue and inaccurate, and incomprehensible. Dr. Jernigan credibly and persuasively opined that due to these deficiencies, the medical records submitted to support claim no. 4 for Recipient 6 did not comply with the pertinent standards in the Handbooks. Accordingly, it is determined that claim no. 4 for Recipient 6 should be denied. Recipient 8 Claim No. 6 Based on Dr. Jernigan's review, Petitioner denied Recipient 8, claim no. 6, for services provided by Respondent on February 29, 2012, on the basis of insufficient documentation. Dr. Jernigan noted that much of the medical record for this visit appeared to be an exact carry-forward from the previous visit, so did not specifically address or reflect the patient's current condition at the time of her follow-up visit. Additionally, several of the components for this visit contained contradictory or clearly inaccurate information. She noted that when inconsistencies are repeated in medical records, it is very difficult to determine the patient's condition or course of treatment for a particular visit. Here, the History of Illness was again a bullet-point list of symptoms or conditions, rather than a chronological narrative of the patient's medical condition presented for this visit. Additionally, although one of the stated reasons for this visit was "infected hands after burns," this component contained the contradictory statement "no skin symptoms." Further, in the Past Medical/Surgical component, it is noted "Pediatric: Failure to thrive." Because the patient is an adult, this was an inaccurate notation in the record. The Social History component stated in part: "Abuse and Neglect: Receiving insufficient liquids and abandonment which resulted in hunger or thirst." Dr. Jernigan opined that this statement was inconsistent with the fact that the patient is obese. The Functional component describes the patient as "unable to lift more than" and "unable to drive more than," but did not contain a complete description of these limitations from which the patient suffered. Additionally, the statements "able to walk" and "difficulty walking unassisted" appeared to be contradictory. The Review of Systems also contained several contradictory statements. Specifically, the Reason for Visit component stated that one of the reasons for this visit was "infected hands after burns," but the Review of Symptoms component stated that the patient exhibited "no skin lesions." Additionally, this component stated that the patient exhibited "no polydipsia" and "polydipsia," "vertigo" and "no vertigo," and "no sensory disturbance" and "tingling of the hands and feet, a burning sensation, and numbness of the hands and feet (distal)." The Physical Findings also contained contradictory and incomplete information. For example, the stance and gait were shown as being both "abnormal" and "normal." Further, the description of the burns on the patient's hands did not specify whether they were first-, second-, or third-degree burns, and although her hands were burned, the skin was described as "general appearance was normal" and having "no skin lesions." The Assessment consisted of an extensive list of conditions, many of which were unsupported by the Review of Systems and Physical Findings components. The Therapy component consisted of an extensive list of items, many of which were unsupported by information in the other components of the medical record. For example, addiction counseling for alcohol and opioids is noted, but there was no information documenting addiction to these substances in other parts of the medical record. Additionally, "psychoactive medication management" was listed as a therapeutic item, but the specific medication was not identified and the other components did not support this therapy. Similarly, "pain management by medication" was listed, but the specific medication was not identified. "Education and instructions" also was listed but there was no description of the specific subjects. The Counseling/Education component consisted of an extensive list of subjects about which the patient ostensibly was counseled or education on this visit, but most of them were unsupported by the information in the other components of the medical record for this visit. Dr. Jernigan noted that it appeared that the EHR system "dumped" a laundry list of unrelated items into the notes for this component, making it difficult to know precisely what type of counseling and education was actually provided for this visit. Taking these deficiencies into account, Dr. Jernigan credibly opined that the medical records submitted to support claim no. 6 for Recipient 8 were internally inconsistent and contradictory, and lacked sufficient documentation to support the treatment provided, and, therefore, were incomplete, untrue and inaccurate, and incomprehensible. Dr. Jernigan credibly and persuasively opined that due to these deficiencies, the medical records submitted to support claim no. 6 for Recipient 8 did not comply with the pertinent standards in the Handbooks. Accordingly, it is determined that claim no. 6 for Recipient 8 should be denied. Recipient 16 Recipient 16 was a young male patient. During the Audit Period, this patient had numerous visits to Respondent, resulting in a total of 59 claims. Of those, 33 are in dispute in this proceeding. Dr. Jernigan testified about claim nos. 3, 6, 15, 18, and 21 as representative of her analysis and opinions regarding claims denied or adjusted pursuant to the grounds stated in Finding No. 1. Claim No. 3 Dr. Jernigan again noted incomplete documentation and inconsistencies with respect to the notations in the various components of the medical record for this claim. Specifically, she noted that in the Social History, there is a notation of "Abuse and neglect: Receiving insufficient liquids and abandonment which resulted in hunger or thirst," but this notation was not consistent with or supported by the information in the other components of the medical record for this visit. In the Review of Symptoms component, there was an inconsistent notation of "earache" and "no earache." In the Physical Findings component, no vital signs were recorded, rendering the medical record incomplete. Additionally, there were several inconsistent observations documented, including a notation of "no distress," notwithstanding that "vomiting was observed." The Assessment component contained extensive carried- forward information from previous visits, rendering that information inaccurate with respect to this particular visit. Additionally, the medications of Phenergan and Bentyl IM apparently were administered, but no dosage was documented. The Counseling/Education component listed subjects about which the patient ostensibly was counseled, such as tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drug use, but these items were not supported by information in the Social History component or in other components in the medical record for this visit. Ultimately, Dr. Jernigan determined that this claim, which was for an injection to treat nausea with vomiting, should be denied because no dosage for the injected medication was provided, as required by the Handbooks for the claim to be payable. Accordingly, it is determined that claim no. 3 for Recipient 16 should be denied. Claim No. 6 Although the Reason for Visit component referred to test results, the types of tests and results thereof were not addressed or otherwise documented in the medical record for this visit. The History of Present Illness again was presented in a bullet-point list, rather than a chronological narrative of the patient's medical condition and its progression and treatment. There was no information regarding when or for how long the list of conditions existed, or whether they existed at the time of this specific visit. The notation in the Physical Findings that there was "no nasal discharge seen" and "no sinus tenderness" was inconsistent with the Review of Symptoms notations documenting the presence of sinus pain and nasal discharge, and the notation that the oropharynx was "abnormal" and "inflamed" was inconsistent with the notation that it also was "normal." The Counseling/Education component notations stated that the patient again was counseled about tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drug use, but as before, there was no information in the other components to support this counseling for this visit. Taking these deficiencies into account, Dr. Jernigan credibly opined that the medical records submitted to support claim no. 6 for Recipient 16 were internally inconsistent and contradictory, and lacked sufficient documentation to support the treatment provided, and, therefore, were incomplete, untrue and inaccurate, and incomprehensible. Dr. Jernigan credibly and persuasively opined that due to these deficiencies, the medical records submitted to support claim no. 6 for Recipient 8 did not comply with the pertinent standards in the Handbooks. Accordingly, claim no. 6 for Recipient 16 should be denied. Claim No. 15 The Reason for Visit component for this claim did not address the reason for the patient's visit or identify the test results that would be reviewed during that visit. As with previous claims, the History of Illness component for this visit was a bullet-point list of symptoms rather than a chronological narrative of the patient's condition. Additionally, it contained contradictory information regarding the presence or absence of pulmonary symptoms. The Review of Systems component for this visit contained multiple contradictions similar to those noted in the previous claims for this patient. Specifically, there were contradictory notations regarding the presence of "neck pain" and "no neck pain," the presence of "neck stiffness" and "no neck stiffness," the presence of "sore throat" and "no sore throat," and the presence of "localized joint stiffness" and "no localized joint stiffness." The Physical Findings component lacked information regarding the patient's vital signs, and contained contradictory notations regarding normal and abnormal breath sounds and the presence and absence of wheezing. The Assessment component contained extensive information that was unsupported by information documented in the other components of the medical record for this visit. Moreover, this patient had been documented in a previous visit as weighing 168 pounds and suffering abuse and neglect resulting in hunger or thirst, so the notation that he was at risk for obesity hypoventilation syndrome appeared inaccurate and inconsistent with his previously documented condition. Taking these deficiencies into account, Dr. Jernigan credibly opined that the medical records submitted to support claim no. 15 for Recipient 16 were internally inconsistent and contradictory, and lacked sufficient documentation to support the treatment provided, and, therefore, were incomplete, untrue and inaccurate, and incomprehensible. Dr. Jernigan credibly and persuasively opined that due to these deficiencies, the medical records submitted to support claim no. 15 for Recipient 16 did not comply with the pertinent standards in the Handbooks. Accordingly, claim no. 15 for Recipient 16 should be denied. Claim No. 18 As with the medical records for previous claims, the Reason for Visit component for this claim lacked key information, such as information regarding the reason for the visit and the test results to be reviewed. The History of Illness component once again consisted of a bullet list of observed conditions, rather than a chronological narrative of the history of the patient's condition, its progression, and its response or lack of response to treatments. The Review of Systems contained many of the previously noted inconsistencies regarding the presence and absence of neck pain and stiffness and presence and absence of sore throat. Additionally, this component contained the contradictory notations of "heartburn" and "no heartburn." The Physical Findings component of this visit also contained many of the same contradictions as noted for previous claims for this patient. Specifically, there was a notation of normal and abnormal pharynx, normal and abnormal lungs, the presence of wheezing and absence of wheezing, and the presence of both an abnormal and normal gait. The Assessment component again consisted of an extensive list of conditions, many of which were not supported by information documented in the other components for this medical record. The Plan component was non-specific and did not address any of the diagnoses listed in the Assessment component. Taking these deficiencies into account, Dr. Jernigan credibly opined that the medical records submitted to support claim no. 18 for Recipient 16 were internally inconsistent and contradictory, and lacked sufficient documentation to support the treatment provided, and, therefore, were incomplete, untrue and inaccurate, and incomprehensible. Dr. Jernigan credibly and persuasively opined that due to these deficiencies, the medical records submitted to support claim no. 18 for Recipient 16 did not comply with the pertinent standards in the Handbooks. Accordingly, claim no. 18 for Recipient 16 should be denied. Claim No. 21 Claim no. 21 for Recipient 16 suffered from many of the same deficiencies as previously identified for other claims for this patient. The Reason for Visit component did not specifically identify the reason for this particular visit, and the laboratory test results to be reviewed were not identified. The History of Present Illness component consisted of a bullet-point list, rather than a chronological narrative, and it did not discuss the history and progression of the patient's condition and response or lack of response to treatment. Additionally, it contained the same or similar contradictory statements as were previously discussed with respect to this component for other claims for this patient. The Review of Symptoms component contained many of the same contradictions previously noted with respect to other claims for this recipient. Specifically, "no facial pain" and "facial pain and sinus pain," "neck pain" and "no neck pain," "no sore throat" and "sore throat," "heartburn" and "no heartburn," and "dizziness" and "no dizziness" were noted in this component. The Physical Findings component also contained contradictory information, such as abnormal and normal orolarynx, wheezing and no wheezing being heard, and abnormal and normal gait and stance. The Assessment component again appeared to be a carried-forward list of numerous conditions, such as acne, anemia, arthropathy, fatigue, thyroid issues, and obesity that were not supported by documentation in the other components of the medical record for this visit. The Plan was non-specific and did not address the diagnosed conditions listed in the Assessment component. Taking these deficiencies into account, Dr. Jernigan credibly opined that the medical records submitted to support claim no. 21 for Recipient 16 were internally inconsistent and contradictory, and lacked sufficient documentation to support the treatment provided, and, therefore, were incomplete, untrue and inaccurate, and incomprehensible. Dr. Jernigan credibly and persuasively opined that due to these deficiencies, the medical records submitted to support claim no. 21 for Recipient 16 did not comply with the pertinent standards in the Handbooks. Accordingly, claim no. 21 for Recipient 16 should be denied. Summary of Grounds for Denial of Claims Under Finding No. 1 Dr. Jernigan's overall assessment of the claims denied on the basis of Finding No. 1 was that Respondent's documentation was not sufficiently clear and accurate to enable a reviewer to discern the reason for a particular patient visit; the symptoms presenting for a particular visit; the nature, history, and progression of the medical condition; the diagnosis or determination of the medical condition; the treatment; or the therapy and counseling provided to address the medical condition. In particular, the frequent lack of key details, such as the patient's vital signs, and the frequent and pervasive contradictions in many of the components of the records rendered them inaccurate, unreliable, and essentially useless in determining the nature of the patient's condition, treating the patient's condition, and documenting that treatment for payment purposes. Additionally, the diagnoses documented in the Assessments component were rarely well-supported by accurately documented information in the other components, and appeared to be more a "basketful of therapies" that were not specific to the patient and not supported by other information documented in the rest of the medical record. As Dr. Jernigan put it, "if I was looking at [the medical record for] that specific patient, I would have nothing that would be helpful to me." Dr. Jernigan testified, credibly and persuasively, that the frequent and pervasive inconsistencies in Respondent's records rendered them untrue, inaccurate, and incomprehensible. The undersigned finds Dr. Jernigan's analysis and opinions regarding the claims denied on the basis of no documentation or incomplete documentation to be credible, accurate, and supported by the documentary and other evidence in the record. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation noted above, the undersigned has applied this analysis in reviewing each of the other claims disputed on the basis of Finding No. 1. The following table sets forth the undersigned's determination of overpayment, based on a review of each claim, for the claims disputed on the basis of Finding No. 1. Finding No. 1: No Documentation or Incomplete Documentation Recipient No. Claim No. Procedure Code Action Determined Overpayment Amount $ 2 2 99212 Deny 48.56 2 21 99213 Deny 77.34 6 1 99214 Deny 39.46 6 2 99214 Deny 39.46 6 3 99214 Deny 39.46 6 4 99214 Deny 39.46 8 6 99213 Deny 79.34 9 4 99214 Deny 48.27 10 10 93000 Deny 9.67 13 3 99213 Deny 83.35 16 2 J2550 Deny 2.05 16 3 96372 Deny 12.42 16 4 93672 Deny 12.42 16 6 99214 Deny 48.27 16 15 99214 Deny 48.27 16 16 99372 Deny 12.42 16 17 99214 Deny 48.27 16 18 99214 Deny 48.27 16 19 96372 Deny 12.42 16 21 99214 Deny 48.27 16 22 96372 Deny 13.43 16 23 99214 Deny 48.27 16 24 96372 Deny 13.43 16 25 99214 Deny 48.27 16 27 99214 Deny 48.27 16 30 99213 Deny 83.35 16 31 99213 Deny 83.35 16 32 99211 Deny 23.06 16 33 96372 Deny 13.43 16 34 99212 Deny 50.56 16 35 96372 Deny 13.43 16 37 96372 Deny 13.43 16 38 99213 Deny 83.35 16 41 99212 Deny 50.56 16 43 99212 Deny 50.56 16 54 99212 Deny 50.56 16 57 96372 Deny 14.14 18 2 J0969 Deny 2.00 18 3 96372 Deny 12.42 18 4 J1100 Deny 0.15 18 5 96372 Deny 14.42 24 1 99213 Deny 79.34 33 9 99213 Deny 77.34 34 4 99214 Deny 39.46 34 7 88150 Deny 10.00 35 5 99214 Deny 39.46 35 6 99214 Deny 39.46 Total Recipients: 12 Total Claims: 47 Determined Total Overpayment Amount: $1,810.95 Finding No. 2 – Services Provided Not Medically Necessary For Finding No. 2, Dr. Jernigan testified, and Petitioner presented related evidence on, the following representative claims: Recipient 2, claim nos. 11, 13, and 19; Recipient 16, claim nos. 15, 17, and 30; and Recipient 34, claim no. 7. However, because claim nos. 15, 17, and 30 are being denied in this Recommended Order on the basis of Finding No. 1, they are not addressed in this discussion of claims denied on the basis of Finding No. 2, and they are not counted toward the amount of reimbursement determined in this Recommended Order to be owed. Additionally, because the following claims previously have been denied in this Recommended Order on the basis of Finding No. 1, they have not been counted toward determining the overpayment amount for claims denied on the basis of Finding No. 217/: Recipient 2, claim no. 21; Recipient 16, claim nos. 15, 17, 30, 31, 32, 34, 41, and 43; Recipient 24, claim no. 1; and Recipient 34, claim nos. 4 and 7. Accordingly, a total of eight claims in dispute on the basis of Finding No. 2 have been addressed in this Recommended Order. The CPT Codes The 2012, 2013, and 2014 versions of the Current Procedural Terminology manuals (collectively, "CPT Manuals") establish the CPT Codes that apply in billing services to Medicaid.18/ The following CPT Codes are pertinent to the claims denied on the basis set forth in Finding No. 2: 99211, 99212, 99213, and 99214. These CPT Codes indicate a progressive increase in the complexity of the medical visit, so require progressively greater levels of documentation to justify billing Medicaid for the service. Dr. Jernigan regularly bills Medicaid for services she provides using these CPT Codes. She is very familiar with their use and with the nature of the medical services that are appropriately billed under each code. CPT Code 99211 The CPT Manuals define CPT Code 99211 as: "Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, that may not require the presence of a physician. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are minimal. Typically, 5 minutes are spent performing or supervising these services." CPT Code 99212 The CPT Manuals define CPT Code 99212 as: Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least 2 of these 3 components: A problem focused history; A problem focused examination; Straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are self[-]limited or minor. Physicians typically spend 10 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. CPT Code 99213 The CPT Manuals define CPT Code 99213 as: Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least 2 of these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; Medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 15 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. CPT Code 99214 The CPT Manuals define CPT Code 99214 as: Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient, which requires at least 2 of these 3 key components: A detailed history; A detailed examination; Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other physicians, other qualified health care professionals, or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Typically, 25 minutes are spent face-to-face with the patient and/or family. In determining whether a service provided is medically necessary for purposes of Medicaid billing, the focus is on whether there is sufficient documentation to support the necessity of the service provided to the patient. The documentation submitted to support a claim is reviewed to determine whether there is sufficient information to demonstrate a medical relationship between the patient's condition and the treatment provided, and to justify the need for the service provided. A. Recipient 2 Claim No. 11 Dr. Jernigan denied this claim as not medically necessary because the medical record for this visit did not contain sufficient information linking the patient's condition with the diagnosis and treatment. Specifically, while the patient presented with conditions that may indicate a urinary tract infection or pelvic inflammatory disease, those diagnoses were only two in a list of 32 assessments, so the record did not clearly indicate the specific diagnosis for her condition at this specific visit. Further, the treatment consisted of a topical medication used to treat arthritis and a medication used to treat painful menstruation, rather than a medication used to treat a urinary tract infection or pelvic inflammatory disease. Thus, Dr. Jernigan determined that there was insufficient information to demonstrate a medical relationship between the patient's condition and the treatment provided. Accordingly, she determined that the service provided was not medically necessary, so the claim should be denied. Dr. Jernigan's analysis of this claim and her opinion that the supporting documentation was insufficient to demonstrate that the service was medically necessary were credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Accordingly, claim no. 11 for Recipient 2 should be denied on the basis that it was not documented as being medically necessary. Claim No. 13 Dr. Jernigan denied this claim as not medically necessary because the medical record for this visit did not contain sufficient information linking the patient's condition with the diagnosis and treatment. Specifically, there were no physical examination findings that appeared to be specifically related either to the patient's condition at that visit, or to the treatment provided. For example, Dr. Jernigan specifically noted that while there was an assessment of vulvodynia and the patient was treated for a yeast infection, the medical record does not note an examination of the patient's genitalia having been performed to support that assessment and treatment. Thus, Dr. Jernigan determined that there was insufficient information to demonstrate a medical relationship between the patient's condition and the treatment provided. Accordingly, she determined that the service provided was not medically necessary, so the claim should be denied. Dr. Jernigan's analysis of this claim and her opinion that the supporting documentation was insufficient to demonstrate that the service was medically necessary were credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Accordingly, claim no. 13 for Recipient 2 should be denied on the basis that it was not documented as being medically necessary. Claim No. 19 Dr. Jernigan denied this claim as not medically necessary because the medical record for this visit did not contain sufficient information linking the patient's condition with the diagnosis and treatment. Here, the stated reason for the visit included fatigue, somnolence and weakness with problems sleeping, arthralgias with muscle pain and tenderness, headache and dizziness, and snoring with acid reflux. However, the assessment contained a list of 33 diagnoses, many, if not most, of which did not appear to be related to the stated reason for the visit. Additionally, the treatment did not appear appropriate for the conditions stated as the reason for this specific visit. Thus, Dr. Jernigan determined that there was insufficient information to demonstrate a medical relationship between the patient's condition and the treatment provided. Accordingly, she determined that the service provided was not medically necessary, so the claim should be denied. Dr. Jernigan's analysis of this claim and her opinion that the supporting documentation was insufficient to demonstrate that the service was medically necessary were credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Accordingly, claim no. 19 for Recipient 2 should be denied on the basis that it was not documented as being medically necessary. Summary of Grounds for Denial of Claims under Finding No. 2 In sum, Dr. Jernigan determined that the claims denied as not medically necessary did not contain sufficient information to demonstrate a medical relationship between the patient's condition and the treatment provided, and to justify the need for the service provided. The undersigned finds Dr. Jernigan's analysis and opinions regarding the claims denied on the basis of no documentation or incomplete documentation to be credible, accurate, and supported by the documentary and other evidence in the record. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation noted above, the undersigned has applied Dr. Jernigan's analysis in reviewing each of the other claims disputed on the basis of Finding No. 2. The following table sets forth the undersigned's determination of overpayment, based on a review of each claim, for the claims disputed on the basis of Finding No. 2. Finding No. 2 – Not Medically Necessary Recipient No. Claim No. Procedure Code Action Determined Overpayment Amount $ 2 11 99213 Deny 81.35 2 13 99213 Deny 81.35 2 19 99213 Deny 77.34 16 36 99211 Deny 23.06 16 39 99212 Deny 50.56 16 45 99212 Deny 50.56 16 47 99211 Deny 23.06 35 4 99214 Deny 39.46 Total Total No. Determined Recipients: of Claims: Total 3 8 Overpayment Amount: $426.74 Finding No. 3 – Established Patients Billed as New Patients As discussed above, a new patient is one who has not received any professional services from a physician or another practitioner of the same specialty who belongs to the same provider group, within the past three years. The two claims in dispute that were denied on the basis set forth in Finding No. 3, that they were not new patients are Recipient 21, claim no. 1; and Recipient 23, claim no. 1. These claims were downcoded to reflect that the patient was an established patient, rather than a new patient. The CPT Codes pertinent to this Finding are 99203, 99204, 99213, and 99214. CPT Codes 99213 and 99214 previously have been defined in the findings pertaining to Finding No. 2, above. CPT Code 99203 The CPT Manuals define CPT Code 99203 as: Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these 3 key components: A detailed history; A detailed examination; Medicaid decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate severity. Physicians typically spend 30 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. CPT Code 99204 The CPT Manuals define CPT Code 99204 as: Office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these 3 key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; Medicaid decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies are provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient's and/or family's needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 45 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Recipient 21 Claim No. 1 Recipient 21, claim no. 1 was adjusted from CPT Code 99204 to CPT Code 99214. Dr. Jernigan determined that this claim should be denied because the notations for the Past Medical History, Social History, and Family History state that they are "unchanged." This notation would not be appropriate for a new patient, but would be appropriate for an established patient. Dr. Jernigan noted that had she determined this claim was for a new patient, it would have been denied, rather than adjusted downward, because the supporting documentation did not contain the patient's comprehensive history, which is one of the three components required in the documentation to support a claim billed under CPT Code 99204. Instead of denying this claim, Dr. Jernigan determined that under the documentation submitted, it should be billed under CPT Code 99214, as a claim for an established patient having a medical problem of moderate to high severity, and for which two of the three components are documented in the medical record. Dr. Jernigan's analysis of this claim and her opinion that the supporting documentation was insufficient to support billing the claim as one for a new patient, but would support billing the claim as one for an established patient, was credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Accordingly, claim no. 1 for Recipient 21 should be billed under CPT Code 99214, rather than CPT Code 99204. Recipient 23 Claim No. 1 Dr. Jernigan determined that this claim should be denied because the notations for the Past Medical History, Social History, and Family History state that they are "unchanged." This notation would not be appropriate for a new patient, but would be appropriate for an established patient. Accordingly, she reviewed the claim as one for an established patient, and, based on the documentation in the medical record, determined that the presented problem was one of low to moderate severity and at least two of the required components were present in the record. For these reasons, Dr. Jernigan determined that this claim should be billed under CPT Code 99213, rather than under CPT Code 99203. Dr. Jernigan's analysis of this claim and her opinion that the supporting documentation was insufficient to support billing the claim as one for a new patient, but would support billing the claim as one for an established patient was credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Accordingly, claim no. 1 for Recipient 23 should be billed under CPT Code 99213, rather than CPT Code 99203. Summary of Grounds for Downcoding Claims Under Finding No. 3 In sum, Dr. Jernigan's determined that the notations in the Past Medical History, Family History, and Social History components of the documentation submitted for these claims, as well as the lack of other components in the record, did not support billing these claims as new patient claims, but would support billing them as established patient claims. The undersigned finds Dr. Jernigan's analysis and opinion regarding the downcoding of these claims to bill them as established, rather than new, patient claims to be credible, accurate, and supported by evidence in the record. The following table sets forth the undersigned's determination of overpayment, based on a review of each claim, for the claims disputed on the basis of Finding No. 3. Finding No. 3 – Incorrectly Billed as New Patient Recipient No. Claim No. Procedure Code Action Determined Overpayment Amount $ 21 1 99204 Adjusted to 99214 25.38 23 1 99203 Adjusted to 99213 37.66 Total Recipients: 2 Total Claims: 2 Determined Total Overpayment Amount: $63.04 Finding No. 4 – Level of Service Not Supported Claims denied on the grounds set forth in Finding No. 4 of the FAR did not contain documentation sufficient to support the higher level of service billed, but did contain documentation sufficient to support a lower level of service than that billed. CPT Codes 99212, 99213, 99214, and 99204 are pertinent to this Finding, and have been previously defined in the findings pertaining to Findings No. 2 and 3, above. As previously noted, CPT Codes 99212, 99213, and 99214 indicate a progressive increase in the complexity of the medical visit, so require progressively greater levels of documentation to justify billing Medicaid for the service. For Finding No. 4, Dr. Jernigan testified, and Petitioner presented related evidence on, the following representative claims: Recipient 8, claim no. 4; Recipient 9, claim no. 2; Recipient 10, claim no. 3; Recipient 13, claim no. 1; and Recipient 16, claim nos. 29 and 52. Recipient 8 Claim No. 4 Dr. Jernigan determined that this claim should be adjusted from CPT Code 99214 to CPT Code 99213. Despite the extensive description in the Reason for Visit component and the extensive list of conditions noted in the Assessment component, the visit ultimately was to address a urinary tract infection, which is a problem of low to moderate complexity and involved the components which would justify billing the claim under CPT Code 99213. Dr. Jernigan's analysis and opinion regarding this claim was credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Accordingly, it is determined that claim no. 4 for Recipient 8 is correctly adjusted from CPT Code 99214 to CPT Code 99213. Recipient 9 Claim No. 2 Dr. Jernigan determined that this claim should be adjusted from CPT Code 99214 to CPT Code 99213. This visit was a follow-up without any significant changes in the findings documented in the components of previous visits. There was no documentation in any of the components for this visit which would indicate that it involved problems that were of moderate to high complexity, and that it entailed components that would justify billing the claim under CPT Code 99214. The documentation for this visit indicated a problem of low to moderate complexity and entailed the components that would justify billing the claim under CPT Code 99213. Dr. Jernigan's analysis and opinion regarding this claim was credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Accordingly, it is determined that claim no. 2 for Recipient 9 is correctly adjusted from CPT Code 99214 to CPT Code 99213. Recipient 10 Claim No. 3 Dr. Jernigan determined that this claim should be adjusted from CPT Code 99214 to CPT Code 99213. This claim entailed extensive internal inconsistencies and contained numerous contradictory notations, which affect the reviewer's ability to determine the purpose of the visit and the appropriate type and level of treatment. Here, Dr. Jernigan opined that this visit ultimately was a follow-up for hypertension and diabetes, and that the patient's condition had not changed from the previous visit. The documentation did not indicate that this visit entailed problems that were of moderate to high complexity, nor did it document the components would justify billing the claim under CPT Code 99214. Rather, the documentation for this visit indicated a problem of low to moderate complexity and involved the components that would justify billing the claim under CPT Code 99213. Dr. Jernigan's analysis and opinion regarding this claim was credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Accordingly, it is determined that claim no. 3 for Recipient 10 is correctly adjusted from CPT Code 99214 to CPT Code 99213. Recipient 13 Claim No. 1 Dr. Jernigan determined that this claim should be adjusted from CPT Code 99204 to CPT Code 99214. The documentation for this claim did not support billing the visit under CPT Code 99204, for a new patient, because it did not contain sufficient information that a comprehensive examination was performed, which is required by this CPT Code. Additionally, the documentation lacked any substantial discussion of the patient's Social History, Family History, or Past Medical History——information that, according to Dr. Jernigan, would be particularly important for a new patient——especially one who, per the documentation in the record, was sexually abused. Further, the Past Medical/Surgical History, Social History, and Family History components all listed this patient's condition as "unchanged," indicating that the patient must have been an established, rather than a new, patient. These deficiencies in the record for this claim did not justify billing the claim under CPT Code 99204, for a new patient. However, due to the severity of the patient's condition, the treatment documented in the record for this visit entailed the components under CPT Code 99214 for an established patient. Dr. Jernigan's analysis and opinion regarding this claim was credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Accordingly, it is determined that claim no. 1 for Recipient 13 is correctly adjusted from CPT Code 99204 to CPT Code 99214. Recipient 16 Claim No. 29 Dr. Jernigan determined that this claim should be adjusted from CPT Code 99214 to CPT Code 99213. Dr. Jernigan found much of the information documented for this claim to be incredible. For example, the patient is a 19-year old male, but the notations in the record state such things as "parental concerns about baby's growth" and "assessment for menopause performed." Dr. Jernigan ultimately determined that this visit was a follow-up to address hypothyroidism and that thyroid medication was prescribed as a treatment for this condition. This visit concerned a problem of low to moderate complexity and involved the components that would justify billing the claim under CPT Code 99213, rather than a more complex problem that would justify the level of service under CPT Code 99214. Dr. Jernigan's analysis and opinion regarding this claim was credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Accordingly, it is determined that claim no. 29 for Recipient 16 is correctly adjusted from CPT Code 99214 to CPT Code 99213. Claim No. 52 Dr. Jernigan determined that this claim should be adjusted from CPT Code 99213 to CPT Code 99212. Here, the Reason for Visit stated that the visit was, among other things, to address a skin rash. Although the documentation for this claim contained numerous inconsistencies, Dr. Jernigan was able to discern that the patient had two dermatological conditions that would support the prescription of Doxycycline. According to Dr. Jernigan, skin issues are relatively easy to see and treat, which would justify billing this claim under CPT Code 99212, for a minor problem that would entail the components for that CPT Code, rather than a more complex problem that would justify the level of service under CPT Code 99213. Dr. Jernigan's analysis and opinion regarding this claim was credible and persuasive. Accordingly, it is determined that claim no. 52 for Recipient 16 is correctly adjusted from CPT Code 99213 to CPT Code 99212. Summary of Grounds for Denial of Claims Under Finding No. 4 Dr. Jernigan's overall assessment of the claims denied on the basis of Finding No. 4 was that while a basis for billing Medicaid could be discerned from the medical records for the claim, the documentation in those records was not consistent with the symptoms or confirmed diagnosis, so did not reflect the level of service that could safely be furnished. The undersigned finds Dr. Jernigan's analysis and opinions regarding the claims denied on the grounds stated in Finding No. 4 to be credible, supported by the evidence, and persuasive. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation noted above, the undersigned has applied this analysis in reviewing each of the other claims disputed on the basis of Finding No. 4. The following table sets forth the undersigned's determination of overpayment, based on a review of each claim, for the claims disputed on the basis of Finding No. 4. Finding No. 4 – Incorrectly Billed at Higher Level of Service Recipient No. Claim No. Procedure Code Action Determined Overpayment Amount $ 8 4 99214 Adjusted to 99213 38.79 9 2 99214 Adjusted to 99213 15.71 10 3 99214 Adjusted to 99213 36.79 13 1 99204 Adjusted to 99214 122.14 16 29 99214 Adjusted to 99213 38.79 16 52 99213 Adjusted to 99212 32.79 17 1 99214 Adjusted to 99213 23.32 21 2 99214 Adjusted to 99213 14.85 22 2 99214 Adjusted to 99213 73.87 30 3 99214 Adjusted to 99213 12.85 32 2 99214 Adjusted to 99213 32.56 35 1 99204 Adjusted to 99202 36.77 Total Recipients: 11 Total Claims: 12 Determined Total Overpayment Amount: $479.23 Findings of Ultimate Fact Pursuant to the foregoing, it is determined that Petitioner proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent was overpaid by the Medicaid program for the disputed and undisputed claims in this proceeding. Respondent defends its position that many of the claims in dispute should be adjusted downward in this proceeding, rather than denied, by asserting that the inaccuracies and lack of comprehensibility in the documentation for the claims were due to the flaws and defects in the Intergy EHR system, rather than any deficiency on his part in diagnosing or treating his patients or in properly documenting their visits. In support of this position, Respondent notes that in many cases, the documentation provided to support a claim did contain——among the many listed conditions and assessment——a diagnosis that matched the reason for the visit. There is little question in the undersigned's mind that Respondent actually provided the services in the claims he billed to Medicaid. However, the issue in this proceeding is not whether the provider did, in fact, provide the services or accurately diagnose and treat the patient's condition. Rather, the issue is whether the documentation submitted to Petitioner to support the Medicaid-billed claims is true, accurate, comprehensible, and demonstrates the medical necessity of the billed claim, as required by section 409.913 and the Handbooks. Unfortunately, due to the substantial flaws in the Intergy system and Respondent's difficulty in using that system, his records did not comply with those standards, so do not support the billed claims. As the enrolled Medicaid provider, Respondent is ultimately responsible for the completeness, accuracy, and comprehensibility of the documentation submitted in support of his claims billed to Medicaid. § 409.913(7), Fla. Stat. The Handbooks, section 409.913, and applicable rules do not recognize, as a defense to actions seeking reimbursement for overpayments, that deficiencies in the provider's records may be excused due to poor or dysfunctional EHR systems. Based on the foregoing, the undersigned found Dr. Jernigan's analyses and opinions credible, supported by the competent substantial evidence in the record, and persuasive. Accordingly, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent was overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $72,084.43 for the disputed and undisputed claims in this proceeding. However, the undersigned determines that Petitioner did not prove the overpayments by clear and convincing evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order directing Respondent to repay to the Agency the sum of $72,084.43 in overpayments. Pursuant to section 409.913(23)(a), Petitioner, as the prevailing party in this proceeding is, entitled to recover, as costs, all investigative, legal, and expert witness costs as the prevailing party is granted. If the amount of these costs cannot be stipulated by the parties, Petitioner may request a hearing solely to establish the amount of costs it is entitled to recover in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jack P. Randall, is a chiropractic physician licensed to practice in the State of Florida. He holds license number 2770. On August 8, 1978, a federal grand jury filed an indictment in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, charging the Respondent with 29 counts of willfully making a false, fictitious and fraudulent statement and representation as to material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Health Care Financing Administration (formerly Social Security Administration) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001 which states: "Whoever, in any manner within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and wilfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme of device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both." This indictment asserts that on 29 occasions between December, 1976, and January, 1978, the Respondent requested payment from the United States for chiropractic services performed on patients when such services were not actually performed. On October 25, 1978, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the Respondent was convicted of 24 of the 29 counts in the indictment, and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one year, and fined the sum of $5,000, to be followed by a suspended sentence of four years during which time the Respondent would be placed on probation. Each of the 24 counts upon which the Respondent was convicted directly relates to the practice of chiropractic. Thereafter, the Respondent appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. By its opinion filed on April 19, 1979, the verdict and judgment against the Respondent was affirmed. Certified copies of the indictment, the verdict and judgment, and the appellate opinion were received in evidence in support of the Administrative Complaint. In his defense, the Respondent asserted that the representation he received from his attorney was ineffective, and that the trial court would not let him employ another attorney. However, these matters are collateral to the issues presented in this proceeding. If they consist of a remedy, the Respondent must pursue it in court and not here.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that license number 2770 held by the Respondent, Jack P. Randall, be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 15th day of May, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jack P. Randall 3244 Seminole Avenue Macon, Georgia 31204 WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May,1981
The Issue Respondent dentist was charged in a twenty-eight count administrative complaint with violations of Subsections 466.028 (1)(c), (1)(j), (1)(l), (1)(n), (1)(u), and (1)(bb) F.S. with regard to twenty-six patients.
Findings Of Fact Although there is evidence (P-12) that Respondent's professional license expired on December 31, 1989, the superior and more credible Exhibit P- 11, which shows that Respondent is currently actively licensed through December 31, 1991 is accepted as fact. Upon the foregoing and all other relevant testimony and exhibits, it is found that Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed dentist in the state of Florida, having been issued license number DN 0009810. Respondent's last known Florida address is 1617 Physician's Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32368. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was an approved Medicaid provider, subject to that program's rules and contracts. Effective May 19, 1987, pursuant to the Recommended and Final Orders in HRS v. Clement, DOAH Case No. 86-3023, Respondent was terminated from the Medicaid program for inappropriate billing in nine identified areas, which areas all fall in the categories of excessive billing or billings which conflicted with HRS claims provisions. Count I (M.C.) C.M.C. is the mother of M.C. (DOB 2/18/81) and A.S. A.S. was treated by the Respondent but M.C. was never provided any dental services by the Respondent. On March 27, 1986, a search warrant was served on Respondent by the State Attorney, who was accompanied by an investigator from the office of the Auditor General, Fraud Control Unit, Mr. Robert E.. Youngblood. At that time, no dental records for M.C. were found. Hearsay materials gathered by Mr. Youngblood, who testified, and by his deputy investigators and by DPR investigators, who did not testify, suggest that Respondent had claimed on March 21, 1985 for $140.00 worth of dental services allegedly rendered to M.C. on February 11, 1985, for which Medicaid's processing agent remitted to Respondent $75.00 for services which were never performed. However, no representative of the processing agent or its successor in interest was able to authenticate documentation that such claims were, in fact, made by Respondents and the supporting documentation for the investigators' summaries was likewise insufficiently authenticated, was uncorroborated, was presented without adequate predicate, and is partly illegible. Therefore, it is found that the investigators' summaries of unauthenticated documents or documents without appropriate predicate to render them at least reasonably reliable by ordinary persons do not constitute such hearsay as will support a finding of fraudulent claim being filed by Respondent for dental services which were never rendered by Respondent to M.C. (See, P-1; TR 31, 44-46, 133-147, 156-160) Counts II (T.S. #1) and III (T.S. #2) M.S. is the mother or caregiver of several children, among them T.S. #1 (DOB 8/3/70) and T.S. #2 (DOB 3/14/67) Respondent billed Medicaid for $185.00 and received $154.00 for dental work allegedly performed on T.S. #1 on December 13, 1984 and May 1, 1985. On March 27, 1986, a search warrant was served on Respondent by the State Attorney, who was accompanied by Mr. Youngblood. At that time no dental records for T.S. #1 were found. Respondent is required to provide dental records for each Medicaid patient, pursuant to the terms of his Medicaid contract. (P-2, P-3; TR 28-32, 59, 138-1.47, 156-160) Respondent billed on January 10, 198.5 and was subsequently paid $80.00 by Medicaid on January 23, 1985 for services allegedly rendered to T.S. #2 on December 13, 1984. Petitioner had admitted in evidence written statements of M.S. to the effect that neither T.S. #1 nor T.S. #2 was ever treated by Respondent, but neither M.S., T.S. #1, nor T.S. #2 appeared to testify, and the written hearsay statements are the only evidence of non-treatment. They corroborate, explain, or supplement no direct evidence of non-treatment and are therefore insufficient, pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S., to support a finding of fact that treatment of T.S. #1 and T.S. #2 by Respondent did not occur as claimed by the Respondent. Count IV (V.W.) [See also Counts XXV and XXVI] M.A. is the grandmother of several children, including V.W. (male, DOB 10/15/73). Roberta J.G. is V.W.'s sister. The oral testimony of M.A. is clear that V.W. was not seen by Respondent before February 21, 1986. Roberta J.G. testified that she thought V.W. had his teeth cleaned by Respondent in October 1986, and V.W. testified that he thought this was done in February of an unknown year. By a validly served search warrant, V.W.'s dental record was seized from Respondent. This seized dental record shows the first date Respondent provided dental services to V.W. was on February 21, 1986. Petitioner's Medicaid processor witness, Mr. Joseph Cooper, was unable to authenticate other materials assembled by the investigators, which exhibits purport to show that Respondent billed Medicaid for $230.00 and received payment in the amount of $101.00 for services he allegedly rendered V.W. on October 30, 1985, four months before the Respondent's office record shows the services were actually performed upon V.W. (P-4; TR 133-147, 156-160) Absent authentication of the claims/remittances, the premature or fraudulent filing of a claim for V.W. has not been proven. Counts V (M.T.) and VI (M.W.) A.V. is the mother of two boys, Marcus T. (DOB 2/29/80) and Martalius W. (DOB 4/6/67). A.V. testified by deposition (P-31) that Respondent pulled two of her teeth but never rendered any services to either of her children. More specifically, A.V.'s unrefuted testimony was that Respondent did not treat Marcus T. on December 6, 1984 or do gum surgery on Martalius W. on December 15, 1984. Due to the failure to authenticate the Medicaid records offered in support of the charges brought against Respondent under Count V for his alleged claims and receipt of Medicaid payments on behalf of Marcus T., those charges were not proven. However, the competent, credible evidence of record supports a finding that on January 10, 1985 Respondent claimed and on January 23, 1985 Medicaid paid Respondent $80.00 for treatment of Martalius W.`s gums (gingival curettage), when, in fact, such a service had not been rendered by Respondent. Although the claim was made by the Respondent for treatment of "Martel" W., not "Martalius W.," it is found that they are one and the same person. It is also clear that on March 27, 1986, no required dental record for Martalius W. was found by investigators. Respondent's file for Martalius W. which was found contained a variety of records for a girl [first name: Matesha; last name same as Martalius W.; DOB 8/1/78]. Apparently that female child was treated by Respondent on February 1, 1985 and February 4, 1985 by two bite wing x-rays and by cleaning and fluoriding, respectively, not for gum disease. (P-5, P-6, P-31; TR 36-42, 133-147, 156-160) Count VII (C.T.) C.T. (DOB February 15, 1968) is the son of J.A.T. Although J.A.T. signed a statement for the DPR investigators, neither she nor C.T. testified. Therefore, there is only uncorroborated hearsay that Respondent never treated this child. The bills, claims, and payments allegedly made or received by Respondent were not authenticated at formal hearing by appropriate custodians of those documents and therefore fraud has not been proven. (P-7, TR 133-147, 156- 160) There is also no credible, competent evidence to support the allegation that the Respondent failed to keep medical records for this patient. (TR 42-43) Counts VIII (D.L.) and IX (S.W.) E.P. is the mother of D.L. (DOB 3/2/82) and S.W. (DOB 4/1/77). None of these persons testified. Therefore, there is no direct evidence of the allegations in Count VIII that D.L. and S.W. have never been seen by Respondent or of the allegation in Count IX that S.W. has not been seen by Respondent. Credible, competent evidence of record does support a finding that Respondent was subsequently paid $77.00 by Medicaid, pursuant to Respondent's claim for $120.00 for dental services he asserted he had provided to D.L. on June 10, 1986 and that Respondent was paid $490.00 by Medicaid pursuant to Respondent's series of claims totalling $1,165.00 that he had rendered dental services to S.W. on August 3, 1985. Mr. Youngblood testified that Respondent produced no medical records for S.W. upon DPR's "request" of January 29, 1986 (TR 49) and that none were found pursuant to a search warrant validly served on March 27, 1986. Among the treatments of S.W. for which Medicaid paid Respondent was installation of six stainless steel crowns/caps at tooth sites A, B, I, J, K, and L on June 18, 1985 and July 4, 1985 when S.W. would have been approximately eight years old. As part of the Medicaid investigation, a consulting dentist examined S.W. and found that stainless steel crowns/caps had, in fact, been installed on her teeth as indicated in the claim and payment records. Upon the testimony of Frances Davis, an assistant to Dr. Sheppard, another local dentist, it is found that Dr. Sheppard installed six stainless steel crowns/caps on an "S.W." with the identical name and birth date but living at a different address from the "S.W." who is the subject patient of Count IX of the Administrative Complaint herein. The undersigned infers that both S.W.'s are one in the same. Dr. Sheppard installed crowns at S.W.'s teeth T, S, I, J, A, and B in 1981. Dr. Kekich, who was accepted as an expert in dentistry, testified that it was his expert opinion that stainless steel crowns/caps installed in 1981 in a four-year-old child would not require replacing in 1985. (TR 148-151) Upon the foregoing, it is found that Respondent did not install either new crowns/caps or replacement crowns/caps on S.W.'s A, B, I, and J teeth in 1985 but made a fraudulent claim for work associated therewith in a minimum amount of $440.00 for which Medicaid actually paid Respondent $172.00. Counts X (T.J.), XI (A.J.), XII (C.J.), XIII (K.J.), and XIV (W.J.) G.J. is the mother of T.J. (male, DOB 10/11/70), A.J. (male, DOB 8/19/73), C.J. (male, DOB 11/27/74), K.J. (female, DOB 9/1/77), and W.J. (male, DOB 6/25/72). According to G.J.'s unrefuted testimony, Respondent never provided any dental services to any of these children. (TR 15-17) With regard to A.J., there is credible, competent evidence to establish that Respondent claimed/billed for $165.00 and was subsequently paid $92.00 by Medicaid for dental services allegedly rendered to A.J. on June 6, 1985, which services were in fact never rendered by Respondent. With regard to C.J., there is credible, competent evidence to establish that Respondent claimed/billed for $105.00 and was subsequently paid $62.00 by Medicaid for dental services allegedly rendered to C.J. on June 6, 1985 which services were in fact never rendered by Respondent. With regard to K.J., there is credible, competent evidence to establish that Respondent claimed/billed for $105.00 and was subsequently paid $62.00 by Medicaid for dental services allegedly rendered to K.J. on June 6, 1985, which services were in fact never rendered by Respondent. (P-15, P-16, P- 17; TR 142-146). With regard to W.J., the evidence supports a finding that Respondent made a claim for $105.00 in Medicaid monies, and it may be inferred that Medicaid paid $62.00 to Respondent for the nonexistent treatment. (P-18; TR 142-147, 156-160) Lack of proper authentication of the Medicaid records offered in support of the allegations that Respondent fraudulently claimed and collected for dental work he never performed on T.J. renders those exhibits uncorroborated hearsay incapable of sustaining a finding of fraud as fact. (TR 142-147, 156- 160) No competent evidence was presented to support the allegations contained in Count X paragraph 58, Count XI paragraph 64, Count XII paragraph 70, Count XIII paragraph 76, or Count XIV paragraph 82 which pertain to Respondent's inability to produce records for each of the foregoing five children. Count XV (C.C.) Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for dental services allegedly rendered to C.C. (adult, DOB 12/7/55) on or about September 14, 1985. There is no direct, credible, competent evidence of record to prove that C.C. did not receive dental services from the Respondent or that Respondent was requested to produce or failed to produce dental records for C.C. as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. (P-19; TR 137-148, 156-160) Count XVI (L.S.) Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for dental services allegedly rendered to L.S. (adult, DOB 9/28/51) on or about September 11, 1985. There is no direct, credible, competent evidence of record to prove that L.S. did not receive dental services from the Respondent or that Respondent failed to produce a dental record in response to a request from an investigator. In fact, the evidence of Mr. Youngblood, sketchy as it is, suggests that at some unspecified point in time, checks and some dental records were produced to some other investigator by the Respondent's wife, acting as Respondent's office manager. (P-20; TR 69-71, 137-147, 156-160) Count XVII (C.F. Jr.) D.D. is the mother of C.F. Jr. (DOB 5/24/82). Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for dental services allegedly rendered to C.F. Jr. There is no direct, credible, competent evidence of record to prove that C.F. Jr. did not receive dental services from Respondent or that Respondent was requested to produce or failed to produce dental records for C.F. Jr. as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. (P-21; TR 137-147, 156-160) Counts XVIII (D.W.) and XIX (G.W.) G.W., a/k/a G.W.W., (DOB 9/10/58) is the mother of D.W. (male, DOB 1/5/84). Pursuant to G.W.'s unrefuted testimony, neither she nor her son, D.W., was ever treated by Respondent. At formal hearing, Joseph Cooper testified to authenticate Exhibit P-22, the records purporting to refer to D.W. Mr. Cooper based his testimony upon his prior certification and signature appearing on Exhibit P-22 in red. (TR 22) However, no such signed certification by Mr. Cooper actually appears on any paper within that file except for one claim therein. Concomitantly, Mr. Cooper could not orally authenticate as Medicaid business records those documents which purported to refer to G.W. (P-23), presumably because they bore no such prior red certification stamp executed by him (TR 142-147, 156-160), and yet Exhibit P-23 actually bears Mr. Cooper's prior certification in all material respects. Despite the tenuous predicate for the admissibility of these records/exhibits, the undersigned infers that in his testimony, Mr. Cooper really meant to identify Exhibit P-23, and, accordingly, Exhibit P-23 as to G.W. is found to establish that Respondent billed $55.00 and was subsequently paid $21.85 by Medicaid for dental services allegedly rendered to G.W. on June 20, 1985 and June 24, 1985, which services were in fact never rendered by Respondent, but finds the evidence insufficient to establish any of the remaining allegations of Counts XVIII and XIX. Counts XX (T.R.), XXI (S.R.), and XXII (D.R.) M.R. is the mother of T.R. (DOB 12/20/77), S.R. (DOB 1/7/75), and D.R. (DOB 2/16/72). It was Petitioner's contention that Respondent claimed and collected for dental work on all three of the children when such work could not have occurred because they had moved to Tampa. Investigator Youngblood found the family living in Tampa, Florida, but only uncorroborated hearsay exists within this record to suggest on what date the family moved away from Tallahassee, Florida, and away from Respondent's dental care. There is no direct, credible, competent evidence of record to prove that claims were made or monies were received by Respondent with respect to T.R. and S.R.; however, clear and convincing direct evidence of record shows that Respondent billed $305.00 and was subsequently paid $152.00 by Medicaid for dental services allegedly rendered to D.R. on July 2, 1985. Mr. Youngblood testified that his investigative files contained dental charts/records on each of the children and that these charts/records showed the last treatment rendered to D.R. by Respondent had occurred on September 20, 1984, but it was not demonstrated how Investigator Youngblood got these charts. Nor could it be shown that there were not other charts which would justify the later treatment. While it is not necessary for Petitioner to prove a negative-positive premise, there is still an insufficient nexus to establish a fraudulent claim here. Count XXIII (M.H.) P.H. is the mother' of M.H. (DOB 12/23/84). Although the undersigned can deduce from the competent, credible evidence as a whole that M.H. wad approximately one year old on December 12, 1985, since neither P.H. nor M.H. testified, there is no direct evidence to support the allegation that M.H. did not receive services from Respondent on December 12, 1985 due to her tender year(s). Lack of authentication of the Medicaid records offered in support of the allegations rendered those exhibits uncorroborated hearsay incapable of sustaining a finding of fraud in billing/claiming/receiving Medicaid monies for services not rendered as fact. On March 27, 1986 in the course of executing a valid search warrant, investigators found no records for this child in Respondent's office. (P-27; TR 85-87, 146, 156-160) Count XXIV (T.M.) V.F. is the mother of T.M. (DOB 6/23/69). Neither of these persons testified, so there is no direct evidence of the allegation that T.M. had not been rendered dental services by the Respondent. There is, however, competent, credible evidence to establish that Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid for dental services allegedly rendered to T.M. on May 5, 1985 and May 10, 1985. No evidence was presented to support the allegations which pertain to Respondent's inability to produce a dental record for T.M. (P-28; TR 88, 146, 156-160). Count XXV (R.G.) Count XXV of the Administrative Complaint put Respondent on notice of charges involving one R.G., without specifying R.G.'s gender or birth date. That count of the Administrative Complaint reads in toto as follows: Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference those allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. Respondent billed and was subsequently paid by Medicaid foil dental services allegedly rendered to R.G. on or about November 25, 1985 and December 6, 1985. On or about March 1986, a request for dental records of R.G. was issued to the Respondent by the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit. The Respondent produced a dental record for R.G. which showed the first date of service was on or about February 21, 1986. The Respondent billed Medicaid for $185.00 and received $128.00 This resulted in the overpayment by Medicaid of $128.00 for services not rendered. Based on the foregoing, Respondent has violated the following statutory provisions: Section 466.028(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1985), by filing a report which the licensee knows to be false; Section 466.028(1)(l), Florida Statues (1985), by making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of dentistry; Section 466.028(1)(n), Florida Statutes (1985), by exploiting the patient for the financial gain of the licensee; and Section 466.028(1)(u), Florida Statutes (1985), by being guilty of fraud, deceit or misconduct in the practice of dentistry. At formal hearing, Investigator Youngblood testified from materials which in part referred to a male "Robert G." His testimony attempted to draw the inference there from that Respondent had billed Medicaid for services performed on November 25, 1985 and December 6, 1985 on a male "Robert G.," but had submitted the bill/claim under the Medicaid number registered for "Roberta G." (female, DOB 11/11/70), a/k/a "Roberta J.G.," that Respondent's dental records which Mr. Youngblood seized by search warrant on March 27, 1986 referred to the specified female as "Roberta J.G." but not to any male "Robert G." and that Respondent's records further showed Respondent's Medicaid claim form dated February 21, 1986 related Respondent's first date of service to "Roberta J.G." as January 21, 1986, several months after Respondent made his claim. (TR 89-90) M.A. is the grandmother of Roberta G., a/k/a Roberta J.G., (female, DOB 11/11/70) and of V.W. (male, DOB 10/15/73). See, Count IV, FOF 7, supra. The oral testimony of M.A. is that Roberta J.G., a/k/a Roberta G., first saw Respondent professionally on February 21, 1986. Roberta J.G., a/k/a Roberta G., testified that she thought she had her teeth cleaned by the Respondent in October 1986 and had never seen him before that date. Petitioner's Medicaid processor witness was unable to authenticate the Medicaid claim and payment materials in Mr. Youngblood's investigative file for "Robert G." submitted and paid under "Roberta J.G.'s" Medicaid number (P-30), and absent such authentication, the fraudulent or even the premature filing of a claim by Respondent has not been proved. (TR 137-147, 156-160) Count XXVI (K.A.) M.A., the grandmother of V.W. [see, Count IV] and Roberta J.G. [see, Count XXV] is also the mother of K.A. This is not to suggest that K.A. (female, DOB 11/17/65), who is the subject of this Count, gave birth to either V.W. when K.A. was eight years old or to Roberta J.G. when K.A. was five years old. This is a "blended" family of several generations which sometimes lives together and sometimes does not. At all material times, K.A. lived with M.A. The oral testimony of M.A. (TR 125-129) and the testimony by deposition of K.A. (female, DOB 11/17/65) (P-34) is unequivocal and unrefuted that K.A. has never been treated by Respondent. The contents of the investigator's file (P-29) containing claims and payment records was not authenticated by the Medicaid processor witness, and therefore the allegations of fraudulent claim and collection of Medicaid payments by Respondent have not been proved by direct, credible, competent evidence. (TR 137-147, 156-160) Count XXVII Pursuant to the foregoing, Petitioner has shown repeated violations of Chapter 466 F.S. so as to discipline under Section 466.028(1)(bb) F.S., but there is no clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to comply with a lawfully issued subpoena of the Board of Dentistry or the Department of Professional Regulation. Count XXVIII On October 6, 1987, the Respondent pled nolo contendere to the third degree felony "medicaid fraud," pursuant to Section 409.325 F.S. and to "grand theft," pursuant to Section 812.014 F.S. He was adjudicated guilty in State v. Clement, Leon County Circuit Court Case No. 86-2519, of the foregoing crimes and fined. Costs were assessed. However, Respondent's sentence was stayed and withheld pending successful completion of five years' probation on each count to run concurrently. His probation included paying restitution of $2,498.55. Although DPR counsel acknowledged that an appeal of his conviction had been filed by Respondent, there is no evidence of record that the foregoing judgment has been reversed, remanded, or otherwise altered
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Dentistry enter a Final Order which Dismisses all Counts and/or paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint listed in Conclusions of Law paragraphs 8 and 9, supra. Finds Respondent has violated all charges listed in Conclusions of Law paragraph 7, supra, and Assesses a penalty of $9,000.00 and two year suspension of Respondent's license to practice dentistry in Florida, subject to reinstatement terms to be determined by the Board in its expertise and set forth in its Final Order. DONE and ENTERED this 3 day of July, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Nancy M. Snurkowski, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Norman J. Clement, D.D.S. 20060 Santa Barbara Detroit, Michigan 48221 William Buckhalt, Executive Director Board of Dentistry Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Medicaid overpayments were made to Petitioner and, if so, what is the total amount of these overpayments.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the stipulations of fact set forth in the parties' March 5, 2002, Joint Prehearing Stipulation: Petitioner Petitioner was incorporated in 1989 by Mr. Taylor. It operated Choice Pharmacy, a pharmacy located at 9920 Northwest 27th Avenue in Miami, Florida, from around the time of its incorporation until approximately 1999. The Provider Agreement During the period from September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998, Petitioner was authorized to provide pharmacy services and goods to eligible Medicaid recipients in Florida. Petitioner provided such services and goods pursuant to a Medicaid Provider Agreement Mr. Taylor had signed, on behalf of Petitioner, on February 21, 1997. The Provider Agreement contained the following provisions, among others: The Provider agrees to participate in the Florida Medicaid program under the following terms and conditions: * * * Quality of Service. . . . The services or goods must have been actually provided to eligible Medicaid recipients by the provider prior to submitting the claim. Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, manuals, handbooks and Statements or Policy as they may be amended from time to time. Term and signatures. The parties agree that this is a voluntary agreement between the Agency and the provider, in which the provider agrees to furnish services or goods to Medicaid recipients. This provider agreement shall become effective the date the provider's Florida Medicaid Enrollment Application is received by the state or its fiscal agent. It shall remain in effect until July 1, 1999, unless otherwise terminated. . . . Provider Responsibilities. The Medicaid provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid. The provider agrees that only records made at the time the goods and services were provided will be admissible in evidence in any proceeding relating to the Medicaid program. * * * (d) Except as provided by law, the provider agrees to provide immediate access to authorized persons (included but not limited to state and federal employees, auditors and investigators) to all Medicaid-related information, which may be in the form of records, logs, documents, or computer files, and all other information pertaining to services or goods billed to the Medicaid program. This shall include access to all patient records and other provider information if the provider cannot easily separate records for Medicaid patients from other records. . . . Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook, and the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook The Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook (referenced in the "Facts Not in Dispute" section of the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation) at all times material to the instant case contained the following "record keeping " provisions, among others: The provider must retain all medical, fiscal, professional and business records on all services provided to a Medicaid recipient. Records may be kept on paper, magnetic material, film, or other media. In order to qualify as a basis for reimbursement, the records must be signed and dated at the time of service, or otherwise attested to as appropriate to the media. Rubber stamp signatures must be initialed. The records must be accessible, legible and comprehensible. Records must be retained for a period of at least five years from the date of service. The following types of records, as appropriate for the type of service provided, must be retained (the list is not all inclusive): . . . . Business records, such as accounting ledgers, financial statements, purchase/acquisition records, invoices, inventory records, check registers, canceled checks, sales records, etc.; Tax records, including purchase documentation; . . . . Providers who are not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies described in this chapter may be subject to administrative sanctions and recoupment of Medicaid payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation or appropriate signatures will be recouped. . . . The Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook (referenced in the "Facts Not in Dispute" section of the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation) at all times material to the instant case contained similar provisions. The Prescribed Drug Services Coverage, Limitations and Reimbursement Handbook (referenced in the "Facts Not in Dispute" section of the parties' Joint Prehearing Stipulation) at all times material to the instant case further provided that "[r]eimbursement for prescribed drug services is based on the cost of the drug to the pharmacy plus a dispensing fee." The Audit and Aftermath In July of 1998, AHCA's Medicaid fiscal agent contractor (Unysis Corporation) conducted a "desk audit" of Medicaid claims submitted by Petitioner. Following the completion of the "desk audit," the matter was referred to AHCA's Office of Medicaid Program Integrity to conduct "a more in depth" audit (involving an examination of invoices and other documentation to determine whether Petitioner had available during the period under review sufficient quantities of goods to support its billings to the Medicaid program). The audit, which covered the period from September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998 (Audit Period), was conducted by Kathryn Holland, with the assistance of an accounting firm retained by AHCA, Krause, Humphress, Pace & Wadsworth, CPA (Krause). Ms. Holland is a Florida-registered pharmacist who has been a senior pharmacist with AHCA for the past 12 years. She has no formal education or training in accounting, but does have 12 years of experience "doing the kind of audits" she conducted in the instant case. In an effort to obtain information needed for the audit, Krause requested that Petitioner fill out and return a Questionnaire for Medicaid Providers. The questionnaire was filled out and returned by Mr. Taylor, on behalf of Petitioner, on or about October 30, 1998. Mr. Taylor indicated on the questionnaire that, during the Audit Period, the "percentage of [Petitioner's] prescription business that [was] Medicaid" was approximately 90 percent. He further indicated on the questionnaire that Petitioner's "total dollar sales volume of prescription drugs" during the Audit Period was $5,732,028.84; Petitioner's "cost of prescription drugs sold during [the] Audit Period" was $5,220,200.27; Petitioner's "prescription drug inventory at cost, [at the] beginning of [the Audit] Period" was $180,721.00; and Petitioner's "prescription drug inventory at cost, [at the] end of [the Audit] Period" was $306,081.00. The questionnaire requested the name(s) of Petitioner's "major drug suppliers during the review period." All suppliers that "provided more than 10% of [Petitioner's] drug purchases" were to be listed. Mr. Taylor listed on the questionnaire the following "major drug suppliers": "McKesson Inc.," "Quality Medical," "Pharma Plus Wholesale Inc.," and "Quest Medical Supply." IV Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc., was not among the "major drug suppliers" named by Mr. Taylor. According to the information provided on the questionnaire by Mr. Taylor, the purchases made by Petitioner from "McKesson Inc.," "Quality Medical," "Pharma Plus Wholesale Inc.," and "Quest Medical Supply" represented approximately 20 percent, 20 percent, 40 percent, and 10 percent, respectively, of Petitioner's "total [drug] purchases" during the Audit Period. By letter dated November 9, 1998, Krause requested Pharma Plus Wholesale, Inc. (Pharma Plus) to provide it "with a download of all transactions (all accounts) for the period September 1, 1997 through August 31, 1998," between Pharma Plus and Choice Pharmacy. Pharma Plus, in a letter dated January 18, 1999, provided the following response to Krause's request: [A]s per our conversation I am submitting this document to formally inform you and your office that Pharma Plus Wholesale, Inc. has never done any business with Choice Pharmacy (Legal Name: OKAN, Inc) 9920 N.W. 27th Avenue Miami, FL 33147.) By letter dated January 20, 1999, Ms. Holland requested McKesson Drug Company (McKesson) to provide her "with a download of all transactions for the period July 1, 1997, through August 31, 1998" between McKesson and Choice Pharmacy. On February 16, 1999, McKesson provided Ms. Holland with a "paper printout" containing the requested information. The material submitted by McKesson revealed that there were a considerable number of transactions between McKesson and Choice Pharmacy during the period in question. On April 2, 1999, Ms. Holland sent a letter to Mr. Taylor, which read, in part, as follows:: On or around July 16, 1998, an auditor from Unisys Corporation, the fiscal agent contractor for the Florida Medicaid program, conducted an audit of your pharmacy department. The audit is being reviewed by Medicaid Program Integrity. In order for us to complete our review, we are requesting and must receive the following: Documentation that identifies all purchases/acquisitions by Choice Pharmacy for the products listed on "Attachment A" for the period from July 1, 1997, through August 31, 1998. Documentation that identifies all credits/returns for the period stated above for the products listed on "Attachment A." . . . You have 30 days from the receipt of this letter to submit the requested information. . . . The "products" listed on "Attachment A" did not include "every single drug Petitioner had billed to Medicaid. Only the 50 "highest paid" drugs were listed on "Attachment A." Mr. Taylor responded to Ms. Holland's letter by providing her with, on May 13, 1999, a three-inch stack of documents reflecting transactions between Petitioner and "quite a few different [drug] wholesalers." Ms. Holland attempted (successfully in some instances and unsuccessfully in others) to contact wholesalers whose names appeared on the documentation provided by Mr. Taylor to obtain from them documentation regarding their transactions with Petitioner. After analyzing the documentation with which she had been provided by Petitioner and by the drug wholesalers she had been able to contact, and examining AHCA's records of the claims filed by Petitioner during the Audit Period, Ms. Holland determined that there was insufficient documentation to demonstrate that, during the Audit Period, Petitioner had available sufficient inventory to support $4,248,262.37 of its billings to the Medicaid program. By letter dated July 28, 1999, Ms. Holland advised Mr. Taylor of this "provisional finding." The letter read, in part, as follows: Medicaid Program Integrity has reviewed your paid Medicaid claims with dates of service from September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998. We have also reviewed your product purchase/acquisition documentation received on May 13, 1999. Some of the purchase/acquisition documents that you furnished could not be substantiated by the distributor/wholesaler and were therefore not included in the review. You have failed to provide adequate documentation to the effect that the available quantity of certain drugs of given strength was as great as the quantity of those drugs billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid. Based on this review, we have made a provisional determination that you were overpaid $4,248,262.37 for claims that in whole or in part are not covered by Medicaid. The amount due for the overpayment is $4,248,262.37. This is, however, a provisional finding and we encourage you to submit any additional information or documentation that you may have that you feel may serve to change the overpayment. * * * Based on the above, we have reason to believe that you have been overpaid by the Medicaid program. The overpayment identified in the summary sheet attachment is with regard only to the 45 drugs listed and comprehends only the period audited, namely September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998. A printout identifying all relevant claims involved in the overpayment and a copy of the drug purchase/acquisitions are attached. The overpayment calculation is based upon the assumption that all stock demonstrated as available during the audit period was exclusively dispensed to Medicaid recipients; this is undoubtedly not the case and the assumption serves to reduce the amount of the overpayment. Medicaid payments that have been substantiated by documented inventory are assumed to be valid; and payments in excess of that amount are regarded to be invalid. Accordingly, as shown in the summary sheet attachment, we have determined at this time that you have been overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $4,248,262.37. If additional overpayments are found subsequently, you will be notified. * * * If you have any additional invoices or other relevant documentation that you wish to submit that you feel would alter these findings, please submit your written explanation and legible copies of the documentation to us immediately. . . . If you have not submitted documentation or made payment within 30 days, we will send you notice regarding the agency's final determination, taking into consideration any information or documentation that you submit within this time period. On August 16, 1999, Mr. Diamond, on behalf of Petitioner, telephonically requested a 21-day extension of time to submit additional documentation for Ms. Holland's consideration. By letter dated August 17, 1999, Ms. Holland advised Mr. Diamond that the requested extension of time had been granted. Mr. Diamond, on behalf of Petitioner, on September 14, 1999, provided Ms. Holland with an "additional package of documentation." Ms. Holland reviewed these documents. "Most everything in this package was a duplicate" of documents that Ms. Holland had already been provided by Mr. Taylor. The following day, Ms. Holland, by facsimile transmission, requested Mr. Diamond to provide her with cancelled checks evidencing Petitioner's payment of eight, specified invoices included in the "additional package of documentation" she had received from Mr. Diamond. Mr. Diamond provided Ms. Holland with five cancelled checks on October 8, 1999. Ms. Holland determined, in light of the additional documentation she had received following her "provisional finding" that Petitioner had been overpaid $4,248,262.37 by the Medicaid program, that the amount of that overpayment should be reduced by $764.67. She advised Mr. Taylor of this "final agency audit" determination, by letter dated October 27, 1999, which read, in part, as follows: Medicaid Program Integrity has completed a review of your paid Medicaid claims with dates of service from September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998. We have also reviewed your product purchase/acquisition documentation received on May 13, 1999, September 14, 1999, and October 8, 1999. You have failed to provide adequate documentation to the effect that the available quantity of certain drugs of given strength was as great as the quantity of those drugs billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid. You are hereby notified that Okan, Inc. d/b/a Choice Pharmacy was overpaid $4,247,497.70 for claims that in whole or in part are not covered by Medicaid. The total amount due for the overpayment is $4,247,497.70. The above action and your right or appeal are discussed below. * * * We have required that you submit invoices from your suppliers to substantiate the availability of drugs that you billed to Medicaid. You have not fully substantiated such availability. Section 409.913(10), F.S., states in part that the Agency may require repayment for inappropriate, medically unnecessary, or excessive goods or services. Section 409.913(14)(n), F.S., states that "The agency may seek any remedy provided by law, including but not limited to, the remedies provided in subsection (12) and (15) and s. 812.035, if: * * * (n) The provider fails to demonstrate that it had available during a specific audit or review period sufficient quantities of goods, or sufficient time in the case of services, to support the provider's billings to the Medicaid program." Billing Medicaid for drugs that have not been demonstrated as available for dispensing is a violation of Medicaid laws and regulations and has resulted in the finding that you been overpaid by the Medicaid program. The overpayment identified in the summary sheet attachment is with regard only to the 45 drugs listed and comprehends only the period audited, namely September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998. A printout identifying all relevant claims involved in the overpayment and a copy of the drug purchase/acquisition review are attached. The overpayment calculation is based upon the assumption that all stock demonstrated as available during the audit period was exclusively dispensed to Medicaid recipients; this is undoubtedly not the case and the assumption serves to reduce the amount of the calculated overpayment. All Medicaid payments sufficient to cover documented inventory have been assumed to be valid, and payments in excess of that amount are regarded to be invalid. Accordingly, as shown in the summary sheet attachment, we have determined at this time that you have been overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $4,247,497.70. If additional overpayments are found subsequently, you will be notified. * * * If you accept or concur with these finding, please send your check in the amount of $4,247,497.70, made payable to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, to: . . . . You have the right to request a formal or informal hearing pursuant to section 120.569, F.S. . . . [I]f a request for a hearing is made, the request or petition must be received within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of this letter. Failure to timely request a hearing shall be deemed a waiver of your right to a hearing. . . . Mr. Diamond, on behalf of Petitioner, filed with AHCA a Petition for Formal Hearing on December 7, 1999. The Petition for Formal Hearing was accompanied by 50 "invoices" purporting to reflect sales of prescription drugs (totaling approximately $4 million dollars) made by IV Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc., to Choice Pharmacy during the Audit Period, as well as the following cover letter from Mr. Diamond to Ms. Holland: Consistent with our prior discussions regarding our above referenced client, you will find enclosed the final documentation from [IV] Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc. As I indicated in our prior discussions it would appear at this time that our independent audit has concluded. Our accounting reveals, based on all invoices provided, our above referenced client has correctly accounted for all medications billed through Medicaid. I also enclose consistent with our prior discussion a copy of our request for a formal hearing in the event that you are not in agreement with our conclusions. In the event that you are satisfied with the conclusions, please advise Mr. John A. Owens, Chief, Medicaid Program Integrity, that we will withdraw our request for formal hearing. Prior to the submission of these "invoices," AHCA had not received any information (in the form of documentation or otherwise) indicating that Petitioner had purchased or otherwise acquired drugs from IV Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc. Ms. Holland examined the "invoices." "They did not look like forms [she had] seen from this wholesaler before, and . . . after years of looking at invoices they just appeared not right" to her. On January 28, 2000, Ms. Holland sent the following letter to Mr. Diamond: Thank you for the documents received on December 7, 1999. As they were received after the Final Agency Action, the Agency will consider them as possible evidence for trial or hearing. Once the hearing date and discovery schedule are set, we will propound interrogatories and take depositions in conjunction with these documents. If you have any question, please contact Mr. L. William Porter, II, senior attorney . . . . Ms. Holland's suspicions regarding the genuineness of the IV Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc., "invoices" submitted by Petitioner were correct. Petitioner had never purchased or otherwise acquired any drugs from IV Pharmaceutical Wholesalers, Inc. The "invoices" were fabricated. They were created by Mr. Pinkoff, for a fee ($800,000.18, which he was paid, in two installments, in November of 1999), at the request of Mr. Taylor and a Betty Bills. 13/ Mr. Pinkoff was told that the "invoices" were needed for an audit to "substantiate the purchases of [certain] product[s]." 14/ Mr. Pinkoff was subsequently charged with criminal wrongdoing for his participation in this fraudulent scheme and "voluntarily surrendered" to the authorities. 15/ The charges were filed after Mr. Pinkoff's place of business had been searched by law enforcement authorities on December 1, 1999, pursuant to a search warrant obtained by the Florida Attorney General's Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, which was conducting a criminal investigation of another matter unrelated to Choice Pharmacy. 16/ The computer that Mr. Pinkoff used to create the falsified "invoices" for Petitioner was seized during the search. Mr. Pinkoff entered into a Plea Agreement with the State of Florida in his criminal case. The Plea Agreement was filed in Leon County Circuit Court (Case No. 2000-4310) on November 8, 2000. Section II of the Plea Agreement contained the "Factual Predicate for this Plea Agreement." It provided as follows: The Defendant and the State agree that the following is the factual basis for the entry of plea in this matter, (hereafter "SUBJECT MATTER"): In June of 1999, the Defendant was approached by Louis A. Petrillo ("Petrillo"),[17/] who told the Defendant that Choice Pharmacy (Okan, Inc. d/b/a Choice Pharmacy ("Choice") and "Betty," an owner, needed certain invoices. Specifically, Choice and Betty needed to demonstrate that Choice had purchased a number of prescription drugs with a value of $4,000,000 dollars dating back to the period of 1997 through 1998. Choice was owned and operated by Raufu ("Ralph") Taylor and Betty (Last Name Unknown). The Defendant owned a 1/2 interest in IV Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Florida corporation that was a licensed prescription drug wholesale company. IV Pharmaceuticals had not sold any prescription drugs to Choice in 1997 or at any other time. Petrillo knew this fact but asked the Defendant if he could produce invoices for a specific list of drugs; the understanding was that the invoices would be false. The Defendant told Petrillo, Betty and Ralph that he could create or otherwise produce invoices from IV Pharmaceutical[s] to give to Choice for prescription drugs that IV Pharmaceutical[s], Inc. had previously purchased from manufacturers or other licensed wholesalers. This was necessary in case IV Pharmaceutical[s] was asked to produce its records to substantiate the invoices from IV Pharmaceutical[s] to Choice. All of the drugs Betty and Ralph requested invoices for were oncology or HIV prescription drugs, largely Neup[o]g[e]n and Procrit. IV Pharmaceutical[s] had invoices to substantiate its own purchases of those drugs. A meeting was arranged by Petrillo. In attendance were the Defendant, Petrillo, Betty, and Ralph. After making introductions, Petrillo left the meeting.[18/] Before leaving, Petrillo told the Defendant that it was up to him whether or not to create the invoices. The Defendant discussed with Betty and Ralph what specific prescription drug invoices were required. Betty and Ralph provided the Defendant with a list of drugs, including dates of purchase and quantities. The Defendant believed that the invoices were to be used for some unlawful purpose, presumably involving AHCA, since the Defendant was familiar with the AHCA audit process and knew that AHCA required such invoices when conducting an audit. Betty and Ralph told the Defendant that the invoices were needed for drugs they had actually purchased but had no invoices for. The Defendant had at least one conversation with Petrillo related to the production following the meeting. Six months after the meeting, the Defendant drafted invoices under the IV Parmaceutical[s] name based upon the list provided by Betty and Ralph. The Defendant gave the invoices to Petrillo to give to Betty and Ralph. Each false invoice produced by Defendant was submitted to AHCA. The foregoing assertions of fact made in this section of the Plea Agreement are true and accurate. Section III of the Plea Agreement indicated that Pinkoff understood that "pursuant to this plea agreement his minimum potential exposure under the Sentencing Guidelines [was] 55.5 months of imprisonment" and "[h]is maximum potential exposure under the Sentencing Guidelines [was] the statutory maximum of thirty-five years in State Prison and a $25,000.00 fine." Section IV of the Plea Agreement set forth the "Defendant's Obligations." It read as follows: The Defendant agrees to plead Guilty to the following charges contained in the information filed in the above-styled criminal case: one count of "Racketeering activity" in violation of Florida Statutes, Section 895.03(3), a first degree felony; and one count of Medicaid Provider Fraud in violation of Florida Statutes, Section 409.920(2)(a), a third degree felony. The Defendant agrees to make himself accessible upon notice to receive and testify truthfully pursuant to any subpoena lawfully issued compelling such testimony pursuant to §914.04, Florida Statutes, However, by this AGREEMENT Defendant does not and shall not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege as to any statement or testimony except and only as to the specific facts set forth as the SUBJECT MATTER of this AGREEMENT; Defendant shall maintain his Fifth Amendment rights as to all other allegations of facts, including those facts related to the charges alleged in the Information not included in the factual predicate herein. The Defendant understands that if lawfully compelled to provide testimony, any perjury committed by him would constitute a violation of the ordinary terms and conditions of Defendant's community control and probation even if related to the charges alleged in the Information. Section V of the Pleas Agreement contained the "sentence the State will recommend," which was as follows: Seven (7) years of probation with the following special conditions: Defendant with will serve 24 months of community control under the terms and conditions set by the Department of Corrections. . . . Defendant shall pay a total of $3,475,000 to the State of Florida as compensation to the State of Florida for its losses, both known and unknown. Such reimbursement shall not be deemed or otherwise construed as a fine or similar penalty. . . . At the entry of this plea, Defendant agrees to provide the State of Florida with sufficient security to guarantee the payment of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00). This security shall be in the form of two Notes secured by two mortgages to be held by the State of two properties. The first property is located at 5721 Oakview Terrace, Hollywood, Florida. The Note on this property shall be in the amount of $400,000.00. The second property secured by a Note is located at 6001 North Ocean Drive, PHS, Hollywood, Florida [and the note on this property] shall be in the amount of $600,000.00.[19/] . . . Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of $25,000.00 which is the Statutory maximum; Defendant shall be Adjudicated Guilty on all counts; Defendant shall be precluded from working or having a business interest in or receiving remuneration or payment of any kind from any health care related facility that receives any funds or participates in any way with the Medicare and/or Medicaid programs under Titles XVIII and XIX of the United States Code. However, this does not preclude the Defendant from receiving proceeds from the divestment of his interests or assets through the sale or transfer of said assets or interest to an entity that receives any funds or participates in any way with the Medicare and/or Medicaid programs of the United States. Defendant shall pay court costs; The monetary obligation under the AGREEMENT shall be paid over the course of probation and community control. However, the STATE and the Defendant agree that there is a value to the STATE in terms of economics and deterrence to receive swift and complete payment and the commitment of the Defendant to attempt to do so reflects his willingness to accept responsibility for his acts. Therefore, in the event that the Defendant pays $3,000,000.00 within 15 months of sentencing and has satisfied all other terms and conditions of community control and probation, the State agrees to the following: the community control portion of the defendant's sentence shall be reduced to 15 months; the term of probation shall be reduced to five (5) years; The STATE agrees to return to court for an Order reducing the total obligation by $500,000.00. Thus, the Defendant's total obligation under this Agreement would become Three Million dollars ($3,000,000.00). . . . The State has no objection to the entry of any Order by the court to permit travel outside of the United States for business purposes upon at least 2 weeks notice to the probation department and the permission of the defendant's probation officer. The Defendant understands that he may not travel outside the United States during the course of the community control portion of his sentence. Section VI was entitled "Withdrawal of Guilty Plea and Vacation of Sentence." It read as follows: In the event that the State files additional charges against the Defendant for matters currently under investigation, but not charged in the Information described in this AGREEMENT, the Defendant shall have the right and full entitlement to vacate the sentence imposed pursuant to this AGREEMENT and to withdraw his plea of guilty. The only condition to the Defendant's right and entitlement to vacate (as just described) shall be that the Defendant must not have breached this AGREEMENT prior to the additional charges being filed. If the Defendant does vacate and withdraw, all monies paid pursuant to this AGREEMENT shall be returned to the Defendant. The Plea Agreement also contained a "Waiver of Rights," which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: My entering into the AGREEMENT is not the result of force, threats, assurances or promises other than the promises contained in the attached agreement. I agree to the provision of this agreement as a voluntary act on my part, rather than at the discretion of or because of the recommendation of any other person, and I agree to be bound by its provisions. I agree that this written plea agreement contains all the terms and conditions of my plea and that promises made by anyone that are not contained within this written agreement are without force and effect and are null and void. . . . The Plea Agreement was signed by Mr. Pinkoff (on September 26, 2001), his attorneys (on September 26, 2001 and November 8, 2000), and the Special Counsel of Health Care Fraud Prosecution (on September 26, 2000). Mr. Pinkoff is currently under "house arrest" at his residence (which he owns) located at 5721 Oakview Terrace in Hollywood, Florida; however, he is allowed to leave his home to work at his office (which is also located in Florida). Mr. Pinkoff is still in the "pharmaceutical wholesaling" business. His business is licensed "out of Georgia." Mr. Pinkoff has paid approximately $200,000.00 of the amount that he owes the State of Florida pursuant to the terms of his Plea Agreement. He sold the 6001 North Ocean Drive property referenced in the Plea Agreement for $1.2 million. The state received approximately $192,000.00 of the proceeds from the sale Mr. Pinkoff is presently paying the state $1,000.00 a month.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order finding that Petitioner received $4,247,497.70 in Medicaid overpayments for claims covering the period from September 10, 1997, through August 31, 1998, and requiring Petitioner to repay this amount to AHCA. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2002.
