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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. ALFRED HERRICK, T/A TAN TARA MOBILE HOME PARK, 89-003183 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-003183 Latest Update: Mar. 15, 1990

The Issue A Notice to Show Cause issued on May 5, 1989, alleges that Respondent violated Sections 723.031(5) and (6), F.S. by increasing mobile home park lot rentals on January 1, 1987 and on October 1, 1987, and by collecting charges for water, sewer and waste disposal from at least one homeowner when such charges were not disclosed prior to tenancy. If it is determined that those violations occurred, it is necessary to recommend an appropriate penalty and corrective action.

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to these proceedings, Alfred Herrick has been the park owner of Tan Tara Mobile Home Park, which is located in Melbourne, Florida. Respondent purchased the park in 1980. Eighty-four (84) lots are offered for rent or lease in the Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. Seventy-eight (78) lots are offered to tenants who own their home. Nineteen (19) lots were leased on or after November 1, 1986. The proposed prospectus for the Tan Tara Mobile Home Park was filed with the Division on September 13, 1985. The prospectus was deemed adequate to meet the requirements of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes on December 23, 1983. The prospectus was delivered to homeowners after January 1986. The prospectus review by the Division determines adequacy with Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. The prospectus is not reviewed to determine consistency with rental agreements or disclosures made to homeowners. Park owners are advised that approval of the prospectus by the Division does not relieve the park owner of any requirements under the law. The park owner determines the contents of the prospectus. Homeowners have no input as to the contents of or in the review process of the prospectus. The prospectus for Tan Tara Mobile Home Park contains a number of disclosures, as required by 723.012, F.S., relating to the mobile home park property, and sets out the terms and conditions of the rental agreement between the park owner and individual tenants of mobile home park. Included in the prospectus is the disclosure of all of the charges which may be charged by the park. Paragraph VII. UTILITY AND OTHER SERVICES, provides the following relevant disclosures: Water - Treated drinking water is provided by the City of Melbourne Utilities and is provided to each mobile home site. The charges for this service is [sic] currently included in the tenants' total monthly rental fee. * * * Sewage - Sewage disposal is provided by the City of Melbourne Utilities. The charges for this service is [sic] included in the tenants' monthly rental fee. * * * Waste and trash disposal - The collection of garbage and trash is provided by the City of Melbourne Utilities and is provided for each mobile home. The charge for this service is currently included in the tenants' total monthly rental fee. ... Paragraph VIII. RENT, RENTAL INCREASES AND OTHER CHARGES, provides the following relevant disclosures: The base rent and other charges applicable to your lot are effective January 1, 1985, as reflected in this section. The "base rent" refers to the regular monthly rent established by the Park Owner from time to time. The base rent is subject to annual rent increases effective each January 1st, after ninety (90) days notice from the Park Owner or Management of such increase. * * * "Other charges" refers to "special use fees" and "pass through charges". SPECIAL USE FEES refers to those separately itemized amounts charged in addition to the base rent for those specific items hereinafter set forth. The following special use fees are in effect within the park: Owner reserves the right to charge an Entrance or "Move-in" fee. The present amount charged for this fee in the Park is $1,000.00. Late rental payment fee of $10.00 after the fifth day of the month and $2.00 per day thereafter. Return check charge of $10.00 for each check not honored by the banking institution upon which the check is drawn. An additional charge of $5.00 per month for each and every person over two occupying a mobile home. Extra visitor and/or guest charge of $2.00 per person per day staying more than 15 consecutive days or 30 days total. Lawn maintenance fee, including mowing, edging, and trimming, in the amount of $10.00 for each required maintenance. If it becomes necessary for Management to place the Tenant' s garbage in proper containers, there will be an additional charge of $5.00 assessed to the Tenant for each occurrence. An additional charge of $5.00 per month for a Tenant's washing machine due to the extra water usage caused by the washing machine and also sewerage charges. For the purchaser, there will be a registration fee of $75.00 for investigating any proposed new Tenant into the Park. A new Tenant nonrefundable application fee of $75.00 for investigating any proposed new Tenant into the Park. A garbage and trash "removal" fee not included in the normal garbage or waste removal, of a minimum of $5.00, the exact charge to be determined by Park Management based upon size and weight of such excess refuse so removed by Management. Additional copies of the Prospectus are available at the park Off ice for Tenants requesting same for which there is a charge of $50.00 for each additional copy requested. Pet fee of 5.00 per pet per month. Skirting area clean up minimum fee of $20.00 if tenant fails to do this. * * * PASS THROUGH CHARGES, means those amounts other than special use fees, which are itemized and can be charged separately from the base rent and which represents the mobile home owner's share of cost charged to the park Owner by any State or local government or utility company. These charges will be passed on to the Tenant(s) on a pro rata basis. ("Pro rata basis" means that percentage derived by dividing the number of mobile home spaces leased by a resident by the total number of occupied mobile home spaces in the park.) The pass through charges which may be passed on to the Tenant(s) are as follows: Water charges or increases in same; Sewer charges or increases in same; Waste disposal charges or increases in same; * * * I. Replacement utility costs charged to the Park Owner by State or local government incurred as the result of the actions of any utility company for any utility or other services not provided or available to park residents on the delivery date that replaces, in whole or in part, any utility or other service that is provided or is available to park residents on the delivery date. * * * The above-mentioned pass through charges and costs which are billed by either the State or local governmental entities or utility companies may be passed through to the Tenants after providing at least ninety (90) days advanced written notice to all Tenants. The amount of an increase in pass through charges shall be limited to the increased costs or charges billed to the park owner by the State or local governmental agency or utility company plus any maintenance and administrative costs related to same as is permitted by 723.045, Florida Statutes. * * * (Petitioner's Exhibit #2, pp 11, 61-66, emphasis added) On September 2, 1986, Mr. Herrick gave a notice to all residents within the Tan Tara Mobile Home Park of a "base rent" increase effective January 1, 1987. On June 23, 1987, Mr. Herrick gave a notice of a pass through charge effective October 1, 1987. The notice provided for billing each tenant for the actual usage of water, sewer and waste disposal. In addition, the notice provided that the extra charge for washing machines would be eliminated effective October 1, 1987. Further, the notice indicated that due to the charges for water, sewer and waste disposal becoming effective October 1, there would not be a base rent increase on January 1, 1988. The cost of providing water, sewer and waste disposal, prior to October 1, 1987, had been included in the base rent charged by Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. Mr. Herrick calculated that the portion of base rent for those utilities was $12.50 for each lot. Individual water meters were installed and beginning October 1, 1987, the park owner began assessing all homeowners in the park for water, sewage and garbage based on individual usage. This cost was in addition to the base rent. The park owner also began assessing each homeowner two dollars and fifty cents ($2.50) per month, for meter reading Beginning January 1, 1989, Herrick started deducting from the base rent the $12.50 previously computed for utilities. He then continued to add on the utility charge based on the individuals meter reading. Bonnie and Reginald Charron are residents of Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. They first assumed occupancy in the park in 1982, leasing lot number 18. At that time they were given the park rules and regulations marked Petitioner's Exhibit 6. No disclosures regarding water, sewage, and garbage were made prior to occupancy. On or after August 30, 1984, the Charrons moved to lot 23. No other disclosures were made regarding the homeowners' obligation to pay for water, sewage or garbage. The prospectus was delivered to the Charrons on January 25, 1986. Since assuming occupancy in the park, the Charrons have been continuous residents and have not been evicted pursuant to Section 723.061, F.S. The Charrons paid fifteen dollars ($15.00) extra per month for their three (3) children plus five dollars ($5.00) per month for the washing machine. Mrs. Charron was advised the five dollars ($5.00) per person was required to cover the cost for extra water and sewage being used by those persons. When the Charrons began to pay for water, sewage and garbage based on individual usage) the fifteen dollars ($15.00) per month was never deducted from the base rent. Since October 1, 1987, the Charrons cost for water, sewage, and garbage has exceeded twelve dollars and fifty cents ($12.50) per month. Peggy E. Headley is a resident of Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. She moved into the park in September of 1982. On August 23, 1982, she was given the park rules and regulations marked Petitioner's Exhibit 8. No other disclosures were made regarding her obligation to pay for water, sewage and garbage. The prospectus was delivered to Mrs. Headley on January 25, 1986. Mrs. Eddie Walters is a resident of Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. She moved into the park in May of 1977. At that time, she received a copy of the park rules and regulations. On January 16, 1986, she received the prospectus. Respondent stipulated that water, sewage, and garbage charges have not been collected from homeowners as a matter of custom. It is undisputed that prior to occupancy in the mobile home park, the tenants listed above did not receive a disclosure from the park owner that they would be responsible for paying pass through or pass on charges as defined in the park prospectus. The rules and regulations which were in effect in the park were amended at various times, and at various times provided that water would be included in the base rent and/or that the park owner may charge separately for water. The set of rules and regulations attached to the prospectus provided that the management reserved the right to assess "pass through charges", including for water, on a pro rata basis. "Pro rata basis" is defined in the rules and regulations in the same manner as defined in the prospectus: "...that percentage derived by dividing the number of mobile home spaces leased by a resident by the total number of occupied mobile home spaces in the park." (Petitioner's Exhibit #2, p. 73) Neither the prospectus nor the rules and regulations provide for collection of water or other utilities based on individual usage. Oral lot rental agreements are in effect in Tan Tara Mobile Home Park. No written lot rental agreements have ever been executed between homeowners and the Respondent or prior park owners of Tan Tara. The term of the oral lot rental agreements is one year and begins January 1 of each year. Respondent has not been required by any governmental agency to install individual water meters or assess homeowners based on usage. However, an official with the City of Melbourne Water and Sewage Operations recommended installing individual meters as a means of finding out where the water was going. Herrick had contacted the city regarding high water and sewer bills. After the meters were installed the city noted an average monthly reduction of 173,200 gallons of water at the park. Water charges within the park are determined by reading individual meters which are located on each individual lot within the mobile home park. The meter readings are forwarded to New York, where Mr. Herrick maintains his residence and main business. A bill for water usage is sent from New York to each tenant and the payment is received in the New York office. Water usage records are kept each month by the New York office in order to determine water usage and the appropriate billing rates for water and sewer for individual residents.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding that Alfred Herrick, d/b/a Tan Tara Mobile Home Park violated Section 723.031(5), F.S., and requiring that: Respondent immediately cease assessing homeowner for utilities based on individual usage, and Respondent reimburse to each homeowner all sums collected since October 1, 1987, for utilities over and above that sum that would have been collected under a "pro rata" computation as described in the prospectus and park regulations. This latter computation should credit the homeowners for the $12.50 collected each month from October 1, 1987 until January 1, 1989. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra Roberts Asst. General Counsel Dept. of Business Regulation 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 David D. Eastman, Esquire P.O. Box 669 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James Kearney, Director Dept. of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1060 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Dept. of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Stephen R. MacNamara Secretary Dept. of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 S. Bronough St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 =================================================================

Florida Laws (13) 120.57120.68723.002723.003723.005723.006723.011723.012723.031723.037723.045723.059723.061
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PAUL CONLEY vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 07-000049 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jan. 03, 2007 Number: 07-000049 Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2007

The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue (DOR) should grant Petitioner's request for a refund of the $1,433.40 in sales tax Petitioner paid in connection with his purchase of a mobile home from Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: In October 2002, Petitioner purchased a lot in a mobile home park in Davie, Florida (Petitioner's Property). There was a "worn out" mobile home on the property that Petitioner had "demolished and removed." On May 30, 2003, Petitioner entered into a Purchase Agreement with Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc., wherein he agreed to purchase, for $23,890.00, a 2003 Homes of Merit mobile home that was not yet built (Purchased Mobile Home). The Purchase Agreement provided that the Purchased Mobile Home was to be "drop shipped" directly from the manufacturer's facility to Petitioner's Property, where it would be "met by [Petitioner]." The Purchase Agreement further provided, in pertinent part, as follows with respect the passing of title of the Purchased Mobile Home: Title to said equipment shall remain in the Seller until the agreed purchase price therefor is paid in full . . . ; thereupon title to the within described unit passes to the buyer as of the date of . . . full cash payment . . . . Petitioner paid the full purchase price of the Purchased Mobile Home upon execution of the Purchase Agreement, but no sales tax was collected from him at that time. On July 13, 2003, the Purchased Mobile Home was delivered to Petitioner's Property, where it has remained. Thereafter, Larry Douglas, Sr., of Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes sent the following letter, dated September 11, 2003, to Petitioner: You have recently purchased a new Homes of Merit manufactured home from Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc. You have not provided us with proof that you are exempt [from] sales tax. Therefore, you owe Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes, Inc., the amount of $1,433.40 for the sales tax on your home. Your home will not be registered in your name until the balance is paid in full. On or about September 15, 2003, Petitioner filed with the Broward County Property Appraiser an "application for the issuance an 'RP' License Plate to identify [the Purchased Mobile Home] as real property." In his application, Petitioner represented that the Purchased Mobile Home had been "permanently affixed on January 1 of the current year, [was] now permanently affixed, and it [was his] intention that [it] remain permanently affixed," to Petitioner's Property. At no time prior to the filing of the application had the Purchased Mobile Home been classified as real property. The Broward County Property Appraiser, on September 15, 2003, issued a certificate stating that the Purchased Mobile Home was "included in an assessment for ad valorem taxation of [Petitioner's Property]." On September 18, 2003, Petitioner reluctantly paid the $1,433.40 that Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes claimed was due "for the sales tax on [the Purchased Mobile Home]." On September 19, 2003, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issued a certificate of title for the Purchased Mobile Home in Petitioner's name. In March 2006, Petitioner applied to DOR for a refund of the $1,433.40 he had paid to Dwight Hatfield Manufactured Homes in sales tax for the Purchased Mobile Home. On July 27, 2006, DOR issued its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's refund request. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2007.

Florida Laws (12) 120.569120.57193.075212.02212.05212.06212.07320.01320.015320.08320.0815672.401
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs ROLAND TARDIFF, 97-001483 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lake City, Florida Mar. 26, 1997 Number: 97-001483 Latest Update: Nov. 21, 1997

The Issue Whether Respondent Tardiff committed the violations as set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated February 24, 1997, and what penalty, if any, should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Mobile Home Act, Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been the owner of Pondview Mobile Home Park. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has had 10 or more lots offered for rent or lease. Respondent offered for rent or lease at least 22 lots. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a "mobile home park owner," as the term is defined in Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes. No annual fees were paid by Respondent from 1984 until 1996. Currently, annual fees are $4.00 per lot, per year. Annual fees are payable to the division between July 1 and October 1 of each year. When Respondent increased his rent in 1993, he failed to file a copy of the lot rental increase notice with the Bureau of Mobile Homes. Under Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, the reason for the increase in rent is irrelevant to the filing requirement. When new tenants entered Respondent's mobile home park, Respondent failed to give them a prospectus or written notification of required information. Twelve homeowners have entered into rental agreements without receiving the statutorily required document. Respondent produced a cancelled check at the formal hearing showing that 1996 annual fees had been paid to the division. It is the park owner's responsibility to comply with Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. It is not the duty of the division to pursue park owners in order to obtain compliance with the Florida Mobile Home Act. Respondent has been permitted with the Department of Health (formerly Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)) every year since 1983.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent has violated the Sections of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, as charged in the Notice to Show Cause, and ordering the Respondent to Pay annual fees for the years 1984-1995 in the amount of $814, plus a 10 percent penalty of $81.40 which equals $895.40; Pay a penalty of $1,200 for the violation of Section 723.013., Florida Statutes; Pay a penalty of $5,000 for the violation of Section 723.037, Florida Statutes; and Comply with all provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, in the future. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne V. Estrella, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Roland Tardiff Route 12 Box 394 Lake City, Florida 32025 Robert H. Ellzey, Jr., Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (6) 120.57723.002723.003723.007723.013723.037
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. BERTRAM F. GOULD, D/B/A INDIAN WOODS, 83-001173 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001173 Latest Update: Jul. 19, 1990

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Bertram Gould, is president and stockholder of Mohican Valley, Inc., d/b/a Indian Woods Subdivision. The Indian Woods Subdivision is located in Seminole County and consists of in excess of 150 subdivided lots. On May 20, 1982, Mohican Valley, Inc. purchased a mobile home park located in Seminole County, Florida, from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation. The park was formerly known as Mohawk Village, but is now known as the Indian Woods Subdivision. Bertram Gould and Mohican Valley, Inc. acquired their interest in the subdivision by virtue of a purchase and sale agreement, deed and assignment of lease indentures from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation. Individuals desiring to live in the mobile home park purchase their mobile home and contemporaneously sign a 99-year lease on the lots upon which the mobile homes are to be placed. The mobile homes purchased by prospective residents in the subdivision are typically purchased from Vaughn Motors, Inc., a corporation of which Mr. Gould is president. In 1981, Vaughn Motors, Inc. sold a mobile home to Alfred and Beverly Powers, which arrived at the park and was setup on November 30, 1981, or shortly thereafter. On March 1, 1982, Vaughn Motors, Inc. sold that mobile home to Warren E. and Sylvia Joyce Krummel, since the Powers had elected not to close the purchase. On the date of the sale to the Krummels, the mobile home was already setup on Lot 1, Block E, of the subdivision and ready for occupancy. On June 14, 1982, after the May 20 purchase of the subdivision by Mohican Valley, Inc, through its president, Bertram Gould, the Krummels executed an Indenture of Lease for Lot 1, Block E. There was thus a residential building on that property subject to the lease at the time the lease was entered into. On June 5, 1982, Dorothy Merritt signed a purchase agreement to buy a mobile home and the mobile home was delivered and setup on her lot on August 6, 1982. On that date she also signed a lease for the lot where the mobile home was placed. Thus, when the interest in that property was conveyed by lease, there was a residential building on the lot. Roy and Lydia Ardizzone initially leased a lot in the park from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation before the sale to Mohican Valley, Inc. and Bertram Gould. In August, 1982, after Mohican Valley, Inc. purchased the subdivision, the Ardizzones decided to place a mobile home on their lot, but since the Phase II portion of the subdivision in which their original lot was located was not completely developed, it was not feasible to place the home on the lot at that time. Accordingly, they asked Mr. Gould to substitute their lot for a lot in Phase I in order to facilitate placing a home on the lot and begin living in the park. Mr. Gould agreed and the substitution occurred on August 31, 1982, on which date the Ardizzones also signed a lease for the lot. They ordered a mobile home to be placed on that lot, which arrived some 10 days later, on September 9, 1982. It was immediately setup on the Ardizzone's lot. Thus, at the time the lease of August 31, 1982, was executed by the Ardizzones and Bertram Gould, the Ardizzones had already ordered the mobile home for immediate delivery, which was delivered and setup some 10 days later. Thus, there was an obligation on the part of the Respondent to provide a mobile home to them in less than two years and indeed within days. On or about September 4, 1982, Bertram Gould caused a mobile home to be placed on Lot 3, Block B of the subdivision and had it prepared for occupancy. On November 5, 1982, George W. and Alice H. Woodward signed a purchase agreement for the mobile home and ultimately executed a lease for the lot upon which that mobile home sat on January 10, 1983. They moved into their home on or about February 17, 1983. Thus, at the time the lease was executed by the Woodwards and Respondent, a residential building was present on the property subject to the lease. Mohican Valley, Inc.'s predecessor in title, Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, had, during the course of its development of the mobile home park, entered into approximately 156 ground leases for mobile home lots. In conjunction with the acquisition of title to the park by Mohican Valley, Inc., Mohican Valley Inc. was assigned all rights of Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation in those 156 leases which had already been recorded by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation prior to the acceptance of assignment by Mohican Valley, Inc. It was not established that Mohican Valley, Inc. or Bertram Gould had participated in any offer or disposition of the property which was the subject of those leases prior to Mohican Valley, Inc.'s acceptance of their assignment. Prior to May 20, 1982, the Respondent had no ownership interest in either the mobile home park or in Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, which owned and managed the Park. He was not an officer, director, employee, salesman or any type of agent for the owner of the mobile home subdivision prior to May 20, 1982. The only nexus between the Respondent and the mobile home park prior to May 20, 1982, was his position as president of Vaughn Motors, Inc. which had sold mobile homes to some of the residents of the park who had executed leases which ultimately became assigned to Mohican Valley, Inc. The Respondent caused certain advertisements to be placed in the Orlando Sentinel newspaper. Although an advertisement was placed April 25, 1982, the Respondent was not involved in the publishing of that advertisement. It appeared in the newspaper approximately a month prior to purchase of the park by Mr. Gould's company. On June 4 and 5, 1982; September 19, 1982; October 10, 1982; and January 29, 1983, the Respondent admittedly placed advertisements in the Orlando Sentinel representing amounts of monthly lot rent, terms of available bank financing, the office address, the phone number and hours of operation, as well as representing the fact that mobile homes could be purchased at the park for a listed price, including certain optional features, as well as the representation that the mobile home park then owned by Mohican Valley, Inc. offered quarter-acre lots and double-wide homes with certain amenities. The price for lot rent was represented as never increasing. Bank financing was advertised as available variously at 14 and a quarter percent interest and 13 and a half percent interest. The representations contained in those advertisements were true, however, at the time Mohican Valley, Inc. took title to the mobile home park, a foreclosure action and lis pendens had been filed on that property by Florida Land Company, the mortgagee on a mortgage executed by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, Mohican Valley, Inc.'s predecessor in title. That foreclosure had been filed on or before March 21, 1983, as evidenced by the Motion to Intervene (in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 4), which was filed in that foreclosure proceeding by Mohican Valley, Inc. No representation was made in these advertisements concerning the fact that the property which was the subject of the mobile home lot leases offered by Respondent was the subject of a mortgage encumbrance which was then in foreclosure, which foreclosure predated those advertisements. Bertram Gould, as president of Mohican Valley, Inc., as the movant in that Motion to Intervene, and as the successor in title to the mortgagor-in-foreclosure, knew of the existence of the facts surrounding that foreclosure as they related to the interest in the land he sought to convey and the effects such a foreclosure might have on the persons or residents of the park who executed those leases as lessee thereafter. Bertram Gould thus materially participated in the offer or disposition of the lots for lease in the subdivision and advertised those dispositions or offerings without representing that the real property to which they related was the subject of a pending foreclosure action. No reservation program has been approved by Petitioner for Bertram Gould, Mohican Valley, Inc. and/or Indian Woods, nor has any application for such been filed. No public offering statement for Bertram Gould, Mohican Valley, Inc. or Indian Woods, nor any application for such has, as of the time of the hearing, been filed and approved. The Indian Woods Subdivision has not been registered with the Petitioner by either Bertram Gould or Mohican Valley, Inc. Bertram Gould has engaged in the disposition of these subdivided lands directly as well as on behalf of Mohican Valley, Inc., of which corporation he is president and stockholder. Bertram Gould has offered, disposed of or participated in the offer or disposition of interests in the subdivided lands involved herein, which are located in Florida, by offering the subject land for leases to prospective mobile home purchasers and park residents.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That Bertram Gould be found guilty of violations of Sections 498.023(1) and (2), and Section 498.049(4) and Sections 498.051(1)(a), (b), and (d); that a penalty of $2,000 be imposed and that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist the above described activities until the requirements delineated above involving registration of the subject subdivision, approval and promulgation of a current offering statement have been accomplished. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ladd H. Fassett, Esquire Post Office Box 2747 Orlando, Florida 32802 E. James Kearney, Director Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary R. Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.5790.803
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NIDIA CRUZ vs ALFRED HOMES AND FALICIA HOMES FOSTER, 20-001279 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Mar. 09, 2020 Number: 20-001279 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondents Alfred Homes and Felicia Homes Foster1 subjected Petitioner Nidia Cruz to discriminatory housing practices based on Ms. Cruz’s national origin, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (FHA).

Findings Of Fact Ms. Cruz, who is Hispanic in national origin, rented and occupied a mobile home at lot #9 in Pine Grove Trailer Park (Pine Grove), in an unincorporated area adjacent to Fernandina Beach, Florida. Respondent Alfred Homes owns Pine Grove. His daughter, Respondent Felicia Homes Foster, oversees the business operations of Pine Grove. Ms. Foster lives in a mobile home at Pine Grove, and owns two other mobile homes that are rental units. Ms. Cruz rented one of these mobile homes from Ms. Foster. The remaining mobile homes in Pine Grove are owner-occupied, with those owners renting their lots from Respondents. Neither party could produce a lease between Respondents and Petitioner concerning the mobile home. Based on the parties’ testimony and other evidence presented at the final hearing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s tenancy for the mobile home commenced on or about October 15, 2016, for an approximately one-year term ending November 30, 2017. Respondents charged a $500 security deposit, and $600 per month for rent, which included water and sanitary sewer that Pine Grove’s well and septic system provided. Ms. Cruz was responsible for electrical services to the mobile home. After the expiration of the lease on November 30, 2017, the parties did not renew the lease, and Ms. Cruz continued to occupy the mobile home under a month-to-month agreement, until she vacated the mobile home on or about September 29, 2018. Ms. Cruz sought out Respondents to rent a mobile home, as her previous landlord had terminated the lease for her previous residence because of her unauthorized possession of pets. Ms. Foster informed Ms. Cruz that she had an available mobile home to rent, but as the previous tenants had just moved out, she needed to make repairs to the mobile home before it could be occupied. Ms. Cruz requested to move in immediately while the Respondents repaired the mobile home, because she and her daughter were, at that point, homeless. Respondents employed Michael Hamilton to repair and provide maintenance work to the mobile homes in Pine Grove. Mr. Hamilton worked for Respondents on weekends, as he had a full-time job during the week. Within approximately one month of Ms. Cruz moving into her mobile home, Mr. Hamilton made the needed repairs to its interior, including replacing the refrigerator, carpet, commode, and door locks. After moving into the mobile home, Ms. Cruz was involved in an incident at a nearby McDonald’s restaurant with an employee. That employee, Theresa McKenzie, was a tenant of Pine Grove and resided in lot #10, which was adjacent to Ms. Cruz’s mobile home. Ms. Cruz and her daughter, Ms. Burgos, complained to Ms. Foster that Ms. McKenzie and her co-tenant Earnest Roberts made loud, harassing, and defamatory statements about Ms. Cruz and her national origin. Respondents, individually, warned Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts to refrain from calling Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos names. The feud between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie was interrupted when Ms. Cruz was arrested on November 18, 2016. Ms. Cruz was charged with, among other offenses, aggravated stalking arising from a violation of an order of protection and filing a false police report. The victim of these offenses was a previous landlord from whom Ms. Cruz had rented a room. While in pretrial detention, a psychologist evaluated Ms. Cruz, and determined her to be incompetent to proceed in the criminal proceeding. The trial court subsequently committed Ms. Cruz to a mental health facility, and she pled guilty to filing a false police report. The trial court sentenced Ms. Cruz to a split sentence of two years with special conditions, which included enrollment into the mental health court program. After acceptance into the mental health court program, Ms. Cruz was released from the Nassau County Jail. On February 13, 2017, Ms. Foster hand delivered a letter to Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts, which warned them that if they did not refrain from verbal attacks against Ms. Cruz, Respondents would evict them from Pine Grove and obtain a no trespassing order. Chris Cummings, who was a Pine Grove resident at lot #4, testified he was aware of the incident at McDonald’s involving Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie, as his wife also worked at that McDonald’s. Mr. Cummings observed, but could not hear, Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie “squaring off” against each other. Mr. Cummings recounted that he observed Ms. Cruz lift her skirt and bend over, in a manner that he interpreted to mean that Ms. McKenize could kiss her rear end. In August 2017, Hurricane Irma caused a large branch from a pine tree to fall on top of Ms. Cruz’s mobile home, puncturing the exterior metal skin of the mobile home’s roof, which allowed water to intrude into the interior of the mobile home. The water intrusion caused significant damage to the ceilings, walls, and floor coverings of the mobile home. It is undisputed that Hurricane Irma inflicted serious damage to the mobile home, and that Ms. Cruz resorted to using buckets to catch water leaking from the roof. Shortly after Hurricane Irma passed, Mr. Hamilton placed a tarp over the top of the mobile home to stop the water intrusion. He then began repairs to Ms. Cruz’s mobile home over the course of several weekends, which included removing and replacing damaged sheet rock, patching the metal roof, and installing new carpet and linoleum flooring. Mr. Hamilton testified that Ms. Cruz, on several occasions, frustrated his ability to complete these repairs by denying him entry into the mobile home. Ms. Cruz presented evidence that her mobile home required extensive repairs upon moving in, and that it sustained severe damage from Hurricane Irma. However, she presented no credible evidence to rebut the testimony that Mr. Hamilton, on behalf of Respondents, completed all necessary repairs. Additionally, Ms. Cruz presented no credible evidence that Respondents treated her differently than other Pine Grove tenants in responding to and completing any necessary repairs to other tenant’s mobile homes. Neither the passage of time, incarceration, nor the trauma of Hurricane Irma, ended the feud between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. The Nassau County Sheriff’s Office had regular call-outs to Pine Grove regarding Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. The feud escalated when, on January 4, 2018, Ms. McKenzie filed a petition for an injunction for protection against Ms. Cruz, and the circuit court entered a temporary injunction that same day. The next day, January 5, 2018, Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos each filed petitions for an injunction for protection against Ms. McKenzie. Then, on January 16, 2018, Ms. Cruz sought a petition for an injunction for protection against Mr. Roberts, which the circuit court granted, as a temporary injunction, that same day. On January 17, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition against Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos’s petition against Ms. McKenzie, and on January 18, 2018, granted a final injunction in each case. On January 18, 2018, Ms. Burgos filed a petition for an injunction for protection against Mr. Roberts, which the circuit court denied. On January 24, 2018, the circuit court heard Ms. Cruz’s petitions against Ms. McKenzie and Mr. Roberts; the circuit court denied the injunction against Ms. McKenzie, but granted a final injunction against Mr. Roberts. On January 29 and February 9, 2018, the circuit court entered orders to show cause in Ms. Burgos’s injunction against Ms. McKenzie, and after hearing argument, dismissed them on February 15, 2018. Despite these multiple injunction proceedings, Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie continued their feud. On January 22, 2018, Ms. Cruz was arrested for violation of the protection order in favor of Ms. McKenzie. Ms. Cruz’s arrest triggered a violation of her felony probation. While in pretrial detention, she was again evaluated by a psychologist, who determined her to be incompetent to proceed. The circuit court committed Ms. Cruz to a mental health facility. She subsequently returned to court and pled guilty to a violation of probation. The circuit court sentenced Ms. Cruz to a split sentence of time served, reinstated probation, and extended probation with an added special condition for 12 months. Ms. Cruz was released from the Nassau County Jail on July 27, 2018. On July 31, 2018, Ms. Foster hand delivered a notice to terminate the lease, stating that the lease will end on August 31, 2018, and that Ms. Cruz should vacate the mobile home no later than September 1, 2018. Ms. Cruz and Ms. Burgos continued to hold over in the mobile home until they moved out on September 29, 2018. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents, or Mr. Hamilton, made any disparaging statements to Ms. Cruz regarding her national origin. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents treated her less favorably than other tenants with regard to her feud with Ms. McKenzie. Put differently, Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents treated any other tenant disputes differently than the way they treated the dispute between Ms. Cruz and Ms. McKenzie. Ms. Foster attempted to intervene on behalf of Ms. Cruz to end the feud, when she hand-delivered the letter to Ms. McKenzie on February 13, 2017, that threatened eviction. The credible evidence presented demonstrated that Ms. Cruz often created or exacerbated this feud, which ultimately led to her incarceration. Ms. Cruz failed to provide any credible evidence that Respondents’ decision to end the month-to-month holdover of the lease of the mobile home was based on her national origin, or that Respondents treated Ms. Cruz differently than any other tenants who resided at Pine Grove in ending the month-to-month holdover of a lease.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Nidia Cruz’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Nidia Cruz Post Office Box 1923 Callahan, Florida 32011 (eServed) James Pratt O'Conner, Esquire James Pratt O'Conner, P.A. Post Office Box 471 Fernandina Beach, Florida 32035 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.23760.34760.35 DOAH Case (2) 12-323720-1279
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs CHESTER YU, RONAL YU AND CAROL YU, 01-002350 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Pierce, Florida Jun. 12, 2001 Number: 01-002350 Latest Update: Oct. 12, 2001

The Issue The issue is whether Respondents imposed upon mobile home owners an invalid "pass-through" charge to pay for the cost of work on the park's electrical distribution system, in violation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Tanglewood Mobile Home Park, Inc., owns the Tanglewood Mobile Home Park located at 345 Weatherbee Road, Fort Pierce, St. Lucie County, Florida (Tanglewood). The Patricia Yu Irrevocable Trust owns Tanglewood Mobile Home Park, Inc. Respondents Chester Yu and Ronald Yu are the trustees of the trust; Respondent Carol Yu is not a trustee. References to "Respondents" shall include only Chester Yu and Ronald Yu. Tanglewood was developed in 1969. The park was originally owned and operated for many years by Respondents' father. An undated prospectus for Tanglewood Mobile Home Park (Prospectus) contains several provisions that have some bearing on this case. Prospectus Section VI.A.1 requires each mobile home owner to bear the expense of "electrical connections." Prospectus Section VI.A.2.a states that, "to the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park." Prospectus Section VIII.3 states that the Owner may assess, on a pro rata basis, "pass-through charges" as rent increases. Prospectus Section VIII.3.a prohibits more than one increase in lot rental annually, except for "pass-through charges." Section VIII.1.c defines "pass-through charges" as "those amounts, other than special use fees, which are itemized and charged separately from the rent and which represent the mobile homeowner's share of costs charged to the Park Owner by any state or local government or utility company." Section VIII.3.b.4 states: "To the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park." The Prospectus states that Tanglewood has 158 lots. In reality, only 148 lots are improved and available for rent. One of these lots is the park office. At present, 139 lots are leased. In October 1999, Hurricane Irene caused flooding in Tanglewood. After the flooding had receded, the power company restored power to the area, but a submerged transformer blew out and damaged part of the Tanglewood's electrical distribution system, leaving 16 mobile homes without power. After repairing or replacing the transformer, the power company employee responsible for reconnecting Tanglewood's electrical distribution system reenergized eight mobile homes, but refused to reenergize the remaining eight due to the deteriorated condition of their meter bank. Meter banks are located in groups at various points in the park. Power enters the park either above- or below-ground and is fed into individual meters for each mobile home. Each meter bank typically contains eight meters, and each meter typically has a junction box and a disconnect box. The concern of the power company employee was that the mechanical force required to reconnect power to one meter bank could possibly be too great for the deteriorated supports to withstand. As was typical of many meter banks at Tanglewood, the meter bank for these eight lots was poorly supported due to the deterioration of its support structure. Most supports at Tanglewood were made of wood, which required close monitoring and careful maintenance. Exposed to the elements, wood suffered considerable damage over time from wood rot. If the support failed, a meter bank would fall over to the ground, exposing live electrical lines in close proximity to the mobile homes and their occupants. Many meter banks throughout Tanglewood also suffered from deteriorated supports. Many meter banks were deficient because of the use of plumbing-grade PVC pipes as conduit, which are of a decreased thickness, when compared to PVC pipes approved for outdoor electrical use and, when exposed to sunlight, tend to deteriorate faster than the type of PVC pipes approved for outdoor electrical use. The use of plumbing-grade PVC pipes may not have been legal at the time it was used. Other meter banks also suffered from rusted and missing components, which might allow rainwater to enter the system and damage the parts. Some of the larger missing components left gaps large enough to allow a child's finger to penetrate and touch a live wire. Meter cans were damaged, masts (for above-ground supply lines) were inadequately supported, and drop wires (for above-ground supply lines) were too low. Confronted with the problem of eight lots without electrical service, Respondents contacted a local electrical contractor, who replaced the meter bank and its supports, using new pressure-treated wood. He also increased the service for these eight meters from 100 amps to 150 amps. The power company promptly restored electrical service after these repairs were completed. Respondents did not try to assess the mobile home owners a pass-through charge for this work. Instead, on January 28, 2000, Respondents sent the mobile home owners a notice that their monthly rent would increase by $15 (net, $12, after relieving the tenants of the obligation to pay a $3 monthly administration fee for water and sewer). The notice states that the rent increase is effective May 1, 2000, which may reflect a common commencement date on all lot leases. The letter notes that the park owner "has expended and will expend substantial sums for improvements and upgrades in the park," but warns that the park owner does not know if "any additional tax, utility or assessment prorations will be necessary." The rent increase covered, among other things, the cost of the work to restore electrical service to the eight lots whose meter bank required replacement. On February 12, 2000, the St. Lucie County Building Inspector inspected the electrical distribution system at Tanglewood. He noted the conditions described above and issued numerous citations, which were submitted to the St. Lucie County Code Enforcement office. In 1998, St. Lucie County adopted the National Fire Protection Association code, which is based on the 1996 National Electrical Code. The new code requirements prohibit a wood support system, require the placement of meters within 30 feet of the mobile home, and require underground wiring, but do not require service above 100 amps, which was the minimum level of service at Tanglewood prior to any electrical work following Hurricane Irene. On May 25, 2000, the County Code Enforcement Officer issued a notice of citations to Respondents for unsafe electrical equipment. The officer required the replacement of the remainder of the electrical distribution system. When work stopped at Tanglewood, the County Code Enforcement Officer issued other notices of citations in June 2000. Respondents responded to these demands from the County by undertaking extensive work to Tanglewood's electrical distribution system. The result was a modern electrical distribution system--at a cost of $161,912, plus $28,977.76 in finance charges, for a total of $190,889.76. By Notice of Pass-Through Charge dated August 14, 2000, Respondents advised the mobile home owners of a monthly pass-through charge of $28.61 per lot from December 1, 2000, through November 1, 2004. The notice discloses that the reason for the pass-through charges is the electrical distribution system upgrade that had recently been completed. The evidence is clear that, except for the upgrade to 200-amp service, the electrical work done in this case was governmentally mandated. This finding is supported by the reluctance of Respondents to attend to the electrical system unless a mobile home was without electricity. Despite Respondents' electrical invoices, their park-management policy obviously deferred maintenance, at least with respect to the electrical distribution system. The closer question in this case is whether the work was a capital improvement or a repair. The addition of 50-100 amps of service was a capital improvement, but it was not mandated by the government. So the capital improvement versus repair question applies to the remainder of the work. In their proposed recommended order, Respondents contend that the electrical distribution system was "completely functional" prior to the inspection and citations. This is true as to the function of conducting electricity; this is untrue as to the function of conducting electricity safely. Weakened and sometimes nonexistent supports, rusted holes, holes from missing components, and occasionally exposed wiring substantially undermined the safety of the electrical distribution system at Tanglewood. Respondents argue that new code requirements forced them to relocate disconnects closer to the mobile homes, use four-wire (not three-wire) feeder line to all mobile homes, use electrical-grade conduit, and use metal supports for meter banks. However, these are subsidiary costs of repair, not capital improvements. As contrasted to the expansion of service, the remaining work does not enlarge the capacity of the electrical distribution system. The remaining work repairs the system to make it safer, with some additional work required to meet current code requirements. Respondents argue that the work increases the value of the land. The record does not support this assertion. Even if such evidence were present in this case, it would not be determinative. Although a capital improvement normally adds value, a residential safety hazard subtracts value, so its elimination would have the appearance of adding value. Respondents argue that the work substantially extends the life of the electrical distribution system. This argument would be more appealing in the presence of an effective preventative maintenance program covering such basic needs as replacing wooden supports and metal covers when needed. However, the nature of the work, other than raising the service from 100 amps, is more retrospective than prospective; the work is really only catching up on preventative repairs and maintenance that was not done for years. Once Respondents allowed the system to fall into such a state of disrepair, the secondary costs of bringing the system up to code, such as adding four-wire feeds and relocating disconnects, do not change the nature of the expenditures; they are repair expenses, not capital improvements. Respondents have proved that a portion of the work was clearly the responsibility of individual mobile home owners. For instance, about two-thirds of the mobile homes required $150-$200 of work to separate the grounded conductors from the grounding conductors. However, it is unclear that any of such work, for which individual mobile home owners were directly responsible, was performed on all lots. Even if this work were a capital expenditure, which it is not, it could not be passed "proportionately" among all of the mobile home owners, if only some of them required the work. Respondent contends correctly that the pass-through charges are a minor violation, as defined in Section 723.006(9), Florida Statutes. Respondents fully disclosed the pass-through charges prior to assessing them. The pass-through charges did not endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the mobile home owners; to the contrary. The charges arose from a substantial expenditure by Respondents to enhance the health, safety, and welfare of the mobile home owners. The pass-through charges caused no economic harm to the mobile home owners because Respondents were authorized by the Prospectus to raise the rent by a sufficient amount to compensate for the entire cost of the work on the electrical distribution system. For these reasons, alone, neither a penalty nor a refund is appropriate; a cessation of the assessment of further pass-through charges and the imposition of the maximum civil penalty for a minor violation are sufficient. An order requiring a refund of any portion of the collected pass-through charges may have a disproportionately disturbing effect on Respondents and the mobile home owners. Respondents borrowed the full cost of the work on the electrical distribution system, and this note is payable in 48 equal monthly instalments ending on August 4, 2004. An order requiring a refund of any portion of the monies already collected may result in a significant disruption in the anticipated cash flow to Respondents, necessitating an even greater increase in rent to cover the loss of these funds. Mobile home owners who have left the park between the time of the electrical work and the time of the rent increase would unfairly be relieved of their proportionate share of the cost of this work, and mobile home owners coming to the park after this rent increase would unfairly be imposed with a disproportionately larger share of the cost of this work.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Amended Notice To Show Cause against Respondent Carol Yu. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order finding that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu have assessed a pass-through charge in violation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes; that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu shall cease and desist from assessing this pass-through charge upon the effective date of the final order; that the violation is a minor violation and no refund is appropriate under the circumstances; and that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu shall pay a single civil penalty of $250, for which they are jointly and severally liable. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ross Fleetwood Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Janis Sue Richardson Attorney for Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Bernard A. Conko Attorney for Respondent Cohen, Norris, Scherer, Weinberger & Wolmer 712 U.S. Highway One Fourth Floor North Palm Beach, Florida 33408

Florida Laws (10) 120.57723.003723.006723.011723.016723.031723.033723.035723.037723.059
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CITY OF MELBOURNE, MELBOURNE REGIONAL AIRPORT vs. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, 79-002387 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002387 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 1980

Findings Of Fact (As established by the Stipulation of Facts) Chapter 77-49, Laws of Florida (Sections 83.770 to 83.794, Florida Statutes.) Created the Mobile Home Tenant-Landlord Commission. Section 6 thereof required the registration of all mobile home parks containing 100 or more dwelling units. A registration fee of $1.00 for each dwelling unit contained in the mobile home park , was required to accompany the application for registration. Pursuant to the Act Respondent, Authority, the owner and operator of a 742 unit mobile home park, filed its application for registration together with $742.00 on March 3, 1978. On April 26, 1979, subsequent to the foregoing payment by Respondent, Chapter 77-49, Laws of Florida was held unconstitutional in the case of Department of Business Regulation v. National Manufactured Housing Federation, 370 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 1979). Thereafter, on July 16, 1979, Respondent requested a refund of $742.00 from the Office of the Comptroller. The Comptroller denied the request on October 26, 1979. On November 13, 1979, Respondent requested an administrative hearing on the Notice of Intent to Deny Refund. The State Mobile Home Tenant-Landlord Trust Fund lacked sufficient monies from which to make a refund at the time of the request by Respondent. The funds received by the State Mobile Home Tenant-Landlord Trust Fund had been disbursed for the payment of salaries, travel expenses of its employees, postage expenses, office supplies, etc. and for the payment of $9.664.96 to the General Revenue Fund of the State of Florida (GRF). This payment was made on June 25, 1979 to repay sums appropriated from the GRF to the Mobile Home Tenant-Landlord Commission for start up costs prior to the collection of registration fees. On October 18, 1977, the State Administration Commission granted a loan of $19,627 from the GRF to the Department of Business Regulation for the purpose of providing start up funds for the administration of the State Mobile Home Tenant-Landlord Act, Chapter 77-49, Laws of Florida. In making the loan the Administration Commission provided that it be repaid on or before June 30, 1978. No evidence has been presented on why the loan was not repaid at that time.

Recommendation In light of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of the City of Melbourne, Melbourne Regional Airport Authority for a refund from the State Treasury in the amount of $742.00 be denied. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of November, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: William C. Potter, Esquire NABORS POTTER McCLELLAND GRIFFITH & JONES, P.A. 1380 Sarno Road Post Office Box 977/EG Melbourne, Florida 32935 Michael Basile, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.65215.18215.26215.32
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FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. A AND M MANAGEMENT, INC., D/B/A SWISS VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK, 85-004221 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-004221 Latest Update: Jun. 06, 1986

Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates a mobile home park in Winter Haven, Florida, known as Swiss Village Mobile Home Park, in which lots are leased to mobile home owners on an annual lease. There are 383 lots in this park and this park has held a permit issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services since 1980 (Exhibit 1). Edward G. Ackerman and his wife entered into a lease with Respondent for the use of a mobile home lot for the period January 15, 1981 until December 31, 1981, at a monthly rental of $75.07 (Exhibit 2). That lease provides for year-to-year renewal with rent for future years based on the Cost of Living Index as determined by the U.S. Government at the nearest reporting period to the end of each calendar year (Exhibit 2). A Guaranteed Lifetime Rent Agreement (Exhibit 3) was executed by the lessor concurrently with the lease in Exhibit 2, which guarantees the rental on the lot leased to Ackerman shall not be increased more than the U. S. Cost of Living Index as long as Ackerman resides in a mobile home located on the leased lot. Using the annual change and CPI to recompute Ackerman's monthly rental has resulted in the rent increasing from $75.00 per month in 1981 to $89.50 per month in 1985 (Exhibit 4). Prior to the time of this hearing Ackerman had purchased a condominium to which he had moved and he was no longer a tenant at the Swiss Village Mobile Home Park. All leases negotiated in years subsequent to 1981, have a similar escalation clause in the rent with the additional proviso that the monthly rent would be increased each year a minimum of $5.00 per month, with the maximum increase not exceeding the CPI. Respondent has used the October All Items Consumer Priced Index For All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) in determining the annual rent increase since operations commenced. This report is received in November and by promptly advising tenants the amount their rent will change, because of changes in the CPI-U, each. tenant receives approximately 30-days notice prior to the January 1 effective date. If the terms of the lease agreement are literally complied with and the December CPI is used, Respondent would have to calculate the rent due January 1 on the CPI which it receives in January. By the time tenants are notified of the effects of the CPI on their rent for the coming calendar year, they would already have paid an inadequate sum for the January rental, and perhaps for the month of February also, and would be billed for the deficiency. There is an active Home Owners Association at Swiss Village Mobile Home Park. This association has not complained of the failure of Respondent to provide 90 days notice prior to the automatic rent change which comes every January, nor have they requested arbitration. In order to insure tenants receive 90 days notice of the rental change, due to changes in the CPI, Respondent would have to use the July Consumer Price Index, which it receives in August. Had Respondent used the July CPI report and given tenants 90 days notice of the annual rental increases since 1981, these increases would have exceeded the increase computed using the October CPI (Exhibit 6). Exhibit 6 indicates the actual adjustments of rentals since 1981, has been $5.00 per month or the CPI, whichever is less.

Florida Laws (2) 723.012723.037
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LEO AND SARAH BEAULIEU vs WAYNE JONES, MANAGER AND SUN KEY VILLAGE, 10-001696 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Mar. 30, 2010 Number: 10-001696 Latest Update: Dec. 01, 2011

The Issue Whether Respondents, Wayne Jones, manager (Mr. Jones), and Sun Key Village (Sun Key), are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to sections 57.105(5) and 120.595, Florida Statutes (2010),1/ and ,if entitled to an award, then the determination of a reasonable amount.

Findings Of Fact The Beaulieus are residents of Sun Key, a mobile home park located at 8607 26th Avenue, East, Palmetto, Florida. Mr. Jones is the manager of Sun Key. Sun Key is a mobile home park as defined by section 723.003(6), Florida Statutes. On March 25, 2010, the Beaulieus filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission stating: I still feel this is discrimination-- Mr. Jones states I am violating park rules by having a dog over 20 lbs this dog is a Visitor not a resident pet. It is my sons' dog--visits on occasion. There are many dogs over 20lbs & living in Sun Key. This is selective enforcement!!! Ms. Beaulieu attached to her Petition for Relief a lengthy hand-written document, alleging that other residents were violating Sun Key park rules concerning the size and number of permissible dogs. On March 30, 2010, the Commission forwarded the Beaulieus' petition to DOAH. An Initial Order was issued, requiring the parties to respond concerning, in part, the amount of time required for the hearing and the date and location for the hearing. On April 6, 2010, Carol S. Grondzik, Esquire (Ms. Grondzik), of Lutz, Bobo, Telfair, Eastman, Gabel & Lee, filed a response for Respondents. On April 8, 2010, the Beaulieus, acting as their own attorneys, filed a response. Based on the responses, the Administrative Law Judge set the case for final hearing on August 3, 2010. On April 12, 2010, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. In the Motion to Dismiss, Respondents argued that the Beaulieus "have not alleged they are members of a protected class under fair housing law." Further, the motion referenced Ms. Beaulieu's letter dated March 8, 2010, requesting an appeal of the Commission's no cause determination. Specifically, the Motion to Dismiss stated that the Beaulieus' complaint was for "selective enforcement" and not tied to retaliation based on the prior housing complaint filed by Ms. Beaulieu's sister. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss concluded that: [B]ecause Petitioners do not assert that they are members of a protected class under fair housing law, because they do not pursue a claim of retaliation against Respondents Wayne Jones and Sun Key, and because Bert Blanchard and the Sun Key Village Homeowners Association, Inc., are not providers of housing subject to fair housing laws, this Petition should be dismissed as a matter of law. On April 12, 2010, Ms. Grondzik served, by U.S. mail, a copy of the Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, pursuant to section 57.105, with a letter to the Beaulieus. Specifically, Ms. Grondzik's letter states: A Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is also enclosed for your review. I will hold this motion for at least 21 days before filing with the Division as required by Florida law. This allows you time to analyze the relevant facts and law, to seek advice as necessary, and to take action. On April 19, 2010, DOAH issued a Notice of Ex-parte Communication after it had received a copy of a letter that had been sent by Kenneth Wiggins (Mr. Wiggins), an attorney for the Beaulieus, to Ms. Grondzik. The terms of the letter sought to settle the dispute between the Beaulieus and Respondents. Mr. Wiggins, however, did not make an appearance for the Beaulieus before DOAH, and it was unclear who mailed the letter to DOAH. In any event, the Beaulieus continued to represent themselves in the proceedings before DOAH. On July 7, 2010, the Beaulieus filed a motion for continuance of the August 3, 2010, hearing date. The Administrative Law Judge denied the motion. On July 19, 2010, the Beaulieus filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of their petition. On July 21, 2010, Respondents filed the Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Notice of Filing Affidavit of Carol S. Grondzik. Ms. Grondzik's affidavit set out the hourly rate and the scope of work performed to date in the case. On July 29, 2010, Respondents filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent's [sic] Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. At the January 14, 2011, hearing, Ms. Beaulieu testified about instances where the mobile home park failed to enforce its rules and regulations concerning the pet size for residents. Further, she testified that she had brought the DOAH proceeding to address the unfair and selective enforcement of the mobile home park's rules. Sun Key Village Mobile Home Park, Park Rules and Regulations provides, in pertinent part, that: 9. Pets: A maximum of two small pets are permitted, which at maturity must not weigh greater than 20 pounds each. Pets must be confined to the interior of the home when the resident is not present and must be on a leash at all times when outside of tenant's home. They must be transported to areas outside of residence or common areas for exercise. The record shows that the Beaulieus were provided a copy of the rule when moving into Sun Key. Mr. Wayne Jones testified that there were instances when exceptions had been made for residents to have dogs larger than 20 pounds. For example, he identified that residents, who had large, elderly dogs when they moved into Sun Key, were allowed to keep their pets. Mr. Peterson, an attorney who has extensive experience in representing mobile home park owners, testified concerning the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and costs. Mr. Peterson testified that he considered the factors outlined in Florida's Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), and reviewed the legal file in this case. Based on his review, Mr. Peterson found that 57.2 hours were reasonable in defense of this case and that the blended hourly rate of $235.92 was reasonable. Therefore, Mr. Peterson testified the reasonable attorney's fees to be $13,494.40 and the amount of taxable costs to be $575.00. Mr. Peterson also testified that Respondents would be entitled to attorney's fees for having to litigate the issue of fee entitlement. Mr. Peterson testified that 14 hours would not be an unreasonable amount of time for preparing and attending a hearing concerning the entitlement to fees, for a total of $3,302.88 using the blended hourly rate of $235.92. Based on a review of the record and testimony offered at trial, 71.2 hours is a reasonable amount of time spent on the defense of the instant case and litigating the issue of entitlement to attorney's fees. A review of the record and testimony shows that $235.92 an hour is a reasonable prevailing blended hourly rate. The parties stipulated that the Beaulieus are not members of a protected class under the fair housing law.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.595120.6857.105723.003
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