Findings Of Fact The Petition filed herein, among other matters, alleges, in pertinent part, that: This is a petition for determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, pursuant to Section 120.54(4), Fla. Stat. (1987). The 1,000 members of the FMHA may be sub- jected to this rule and Gerry Barding as an individual are substantially affected in that the rule has the effect of allowing the DBR to schedule a mediation or arbitration if the request "does not substantially comply with Chapter 723, Fla. Stat., and these rules." Section 723.037 limits the substantial rights of a party who fails to mediate or arbitrate a dispute under Section 723.037 with the DBR . . . . * * * The substantial rights of the members of FMHA will be affected if the DBR is allowed to grant mediation or arbitration requests when the mobile home owners have not complied with the provisions of Section 723.037, Fla. Stat. (1987). The proposed rule of the DBR enlarges, modifies, or otherwise contravenes the statu- tory authority granted by Chapter 723, Fla. Stat. (1987), and is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. Petitioner, FMHA, is an incorporated association not for profit whose members include approximately 1,000 mobile home park owners. All of the mobile home park members of FMHA own mobile home parks which contain greater than 25 mobile home lots which are offered for lease. A substantial number of the members of the FMHA on a regular basis annually increase the lot rental amount in their mobile home parks. The residents of the FMHA members' mobile home parks are entitled to and may request mediation of lot rental amount increases pursuant to Sections and 723.038, F.S. (1987), and the rules of the Florida Department of Business Regulation. Requests for mediation have been made in the past by homeowners residing in FMHA members' mobile home parks and many of those mediation proceedings have not yet been completed. Petitioner, Gerry Barding, is the owner of Pinelake Village Mobile Home Park located in Jensen Beach, Florida. In the past, Mr. Barding has increased the lot rental amount in Pinelake Village Mobile Home Park and expects to do so in the future. In September 1987, a request for mediation from Pinelake Village residents was not filed within 30 days of the meeting between the park owner and the residents. The Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes reviewed the request for mediation and determined that it was willing to mediate the dispute. The Division requested that Mr. Barding advise it of his willingness or refusal to participate in the mediation. Mr. Barding declined to agree to mediation of the dispute, and the mediation file of the Division was closed. Sections 723.037(4), F.S. (1987), provides in pertinent part that: Within 30 days of the date of the scheduled meeting described in subsection (3), the home owners shall request that the dispute be submitted to mediation pursuant to Section if a majority of the affected home owners have designated, in writing, that: The rental increase is unreasonable; The rental increase has made the lot rental amount unreasonable; The decrease in services or utilities is not accompanied by a corresponding decrease in rent or is otherwise unreasonable; or The change in the rules and regulations is unreasonable. [Emphasis supplied]. The Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes does not interpret Section 723.037(4), F.S., as depriving it of authority to mediate when the request for mediation is filed more than 30 days after the referenced meeting. Section 723.037(6), F.S., provides that: No action relating to a dispute described in this section may be filed in any court unless and until a request has been submitted to the Division for mediation and arbitration and the request has been processed in accordance with Section 723.038. Section 723.037(7), F.S., provides that: If a party refuses to agree to mediate or arbitrate, or fails to request mediation, upon proper request, that party shall not be entitled to attorney's fees in any action relating to a dispute described in this section. Section 723.004(4), F.S., provides that: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent the enforcement of a right or duty under this section, Sections 723.022; 723.023; 723.031; 723.033; 723.035; 723.037; 723.038; 723.061; 723.0615; 723.062; 723.063; or 723.081 by civil action after the party has exhausted its administrative remedies, if any. Existing Rule 7D-32.005(3), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: The homeowners' committee shall request mediation, or the homeowners' committee and the park owner may jointly request arbitration, by mailing or delivering the following items to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, 725 South Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007: A completed Form DBR 405, which becomes effective on the same date as this rule and which may be obtained by writing to the Division at the above address, and A copy of the written designation required by Rule 7D-32.005(1), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 723.037(4), Florida Statutes; and A copy of the notice of lot rental increase, reduction in services or utilities, or change in rules and regulations which is being challenged as unreasonable; and A copy of the records which verify the selection of the homeowners' committee in accordance with Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. [Emphasis supplied] Proposed Rule 7D-32.005(4), F.A.C., which was published in Volume 14, No. 4, Florida Administrative Law Weekly (January 29, 1988), and which is here challenged, provides that: A request for mediation or arbitration shall be denied if the request does not substantially comply with Chapter 723, Fla. Stat., and these rules. The word "may," which is struck through, is to be deleted from the existing rule now in effect. The underlining indicates that the words "shall" and "substantially" are amendatory language to be added. Rule 7D-32.005(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides: If the homeowners' committee requests media- tion, a copy of the four items required by subsection (3) of this rule shall be furnished to the park owner by Certified U. S. Mail, Return Receipt Requested, at the time the request is filed with the Division. Failure to comply with this requirement may result in a delay in scheduling of a mediation meeting until the required items have been furnished to the park owner. [Emphasis supplied] Rule 7D-32.005(6), Florida Administrative Code, provides: Within 10 days from the date that the park owner or his agent receives copies of the documents required to be furnished to him pursuant to subsection (5) of this rule, the park owner shall advise the Division in writing of his willingness or refusal to participate in the requested mediation. If the park owner is of the opinion that the home owners or the homeowners' committee have failed to satisfy the statutory requirements set forth in Section 723.037, Florida Statutes, or the requirements of these rules he may indicate his willingness to participate in the mediation process without waiving his objections to the procedures used by the homeowners' committee. Rule 7D-32.005(7), Florida Administrative Code, provides: A decision by the Division to grant or deny a request for mediation does not constitute an adjudication of any issues arising under Section 723.037, Florida Statutes. Any dispute concerning the applicability of Section 723.037(6)-(7), Florida Statutes, must be submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction in the event that judicial proceedings are initiated. Rule 7D-32.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides: `Mediation' means a process whereby a mediator provided by the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes partici- pates in discussions with a homeowners' committee and a park owner concerning the reasonableness of an increase in lot rental amount, change in park rules and regulations, or a decrease in services or utilities. The purpose of the mediator's participation is to assist the parties in arriving at a mutually agreeable settlement of their differences.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice by the Respondent through the alleged failure of the Respondent to provide a reasonable accommodation for a disability.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the case, the Respondent operated an age-restricted mobile home park in Sarasota, Florida. With limited exceptions, residents of the mobile home park are 55 years of age and older. In September 2000, the Petitioner, a woman over 55 years of age, purchased a mobile home located within the Ridgewood Mobile Home Park. The mobile home was purchased through a real estate broker. The mobile home park apparently identifies itself through signage as a community for persons 55 years of age and older. Prior to the purchase the Petitioner had no communication with the Respondent and made no inquiry of the Respondent as to whether her son, who is under 55 years of age, would be allowed to live in the mobile home park. Within a few days of the purchase, the Petitioner was advised that residence in the mobile home park was limited, with certain exceptions, to persons 55 years of age and older. The Respondent advised the Petitioner that her son, who is under 55 years of age, could remain with her only for a period of up to two months to help her "settle in." By lease application dated October 1, 2000, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that her son would remain with her for a period of two months. In November 2000, after the two months had passed, the manager of the mobile home park (Mr. Cobb) informed the Respondent that her son would have to leave the residence. At that time, the Petitioner's son asserted that he was his mother's full-time, live-in caregiver. Prior to this point, the Petitioner had not indicated to the Respondent that she suffered from a handicap or required the services of a full-time, live-in caregiver The evidence fails to establish that, either at the time of the Petitioner's initial residence at the Respondent's mobile home park or by November 2000, the Petitioner suffered from a handicap or from any condition that substantially limited any major life activity, or that the Petitioner required the assistance of a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time the Petitioner moved into the Respondent's mobile home park, the Petitioner was able to accomplish all major life activities. Although diabetic, the Petitioner was able to walk, drive, and shop for food or other necessities. Her son assisted in house cleaning and in other routine activities, but there is no credible evidence that, prior to August 2002, such assistance was required for performing major life activities. In August 2002, shortly after a medical procedure on the Petitioner's carotid artery, the Petitioner suffered a stroke. She was hospitalized for a period of approximately ten days and then transferred into a rehabilitation hospital for a period of approximately six weeks. Letters submitted from medical professionals involved with the Petitioner's case at the time of her stroke suggest that assistance was needed during the period of incapacity related to the stroke. There is no credible evidence that, subsequent to rehabilitation, the Petitioner needed the services of a full- time, live-in caregiver. After rehabilitation, the Petitioner recovered from the stroke sufficiently to regain her ability to perform major life activities, including driving an automobile. A subsequent automobile accident wherein she ran down a stop sign in the mobile home park after going shopping suggests that driving at night may be inappropriate. Following post-stroke rehabilitation, the Petitioner's son continued to reside with his mother, to assist in household duties and in assuring that the Petitioner followed a medication regimen, but the evidence fails to establish that she currently requires a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time of the hearing, neither the Petitioner nor her son was residing in the Respondent's mobile home park. The evidence establishes that disabled or handicapped persons in the mobile home park who require full-time, live-in caregivers are accommodated without regard to the age of the caregiver or to the mobile home park's age-related restrictions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the complaint of Dona M. Burgess against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth M. Boyle, Esquire Gulfcoast Legal Services, Inc. 1750 17th Street, Building 1 Sarasota, Florida 34234 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kimberly P. Walker, Esquire Kevin Bruning, Esquire Williams, Parker, Harrison, Dietz & Getzen 200 South Orange Avenue Sarasota, Florida 34236-6802 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue As presented in the petition to determine the invalidity of a proposed rule filed on February 14, 1992, and as refined in the parties' joint stipulation filed at hearing on September 14, 1992, the issue presented for disposition is the validity of proposed amendments to rules 12D-6.001(3) and 12D-6.002(1)(d)1. and 2., F.A.C.
Findings Of Fact The following facts are based in their entirety on the parties' joint stipulation presented at hearing on September 14, 1992: This is a Section 120.54(4), F.S., rule challenge proceeding initiated by the Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., Petitioner, to challenge the validity of proposed amendments to Rules 12D-6.001(3) and 12D-6.002(1)(d)1. and 2., F.A.C., as proposed by the State of Florida Department of Revenue, Respondent. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this action. The Petitioner is the Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., "FMHA". The FMHA is a not-for-profit corporation organized to do business in the State of Florida. The FMHA is located at 115 North Calhoun Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. The agency affected by this proceeding is the Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue, whose address is Post Office Box 3000, Tallahassee, Florida 32315-3000. The proposed rules at issue in this proceeding are proposed Rule 12D- 6.001(3) and proposed rule 12D-6.002(1)(d)1. and 2., F.A.C., as published in Volume 18, Number 4 of the Florida Administrative Weekly, January 24, 1992. The challenged provisions of these rules provide as follows: 12D-6.001(3) - "Permanently affixed." A mobile home shall be considered "permanently affixed" if it is tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities, and if the owner of the mobile home is also the owner of the land to which it is affixed. 12D-6.002(1) This rule subsection shall apply if the owner of the mobile home is also the owner of the land on which the mobile home is permanently affixed and the mobile home has a current sticker affixed, regardless of the series. (d) This rule subsection shall apply to mobile home parks operating a sales office in which a mobile home is being offered for sale where the dealer/developer/owner owns the mobile home and the land to which it is permanently affixed as follows: The dealer/developer/owner must pay real property taxes even if the mobile home has been issued a dealer license plate. A mobile home discussed in this subsection shall not be considered tangible personal property or mobile home inventory. The proposed rules were promulgated by the Department of Revenue to give effect to the statutory change to Section 193.075, F.S., as set forth in Committee Substitute to Senate Bill 1578 which provides as follows: 193.075 Mobile Homes -- A mobile home shall be taxed as real property if the owner of the mobile home is also the owner of the land on which the mobile home is permanently affixed. A mobile home shall be considered permanently affixed if it is tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities. A mobile home that is taxed as real property shall be issued an "RP" series sticker as provided in Section 320.0815. A mobile home that is not taxed as real property shall have a current license plate properly affixed as provided in Section 320.08(11). Any such mobile home without a current license plate properly affixed shall be presumed to be tangible personal property. The Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., is a trade association representing the interests of approximately 1300 mobile home parks, dealerships, manufacturers and related mobile home service firms who conduct business in the State of Florida. One of the primary purposes of the FMHA is to act on behalf of its members before the various governmental entities of the state, including the Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue. The subject matter of the proposed rules at issue in this proceeding is within the general scope of interest and activity of the FMHA. The relief requested in this action is of the type appropriate for FMHA to obtain on behalf of its members. The proposed rules and economic impact statement were promulgated by the Department of Revenue in accordance with the requirements of Section 120.54, F.S. The FMHA member manufacturers, dealers and park owners who are substantially affected by the proposed rules at issue herein are engaged in the business of selling mobile homes and offer mobile homes for sale to the public. A number of these homes are tied down in accordance with all applicable local, state and federal requirements and connected to the normal and usual utilities so that they can be displayed as fully functioning "model" homes prior to the time they are sold. The FMHA member manufacturers, dealers and park owners who display fully functional mobile homes for sale to the public maintain they have no intention of permanently affixing the homes to their real property. The homes are maintained in this manner for the purposes of safety and display only, with the full intention that they be removed from the realty subsequent to the sale. A substantial number of the members of the FMHA will be substantially affected by the proposed rules, because their business activities are subject to the rule provisions challenged herein and because it is FMHA's position that the proposed rules will directly impact the continued ability of FMHA member manufacturers, dealers and park owners to display fully functioning model homes held for sale to the public on their real property without being subject to ad valorem tax liability. FMHA members who own and operate mobile home parks, mobile home dealerships and mobile home manufacturing enterprises are subject to the rulemaking authority of the Respondent, Department of Revenue. A substantial number of FMHA members are engaged in the process of manufacturing mobile homes. Mobile home manufacturers commonly display one or more completed mobile home units which are tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities at model home centers located on their manufacturing premises. The homes are held for sale to mobile home dealers or to the general public. The homes are tied down and connected to utilities for purposes of safety and display. The attachment of the homes to the property is not intended by the manufacturer to be permanent. When the homes are sold, they are disconnected from the utilities, removed from the tie-downs, and transported off the manufacturer's property. The removal process does not cause damage to the home or the real property. A substantial number of FMHA members operate retail sales lots, where new and used mobile homes are held for sale and displayed for sale to the public. These homes are owned by the retail dealers. Mobile home dealers typically display one or more mobile homes which are tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities located on the dealer's sales lots. The homes are held for sale to mobile home park owners or the general public. The homes are tied down and connected to utilities for purposes of safety and display. The attachment of the homes to the property is not intended by the dealer to be permanent. When the homes are sold, they are disconnected from the utilities, removed from the tie-downs, and transported off the dealer's property. The removal process does not cause damage to the home or the real property. A substantial number of FMHA members own and operate rental mobile home parks. In rental mobile home parks, a tenant places his own mobile home upon land owned by the park owner commonly referred to as a park "developer", and leases the land. A substantial number of FMHA members who own mobile home parks also hold dealer licenses, and operate a mobile home sales business within the park. Mobile home park owners or developers typically display one or more model homes which are tied down and connected to the normal and usual utilities. The homes are held for sale to the public. When the units are sold to a purchaser, they are disconnected from the utilities, removed from the tie-downs, and transported from the model home area to a designated lot within the mobile home park. This process does not result in damage to the mobile home or the real property. At the time of sale, the purchaser of the mobile home enters into a land lease with the mobile home park owner. At his option, the purchaser may choose to terminate the lease and remove the mobile home from the mobile home park. In some instances, FMHA members, who own mobile home parks and operate a sales business within the park, lease both land and mobile homes to tenants as part of a lease option agreement, where the park owner retains ownership of the home and land until the home purchase option is exercised. If the tenant fails to exercise the option or defaults under the agreement, the park owner may sell the home to another purchaser. That purchaser may either remove the mobile home from the lot, or enter into a new land lease with the park owner. Under proposed Rules 12D-6.002(1)(d)1. and 2., mobile homes owned by FMHA member manufacturers, dealers and park owners determined to be permanently affixed to real property, as defined by Section 193.075, F.S., and owned by the manufacturers, dealers and park owners will be declared real property, and taxed accordingly. Under the proposed rules the assessment date is January 1 of any given year, and a mobile home permanently affixed to real property owned by FMHA member manufacturers, dealers, or mobile home park owners on January 1 will be taxed as real property. The FMHA member manufacturers, dealers and park owners determined to own mobile homes permanently affixed to their realty will have their real property tax increased by the assessed valuation of the mobile homes, without regard to their intended use or disposition of the homes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Donna M. Clark, is a licensed real estate salesman, holding license number SL 0164246. In 1972, the Respondent acquired title to a mobile home and lot in Casselberry, Florida, as trustee for her two minor sons, by warranty deed. She did not receive a bill of sale or a certificate of title to the mobile home separately, but took title to both the lot and the mobile home via the deed. At no time thereafter, to the time of the transaction which is the subject of this proceeding, did the Respondent ever acquire either a bill of sale or certificate of title to the mobile home. The mobile home was attached to the real property when the Respondent took title. On May 10, 1979, while continuing to act as trustee for her children, the Respondent agreed to sell this lot in Casselberry, with the mobile home still attached to it, for $12,500. The mobile home was described as a 1964 Liberty mobile home with central heat and air conditioning, and the total price included a range, refrigerator, and furnishings. The contract between the Respondent and the purchaser required that the title to the lot, the mobile home, and the furnishings be transferred by warranty deed. The Respondent represented that the entire property was free and clear of all encumbrances. Title was to be transferred subject to a purchase money mortgage to the Respondent in the amount of $10,000. The transaction closed in July of 1979. Subsequently, the purchaser of the lot and mobile home sought to take out a second mortgage thereon, and acquired information leading him to believe that there was an unsatisfied lien still encumbering the property. Nevertheless, the second mortgage was placed by the lender. The Complaint alleges that this lien is in the amount of $4,000 and is payable to the Florida Hospital Credit Union. However, the only lien held by the Florida Hospital Credit Union that encumbered the subject property was satisfied on March 17, 1975. Another encumbrance that existed at the time the Respondent contracted to sell the mobile home and lot was a mortgage which had been taken out in 1972, but a satisfaction of this mortgage was recorded in July of 1979. The evidence presented supports a finding that the subject property was transferred to the purchaser free and clear of all encumbrances. The Complaint further alleges that the Respondent failed to deliver a motor vehicle title certificate to the purchaser, notwithstanding that the purchaser made a demand for delivery of same. The purchaser remembers asking the Respondent for a bill of sale to the mobile home prior to the execution of the contract to purchase, but he did not ask for a title certificate. The parties signed the contract which did not provide for delivery of a title certificate, but required that the property be conveyed by warranty deed. Nothing was said at the closing about a certificate of title to the mobile home. Moreover, the mobile home sits on blocks on the lot. According to the title search made by the title company at the time the subject property closed, the mobile home was listed as realty on the tax records of Seminole County, so that the lot and the mobile home were taxed together. The land valuation for tax purposes was $3,690 and the mobile home was valued at $1,480. One tax bill was submitted for both, with these valuations shown thereon. At the closing, the title company treated the mobile home as realty, and did not collect Florida sales tax as would be required if the mobile home were personal property. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the mobile home which is the subject of this proceeding was not personalty requiring a title certificate, but was realty and taxed as such by Seminole County. The Respondent is also charged with threatening to institute foreclosure proceedings against the purchaser when the insurance policy on the mobile home was allowed to lapse, leaving the mobile home uninsured. The purchase money mortgage executed by the purchaser at the time the sale of this property closed required that insurance be maintained on the mobile home for its full insurable value. This mortgage and the promissory note attached thereto also provided for acceleration of all amounts due upon default in the payment of any money payable under the terms of the mortgage. When the purchaser let the insurance on the mobile home lapse, the Respondent placed the matter in the hands of her attorney, who wrote the purchaser that he was in default under the mortgage. The purchaser was advised that the acceleration clause was being invoked, and demanded full payment of the indebtedness, failing which foreclosure proceedings would be commenced. The evidence does not support a finding that any other threat was made by the Respondent, and the letter to the purchaser from the Respondent's attorney does no more than advise that the Respondent would exercise her right to recover monies due her under the mortgage.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against Donna M. Clark be dismissed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 18th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Doherty, Esquire 3220 Chelsea Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Kenneth D. Morse, Esquire Post Office Box 431 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issues in this case concern the attempt by Petitioner to collect $11,684.62 in attorneys fees and costs associated with the defense of the case of State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Petitioner, vs. Donald L. Hilgeman and Marilyn Hilgeman, d/b/a DLH Enterprises; and Pat Montgomery, as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort, Respondents, DOAH Case No. 89-4100, and $931.50 in attorneys fees and costs attributable to the pursuit of the present case to collect those attorneys fees and costs attributable to the defense of the administrative prosecution. See Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this inquiry Petitioner was a mobile home park owner as defined by Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes (1987). Petitioner, Marilyn Hilgeman, his former wife, and Pat Montgomery had administrative charges brought against them through a notice to show cause. In that notice to show cause those three individuals were identified as park owners of Lake Waldena Resort in Silver Springs, Florida. In particular the present Respondent charged the Petitioner and the others with violating Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) for having refused to meet with a designated mobile home owners committee within 30 days of giving notice of a lot rent increase and having been requested to conduct that meeting for purpose of discussing the reasons for the increase in the lot rental amount. The accused sought a formal hearing as envisioned by Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. That hearing was conducted by the undersigned and a recommended order entered on April 18, 1990, in the aforementioned DOAH Case No. 89-4100. For reasons set out in the conclusions of law found within the recommended order, the suggested disposition of that case was one which found the several Petitioners innocent of any wrong doing and called for the dismissal of the administrative prosecution. On July 25, 1990 the prosecuting agency entered its final order in DOAH Case No. 89-4100. It accepted the fact-finding in the recommended order; however, it modified the conclusions of law and recommended disposition. Unlike the recommended order, the final order in its conclusions of law specifically found that the present Petitioner and the others accused had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes, wherein at page 17 it was held "Therefore, it is concluded Respondent violated Sections 723.037(3), Florida Statutes." The conclusions of law in the final order went on to say that in mitigation of the violation the prosecuting agency had considered the apparent confusion of those Respondents regarding the affect of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, as it might influence the actions of the accused and in particular, the present Petitioner. In the final order concerning the mitigating affects of Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, it was decided that notwithstanding any misunderstanding the accused had as to the significance of the Rule it could not alter the statutory requirements of having a meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase as described in Section 723.037(3), Florida Administrative Code (1987). The language within Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code, stated: If requested to do so by the park owner or subdivision developer, the committee shall certify that it has been selected as described in Rule 7D-32.003, Florida Admin- istrative Code. This certification shall include a certificate of all members of the committee attesting to its proper formation under the statute and these rules. For reasons expressed in the recommended order that rule was seen as tolling the 30-day requirement for meeting expressed in Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) on the facts found in both the recommended and final orders. This was based upon a recognition that the present Petitioner had employed the rule in an attempt to gain a certification from the committee of mobile home owners prior to the conduct of a meeting to discuss the increase in lot rentals. Again, this belief that the rule tolled the requirement for conducting the meeting within 30 days of the notice of lot rental increase expressed in the recommended order was rejected in the final order. The final order controls absent further relief by resort to the appellate court process. In describing the reasons why the prosecution maintained that the rule could not alter the statutory requirement for holding a meeting within 30 days, the final order states that there are policy considerations that make it important for the committee and the park owner to meet within 30 days and those reasons concern the fact that the rent increase becomes effective within 90 days over the notice, the informational value of having the reasons explained for the lot increase as a prelude to any request to having a dispute about lot rental increases submitted to mediation within 30 days following the scheduled meeting. The final order goes on to describe, through its conclusions of law, that the meeting to discuss lot rental increase was not held until November 14, 1989 over a year after the notice of lot rental increase. That statement comes immediately before the conclusion of law that the present Petitioner had violated Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes. In the conclusions of law set out in the final order the prosecuting agency in its paragraph describing the mitigating circumstances acknowledges the possible confusion on the part of the accused as well as the mobile home owners committee when it describes, as did the recommended order, the filing of a complaint by the committee as a means of ostensibly preserving the right to have the meeting envisioned by Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), when taken against the background of the opportunity to have a credential check of mobile home owners committee members as envisioned by Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code. This refers to the issue of whether a meeting could be held after 30 days from the notice of intended lot rental increase absent such a complaint. In the statement on mitigation the final order recognizes that the administrative prosecution was penal in nature and that Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987) and Rule 7D-32.004(2), Florida Administrative Code needed to be read in context and should be strictly construed with ambiguities favoring the accused. The final order cites to State v. Pattishall, 99 Fla. 296, 126 So. 147 (1930) and Davis v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 457 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 1DCA 1984). The treatment of those cases and the resolution of the dispute through final order is one which finds the accused in violation of Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987), but mitigates the disposition in the way of the penalty based upon the reading given Pattishall and Davis, supra. That factual impression is given when the order in disposition is examined wherein it is stated through the final order, "Based upon the consideration of the facts found, the conclusions of law reached, and the mitigation evidence, it is ordered that the notice to show cause is hereby dismissed." On August 22, 1990, the present Petitioner noticed an appeal of the final order in the administrative prosecution but later abandoned that appeal before the court had the opportunity to speak to its merits. On October 22, 1990, the present Petitioner filed a petition for collection of attorneys fees and costs spoken to in the statement of issues. The petition for attorneys fees and costs were subjected to a motion to dismiss based upon a claim of untimeliness and that motion was denied by order of December 10, 1990. The present Respondent requested an evidentiary hearing as contemplated Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, and the evidentiary hearing was conducted on the date described before. When the present Petitioner abandoned his appeal to the District Court, he necessarily was placed in the position of arguing that the final order drawn by the prosecuting agency constituted the basis for the claim that he was a small business party who had prevailed in the dispute related to DOAH Case No. 89-4100. See Section 57.111(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes. Contrary to his assertion the final order as described in these facts did not favor the present Petitioner. Although the prosecuting agency did not choose to impose a penalty against the present Petitioner based upon its assessment of matters in mitigation and dismissed the case without exacting a penalty, it had found the present Petitioner in violation of a substantiative provision of law, i.e. Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1987). Thus, the disposition cannot be said to favor the present Petitioner. Having decided this mixed question of fact and law against the present Petitioner, it is not necessary to make findings of fact concerning whether the present Petitioner is a small business party as defined at Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes and whether the present Respondent was substantially justified in this administrative prosecution related to law and fact as contemplated by Sections 57.111(3)(e) and (4)(a), Florida Statutes, or to examine whether special circumstances exist that would make the award of attorneys fees and costs unjust.
The Issue Did Respondent violate Section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to give timely written notice of rent increase on mobile home lots, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent owned the Arcadia Peace River Campground (Campground) located in DeSoto County, Florida, whose mailing address is 2988 Northwest Highway 70, Arcadia, Florida 34266. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, the Campground had 14 or more of its mobile home lots occupied by mobile homes. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, seven or more of the mobile homes located in the Campground were owned by residents of the Campground other than Respondent. Furthermore, these mobile homes were placed on lots leased by the mobile home residents from the Campground. From October 3, 1996 through March 21, 1998, four or more of the mobile homes located in the Campground were owned by Respondent's employees and placed on lots in the Campground. The rental for these lots was considered as part of the employees' compensation. On January 1, 1997, Respondent implemented and began collecting a $30.00 increase in the monthly lot rental from those mobile home owners leasing spaces in the Campground. Respondent gave the affected mobile home owners written notice of the January 1, 1997, monthly lot rental increase on November 26, 1996, some 36 days prior to the effective date (January 1, 1997) of the increase. No other notice of the lot rental increase was given to the affected mobile home owners. Respondent collected the $30.00 lot rental increase from the affected mobile home owners during the period from January 1, 1997, through March 21, 1998. On January 1, 1998, Respondent implemented and began collecting a $15.00 increase in the monthly lot rental from those mobile home owners leasing spaces in the Campground. Respondent gave the affected mobile home owners written notice of the January 1, 1998, monthly lot rental increase on October 28, 1997, some 65 days prior to the effective date of the increase. Respondent collected the $15.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1998, through March 21, 1998. Each of the following affected mobile home owners paid both the $30.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1997, through March 21, 1998 and the $15.00 monthly lot rental increase from January 1, 1998, through March 21, 1998: Charles Collins; Arthur P. McRae; Harold Martin; Maurice W. Jackson; Robert F. Martin; Irene K. Apps and; Reba Conner. On March 21, 1998, the Peace River flooded the Campground. The mobile homes located in the Campground were damaged. Subsequently, the mobile homes were removed from the Campground, purchased by Respondent, or were purchased by one or more new employees of Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and having specifically reviewed the factors set out in Section 723.006(5)(c), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order assessing Respondent with an administrative fine of $500.00. It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to refund to Charles Collins, Arthur P. McRae, Harold Martin, Maurice W. Jackson, Robert F. Martin, Irene K. Apps, and Reba Conner all sums collected from these individuals as increases in lot rental during the period of January 1, 1997 through March 21, 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Eric H. Miller, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 George Lempenau, Qualified Representative 2998 Northwest Highway 70 Arcadia, Florida 34266
The Issue Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD) properly denied the application for licensure renewal sought for the group home facility license held by Tracy Court Group Home, owned and operated by V-Agape, LLC.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the licensing and operation of foster care facilities, group home facilities, and residential habitation centers pursuant to section 20.197 and chapter 393, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this complaint, Respondent held foster or group home facility licenses issued by APD. The current group home license issued for V-Agape, LLC, located at 19103 Tracy Court, Lutz, Florida 33548, is owned by Tonya Nelson, the sole managing member. Respondent has contracted with APD to provide the residents with Medicaid waiver developmental disability residential habitation services. HCSO conducts investigations of reports of abuse, neglect, abandonment, and threats of harm to children on behalf of DCF. Investigations of abuse, neglect, abandonment, and threats of harm are initiated by reported incidents through the Florida Abuse Hotline. Karen Gonzalez is the supervisor of the Specialized Investigating Unit. She supervises the CPIs who perform the abuse hotline investigations. Ms. Gonzalez supervised Robert Hoon and Jennifer Campbell, both CPIs. A report was made to the Florida Abuse Hotline on January 24, 2014, that a minor female resident of Respondent’s Tracy Court Group Home sustained bruising and a red mark on the back of her hand from being struck on her hands by Tonya Nelson. The resident is non-verbal and intellectually disabled. The subsequent investigation by CPI Hoon, on behalf of DCF, was ultimately closed with verified indicators for physical injury upon the minor resident living in the Tracy Court Group Home, but did not identify the caregiver responsible. CPI Hoon reviewed and discussed the investigation with Supervisor Gonzalez before he prepared the Investigative Summary (IS). When conducting investigations, the CPI reviews the prior history of incidents reported on a group home and its owner/operator. In subsection “D. Prior Reports and Service Records Implications for Child Safety,” CPI Hoon reported that: There are prior reports on the facility that include concerns for physical discipline in the foster home and to her o[w]n children. There is a verified report in 2012 for physical injury and the aps [adult perpetrators] where [sic] Tonya Nelson and the aunt as it is unknown who caused the injuries. Ms. Gonzalez testified that prior reports are reviewed in conducting their investigations to determine whether a pattern of concern for the health and safety of the children placed in that home and for the caretakers caring for the children in the home exists. The CPIs utilize DCF Operating Procedure (CFOP) 175-28, Child Maltreatment Index, as a guideline in conducting their investigations. A “verified finding” is made when a preponderance of the credible evidence results in a determination that the specific harm or threat of harm was the result of abuse, abandonment, or neglect. CPI Campbell explained the application of CFOP during an investigation: [I]t . . . breaks down the different maltreatments that are investigated under the umbrella of abuse, neglect, and abandonment, and it provides a guideline for the definitions of what the different maltreatments are, and the different types of supporting evidence and documents that may be needed when supporting a maltreatment when the investigator comes up with the findings. It’s basically a guideline for investigations, because when a report comes in it may not be just one maltreatment, there may be a number of different maltreatments; or an investigator may identify a maltreatment during the course of an investigation, and so this provides a guideline for the investigator. On May 20, 2014, a report was made to the Florida Abuse Hotline about a minor resident of Respondent’s Tracy Court Group Home. An investigation was commenced concerning unexplained bruises observed on the resident, a vulnerable minor. CPI Campbell completed the investigation and prepared the IS. She discussed the verified findings with Supervisor Gonzalez. CPI Campbell is an experienced investigator, having had 11 years of service with HCSO following five years’ experience as a CPI in Michigan. The report of May 20, 2014, was a “Supplemental” report since, according to Supervisor Gonzalez, it came in right after the initial risk sequence. Rather than creating an entire new report, this one became supplemental to the prior one. The IS stated that the resident had a large bruise on her left thigh and bruises on her left arm and the back of her leg. Ms. Nelson was not able to explain how the minor resident sustained the bruises on her leg and arm. CPI Campbell became involved with Ms. Nelson and the investigation of the group home when Supervisor Gonzalez gave her the task of completing the investigation initiated by CPI Krisita Edwards. At the time CPI Campbell took over the investigation, CPI Edwards had been assigned to other duties. CPI Campbell explained that it was not unusual for a second investigator to complete work begun by another since all their notes are kept on a central database known as the Florida Safe Families Network (FSFN), where all contacts are noted, as well as the investigative summary. CPIs Edwards and Campbell collaborated on the investigation in this case. CPI Edwards entered her initial findings in the FSFN, which was picked up and continued by CPI Campbell when she took over the case. The two CPIs have collaborated on other cases in a similar fashion. The initial documentation by CPI Edwards was performed within 48 hours of the call coming into the abuse hotline as required. CPI Campbell’s completion of the report and investigation occurred after she had spoken with CPI Edwards and discussed the matter with Supervisor Gonzalez. The result of the investigation concerning the bruises on the minor resident was that the bruises were “indeterminate for physical abuse” and “indeterminate for supervisory neglect” due to the fact that a specific cause of the injuries could not be determined. Further, since the minor resident had been removed to another group home, the report concluded that there existed no continuing threat to the resident’s well-being. Even though the resident had been removed from the Tracy Court Group Home and, therefore, was not in any danger of being further harmed, CPI Campbell continued to have serious concerns about the care of residents in the group home. She believed that several allegations of the same type of harm were being made in the group home and that they could not ask the resident how she received her injuries since she was non-verbal. Myra Leitold, an APD residential licensing supervisor, had monitored the Tracy Court Group Home for the previous nine and one-half years. On December 28, 2012, she observed that a door lock to the office and bedroom was keyed so that it could be readily opened from the inside which, she believed, created a safety hazard. Between December 2012 and August 2014, the group home was cited for ten violations of Medication Administration Procedures. On one of her visits, in December 2012, Ms. Leitold noted that no current prescription was present for one of the residents, and that the label on the prescription bottle did not match the prescription drugs inside the bottle. Additionally, she found that the accounting for one of the resident’s finances was not current and that the temperature inside the group home was a chilly 65 degrees Fahrenheit. Mitchell Turner, human services program specialist for APD, recorded numerous medication administration violations at the group home. He noted on May 30, 2013, that the medication prescriptions and instructions for the Medical Administration Record (MAR) did not match. On June 18, 2013, he discovered that the wrong dosage of prescription was being given to a resident, and Ms. Nelson admitted this mistake. Mr. Turner grew so concerned about the prescription irregularities that he requested Pamela Lassiter, a medical case management registered nurse, to review the group home. Nurse Lassiter was sent to the home where she discovered and cited the home for three additional prescription violations. Even following Nurse Lassiter’s visit, on another trip to the group home on April 9, 2014, Mr. Turner cited an additional MAR violation. He believed these violations posed a health and safety risk to the residents affected and exhibited a pattern of neglect by Respondent to the health and safety of vulnerable children. During the period when prescription and other violations were noted, on January 11, 2013, Ms. Nelson exceeded the maximum licensed capacity of three in the group home when she accepted a fourth resident. She did not have prior written approval from APD to exceed her licensed capacity of residents. On September 25, 2013, Mr. Turner issued a Notice of Non-Compliance (NNC) because Ms. Nelson again exceeded the licensed capacity for the number of residents in the group home without prior written approval from APD. Mr. Turner expressed his concerns over the repeated violations by Respondent. Ms. Nelson testified that she had received verbal approval for the placements in excess of the home’s licensed capacity from Meisha Stewart, residential placement coordinator for APD, and that on a prior occasion in 2012, she had accepted a resident after receiving verbal approval. This testimony was rebutted by both Geraldine Williams, the former regional operations manager for APD’s Suncoast Region, and Ms. Leitold, who testified she had never known APD to give verbal approval for a placement of a resident in a group home. With the high volume of referrals APD makes to group homes, they cannot operate in a system where verbal placements occur. All placements must be made in writing. When a provider receives a NNC, the provider is required to submit and successfully complete a Corrective Action Plan (CAP). Mr. Turner testified that Ms. Nelson did not submit or successfully complete a CAP for the MAR violations. On January 17, 2013, Ms. Leitold visited the group home and observed the following violations: volatile materials were not stored in approved metal containers and three prescriptions for a resident’s medications were not present. The gasoline, charcoal, and lighter fluid found by Ms. Leitold were required to be stored in approved metal containers. Keeping these materials in the open posed a safety hazard for the minor residents by giving them access to volatile materials. On November 4, 2014, Ms. Nelson sent an email to Meisha Stewart advising her she intended to accept a non-APD client for placement in the Tracy Court Group Home without APD’s prior approval. Ms. Nelson testified that since that same resident had been placed in the Tracy Court Group Home for a six-month period in 2013, she believed she did not need a new approval in 2014.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying V-Agape, LLC, d/b/a Tracy Court Group Home’s application for license renewal. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of November, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Lindsey Ann West, Esquire The Plante Law Group, PLC 806 North Armenia Avenue Tampa, Florida 33609 (eServed) Gerald D. Siebens, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 1313 North Tampa Street, Suite 515 Tampa, Florida 33602-3328 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Executive Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David De La Paz, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the violations as alleged and, if so, what civil penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, T. Cayton Enterprises, Inc. is the owner and operator of Four Oaks Mobile Home Village, a mobile home park located in Titusville, Brevard County, Florida. On or around June 27, 1986, Thomas Cayton, as President of T. Cayton Enterprises, Inc. filed a prospectus for the park with Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes. The filing statement provided that 49 lots would be offered for rent, and that none of the lots were occupied. The $10.00 per lot filing fee ($490.00) was paid. The filing was rejected as the form was deficient. Between the end of June 1986, and August 26, 1987, the date of the approval letter, eight versions of the prospectus were filed by the park owner and were reviewed by staff of the division. After each review, the owner was sent a letter outlining the deficiencies. At one point, sometime around June 1987, Mr. and Mrs. Cayton travelled to Tallahassee to meet with Selena Einwechter, the Supervisor of the Examination Section in the agency's Bureau of Mobile Homes. The prospectus submittals and correspondence to and from the Bureau comprise 425 pages. Between the filing of the first version of the prospectus and the final approval, approximately 14 months later, twelve lots were rented at Four Oaks Mobile Home Village. The lot numbers and dates of the rentals are: Lot #3 August 1, 1986 Lot #2 August 2, 1986 Lot #44 August 15, 1986 Lot #46 August 30, 1986 Lot #12 November 1, 1986 Lot #4 November 30, 1986 Lot #19 January 15, 1987 Lot #7 March 9, 1987 Lot #6 June 1, 1987 Lot #15 June 1, 1987 Lot #5 June 6, 1987 Lot #9 June 30, 1987 Six of the recitals are evidenced by written leases; the remainder were oral agreements, reflected in the office records of the park. All of the tenants commenced paying rent upon occupancy of the lot and no one was told that the leases were unenforceable. At the beginning of the process, on July 29, 1986, Thomas Cayton was sent a letter from the Bureau of Mobile Homes confirming that his prospectus filing had been received and was being examined. The bottom of the letter includes this statement, clearly displayed: NOTE: Section 723.011, Florida Statutes, and Rule 7D-31.01, Florida Administrative Code, requires the delivery of a prospectus which has been deemed adequate by the Division prior to entering into enforceable rental agreements or renewal of existing rental agreements. Renewals of existing rental agreements or entering into new rental agreements without delivery of a prospectus which has been deemed adequate will constitute a violation of the Florida Mobile Home Act. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1, composite) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Subsection 723.005(d)1., F.S. authorizes the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes to impose a civil penalty not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) against a mobile home park owner for each separate violation of Chapter 723, F.S. or regulation promulgated pursuant thereto. The statute and rule allegedly violated by Respondent provides as follows: 723.011 Disclosure prior to rental of a mobile home lot; prospectus, filing, approval.-- (1)(a) In a mobile home park containing 26 or more lots, the park owner shall file a prospectus with the diversion. Prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement for a mobile home lot, the park owner shall deliver to the home owner a prospectus approved by the division. This subsection shall not be construed to invalidate those lot rental agreements for which an approved prospectus was required to be delivered and which was delivered on or before July 1, 1986, if the mobile home park owner had: Filed a prospectus with the division prior to entering into the lot rental agreement; Made a good faith effort to correct deficiencies cited by the division by responding within the time limit set by the division, if one was set; and Delivered the approved prospectus to the mobile home owner within 45 days of approval by the division. This paragraph shall not preclude the finding that a lot rental agreement is invalid on other grounds and shall not be construed to limit any rights of a mobile home-owner from seeking any remedies allowed by this chapter, including a determination that the lot rental agreement or any part thereof is unreasonable or unconscionable. (emphasis added) * * * 7D-31.001 Prospectus and Rental Agreement. * * * (13) The park owner shall deliver the prospectus to existing tenants prior to the renewal of their rental agreements or prior to entering into a new rental agreement. Once a tenant has been given a prospectus, the park owner shall not be required to provide another prospectus but shall provide amendments, as described in Rule 7D-30.004 and this rule. Because Four Oaks' prospectus was not approved until the end of August 1987, the 12 rental agreements entered between August 1, 1986 and June 30, 1987, violated the above provisions. Respondent claims that he thought that as long as the prospectus had been filed, he could enter into rental agreements. This would have been true under the original version of the Florida Mobile Home Act, passed by the Legislature in 1984. The relevant provision of that act is found in Section 720.302(1), F.S. (1984) as follows: Every mobile home park owner of a park which contains 26 or more lots shall file a prospectus or offering circular with the division prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement. Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida, Part III) This section took effect on January 1, 1985, for parks with more than 100 lots, and on July 1, 1985 for parks with less than 100 lots. (Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida) The current version, reflected in Section 723.011, F.S., cited above, took effect on July 1, 1986. (Chapter 86-162, Laws of Florida) Respondent cannot avail himself of the "grand-father" provision of Section 723.011, since his rental agreements and prospectus approval occurred after July 1st. Further, the explicit language of the note on the July 29, 1986, letter should have put him on notice of the new requirements of the law. There are no guidelines for the imposition of a penalty, other than the $5,000.00 maximum per violation found in Section 723.006(5)(d)1. F.S. No evidence was presented as to prior violations by this Respondent. The extensive file evidences a good faith attempt to comply with a law that was still relatively new.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of violation of Section 723.011(1)(a), F.S. (1986), as charged, and that a civil penalty of $100.00 per violation be imposed, for a total of $1,200.00. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Coates, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Thomas Cayton, Registered Agent 2475 Cheney Highway Titusville, Florida 3270 Debra Roberts, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Van B. Poole, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
The Issue Whether the discriminatory housing practices alleged in Petitioner's amended housing discrimination complaint were committed by Respondents and, if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) provide Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a woman of Native American heritage. The record evidence, however, does not reveal that, at any time material to the instant case, anyone outside of her family, including Respondents, was aware of Petitioner's Native American background; nor does the record evidence establish that Petitioner was ever subjected to derogatory remarks about being of Native American descent. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner has suffered from health problems that have substantially limited her ability to walk and have required her to use a motorized wheelchair to ambulate. Petitioner is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a resident of Kings Manor Estates (Park), a residential community of single-family mobile homes that is located in Davie, Florida. The Park is one of various mobile home communities that Respondent Uniprop Corporation (Uniprop) owns and operates. Like the other residents of the Park, Petitioner owns the mobile home in which she resides and pays rent to Uniprop for the use of the lot on which home is situated. Petitioner's home occupies lot 78 in the Park. As a resident of the Park, Petitioner has use of the Park's common areas and facilities, which include a swimming pool. There has been no showing that Petitioner has been denied access to any of these common areas or facilities due to her handicap. Residents of the Park must comply with the Park's rules and regulations. These rules and regulations reasonably require, among other things, that residents obtain, in addition to any permits they may need from the Town of Davie, the approval of Uniprop (referred to as "design approval") before constructing any improvements on their lots, including wheelchair ramps. To obtain such "design approval," a resident must submit to Park management a completed "design approval" application form and any supporting documentation. The application form provides a space for the resident to provide a "[d]escription, [d]rawing [l]ocation & [s]ize of [the proposed] [a]ddition." Immediately underneath this space on the form is the following pre-printed language: It is the Resident's responsibility to obtain all governmental approvals, to make certain the proposed improvement is suitable for the purpose intended and that the improvement complies with all applicable codes, standards and governmental requirements. Approval by Management of any improvement is limited to considerations of appearance. Resident agrees to have their home improvements built to the specifications listed above and illustrated in the space above and/or attached drawings, exhibits and permits. It is the responsibility of the Park's property manager, with the help of the Park's assistant property manager, to enforce the Park's rules and regulations. The duties of the Park's property manager and assistant property manager (whose work stations are located in the Park's business office) also include collecting rent from the Park's residents and taking appropriate action when residents are delinquent in their rental payments. There is a "drop off box" located outside the Park's business office in which residents can place their rental payments when the office is closed and the Park's property manager and assistant property manager are unavailable. Neither the property manager nor the assistant property manager is authorized to give residents "design approval." Only the Uniprop regional supervisor has such authority. The property manager and assistant property manager merely serve as "conduits" between the resident and the Uniprop regional supervisor in the "design approval" process. They take the completed "design approval" application form from the resident, provide it to the Uniprop regional supervisor, and, after hearing back from the regional supervisor, communicate the regional supervisor's decision to the resident. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent Delores Maddox was the Park's property manager. Ms. Maddox no longer works for Uniprop. Hazel Crain is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, the Park's assistant property manager. At all times material to the instant case, Milton Rhines was the Uniprop regional supervisor having authority over the activities at the Park. Mr. Rhines was based in Ft. Myers, Florida, on the other side of the state from the Park. Josephine Patricia Silver is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, employed as a sales consultant for Uniprop. In this capacity, she engages in activities designed to facilitate the sale of mobile homes manufactured by Uniprop (to be placed in the Park and other mobile home communities Uniprop owns and operates). Although her office is located in the Park, she plays no decision-making role in Park management. Notwithstanding that it is not her job responsibility to accept rental payments, she sometimes will do so as a courtesy to Park residents when she is at the Park on weekends or during the evening hours and the business office is closed. Although Ms. Silver and Petitioner do not get along, Ms. Silver has never threatened to "throw away" Petitioner's rental payments; nor has she ever told any of Park's residents that Petitioner was not paying her rent. Ms. Silver, however, has "gossiped" and made derogatory comments about Petitioner, but no showing has been made that Petitioner's handicap, her Native American heritage, or her having exercised any of her rights under Florida's Fair Housing Act played any role in Ms. Silver's having made these comments. In August of 2002, Petitioner mentioned to Ms. Crain about her interest in having a wheelchair ramp constructed on her lot. Ms. Crain suggested to Petitioner that she contact the Town to discuss the feasibility of such a project. Petitioner subsequently telephoned Brian Dillon, the Town's chief structural inspector. Mr. Dillon not only attempted to assist Petitioner in her efforts to obtain a permit from the Town to construct the wheelchair ramp, he also helped her make arrangements to have a boy scout troop construct the ramp for her with donated materials. The Town would not issue Petitioner a permit for the ramp unless and until she obtained the written approval of the Park owner, Uniprop. The ramp was constructed for Petitioner by the boy scouts during a weekend in mid-November 2002, without Petitioner's having first obtained Uniprop's "design approval" or a permit from the Town. Prior to the construction of the ramp, Petitioner had received a "design approval" application form from Ms. Crain and, on or about November 12 or 13, 2002, with Ms. Crain's assistance, had begun the application process. Petitioner, however, did not wait to receive the "design approval" she had applied for from Uniprop before giving the boy scouts the go ahead to start constructing the ramp. After discovering that the ramp had been constructed, Park management attempted to "work" with Petitioner to enable her to complete the paperwork necessary to obtain (belatedly) "design approval" for the ramp. On November 21, 2002, Petitioner submitted to Park management the following note from her physician, James Milne, D.O.: Due to Medical Necessity, my patient Mary Helen Meacham requires use of a motorized wheelchair, and it is necessary for her to have ramp access. If you have any questions, please feel free to call my office. By December 5, 2002, Petitioner had yet to submit the design plans needed to obtain "design approval" for the ramp. Accordingly, on that date, Uniprop's attorney, Ernest Kollra, Esquire, sent Petitioner, by certified mail, a Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, which read as follows: Please be advised the undersigned represents Kings Manor Estates with respect to your tenancy at the Community. This Notice is sent to you pursuant to Florida Statute, Chapter, 723.061, Et Seq. Park Management has advised the undersigned that you are in violation of the following Community Covenants of Kings Manor Estates: 7. Improvements: Before construction of any type is permitted on the homesite or added to a home, the Resident must obtain written permission from Management in the form of a Design Approval. Additional permits may be required by the municipality in which the Community is located. 10. Handicap Access: Any Residents requiring handicap access improvements such as ramps are permitted. All plans for such ramps must be approved by Management and comply with all other Community Covenants and governmental standards. You are in violation of the above Community Covenants, in that you have failed to submit plans to Management prior to the construction of your ramp. Park Management has been apprised by the Town of Davie that permits are required and none was obtained by you prior to construction, in compliance with Town of Davie governmental standards. In order to correct the above violation, you must within seven (7) days from delivery of this Notice, remove the ramp from your homesite. Delivery of the mailed notice is deemed given five (5) days after the date of postmark. If you fail and/or refuse to comply with this Notice, your tenancy will be terminated in accordance with Florida Statute Chapter 723.061.[2] If you have any questions concerning any of the above, you may contact Park Management at . . . . Petitioner did not remove the ramp by the deadline imposed by the December 5, 2002, Notice of Violation of Community Covenants. Park management, however, took no action to terminate her tenancy. After receiving the December 5, 2002, Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, Petitioner stopped making rental payments to Uniprop and, instead, deposited these monies with the Florida Justice Institute to be held in escrow until the controversy concerning the ramp was resolved. In or around mid-January 2003, Park management received from Petitioner corrected design plans for the ramp (that had been prepared by Doug Amos of Doug Amos Construction). On January 15, 2003, Ms. Maddox sent to Mr. Rhines, by facsimile transmission, a copy of these plans. Petitioner was subsequently granted "design approval" for the ramp. It has not been shown that there was any unreasonable or excessive delay involved in the granting of such approval. On February 19, 2003, Ms. Maddox wrote the following letter to the Town's Building Department: Please be advised that MaryHelen Meacham Woods is authorized to have permits issued for site #78 at 12620 SW 6th Street Davie, Florida 33325 for the Installation of a handicapped ramp. Thank you for your consideration in this matter. Following an inspection, the Town, in March 2003, issued a permit for the ramp. Petitioner has had use of the ramp since mid-November 2002 when it was first built (notwithstanding that she did not obtain Uniprop's "design approval" and a permit from the Town until some months later). On or about May 30, 2003, Petitioner authorized the Florida Justice Institute to deliver to Uniprop the rental payments it was holding (at Petitioner's request) in escrow. Uniprop accepted these rental payments when they were delivered. Petitioner has had raw eggs thrown at her wheelchair ramp. She suspects that Ms. Maddox's children were responsible for this vandalism, but there is insufficient record evidence to identify the culprits, much less ascertain their motives. On or about August 31, 2004, at a time when Hurricane Frances was approaching the Florida peninsula from the southeast, Park management sent Petitioner a Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, which read as follows: Pursuant to Florida Statute 723.061 et seq, you are hereby advised that you are in violation of the following Community Covenant(s) of which the Community first became aware on August 30, 2004. SECTION I: HOME AND SITE MAINTENANCE - Eachresident shall keep his/her site and home in a clean and neat condition and free of any fire hazards, there is no storage permitted around or under the home or in screened rooms. ALL items must be stored inside the home or storage shed. Although you have previously been furnished a copy of the Community Covenants of the park, and said Community Covenants are posted in the recreation center and business office, a copy of the rule(s) of which you are in violation is attached to this notice for your convenience. Specifically, you are in violation of the above Community Covenant(s) in that Your home, trim and utility shed are dirty, there is growth in the gutters and there is a window air conditioner on the home. In order to correct the above violation of the Community Covenant(s) you must Wash your home, trim and utility shed, paint with colors approved by management, clean the growth from the gutters and remove the window air conditioner within seven (7) days from delivery date of this letter. If you fail and/or refuse to correct the violations of the Community Covenant(s) in the manner listed above, the park will pursue all its rights and remedies pursuant to 723.061 et seq. PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY It has not been shown that Park management took this action to retaliate against Petitioner for having requested permission to construct a wheelchair ramp on her lot or that such action was motivated by any other improper purpose. Park management has not pursued the matter the further. At no time has Park management initiated legal action to terminate Petitioner's tenancy and evict her. The record evidence is insufficient to establish that Respondents, or anyone acting on their behalf, have said or done anything having the purpose or effect of disadvantaging Petitioner based on her handicap, her Native American heritage, or her having asked to be allowed to build a wheelchair ramp on her lot.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that Respondents are not guilty of any "discriminatory housing practice" and dismissing Petitioner's amended housing discrimination complaint based on such finding. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 2005.
