The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ Petitioner forfeited his Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) Investment Plan account by entering a nolo contendere plea to two counts of violating section 893.13(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes, a second-degree felony.
Findings Of Fact The Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding Mr. Combs began working for DOC on May 25, 2001, as a Correctional Officer Level 1 at the Union Correctional Institution (“Union Correctional”) in Raiford, Florida. Union Correctional is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 inmates, and Mr. Combs assisted with their care and custody. In January of 2006, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Sergeant. While his responsibilities were very similar to those of his previous position, Mr. Combs was now supervising other correctional officers. In October of 2011, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Lieutenant, and was responsible for supervising 50 to 70 correctional officers at Union Correctional. In April of 2013, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Captain, and transferred to Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. A captain is the highest ranking correctional officer on a given shift, and Mr. Combs supervised approximately 50 correctional officers at a time, including sergeants and lieutenants. Like Union Correctional, Florida State Prison is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 prisoners. A colonel manages Florida State Prison, and it has two separate units. One of those units is a work camp housing lower- custody inmates who may work outside the facility, and the main prison is the other unit. Each of the units is run by its own major. In February of 2015, Mr. Combs was promoted to Major and took charge of the work camp at Florida State Prison. At some point in 2014 and prior to his promotion to Major, Mr. Combs had begun taking Oxycodone recreationally. Mr. Combs typically purchased one Oxycodone pill three to four times a week, and Dylan Hilliard (a Correctional Officer 1 at Florida State Prison) was Mr. Combs’ primary source of Oxycodone. Mr. Hilliard usually worked at the main prison, but he occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs knew Mr. Hilliard because of their employment with DOC. Mr. Combs purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard at the latter’s home in Lawtey, Florida. However, some transactions occurred in Mr. Combs’ state-issued housing on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Hilliard charged Mr. Combs $35 for an Oxycodone pill, and that was a discount from the $38 price Mr. Hilliard charged others. Mr. Combs allowed his subordinates (Sergeants Jesse Oleveros and Evan Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. After returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard, Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give Mr. Combs an Oxycodone pill free of charge. Operation Checkered Flag was a joint task force led by the Bradford County Sheriff’s Office, and its purpose was to arrest individuals involved with the distribution and use of illegal drugs. The authorities arrested Mr. Hilliard after he engaged in an illegal drug transaction with an undercover agent from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. A subsequent search of Mr. Hilliard’s cell phone revealed text messages between Mr. Hilliard and several other DOC employees, including Mr. Combs. Mr. Hilliard referred to Mr. Combs as “Chicken-Hawk” or “Hawk” in those text messages, and the two of them used car part terminology as a code for different milligram sizes of Oxycodone. Operation Checkered Flag ultimately resulted in the arrest of 10 DOC employees. The authorities arrested Mr. Combs on July 1, 2015, based on allegations that he had committed six felonies relating to the alleged unlawful and illegal purchase and distribution of Oxycodone. DOC fired Mr. Combs on approximately July 1, 2015. Mr. Combs initially denied all of the allegations. However, after spending nearly 56 days in jail, Mr. Combs reached an agreement with the State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County that called for his criminal charges to be reduced in exchange for his cooperation with Operation Checkered Flag. During an interview on August 20, 2015, with members of Operation Checkered Flag, Mr. Combs admitted that he had purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. In addition, Mr. Combs admitted that on six or seven occasions he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave the prison grounds so that they could purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. The State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County chose to dismiss most of the charges against Mr. Combs. The Information ultimately filed against Mr. Combs set forth two counts alleging that he violated section 893.13(2)(a)1., by illegally purchasing Oxycodone on March 23, 2015, and March 31, 2015. Those purchases occurred approximately 10 miles from Florida State Prison at Mr. Hilliard’s residence in Lawtey, Florida. Neither Mr. Combs nor Mr. Hilliard was on duty during those transactions. On August 25, 2015, Mr. Combs pled nolo contendere. The Bradford County Circuit Court entered judgment against Mr. Combs based on the two violations of section 893.13(2)(a)1., but withheld adjudication. All of the conduct underlying Mr. Combs’ nolo contendere plea occurred while he was employed by DOC. The SBA Determines that Mr. Combs Forfeited his FRS Benefits At all times relevant to the instant case, Mr. Combs was a member of the FRS. The FRS is the legislatively-created general retirement system established by chapter 121, Florida Statutes. See § 121.021(3), Fla. Stat. The SBA is the governmental entity that administers the FRS Investment Plan, a defined retirement benefits contribution plan. § 121.4501(1), Fla. Stat. Via a letter dated August 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that a hold had been placed on his FRS account due to the criminal charges. As a result, no distribution of employer contributions from Mr. Combs’ account would be permitted until the SBA had evaluated the final disposition of those criminal charges. Via a letter dated September 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that he had forfeited his FRS benefits as a result of his nolo contendere plea. In support thereof, the SBA cited section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, which provides for the forfeiture of a public employee’s FRS retirement benefits upon the entry of a nolo contendere plea to certain types of offenses. The SBA’s letter closed by notifying Mr. Combs of his right to challenge the SBA’s proposed action through an administrative hearing. Mr. Combs requested a formal administrative hearing and asserted that the crimes for which he was convicted did not fall within the scope of section 112.3173(2)(e). In other words, Mr. Combs argued that his convictions were not associated with his employment at DOC and thus did not amount to a violation of the public trust. Testimony Adduced at the Final Hearing Mr. Combs testified that he was responsible for the work camp and the supervision of the correctional officers assigned there. He also testified that he would occasionally supervise correctional officers who normally worked in the main prison. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Hilliard was his primary source of Oxycodone and that Mr. Hilliard occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs was aware that two Florida State Prison employees who worked directly under him (Sergeant Jesse Oleveros and Sergeant Evan Williams) were purchasing Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave Florida State Prison grounds six or seven times in order to purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give him an Oxycodone pill after returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs acknowledged during his testimony that DOC policy prohibits correctional officers from leaving prison grounds during their shift. Mr. Combs acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs also acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to be on prison grounds with illegal narcotics. Finally, Mr. Combs acknowledged that as a sworn officer with the Department of Corrections, he had an obligation to report any criminal activity committed by a correctional officer working at Florida State Prison, regardless of whether that correctional officer reported to him. Findings of Ultimate Fact An examination of the circumstances associated with Mr. Combs’ Oxycodone purchases from Mr. Hilliard demonstrates that there is a nexus between Mr. Combs’ employment as a correctional officer with DOC and his commission of the crimes to which he pled nolo contendere. For instance, Mr. Combs came to know his primary source of Oxycodone (Mr. Hilliard) through their mutual employment with DOC. Indeed, Mr. Combs supervised Mr. Hilliard when the latter was assigned to the work camp at Florida State Prison. Also, Mr. Combs knew that these transactions were illegal. As noted above, he and Mr. Hilliard used a code based on car part references to disguise the actual subject of their communications. Contrary to DOC policy and Florida Law, Mr. Combs allowed two of his subordinates (Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their duty shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs would then receive a free pill from Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams. Mr. Hilliard sold Oxycodone to Mr. Combs at a reduced price. It is reasonable to infer that Mr. Combs received this discount due to his high-ranking position at Mr. Hilliard’s place of employment and because Mr. Combs facilitated Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams’ purchases of Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs willfully violated DOC policy and Florida law by allowing correctional officers to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs knowingly violated his obligation as a sworn correctional officer by not reporting the criminal activity committed by Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs defrauded the public from receiving the faithful performance of his duties as a correctional officer. The public had a right to expect that one of its employees would not purchase drugs from someone he supervised. The public also had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not use his authority at Florida State Prison to facilitate Mr. Hilliard’s illegal drug sales to other DOC employees. In addition, the public had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not engage in illegal transactions on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Combs realized a profit, gain, or advantage through the power or duties associated with his position as a Major at DOC. Specifically, Mr. Combs satisfied his Oxycodone habit through purchases made from a DOC employee who he supervised. Also, Mr. Combs used his position to facilitate other sales by Mr. Hilliard, and Mr. Combs’ assistance led to him receiving free Oxycodone and a discounted price on his Oxycodone purchases. The findings set forth above in paragraphs 49 through 57 are the only ones needed to establish a nexus between Mr. Combs’ public employment and the two counts to which he pled nolo contendere. That nexus is evident from Mr. Combs’ testimony, Mr. Combs’ Responses to the SBA’s Requests for Admissions, and the Stipulated Facts. It was not necessary to consider the exhibits to which Mr. Combs raised objections, i.e., the arrest warrant, the warrant affidavit, and the audio recordings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of specified offenses that were committed prior to retirement, and that pursuant to section 112.3173 he has forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account, except for the return of his accumulated contributions as of the date of his termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Council 79 is a labor organization whose business is to represent employees in matters involving public employers concerning contractural negotiations and the administration of bargaining agreements. Council 79 employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during 1987 and 1988. Council 79 has elected officers. Blondie P. Jordan, a black female, is the elected president and chief executive officer of Council 79. Jordan has the authority to employ persons to assist her in carrying out the duties of Council 79. Until the fall of 1988, Cox, a white male, was one of those employed by Council 79, under Jordan. Cox was employed as the Regional Director of Region III (also referred to as Tampa Region) of Council 79, and reported to Jordan. Council 79, under Jordan, also employed several other white males in positions of authority. Those included: Charles Brannon, employed in March, 1988, as the Assistant to the President, who in the absence of Jordan ran the day to day operations of Council 79 Headquarters; Ted Buri, Regional Director in Tallahassee; John Crosby, Business Manager; Mark Neimeisser, lobbyist; and Ben Patterson, Chief Attorney. Council 79 has an Executive Board over which Jordan presides, but through which the Council is governed and operated. During 1987 and 1988, Nancy Serrano, Jimmy Newell, Wesley Leon and Craig Lehning were members of the Executive Board from Region III. Serrano, Leon and Lehning belonged to a group referred to as the "Solidarity Group" that opposed Jordan. During 1987 and 1988, Serrano, Newell, Leon and Lehning at Executive Board meetings complained to Jordan about the operation of Cox's office in Tampa, particularly about the office staff and Cox not being responsive to the membership of the local unions. However, during this same period of time there were presidents of local unions who complained to Jordan about how these same Executive Board Members were not being responsive to the local union, specifically in regard to how these Executive Board members were attempting to close the Regional Director's Office in Tampa, and advised Jordan that Cox and his staff were working well with the local unions. Also, one member of Cox's staff complained to Jordan about having to drive Cox to meetings and run the office while Cox absence attending to personal business. There was no written documentation that Jordan ever discussed these complaints with Cox or any of his staff, and even though Cox admitted to having heard these complaints, although not from Jordan, he dismissed them as being political because there were coming from the Solidarity Group that opposed Jordan. Notwithstanding Jordan's testimony to the contrary, there is insufficient evidence to show that Jordan discussed any of these complaints with Cox or that Jordan counseled or advised about correcting the problems before November 3, 1988. Apparently, Jordan left the day to day operation of Region II, including the Regional Office, to the discretion of Cox, and expected Cox to correct problems in the Region without being counseled or advised by Jordan unless Cox determined that Jordan's intervention was necessary or appropriate. Likewise, there was no documentation that Cox had ever been reprimanded or counseled about his performance. In fact, the only written documentation concerning Cox's performance (other than an incomplete report by Linoria Anthony which was not received as evidence) of any problems with Cox's performance was the report written by David McGhee to Jordan on November 1, 1988, after McGhee replaced Cox, having been appointed Acting Regional Director of Region III on September 14, 1988 by Jordan. On September 12, 1988, Cox was scheduled to attend a meeting with employees from the City of Fort Myers which McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero were also to attend. Cox was to meet privately with McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero before meeting with the employees from Ft. Myers. Before the meeting, Cox was observed around the pool area by Neimesser. Cox did not attend the private meeting with McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero but did attend the meeting with the Ft. Myers employees. On September 13, 1988, Neimesser reported to Jordan that Cox had failed to attend the private meeting. On September 14, 1988, as instructed by Jordan, Brannon informed Cox that he was relieved of his duties as Regional Director. Cox was not given an opportunity to explain his failure to attend the private meeting in Ft. Myers, Florida before relieving him of his duties as Regional Director. Although Cox was relieved of his duties as Regional Director, he continued in the employment of Council 79 assisting McGhee in negotiating contracts and other matters. By letter dated September 14, 1988, Jordan appointed David McGhee Acting Regional Director of Region III. McGhee, a black male, employed by the International which Council 79 was affiliated. McGhee was the Assistant Area Director for International and its staff person with responsibility for Region III. McGhee assumed the responsibilities of Acting Regional Director for Region III on September 14, 1988.. McGhee is not now nor has he ever been on the payroll of Council 79. McGhee is continues to be the Acting Regional Director for Region III, and in addition to reporting to Jordan, reports to Gilbert Escudero, a Hispanic male, Area Director for the International and to Gerald McEntee, a white male, president of the International. On September 19, 1988, Cox voluntarily entered Horizon Hospital for treatment. Upon entering Horizon, Cox described his condition as being depressed and unable to function. Cox also described a previous history of excessive alcohol intake to the point of intoxication every weekend since his early twenties. However, there was insufficient evidence to show that Cox was suffering from alcoholism. Cox did not advise Jordan or McGhee or anyone else in authority with Council 79 that he was entering Horizon for treatment, or more specifically that he was being treated for alcoholism. Although Jordan and other employees of Council 79 may have known that Cox consumed alcohol, even to the point of intoxication on occasions, there is insufficient evidence to show that either Jordan or any other employee of Council 79 were aware that Cox had a problem with alcohol, or more specifically that Cox was suffering for alcoholism. As requested by Jordan, McGhee, by letter dated November 1, 1988, reported the problems he had encountered in the Regional Office since assuming the duties of Acting Regional Director. The report basically advised Jordan of the the problems that had been reported earlier by Serrano, Newell, Leon and Lehning. Additionally, McGhee reported on Cox's failure to negotiate contracts with the city of North Port and Local 167, Hillsborough County before they expired on September 30, 1988. As requested by Jordan, Linoria Anthony prepared a report concerning Cox's failure to negotiate contracts for several local unions in Region III with their employers. However, this report, initially offered as evidence, was withdrawn because Council 79 was unable to furnish a complete copy. On November 3, 1988, Charles Brannon was instructed by Jordan to secure Cox's resignation or to terminate his employment with Council 79. Cox resigned after being given the choices by Brannon. Upon resigning, Cox was to be given certain concessions, including one month's severance pay. Council 79 failed to honor this agreement with Cox, and he obtain a judgment in the County Court of Hillsborough County which was eventually satisfied. While Jordan's decision to effectively terminate Cox's employment (discharge) without first counseling or advising Cox on the problems in Region III as reported to her, and giving him an opportunity to correct those problems may not have been the correct or morally right decision, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish facts to show that Jordan did not terminate Cox's employment because of his race (white) or alleged handicap (alcoholism).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner, Robert Cox, was not discharged due to his race or alleged handicap in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and that the Petition For Relief be Dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statute, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the Respondent in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner The Petitioner did not file any Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent The following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(3); 4(4); 5(4); 6(5); 7(6&7), 9(6); 10(9); 11(10); 12(11); 13(12); 14(13); 16(16&17); 17- 18(18); 19-20(14) and 21(19). Proposed finding of fact 8 is rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, except for thesecond phrase, that complaints did not stop, which is adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Proposed finding of fact 15 is neither material nor relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 125 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Robert Cox, Pro se 8514-#3, Daffodil Drive Hudson, FL 34667 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Patterson and Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, FL 32315
The Issue Whether or not on or about October 24, 1975, the Respondent, Dallas Norman House was convicted upon a plea of not guilty and a verdict of guilty of the offense of unlawfully and knowingly possessing marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of Subsection 841(a)(1), Title 21, United States Code, and unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally importing marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, into the United States, in violation of Subsection 952(a), Title 21, United States Code, and thereby was guilty of a crime against the laws of the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing in violation of 475.25(1)(e), F.S. Whether or not the Respondent, Dallas Norman House, was committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of five (5) years on each of counts one and two of the aforementioned charges and that the execution of those sentences should run concurrently, to be followed by a parole term of five (5) years and thereby is guilty of a violation of 475.25(2), F.S., by being confined in a state or federal prison.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Dallas Norman House, is registered as a non-active salesman under certificate no. 0041416 held with the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission since October 1, 1976. Prior to that date the Respondent held the same certificate number as an active salesman beginning October 4, 1974 through September 30, 1976. Copies of these registrations may be found as part of Petitioner's Composite Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence. On October 24, 1975, the Respondent, Dallas Norman House, was adjudged guilty upon his plea of not guilty and a verdict of guilty of the offenses of; (1) unlawfully and knowingly possessing marijuana a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of 841(a)(1), Title 21, United States Code; and (2) unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally importing marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance into the United States, in violation of 952(a), Title 21, United States Code. The Respondent was adjudged guilty and convicted, and committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of five (5) years on each of the two counts with the execution of the two sentences to run concurrently, to be followed by a parole term of five (5) years. The terms of the judgement and commitment may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit #2, admitted into evidence. On August 2, 1976, the Respondent, Dallas Norman House surrendered himself at the Federal Prison Camp, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida to begin the service of the aforementioned sentences as imposed and at the time of the hearing was serving that sentence.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this cause, it is recommended that the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission, revoke the registration of the Respondent, Dallas Norman House, certificate no. 0041416. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Dallas Norman House c/o Superintendent E.V. Aiken Post Office Box 600 Eglin Air Force Base Eglin, Florida 32542
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether there is cause for termination of employment of John Abbott with the employer, Escambia County School Board.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, John Abbott was employed as a maintenance mechanic helper by Petitioner, the Escambia County School Board. As part of his employment, the Respondent resided in a mobile home at Hallmark Elementary School, 115 South "E" Street, Pensacola, Florida. On or about June 5, 1996, Pensacola police officers received confidential information that John Abbott was growing marijuana at his residence. Police officers went to the trailer and were allowed to enter with the permission of Mr. Abbott's 15-year-old son who also resided in the trailer. Mr. Abbott arrived shortly after the officers arrived. The officers inquired as to the presence and location of marijuana in the trailer. Mr. Abbott told the officers there were marijuana plants in the closet in his bedroom. The officers completed a consensual search of the closet and seized approximately 20 marijuana plants that were growing inside the bedroom closet. The officers also seized marijuana seeds and cardboard planters. The Respondent admitted he knew the marijuana was in the bedroom closet. The marijuana actually belonged to a girlfriend who had left town a few days previous. However, Respondent acknowledged he allowed the marijuana to be brought into his trailer and stored in his bedroom closet. Respondent knew it was there for several days and had taken no action to remove the marijuana from his property. Respondent clearly was in possession of marijuana on school property. Mr. Abbott was arrested for possession of marijuana. Eventually, he entered a plea of no contest to the charge and successfully completed his sentence. When the school board learned of Mr. Abbott's conviction, they terminated his employment with the school board. Mr. Abbott had no prior disciplinary problems. Respondent was considered a good employee by his supervisor. Respondent's supervisor requested that he remain a school board employee and not be terminated. However, at all times material to this action the Escambia County School District has had in force a Drug Free Work Place Program as authorized under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. The Escambia County School District has also had a policy and practice of zero tolerance for possession and use of controlled substances. Respondent's possession of marijuana violated the Board's policy. The District has consistently terminated employees found in possession of controlled substances with or without evidence of prior disciplinary problems. No exceptions have ever been allowed. Given the Board's policy and enforcement of its Drug Free Work Place Program, the evidence demonstrates that the Superintendent's recommendation for termination of Respondent should be upheld.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Petitioner, Escambia County School Board terminating the employment of John Abbott. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 COPIES FURNISHED: John T. Abbott 115 South "E" Street Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 1997. Pensacola, Florida 32501 Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire Hammons and Whittaker, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Michael H. Olenick, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 323990-0400 Jim May, Superintendent Escambia County School Board Post Office Box 1470 Pensacola, Florida 32597-1470
The Issue The issue in this case is whether just cause exists to impose sanctions against Respondent, Winston Northern (“Northern” or the “Teacher”), up to and including revocation of his Educator’s Certificate.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Education Practices Commission is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility to revoke or suspend, or take other appropriate action with regard to Florida Educator Certificates, as provided in sections 1012.795 and 1012.796(6), Florida Statutes (2016). The Commissioner of Education is charged with the duty to file and prosecute administrative complaints against individuals who hold Florida Educator Certificates and who are alleged to have violated standards of teacher conduct. § 1012.796(6), Fla. Stat. (2016) At all times relevant hereto, Northern held a Florida Educator Certificate and was employed as a teacher in the Duval County School System, teaching at A. Philip Randolph Academy of Technology, a charter school within the Duval County school system (and referred to herein as the “School”). On October 30, 2013, L.E. was a ninth-grade male student in the Teacher’s fourth period class, Introduction to Information Technology. L.E., who had a history of misbehaving in class, was one of 25 students in class on that day. The facts of this case read like A Tale of Two Cities; “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.” Although the duration of the incident in question was very short, and the location where it occurred was limited in size, the disparity in the testimony of eye witnesses could not be greater. For some, there was clearly an egregious event precipitated by the Teacher’s actions. For others, there was only a minor disruption of class with little significance. Few of the witnesses seemed to have a clear memory of the events that transpired that day, as evidenced by the contradictory and imprecise testimony evoked at final hearing. The Commissioner’s View Mrs. Byrd (formerly Ms. King) was the School’s “computer technology coordinator.” She would often come into Mr. Northern’s classroom because most of the School’s computer- related supplies were kept in a closet in that classroom. Mrs. Byrd came into Mr. Northern’s room on October 30, 2013, to get some IT supplies out of the closet. As she exited the classroom, Mrs. Byrd saw a woman walking quickly towards the classroom door; the woman appeared to be very agitated. Mrs. Byrd asked the woman (later identified as T.E., L.E.’s mother, and also referred to herein as the “Mom”) if she needed assistance. Mrs. Byrd noticed that the woman was not wearing a Visitor’s badge, as required by school rules. The woman said she did not need any help and that Mr. Northern had called her to come and deal with her son’s behavior issues. At that point, Mr. Northern opened the door and ushered T.E. into the classroom, indicating to Mrs. Byrd that it was “okay.” Mrs. Byrd followed them back into the classroom. T.E. immediately made a beeline to where her son, L.E., was sitting. Mrs. Byrd remembered T.E. physically attacking her son as she yelled profanities at him. The beating, with fists and open hands to L.E.’s face, lasted “a long time.” Mrs. Byrd initially estimated it to be about a minute and a half in length, but later agreed that it was probably about 15 seconds in duration. During the time that L.E. was being physically attacked by his mother, Mr. Northern did not intervene. Mrs. Byrd was in shock at what she was witnessing. At some point, Mrs. Byrd recovered from her shock and began to shout Mr. Northern’s name over and over to get his attention. Mr. Northern then directed the Mom and L.E. out into the open area outside the classroom. A student told Mrs. Byrd she “needed to do something” after L.E., his mom and Mr. Northern left the room. She obtained L.E.’s name from a student so that she could report the incident. Once outside the classroom, T.E. continued to berate both L.E. and Mr. Northern. At that point, Mrs. Byrd (who had walked out of the classroom sometime after the others) walked towards the elevator which was located just across from the classroom. As she neared the elevator, she met Mr. Lewis, the principal at the school. She indicated to Principal Lewis that she needed to talk to him about something important, i.e., the incident she witnessed in Mr. Northern’s classroom. However, Principal Lewis heard the Mom cursing loudly at T.E. and instead of talking to Mrs. Byrd, he went to speak to the Mom. Mrs. Byrd entered the stairwell next to the elevator and went downstairs. Principal Lewis explained to the Mom that the language she was using was not allowed on campus and that she needed to calm down. She did so. T.E. then took her son downstairs and presumably signed him out of school for the remainder of the day. Mr. Northern did not indicate to Principal Lewis that there had been a problem of any kind in the classroom. Principal Lewis’ testimony overall was not persuasive. He seemed very unclear as to how the events unfolded and seemed to contradict other, more believable witness testimony. Mrs. Byrd was upset by the incident and immediately called the abuse hotline at the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) to report the incident. DCF advised Mrs. Byrd to notify administration at the School about the incident. Mrs. Byrd contacted the assistant principal, Mrs. Peeples, but not until the next day. Mrs. Peeples asked Mrs. Byrd to provide a written statement about the incident and Mrs. Byrd prepared the statement. At about 4:15 p.m. on the day of the incident, Mrs. Peeples allegedly received a telephone call from the parent of one of the other students in Mr. Northern’s class. The student had purportedly told his/her parent a fellow student, L.E., had been severely beaten by his mother in the presence of the entire classroom. Based on that call, Mrs. Peeples contacted Principal Lewis to tell him what she had heard from the parent. Principal Lewis remembered that he, not Mrs. Peeples, received the parent’s phone call on that day. He also remembered talking with Mrs. Peeples about the incident and that she recounted her conversation with Mrs. Byrd. Mrs. Byrd, however, said she did not talk to Mrs. Peeples about the incident until the following day. Therefore, who talked to whom and when the conversations occurred are not completely clear from the testimony provided. Principal Lewis contacted Mr. Northern and told him they needed to talk, so Mr. Northern later stopped by Mr. Lewis’ office. A short conversation was held, but Mr. Northern did not say that the Mom had physically attacked her son in the classroom. Mr. Northern did not remember being summoned to Principal Lewis’ office, but remembered talking briefly to him in the breezeway on the first floor of the School. The School gathered statements from six of the 25 children in Mr. Northern’s classroom that day. Three of the statements were not signed and did not clearly indicate who had written them. Mrs. Peeples, who decided which students to ask for statements and was present as each child wrote his or her statement, could not--on the day of final hearing--identify the authors of the unsigned statements. Mrs. Peeples’s testimony was credible, but not substantively helpful. Some of the students’ hearsay statements seem to confirm what Mrs. Byrd reported; some do not. From the affirming statements came these remarks: “His mom came up there and kept punching [L.E.] in the face.” (K.B.) “His mom had just started beating on him.” (W.W.) “[His] mother just started hitting him in the face.” (J.W.) “A mom . . . came in and was very angry, very verbal about her anger and started hitting her son and yelling.” (Unsigned) “[L.E.’s] mom started hitting him.” (Unsigned) None of the hearsay statements were particularly credible as they are all unverified and without information as to the author. The Teacher’s View On October 30, 2016, L.E. was engaged in playing a very violent video game on a classroom computer in Mr. Northern’s classroom. L.E. had accessed the game by way of a “modified” thumb drive which made his actions undetectable by school administration, which may have been monitoring the computer. Mr. Northern told L.E. to put the game away, because it was prohibited by school policy. Further, a school assembly had been held recently wherein the consequences for playing such video games were announced, i.e., five days suspension from school and 45 days restriction from use of school computers--at least that was Mr. Northern’s description of the events at final hearing. In his deposition (taken on July 18, 2016), Mr. Northern said the issue with L.E. was that L.E. was “playing video games” instead of logging on to the appropriate website. He made no mention of the nature of the video games or that they were violent or prohibited by school policy, only that L.E. was told three times to stop playing videos and log on to the website as directed. After the third warning, Mr. Northern decided to call in reinforcements, to wit: L.E.’s mom. It was customary for Mr. Northern to call L.E.’s mom or Dean Lapkin, a school administrator, when L.E. would act out in class or fail to stay focused on his work. Mr. Northern said L.E. was a bright student, very versed in computer skills. He had a lot of potential, but was very often off-track and off-task. When L.E. refused to comply with instructions, Mr. Northern would call T.E. and have her talk with her son. That was usually enough to get L.E. back on track. Principal Lewis confirmed that calling a student’s parent was an acceptable method for dealing with recalcitrant students. On the day in question, Mr. Northern finally pulled L.E. off the computer (whether for playing video games despite being warned three times or for playing forbidden violent video games) and telephoned L.E.’s mother. Mr. Northern said at final hearing that he had first contacted Dean Lapkin to see if L.E. might be released from the prescribed discipline for watching violent video games on campus. Dean Lapkin said the discipline was to be imposed, that Mr. Northern should write a referral and he, Lapkin, would make the call to L.E.’s mom. But somehow Mr. Northern determined that the dean was too busy to call T.E., so Mr. Northern called the Mom himself. Mr. Northern said he received the Mom’s telephone number from Dean Lapkin that very day, but that statement flies in the face of his prior testimony that he had called the Mom several times in the past about L.E.’s behavior. (This sort of discrepant testimony severely clouds the facts in this case.) As Mr. Northern was talking to the Mom, she put him on hold to take another call, reputedly from Dean Lapkin. When she returned to the phone call with Mr. Northern, the Mom said she was already at the School. In his deposition, Mr. Northern said that he called T.E. immediately, i.e., there was no mention of calling the dean first, and that she arrived at the School as they talked. Mr. Northern anticipated receiving a call from downstairs for him to send L.E. down to the Guidance Office to check out, or, possibly, that the Mom would be escorted to his classroom to get L.E. Instead, a few minutes after Mr. Northern completed his call to T.E., she appeared in his classroom. Mrs. Byrd had just left the room, so Mr. Northern assumed she had let T.E. into the room (as the door is generally locked). However she gained entrance, Mr. Northern heard L.E. say to someone, “Bitch, what you gonna do now?” and turned around to see T.E. racing toward L.E., cursing loudly. Mr. Northern testified that he “tried to rush over” to intercept the Mom before she got to L.E. He stated that he was able to get between the two and fend off the Mom’s attempts to hit her son. As far as he knew, the Mom never landed any blows on L.E. Mr. Northern did not remember anyone in the classroom saying anything to him during the confrontation. After some unspecified amount of time, Mr. Northern escorted T.E. and L.E. outside the classroom into the hallway area. The Mom continued haranguing her son in that area until Principal Lewis intervened. One student’s statement seems to confirm Mr. Northern’s comments: The student wrote, “Mr. Northern call [L.E.] to his desk then his mom came and took him out of the classroom.” At final hearing, Ms. Williams, a former student who was present on the day in question, remembered the Mom slapping at L.E. but could not remember if the Mom ever made contact. Hearsay evidence at final hearing presented by Mrs. Byrd, uncorroborated but not objected to, indicates that during the DCF investigation L.E. had reported that his mom never hit him, but neither L.E. nor T.E. testified at final hearing to verify what actually happened. According to Mr. Northern and at least two of the students, Mrs. Byrd was not in the classroom during the confrontation between L.E. and his Mom. Mr. Northern did speak to Principal Lewis at some point after the incident. According to Mr. Northern, they met in the breezeway on the first floor for a few moments. Principal Lewis maintained that he called Mr. Northern to his office to talk about the incident later on the day it happened. Mr. Northern’s testimony was not persuasive as to the specifics of his meeting with Principal Lewis. Other Factors in the Dispute The Mom’s physical size was discussed by three witnesses. Mrs. Byrd described her as being “bigger than me.” (Mrs. Byrd is approximately five feet, two inches tall and stout in stature.) Ms. Williams said the Mom was about five feet, four inches tall and “not that big.” Mr. Northern said she was about five feet, one inch tall and weighed about 102 pounds. L.E. was a ninth-grade student and was sort of slight in stature. Mrs. Byrd said the Mom did not have a Visitor’s badge on her person. She could not remember what the Mom was wearing on that day, but did not see a badge. Mr. Northern said the Mom was wearing a halter top and tight jeans that day, totally inappropriate clothing under the student dress code (as he initially thought T.E. was a student). She did have a Visitor’s badge but, with no place to put it on her clothes, she had it in her purse. Neither party presented the Visitor’s log for that day to substantiate whether T.E. had registered or not, so we shall never know. It is interesting that Principal Lewis never asked T.E. about a Visitor’s badge. There were allegedly three investigations done concerning the alleged incident: One by the school; one by DCF; and one by law enforcement. None of the investigative reports (or their ultimate findings) was introduced into evidence in order to substantiate either party’s position. It was not mentioned whether photographs were taken of L.E. to ascertain bruising or other injuries from the alleged beating. So, again, we shall never know. After the investigations were concluded, Principal Lewis did not “trespass” the Mom from coming on campus in the future, even though he had authority to do so if warranted.1/ Neither the Mom nor L.E. was called to testify or bring some clarity to the matter at hand. Presumably they would have confirmed the position of one side or another in this matter, but again we shall never know. Nor was Dean Lapkin called to verify his involvement in the situation. Mr. Northern served as a teachers’ union representative at the School. He has brought complaints to Principal Lewis on numerous occasions as part of his duties in that role. Mr. Northern has also brought direct complaints to Principal Lewis regarding computer equipment issues in his own classroom. The two men have a “history” outside the present dispute. In fact, just about two weeks prior to the alleged incident, Mrs. Byrd wrongfully removed ten computers from Mr. Northern’s classroom, forcing him to have Principal Lewis intervene to have the equipment returned. The Amended Administrative Complaint in this matter contains four counts: Count I is a general count alleging that Mr. Northern violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession; Count II alleges Mr. Northern’s failure to protect a student from conditions harmful to learning or to the student’s mental health and/or physical health and safety; Count III alleges intentional distortion of facts concerning an event; and Count IV alleges failure to maintain honesty. What the unrefuted evidence at final hearing proved is this: Mr. Northern was teaching his class on October 30, 2013. L.E. was a student in that class. L.E.’s mother came to the classroom cursing loudly and took L.E. away. Mrs. Byrd had been in the classroom in close proximity to L.E. as he was being removed from the classroom by his mom and/or Mr. Northern. Mrs. Byrd reported an incident to DCF and to the School administration. Mr. Northern discussed the matter with Principal Lewis. “Tis a far harder decision I make in this case than I have ever made . . .,” at least as to what actually transpired that fateful day in Mr. Northern’s classroom. The conflicting and unclear stories delivered by the key players in this incident (minus the two primary protagonists), does little to explain what actually happened on that day. Based on the totality of the conflicting testimony, it is likely that T.E. came into the classroom and accosted her son. The finer details of what she did, however, seem to be forever lost.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Pam Stewart, as Commissioner of Education, dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, Winston Northern. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2016.
The Issue Whether respondent discriminated against petitioner on account of his race in terminating his employment?
Findings Of Fact Larry Drake, who is black, began his employment at Whataburger, Inc., on May 2, 1983, as a management trainee in Pensacola. He trained first under June Bell at Unit No. 168, then under Kin Pearson at Unit No. 42. New Warrington Road On July 17, 1983, he became assistant manager at Unit No. 25, Whataburger's restaurant on New Warrington Road, where he was put in charge of the "early bird" or late night shift, from eleven at night to seven in the morning. Randall Potts occasionally worked the late night shift, and, during his tenure as assistant manager in charge of the shift, Mr. Drake supervised Elijah Johnson and Randy Cotton, as well. He initially supervised only one employee, but when Linda Blevins began on the late night shift, he also supervised her. As manager of Unit No. 25, Byron Reno was Mr. Drake's supervisor while Mr. Drake worked there. Mr. Reno came in at six or seven in the morning and left before the late night shift began, but he saw petitioner when the night shift started on numerous occasions, in addition to occasionally overlapping petitioner's shift in the morning. He worked with Mr. Drake when, as sometimes happened after Mr. Drake's initial three months at Unit No. 25, Mr. Drake worked the day shift. On October 30, 1983, Mr. Reno prepared a written evaluation of petitioner's job performance on a form calling for a "CLASSIFICATION EVALUATION" and for a separate "PERFORMANCE EVALUATION." Respondent's Exhibit B-2. On the "CLASSIFICATION EVALUATION" section, he gave hid a total score in the "needs improvement" range, although written comments indicated he was "FULLY ADEQUATE IN MOST AREAS." On the "PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, he gave him a score of 41.4, half a point from the "needs improvement" cut-off. These ratings may be lower than those for "the bulk of the" (T.i27) assistant managers. By May 5, 1904, when Mr. Reno prepared a second evaluation using the same format, he rated petitioner fully adequate overall, and gave him a score in the outstanding range for "CLASSIFICATION EVALUATION." Respondent's Exhibit A-2. Sometimes petitioner complained he was tired when he reported for work at Unit No. 25, and Mr. Reno felt his energy level was low in general. Mr. Reno also felt that inaccuracies in the daily reports and in inventory reports should be eliminated. During the time Mr. Drake worked at Unit No. 25, Sonya Jarman worked, at various times, on both day shifts. On the later shift, she was sometimes unable to leave at eleven, because petitioner had not yet arrived at work. Sometimes she telephoned petitioner to wake him up so he would relieve her. On the other hand, Mr. Drake also "stayed over plenty of times" (T.75, 76) for late replacements. On the earlier day shift, Ms. Jarman sometimes arrived to find that the night shift's paperwork had not been done. Mr. Drake asked her more than once to do the paperwork for the night shift, saying he would help serve customers. Sometimes he sat in his office, reading the paper and smoking cigarettes, while Ms. Jarman completed reports which night shift personnel were charged with filling out. One night Mr. Drake was on duty, Ms. Jarman was summoned "to fix the register because the drawer had jammed." (T.149). When she arrived, she found petitioner had left the premises, leaving the cash register with open drawer in the care of a subordinate. In general, Ms. Jarman characterized her experience working with petitioner as "wild." In her opinion, "Larry ... just wasn't Whataburger material." (T.14i) He did not pitch in when things got busy. He was slow on the grill ... and even on the board he wasn't fast (T. 148). For part of the time petitioner worked as assistant manager at Unit No. 25, Elijah Johnson worked under his supervision as a crew leader. Mr. Johnson once left the premises to buy Krispy Kreme doughnuts. Petitioner once left to buy cigarettes. Gregory Street When Mr. Drake tired of working the graveyard shift, he asked the senior area supervisor, Mr. Turbeville, for a new assignment. Mr. Turbeville obliged and petitioner began work at the Gregory Street Whataburger, Unit No. 42, as assistant manager for the day shift, on August 12, 1984, under the supervision of Bob Echois, a long-time Whataburger manager and a former marine. The third time in eight days that petitioner reported late for work, Mr. Echois, who had come to view petitioner as incompetent after he sent to the bank $100 more in cash than the deposit slip reflected, made a written report of Mr. Drake's tardiness and forwarded it to Mr. Turbeville, the area supervisor, who counselled petitioner, urging him to come to work on time. Mr. Turbeville was present on August 28, 1984, when petitioner arrived or 30 minutes late, his fourth late appearance for work at Unit No. 42. He had had a flat tire on his way to work, abandoned the car, and run the rest of the way. Mr. Turbeville asked for directions to the abandoned car, confirmed that the tire was flat, and asked Mr. Drake to report to his office the following day. At the meeting the following day, Mr. Turbeville placed him on disciplinary leave for four days for "excessive tardiness," Respondent's Exhibit A-30, after first, however, telling him he was going to fire him. To this, petitioner had responded with a claim that another employee, Ronnie Hill, had an even less satisfactory record for prompt arrivals which, he said, the time cards would bear out; and he threatened to retain a lawyer. It was true that Ronnie Hill arrived late some days, but it was because Mr. Echois instructed him to pick up certain supplies on his way to work. (T.157) Ronnie Hill is white. Unit No. 21 Instead of returning to Mr. Echois' supervision, petitioner reported to Unit No. 21 on September 2, 1994. He chose this assignment over returning to Unit No. 25, the alternative Mr. Turbeville offered. Petitioner felt the manager of Unit No. 21, Kim Pearson, did not back him up properly in his dealings with a subordinate, who was also a friend of the manager. In any event, the manager of Unit 21 gave petitioner a written reprimand for "[f]ailure to use proper set out procedure for breakfast items," Respondent's Exhibit A-28, on October 29, 1984, but, on November 3, 1984, rated him fully adequate in his overall classification and performance evaluations, while indicating that improvement was needed in certain categories, including dependability. Jack Riley replaced Don Turbeville as Whataburger's senior area supervisor. In speaking to managers in the area, he asked most of them, including Pearson, how he could help improve day-to-day operations. In reply, Mr. Pearson complained that Mr. Drake would not take directions. Mr. Riley had not received a good report from Mr. Turbeville about Mr. Drake, and, in visiting Whataburger outlets, had not been favorably impressed with petitioner. Once he walked in the unit... "[and] was probably in the unit ten to fifteen minutes before Larry even knew ... [H]e was busy reading the newspaper." (T.163) One Sunday afternoon he found petitioner watching a basketball game on a television set he had brought to work. (T.62). Unit No. 169 In order, he testified, to see how petitioner Drake would do in a "clean environment," Mr. Riley transferred him to Unit No. 169, where Jamie Harrelson was manager, and assigned him to the late night shift. The transfer was effective March 3, 1985. Respondent's Exhibit A-32. Some two weeks later, Mr. Riley terminated petitioner's employment, effective March 16, 1905. In the interim, Messrs. Drake and Riley spoke three times, the first at Mr. Riley's office when petitioner asked why he had been transferred. As reasons for discharge, Mr. Riley cited "poor attitude, failure to follow orders and being late for work on several occasions." Petitioner did not do his job well at Unit No. 169. He ignored instructions the manager left for him in a notebook, refused to look at her when she spoke to him, called the manager at home at 10:30 or 11:00 at night to complain about his schedule, called her at two in the morning to ask her permission to lend another Whataburger unit a CO2 tank which, as assistant manager, he might well have lent without special authorization, and arrived late for work by, at least on one occasion, well over an hour. That night he called to say "he was having his car repaired at almost 9:00 o'clock at night." (T. 203). Assistant managers who were white have been terminated "for being late to work in the same situation. (T.169) Mr. Riley believed that no Whataburger manager in Pensacola was willing to accept petitioner as an assistant manager. Employees' Race On June 2, 1985, Whataburger promoted Elijah Johnson, a black assistant manager, to manager. On January 27, 1985, Whataburger promoted Sandra Mack, another black assistant manager, to manager. Under Mr. Riley, who is white and still works as the senior area supervisor, Whataburger's employment of black persons reached a peak in the Tallahassee-Pensacola area. Of the 174 persons Whataburger employs in the area as "team members," 45, or 26 percent, are black. About 26 percent of the assistant managers in the area are also black and, since the recent promotions, three of eleven (or 33 percent) of the managers are black. Fifty-eight percent of the area's "team leaders" and 67 percent of the "breakfast coordinators" in the area are black. Until Mr. Drake made these accusations, neither Whataburger nor any of the managers with whom he worked had been accused of discriminating on grounds of race. Nor, however, was there a black manager in Pensacola until after petitioner was fired and complained to the FCHR.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from his position as a janitor with Respondent because of his handicap, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lee, was hired by Respondent in August 1994 as a custodial worker at the Tallahassee Mall in Tallahassee, Florida. As a janitor Petitioner's duties included bending, stooping, and lifting. He was assigned to zone 3 in the Mall. Up until 1996, when Petitioner was injured, Petitioner received good evaluations on his job performance. Indeed Petitioner was very proud of the quality of his work and took special care to do his job well. Sometime prior to May 20, 1996, Petitioner, while at work and in the scope of his employment, stepped on a set of stairs which were not properly attached to a stage in the Tallahassee Mall. The steps slipped causing Petitioner's feet to come out from under him. Petitioner fell flat on his back. As a consequence Petitioner suffered a permanent back injury for which he received workers' compensation. The injury impairs his ability to work and therefore is a handicap. Around May 20, 1996, Petitioner was released by his doctor and was given orders for light duty with no bending, stooping, or heavy lifting. Petitioner gave these orders to his supervisor, Mr. Navin, when he returned to work on May 20, 1996. Respondent had light duty work available which Petitioner was qualified to perform. However, Respondent did not assign Petitioner to light duty work, but changed his work area from zone 3 to zone 1. Zone 1 is located at the front entrance to the mall and requires more work to maintain. Petitioner attempted to perform his duties but could only work for 3 1/2 hours before being overcome by pain from his injury. Petitioner could not work the next four working days because of the aggravation of his injury. On May 28, 1996, after returning to work, Petitioner was again given full duty work. Petitioner attempted to perform his custodial duties for about 2 weeks. However, the pain from his injury was so severe he again requested light duty work. Petitioner's supervisor asked Petitioner to bring him another notice from his doctor. Petitioner's doctor faxed the supervisor a second notice and Petitioner was placed on light duty work. Once Petitioner was placed on light duty work, the mall manager, Mr. Renninger, followed Petitioner around the mall watching him all the time while he worked. On July 8, 1996, prior to the mall opening for business, Petitioner was helping one of the mall store owners with a problem. Such aid was part of Petitioner's job. The mall manager walked up to Petitioner and began to yell at him in a very rude and disrespectful manner. The manager would not listen to Petitioner's explanation of the event. The manager gave Petitioner a written disciplinary notice for his aid to the mall store owner. The manager continued to follow Petitioner around the mall while he worked. Sometime around August 15, 1996, the mall manager advised the mall's employees that they should take their respective vacations prior to October. Petitioner thought it would be a good time for him to take the 4-day vacation time he had accumulated during his employment with the mall. He could use the time to allow his back to heal more. On August 15, 1996, Petitioner requested vacation leave and vacation pay for the period beginning September 3, 1996 and ending September 9, 1996. Initially, the request was denied. Petitioner's supervisor felt he had missed too much work and been late too often. However, Petitioner had only been absent or late in relation to his back injury. Petitioner explained that fact to his supervisor. His supervisor agreed and approved Petitioner's vacation. Petitioner returned to work on August 10, 1996. An argument with the administrative assistant occurred when she refused to recognize that Petitioner was entitled to be paid for his vacation time. She was not going to turn in any time for him so that Petitioner could get paid while on vacation. Getting a paycheck was a serious matter to Petitioner, and Petitioner, understandably, became gruff with the administrative assistant. Petitioner only raised his voice at the administrative assistant. He was not abusive and did not curse at her. In fact, the administrative assistant yelled at Petitioner when he raised the subject of his pay "Now, before you start bitching." Petitioner called the headquarters of Respondent and confirmed he had vacation time and pay accrued. After this incident Petitioner was fired ostensibly for mistreating the administrative assistant. The administrative assistant, who was incorrect, was not terminated. The reason appears to be a pretext. Petitioner's pay was $5.35 per hour and he worked a 40-hour-work-week. After his termination, Petitioner actively sought employment but could not find any until September 1, 1997. At that time he began work for Tallahassee Community College as a custodial worker with light duties at a higher rate of pay. Petitioner's search for work was reasonable.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner and awarding Petitioner backpay in the amount of $11,770.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2000.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by Respondent, based on his disability, in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes, the Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"); and, if so, what is the appropriate remedy?
Findings Of Fact From October 2 through December 7, 2017, Petitioner was employed by the City as a PES in its Transportation and Mobility Department ("TAM"). Nature of the Parking Enforcement Specialist Job The role of a PES is to ensure that members of the public follow the City's parking ordinances and regulations. Job duties include patrolling an assigned area in a vehicle or on foot, inspecting for parking violations, issuing summonses and tickets to violators, and assisting the public by answering questions. A PES must be able to work independently with little or no supervisory assistance and deal courteously and fairly with the public. The PES position is governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between the City and the Teamsters' Union. Under the CBA, assignment of work shifts is based on seniority. A PES may be assigned to work night and weekend shifts. Before being assigned a shift to work alone, a newly- hired PES participates in two phases of training. Phase one consists of familiarization with equipment, systems, parking ordinances and regulations, and typically lasts four to six weeks. Phase two is focused on hands-on training and a trainee is given more opportunity to operate the vehicles and equipment. One of the purposes of phase two is to ensure that the trainee is able to appropriately handle problems and stressful situations that may arise on the job, such as dealing with irate members of the public while immobilizing a vehicle. Each phase of training is conducted by a fellow PES who is temporarily designated as a training officer under the CBA. A PES serving in the temporary designation of training officer is not considered a supervisor. The City issues each PES certain take-home equipment, including a public safety police radio, keys, flashlight, and identification card, for use while on the job. A PES takes these items home when not on the job and is at all times responsible for his or her City-issued equipment. To perform the job, a PES is also required to use a License Plate Reader ("LPR") and related systems. A LPR scans license plates and indicates when a car should be issued a citation or boot. A PES is expected to drive a City vehicle and view the screens of the machine that alert when the camera scans a vehicle with outstanding citations. When a LPR alerts a PES of a vehicle with outstanding citations, the PES must carefully pull over and turn on the caution lights to advise oncoming traffic of the stopped City vehicle. Once safely pulled over, the PES may then check whether the vehicle has outstanding citations and issue tickets. The City's Policies and Work Rules Prior to commencing employment at the City, each newly- hired employee is provided with copies of the City's written policies. The City has a Policy Concerning Persons with a Disability and Procedures for Accommodation ("ADA Policy"). It prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual because of his or her disability and states that the City will provide reasonable accommodation when necessary. It also explains the procedures for requesting accommodation and that a request may be made by contacting the City's Office of Professional Standards ("OPS"). OPS handles requests for workplace accommodation and determines whether an accommodation will be provided. On September 27, 2017, Petitioner was given a copy of the City's ADA Policy and executed a form acknowledging receipt of same. At no time during his employment did Petitioner indicate that he was a qualified individual with a disability or that he needed an accommodation for a disability or handicap from the City. In fact, at final hearing, Petitioner admitted he did not believe he had a handicap or needed an accommodation to perform his role as a PES. The City has General Employees' Work Rules ("General Work Rules"), which define Major Rule violations. Leaving the City premises during work hours without a supervisor's permission is listed as a Major Rule violation for which any employee can be discharged immediately without warning. All newly-hired employees at the City receive training on the City's General Work Rules. Each Department is required to post the City's General Work Rules in work areas. TAM posts the City's General Work Rules document in the main security office, which is where PESs check out their parking enforcement equipment and pick up the keys to their vehicles. On September 27, 2017, Petitioner was given a copy of the City's General Work Rules and executed a form acknowledging its receipt. Petitioner's Employment with PES Effective October 2, 2017, Petitioner commenced employment at the City as a probationary PES. Parking Enforcement Supervisor Bryan Greene ("Mr. Greene") was involved in the process of interviewing and hiring Petitioner for the PES position. When Mr. Greene initially contacted Petitioner to set up an interview, he asked if Petitioner would need any accommodation. Petitioner stated that he did not need any accommodation. Petitioner never told Mr. Greene that he had a disability or needed an accommodation to perform the job. Mr. Greene was not aware that Petitioner self-identified as a disabled veteran on his job application with the City. For phase one of training, Petitioner was assigned to train on the day shift. For phase two, Petitioner was assigned to train on the night-shift with fellow PES and training officer, Stephanie Sanchez ("Ms. Sanchez"). Petitioner began his night-shift training with Ms. Sanchez in November 2017. Acting Parking Shift Coordinator Jose Vazquez ("Mr. Vazquez") was the immediate supervisor of Petitioner and Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Vazquez's immediate supervisor was Mr. Greene. In the day-to-day performance of his job, Petitioner could communicate with Mr. Vazquez by phone or e-mail. Petitioner never told Mr. Vazquez or his coworker trainers that he had a disability or needed any accommodation. From time to time, Mr. Vazquez would check in with Petitioner on his progress as a regular part of the training process. Petitioner never reported any problems with Ms. Sanchez to Mr. Vazquez or Mr. Greene. On December 6, 2017, Mr. Vazquez sent Petitioner a series of routine e-mails regarding the status of various equipment and training. In one of his e-mails, Mr. Vazquez asked Petitioner if he felt comfortable with enforcement operations and procedures and to let him know if there was anything he was uncertain about. Petitioner sent a response stating, in relevant part, "Thanks Jose, I am comfortable with enforcement. Would like a little more training with the LPR and the different computer programs used in the field." Petitioner did not request to review anything else as part of training. Events Leading to Petitioner's Termination On December 7, 2017, at 12:30 p.m., Mr. Vazquez forwarded Petitioner's e-mail to Ms. Sanchez in reference to training. He instructed her to go over the LPR process and how it works with Petitioner again and told her to "[l]et him drive and control everything so that he gets a feel of it" and "[h]ave him input manual tags too so that he is aware that the LPR will not read all tags." On December 7, 2017, at 5:00 p.m., Petitioner started his shift. Ms. Sanchez let Petitioner drive the City vehicle in the parking garage while she sat in the back. They stopped, parked behind another vehicle, and turned the caution lights on so that Ms. Sanchez could review the LPR process with Petitioner as he had requested. Ms. Sanchez encouraged Petitioner to review his notes on the LPR from the night before and asked him to replicate the process to check if a vehicle was eligible for immobilization. Petitioner became angry that rather than verbally reviewing the instructions over and over with him, Ms. Sanchez directed him to review his notes. Ms. Sanchez explained that she previously had repeated the verbal instruction and wanted to be sure that Petitioner could understand his own notes because he was nearing the end of his training and would soon be on his own with nothing to rely on but his notes. At that point, Petitioner burst out at Ms. Sanchez in a raised voice, "You're aggravating me, I can't stand working with you--you just want me to fail. I'm going home." Sanchez calmly explained that she was trying to help him and reiterated that they would have to go through the steps to learn the process. Petitioner did not listen. He immediately put the City vehicle into drive and sped off to the other side of the garage with Ms. Sanchez still in the vehicle. Petitioner then parked, got out of the vehicle, and went into the main security office with his belongings. Because of Petitioner's outburst and behavior, Ms. Sanchez did not feel that it was safe for her to approach him and waited in the vehicle. After approximately five minutes, Petitioner exited the main security office. He went towards the parking elevator and left. Petitioner left his City-issued take-home equipment, including police radio, keys to access the building, and identification, inside the main security office which was unsecured. Prior to leaving, Petitioner had only been at work for about one hour. Ms. Sanchez immediately contacted Mr. Vazquez. She notified him that Petitioner left work without permission and sent him an e-mail detailing the incident that occurred while training Petitioner on use of LPR systems. Mr. Vazquez advised Mr. Greene of the incident and forwarded him Ms. Sanchez's e-mail. At no time during his December 7, 2017, shift did Petitioner communicate to any supervisor that he was leaving work or not returning that night. Mr. Greene recommended through chain-of-command that Petitioner, as a probationary employee, be terminated from City employment. He felt that Petitioner would not be a good fit for the PES position because he left work without a supervisor's permission in violation of a Major Rule and left his City-issued take-home equipment unattended in an unsecured building. This raised serious safety concerns given the sensitive nature of the equipment, which included a police radio. Additionally, Petitioner's rude, disrespectful, and troubling behavior towards Ms. Sanchez raised concerns as to his ability to appropriately deal with coworkers and members of the public. The City determined that Petitioner voluntarily resigned when he left work without contacting a supervisor and left his City-issued take-home equipment unsecured in the security office. Accordingly, the City accepted Petitioner's voluntary resignation from employment, effective December 7, 2017. Petitioner's Argument Petitioner claims that he had no intention of resigning and that his separation from employment was a termination based upon his disability or handicap. Petitioner believes that his training by Ms. Sanchez should have conformed to his preference on how to learn (repeated verbal instructions without reference to notes or the guide book) and that he was justifiably upset with her. Petitioner explained that his interaction with Ms. Sanchez triggered intestinal distress, necessitating his need to go home and change clothing. He intended to return to work that night but claims he saw an e-mail from management that if Petitioner returned to work, he was to be told to go back home. Petitioner was not copied on that e-mail nor could he explain at final hearing how he saw that e-mail prior to the initiation of his administrative complaint. Petitioner's testimony on this point is not credible. Further, Petitioner admits he did not contact a supervisor prior to leaving his shift. Despite receiving and reviewing the General Work Rules, Petitioner irrationally assumed it was management's responsibility to reach out to him to find out what was going on, rather than him requesting time off. After going home, Petitioner made no effort that evening to contact a supervisor to explain why he left the job. Petitioner's suggestion, that leaving his work equipment was not an indication of quitting, is also not credible. Petitioner claims that he left the keys and equipment in what he believed was his own mailbox, assumed no one would touch it, and that the building was secure. Petitioner cross- examined the City witnesses at final hearing in detail about where his equipment was actually left (on a desk or in his mailbox) but, ultimately, he provided no rational explanation why he left everything in an unsecured building on December 7, 2017, when after every other shift, he previously took those things home. Petitioner did not identify any handicap or disability either while employed with the City or at final hearing. Nor did he request any accommodation that would have enabled him to perform the essential functions of the PES job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the FCHR Petition 2018- 04710. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2019.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered sustaining the revocation of furlough on the grounds that respondent violated the terms of his Furlough Agreement. Respectfully submitted and entered this 14th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher Cobb Post Office Box 490 Arthur G. Dozier School Marianna, Florida 32446 Julia Cobb 1527 Lancelot Loop Tampa, Florida 33619 Amelia M. Park, Esquire District VI Legal Counsel 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 David Pingree, Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301