Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
ROBERT T. LACEY vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 93-003968 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jul. 19, 1993 Number: 93-003968 Latest Update: May 09, 1994

The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner's rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System are subject to forfeiture.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert T. Lacey (Lacey), was employed as the Director of the Criminal Justice Institute, Broward Community College, Broward County, Florida, from at least January 1, 1985, until his resignation in March 1986. At all times pertinent to this case, Broward Community College (BCC) was an employer which participated in the Florida Retirement System, and petitioner, while employed by BCC, was a member of the Florida Retirement System. On February 4, 1987, a Grand Jury impaneled in Broward County, Florida, returned a fourteen (14) count true bill of indictment against Lacey. The matter was ultimately assigned Case No. 87-2056CFA, Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida. Pertinent to this case are Counts I-XII of the indictment, one count for each of the calendar months of 1985 (January through December 1985). Each count charges that Lacey did, while employed by BCC that year, commit the following acts each month: . . . unlawfully and knowingly obtain or endeavor to obtain the property of Broward Community College, to wit: United States Currency, services and/or material, of a value of one hundred dollars ($100.00) or more, with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive Broward Community College of a right to the property or a benefit thereof, or to appropriate the property to his own use or the use of any person not entitled thereto, contrary to F.S. 812.014(1)(a)., and (1)(b)., and F.S. 812.014(2)(b). The gravamen of such charges was the assertion that while employed as director of the Criminal Justice Institute, an entity within Broward Community College, Lacy used materials, time and personnel to benefit him personally in his consulting business. On February 25, 1988, following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of grand theft, as alleged in Counts I-XII of the indictment, and not guilty as to Counts XIII and XIV of the indictment. Although found guilty by a verdict of the jury, the court withheld adjudication as to each count, placed Lacey on probation for a period of three years, ordered Lacey to pay $3,000 in restitution to BCC, and ordered Lacey to perform 200 hours of community service. Lacey's post trial motions for arrest of judgment, new trial, and renewed motion for judgment of acquittal were denied by the court. Following the true bill of indictment that issued February 4, 1987, Lacey was also charged by direct information filed April 21, 1987, in the Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida, Case No.87-6744CFA, with two counts of official misconduct (Counts I and III), one count of petit theft (Count II), and one count of grand theft (Count IV). Pertinent to this case, Count I of the information charged that on or about September 5, 1985, Lacey did, while a public servant, to wit: . . . an employee of Broward Community College . . . did then and there unlawfully and knowingly falsify, or cause another to falsify, an official record or official document, to-wit: a Broward Community College form entitled "STAFF AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT COURSE APPROVAL FORM," with the corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself . . . or another, to-wit: for the benefit of JACINDA LYNN FANNIN, contrary to F.S. 839.25(1)(b). Counts III and IV of the information charged Lacey with official misconduct and grand theft, respectively; however, that portion of the information which would have set forth the factual basis for Counts III and IV is not of record, and no conclusion can be drawn as to whether or not the basis for those charges related to Lacey's employment with BCC. In response to the information in Case No. 87-6744 CFA, and following the resolution of Case No. 87-2056CFA, Lacey entered a plea of nolo contendere to all counts. The Court, by order of November 28, 1988, withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Lacey on probation for three years with regard to Counts I, III and IV and six months as to Court II. All probationary terms were to run concurrent and coterminous with those imposed in Case No.87-2056CFA. 2/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered forfeituring the rights and benefits of petitioner, Robert T. Lacey, under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of his accumulated contributions. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of March 1994. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March 1994.

Florida Laws (8) 112.3173120.57120.68121.021121.091812.014838.15838.16
# 1
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY, AND MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING vs PATTI L. WILLIAMS, 01-004570PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Nov. 30, 2001 Number: 01-004570PL Latest Update: Aug. 29, 2002

The Issue Whether Respondent failed to meet the minimum standards of performance required by Section 491.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes, on two occasions.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the profession of marriage and family therapy pursuant to Section 20.43(3)(g) 29, and Chapters 456 and 491, Florida Statutes. Respondent is, and has been at all times material, a marriage and family therapist holding Florida license number MT1416. The last address of record of Respondent was 1416C, West 16th Street, Panama City, Florida 32405. Events relating to Ms. P.D. Ms. P.D. is a registered X-ray technologist, a registered ultrasound technologist, and a registered specialist in mammography. Ms. P.D. and her husband sought Respondent's professional help because they were experiencing marital difficulties. Ms. P.D. did not know Respondent until her husband chose Respondent as counselor. This occurred in June or July of 1997. They continued in counseling until March of 1999 or 2000. The dates provided herein are nonspecific because Ms. P.D. could not recall the exact years. At the beginning of the counseling, Ms. P.D. and her husband received counseling at Respondent's office. Later they went to dinner together and received these services in a less formal setting. At least two of Ms. P.D.'s daughters received counseling also. Ms. P.D. and her husband owned property in Panama City, Florida, located at 703 Kristana, a house in St. Croix, a farm in Nova Scotia, and waterfront property in Nova Scotia. Mr. and Ms. P.D. also owned a building at 810 Grace Avenue in Panama City, Florida. This property was purchased probably in 1994, and was sold in May or June of 2001. Ms. P.D. and her spouse operated an ultrasound school on the premises from about 1994 until late 1997. The ultrasound school was eventually closed due to lack of business. Ms. P.D. was a client of Respondent during the latter part of the time in which the ultrasound school was in operation. In the latter part of 1997, or in the early part of 1998, Respondent found that she could no longer occupy the office in which she had been practicing. During a counseling session, Respondent mentioned that she needed an office for her practice and Ms. P.D. informed her that she could lease the premises at 810 Grace Avenue. Respondent paid rent to Ms. P.D. by check. Ms. P.D. deposited the checks to one of at least two accounts she maintains. At some point subsequently, Ms. P.D. volunteered to work with Respondent in her practice. This was motivated in part because Ms. P.D. was an adoptive mother of two children who were acquired through an international adoption process. Respondent has experience in adoptions including working with the Florida Department of Children and Family Services. Eventually, an organization was formed with the corporate name of Future Choices, Inc. (FCI). Initial participants in the organization included Mr. and Ms. P.D. and Respondent, among others. This organization involved the adoption process. It also involved "supervised visitations." The record does not fully explain what a "supervised visitation" actually is, but it is apparent from the record that someone or some entity is willing to pay for "supervised visitations" and therefore, "supervised visitations" provided income for FCI. The business plan called for the organization to become profitable before any participants received a salary. Ms. P.D. was a member of the board of directors and was vice- president. She assumed these positions in 1998. She worked as a volunteer. She was not a subordinate of Respondent. They were business associates. Ms. P.D. served on the board until around 2000 or 2001. Events relating to Ms. P.M. Ms. P.M. works for the Salvation Army Domestic Violence Program. She sought family counseling from Respondent in 1997. She thereafter received individual counseling from Respondent until 1998. Ms. P.M. became friends with Respondent almost immediately upon the initiation of counseling. Respondent visited her in Ms. P.M.'s home, and Ms. P.M. visited Respondent in her home while the counseling relationship was ongoing. They had lunch together and went shopping. Her friendship with Respondent ended in 1999 when Ms. P.M. was informed that Respondent had revealed matters Ms. P.M. had provided to her in confidence. Events relating to both Ms. P.D. and Ms. P.M. Ms. P.D. traveled with Respondent to Tallahassee, Florida, for supervised visitation training, and to Hollywood, Florida, for a batterers intervention program, and to Orlando, Florida, for a program dealing with sex offenders. Ms. P.M. also went on the Hollywood and Orlando, Florida trips. These trips required an overnight stay or stays. Ms. P.D. also traveled with Respondent to near-by cities such as Marianna, Florida. During these trips Ms. P.D. remained a counseling client of Respondent, and Ms. P.D. voluntarily paid the cost of these trips. Ms. P.D. was excited about the business prospects of FCI. As a member of the board of FCI, Ms. P.D. signed checks drawn on the corporation. Ms. P.D. also paid the utility bills, and paid for much of the office equipment, for the benefit of FCI out of her personal funds. Sandy Gorman was a business associate of Ms. P.D. Ms. Gorman was introduced to Respondent by Ms. P.D. Ms. Gorman eventually bought the building at 810 Grace Avenue for $57,000. Mr. and Mrs. P.D. had purchased it for about $30,000. The sale to Ms. Gorman was for less than market value because Mrs. P.D. wanted to help her. During the time that Mr. and Mrs. P.D. owned the building, improvements were made on it, including the completion of an extant second floor. Respondent contributed to these improvements by causing Ms. P.M.'s husband to contribute toward making the top floor of the building habitable. Sandy Gorman is now a direct competitor of Respondent in the visitations and adoptions business in Panama City, Florida. Ms. Gorman continues to be close friends with Ms. P.D. Eventually the relationship between Ms. P.D. and Respondent soured. Around March, 2000, Ms. P.D. ejected Respondent and her belongings from the premises at 810 Grace Avenue. However, the business was beginning to turn a profit about the time Respondent was ejected. Expert testimony Debra Frank is a licensed marriage and family therapist, a licensed psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner, and a professor at Florida State University. She received her Ph.D. from Florida State University in the Interdivisional Program in Marriage and Family. She is an expert on the practice of marriage and family therapy in the State of Florida. Dr. Frank related that a marriage and family therapist provides counseling with regard to marital concerns or relationship concerns. She noted that the relationship between counselor and patient is based on trust. She opined that the counselor, because of her position, would often be able to exert influence on the client. She noted that clients come to the counseling relationship with emotional vulnerability and that it is the counselor's responsibility to act in the client's best interest. Dr. Frank explained that a dual relationship is one where there are relationships other than the counselor-client relationship. These relationships would include relationships based on business interests as well as those based on friendship. Dual relationships are not per se prohibited by either the law or by ethical standards. However, they are prohibited where they may have the potential to harm a client. In order to obtain a permissible dual relationship the therapy must terminate and there should be a gap in time prior to moving to another relationship. Moreover, the client should be referred to another counselor so that the client can discuss with another counselor the dual relationship prior to entering into it. Respondent accomplished neither of these actions.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which finds that Respondent violated Section 491.009(2)(s), Florida Statutes, on two occasions, and which places Respondent on probation for a period of three months with remedial action as the Board may find appropriate, so long as such action is not inconsistent with the provisions of Section 491.009(1)(g), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah B. Loucks, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Russell K. Ramey, Esquire 1042 Jenks Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Susan Foster, Executive Director Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage and Family Therapy and Mental Health Counseling Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R.S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.6020.43491.009
# 2
JOHN F. MORACK vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 88-004183 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004183 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 1988

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, John F. Morack, is a member of the Teachers Retirement System (TRS). The TRS is administered by respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement (Division). On April 18, 1988, petitioner began working for a new employer and concurrently filled out an application form to enroll in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), a plan also administered by the Division. By letter dated June 27, 1988, the Division, through its chief of bureau of enrollment and contributions, Tom F. Wooten, denied the request on the ground Morack failed to qualify for such a transfer. Dissatisfied with the agency's decision, Morack initiated this proceeding. Petitioner first enrolled in the TRS on September 18, 1970, when he began employment as a dean at Broward Community College. At that time, he had no option to enroll in any retirement program except the TRS. Under the TRS, an employee did not have to make contributions to social security and earned "points" for calculating retirement benefits at a rate of 2% for each year of creditable service. In contrast, under the FRS, which was established in late 1970, members earned benefits at a rate of only 1.6% per year but were participants in the social security program. Finally, a TRS member could not purchase credit for wartime military service unless he was an employee at the time he entered the military service and was merely on a leave of absence. On the other hand, an FRS member could purchase credit for military service after ten years of creditable service as long as such military service occurred during wartime. When the FRS was established in late 1970, members of the TRS were given the option of transferring to the newly created FRS or remaining on TRS. Morack executed a ballot on October 15, 1970 expressing his desire to remain on the TRS. In November 1974, the Division offered all TRS members an open enrollment period to change from TRS to FRS. Morack elected again to remain on the TRS. In the latter part of 1978, the Division offered TRS members a second open enrollment period to switch retirement systems. On November 21, 1978, Morack declined to accept this offer. On January 1, 1979 Morack accepted employment with the Department of Education (DOE) in Tallahassee but continued his membership in the TRS. He remained with the DOE until July 1981 when he accepted a position in the State of Texas. However, because Morack intended to eventually return to Florida, he left his contributions in the fund. Approximately two years later, petitioner returned to Florida and accepted a position at Florida Atlantic University (FAU) in Boca Raton as assistant vice president effective July 11, 1983. About the same time, he prepared the following letter on a FAU letterhead. To Whom it May Concern: This is to indicate that I elect remaining in TRS rather than FRS. (Signature) John F. Morack The letter was received by the Division on July 19, 1983, and the enrollment form was processed on November 2, 1983. Although Morack stated that he was told by an FAU official that he could not transfer plans at that time, there is no competent evidence of record to support this claim since the testimony is hearsay in nature. On November 18, 1985, Morack requested the Division to audit his account for the purpose of determining how much it would cost to purchase his Korean War military service. On January 24, 1986, the Division advised Morack by memorandum that because he had "no membership time prior to (his) military service, that service is not creditable under the provisions of the Teachers' Retirement System." During the next two years Morack requested two audits on his account to determine retirement benefits assuming a termination of employment on July 31, 1987 and June 30, 1988, respectively. On April 14, 1988, Morack ended his employment with FAU and began working on April 18, 1988, or four days later, at Palm Beach Junior College (PBJC) as construction manager for the performing arts center. When he began working at PBJC he executed Division Form M10 and reflected his desire to be enrolled in the FRS. As noted earlier, this request was denied, and Morack remains in the TRS. The denial was based on a Division rule that requires at least a thirty day break in service with the state in order to change retirement plans after returning to state employment. Because Morack's break in service was only four days, he did not meet the requirement of the rule. At hearing and on deposition, Morack acknowledged he had several earlier opportunities to transfer to the FRS but declined since he never had the benefits of the FRS explained by school personnel. As retirement age crept closer, petitioner began investigating the differences between the TRS and FRS and learned that the latter plan was more beneficial to him. This was because the FRS would allow him to purchase almost four years of military service, a higher base salary would be used to compute benefits, he could participate in social security, and there would be no social security offset against his retirement benefits. Also, petitioner complained that school personnel were not well versed in retirement plans and either were unaware of alternative options or failed to adequately explain them. As an example, Morack points out that when he returned from Texas in 1983 he was not told by FAU personnel about the change in the law now codified as subsection 121.051(1)(c). Finally he thinks it unfair that the Division counts four days employment in a month as a full month's creditable service for computing benefits but will not count his four days break in service in April 1988 as a full month for computing the time between jobs.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's request to change retirement plans be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4183 Respondent: 1. Covered in finding of fact 6. 2-4. Covered in finding of fact 7. 5. Covered in finding of fact 10. 6-7. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in findings of fact 8 and 11. Covered in findings of fact 1 and 10. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John F. Morack 10474 Green Trail Drive Boynton Beach, Florida 33436 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Andrew J. McMullian, III State Retirement Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Adis Maria Vila Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire general Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.051
# 3
RUSSELL J. KEIRS vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 80-001171 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001171 Latest Update: Oct. 14, 1980

Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Florida State University during the 1979- 1980 academic year as a tenured professor of chemistry at an annual salary of $22,819.00. Petitioner submitted an Application for Service Retirement Benefits dated May 2, 1980, to Respondent, which application reflected Petitioner's intention to terminate his employment at Florida State University effective May 30, 1980. Previously, Petitioner had advised the Chairman of the Chemistry Department of Petitioner's intention to retire effective June 5, 1980. However, in submitting the aforesaid application dated May 2, 1980, Petitioner determined to relinquish four days of employment salary in June in order to become eligible for retirement benefits begin to accrue on the first day of the first month following termination of employment. Petitioner's request to terminate his employment effective May 30, 1980, was approved by both his department chairman and by the Retirement Coordinator at Florida State University. As a result of his notification of intent to terminate his employment effective May 30, 1980, Petitioner was removed from the payroll of Florida State University effective May 30, 1980. However, Petitioner continued to perform his duties as a professor of chemistry at Florida State University until the end of the academic school year on June 16, 1980. Petitioner continued actual classroom and laboratory instruction until the end of classes on June 6, 1980. Petitioner continued actual classroom and laboratory instruction until the end of classes on June 6, 1980, and, following the end of classes, he conducted final exams, graded examinations, issued grades and, on June 16, 1980, briefly attended a faculty meeting. Although Petitioner's contract of employment provides for a faculty appointment from September 7, 1979 through June 5, 1980, these dates relate only to pay periods, since a faculty member's contractual duties and responsibilities, unless specifically altered by mutual agreement between the contracting parties, extend through the end of the academic school year in this case, June 16, 1980. The academic school year at Florida State University is nine months long and is comprised of three academic quarters, during which approximately one-third of a faculty member's annual salary is paid in each of the three academic quarters. Petitioner was paid through May 30, 1980, by Florida State University, and received no payment for services rendered during the month of June, 1980. However, when Florida State University officials were advised by respondent's personnel that Petitioner's request to establish May 30, 1980 as his termination date for retirement purposes would not be honored, Petitioner was advised that the University stood ready to pay him the $468.08 which he would have received for his work in June, 1980, had he not chosen the May 30, 1980 employment termination date. The record reflects that Petitioner made the decision to choose May 30, 1980, as his employment termination date, rather than the later date of June 5, 1980, during counseling sessions with representatives of Respondent, when it became apparent to them that he could receive $1,554.64 in retirement benefits for the month of June, as opposed to the $468.08 he would receive in June in salary had he chosen to continue to receive his salary for services performed at Florida State University. Petitioner was correctly advised by Respondent's personnel that by working through June 5, 1980, and earning salary for that time period, he would be ineligible to begin accruing retirement benefits until the end of June, 1980.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57121.091
# 5
ROBERT P. HATCHER vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 93-005528 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Sep. 27, 1993 Number: 93-005528 Latest Update: Aug. 17, 1995

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, Mr. Robert P. Hatcher, is eligible to retire under the Florida Retirement System rather than under the Teachers' Retirement System.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed by the Hillsborough County School Board on August 25, 1959, and was enrolled in the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) at that time. The Petitioner worked for the Palm Beach County School Board for 27 years, from 1966 through May 15, 1992. The Petitioner worked with no breaks in service during all years in which the Legislature provided open enrollment periods for members of the TRS to transfer to the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The Petitioner was aware of the open enrollment periods, but declined all opportunities to transfer to the FRS. In this regard, the Petitioner specifically rejected membership in the FRS for the 1974 and 1978 open enrollment periods by signed ballots dated November 27, 1974, and November 2, 1978. Petitioner voluntarily terminated his employment with the Palm Beach County School Board on May 15, 1992. Following his termination with the Palm Beach County School Board, Petitioner began seeking employment with an agency that participated in the FRS in order to become eligible to transfer from the TRS to the FRS. The Petitioner's first contact with the Okeechobee County School Board (OCSB) was approximately two years ago when Dr. Mary Gray, Petitioner's acquaintance, introduced Petitioner to Mr. Owens. The Petitioner approached Mr. Owens in an attempt to obtain employment with the OCSB. The Petitioner sought employment with the OCSB for the sole purpose of obtaining entry into the FRS. Mr. Owens recruited and interviewed the Petitioner for the position of Custodian I at the OCSB. At the time the Petitioner was recruited and interviewed, Mr. Owens knew the Petitioner wanted to work for the OCSB for the sole purpose of establishing retirement eligibility. The Petitioner requested that he be hired to work only long enough to establish retirement eligibility by working for a state employer that was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Prior to the Petitioner's request, the OCSB had never had such a request before. The OCSB hired the Petitioner with the knowledge that he had health problems and believing that he would not be able to perform the duties of custodian for more than a short period of time. By letter dated June 23, 1993, the OCSB approved the Petitioner's employment as Custodian I for the OCSB effective June 30, 1993. The Custodian I position was classified as a regular position, not a short-term position. The Petitioner reported to work at the Okeechobee High School on June 30, 1993. He answered phones for several hours, performed some inventory work, then resigned that afternoon. The OCSB acknowledged receipt of the Petitioner's resignation letter, effective June 30, 1993, by letter dated August 2, 1993. The Petitioner submitted an application for membership in the FRS to the OCSB on June 30, 1993. Prior to his employment with the OCSB, the Petitioner investigated the possibility of transferring from the TRS to the FRS. The Petitioner was neither told nor did he receive any written communication by the DOR that he could transfer to the FRS based upon employment for one day. By letter dated August 16, 1993, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that he could not obtain entry into the FRS because his employment was not bona fide, but that he could retire under the TRS. If the Petitioner were to retire under the TRS, his Option 1 monthly benefit payment would be $2,571.64; his Option 3 monthly benefit payment would be $2,396.25. Under the FRS, Petitioner's Option 1 monthly benefit payment would be $3,054.91; his Option 3 monthly benefit payment would be $2,771.20.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement issue a final order concluding that the Petitioner is not eligible for participation in the Florida Retirement System and denying Petitioner's application for transfer from the Teachers' Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January 1994. APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs a and b: Accepted in substance. Paragraph c: Accepted in part and rejected in part; accepted that the Petitioner obtained the described employment, but rejected that the employment was bona fide. Paragraph d: Accepted in part and rejected in part. The conclusion that the one day was sufficient to qualify the Petitioner for transfer to FRS is rejected as incorrect and as not warranted by the evidence; the remainder of the facts in this paragraph are accepted. Paragraph e: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact; a conclusion which is, in any event, not warranted by the evidence in this case. Paragraph f: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact; a conclusion which is, in any event, not warranted by the evidence in this case. Findings submitted by Respondent: All of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent have been accepted in whole or in substance in the Findings of Fact made in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Jodi B. Jennings, Esquire Division of Retirement Building C Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Allan L. Hoffman, Esquire 1610 Southern Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 3406 J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sylvan Strickland, Acting General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (6) 120.57121.011121.031121.051121.052121.055 Florida Administrative Code (2) 60S-1.00260S-6.001
# 7
ROBERT DANIELS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 19-002093 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Apr. 18, 2019 Number: 19-002093 Latest Update: Oct. 05, 2024
# 8
DAVID MORAN vs STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, 17-005785 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 18, 2017 Number: 17-005785 Latest Update: Jul. 06, 2018

The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2017),1/ Petitioner forfeited his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account after he was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.

Findings Of Fact The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. See § 121.021(3), Fla. Stat. Petitioner was a state employee and a special risk class member of the FRS. Work History Petitioner was a 20-year DOC employee. Since 2004, he served as a sergeant at the Reception and Medical Center at Lake Butler, Florida (Center). A sergeant is a supervisory position whose duties include the “care, custody and control of inmates.” Retaliating against an inmate is a violation of DOC policy and the oath administered to correction officers.2/ Witnessing or having knowledge of a DOC officer’s conspiracy to murder a former inmate, and failing to report that conspiracy would also be a violation of a DOC sergeant’s duties. As explained by Petitioner, such conduct would be, “outside the guidelines. That’s not the rules. That’s not what [a DOC sergeant is] supposed to do.” Underlying Crime On August 4, 2013, Thomas Driver, a DOC corrections officer who worked at the Center at the same time as Petitioner, was involved in an altercation with an inmate (referred to as Mr. Williams). During that altercation Mr. Williams bit Mr. Driver. Charles Newcomb was a former DOC employee who knew Petitioner from the Center and also about Mr. Driver’s incident with Mr. Williams. All of the DOC employees at the Center knew about the incident between Mr. Williams and Mr. Driver. Based on information they gathered from working at the Center, Mr. Driver, Mr. Newcomb and Petitioner (collectively referred to as the conspirators) believed Mr. Williams had a contagious medical condition and intentionally bit Mr. Driver to infect him. After the incident Mr. Driver was subject to treatment for a possible infection. Mr. Williams was African-American. Although their race is not apparent from the record, in December 2014, the conspirators were members of a local chapter KKK. Joe Moore, served as a Knighthawk for the KKK. A Knighthawk is the person responsible for security at KKK events and traditionally is responsible for the security and protection of the KKK Grand Dragon (the leader of the local KKK chapter). Petitioner and his fellow KKK members (also referred to as “klansmen”) knew that Mr. Moore was a veteran and had training as a sniper. Unbeknownst to the conspirators, however, Mr. Moore was a undercover informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). Although Mr. Newcomb and Mr. Driver referred to each other and Mr. Moore as “Brother,” they referred to and addressed Petitioner as “Sarge” based on his position as a DOC sergeant at the Center. On December 6, 2014, Mr. Driver and Petitioner approached Mr. Moore at a KKK event. As they spoke, Mr. Newcomb stood nearby to ensure that the other klansmen would not interrupt or overhear the conversation. Mr. Driver and Petitioner showed Mr. Moore a picture of an African-American male. The picture was on an 8” x 10” piece of paper that looked as if it had been printed from a database. It was apparent to Mr. Moore at the time that it was a picture of an inmate. After speaking with Petitioner and Mr. Driver, Mr. Moore believed they wanted his help to harm or kill Mr. Williams. Mr. Moore immediately notified the FBI of his conversation with Petitioner and Mr. Driver. At the FBI’s request, Mr. Moore began wearing a microphone and secretly, but legally, taping and transmitting his conversations with the conspirators. Eventually, it was confirmed that the conspirators wanted Mr. Williams put “six-feet under.” Mr. Driver explained to Mr. Moore the graphic nature of the altercation, his subsequent blood treatment as a result of Mr. Williams’ attack, and the fact Mr. Williams served very little time for the attack before he was released on probation. Mr. Driver clearly wanted revenge. Mr. Driver: Yeah, it pissed me off. If I could I’d kick his fricking throat out. Mr. Moore: That’s not necessary I’m all over it we’re all over . . . how do you want [it] done? Mr. Driver: Well. I’m going to tell you like this: If it was me personally and I had another chance at him I’d stomp his larynx. On January 30, 2015, Petitioner, Mr. Newcomb, and Mr. Moore met at a prearranged location and time to drive to the area of Mr. Williams’ home. Mr. Williams had been released and was no longer in custody at the Center. Mr. Driver was intentionally absent from this drive so that he would not come under suspicion for the actions Petitioner and Mr. Newcomb were planning to take that night. In fact, based on his knowledge from working at the Center, Petitioner assured the group that Mr. Driver was working the night shift at the Center and, therefore, had an alibi. Petitioner clearly knew the purpose of the drive was to attempt to kill Mr. Williams. Prior to the drive, Petitioner asked when they were going to “grab him” and discussed with the others whether he should bring his gun on the ride. He told the others that he had obtained the gun, a nine-millimeter, from “the guy that I work with.” Petitioner also wanted to wear protective clothing because he knew, presumably from his work as a DOC sergeant at the Center, that Mr. Williams had a contagious infection or disease. During the car ride, Petitioner discussed the best way to terminate Mr. Williams without raising suspicion. Mr. Newcomb suggested abducting Mr. Williams, injecting him with insulin, and leaving him near the water with a fishing pole. Petitioner said this would look suspicious unless Mr. Williams was known to go fishing. The men also discussed how to dispose of Mr. Williams’ body. Petitioner suggested a “complete disposal” by chopping up the body. At some point that night Mr. Newcomb indicated a recent picture of Mr. Williams would be helpful; Petitioner agreed to “go to work and pull up [Mr. Williams’] picture.” When they arrived in Mr. Williams’ neighborhood, Petitioner made numerous offensive and stereotypical remarks about African-Americans. Neither Petitioner nor the others took any action against Mr. Williams the night of the January 30 drive; and Mr. Williams was never harmed.3/ On March 19, 2015, Mr. Moore met with Petitioner and showed him a staged picture of Mr. Williams’ body lying on the ground in a pool of blood. Upon seeing the photo of what he believed was Mr. Williams’ dead body, Petitioner laughed and stated, “I love it. F—king p-d on himself . . . good f-king job.” During that same meeting, Mr. Moore asked Petitioner if he was happy with the results. Petitioner seemed elated: Mr. Moore: And, we need to make sure that everybody was happy with it. Petitioner: Hell yeah . . . uh Brother I love you, man. . . . I will call [Mr. Driver] as soon as I get – dude you don’t know how happy . . . I love you, brother. I love you, brother. I love you brother. At the final hearing, Petitioner claimed he did not intend to hurt Mr. Williams, but only went along with the others because he believed it was part of the KKK initiation process; and that he was entrapped by the FBI. He also argued he did not know the victim was Mr. Williams or that he was a former inmate. Petitioner’s assertions are not credible and his testimony is unbelievable for a number of reasons. First, the evidence at the underlying criminal trial established the conspirators did not want KKK leaders to know about the plan to attack Mr. Williams. Petitioner admitted the KKK oath includes a promise not to commit acts of violence. These facts contradict the assertion that Petitioner was pretending to plan the death of an African-American (who coincidentally happened to be a former inmate) just to prove his loyalty to the KKK. Second, although he claimed he was unaware of the purpose of the January 30 car ride or that Mr. Williams was a former inmate, the transcripts of the taped recordings clearly establish this is not true. In fact, Petitioner not only knew who the intended victim was, but knew he had attacked Mr. Driver and that he allegedly had an infectious disease. Third, Petitioner’s testimony that he was a passive participant induced by the FBI informant into planning the death of Mr. Williams is also implausible. Again, Petitioner offered to bring a gun along on the ride, offered advice on how to possibly set up the attack so that it looked like an accident, and suggested how to dispose of Mr. Williams’ body. Petitioner’s reaction to seeing Mr. Williams’ body in the photo also contradicts any contention that he did not intend harm to Mr. Williams or that he did not derive any pleasure from his death. Finally, Petitioner testified he was not racist. This was clearly contradicted by the statements he made about African- Americans during the January 30 car ride. Similarly, his testimony that he was a passive KKK member who only participated in its social aspects (i.e., picnics and “fellowship”) was belied by his own acknowledgment that his wife did not want him to be a member of the KKK, and that he participated in cross-burnings.4/ On August 11, 2017, a jury found Mr. Moran guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Murder in the First Degree.5/ Findings of Ultimate Fact The evidence clearly establishes there is a nexus between Petitioner’s employment as a DOC correctional sergeant at the Center and the commission of the felony of conspiracy to commit murder. Petitioner’s actions were intentional and he knew his participation in the conspiracy was illegal. Petitioner knowingly violated his obligation as a sworn correctional officer by participating in the conspiracy and not reporting the criminal activity committed by the other conspirators. Petitioner defrauded the public from receiving the faithful performance of his duties as a DOC sergeant. The public had a right to expect that one entrusted with guarding inmates would not act as a violent vigilante to exact revenge for a fellow correctional officer. Petitioner realized a profit, gain, or advantage from the commission of the crime in the form of self-gratification and comradery with and respect from Mr. Driver. Petitioner used his power, rights, privileges, and the knowledge accessible to him through his work as a correctional officer to facilitate his crime.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of a specified offense committed prior to retirement; and that pursuant to section 112.3173, he has forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account, except for the return of his accumulated contributions as of the date of his termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2018.

Florida Laws (6) 112.3173120.569120.57121.021777.0490.803
# 9
KENNETH JENNE vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 08-001829 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Apr. 14, 2008 Number: 08-001829 Latest Update: May 28, 2009

The Issue Whether the Petition has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS) as a result of a guilty plea in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, for acts committed in connection with Petitioner's employment with the Broward County Sheriff's Department.

Findings Of Fact From the Joint Stipulation of Facts: The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS on behalf of the Department of Management Services. Petitioner was employed as an Assistant State Attorney by the State Attorney's Office from December 1972 to January 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed as Executive Director of the Broward County Charter Commission from January 1974 to November 1974. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS and this service is credited as service under the FRS. Petitioner was employed by the Broward County Board of County Commissioners from March 1975 to November 1978. During this time, Petitioner was a member of the FRS, and this service is credited as service under the FRS. In November 1978, Petitioner was elected to serve as a member of the Florida Legislature; he continued to serve as a state legislator for approximately 18 years. As a state legislator, Petitioner was a member of the FRS class of State Elected Officers, and this service is credited service under the FRS. Most recently, Petitioner was the elected Sheriff of Broward County. By reason of his service as Sheriff, Petitioner was a member of the FRS. Petitioner was initially appointed Sheriff in January 1998 by then-Governor Lawton Chiles. Petitioner was subsequently elected Sheriff in 1998 and reelected in 2000 and 2004. As Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner was Broward County's chief law enforcement officer and was responsible for directing the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BSO"), a law enforcement agency that currently employs over 6,000 employees. The office of Sheriff is a constitutional office established under Article VIII, Section 1(d), Constitution of Florida. Upon assuming his duties as Sheriff of Broward County, Petitioner took an oath to support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States and the State of Florida and to faithfully perform the duties of sheriff pursuant to Article II, Section 5(b), Constitution of Florida. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner wrote a letter to Governor Charlie Crist notifying him of his resignation from the office of Sheriff of Broward County. By reply letter of the same date, Governor Crist accepted Petitioner's resignation. Petitioner is not retired from the FRS and currently does not receive FRS retirement benefits. On or about September 4, 2007, Petitioner was charged, by information, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, and three counts of filing a false tax return, in violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206(1). The same four-count information is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr- 60209-WPB as document 1. At all times relevant to the information, Petitioner was the Sheriff of Broward County. The section of the information entitled "General Allegations" contains numerous references to Petitioner's service as Sheriff of Broward County and the power and authority vested in that position. The "Objects of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: An object of the conspiracy was for JENNE to unlawfully enrich himself by obtaining monies from P.P. and L.N., who were Broward Sheriff's Office vendors, by making false representations, omitting to state material facts, and concealing material facts concerning, among other things, the ultimate destination of monies that JENNE asked P.P. and L.N. to give to his secretaries, A.V. and M.Y. It was further an object of the scheme for JENNE to perpetuate and conceal the scheme and the actions taken in furtherance of it by, among other things, making false, misleading, and incomplete statements in public filings and to investigators. The "Manner and Means of the Conspiracy" contained in count one of the information states: JENNE and M.Y. arranged for JENNE to receive $20,000 from P.P. by having the money transferred from P.P. through JENNE's secretary, M.Y., to JENNE. JENNE and M.Y. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds. JENNE provided L.N. with access to off- duty Broward Sheriff's Office deputies, who L.N. hired to do work for his companies. On two different occasions, in exchange for the access to the deputies, JENNE instructed L.N. to pay money to JENNE's secretary, A.V., purportedly to compensate A.V. for work done for L.N. JENNE instructed A.V. to cash checks given to her by L.N. and to have the cash deposited into JENNE's bank account. JENNE and A.V. did this in order to conceal that JENNE was the true recipient of the funds, which totaled $5,500. JENNE perpetuated this fraud and attempted to prevent its detection by mailing incomplete and misleading annual financial disclosure forms, which did not list his receipt of the payments from P.P. and L.N., to the Florida Commission on Ethics. On or about September 5, 2007, after being advised of the nature of the charges against him, the above-referenced information, and of his rights, Petitioner waived in open court prosecution by indictment and consented to proceeding by information. The same waiver of indictment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 13. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered into an agreement with the United States of America to plead guilty as charged in the four-count information. The same plea agreement is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 3. Paragraph 7.c. of the plea agreement provides: 7. The United States and the defendant agree that, although not binding on the probation office or the court, they will jointly recommend that the court make the following findings and conclusions as to the sentence to be imposed: * * * c. Advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count: That, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, the applicable guideline to be used in calculating the defendant's advisory sentencing range on the conspiracy to commit mail fraud count is § 2B1.1; that under § 2B1.1(a)(1), the Base Offense Level is 7; that under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), four levels are added because the loss was between $10,000 and $30,000; that under § 3B1.3, two levels are added because of the defendant's abuse of his position of public trust; and that under § 3E1.1(b), two levels are subtracted for acceptance of responsibility . . . The United States Sentencing Guide, Section 3B1.3, referenced in paragraph 7.c of the plea agreement, provides in relevant part that "[i]f the defendant abused a position of public . . . trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels." USSG § 3B1.3. Paragraphs 10. and 12. of the plea agreement provide: 10. The defendant confirms that he is guilty of the offenses to which he is pleading guilty; that his decision to plead guilty is the decision that he has made; and that nobody has forced, threatened, or coerced him into pleading guilty. The defendant affirms that he has discussed this matter thoroughly with his attorneys. The defendant further affirms that his discussions with his attorneys have included discussion of possible defenses that he may raise if the case were to go to trial, as well as possible issues and arguments that he may raise at sentencing. The defendant additionally affirms that he is satisfied with the representation provided by his attorneys. The defendant accordingly affirms that he is entering into this agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and with the benefit of full, complete, and effective assistance by his attorneys. * * * 12. This is the entire agreement and understanding between the United States and the defendant. There are no other agreements, promises, representations, or understandings. On or about September 5, 2007, Petitioner entered a statement of factual basis for guilty plea with the United States of America (hereinafter "factual proffer"), wherein he agreed that, if the case went to trial, the government would have been able to establish the facts recited therein beyond a reasonable doubt. The same factual proffer is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 8. On or about September 5, 2007, a hearing was held in which Petitioner pled guilty as charged in the information. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted to committing the acts set forth in the charges and to which he pled guilty. In addition, at the hearing Petitioner admitted to the following facts and to committing the following actions: At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that he received an $8,130 benefit from P.P. in November 2001 in connection with the demolition of a house he owned in Lake Worth, Florida. Within P.P.'s internal accounting system, the $8,130 check was attributed to the "HIDTA project" (i.e., a lease committing BSO and HIDTA as tenants of an office building owned by P.P.). Petitioner never reported the $8,130 benefit on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. At no point in time did Petitioner ever disclose to the public that, in September 2002, he had received $10,000 from P.P. as a reward for his work concerning a new company called SuperTech Products, Inc. Petitioner never reported the $10,000 payment on any of his state ethics disclosure forms, nor did he ever make a disclosure in any other fashion. Prior to becoming Sheriff, Petitioner was a partner in Conrad, Scherer & Jenne, a law firm located in Fort Lauderdale. Petitioner was with the firm from 1992 through the beginning of 1998, when he left to become Sheriff. While Petitioner was at the firm, he, like some other partners, drove a car paid for by the firm's investment arm, CSJ Investments. In October, 1997, at Petitioner's request, the law firm, through CSJ Investments, bought a used 1994 Mercedes E320 convertible for Petitioner to drive. The price of the Mercedes was $61,297. Rather than pay for the car all at once, the firm financed the car with a 60-month loan. When Petitioner left the firm in early 1998 following his appointment as Sheriff, he took the Mercedes with him. Despite the fact that Petitioner no longer worked for the firm, the firm continued to pay off the Mercedes loan for the balance of the loan term, making the final payment in 2003. The loan payments were $1,320 per month, resulting in a total eventual cost to the firm of approximately $79,234 in loan payments, all but approximately $1,320, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. In addition, after Petitioner left the law firm, the firm continued to pay for the insurance on the Mercedes. The insurance payments continued even unto September 2007. At that time, the firm had made a total of approximately $30,961 in insurance payments on Petitioner's behalf, all but approximately $880, of which were made after Petitioner had already left the firm to become Sheriff. Petitioner never disclosed any of the loan payments or insurance payments made by the firm on his behalf on any state ethics filing. During the time that Petitioner was receiving these undisclosed payments from Conrad, Scherer, the firm was billing BCSO for legal work that it was doing on its behalf. At the hearing, Petitioner did not take any exception or make any objections to the facts as summarized in the factual proffer. In fact, with the exception of one non-substantive addition, Petitioner accepted the factual proffer as indicated. On or about November 16, 2007, a judgment was entered on the aforesaid guilty plea, wherein Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of all counts charged in the four-count information. The same judgment is filed in U.S. District Court (S.D. Fla.) in case number 0:07-cr-60209-WPB as document 59. By certified letter dated January 24, 2008, Petitioner was notified of Respondent's proposed action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of the aforesaid guilty plea. The notice set forth the basis for the Division's decision and informed Petitioner of his right to an administrative hearing. Petitioner, by and through counsel, timely requested a formal administrative hearing to challenge said proposed agency action. [End of Stipulated Facts] The parties agreed that the following exhibits would be considered in this cause: Petitioner's resignation letter dated September 4, 2007; Governor Crist's letter accepting Petitioner's resignation dated September 4, 2007; The Information filed against Petitioner on September 4, 2007, in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Plea Agreement offered in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Statement of Factual Basis for Guilty Plea of Defendant Kenneth C. Jenne in United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Transcript of the Plea of Guilty before the Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, U.S. District Judge, United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209- WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Waiver of Indictment from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Judgment in a Criminal Case from United States of America v. Kenneth C. Jenne, Case No. 0:07-cr-60209-WPB, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida; The Agency Action letter dated January 24, 2008; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2001 (with attachments and amendments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, June 27, 2002; Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2002 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 7, 2003; and Form 6 Full and Public Disclosure of Financial Interests 2004 (with attachments), Ken Jenne, Sheriff, Broward County, Elected Constitutional Officer, July 1, 2005. Petitioner did not have a trial on the merits of the charges against him. Instead, he voluntarily accepted and admitted to the factual allegations set forth in the charging and plea documents. The factual statements set forth in those documents are not subject to interpretation or conjecture. They must be considered facts of this case based upon the stipulation of the parties. Petitioner was notified of the Department's preliminary decision to forfeit the FRS benefits and rights and Petitioner timely challenged that decision.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding Petitioner was convicted of crimes that require the forfeiture of his rights and benefits under the FRS, pursuant to Florida law. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Mark Herron, Esquire Thomas M. Findley, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Post Office Box 15579 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5579 Clifford A. Taylor, Esquire Barbara M. Crosier, Esquire Geoffrey M. Christian, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160D Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

USC (2) 18 U. S. C. 37126 U. S. C. 7206 Florida Laws (6) 112.3173120.57121.091800.04838.15838.16
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer