The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-10.041(3)(d) of the South Florida Water Management District (“the District”) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Conservancy is a non-profit Florida corporation with its offices in Naples, Florida. It has 6,200 members residing in Southwest Florida. The mission of the Conservancy is to protect the environment and natural resources of Southwest Florida. The Caloosahatchee River is an important focus of the Conservancy’s organizational activities and objectives. A substantial number of the members of the Conservancy use the Caloosahatchee River for drinking water, boating, fishing, wildlife observation, and scientific research. The proposed rules create a prospective reservation of water in the not-yet-operational Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Reservoir “for fish and wildlife.” The Conservancy’s interests would be substantially affected by the proposed reservation. The District is a regional water management agency created, granted powers, and assigned duties under chapter 373, Florida Statutes (2013). It is headquartered in West Palm Beach, Florida. Proposed rule 40E-10.041(3) states: (3) Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir: All surface water contained within and released, via operation, from the Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir is reserved from allocation. The water reserved under this paragraph will be available for fish and wildlife upon a formal determination of the Governing Board, pursuant to state and federal law, that the Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir is operational. The reservation contained within this subsection and the criteria contained in section 3.11.4 of the Applicant’s Handbook for Water Use Permit Applications within the South Florida Water Management District, incorporated by reference in Rule 40E-2.091, F.A.C., shall be revised in light of changed conditions or new information prior to the approval described in paragraph (3)(b) above. Pursuant to subsection 373.223(4), F.S., presently existing legal uses for the duration of a permit existing on [RULE ADOPTION DATE] are not contrary to the public interest. The Conservancy challenges only paragraph (3)(d), contending that it modifies or contravenes the implementing statute, section 373.223(4).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Florida Clearwater Beach Hotel, Inc., is the owner of Lots 1-5 and 49-52 at 490 North Gulfview Boulevard, Clearwater Beach, Florida. Lots 1-5 are located on the southwest corner of Baymont Street and Gulfview Boulevard and front directly on Clearwater Beach. They measure approximately one hundred feet in depth and one hundred forty-one feet at their widest point. Lots 49-52 lie immediately across the street from Lots 1-5 and are approximately one hundred feet south of Baymont Street. They form a square and measure one hundred feet on each side. Petitioner purchased the property in question in 1978. Prior to that time the two parcels of land enjoyed common ownership and a common development pattern for at least forty years. A twenty-two room facility presently sits on Lots 1-5 and is rented out as ten units. Lots 49-52 are used as a parking lot for the tenants and guests of the facility. The property is presently zoned CTF-28 (High Density Commercial Tourist Facilities), which provides for a complete range of motel/hotel developments. The major emphasis of the district is tourist oriented with a permitted maximum density of forty-two hotel or motel units per acre. Petitioner wishes to destroy the existing structure and replace it with a new rectangular-shaped facility containing approximately twenty-two motel or hotel units. Because of the need to comply with flood ordinances, it must be built on pilings or piers. The proposed new structure will consist of four living levels over grade level parking. Petitioner's property measures less than two hundred feet in depth; therefore, the maximum height of its proposed facility cannot exceed forty feet under existing zoning requirements. Other property owners whose lots exceed two hundred feet in depth may construct buildings not to exceed eighty feet in height. Under present plans, the proposed hotel will have a forty-four foot height, which will require a four-foot variance. Petitioner contends that the hotel cannot be built with smaller dimensions. It also contends that a vista or side setback on the northwest corner of the building is required since present plans call for a small portion of the building to project into the vista area. This is due to the north property line running at an angle to the south property line and the proposed building being rectangular in shape. This variance will be contingent upon the City vacating a right-of-way adjacent to Baymont Street, thereby giving Petitioner an additional twenty feet in which to build its new facility. The City opposes the application on the ground that all criteria necessary to grant a variance have not been met. It specifically points out that the problems encountered by Petitioner are not unique to Petitioner alone, but are hardships common to all area owners.
Findings Of Fact James R. Gray owns Lots 10, 11, 12 and 13, Clearwater Beach Park, as recorded in Plat Book 10, p. 42, of the official Records of Pinellas County. These lots are located on Clearwater Beach in an area zoned CTF-28. For the past several years beach chairs, umbrellas and cabanas have been rented for use in the vicinity of these lots and a portable 4' x 8' building standing on these lots has been used to store the chairs, umbrellas and cabanas when not rented. Gray proposes to replace the 4' x 8' building with an 8' x 10' portable aluminum shed from which to operate the business of renting beach equipment and expand it to include the sale of suntan lotion, soft drinks, and related items. The business will be operated by Roy Pearl, a co-applicant with Gray in these proceedings. Gray and Pearl applied for a building permit to erect the portable shed and their application was rejected by the City of Clearwater Building Department on the basis that the proposed use of the property was not in conformity with the Building and Zoning Regulations and did not fit the special exceptions provided by Section 131.099 of the Zoning Regulations. The latter determination was made by the Clearwater Planning Department. Gray then submitted on a City of Clearwater form an Application-- Request for Special Exception to the Clearwater Board of Adjustment and Appeal on Zoning, which, as noted above, approved the application. The area in question comprises a private beach; and businesses in the vicinity consist of motels, hotels, apartments and restaurants. An 8-unit motel occupies part of the site involved. The location of the proposed portable aluminum shed is on Lots 12 and 13, approximately 150 feet seaward of the seawall which separates the beach from the business establishment seaward of Gulf View Boulevard. Approximately 150 feet south of this proposed location is a similar storage shed operated in conjunction with a sailboat rental business. Some of the hotels and motels on Clearwater Beach rent umbrellas, chairs and cabanas, some of which are stored when not in use in storage sheds located more than 100 feet from the main building. On the public beach the City of Clearwater operates a concession which provides the same services proposed by applicant. The chairs, umbrellas, and cabanas are utilized by guests of the motels and apartments located in the vicinity and by tourists who are using this area of the beach for sunbathing or swimming.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Petitioner is entitled to an environmental resource permit and modified sovereignty submerged land lease for the construction of commercial marinas and related structures at Petitioners property in Lee County, Florida. PRELIMARY STATEMENT On October 23, 2006, Petitioner applied to the South Florida Water Management District (“District”) for an environmental resource permit (“ERP”). Petitioner also sought modification of its sovereignty submerged land lease ("Lease") from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board of Trustees). On September 28, 2007, the District issued a Staff Report recommending that the ERP and Lease be denied. The Governing Board of the District adopted the staff’s recommendation on October 11, 2007. On October 12, 2007, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing challenging the agency action. The District referred the petition to DOAH to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The case was abated for an extended period of time during which the parties attempted to settle their disputes. In October 2009, Intervenors' petition to intervene was granted. Intervenors were subsequently granted leave to amend their petition. Following notice from the parties that they were unable to settle their disputes, a final hearing was scheduled. At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of: Michael Morris, Jr.; David Depew; and Hans Wilson, accepted as an expert in ocean engineering, environmental sciences and navigation. Petitioner presented the testimony of Anita Bain through the introduction of her deposition. Petitioner's Exhibits 5, 8, 9, 14 through 16, 19, 20, 24, 26, 30, 34, 35, 40 through 43, 46 through 50, 52, and 56 through 58, were admitted into evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit 35 was accepted as a proffer. The District presented the testimony of: Holly Bauer- Windhorst, accepted as an expert in environmental biology; Melinda Parrott, accepted as an expert in marine biology and environmental impact analysis; Anita Bain, accepted as an expert in biology and environmental impact assessments; Robert Brantly, a professional engineer and Director of the Department's Bureau of Coastal Engineering; and Mary Duncan, accepted as an expert in biology and manatee impact assessment. The testimony of Peter Eckenrode was presented through his deposition. The District's Exhibits 5, 10, 12, and 14 through 18 were admitted into evidence. Intervenors presented the testimony of: Leonardo Nero, accepted as an expert in marine biology, seagrass conservation, oceanography, navigation, and vessel operation and maintenance; Gary Shelton; Sally Eastman; and Christine Desjarlais-Leuth. Intervenors' Exhibits 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 14 were admitted into evidence. The two-volume Transcript of the hearing was filed with DOAH. The parties filed proposed recommended orders. Petitioner filed revised pages to its proposed recommended order to correct scrivener's errors. Petitioner moved to strike an issue that was raised for the first time in the District and Intervenors' Joint Proposed Recommended Order. The motion to strike is granted as discussed in the Conclusions of Law.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Highpoint Tower Technology, Inc., is a Florida corporation with its mailing address at 800 South Osprey Avenue, Building B, Sarasota, Florida 34246. Petitioner is the owner of property located in Section 25, Township 45 South, Range 22 East, in Lee County, Florida, consisting of approximately eight acres. The property is on Bokeelia Island, on the northern tip of Pine Island. Petitioner is the applicant for the ERP and Lease which is the subject of this proceeding. The District is a regional water management agency with powers and duties established in Chapter 373, Florida Statutes. Its principal office is located at 3301 Gun Club Road in West Palm Beach. The District regulates certain construction activities in waters of the state pursuant to Chapter 373, Part IV, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 40E. The District has also been delegated authority from the Board of Trustees to process applications for submerged land leases for structures and activities on or over sovereignty submerged lands. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.0051. Intervenor Sally Eastman resides on property adjacent to the proposed project. Intervenors, Christine Desjarlias-Leuth and Ron Leuth, own and reside on riparian property approximately 400 feet from the proposed project. Intervenor Gary Shelton owns and resides on riparian property near the proposed project. All Intervenors use the waters of Charlotte Harbor for water-based recreational activities, including fishing, swimming, boating, wading, and nature observation. The Affected Waterbodies The north side of Petitioner's property is adjacent to Charlotte Harbor. The south side of the property is adjacent to Back Bay. Both waterbodies are within the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve. The aquatic preserve is an Outstanding Florida Water. Aquatic preserves are so designated because they have exceptional biological, aesthetic, and scientific value. It is the intent of the Legislature that aquatic preserves be set aside forever as sanctuaries for the benefit of the public. See § 258.36, Fla. Stat. Aquatic preserves were established for the purpose of being preserved in an essentially natural or existing condition so that their aesthetic, biological and scientific values may endure for the enjoyment of future generations. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.001(1). Charlotte Harbor in this location is a large expanse of open water with 10 to 12 miles of fetch to the north, making it subject to high winds and waves during storms. The water bottom of Charlotte Harbor is sandy. There are many areas of Charlotte Harbor with "prop scars," which are caused when boats travel in shallow waters and impact the bottom with boat motor propellers. There are seagrasses growing in the vicinity of Petitioner's Charlotte Harbor shoreline, mostly Thallasia testudinum (turtle grass) and Syringodium filiforme (manatee grass). Healthy turtle grass beds are growing near the proposed marina structures in Charlotte Harbor. There was some dispute about whether the turtle grass is 12 inches or 18 inches in length. The more persuasive evidence is that mature turtle grass is 18 inches in length. If there is turtle grass of shorter length in the area of the proposed project, it will eventually mature to a length of 18 inches. These seagrass communities qualify as a Resource Protection Area ("RPA") 1, which is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.003(54) as "[a]reas in aquatic preserves which have resources of the highest quality and condition for that area." There is also small patch of soft whip coral offshore, as well as some sea lettuce and interstitial algae on the sandy bottom. No water quality data for this area of Charlotte Harbor was presented by Petitioner. West Indian manatees are known to forage and move in the area near Petitioner's Charlotte Harbor shoreline, as well as in Back Bay. The manatee is a "listed" species. Back Bay is a small, semi-enclosed bay. It is shallow, averaging around four feet in depth at mean low water. A narrow passage known as Jug Creek leads out of Back Bay to Pine Island Sound. There are no seagrasses along Petitioner's shoreline on Back Bay, but there are seagrasses elsewhere in Back Bay. There are many prop scars in the shallower areas of Back Bay. The water bottom in Back Bay is silty and organic. It can be easily stirred up by boats and propeller action. No water quality data for Back was presented by Petitioner. Existing Structures A public access fishing pier extends about 400 feet from Petitioner's property into Charlotte Harbor, generally forming a "T." The pier has existed for decades and was one of the first landing and offloading piers in the region for commercial fishing activities, with fish houses on the adjacent uplands. The riparian owner obtained title to the submerged lands beneath the fishing pier by operation of the Butler Act, which vests title in the riparian upland owner to submerged lands if structures were erected over or upon the submerged lands before 1951. Therefore, a submerged land lease from the Board of Trustees is not required for the fishing pier. However, Petitioner obtained a submerged lands lease in 2000 for two recreational boat slips along the east side of the pier. There is a seawall along Petitioner's Charlotte Harbor shoreline. Petitioner's upland was formerly occupied by approximately 120 mobile homes, which were served by septic tanks. The mobile homes were removed two or three years ago and Petitioner obtained a separate environmental resource permit from the District in May 2006 for a proposed new residential and commercial development on the uplands called Bokeelia Harbor Resort. Construction of the new development, which would include single-family homes, multi-family buildings, a swimming facility, and a restaurant, has not yet begun. In Back Bay, Petitioner's shoreline has a seawall and a number of finger piers extending off the seawall. Petitioner has two submerged land leases in Back Bay, one that authorizes 50 boat slips and another that authorizes 10 slips. Only about a dozen boats have been using these slips in recent years. There are two boat ramps on Petitioner's property for access to Back Bay. The record evidence leaves unclear whether the ramps were for the exclusive use of the former mobile home residents or were used by the general public. The historical and current use of the boat ramps, in terms of the average number of launches per month or year, was not established in the record. There is a man-made, seawalled canal or basin on Petitioner's property that connects to Back Bay. There are piers and slips in the canal, which Petitioner claims could accommodate about 30 boats. Aerial photographs of the canal indicate that 20 to 25 boats is a more reasonable estimate. The water bottom of the canal is privately owned and, therefore, does not require a submerged lands lease. Petitioner presented inconsistent information about the number of existing boat slips in Back Bay. Petitioner claimed that there are as many as 108 slips in Back Bay. That number seems impossible, given that only 60 slips are authorized by the two submerged land leases. There was no exhibit presented to show where the 108 slips are located. The Department of Community Affairs determined that 85 slips in Back Bay were "vested" for purposes of the development of regional impact review program in Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, which means the slips were constructed before July 1, 1973. The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission thinks there are now 82 boat slips in Back Bay. The Department of Environmental Protection thinks there are 80. Petitioner had a motive to exaggerate the number of existing slips. The unsupported testimony of Petitioner's witness that there are 108 slips in Back Bay was not substantial evidence.1/ It is found that Petitioner currently has approximately 82 boat slips in Back Bay. Petitioner is not currently controlling the use of the slips in Charlotte Harbor and Back Bay, such as by limiting the size or draft of vessels. There are no signs that inform boaters about seagrasses or manatees. There are currently no sewage pump-out facilities. Petitioner is not currently controlling boaters' uses of fuel or other chemicals. However, no evidence was presented to show the extent of any past or current polluting activities. Petitioner sought to show that the septic tanks that had been removed from the upland property were a source of nutrients and other pollutants to Charlotte Harbor. The District and Intervenors objected to this evidence as irrelevant because the ERP and Lease applications do not involve the removal of the septic tanks and their replacement with a central sewage collection system, and because Petitioner removed the septic tanks some years ago as part of its re-development of the uplands. The objection was sustained, but Petitioner was allowed to make a proffer that the removal of the septic tanks improved the water quality of the adjacent waterbodies. The issue was one of relevancy alone, because it was apparently undisputed that the removal of the septic tanks resulted in some unquantified improvement in the water quality of adjacent waterbodies.2/ The Proposed Project Petitioner proposes to construct new commercial docks and related structures (marinas) in both Charlotte Harbor and Back Bay. The Charlotte Harbor marina would have 24 boat slips, which is 22 more slips than currently exist. The Back Bay marina would have 43 slips, which is 39 fewer slips than currently exist. Overall, the proposed project would result in a reduction of about 17 slips. Petitioner would make all boat slips in the marinas available to the public on a “first come - first served” basis. Some slips would be leased on an annual basis. An unspecified number of slips would be for day rental, primarily to accommodate patrons of the restaurant on the uplands. In Charlotte Harbor, a long pier would extend to a dock configuration that forms a marina basin, with concrete panels on three sides extending from above the water line to below the sandy bottom to act as a breakwater. The opening into the marina basin for ingress and egress by boaters would be to the southeast. On the west side of the marina basin would be a 1500 square foot fishing platform. Slips 1 through 5 would be along the east side of the pier and would have boat hoists to raise the boats out of the water. Because seagrasses are growing near slips 1 through 5, Petitioner agreed to limit the draft of boats using these slips to 30 inches. Slips 6 through 24 would be within the protected marina basin. These slips are intended to accommodate larger boats than the kinds of boats that can safely navigate in the shallow waters of Back Bay. However, boats using slips 6 through 24 would not be allowed to have drafts greater than five feet. These slips would not have hoists. All the new slips in Back Bay are designed for a maximum boat length of 30 feet, but the slips vary with regard to maximum allowed draft, from 16 inches to three feet, depending on the depth of the adjacent waters. The Charlotte Harbor marina would extend about 100 feet more waterward so that it would be 500 feet from the shoreline, which is the maximum extension allowed under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1. No boats slips or mooring would be allowed beyond the 500-foot limit. The canal connected to Back Bay would be filled in, and three additional residential units would be placed on the uplands created by the filling. Petitioner suggested that the canal has poor water quality, such as low dissolved oxygen, and that elimination of the canal would be a benefit for the water quality of Back Bay. Petitioner presented no water quality data to support this allegation, but the elimination of the canal would more likely than not have some small water quality benefit for Back Bay. The boat ramps on the upland would be removed. A new seawall would be installed along Petitioner's Back Bay shoreline and approximately 400 reef balls would be placed in the water along the face of the seawall. The reef balls are three feet tall and four feet wide, made of cement, and have openings. It is expected that oysters and barnacles would colonize the reef balls. Because there are oysters, barnacles, and other filter feeders in Back Bay, that expectation is a reasonable one. Fish are likely to be attracted to the reef balls. Petitioner contends that the reef balls, after they are colonized by oysters, will provide water quality benefits, because oysters filter the water when feeding. Although there was some support in the record for this general proposition, there was no evidence presented about the types of pollutants that can be removed from the water by oysters, or the level of water quality improvement that reasonably could be expected. Reef balls have been used at another marina in the region and were determined by the regulatory agencies to provide some public benefit, but Intervenors' expert, Leonard Nero, believes that the value of reef balls is exaggerated. It is his opinion that reef balls do not function like a natural habitat because there is no primary food production or sustainable biological interrelationships. It is found that the proposed reef balls would provide some small environmental benefits to the Back Bay ecosystem. In Back Bay, there are currently no channel markers except in Jug Creek. Petitioner proposes to provide channel markers so that boats entering and leaving the marina would be guided away from shallower waters and away from seagrasses. Petitioner prepared a Marina Management Plan to govern the operation of the marinas, including the use of the slips. The management plan requires waste receptacles and restricts the use and storage of fuel and other chemicals. The plan also includes an education program to inform marina users about water quality and habitat protection. A harbor master would be employed to oversee the operation of the marinas. The harbor master would be responsible for assuring compliance with the requirements in the Marina Management Plan, including maximum boat drafts, fuel spill prevention and clean-up, proper use of sewage pump-out facilities, prevention of hull cleaning and use of deleterious boat cleaning products, and proper disposal of fish cleaning wastes. The harbor master's office would be located on the docks over Charlotte Harbor. The District and Intervenors are not impressed with Petitioner's proposal to employ a harbor master to control marina activities because the harbor master would not be at the marinas 24 hours a day and could not be present at both marinas at the same time. However, the employment of a harbor master would strengthen the use and enforcement of the Marina Management Plan. There would be educational signs for boaters with information about manatees and seagrasses. Petitioner proposes to install sewage pump-out facilities at both marinas that would be connected to the sewage collection system that will serve the upland development. The proposed project includes modifying the proposed upland residential development to add three residential units and a cul de sac, and enlarging a stormwater retention area to accommodate the associated stormwater impacts. Project Impacts Seagrasses It is usually difficult and sometimes impossible for seagrasses to re-colonize an area that has been prop-scarred. Seagrasses are the primary food of manatees, so an adverse impact to seagrasses is an adverse impact to manatees. The seagrasses to the east of the entrance of the proposed Charlotte Harbor marina are subject to disturbance from boats entering and leaving the marina. Boats approaching or departing from slips 1 through 5 are likely to cross these seagrasses from time to time. The water depth in the area of slips 1 and 2 is about minus five feet (mean low water) at the shallowest. For any seagrasses growing at minus five feet, and assuming the seagrasses are 18 inches in length, the clearance between the bottom of a boat with a 30-inch draft and the top of seagrasses would be 12 inches at mean low water. District and Intervenors are also concerned about the potential impacts to the seagrasses near the proposed Charlotte Harbor marina from large boats using slips 6 through 24, which could have a draft of five feet. About 260 feet to the east of Petitioner's pier is another pier, known as Captain Mac's Pier. There are seagrasses between the two piers. Boaters wanting to reach slips 6 through 24 would have to navigate past Petitioner's marina basin, into the area between Petitioner's pier and Cap'n Mac's pier, and then make nearly a 180 degree turn to enter the marina basin. The more persuasive record evidence indicates that this maneuver would sometimes be difficult for inexperienced or inattentive boaters even in relatively calm conditions. In windy and storm conditions, the maneuver would be difficult even for experienced boaters. If there are tethered buoys marking the limits of the seagrasses, as proposed by Petitioner, the buoys would add to the navigational challenge. The preponderance of the credible evidence shows that it is likely that boaters in vessels with drafts greater than 30 inches, when entering or leaving the marina basin, would sometimes cross the seagrasses and do damage to the seagrasses and other submerged resources. Another potential adverse impact to seagrasses is shading caused by structures. Shading caused by the existing fishing pier in Charlotte Harbor appears to have impeded the growth of seagrasses in some areas near the pier. The proposed breakwater for the Charlotte Harbor marina presents a relatively unique shading issue. Petitioner did not adequately demonstrate that shading from the proposed structures in Charlotte Harbor would not adversely affect seagrasses. The District and Intervenors contend that the proposed project would also cause adverse impacts to seagrasses in Back Bay. However, because Petitioner has reduced the numbers of slips in Back Bay and eliminated the boat ramps, the boat traffic in Back Bay should be reduced. Furthermore, Petitioner would restrict boat drafts and mark a channel to guide boaters to deeper waters and away from seagrasses. Therefore, the proposed project would likely reduce the risk of damage to seagrasses and other submerged resources in Back Bay. The District and Intervenors describe Petitioner's proposal to install channel markers in Back Bay as too "tentative" because there is another developer that has proposed to install channel markers and Petitioner's proposal is to install the markers if the other developer does not. However, the details of the channel marking are in evidence. If the channel marking is made a condition for construction of the proposed project, it can be considered a part of the reasonable assurance of compliance with relevant permitting criteria. No specific evidence regarding the general health and value of the seagrasses in Back Bay was presented. The seagrasses in Back Bay are not designated as an RPA. There was no evidence presented that there is soft coral or other submerged resources in Back Bay. Therefore, the reduced risk of harm to the seagrasses in Back Bay does not offset the potential harm that the proposed project would cause to the seagrasses and other submerged resources in Charlotte Harbor. Manatees Petitioner agreed to comply with all of the conditions recommended by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission related to the protection of manatees: In order [to] ensure a minimum clearance of 12 inches above the top of seagrass so as to avoid damage located in the project ingress/egress route, the maximum draft, including propeller(s), for vessels associated with slips 1-5 in Charlotte Harbor shall be 30 inches. The Standard Manatee Conditions for In- Water Work (revision 2009) shall be followed for all in-water activity. Handrails shall be constructed and maintained along the access pier and the landward side of the terminal platform to prevent mooring outside of the designated slip areas. The Permittee shall develop and implement a Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC)-approved marina educational program prior to slip occupancy. The Permittee shall develop this educational program with the assistance of FWC, and FWC shall approve this education plan prior to its implementation. The program may include (at a minimum) the posting of permanent manatee educational signs and the display of brochures in a prominent location. The educational program must be maintained for the life of the facility. The [Permittee] shall install and maintain seagrass marker buoys as depicted in the site plan for the docks in Charlotte Harbor. The buoys must be permitted by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission's Boating and Waterways Section, and maintained for the life of the project. The [P]ermittee shall provide bins for the disposal of or recycling of monofilament line or other used fishing gear. The [P]ermittee shall also provide educational signs encouraging the use of these bins. Larger boats are generally more lethal in collisions with manatees because there is usually more momentum involved. Greater momentum generally causes deeper propeller cuts and other serious physical injury. Slips 6 through 24 in the Charlotte Harbor marina would accommodate boats of greater size (up to five-foot draft) than would have used the slips that would be eliminated in Back Bay, creating some small, unquantified additional risk of increased injury or death to manatees in Charlotte Harbor and other area waters. Lee County reviewed the proposed project against the Lee County Manatee Protection Plan and scored the project as "Preferred." The factors that the County considered in scoring the project were not explained. The reduction of boat traffic in Back Bay that would result from the eliminating boat slips and removing the boat ramps, and the marking of a channel away from seagrasses in Back Bay, would reduce the current risk to manatees using Back Bay. However, that reduction of risk is offset by the increased risk of injury to manatees associated with the addition of 17 larger slips in the Charlotte Harbor marina, the potential for collisions with any manatees foraging in the seagrass near the Charlotte Harbor marina, and the potential loss of seagrasses from boat impacts and shading. The overall effect of the proposed project on manatees would probably be negative. Water Quality The District and Intervenors contend that the proposed project would cause additional pollution associated with boating activity and, therefore, would violate the water quality standard applicable in Outstanding Florida Waters that ambient water quality cannot be degraded. However, Petitioner would reduce the total number of boats that could operate out of the marinas and would implement a number of prohibitions and other management practices that would reduce the potential for pollution when compared to the current situation. There was no evidence presented to quantify the pollution that might now be occurring as a result of the absence of pump-out facilities at the marinas, or the presence of related pollution in Charlotte Harbor or Back Bay. However, it was undisputed that the availability of pump-out facilities is generally a benefit for water quality. Petitioner has not indicated where the sewage pump-out facilities would be located. Although this is a relatively minor issue, the location of these facilities can affect the potential for pollution and, therefore, it is reasonable for the District to require this information before the ERP can be approved. Although the District and Intervenors contend that insufficient information was presented regarding flushing characteristics in Charlotte Harbor, that contention is inconsistent with their claim that strong winds, waves, and tidal forces that occur in this area of Charlotte Harbor would cause shoaling and scour at the breakwater. There is sufficient evidence that the Charlotte Harbor marina would be well flushed. An issue was also raised about the potential for turbidity problems in Back Bay caused by disturbance of the silty bottom by boats using the Back Bay slips. However, the reduction of the number of boats that would operate out of the Back Bay marina, the marina management proposals, and the channel marking would likely reduce such incidents in Back Bay. As discussed above, some small water quality benefits to Back Bay would be realized by the reef balls and the elimination of the canal. The overall effect of the proposed project would be to reduce the potential water quality impacts associated with the marinas, resulting in some small net improvement to the ambient water quality of the Pine Island Aquatic Preserve. Shoaling and Scour Shoaling is generally the accumulation of unconsolidated sediments that occur because of their movement by hydrodynamic forces of water flow, waves and currents. Scour is a type of erosion that occurs when current forces, when moving around a structure, push sediments away. Petitioner's expert, Hans Wilson, testified that it would take a relatively extreme amount of wave energy to create scour at the bottom of the breakwater. He said that the proposed breakwater was similar to one used at Royal Palm Yacht Club in Charlotte Harbor, which has not caused shoaling or scour. Robert Brantly, of the Department of Environmental Protection, believes that the proposed breakwater could cause shoaling and scour. While not agreeing with Mr. Brantly's concern, Petitioner offered to place reef balls at the base of the breakwater to further dissipate wave energy. Petitioner's evidence on this issue lacked much detail, but the evidence offered by the District was speculation -- Mr. Brantly thought there might be a problem and wanted to see more information. The District failed to rebut Petitioner's prima facie case that the breakwater would not cause shoaling or scour. Public Uses The District and Intervenors contend that the proposed project would reduce access by the general public to the aquatic preserve because the boat ramps would be eliminated and the fishing platform would be smaller than the area now available to the public on the fishing pier. The evidence shows some small reduction in public access to the aquatic preserve would likely result from the proposed project. Fill The District and Intervenors claimed for the first time in their Joint Proposed Recommended Order that the proposed breakwater for the Charlotte Harbor marina is prohibited fill. Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-20.004(1)(c) prohibits "filling waterward of the mean or ordinary high water line." "Fill" is defined in Rule 18-20.003(27): "Fill" means materials from any source, deposited by any means onto sovereignty lands, either for the purpose of creating new uplands or for any other purpose, including the spoiling of dredged materials. For the purpose of this rule, the placement of pilings or riprap shall not be considered to be filling. The District claims that the breakwater is "clearly prohibited" and that no additional factual evidence needs to be presented to determine the issue. However, although it is clear that the rule prohibits the deposition of fill materials such as dirt or sand into the water, it is not clear what other activities are prohibited by the rule.3/ Docks and marinas are clearly allowed by the aquatic preserve rules. Whether the breakwater is a piling structure is not answered by the record evidence. Evidence regarding the practices of the Board of Trustees, the Department of Environmental Protection, and the District in the interpretation and application of the rule is also absent from the record. Therefore, even if the issue had been timely raised by the District and Intervenors, the record evidence is insufficient to prove their claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District deny the ERP and Lease requested by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner River Trails is the developer of a condominium community in Palm Beach County known as River Walk. River Walk is contiguous to and immediately adjacent to 2600 feet of South Florida Water Management District (hereinafter "SFWMD") property bordering Canal C-18 in Palm Beach County. The right- of-way adjacent to C-18 as well as the bottom of C-18 is owned by SFWMD. C-18 is not in an area designated as Outstanding Florida Waters. As required by Section 403.813(2), Florida Statutes, River Trails sought and obtained on January 12, 1984, a permit from the SFWMD to construct a dock and boat ramp in Canal C-18. The permit conveyed no property rights to River Trails. On October 12, 1984, River Trails asked DER to confirm that River Trails' proposed boat ramp qualified for an exemption pursuant to Section 403.813(2)(c), Florida Statutes. By letter dated December 20, 1984, DER informed River Trails that the proposed boat ramp did qualify for the exemption and, therefore did not require any permit from DER. On October 18, 1984, River Trails asked DER to confirm that River Trails' proposed dock of 1,000 square feet or less qualified for an exemption from DER's permitting authority pursuant to Section 403.813(2)(b), Florida Statutes. However, on November 30, 1984, DER informed River Trails that its proposed dock did not qualify for the exemption because there was already an existing dock on SFWMD property on Canal C-18. As authority for its position, DER cited the following sentence in DER Rule 17-4.04(9)(c), Florida Administrative Code: "A private dock is a single pier at a parcel of property." On the 2600 feet of SFWMD-owned right-of-way contiguous to River Trails, there are presently no docks. On SFWMD-owned right-of-way east of River Trails, between River Trails and the southwest fork of the Loxahatchee River, there are two docks approximately 300 feet apart located in front of single-family residences. DER contends all contiguous property owned by an individual, group or entity, including a water management district, constitutes a "parcel of property" and accordingly does not recognize River Trails' claim to an exemption because of the existence of these docks. Prior to River Trails' request that DER confirm River Trails' right to an exemption, DER had not interpreted water management district-owned right-of-ways to be a "parcel of property" within the meaning of Rule 17- 4.04(9)(c). In the past, the SFWMD has permitted numerous docks of less than 1,000 square feet on SFWMD-owned right- of-ways. Copies of these permits were routinely forwarded to DER. While these docks were and are on right-of-ways which DER now defines as a "parcel" within the meaning of Rule 17-4.04(9)(c), DER has not required permits for these docks. The DER employees who interpret the rule in question as part of their duties and whose depositions were introduced at hearing do not agree on the configuration which constitutes a single pier, on the degree of ownership or control required over a parcel of property by an applicant for an exemption, or on the definition of a parcel of property. DER has failed to adequately explain its deviation from past agency practice in interpreting SFWMD right-of- way as a parcel of property. But for DER's new interpretation of the term "parcel of property" found in Rule 17-4.04(9)(c), Florida Administrative Code, River Trails' proposed dock meets the statutory and rule requirements for an exemption from obtaining a permit from DER.
Findings Of Fact Sarasota County and MPS both filed extensive exceptions to the Recommended Order. I have grouped these exceptions according to the following issues: Manatee Protection, Turtle Nesting impacts, Fisheries impacts, Seagrass impacts, Wetlands Impacted, Water Quality Improvement, Public interest Balancing Test, Miscellaneous Exceptions, Requests For Additional Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law. I shall discuss and rule on each exception by the above groupings. 1. Manatee Protection Sarasota County Exception Number 1 and MPS Exception Numbers 6 and 8 are directed to the issue of adverse affects on the West Indian Manatee. Sarasota County and MPS take exception to Finding of Fact ("FOF") No. 24, claiming that there is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that it is anticipated that increased motorboat traffic in the pass vicinity would be an increased potential danger to manatees. MPS additionally takes exception to the finding in FOF No. 29 that maintenance dredging will entail a danger to manatees similar to that during the construction phase. At the outset, I note that where a Hearing Officer's finding of fact is supported in the record by any competent, substantial evidence I am not permitted to reweigh the evidence and reject the finding of fact. See, e.g., Florida Debt. of Corrections v. Bradley, 510 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Section 120.57(1)(b)1O., Florida Statutes. In this case the record does contain competent substantial evidence supporting FOF Nos. 24 and 29. The Hearing Officer's finding that increased motorboat traffic is an expected result of opening of the pass is not disputed. FOF No. 34. The area is designated as a critical habitat for the West Indian Manatee. FOF No. 22. The prefiled testimony of Ms. Kimberly A. Dryden states that "[a]n increase in boat/manate collisions associated with increased boat presence in the pass may occur." Dryden, PF-11. Ms. Dryden was admitted as an expert in wildlife biology including expertise in manatees, and her prefiled testimony was accepted into evidence. TR-756-760. Finally, the fact that Sarasota County itself proposed a manatee protection plan involving, among other things, that all project vessels operate at "no wake" speeds, supports the finding that increased motorboat traffic in the pass vicinity would be an increased potential danger to manatees. Sarasota County and MPS point to the public notice of the U.S Army Corps of Engineers (Hearing Exhibit 26) and a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service letter (Hearing Exhibit 27) as overwhelming evidence that no adverse effect on the manatee is expected. In essence, Sarasota County and MPS are asking me to reweigh the competent, substantial evidence. As noted above, I may not lawfully do that. The parties do not dispute the Hearing Officer's finding that maintenance dredging is expected to be needed as long as the inlet remains open. FOF No. 21. For the reasons set forth above, the Hearing Officer's finding that maintenance dredging will present a danger to manatees similar to the construction is supported in the record by competent substantial evidence. Sarasota County and MPS also assert that FOF No. 24 must be rejected because it is contrary to a stipulation of fact by the parties. Indeed, the record shows that a prehearing stipulation was filed and accepted into the record without objection at the hearing. TR-8. Stipulation of Fact No. 24 states: With the implementation of recommendations of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, it is not expected that the project will have a significant adverse impact on the manatee or its habitat. Steven Sauers, Director of the Coastal Zone Division for Sarasota County, testified that he believed the County "could adhere to these [U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service] recommendations under a condition of authorization." TR-94-98. I note that when the prefiled testimony of Ms. Dryden was accepted into evidence at the hearing, neither Sarasota County nor MPS objected to those portions dealing with manatee impacts as being contrary to Stipulation of Fact No. 24. I must therefore consider whether the failure to object constitutes a waiver of the stipulation, and whether the Hearing Officer, as the ultimate finder of the facts, is bound by a stipulation of fact when the record contains competent, substantial evidence which conflicts with the stipulation. It has long been the eablished rule of law that stipulations of fact properly entered into are binding on both the parties and the court. See, e.g., Troup v. Bird, 53 So.2d 717, 721 (Fla. 1951) (where case is tried on stipulation, no further or different facts will be presumed to exist). Where a party seeks to be relieved from a stipulation, he or she generally must file a timely motion, with notice to opposing parties, showing good cause and no prejudice to opposing parties. U.S. Fire insurance Co. v. Roberts, 541 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Lopez v. Dublin Co., 489 So.2d 805, 807 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Munilla v. Perez-Cobo, 335 So.2d 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. den., 344 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1977); Villa v. Mumac Construction Corp., 334 So.2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Curr v. Helene TransportatIon, 287 So.2d 695 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Good cause requires showing of fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation, withholding of facts by the adversary party, or such other element as would render the agreement void. Spitzer v. Bartlett Brothers Roof in, 437 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Citv of Vero Beach v. Thomas, 388 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In this case, neither the Department nor the Respondent Intervenors sought to be relieved from the stipulation, and there is no contention that any basis for good cause exits to be relieved from the stipulation. However, it is also a long established rule of law that failure to contemporaneously object to the admission of contested evidence is a waiver of the right to object. See, e.g., Swan v. Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 404 So.2d 802 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); DeLuca v. State, 384 So.2d 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), rev. den., 389 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1980); Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, Section 104.1 (2d Ed 1984); Section 90.104, Florida Statutes. in this case the testimony which conflicts with the stipulation was pre-filed before the hearing and the opposing parties had ample opportunity to review it before the hearing. Yet, although Sarasota County did raise objections to certain portions of Ms. Dryden's pre- filed testimony, no objection was raised to the portion relevant to impacts on manatees. TR-754-760. There is also authority for the proposition that when evidence contrary to a stipulation is introduced at trial without objection, the finder of fact is not bound by the stipulation. Special Disability Trust Fund v. Myers, 492 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), cause dism'd, 491 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1986); Espada Enterprises Inc. v. Spiro, 481 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Woods v. Greater Naples Care Center, 406 So.2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), rev. den., 413 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1982). In consideration of the above authorities and circumstances, I conclude that the Hearing Officer was not bound by the stipulation and could properly consider the relevant portion of Ms. Dryden's pre-filed testimony. Therefore the record contains competent, substantial evidence in support of the above findings of fact. Accordingly, the above noted exceptions of Sarasota County and MPS are denied. Turtle Nesting Impacts Sarasota County Exception No. 2 and MPS Exception No. 7 dispute FOF No. 26, which states that: "Once dredged, the beach area in the pass vicinity would be permanently lost for the purpose of turtle nesting." Sarasota County and MPS argue that although a portion of the beach will be removed to create the inlet, the loss of beach will not significantly impact on turtle nesting. Sarasota County and MPS contend that the "overwhelming weight" of the evidence is contrary to FOF No. 26. They are in essence asking me to reweigh the evidence. For the reasons stated above, I cannot do so. If the finding of fact is supported in the record by any competent, substantial evidence, then I am not at liberty to reject it. Florida Department of Corrections, supra; Section 120.57(1) (b)10., Florida Statutes. Ms. Belinda Perry, Projects Coordinator in the Coastal Zone Division of Natural Resources of the Sarasota County Natural Resources Department, testified that she had maintained records of sea turtle nests in the vicinity of Midnight Pass. She testified that on the average over the last eight years there have been four nests per year in the area that the new inlet at Midnight Pass will be located. Perry, TR-537-538; Perry PF-2, 5, 8. This is competent, substantial evidence of an adverse impact on the nesting habitat of sea turtles. Sarasota County and MPS argue that this impact is not "Significant." If I were to consider the "significance" of the loss of 4 nests per year for the purpose of accepting or rejecting FOF No. - 26, I would in effect be weighing that evidence. This I may not do. If the finding of fact is supported in the record by any competent, substantial evidence I may not reject it. Although not articulated, Sarasota County and MPS may be arguing that when evidence which supports a finding of an adverse impact on an endangered or threatened species is "not significant," then such evidence or finding of fact cannot be considered when weighing the seven factors set forth in the public interest balancing test of Section 403.918(2) (a), Florida Statutes. I reject any such argument as contrary to the law. Neither the statute nor any authority requires a minimum threshold weight for any of the factors. The statute merely requires the Department to "consider and balance" the seven criteria. For the foregoing reasons, Sarasota County's Exception No. 2 and MPS's Exception No. 7 are rejected. Fisheries Impacts Sarasota County Exception No. 4 and MPS Exception No. 10 challenge that part of FOF No.-3- that states "the flushing and arrival of predator fishes will adversely affect the nursery habitat now enjoyed by the fish community currently within the LSB." (emphasis added) Sarasota County and MPS contend that this finding is unsupported by any competent substantial evidence in the record. I disagree. Robert L. Stetler, Environmental Administrator, Wetlands Resource Management for the Department's Southwest District testified as follows: Q. What impact on fisheries does the present, i.e., closed condition of the Midnight Pass area have? A. Current conditions in the backwater area of Midnicht Pass as mentioned Before, as quiescent in nature. This influences the fisheries utilization to the competitive advantage of the smaller species and of the early life stages of many of the larger pelagic fish species. The additional cover afforded by seagrass communities and the very shallow water nature of large portions of the site tend to limit successful predation on the smaller specimens. The periphyton communities associated with shallow water areas and seagrass beds also provide large quantities of food to the smaller or younger fish. The conditions now found at Midnight Pass enable it to be classified as a nursery area because they perform the functions of feeding and protecting the early life stages of numerous fish species. Nursery areas like the pass region have been identified as essential to the maintenance of healthy, well balanced fish populations. Q. Does a quiescent estuarine zone provide any particilar benefit to commercially important fish species? A. Under the estuarine conditions, water quality also contributes to the success and/or failure of certain fish species. Many of the estuarine dependent fish species have life histories that include spawning in or near the marine environment and the mitigation [sic] of the larval forms into areas of lower salinity, sometimes lower dissolved oxygen and, in the summer months, often very high water temperatures. These harsh conditions are tolerable to a early life stages of several commercially important fish species and further protects them from predation by adult piscivorous (fish eating) fish that cannot tolerate these conditions. Some of the important commercial species exhibiting this life cycle are the Tarpon, Spotted Seatrout, Redfish, Mangrove snapper, Sheepshead and Mullet. Q. What, in your opinion, would be the overall impact to fisheries resources from the opening of Midnight Pass? A. The overall impact of the project to fisheries would be significant. Reactivating an inlet would produce conditions conducive and reintroducing larger, motile, pelagic fishes into the area. increased flushing would likely occur resulting in increased salinities, higher energy conditions from waye and tidal action. The recreational fishery would probably produce more larger fish utilizing the pass as a migratory, spawning and feeding site. However, the direct impact of the project would also result in the loss of significant portions of the nursery habitat previously described. Q. in your opinion, would opening Midnight Pass be in the public interest from a fisheries standpoint? A. No. Q. Why not? A. The expected physical damages associated with reopening the pass -- increased water depths, destabilization of the substrate by tide and wave energy and destruction of existing shallow water habitat will eliminate or significantly change the habitat characteristics and water guality conditions essential to the early life stages of many fish species. Loss of nursery habitat has been a long-term trend to Tampa and Sarasota Bay due to past dredge and fill activities and increased development. This long-term loss results in a need to classify remaining nursery areas, like Midnight Pass, as critical habitat warranting special protection. (emphasis added) Stetler PF-11-13. This prefiled testimony was accepted into evidence. TR-836, 839. When read in its entirely it clearly provides competent, substantial evidence to support the above finding of fact. Mr. Stetler testified that the existing nature of LSB provides a nursery for certain fishes that in the early stages of their life take advantage of areas of lower salinity, sometimes lower dissolved oxygen and, in the summer months, often very high water temperatures. Such harsh conditions protect them from predation by adult fish that cannot tolerate such conditions. He further testified that reopening Midnight Pass would result in increased flushing, increased salinity, and the loss of significant portions of the above characteristics with a consequent loss of significant portions of the nursery habitat. This testimony is competent, substantial evidence supporting FOF No. 32. Therefore, i may not disturb this finding of fact. Accordingly, the above noted exceptions are rejected. Seagrass Impacts Loss of Seagrass Sarasota County Exception No. 5 and MPS Exceptions Nos. 10 and 11 take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that the submerged areas of LSB in the vicinity of the inlet are vegetated with seagrasses (including shoalgrass, turtle grass, manatee grass, and halophila), and that a significant portion of these grasses will be dredged if the proposed project is implemented. FOF No. 33. The Hearing Officer also found that the dredged seagrass areas will no longer serve as a nursery to young fishes. FOF No. 34. Sarasota County and MPS contend that only 10 acres of seagrasses will be dredged, and that the evidence shows that reopening Midnight Pass will cause more dense growth of seagrasses in those areas not dredged. Sarasota County and MPS also contend that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that all four of the above noted types of seagrasses would be lost. The gist of Sarasota County's and MPS's argument is that the loss of ten acres of seagrss is less than 10% of the total seagrass acreage in the project area, and therefore is not significant. Sarasota County and MPS further argue that even if the loss of 10 acres of seagrass was significant, it would only be a temporary loss because the opening of Midnight Pass would result in greater seagrass growth, density, and diversity in those areas not dredged. Neither Sarasota County nor MPS take exception to the finding that l0 acres of seagrasses will be dredged, and that, due to the depth of the channel to be dredged, seagrasses would not be expected to reseed or colonize in the deep channel cuts. FOF No. 34; Prehearing Stipulation of Fact No. 22. The record contains competent, substantial evidence that in the vicinity of the project there are 108 acres of seagrasses. Lewis, PF-6 (accepted into evidence TR-425-436). A loss of ten acres of seagrasses would be a loss of more than 9% of the total acreage in the vicinity of the project. A loss of seagrass can have an adverse impact on a fish nursery. Leiby TR-507, 509-510. I reject any suggestion that such a loss is not significant. MPS and Sarasota County contend that there will be no net loss of seagrass because the loss of the ten acres will be offset by increased growth, density, and diversity of seagrasses in the areas not dredged. in asking me to reject the above noted findings, Sarata County and MPS are in effect asking me to weigh the evidence of the impact of the loss of ten acres against the evidence that increased growth, density, and diversity of the seagrasses elsewhere will soon offset any reduction in nursery value to young fishes. When I rule on exceptions to findings of fact I cannot reweigh the evidence. If the record contains any competent, substantial evidence to support the finding, I must accept it. Finally, as to issue of the types of seagrasses present, the record contains competent, substantial evidence that all four of the species mentioned in the finding of fact are found in the project area to be dredged. Stetler PF- 6, TR-843-845; Wilber PF-33, TR-908-915; Dryden PF-5-7; Prehearing Stipulation of Fact No. 21. For all of the reasons set forth above, i reject the exceptions of Sarasota County and MPS. Propeller Dredging of Seagrass Sarasota County Exception No. 6 and MPS Exception No. 12 take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that "increase motorboat traffic which is an expected result of the pass reopening, would also limit grasses from re- establishing in shallower areas due to damage caused by propellers." FOF No. 34. Sarasota County and MPS do not dispute that opening - Midnight Pass will increase motoboat traffic in LSB. Dr. Wilber testified that the "foreseeable increased boat utilization, especially by large boats will increase seagrass bed damage through prop dredging . . . ." Wilber PF-31. There being competent, substantial evidence in the record supporting the above finding, the exceptions of Sarasota County and MPS are denied. Wading Bird Habitat Impacts Sarasota County Exception No. 5 takes exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that "the grassy flats will no longer be available to the numerous species of wading birds which frequent the areas since the closure of the pass." FOF No. 33. Ms. Dryden testified that wading birds now use the shallow tidal flats and mud flats which are proposed to be removed. Dryden PF-4-8, 10-11. Mr. G. Jeffery Churchill testified that, as a result of the project, approximately 9 acres of wading bird feeding habitat would be lost. Churchill PF-16-17, TR- 485-487. The record contains competent, substantial evidence supporting the above finding. Therefore, Sarasota County's exception is denied. Wetlands Impacted Sarasota County Exception No. 6 and MPS Exceptions Nos. 5 and 12 take exception to the finding that the dredging proposed by the County would eliminate at least 50 acres of wetlands. FOF Nos. 17 and 34. Sarasota County and MPS contend that only 1.1 - 1.3 acres of vegetated wetlands will be lost. This contention appears to be based on the assertion that submerged lands are not "wetlands" within the meaning of Sections 403.91 - .929, Florida Statutes. I reject Sarasota County's and MPS's narrow construction of the meaning of jurisdictional wetlands. Section 403.912(1) sets forth the powers and duties of the Department in permitting activities in wetlands, including activities "in waters to their landward extent . . ." (emphasis added). The term "waters" includes "rivers, lakes, streams, springs, impoundments and all other waters or bodies of water, including fresh, brackish, saline, tidal, surface, or underground waters." Section 403.031(12), Florida Statutes. the term "wetlands" therefore is inclusive of surface bodies of waters up to and including the limit of the Department's jurisdiction as established by Section 403.817, Florida Statutes and Rule 17-301, F.A.C. Dr. Wilber testified that the project would dredge 43.8 acres for the two access channels, 3.6 acres for the sediment basin, and 7.5 acres of jurisdictional wetlands for the inlet channel. Wilber PF-5-6. Dr. Wilber further testified that habitat within the proposed channels consisted of valuable biological communities of a natural character that would be severely disrupted or eliminated if the project were permitted. Wilber PF-9. The record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the above finding. The exceptions of Sarasota County and MPS are rejected. Water Quality Improvement Sarasota County Exception No. 7 and MPS Exception No. 14 take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that "the water quality within LSB will not be significantly improved as a result of the reopening of the inlet. "FOF No. 38. it is contended that this finding is immaterial and irrelevant. These exceptions also challenge as irrelevant the Hearing Officer's finding that "it is impossible to conclude that marine environments serve a more useful purpose than estuarine systems." FOF No. 38. I agree that it is not required that the proposed project improve the water quality in LSB in order to be permittable. Permitting of a dredge and fill project in an Outstanding Florida Water requires that the applicant show that the project is clearly in the public interest, and that reasonable assurance has been provided that the project will not cause or contribute to violations of water quality standards, including a showing that the existing ambient water quality within the OFW will not be lowered as a result of the proposed activity. Section 403.918(1),(2), Florida Statutes; Rules 17-4.242(2) (a), 17-302.300, F.A.C. The applicant must also show that secondary impacts of the project, and cumulative impacts of reasonably foreseeable similar projects in the same geographical location will not result in violations of water quality standards, and will not result in the project being not clearly in the public interest. Conservancy, Inc. v. A. Vernon Allen Builder, Inc., No. 90-520 (Fla. 1st DCA, March 29, 1991); Caloosa Property Owners' Ass'n v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 462 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Section 403.919, Florida Statutes. The analysis of secondary and cumulative impacts is not a third test; rather, it is a factor to be considered in determining whether reasonable assurance has been provided that the project will not result in violations of water quality standards, and that the project meets the applicable public interest test. Conservancy, Inc., supra; Peebles v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 12 FALR 1961 (DER, April 11, 1990); Concerned Citizens League of America v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 11 FALR 4237, 4246 (DER, March 29, 1989). if the applicant is unable to satisfy the applicable public interest test, the applicant may propose or accept measures to mitigate the adverse effects caused by the project. Section 403.918(2)(b), Florida Statutes. 4/ On the other hand, throughout these proceedings Sarasota County has attemptd to justify the project and show that it is clearly in the public interest by asserting the project will improve water quality in LSB. For example, at page 7 of Sarasota County's Proposed Recommended Order it states: Sarasota County has convincingly demonstrated that it meets the statutory criteria for approval of this project in this Outstanding Florida Water. The project will not degrade ambient water quality, and it will cause an improvement in water guality, not only in the immediate vicinity of the Pass but throughout Little Sarasota Bay. This improved water guality will in turn reap substantial benefits to the degraded marine habitat, the flora and fauna, commercial and recreational fishing and the public's general enjoyment and ability to use Little Sarasota Bay. (emphasis added) Similarly, Sarasota County stated in its opening argument at the hearing that: TR-14. We think that there has been a decline in water quality and it will continue to decline and it will continue to get worse. By reopening the pass, we think we can stop that decline. We think that there will be such considerable improvements to the bay to be clearly in the public interest. The Hearing Officer's finding is clearly relevant to Sarasota County's assertion that the claimed improvement in water quality will make or help make the project to be clearly in the public interest. Similarly, since the reopening of the pass will cause the reversion of LSB from an estuarine to a marine ecosystem, the Hearing Officer's finding on the failure to show that a marine ecosystem has a more useful environmental purpose is also, at least arguably, relevant to the public interest test. 5/ The record contains competent, substantial evidence which supports this finding. Nearhoof PF-8-12, TR-891-895; Wilber PF-17-18, TR-920-921. There being competent, substantial evidence to support the finding, I shall not reject it. The exceptions are there denied. Public Interest Balancing Test Sarasota County Exceptions Nos. 8 and 12, and MPS Exceptions Nos. 15 and 17, take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that "the beneficial changes expected to result from the reopening of the pass do not offset the adverse affects reasonably expected to be caused by the dredging." FOF No. 39. Exception is also taken to FOF No. 43, which states that it was not established that the project is clearly in the public interest. The gist of these exceptions is that the balancing test is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Even if that were so, the error in mislabeling would be harmless. Even though I agree that the ultimate determination of the public interest balancing test is a conclusion of law, I do not agree that predicate findings of ultimate facts are not appropriate. Florida Audubon Society v. Cullen, ER FALR 91:018 (DER, Sept. 27, 1990). The Hearing Officer's FOF Nos. 34 and 43 are predicate findings of ultimate facts sufficiently supported in other findings of fact for each of the seven criteria in the public interest balancing test of Section 403.918(2)(a), Florida Statutes. See for example: Department's Response To Request For Admission No. 17, and R.O. at 21 and 23, accepting MPS's proposed finding of fact- No. 74, and Sarasota County's proposed finding of fact No. 50 (project will not adversely affect public health, safety or welfare); (b) FOF Nos. 17, 22, 24-26, 29, and 32-35 (regarding conservation of fish and wildlife, etc.); FOF No. 36 and R.O. at 23, accepting MPS's proposed finding of fact Nos. 134 and 135 (regarding navigation, flow of water, erosion or shoaling); FOF Nos. 32 and 33 (regarding fishing recreational values or marine productivity); FOF No. 21, 29 and 37 (regarding temporary or permanent nature of project); FOF No. 28 (regarding historical and archaeological rsources); and FOF Nos. 30 and 38 (regarding current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by project). The exceptions are therefore rejected. Miscellaneous Exceptions Sarasota County Exception No. 9 Sarasota County Exception No. 9 contends that there is no competent, substantial evidence for the finding that the Department has not permitted the destruction of a habitat of this size without requiring extensive mitigation. FOF No. 40. Mr. Randall L. Armstrong, then Director of the Division of Water Management of the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, testified that he had worked at the Department since 1972, and that "[i]n my experience with the Department in issuing permits under those statutes (Sections 403.918-.919] the Department has never permitted the destruction of such a large area of viable habitat without requiring extensive mitigation." Armstrong PF-9, TR-1017. Sarasota County's reliance on the testimony of Mr. Lewis about lack of mitigation in a Key Biscayne project is misplaced since that project occurred before the enactment of the Henderson Wetlands Act in 1984. Lewis TR at 482. in any event, FOF No. 40 is supported in the record by competent, substantial evidence. The exception is denied. Sarasota County Exception No. 11 and MPS Exception No. 16 Sarasota County Exception No. 11 and MPS Exception No. 16 complain about FOF No. 42, yet do not dispute its correctness. The finding is a irrefutable finding that no mitigation is proposed for 10 acres of seagrasses which will be dredged. The exceptions are merely an assertion that mitigation is not necessary for the loss of seagrasses because additional seagrass will grow elsewhere. This contention was addressed above under the heading of Seagrass impacts. Furthermore, the Department has the ultimate authority to determine whether mitigation is required and, if so, whether the proposed mitigation is adequate. 1800 Atlantic Developers v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 522 So.2d. 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The exceptions are rejected. Sarasota County Exception No. 3 Sarasota County's Exception No. 3 claims to take exception to FOF No. 29 but does not dispute any of the facts stated therein. The exception is rejected. MPS Exception No. 1 This exception quibbles over an immaterial issue of semantics in FOF No. 2, i.e., whether the project is to "dredge an inlet" or to "restore" the past inlet. The exception is rejected. MPS Exception No.2 MPS takes exception to FOF No. 4 which states that LSB was designated an Outstanding Florida Water. The gist of MPS's exception is that the Environmental Regulation Commission excluded Midnight Pass when LSB was designated as an OFW. Since "Midnight Pass" no longer existed as a body of water when LSB was designated an OFW on April 29, 1986, the exception is rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. MPS Exceptions No. 3 and 13 MPS takes exception to the Hearing Officer's finding in FOF No. 7 that prior to the closing of Midnight Pass the "beach along the northern stretch of Casey Key eroded badly." MPS also excepts to the finding that without beach renourishment the restoration will cause "harmful erosion" along Casey Key. FOF No. 37. MPS does not dispute the erosion; rather, MPS complains about the choice of words describing the degree of erosion. The choice of words is not material to the underlying validity of the finding. The exceptions are without merit and are rejected as immaterial. MPS Exception No. 9 MPS takes exception to FOF No. 30, contending that there is no support in the record for a finding that, as a result of the evolution of LSB from a marine to an estuarine system, LSB has a longer freshwater residence time. MPS is misreading FOF No. 30. It is clear that FOF No. 30, when properly read, states that as a result of the closure of the pass LSB has evolved from a marine to an estuarine system, and that this evolution is a consequence of the longer freshwater residence time which was caused by the closing of the inlet. This is supported in the record by competent, substantial evidence. Echernacht TR-707. MPS also takes exception to the finding that levels of dissolved oxygen and salinity within LSB are fairly typical for a healthy estuarine system. FOF No. 30. The record contains competent, substantial evidence to support this finding. Wilber PF-32. The exceptions are rejected. Requests For Additional Findings of Fact Sarasota -County Exceptions Nos. 3, 10, and 13 through 16, and MPS Exceptions Nos. 4 and 18 are in essence asking me to make additional findings of fact, or to accept proposed findings of fact which were rejected by the Hearing Officer. I may not lawfully make an independent determination of a disputed fact. Cohn v. Department of Professional Regulation, 477 So.2d 1039, 1047 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985). Accord, Miller v. State, Department of Environmental Regulation, 504 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). See also Manasota 88, Inc. v. Tremor, 545 So.2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Inverness Convalescent Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 512 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Friends of Children v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 504 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). As to Sarasota County Exception No. 14, which requests a finding of fact that the project will not adversely affect the pubic health, safety and welfare, I note that the Hearing Officer accepted this finding of fact which was proposed in both paragraph 74 of MPS's proposed recommended order and in paragraph 50 of Sarasota .County's proposed recommended order. See R.O. at 21 and 23. Therefore, I consider the requested finding of fact to have already been made by the Hearing Officer. No additional finding is required of me. Sarasota County Exception No. 15 asks me to make specific additional findings of fact in relation to effects of the project on marine productivity. Sarasota County orrectly points out that a finding regarding whether the project will adversely affect marine productivity is needed to conduct the public interest balancing test of Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes. However, I note that the Hearing Officer's FOF Nos. 32 and 33 are sufficient predicate findings for her to consider and weigh this criteria in the balancing test. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer has considered and ruled on Sarasota County's proposed findings related to marine productivity as set forth in Sarasota County's proposed recommended order paras. 105-108 and 110 (accepted) and para. 111 (rejected as vague). See R.O. at 22. Sarasota County Exception No. 15 is essentially a reiteration of proposed findings of fact which had been asserted before the Hearing Officer. Where the Hearing Officer clearly and specifically addressed and ruled on the proposed finding in the recommended order, I am not required to provide further reasons for my ruling. Britt v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 492 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), overruled on other grounds sub nom., Dept. of Professional Regulation v. Bernal, 531 So.2d 967 (Fla. 1988). I concur with and adopt the Hearing Officer's rulings as being based on competent, substantial evidence, and therefore reject the exception. Sarasota County Exception No. 16 asks me to make specific findings with regard to cumulative impacts. The matter ofwhether the proposed project will have any significant adverse secondary or cumulative impacts was a disputed issue at the hearing. See Prehearing Stipulation at 24, Stipulated Disputed issue VI(A)9. Section 403. 919, Florida Statutes, requires consideration of the cumulative impacts of the project in conjunction with other existing or future projects where there is a "reasonable likelihood" of similar project applications in the same geographic location in the future. Caloosa Property Owners Ass'n v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 462 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Reasonable expectation of future projects is the polestar of cumulative impact analysis. Chipola Basin Protective Group v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 11 F.A.L.R. 467, 477 (D.E.R. December 29, 1988). Testimony at the hearing showed that the Department conducted an evaluation of the project for cumulative impacts and was unable to identify any such impacts. Wilber PF-30, TR-949-950; Armstrong TR-1021-1022. A finding that the Department conducted a cumulative impact analysis and concluded that it was unable to identify any cumulative impact was proposed by Sarasota County in its Proposed Recommended Order, paras. 118 and 119. - These findings were accepted by the Hearing Officer (R.O. at 22). Therefore, the requested findings of fact have already been made by the Hearing Officer, and no additional finding is required of me. The exception is therefore rejected. MPS Exception No. 18 asks me to adopt numerous proposed findings of fact which the Hearing Officer expressly rejected. The Hearing Officer expressly ruled on each of these proposed findings of fact. (Recommended Order at 23-24) Where exceptions merely reiterate proposed findings of fact which had been asserted before the Hearing Officer, and where the Hearing Officer clearly and specifically addressed each in the recommended order, I am not required to provide any further explicit reasons for my ruling. Britt v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, supra. I concur with and adopt the Hearing Officer's rulings on these proposed findings of fact. I therefore reject the above exceptions. RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Public Interest Test Sarasota County's Exception To Conclusion of Law No. 2, and MPS Exception No. 20 take exception to the Hearing Officer's conclusion of law that "the County has failed to establish that the proposed project is clearly in the public interest." Conclusion of Law No. 6, R.O. at 15-16. As I noted in my earlier discussion on findings of fact, in order to obtain a permit to dredge and fill in an Outstanding Florida Water, the applicant must show, among other things, that the project is clearly in the public interest. Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes. Failure of the applicant to make that showing makes the project not permittable. In order to determine whether the project is clearly in the public interest, the Department must consider and balance the following seven factors set forth in Section 403.918(2)(a): Whether the project will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; Whether the project will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project will be of a temporary or permanent nature; Whether the project will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources under the provisions of 5.267.061; and The current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity. In order to consider and balance these factors it is necessary, of course, to make sufficient findings of fact as to each factor. As I discussed above, the Hearing Officer had accepted or expressly made findings of fact relevant to each of the above factors. in Conclusion of Law No. 6, she considered and balanced those factors in reaching her determination that it was not shown that the project is clearly in the public interest. I am, of course, not bound by the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law. I am free to substitute my own legal conclusions for those of the Hearing Officer, so long as competent, substantial evidence supports my legal conclusions. Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 16 FLW D458 (Fla. 2d DCA, Feb. 20, 1991); Hunter v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 458 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); MacPherson v. School Board of Monroe County, 505 So.2d 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Section 120.57(1) (b)lO., Florida Statutes. I have considered and balanced each of the seven criteria set forth in Section 403.918(2) (a) in the light of the findings of fact discussed above. I concur in the Hearing Officer's conclusion that it has not been demonstrated that the project is clearly in the public interest. In reaching my conclusion I am aware of the holding in 1800 Atlantic Developers v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 552 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) that no net public benefit need be shown. I conclude that Findings of Fact Nos. 17, 22, 24-26, 29 and 32-35 on balance establish that the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. Findings of Fact 32 and 33 on balance show that the project will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in LSB. Findings 30 and 38 on balance sfrthat the current conditiofr of LSB makes it a valuable estuarine ecosystem which will be lost if the project is permitted. Finding of Fact 36 and MPS proposed findings of fact Nos. 134 and 135, which were accepted by the Hearing Officer, on balance show a net benefit to navigation. And, the Hearing Officer's acceptance of Sarasota County's proposed finding of fact No. 50, and MPS's proposed finding of fact No. 74, allow me to conclude that the project will not adversely affect the public health, welfare or safety. I note that there is abundant proof that the project is permanent in nature and that there will be no adverse affect on historical or archaeological resources. When I consider and balance all of these factors and their relevant facts, I conclude that the adverse impacts outweigh any benefits, and therefore donclude that there has been no showing that the project is clearly in the public interest. Since I have determined that it has not been shown that the project is clearly in the public interest, I must also consider any mitigation which Sarasota County has proposed. Sarasota County and MPS contend that no mitigation is needed for the loss of ten acres of seagrasses because reopening the pass will result in recolonization of new areas of seagrass, greater density of growth in existing areas, and greater diversity of seagrass species. Even when I assume that Sarasota County's and MPS cotentions are true, I still conclude that the adverse effects of the loss of ten acres of seagrass will not be mitigated by the proposed project. 6/ Accordingly, I reject the exceptions. Water Quality Improvement Sarasota County Exception To Conclusion of Law No. 1, and MPS Exception No. 19, challenge the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law No. 4. Specifically, the exceptions challenge the statement that "[t]he County has not established, however, that the reopening of the inlet will somehow improve water quality and justify the proposed dredging." Conclusion of Law No. 1, R.O. at 14. To the extent that the Hearing Officer may have thought that a showing of improvement in water quality was a requirement for obtaining a permit, she erred. However, for the reasons set forth in my previous discussion of water quality in relation to findings of fact, Sarasota County and MPS had made improvement in water quality an issue in determining whether the project was clearly in the public interest. Rather than erroneously imposing a requirement of improvement of water quality, it appears that the Hearing Officer was merely making a predicite observation prior to conducting the public interest balancing test. Regardless of how one interprets the above matter, it is clear that the issue does not affect the outcome of this case because both the Hearing Officer and I have concluded that there has been no showing that the project is clearly in the public interest. I therefore reject the exception on the basis that the conclusion of law is not erroneous, or if error, then it is harmless error. Having ruled on all of the exceptions it is ORDERED: Except as is otherwise stated in this Final Order, the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order is adopted and incorporated herein by reference. Sarasota County's Permit Application No. 581473069 is DENIED. NOTICE OF RIGHTS Any party to this Final Order has the right to seek judicial review of the Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by the filing of a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the clerk of the Department in the Office of General Counsel, 2600 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400; and by filing a copy of the Notice of Appeal accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days from the date this Order is filed with the clerk of the Department. DONE AND ORDERED this 4 day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation CAROL BROWNER Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL. 32399-2400
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a final order denying the permit requested by Sarasota County. DONE and ENTERED this 19 day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19 day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-3533 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 19 are accepted. Paragraphs 20 through 24 are rejected as irrelevant, speculative or immaterial to the issues of this case. Paragraphs 25 and 26 are accepted. Paragraphs 27 through 29 are rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraph 31 is accepted with the deletion of the quotation marks around the word monitor and with the deletion of the last phrase following the words "survival rate" which is rejected as argumentative or irrelevant or not supported by the record. Paragraphs 32 through 36 are accepted. Paragraph 37 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraphs 38 through 40 are accepted. Paragraph 41 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 42 through 44 are accepted. Paragraph 45 is rejected as irrelevant or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues of this case. Paragraphs 46 through 48 are accepted. Paragraphs 49 through 53 are rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary to the resolution of the issues, comment, repetitive, or argumentative. Paragraphs 54 through 62 are accepted. Paragraph 63 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraph 64 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 65 and 66 are accepted. Paragraph 67 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 68 through 73 are accepted.
The Issue Whether the Notice to Proceed with the work and activities authorized by Amended Permit IR-507 should be issued.
Findings Of Fact On July 24, 1996, Respondent, Town of Indian River Shores (Town), filed an application with Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (Department), for a permit to construct a beach access ramp seaward of the coastal construction control line. By Final Order dated November 27, 1996, the Department granted Permit Number IR-507. Petitioners, Peter Broom and Jeremy R. Geffen, and Duane Jackson, who is not a party to this proceeding, protested the granting of the permit and requested a formal hearing. A formal administrative hearing was held on November 13- 14, 1997, before Administrative Law Judge Errol H. Powell, who issued a Recommended Order on December 8, 1997, recommending that the Department enter a final order granting Permit Number IR-507 with special conditions as may be required by the Department for the protection of marine turtles. Administrative Law Judge Powell concluded the following in Paragraph 49 of the Recommended Order: 49. The evidence demonstrates that the impact of the proposed beach access ramp is minimal; that the construction or use of the beach access ramp will have no adverse effect on the marine turtle or the turtle nesting; and the beach access ramp will not cause significant adverse impacts or cumulative impacts. On January 13, 1998, the Department entered a Final Order, adopting the Recommended Order of Administrative Law Judge Powell and granting Permit Number IR-507 subject to two additional special conditions recommended by the Department staff during the final hearing pertaining to a survey of turtle nesting areas and restrictions on the use of the Town's ATV vehicle as discussed in Findings of Fact 34 and Conclusion of Law 52 of the Recommended Order, which provided: 34. At hearing, the DEP made another recommendation for the issuance of the CCCL permit, involving the marine turtle. Prior to the issuance of the Final Order, the DEP was not fully aware that the proposed beach access ramp was to be used for both emergency and routine patrol access. Having considered the circumstance of routine patrol, the DEP further recommends that a survey of turtle nesting be conducted after construction, but prior to routine use, on the Town's entire five-mile stretch along the Atlantic Ocean to mark turtle nesting areas for their protection and to place certain restrictions on the use of the ATV vehicle. This recommendation will not prohibit or hinder the construction of the beach access ramp. * * * 52. Additionally, the DEP having considered both emergency and routine patrol access, did not deny the CCCL permit. Only another recommendation to protect marine turtles was made by the DEP, regarding the routine patrol. On June 16, 1998, a Final Order was issued by the Department, issuing Amended Permit Number IR-507. Among the special conditions of the amended permit was that the Town would conduct a marine turtle nesting survey prior to the utilization of the access ramp. A notice to proceed with the activities authorized by Amended Permit Number IR-507 was issued on September 17, 1999. Petitioners requested an administrative hearing, challenging the notice to proceed. Petitioners allege that the notice to proceed had been issued without adequate demonstration of marine life/turtle nursery protection and that the proposed construction would adversely affect marine and turtle life on the beach. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Petitioners conceded that Town had fulfilled all special conditions prerequisite to the issuance of the notice to proceed and that the permit did not require that a survey of turtle nesting be done prior to the issuance of the notice to proceed or to the commencement of construction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That a final order be entered dismissing the Request/Petition for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Thomas I. Mayton, Jr., Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Theodore W. Herzog, Esquire 1101 Simonton Street Key West, Florida 33040 Michael R. Dombroski Coastal Technology Corporation 3625 20th Street Vero Beach, Florida 32960 Chester Clem, Esquire Clem, Polackwich & Vocelle 3333 20th Street Vero Beach, Florida 32960-2469
Findings Of Fact Because of a 1984 Thanksgiving Day storm which inflicted damage in coastal areas, Barry Manson-Hing, an area engineer employed by the Department, issued emergency coastal construction permits from a temporary office in the Vero Beach Administration Building. On December 3, 1984, Respondent sought an emergency permit to allow him to place sand and sand-filled bags on his coastal property at 3755 Ocean Drive, Vero Beach, Florida. Respondent asked Mr. Manson-Hing if he could use sand from the beach to restore eroded areas. Mr. Manson-Hing said he could not, and told him that sand would have to be obtained from an upland source. Respondent replied that he had an available source of upland sand and would haul it by truck to the beach site. He also mentioned that he would remove an existing pine tree to allow vehicular access. On the next day, December 4, 1984, Mr. Manson-Hing issued an emergency coastal construction permit, #1R-127E, to Respondent. The permit allowed Respondent to place 1,500 cubic yards of sand fill material to restore eroded beach and dune areas at the site, and also permitted him to temporarily place sand-filled bags on filter cloth. In capital letters, the permit warned, "SCRAPING OF THE BEACH IS PROHIBITED." (Dept. Exhibit 4) On December 5, 1984, Lt. Raymond Barker of the Vero Beach Police Department, observed beach scraping activities being conducted on Respondent's coastal property. Respondent was present on the site. Beach sand seaward of the Coastal Construction Control Line for Indian River County had been scraped and deposited at the face of the sand dune. The removal of the sand created depressions in the beach area seaward of the Coastal Construction Control Line. Lt. Barker ordered Respondent to cease the activity until it could be determined he had the required authorization. Respondent complied with Lt. Barker's order. The scraping of the beach and removal of sand below the coastal construction control line was accomplished without a permit from the Department. On July 17, 1985, the Department entered its "Final Order" assessing Respondent a $500 fine for unauthorized coastal construction activities in violation of Section 161.054, Florida Statutes (1985). Respondent requested a hearing; resulting in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department assess, impose, and collect an administrative fine of $500, to be paid within 30 days of final agency action. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of June, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings the 20th day of June, 1986.
