The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) should grant the Petition for Relief, charging the Respondent with discrimination based on handicap (back and knee injuries), in violation of Section 760.10, Fla. Stat. (1989).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ulysess S. Uqdah, is a carpenter. He has injured his back on-the-job with a construction company other than the Respondent in 1981 or 1982 and, with another construction company other than the Respondent, in early 1984. On one of those occasions, the Petitioner received worker compensation. On both occasions, after a period of time off, the Respondent returned to work with the same employer without any continuing difficulties. In 1984 or 1985, while working for a construction company other than the Respondent, the Petitioner hurt his knee while on the job. He took time off, received worker compensation, and ultimately required surgery. After recuperating from the surgery, the Petitioner was able to return to work. Other than occasional recurring pain, the Petitioner does not worry about the knee, and his knee does not significantly hamper him in the performance of his work as a carpenter. On or about December 12, 1986, the Petitioner was hired by the Respondent, Pace Construction Corporation of Georgia. The Respondent was aware of the Petitioner's prior injuries. He disclosed them on his written employment application. The application also disclosed that the Petitioner had received worker compensation. The Petitioner worked for the Respondent until June 17, 1988, when he was terminated because of the Respondent's lack of work. During his employment with the Respondent, the back and knee injuries did not cause the Petitioner any difficulties in performing his work, and his work was satisfactory. In fact, the Separation Notice states: "Ulysess has proved himself to be a very good worker and gives 100% at all times. He has leadership qualities and shows his concern for the success of the project." The Respondent's regular practice was 1/ to box up all paperwork relating to a construction project when it is completed and put the paperwork in storage. The paperwork from finished projects was stored off the premises of the main business office and was not accessible to the Respondent for reference in connection with subsequent construction projects. 2/ In approximately late 1989 or early 1990, when the Respondent started a major new project in Tampa, the Petitioner applied to again work as a carpenter for the Respondent. His application was held, along with others applying for work, until the Respondent was ready to begin hiring. In approximately March, 1990, the project superintendent reviewed the applications, selected those he wanted to hire, and forwarded those applications to the Respondent's business office for processing. The Petitioner's application was among those selected. In accordance with the Respondent's normal practices, arrangements were made to have the Petitioner and the other chosen applicants undergo a drug and physical examination. The Petitioner's examinations took place on or about March 16, 1990. Meanwhile, the Respondent's personnel office verified the answers given by the Petitioner and the other chosen applicants to the question on the employment application asking whether the applicant had ever received worker compensation. The Respondent located a worker compensation claim report from April, 1989, which noted as to the Petitioner: "10/13/83 West Coast Form. LT- Back" and "4/24/86 Johnson Glen LT-Left leg/ft." 3/ This indicated that the Petitioner had received worker compensation on those two occasions. The Respondent's personnel office forwarded the worker compensation report to the project superintendent, who told the Petitioner that he would not be hired. The Petitioner understood the superintendent to say that the Petitioner was not being hired because of his history of on-the-job injuries and because it would not be in the best interest of the Respondent to hire the Petitioner. The Petitioner understood the superintendent to mean that the prior injuries, which had resulted in worker compensation, would handicap the Petitioner in his ability to perform his assigned duties as carpenter and that the Respondent did not want to have to pay worker compensation if the Petitioner reinjured himself. The superintendent testified that he told the Petitioner he was not being hired because he had falsified his answer to the question on the employment application concerning worker compensation history. It was the Respondent's company policy not to hire any applicant who failed to disclose on his employment application the receipt of worker compensation in the past. This is because a special disability fund would pay worker compensation for such employees only if the receipt of worker compensation in the past was disclosed on the written employment application. The Petitioner claims that he in fact disclosed on his application his receipt of worker compensation in the past and that the Respondent's claim to the contrary is a pretext for intentional discrimination on the basis of a perceived handicap. The Respondent's evidence was that, at that point in time, the Respondent's policy was to discard the application and similar paperwork on applicants who were not hired. Now, after the claims the Petitioner made in this case, the Respondent keeps this documentation. Neither party could produce the Petitioner's application at the final hearing to clarify whether the Petitioner had in fact disclosed on his application his receipt of worker compensation in the past. 4/ The Petitioner concedes that, on or about April 11, 1990, he was advised by an investigator with the Florida Commission on Human Relations that the Respondent was contending it declined to hire the Petitioner due to false statements on his employment application relating to worker compensation. The Respondent submitted persuasive evidence that, besides hiring the Petitioner in 1986 with knowledge of past injuries, it has continued to hire other individuals with a history of on-the-job injuries. The Respondent also submitted persuasive evidence that it has fired employees when it later came to the attention of the Respondent that the employee had falsified an employment application, particularly by falsely stating that worker compensation had not been received in the past. It is found that the Respondent declined to hire the Petitioner based on the Respondent's perception that the Petitioner had falsified his employment application by stating that he had not received worker compensation in the past. It is specifically found that the Respondent did not discriminate against the Petitioner due to a handicap or perceived handicap. There is no evidence of any reason why the Respondent would have discriminated against the Petitioner due to a handicap or perceived handicap. To the contrary, the evidence is clear that the Respondent viewed the Petitioner as being fully capable of performing the job of carpenter satisfactorily notwithstanding his prior back and knee injuries. 5/ In light of the findings made in this case, it would appear that the Petitioner misunderstood the statement made by the job superintendent as to the reasons why the Petitioner was not being hired. This proceeding resulted from the Petitioner's misunderstanding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying the Petition for Relief filed in this case. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1991.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent failed to obtain required workers' compensation insurance and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Manuel Farinas owns Respondent, which has been in existence since 2001 or 2002. He is an officer of the company, as is his wife. Respondent provides construction services-- specifically, the installation of decorative tiles and stones in residences--as a subcontractor to residential contractors. Prior to forming Respondent, Mr. Farinas performed similar services, but he has never previously owned a corporation such as Respondent. On March 24, 2006, an investigator of Respondent visited a worksite at 6620 Holmberg Road in Coconut Creek. The investigator saw several contractors enter and exit the residence. Among them was Respondent and another man, who were installing stone at the residence. During the course of their work, they went back and forth from the residence to a work van marked with Respondent's name. The investigator approached the two men, who were Mr. Farinas and his assistant, Christopher Crespo. The investigator asked Mr. Farinas for proof of workers' compensation coverage, but he was unable to provide it because Respondent had not obtained any workers' compensation insurance. Clearly, Mr. Farinas was an employee of Respondent. For purposes of withholding taxes and paying Social Security, Respondent treated Mr. Farinas's assistants as independent contractors, issuing them Form 1099s at the end of the year. However, they were clearly involved in the construction industry, although the evidence fails to establish that they were not independent contractors, for the purpose of workers' compensation coverage, prior to 2004. By Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated April 12, 2006, Petitioner noted that it had issued a stop-work order to Respondent on March 24, 2006, determined that Respondent had failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance, and assessed a penalty of $13,835.37. Attached to the Amended Order is a worksheet that lists a dozen payees on which Petitioner relies in calculating the total penalty. Mr. Farinas candidly testified that the following payees were, from time to time, assistants who helped him install decorative stone and tile: Mr. Crespo, Jahmar Suarez, Michael Sanchez, Roberto Carvahal, Roberto Arquello, Guillermo Gonzalez, Mikel Gonzalez, and Yunier Nunez. The penalty attributeable to these persons totals $3172.10. Mr. Farinas is also a payee on the worksheet. The penalty attributeable to him totals $2554.72. The worksheet lists three other payees: Martineax Stone Service, for which the penalty is $5602.80; "subcontractors," for whom the penalty is $2482.62; and Ana Gonzalez, for whom the penalty is $23.13. However, Martineax was a supplier of stone and tile, not an employee or independent contractor, so Petitioner improperly used the payments to Martineax to calculate the penalty. Ms. Gonzalez was not a stoneworker, but an officeworker, so Petitioner used an excessively high rate to calculate the unpaid premium. "Subcontractors," though, is a legitimate inclusion because, during the January 1 to June 1 period covered by this category, no other listed payee received any payments from Respondent. After reducing the proposed penalty for the amounts of the penalty improperly attributed to Martineax and Ms. Gonzalez, the penalty is $8209.44. However, for the reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner has failed to prove that the penalty should be based on any payments to independent contractors prior to 2004. Excluding from this adjustment two payments to Martineax (to avoid a double reduction), the portion of the penalty improperly attributed to these pre-2004 payments is $2676.50. The correct penalty is thus $5532.94.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of failing to obtain workers' compensation insurance, imposing a penalty of $5532.94 on Respondent, and maintaining the stop-work order until Respondent complies with all applicable workers' compensation laws. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Alex Sink Chief Finacial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahssee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahssee, Florida 32399-0307 Colin M. Roopnarine Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Michael A. Shaffir Carlton Fields, P.A. 100 Southeast Second Street, Suite 4000 Miami, Florida 33131
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the stipulations of fact, the deposition of Luis Martinez, a senior appeals referee, taken on May 18, 1979, with exhibits and the stipulated documentary evidence adduced in this proceeding, the following relevant facts are found: At the time of the filing of the instant petition challenging Rule 8B- 5.13(1), both petitioner Cotilla and petitioner Prieto were parties in proceedings before the respondent to obtain unemployment compensation benefits. Their applications for benefits had originally been denied for lack of sufficient wage credits. Both petitioners had been continuously employed by Florida East Coast Deliveries, Inc. from 1974 through December of 1978. The finding of lack of credits was based on the employer's switch from the Florida Unemployment Compensation System to coverage under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. By letters dated March 29, 1979, the attorney for the petitioners made a request to Manuel M. Garcia, the appeals referee, for subpoenas to produce certain documents and a witness at the hearing scheduled for April 12, 1979. The letter requesting subpoenas stated that the records and witnesses are expected to provide evidence to show that the claimants had in fact been paid sufficient wages for insured work under Fla. Stat. 443.05(1)(e), during their base periods to qualify for Florida Unemployment Compensation benefits, which they have earned." By letter dated March 30, 1979, Appeals Referee Garcia denied the request for subpoenas "at this point in time," stating that "I will take into consideration your request, and if necessary, subpoenas will be issued later. However, sufficient cause has not been shown at this point to warrant subpoenas. There is no indication in your letter that the employer has refused to comply with any request for documents and/or witnesses. In addition, is questionable whether subpoenas can be issued and served prior to the April 12, hearing. Finally, the documents and information you are requesting are so general in nature, and its relevancy is at best questionable." Petitioners' attorney requested a reconsideration of her subpoena request by letter dated April 2, 1979. This letter stated in great detail why the attorney for the claimants (petitioners herein) felt that the information and documents requested were relevant to the issue in dispute. On April 9, 1979, Referee Garcia again denied the request for subpoenas by a letter stating: Most of the information that you provided as to why these documents should be subpoenaed refer to the instant employer's liability under the Florida Unemployment Compensation Law. In addition, your clients' position, earnings, and weeks of employment with the instant employer are not being disputed, as far as I can tell. My previous denial of your request for subpoenas at this point in time still stands. I will consider a second Hearing near the employer's vicinity, subpoena or a field investigation after the hearing, if such are necessary to comply, with due process. To clarify one point the subpoenas you are requesting are not being denied because of the time involved in issuing and serving subpoenas. The matter was mentioned because it is impractical to request documents of unproven relevancy, which in all probability will not be available for the April 12, 1979, Hearing, even if the subpoenas are issued." A hearing was held in petitioner Cotilla's appeal on April 12, 1979. The employer, Florida East Coast Deliveries, Inc., refused to voluntarily supply the requested information. The petitioners did not have knowledge of or access to the requested information except by the subpoenas which were refused. Thomas J. Edwards appeared at the April 12th hearing as agent of the employer, but he did not have the information requested in the subpoena request. Other agents of the employer did have the requested information. Petitioner Prieto's hearing was postponed until May 7, 1979. By letter dated April 23rd, his attorney renewed her requests for subpoenas and the request was again denied. Since the basis for the denial of petitioners' unemployment benefits was the question of the employer's liability under the Florida Unemployment Compensation Act, the information requested was relevant to the proof of their case. In addition, in petitioner Prieto's case, it was relevant to the issue concerning the timeliness of his appeal, in that the testimony and evidence sought were relevant to the wrongfulness of the respondent's actions in denying him benefits which petitioner Prieto contends was a cause of his failure to file his appeal within ten (10) days. At their unemployment hearing, the petitioners were unable to prove the circumstances under which their former employer switched coverage from the Florida Unemployment Compensation Act to the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. Petitioner Cotilla has not received any unemployment compensation benefits, and no decision has been rendered in the case of petitioner Prieto. The basis for all of the denials of the subpoena requests which have occurred in the unemployment compensation proceedings of the petitioners is the challenged Rule 8B-5.13(1). This Rule, which is set forth in full below, provides in pertinent part that subpoenas "may" be issued by the appeals referee upon timely written application and that the application must state the "reason for appearance to include what testimony or evidence the witness is expected to provide." Pursuant to Rule 8B-5.13(1), it is the current practice of respondent's appeals referees to deny requests for subpoenas which do not contain a written explanation of the reason the subpoena is needed prior to the hearing. The explanation must state, to the satisfaction of the appeals referee, the materiality, relevance and competence of the testimony or evidence sought. Absent such a showing which is deemed satisfactory by the referee, the request for subpoenas will be denied. Even when the request provides an explanation which illustrates that the evidence or testimony sought is material, relevant and competent, it is typical practice for the appeals referee to attempt to use other means of obtaining the facts sought. For example, someone from the referee's office will telephone the person to whom the subpoena request is directed and ask them to voluntarily appear at the hearing. Also, the referees may request a field auditor or field examiner to examine employer records and file a report at the hearing. If it becomes apparent to the referee at the hearing that a witness or document is needed, the hearing will be continued and a subpoena will be issued.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner based on her race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Respondent initially hired Petitioner through a temporary labor service. Petitioner worked for approximately 60 days as a temporary employee in the position of a medical transcriptionist preparing medical chronologies. At the end of the 60-day period, Respondent decided to eliminate Petitioner's position. Petitioner decided to enhance her career opportunities by applying for a position as a paralegal with Respondent. In a letter dated June 19, 1996, Petitioner expressed her interest in working for Respondent as a full-time employee. According to the letter, Petitioner had worked for over 20 years as a secretary/administrative assistant, including some experience in the areas of management and supervision. The letter, together with Petitioner's resumé, indicated that she had experience as a legal secretary. In a letter dated August 26, 1997, Respondent offered Petitioner a job as a paralegal. Petitioner accepted the offer. Randy Fischer, Esquire, explained the duties of a paralegal to Petitioner and gave her a copy of a paralegal's job description. The duties included, but were not limited to, the following: (a) drafting pleadings and correspondence; (b) drafting discovery requests; (c) organizing files and preparing file indexes; (d) investigating cases; (e) scheduling depositions; (f) attending document productions, exhibit exchanges, and pretrial conferences; and (g) assisting in legal research. Respondent gave Petitioner an employee handbook. The handbook included, among other things, information about attendance, discipline, and the firm's anti-discrimination policies and procedures. Petitioner also received a paralegal manual and billing guidelines. Respondent's anti-discrimination policy communicated to employees that sexual harassment, racial discrimination, or any other type of discrimination would not be tolerated. Respondent had an "open door" policy by which employees could report discrimination to the office manager or the office-managing partner. At all times material here, Mr. Fischer was the office-managing partner, and Janet Siefert was the office manager. Petitioner never took advantage of the opportunity to report any alleged racial discrimination to anyone on Respondent's staff. From the beginning of her employment as a paralegal, Mr. Fischer communicated to Petitioner that she would be expected to schedule, coordinate, and calendar activities for attorneys. He frequently was critical of Petitioner's performance because she failed to meet these expectations. There is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Fischer's criticisms were racially motivated. Respondent regularly provided written performance evaluations of employees. Petitioner's first review took place in December 1997. The evaluation indicated that Petitioner's attendance or dependability and teamwork were "highly acceptable." Her performance in oral expression, writing ability, decision-making ability, work product accurateness, and work product volume was "acceptable." Petitioner "needed to improve" in the following areas: (a) knowing subject matter; (b) analyzing problems; (c) obtaining information; (d) meeting deadlines; (e) performing assignments resourcefully and creatively; (f) recording billable time; (g) showing initiative; and (h) following through on assignments. Petitioner's overall rating on the evaluation was "acceptable." During the evaluation, Mr. Fischer counseled Petitioner about her job deficiencies. He particularly discussed Petitioner's need to follow appropriate guidelines for billing. This was important because Respondent routinely had to reduce Petitioner's excessive billing time in some areas. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner was singled out in terms of having billing time entries removed from the timesheets. In February 1998, Petitioner began having problems with her attendance and low work productivity. A written disciplinary action dated February 11, 1998, outlined the following deficiencies: (a) inattention to detail in handling files by failing to schedule the continuation of a deposition; poor performance in handling the Angela Davis file; leaving the building during work hours without proper authorization; (d) being late for work on numerous occasions; and (e) taking numerous personal absences. Regarding the Angela Davis file, Petitioner's failure to follow instructions adversely affected Mr. Fischer's handling of the file. Mr. Fischer became angry because it took Petitioner two hours to drive from Ocala, Florida, to Gainesville, Florida, with only a portion of the Angela Davis file that he had requested. However, there is no evidence that Mr. Fischer's anger was racially motivated. Petitioner admits that she occasionally left the building during her work breaks to go to the bank or for other personal reasons instead of spending that time in the employees' break room. She asserts that she did not know she had to have permission to do so and that she had to sign in and out. According to Petitioner, other employees were allowed these privileges without being reprimanded. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not credible. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that her attendance record was problematic due to personal problems. On at least one occasion, Mr. Fischer agreed to let Petitioner make up some of the time she had lost. There is no persuasive evidence that Respondent's attendance policy was applied more rigidly to Petitioner than to any other employee. More importantly, Petitioner admitted that she was not qualified to perform all of the duties of a paralegal when she accepted the position. It is clear that she had difficulty learning "on-the-job." On February 20, 1998, Mr. Fischer wrote Petitioner and another paralegal a note regarding the importance of pulling a file together and following directions. Mr. Fischer had gone to mediation without the necessary file documents because Petitioner and her co-worker had not followed his directions. On March 12, 1998, Mr. Fischer reminded Petitioner and another paralegal about the importance of providing him with daily timesheets in a timely manner. Petitioner and her co-worker were at least a week behind in providing him with their timesheets. On March 26, 1998, Petitioner used the firm's copy machine and other supplies for personal reasons. On April 8, 1998, Petitioner was late to work due to a flat tire. In May 1998, Petitioner requested a more flexible work schedule so that she could attend class in Orlando, Florida, one afternoon each week. Mr. Fischer responded that her billing hours were already low and that she was routinely late to work. However, Mr. Fischer agreed to give her the time off for a 30-day period if she documented her time at the office, improved her productivity, and billed a minimum of 25 billed hours per week. In June 1998, Mr. Fischer had to remind Petitioner again about the importance of keeping calendars for the attorneys. Because Petitioner failed to follow instructions, no attorney from Respondent's office attended a scene viewing. In July 1998, Mr. Fischer sent Petitioner an e-mail message criticizing her for not properly issuing a subpoena and deposition notice. When he realized that Petitioner was not at fault, he promptly apologized in a subsequent message. On August 18 and 19, 1998, Petitioner received two personal facsimile transmissions at the office. On August 25, 1998, Mr. Fischer gave Petitioner a written disciplinary action and placed her on probationary status. The discipline was based on the following reasons: (a) Petitioner had been out of the office for various personal reasons 31 times in the last 90 days; (b) Petitioner had provided Respondent with inaccurate or incomplete reasons for those absences; (c) Petitioner's productivity was below office standards; (d) Petitioner had failed to properly schedule activities and calendar events for an attorney; (e) Petitioner had failed to follow repeated instructions in relation to file handling, scheduling depositions, and scheduling meetings; (f) Petitioner had used firm time to receive and review personal facsimile transmissions, to discuss personal information, and to participate in personal telephone calls; and (g) Petitioner had inappropriately used firm resources. On September 16, 1998, Mr. Fischer gave Petitioner another written disciplinary action. The memorandum outlined continued problems with Petitioner's performance. One example of Petitioner's poor performance involved her failure to properly arrange for a deposition. Other examples involved excessive billing for making summaries of records; the lack of time billed for other case activities, such as setting and noticing depositions and hearings; failure to resolve unpaid costs on a case; and modification of timesheets after they had been edited. The September 16, 1998, disciplinary action also reviewed continued problems with Petitioner's attendance and attitude. Respondent's paralegals are required to bill 100-105 hours per month. Some examples of Petitioner's billing hours are as follows: (a) March 1998, 97.3 hours; (b) April 1998, 58.9 hours; (c) May 1998, 74.3 hours; and (d) June 1998, 69.7 hours. Respondent fired Petitioner on September 25, 1998. Her termination was based on cumulative reasons, including low productivity, failure to be attentive to detail in the handling of files, and frequent absences and tardiness. During the time that Petitioner worked for Respondent, Mr. Fischer fired Robin Carr, a white female, for similar reasons that Petitioner was terminated: excessive absences, inappropriate use of personal time in the office, and excessive personal telephone calls. Mr. Fischer also fired Art Monig, a white male, for low work productivity. Ms. Carr and Mr. Monig both worked as paralegals. Petitioner testified that, on one occasion, Ms. Carr and other employees were in the employees' break room discussing the turnover of staff in the office. Petitioner testified that Ms. Carr made the statement that Petitioner did not have to worry about losing her job because she was a "token." In the Petition for Relief, Petitioner alleges that Ms. Seifert made this comment. Ms. Carr did not testify at the hearing but Ms. Seifert did testify and denies making such a statement or ever hearing it made. Similarly, Jennifer Whitehead, who was Mr. Fischer's secretary from February 1997 through May 2001, testified that she never heard anyone in the office make a statement that Petitioner was a "token" or a "quota." Nevertheless, Petitioner's testimony in this regard is persuasive. Petitioner admits that she never reported the statement allegedly made by Ms. Carr to anyone in Respondent's office. She admits that Mr. Fischer never made inappropriate racial comments in her presence. Mr. Fischer's dissatisfaction with Petitioner's performance may have caused Petitioner to be uncomfortable from time to time, but there is no evidence that his reactions to her poor performance were racially motivated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorine Alexander 1421 Southwest 27th Avenue Apartment No. 1807 Ocala, Florida 34474 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Randy Fischer, Esquire Boehm, Brown, Fischer & Harwood, P.A. Post Office Box 4140 Ocala, Florida 34478 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the Respondent was required to carry workers' compensation coverage for certain individuals, and, if so, whether the Petitioner correctly assessed a penalty against the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact On September 18, 2003, Tracy Gilbert, an inspector employed by the Petitioner, visited a residential construction worksite located at 3109 West Sunset Drive, Tampa, Florida. At the time of her visit, Ms. Gilbert saw three unidentified men painting the interior of a two-story residence. The men were wearing t-shirts bearing the Respondent's name and a telephone number. She attempted to speak to the men, but none spoke English, and Ms. Gilbert was unable to communicate with them. Ms. Gilbert attempted to obtain information from a fourth unidentified man who arrived at the construction site while she was present, but the evidence fails to establish that any relevant information was obtained. Ms. Gilbert then located the construction site permit board, and as she examined the board, a fifth unidentified man wearing a t-shirt bearing the Respondent's name and a telephone number, walked up to her and gave her a business card with the Respondent's information on it. Ms. Gilbert called the telephone number printed on the t-shirts and business card and left a message. Within a few minutes, Richard T. Killam returned her call. Mr. Killam is the owner and operator of the Respondent. Ms. Gilbert advised Mr. Killam of what she had seen. Mr. Killam advised Ms. Gilbert that the individuals she had seen were not his employees, and stated that they were employed by an individual identified as Mauro Makawachi (Mauro) to whom the job was "subcontracted." Mr. Killam provided a telephone number to Ms. Gilbert, which he identified as that of Mauro. The Respondent contracts with general contractors for painting jobs at various construction sites. In situations where additional labor is required, including the one at issue in this proceeding, the Respondent has on occasion hired Mauro to work on those jobs. The evidence fails to establish the existence of any written contract between Mr. Killam and Mauro related to the worksite at issue in this proceeding. Ms. Gilbert called the telephone number provided by Mr. Killam and had a brief conversation with the individual identified as Mauro, but apparently obtained no information regarding the situation during the conversation and has since been unable to establish further contact with Mauro. Although it is reasonable to presume that the unidentified persons observed at the worksite by Ms. Gilbert were being paid for their work, there is no evidence that the Respondent employed or paid the unidentified persons. Mr. Killam testified that he had arranged for the work at the jobsite to be performed by Mauro. It is reasonable to infer that the unidentified persons observed painting at the worksite by Ms. Gilbert were there at the direction of Mauro and would have been paid by Mauro. The Respondent asserts that Mauro is an independent contractor for whom the Respondent is under no obligation to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage. Mr. Killam provided to Ms. Gilbert an affidavit of "independent contractor" status and a certificate of insurance both allegedly provided to him by Mauro. The evidence fails to establish that Mauro's affidavit reflected the actual terms of his work on behalf of the Respondent. Mauro's affidavit of independent contractor status indicates that Mauro incurred the "principle [sic] expenses related to the services or work" that Mauro performed for the Respondent. Mr. Killam testified that the primary expenses of a painting business are paint and labor. There is no credible evidence that Mauro maintained a separate business with his own materials. The Respondent paid for the paint used at the worksite. The affidavit indicates that Mauro held or had applied for a federal employer identification number. There is no credible evidence that Mauro held or has applied for a federal employer identification number. The affidavit indicates that Mauro performed specific amounts of work for specific amounts of money. There is no credible evidence that Mauro was paid on a commission or per-job competitive bid basis by the Respondent. The Respondent paid Mauro on a regular basis for labor performed during the pay period. Mauro's certificate of insurance identified the insurer as "Aries Insurance Company." Ms. Gilbert determined that Aries Insurance Company had stopped writing business prior to the date of issuance on the certificate of insurance provided by the Respondent to the Petitioner, and, therefore, the Certificate of Insurance was invalid. The Respondent leased some employees from Progressive Employer Services, which provided workers' compensation insurance for leased employees. Mauro was not a leased employee. There is no evidence that Mauro or the unidentified workers observed by Ms. Gilbert were exempt from workers' compensation requirements. The evidence establishes that the Respondent failed to provide workers' compensation coverage for Mauro. There is no evidence that the unidentified workers observed by Ms. Gilbert were provided with workers' compensation coverage by anyone. Based on the payroll records provided to Ms. Gilbert by the Respondent, Ms. Gilbert calculated the total amount of penalty directly attributable to payments by the Respondent to Mauro as $13,049.45.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a Final Order affirming the Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order issued on September 22, 2003, as amended by the Amended Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order issued on September 30, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: John M. Iriye, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Joseph E. Launikitis, Esquire Fuller, Holsonback, Bivins & Malloy 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 1500 Tampa, Florida 33602 Honorable Tom Gallagher, Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner was an "employee" of Respondent pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, so as to be eligible to pursue her Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice, to wit: racial and sexual discrimination.
Findings Of Fact On or about June 16, 1999, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, alleging racial and sexual discrimination against her by Respondent, Florida Times Union. On or about December 3, 2002, the Commission entered a "Determination: No Jurisdiction," on the basis that its investigation showed that Petitioner, as an independent contractor, was not able to demonstrate her "employee" status under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief, and on or about January 8, 2003, the Commission referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings. On January 17, 2003, an Order to Show Cause was issued, instructing Petitioner to show cause, in writing, filed with the Division, why the Division would have jurisdiction in light of the Commission's "Determination: No Jurisdiction." Petitioner did not show cause. Because Petitioner at least has a right to present evidence and to have an adjudication of the threshold issue of jurisdiction, a telephonic conference call was scheduled and went forward with both parties present on March 4, 2003.1/ An Order was entered March 6, 2003, memorializing the agreements reached in the telephonic conference call as follows: Petitioner Iris Worthy states [sic] that so far as she knew she was an independent contractor with Respondent. The parties agreed that the jurisdictional issue would be submitted to the undersigned by each one mailing/filing a copy of the "contract of employment" to the undersigned/the division.2/ Thereafter, if jurisdiction is established, the case will be tried on the merits via a notice of hearing, but if jurisdiction is not established, the case will be dismissed. The contract is entitled "Independent Newsdealer Contract." It was signed by two witnesses, Respondent's representative, and Petitioner. The contract specifically states that Petitioner is an "independent contractor," is not an employee or an agent of [Respondent], and is not subject to [Respondent's] direction or control." The contract provides in a second place, that: [Petitioner] is a separate, independent contractor and not subject to the exercise of any direction or control by [Respondent] over his [sic] method of distributing or otherwise handling the delivery of said newspaper within his area. . . . And in a third place, that: [Petitioner] shall have no proprietary interest herein. The contract provides that Petitioner had to purchase newspapers from Respondent at wholesale rates and would be paid a set amount, minus the wholesale cost of the newspapers. She had the right to select, furnish, and control her own equipment, method, and means of delivery, and to select, furnish, and control anyone she employed or with whom she sub-contracted. The contract provides that it is subject to termination by either party, with or without cause, upon 30 days' written notice, or immediately upon notice of a breach of the contract. The Petition for Relief admits that Respondent gave Petitioner a termination notice and that Respondent charged Petitioner for newspapers. The contract requires Petitioner to purchase her own insurance of all types. Under the contract, Petitioner could independently arrange, on her own, for a substitute delivery person when she was unavailable, and she was liable to Respondent if Respondent had to deliver the newspapers. Also under the contract, Petitioner did not have to comply with any of Respondent's rules, policies, or procedures.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 11th day of April, 2003.
The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Countrywide Siding and Windows, Inc., failed to secure workers compensation that meets the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and, if so was correctly assessed a penalty for violating, the workers’ compensation laws of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure workers’ compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. (2009). Respondent is a corporation domiciled in Florida and engaged in the construction industry. On February 13, 2009, Petitioner’s investigator, Carl Woodall, stopped to spot check a house in the Cabrille Lane area of Panama City, Florida, where he saw workers installing siding. Petitioner’s investigator is the only employee for Petitioner who investigated and developed the substantive evidence in this case. Other employees, who have no direct knowledge of the underlying facts, calculated the amounts of the proposed penalties. Mr. Woodall inquired of the workers and ascertained that they worked for Respondent. The investigator then contacted the Respondent to determine whether Respondent had secured or obtained workers’ compensation insurance under Florida’s workers’ compensation law. Respondent’s representative indicated that it maintained workers’ compensation insurance through Employee Leasing Service (ELS), an employee-leasing company. There is no dispute that in February 2009, Respondent leased its workers from ELS and that under the lease agreement, ELS provided workers’ compensation coverage to Respondent and its leased workers. Other evidence suggested that in past years, Respondent had leased its workers from other employee-leasing companies. The evidence was not specific as to who those companies were. The evidence, while not specific, also suggested that Respondent paid its leased employees bonuses and sometimes loaned them money.1/ In general, employee-leasing agreements provide clerical duties to client companies including tax deduction and workers’ compensation, in exchange for a fee. Client companies’ workers who are registered with the leasing company are employees of the leasing company, not the client company. In this case, the specific contract between ELS and Respondent was not introduced into evidence. Likewise, neither the contract nor the proof of coverage between ELS and its workers’ compensation insurer was introduced into evidence and it is unknown who the actual workers’ compensation insurer was or is. Therefore, there is no credible evidence regarding the specific terms of the contract between ELS, Respondent or the workers’ compensation insurer. Importantly, there is no evidence regarding any fee arrangement between ELS and Respondent showing that workers’ compensation coverage was provided based on payroll or that direct payments to Respondent’s workers constituted payroll under the terms of the lease contract for which workers’ compensation had not been secured. Petitioner’s investigator telephoned ELS and learned from some person (purportedly Ellen Clark) that it did have an employee-leasing contract with Respondent and did maintain workers’ compensation on Respondent’s workers. The investigator was also told that ELS intended to or had cancelled its employee-leasing contract with Respondent effective either February 14 or 15, 2009. No one from ELS testified at the hearing and the substance of the above conversation, as with all the testimony about purported ELS statements, constitutes hearsay that was not corroborated by other credible evidence in the record. As such, the substance of these conversations is not found as facts, other than to establish that Petitioner’s investigator had a conversation with a person purporting to Represent ELS. However, on February 14, 2010, the investigator did not take any action against Respondent since he felt Respondent was in compliance with Florida’s workers’ compensation law. On February 17, 2009, Mr. Woodall again returned to the Cabrille Lane area and observed Respondent’s workers installing siding on a house. One of the workers, Mike Moore, revealed to Mr. Woodall that he was a subcontractor of Respondent, but that the other worker, Ryan Grantham, was Respondent’s employee. The subcontractor was in compliance with Florida’s workers’ compensation laws. In order to find out if the other worker was covered by workers’ compensation insurance, Mr. Woodall met with Ronnie Creed, Respondent’s owner and officer, who was exempt under Florida’s workers’ compensation law. Mr. Creed was unaware of Respondent’s workers’ compensation status but put Mr. Woodall in contact with his wife, India Creed, who was also exempt from Florida’s workers’ compensation law. Ms. Creed told Mr. Woodall that Respondent had received a letter from ELS that day, purportedly notifying it that ELS intended to cancel or had cancelled its employee-leasing contract with Respondent. The letter was not introduced into evidence and it is unclear whether the letter discussed the workers’ compensation insurance coverage ELS maintained on its employees that it leased to Respondent. Again, no one from ELS or its workers’ compensation insurer testified at the hearing regarding its lease or which workers were covered under the lease. The record is devoid of any evidence that these employees were no longer employed by ELS and, more importantly, not covered by ELS’s workers’ compensation coverage on February 17, 2009.2/ Mr. Woodall also checked the Department’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) database. CCAS is a database that maintains information on business entities in Florida and whether they have secured workers’ compensation and /or whether exemptions from workers’ compensation have been granted to eligible company officers. CCAS did not reflect that Respondent had a workers’ compensation insurance policy in place. However, the investigator did not check to see if ELS or another employee-leasing company had such a policy. Similarly, the investigator did not investigate the terms of those contracts and whether those contracts considered any bonuses or loans paid by Petitioner to its employees to be payroll, and if it was, whether any workers’ compensation coverage was dependent on such payments being reported to these companies. As such, the information in that system is hearsay which may or may not indicate a need to investigate further. Moreover, CCAS is simply a database of information reported by others and maintained by the Petitioner. Its reliability is questionable in this case given the multiple contractual entities involved in the provision of workers’ compensation to Respondent and the lack of any direct evidence from those contractual entities. Therefore, the fact that CCAS did not reflect that Respondent had workers’ compensation insurance is not given weight in this Order and is neither clear nor convincing evidence demonstrating that Respondent failed to secure workers’ compensation insurance on February 17, 2009, or for prior years. Based on his belief that Respondent had not secured workers’ compensation on its workers, Mr. Woodall issued a Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation to Respondent (Request) asking for Respondent’s business and financial records related to Respondent’s business and employee leasing for the last 3 years. The records were requested to construct Respondent’s alleged payroll and determine the employees of Respondent. There was no evidence that there was any inquiry into past employment leasing companies that Petitioner contracted with or the terms of those contracts. As with the contract with ELS, there was no inquiry into whether loans or bonuses or any other money paid by Respondent to its workers was considered payroll, required to be reported, or had any impact on workers’ compensation coverage that the leasing companies provided on the employees they leased to Respondent. Respondent complied with the Request and provided the requested business records to Petitioner. Mr. Woodall forwarded the financial records to Petitioner’s penalty calculator, Monica Moye. Beyond checking CCAS, Ms. Moye was not responsible for factually determining whether Respondent had properly secured workers’ compensation insurance during the period under review. Using Respondent’s financial records, Ms. Moye calculated a penalty to be assessed to Respondent based on class code 5645 for siding installation as established by the National Council on Compensation Insurance in the Scopes Manual. She also separated Respondent’s periods of alleged noncompliance based on periodically changing approved manual rates. Approved manual rates are set by the National Council on Compensation Insurance and represent the amounts employers would pay in workers’ compensation premiums for tasks performed by their employees. On March 13, 2009, Petitioner issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, assessing a penalty of $159,002.46 to Respondent. Based on additional records submitted by Respondent, Petitioner recalculated the previously-assessed penalty and issued a 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Respondent on June 9, 2009, reducing the assessed penalty to $130,914.99. Additionally, following the hearing, the Department revised the assessed penalty and issued a 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (3rd Amended Order) reducing the assessed penalty to $130,135.03.3/ The list of employees attached to the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment contains several incidents of imputed employment listed as “cash,” “unknown” or “Star H.” There is nothing in the record that supports a finding that these amounts were paid for employment purposes. However, the evidence did not establish that Petitioner did not secure workers’ compensation coverage and the issues regarding the correctness of the amount of penalty assessed against Respondent is not addressed in this Recommended Order. Since the evidence did not establish that Respondent failed to secure workers’ compensation, the Stop-work order should be cancelled and the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a Final Order that Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner failed to secure workers’ compensation to its employees and canceling the Stop Work Order and dismissing the 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 2010.
The Issue Whether this cause is barred by a release of all claims.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Maurice G. Hargrove, Sr.’s, Petition for Relief from employment discrimination due to a lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 2016
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Brian’s Painting and Wall Papering, Inc., conducted operations in the State of Florida without obtaining workers’ compensation coverage, meeting the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2007),1 in violation of Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes. If so, what penalty should be assessed by Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 69L.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. Petitioner is a corporation domiciled in Florida and engaged in the construction industry, providing painting and wallpapering services to private residences in Florida. On December 4, 2007, Investigator Ira Bender conducted a random workers’ compensation compliance check of a new home construction site located at 4009 Twenty-second Street, Southwest, in Lehigh Acres, Florida. Investigator Bender observed two men painting. He later identified the two men as Larry Zoelner and Brian Zack, who were later determined to be Petitioner’s employees. Investigator Bender continued the investigation of Petitioner, utilizing the Respondent’s Compliance and Coverage Automated System (“CCAS”) database that contained all workers’ compensation insurance policy information from the carrier to an insured and lists all the workers’ compensation exemptions in the State of Florida. Based on his search of CCAS, Investigator Bender determined that for the period, December 3, 2004, through December 4, 2007 (“assessed penalty period”), Petitioner did not have a State of Florida workers’ compensation insurance policy or a valid, current exemption for any of Petitioner’s employees, including Zoelner and Zack. Based on his search of CCAS, he also determined that Petitioner did not have a State of Florida workers’ compensation insurance policy or a valid, current exemption for Brian Galvin, Petitioner’s owner and operator, for the assessed penalty period. Galvin admitted that he did not have an exemption prior to December 4, 2007. Section 440.05, Florida Statutes, allows a corporate officer to apply for a construction certificate exemption from workers’ compensation benefits or compensation. Only the named individual on the application is exempt from carrying workers’ compensation insurance coverage. Petitioner was not in possession of a current, valid construction industry exemption for its corporate officer, Galvin, during the three-year search period. To be eligible for the exemption in the construction industry, an employer must pay a $50 processing fee and file a “notice of election to be exempt” application with Respondent for each corporate officer and have that application processed and approved by it. 7. Subsections 440.107(3) and 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes, authorized Respondent to issue SWOs to employers unable to provide proof of workers’ compensation coverage, including proof of a current, valid workers’ compensation exemption. Failure to provide such proof is deemed “an immediate serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare . . .” § 440.107(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Based on the lack of worker’s compensation coverage and a current, valid workers’ compensation exemption for its employees, including Galvin, Respondent issued a SWO on Petitioner on December 4, 2007. The SWO ordered Petitioner to cease all business operations for all worksites in the State of Florida. On the day the SWO was issued, Investigator Bender also served Petitioner with a “Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation,” for the purpose of enabling Respondent to determine a penalty under Subsection 440.107(7), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.015, Investigator Bender requested business records from Petitioner for the assessed penalty period. The requested records included payroll documents, copies of certificates of exemptions, employee leasing records, and other business records. Investigator Bender was satisfied that the records produced by Petitioner were an adequate response to the business records request. Based on Investigator Bender’s review of the business records, he determined that Galvin was dually-employed during the assessed period. Dual employment occurs when an employee is paid remuneration by two different employers. Galvin was simultaneously employed by SouthEast Personnel Leasing, Inc., as a painter and by Petitioner as its chief operating officer. In calculating the assessed penalty, Investigator Bender only took into account Petitioner’s payroll. It was determined that the payroll from the leasing company demonstrated secured payment of workers’ compensation coverage for the two painters and for Galvin, when he was operating as a painter. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L- 6.035, Investigator Bender included “dividends” paid by Petitioner to Galvin during the assessed penalty period, in calculating Petitioner’s total payroll amount used in the calculation of the assessed penalty. Galvin argued that dividends paid to him by Petitioner should be excluded from the calculation. However, the dividends that Petitioner paid to Galvin constituted unsecured payment for workers’ compensation coverage, in violation of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Insurance Code. Through the use of the produced records, Respondent calculated a penalty for the assessed period. The Amended Order, which assessed a penalty of $45,363.76, was issued and served to Petitioner on December 13, 2007. Based on business records Investigator Bender received from SouthEast Personnel Leasing, Inc., on December 17, 2007, Investigator Bender determined that the classification code assigned for Galvin should be changed from 5474 to 5606. Classification code 5474 represented the designation for a painter while classification code 5606 represented the designation for a manager. In the course of his investigation, Investigator Bender also deleted Charlie Galvin after he determined Charlie Galvin was not Petitioner’s employee. Investigator Bender assigned the new class code to the type of work performed by Galvin while working as a manger for Petitioner, utilizing the SCOPES Manual. He multiplied the class code’s assigned approved manual rate with the payroll per $100, and then multiplied all by 1.5. Consequently, the 2nd Amended Order, which was issued and served to Petitioner on December 18, 2007, assessed a penalty in the amount of $19,943.08. The recalculated penalty, as calculated, was consistent with the method in which the investigator had calculated the previous penalties.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order, as follows: Petitioner failed to secure workers’ compensation coverage for its employees, including its corporate officer, as required by statute; and Petitioner be assessed a penalty of $19,943.08. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2008 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2008
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (the Department), properly issued a Stop-Work Order and Penalty Assessment against Respondent, Ogles Construction and Roofing, LLC (Respondent), for failing to obtain workers' compensation insurance that meets the requirements of chapter 440, Florida Statutes.1/
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On September 30, 2013, the parties filed a Joint Pre- hearing Stipulation, by which the parties stipulated to the facts set forth in the following paragraphs 2 through 12. Those facts are accepted and adopted by the undersigned. The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation for the benefit of their employees and corporate officers. Respondent, a Florida corporation,2/ was engaged in business operations as a roofing company in the State of Florida from June 13, 2010, through June 12, 2013. Respondent received a Stop-Work Order for Specific Worksite Only and Order of Penalty Assessment from the Department on June 12, 2013. Respondent received a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation from the Department on June 12, 2013. The penalty period in this case is from June 13, 2010, through June 12, 2013. Respondent employed Robert Ogles, II, Matthew Ogles, and Stephen Ogles during the period from June 13, 2010, through June 12, 2013. Robert Ogles had no exemption from June 13, 2010, through November 14, 2010, and from November 15, 2012, through January 9, 2013. Respondent was an “employer,” as defined in chapter 440, Florida Statutes, throughout the penalty period. Respondent did not secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees during the period from June 13, 2010, through June 12, 2013. The appropriate class code from the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI), Scopes Manual for Respondent's employees is 5551, corresponding to “Roofing - All Kinds and Drivers.” The NCCI manual rates attached to the Prehearing Stipulation as Exhibit “C” are the correct manual rates for NCCI Class Code 5551 during the penalty period. Given the above stipulations, Respondent was in violation of the workers’ compensation coverage requirements of chapter 440 because Respondent employed uninsured employees working as roofers throughout the penalty period. Andre Canellas, penalty auditor for the Department, was assigned to assess the appropriate penalty owed by Respondent. Penalties for workers' compensation insurance violations are based on the amount of evaded insurance premiums over the three-year period preceding the Stop-Work Order, multiplied by 1.5. § 440.107(7)(d)1., Fla. Stat. At the time of his assignment, Mr. Canellas was provided with personal bank statements from Matthew, Stephen, and Robert Ogles, II, some checks that were written to Stephen and Robert Ogles, II, and an excel spreadsheet typed up for Respondent's payroll to Matthew Ogles. The records from Robert Ogles, II, consisted of statements from his personal bank account, which he jointly held with his wife, covering the course of the penalty period; and checks paid from Respondent to Robert Ogles, II, during the years of 2012 and 2013. The bank statements reference the amounts of all transactions in Robert Ogles, II, and his wife's joint personal bank account and do not distinguish the amounts for payroll from Respondent. From the periods of time in which Robert Ogles, II, produced checks from Respondent, Mr. Canellas was able to determine that Robert Ogles, II, did not deposit the entire amount from Respondent into his joint personal bank account. Thus, Robert Ogles, II's, personal joint bank statements covering the course of the penalty period were insufficient to enable the Department to determine his compensation from Respondent for those time periods. With respect to Stephen Ogles, the Department received statements from a joint personal bank account for the period of December 2012 through June 2013; checks paid from Respondent from December 2012 through June 7, 2013; and an IRS Form 1099 for payroll to Stephen Ogles, LLC from Respondent. The Department received personal bank statements from Matthew Ogles for the entire penalty period and an excel spreadsheet setting forth the payroll to Matthew Ogles from Respondent for all but one month of the penalty period. Petitioner did not receive any records at all for the payroll to Robert Ogles or to any of Respondent's subcontractors. Although Robert Ogles testified in deposition that he probably has the records requested by the Department, he stated that he “just chose not to” produce them. Employers in Florida are required to maintain the records that were requested by the Department and produce them upon the Department's request. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L- 6.015(1) and 6.032(1). For the time periods of January 1, 2012, through November 14, 2012, and from January 10, 2013, through June 12, 2013, Mr. Canellas could have potentially ascertained Respondent's payroll to Matthew, Stephen, and Robert Ogles, II- assuming that those individuals had identified all of the payroll they had received from Respondent during those periods. However, Mr. Canellas could not determine Respondent's overall payroll because the Department did not receive any records concerning Respondent's payroll to the subcontractors that Respondent regularly hires. Having not received business records sufficient to determine Respondent's actual payroll for the period of June 13, 2010, through June 12, 2013, Penalty Auditor Canellas calculated an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment of $158,423.82 by imputing the statewide average weekly wage, multiplied by 1.5, to Respondent's payroll for each identified employee during the penalty period. This methodology is required by section 440.107(7)(e), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L- 6.028(3). The Statewide Average Weekly Wage is determined by the Agency for Workforce Innovation (now the Department of Economic Opportunity). When the Average Weekly Wage changes, the Department updates its Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) to reflect the new amounts. The Average Weekly Wage that corresponds to various periods of non- compliance are populated automatically in the penalty worksheet when a penalty auditor selects an imputed penalty in CCAS. The Department has adopted a penalty calculation worksheet to aid in calculating penalties against employers pursuant to section 440.107. See Fla. Admin Code R. 69L-6.027. Mr. Canellas utilized this worksheet in assessing Respondent's penalty. In the penalty assessment calculation, the Department's Penalty Auditor consulted the classification codes listed in the Scopes Manual, which has been adopted by the Department through Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L- 6.021(3). As stipulated by the parties, the appropriate class code from the NCCI Scopes Manual for Respondent's employees is 5551, corresponding to “Roofing - All Kinds and Drivers.” Penalty Auditor Canellas applied the correct manual rates corresponding to class code 5551 for the periods of non- compliance in calculating the penalty. Mr. Canellas utilized the manual rates to satisfy his statutory obligation to determine the evaded workers' compensation insurance premium amounts for the period of June 13, 2010, through June 12, 2013, pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d)l. Respondent did not provide records sufficient to enable the Department to determine his actual total payroll for the period at issue. Accordingly, the Department was required to impute Respondent’s payroll in calculating the penalty assessment set forth in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is calculated correctly, if the manual rates were properly adopted by rule.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation enter a final order assessing a penalty of $158,423.82 against Respondent, Ogles Construction and Roofing, LLC, for its failure to secure and maintain required workers’ compensation insurance for its employees. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. David Watkins Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2014.
