Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty of regulating harness horse racing in the State of Florida. On December 7, 1979, the Chief of the Division's laboratory, Dr. Wayne Duer, reported four findings of impermissible drugs or medications in four horses that raced at a harness meeting that was then being conducted at Pompano Park. Division documentation indicated that the four horses had been trained by three trainers, one of whom was the Respondent. See Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Charles R. Federman, DOAH Case No. 80-817. As a matter of standard policy, the Director of the Division authorized a search to be conducted of the barn area and vehicles of the three trainers as soon as possible. The reason for a prompt search was to ensure that no further violations would take place as well as to secure any evidence of the illegal administration of the prohibited substances. Upon arrival at the track, Division personnel authorized to conduct the search had Respondent Federman paged to his barn. After a search of the barn revealed no evidence of Prohibited substances, Respondent was asked the location of his car so that it could also be searched. Respondent questioned the authority of Division personnel to search his vehicle, whereupon he was shown a copy of the Division's rules purporting to authorize such a search. Respondent then agreed to allow the search of-his car. Respondent unlocked the front of his car, and upon a search of the interior of the car the following items were found: six insulin syringes; a bottle of Didrex pills, which were shown by analysis to be benzphetamine, a central nervous system stimulant; a packet of zigzag cigarette papers; a hand-rolled cigarette, analyzed by the Broward County Sheriffs Department to contain cannibas or marijuana; one 12-cc syringe filled with clear substance with a needle attached to it; another 12-cc syringe; a 3-cc syringe with needle; a glass smoking apparatus; a plastic shaving kit; a 30-cc vial containing an unknown substance; and ten 2-cc vials of Narcan, analyzed to be naloxome, a narcotic antagonist which removes the effect of narcotics such as heroin and morphine. Respondent was than asked to unlock the trunk of his car. Respondent stated that he did not have the key to the trunk of his car, so he was driven by Division personnel to his motel room to obtain the key. Respondent was unable to find the key in his motel room. Division; personnel then informed Respondent of their intention to impound the car, pending a search of the trunk. Upon researching the interior of the car, Respondent then announced that he had found the key and proceeded to unlock the trunk. Inside the trunk were found three 100-milliliter vials marked "Solo-Delta Cortef", five 100-milliliter vials marked "Solu-Delta-Cortef"; two 3-milliliter vials marked "Solu-Delta Cortef"; two 4-milliliter vials marked "Levophed"; four bottles marked "Tevcodyne" containing 100 tablets each; one 250-cc bottle of sterile water; a box containing fifty 12-cc syringes; and a box containing fifty 3-cc syringes. Respondent did not have written permission from the stewards to possess any of the items taken from his car.
The Issue The issue is whether the proposed amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-3.001 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the agency responsible for enacting administrative rules within the scope of its delegated legislative authority as set forth in chapter 550, Florida Statutes, as the statutes contained therein are amended from time to time. Petitioner, FHBPA, is a Florida not-for-profit corporation whose purposes, as set forth in its Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation filed with the Secretary of State on December 5, 2005, include, but are not limited to, the following: A. to advance, foster, and promote, generally, the sport of thoroughbred horse racing and the thoroughbred horse racing industry in the State of Florida; * * * D. to establish standards for racetrack conditions and equine care, safety, health, treatment, and well-being; * * * to foster professional integrity among horsemen and the horse racing industry and to develop a code of ethics governing the behavior of those persons engaged therein; * * * to cooperate with equine and humane organizations and public and private agencies, regulatory authorities, racing associations, racing commissions and other organizations located in Florida including, for example, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (the “Division”), and its departments and sub-divisions. and the public, in formulating fair and appropriate laws, rules, regulations and conditions that affect in any manner pari-mutuel wagering and awards, and are deemed to be in the best interests of horsemen, their employees, backstretch personnel, and the horse racing industry in general, and to ensure the enforcement of such rules is fair and equitable; * * * J. to represent the interests of its members, before any local, state, or federal administrative, legislative, and judicial fora including, but not limited to, the Division with regard to all matters affecting horsemen and the horse racing industry. Currently, the FHBPA represents more than 200 Florida licensed thoroughbred horse trainers and more than 5,000 Florida licensed thoroughbred horse owners. Pursuant to its Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation and applicable law, the FHBPA has associational standing to file and prosecute this petition challenging the proposed amendment to rule 61D-3.001 on behalf of its members. Petitioner, Gulfstream Park, is the holder of a pari-mutuel permit issued by the Division authorizing thoroughbred horse racing at its permitted facility in Broward County. It is directly and substantially affected by the proposed amendment to rule 61D-3.001. Current rule 61D-3.001(2) provides that alleged violations of chapter 550 or chapter 61D in horseracing “shall be heard by a board of stewards. Each horseracing permitholder shall establish a board of three stewards, at least one of whom shall be the state/division steward selected and hired by the division.” Current rule 61D-3.001(19) provides, in relevant part: (19) Orders. In the event the stewards … determine a statute or rule has been violated and a penalty of a license suspension of 60 days or less, or a fine not to exceed $1,000 is sufficient to address the violation, the stewards or division judge shall enter an order within 14 days after the hearing. The order shall include a caption, time and place of the hearing, findings of fact, statement of rules or statutes violated, and a ruling stating the length of any suspension and the amount of the fine imposed for each violation. In the event the stewards … determine a statute or rule has been violated and a penalty of a license suspension of greater than 60 days, or a fine of greater than $1,000 should be imposed for the violation, the stewards or division judge shall forward a recommendation to the division stating their findings of fact, statement of statutes or rules violated, and recommended penalty within 14 days after the hearing. The recommendation shall be served to each party at the time it is forwarded to the division. A party shall have 14 days from the date the recommendation is issued in which to file a response with the division prior to the entry of a final order. Subsection (19) of the current rule plainly contemplates that the stewards may make factual findings sufficient to permit them to “determine a statute or rule has been violated.” The language of subsection (19) has been in place since June 26, 2011. Section 120.80 is titled “Exceptions and special requirements; agencies.” The statute sets forth various exceptions to the requirements of chapter 120 for specific agencies in specific situations. Section 120.80(4) sets forth the exceptions and special requirements for the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Section 120.80(4)(a) is the provision cited by the Division as one of the statutes implemented by both the current rule and the proposed amendment to rule 61D-3.001. Section 120.80(4)(a) provides: (a) Business regulation.—The Division of Pari- mutuel Wagering is exempt from the hearing and notice requirements of ss. 120.569 and 120.57(1)(a), but only for stewards, judges, and boards of judges when the hearing is to be held for the purpose of the imposition of fines or suspensions as provided by rules of the Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering, but not for revocations, and only upon violations of subparagraphs 1.-6. The Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering shall adopt rules establishing alternative procedures, including a hearing upon reasonable notice, for the following violations: Horse riding, harness riding, greyhound interference, and jai alai game actions in violation of chapter 550. Application and usage of drugs and medication to horses, greyhounds, and jai alai players in violation of chapter 550. Maintaining or possessing any device which could be used for the injection or other infusion of a prohibited drug to horses, greyhounds, and jai alai players in violation of chapter 550. Suspensions under reciprocity agreements between the Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering and regulatory agencies of other states. Assault or other crimes of violence on premises licensed for pari-mutuel wagering. Prearranging the outcome of any race or game. Section 120.569 is titled “Decisions which affect substantial interests.” Subsection (1) provides as follows: The provisions of this section apply in all proceedings in which the substantial interests of a party are determined by an agency, unless the parties are proceeding under s. 120.573 [mediation of disputes] or s. 120.574 [summary hearings]. Unless waived by all parties, s. 120.57(1) applies whenever the proceeding involves a disputed issue of material fact. Unless otherwise agreed, s. 120.57(2) applies in all other cases. If a disputed issue of material fact arises during a proceeding under s. 120.57(2), then, unless waived by all parties, the proceeding under s. 120.57(2) shall be terminated and a proceeding under s. 120.57(1) shall be conducted. Parties shall be notified of any order, including a final order. Unless waived, a copy of the order shall be delivered or mailed to each party or the party’s attorney of record at the address of record. Each notice shall inform the recipient of any administrative hearing or judicial review that is available under this section, s. 120.57, or s. 120.68; shall indicate the procedure which must be followed to obtain the hearing or judicial review; and shall state the time limits which apply. (emphasis added). Section 120.57 is titled “Additional procedures for particular cases.” Section 120.57(1) sets forth “additional procedures applicable to hearings involving disputed issues of material fact” and section 120.57(2) sets forth “additional procedures applicable to hearings not involving disputed issues of material fact.” Subsection (1)(a) provides: (a) Except as provided in ss. 120.80 and 120.81, an administrative law judge assigned by the division shall conduct all hearings under this subsection, except for hearings before agency heads or a member thereof. If the administrative law judge assigned to a hearing becomes unavailable, the division shall assign another administrative law judge who shall use any existing record and receive any additional evidence or argument, if any, which the new administrative law judge finds necessary. In the absence of an exception in section 120.80 or 120.81, a case involving a disputed issue of material fact must be heard by an ALJ or an agency head or member thereof. Section 120.57(2) gives agencies greater discretion in hearings not involving disputed issues of material fact to agency discretion: ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO HEARINGS NOT INVOLVING DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.— In any case to which subsection (1) does not apply: The agency shall: Give reasonable notice to affected persons of the action of the agency, whether proposed or already taken, or of its decision to refuse action, together with a summary of the factual, legal, and policy grounds therefor. Give parties or their counsel the option, at a convenient time and place, to present to the agency or hearing officer written or oral evidence in opposition to the action of the agency or to its refusal to act, or a written statement challenging the grounds upon which the agency has chosen to justify its action or inaction. If the objections of the parties are overruled, provide a written explanation within 7 days. An agency may not base agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party on an unadopted rule or a rule that is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The record shall only consist of: The notice and summary of grounds. Evidence received. All written statements submitted. Any decision overruling objections. All matters placed on the record after an ex parte communication. The official transcript. Any decision, opinion, order, or report by the presiding officer. Section 120.80(4)(a) exempts the Division from the hearing and notice requirements of sections 120.569 and 120.57(1) for hearings before stewards “when the hearing is to be held for the purpose of the imposition of fines or suspensions” for violations of subparagraphs 1.-6. Section 120.80(4)(a) does not exempt the Division from the hearing and notice requirements of sections 120.569 and 120.57(1)(a) for license revocations. The statute requires the Division to adopt rules establishing “alterative procedures” for the stewards’ hearings under subparagraphs 1.-6. It is notable that section 120.80(4)(a) does not under any circumstance exempt the Division from section 120.57(1)(b)-(n), which provides the procedural due process rights of parties to administrative hearings involving disputed issues of material fact. The narrow exemption provided by section 120.80(4)(a) allows the Division to retain jurisdiction over cases involving disputed issues of material fact rather than refer them to DOAH or have them heard by the agency head or a member thereof as would otherwise be required by sections 120.569(1) and 120.57(1)(a). Stewards may hold formal hearings that carry the penalty of fines or suspensions for the violations listed in section 120.80(4)(a)1.-6., but must respect the procedural rights established by section 120.57(1)(b)-(n). Nothing about the interplay of sections 120.57 and 120.80 suggests that stewards lack the authority to resolve disputed issues of material fact in the hearings subject to their jurisdiction. The Legislature’s exemption of the Division from only subsection (1)(a) of section 120.57 strongly suggests the opposite. The Division’s current rule 61D-3.001 clearly anticipates that stewards will resolve disputed issues of material fact in order to determine whether a statute or rule has been violated. The text of the proposed rule amendment indicates that the Division has revised its view of the statutory authority conferred by section 120.80(4)(a). The following are the most problematic portions of the proposed amendment: Hearings Conducted by a Board of Stewards: All proceedings for alleged violations indicated in subsection (1)(b) of this rule shall be heard by a Board of Stewards unless the division indicates in its administrative complaint that it is seeking revocation of a licensee’s pari-mutuel license or the Board of Stewards relinquishes jurisdiction as required by the Florida Administrative Code and/or Florida Statutes. Allegations of the following violations shall be heard by a Board of Stewards: Horse riding and harness riding actions in violation of Chapter 550, F.S. Application and usage of drugs and medication to horses in violation of Chapter 550, F.S. Maintaining or possessing any device which could be used for the injection or other infusion of a prohibited drug to horses in violation of Chapter 550, F.S. Suspensions under reciprocity agreements between the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering and regulatory agencies of other states involving horse racing. Assault or other crimes of violence on premises licensed for horse racing. Prearranging the outcome of any pari-mutuel horse racing event. * * * Procedures Applicable to Hearings by a Board of Stewards: * * * Conduct of Hearings Before a Board of Stewards The division shall have an opportunity to present to the Board of Stewards the undisputed facts of the alleged violation and any evidence of mitigation or aggravation for purposes of deciding a penalty. All parties shall have an opportunity to present evidence and witnesses regarding mitigation for purposes of deciding a penalty. All witnesses shall be sworn in by a member of the Board of Stewards and are subject to examination, cross-examination, and questioning by any member of the Board of Stewards. All parties shall have an opportunity to present legal arguments to the Board of Stewards, including interpretation of applicable division rules and statutes. * * * (4) Disputes of Material Fact: The Board of Stewards does not have jurisdiction to hear cases involving genuine issues of material fact. For purposes of this rule, a material fact is a fact that is essential to the determination of whether the respondent committed the alleged violation. Once a disputed issue of material fact is presented, the Board of Stewards must relinquish jurisdiction over the proceeding back to the division to be governed by Section 120.57(1), F.S., and referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Division’s rationale for the proposed amendment is that section 120.80(4)(a) only allows stewards to impose fines or suspensions upon licensees, not to make factual determinations as to the underlying violations. The Division argues that if a matter requires anything more than a decision over the imposition of a fine or suspension when the violation is undisputed, then the exemption in section 120.80(4)(a) is no longer operative and the hearing and notice requirements of sections 120.569 and 120.57(1)(a) apply to force the stewards to refer the case to DOAH. The Division concludes that the proposed amendment does not limit the stewards’ jurisdiction but merely restates the limitations imposed by section 120.80(4)(a). The undersigned finds that the Division’s reading of the statute, while colorable if one considers the language of section 120.80(4)(a) narrowly and in isolation from the other provisions it cites, is fundamentally backward. As noted above, the only portion of section 120.57 that the Division is ever exempted from is subsection (1)(a). Thus, under section 120.80(4)(a), when the stewards go forward with their hearings to impose fines or suspensions, they remain subject to the provisions of section 120.57(1)(b)-(n). These provisions contain repeated specific references to the disputed issues of material fact that the Division argues stewards lack the jurisdiction to decide. For example: Section 120.57(1)(b) states that parties must be provided the opportunity “to submit proposed findings of facts and orders.” There would be no need to submit proposed findings of fact in the stewards’ hearings contemplated by the Division. Section 120.57(1)(c) sets forth the limitation on the use of hearsay in a section 120.57(1) hearing, a provision that would not be necessary in a proceeding with no disputed facts. Section 120.57(1)(d) provides, in relevant part, “Notwithstanding s. 120.569(2)(g), similar fact evidence of other violations, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.” (Emphasis added.) Again, this provision would not be necessary for a stewards’ hearing as contemplated by the Division, yet is fully applicable to the stewards’ hearings under section 120.80(4)(a). Section 120.57(1)(j) provides that “Findings of fact shall be based upon a preponderance of the evidence, except in penal or licensure disciplinary proceedings or except as otherwise provided by statute, and shall be based exclusively on the evidence of record and on matters officially recognized.” The jurisdictional authority of stewards is established by section 550.1155, the full text of which is as follows: 550.1155 Authority of stewards, judges, panel of judges, or player’s manager to impose penalties against occupational licensees; disposition of funds collected.— The stewards at a horse racetrack; the judges at a dog track[3]; or the judges, a panel of judges, or a player’s manager at a jai alai fronton may impose a civil penalty against any occupational licensee for violation of the pari-mutuel laws or any rule adopted by the division. The penalty may not exceed $1,000 for each count or separate offense or exceed 60 days of suspension for each count or separate offense. All penalties imposed and collected pursuant to this section at each horse or dog racetrack or jai alai fronton shall be deposited into a board of relief fund established by the pari-mutuel permitholder. Each association shall name a board of relief composed of three of its officers, with the general manager of the permitholder being the ex officio treasurer of such board. Moneys deposited into the 3 References to dog racing in this section have been eliminated by section 13, CS/SB 8A, approved by the Governor on May 25, 2021. As of the writing of this Final Order, the bill has not been codified. Therefore, the statute has been quoted in its 2020 form. board of relief fund shall be disbursed by the board for the specific purpose of aiding occupational licenseholders and their immediate family members at each pari-mutuel facility. When section 550.1155 is read in conjunction with section 120.80(4)(a), it is clear that the Legislature contemplated racetrack stewards having full authority to hear cases and impose the limited discipline of fines and suspensions against occupational licensees for violation of the pari-mutuel laws or Division rules, including cases involving disputed issues of material fact. Section 120.80(4)(a) does not extend that authority to cases seeking license revocation, which is consistent with the provisions of section 550.1155. The proposed amendment to rule 61D-3.001 provides that stewards may conduct only hearings not involving disputed issues of material fact. The board of stewards’ jurisdiction is expressly limited to hearings in cases with “undisputed facts” as to the violation. Evidence may be presented only as regards to mitigation or aggravation of the penalty for the violation. The proposed amendment requires the board of stewards to relinquish jurisdiction of the case to DOAH whenever a disputed issue of material fact arises, meaning that it strictly follows section 120.57(1)(a) in the face of the express exemption from that provision set forth in section 120.80(4). The authority of an agency to conduct hearings not involving disputed issues of material fact without resort to DOAH is codified in sections 120.569(1) and 120.57. The proposed amendment purports to implement section 120.80(4), but in fact ignores the exemption provided therein. In this, the proposed rule clearly contravenes the provisions of the statute it purports to implement. The Division’s reasoning, while erroneous, does not rise to the level of being arbitrary or capricious. The language of section 120.80(4)(a), restricting the exemption to hearings “held for the purpose of the imposition of fines or suspensions,” standing alone, could reasonably lead to the conclusion reached by the Division that the stewards’ hearings should be limited to instances in which the facts of the violation are undisputed and the only question is the level of discipline to be imposed. It is when section 120.80(4)(a) is placed in the context of sections 120.569(1), 120.57(1)(a), and 550.1155 that the Division’s error becomes apparent. The Division should have made the observation that sections 120.569(1) and 120.57(1)(a) require the agency to send disputed fact hearings to DOAH, and that section 120.80(4) provides an exemption from that requirement. The Division then should have asked, “If the stewards are already precluded from hearing cases involving disputed issues of material fact by section 120.569(1), then what does the exemption in section 120.80(4)(a) do?” It being impermissible for an executive branch agency to read a statute as mere surplusage, the exemption must mean that certain defined disputed fact hearings may be conducted by the agency without the need to refer the matter to DOAH.4 4 This reading is supported by the fact that section 120.80 exempts several other entities from section 120.57(1)(a): section 120.80(2)(b) exempts the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services from section 120.57(1)(a) for hearings held pursuant to the Florida Citrus Code, chapter 601, Florida Statutes; section 120.80(7) exempts the Department of Children and Families from section 120.57(1)(a) for certain social and economic programs; section 120.80(8)(a) exempts the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles from section 120.57(1)(a) for hearings regarding driver licensing pursuant to chapter 322, Florida Statutes, and section 120.80(8)(b) exempts the same agency from section 120.57(1)(a) for hearings to deny, suspend, or remove a wrecker operator from participating in the wrecker rotation system established by section 321.051, Florida Statutes; section 120.80(10)(c) exempts the Department of Economic Opportunity from section 120.57(1)(a) for hearings held under the Reemployment Assistance Program law, chapter 443, Florida Statutes; section 120.80(12) generally exempts the Public Employees Relations Commission from section 120.57(1)(a); and section 120.80(15) provides that the Department of Health is exempt from section 120.57(1)(a) for hearings conducted “in execution of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children; Child Care Food Program; Children’s Medical Services Program; the Brain and Spinal Cord Injury Program; and the exemption from disqualification reviews for certified nurse assistants program.” The language of these exemptions is not uniform. In most instances, the statute states that the agency may conduct the hearings in-house “notwithstanding s. 120.57(1)(a).” In some instances, the language appears to give the agency the option of sending the case to DOAH or keeping it in-house. In none of the exemptions is there any indication that the hearing to be conducted by the agency may not resolve disputed issues of material fact. As explained above, the Division’s reasoning went in another direction. The undersigned finds the Division’s reasoning wrong but not irrational, or completely lacking in logic, and therefore not arbitrary or capricious. In light of the findings above, it is unnecessary to make extensive findings as to Petitioners’ other main contention, i.e., that the proposed amendment too closely mirrors DOAH procedures to be considered an “alternative procedure” under section 120.80(4)(a). The undersigned is persuaded that the Division had the better argument on this point. The statute does not define “alternative procedures.” The “alternative procedures” the Division adopts in its rule would still have to be consistent with administrative due process and thus would be expected to bear at least some passing similarity to the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. How similar the alternatives may become before they cease to be “alternative” under the statute is a question for another day.
The Issue The Petitioner has accused the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, with a violation of Rule 7E-1.06(11)(a) Florida Administrative Code, which reads: "The running of a horse in a race with any narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic is prohibited. If the stewards shall find that any narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic has been administered or attempted to be administered, internally or externally, to a horse before a race, such stewards shall impose such punishment and take such other action as they may deem proper under any of the rules, including reference to the Division, against every person found by them to have admini- stered, or to have attempted to administer, or to have caused to be administered, or to have caused an attempt to administer, or to have conspired with another person to administer, such narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic. If the Division laboratory shall find a positive identification of such medication, such finding shall constitute prima facie evidence that such horse raced with the medication in its system." Under the accusation, the Respondent is made responsible pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code, referred to herein as the absolute insurer's rule, which provides that: "The trainer shall be responsible for, and be the insurer of the condition of the horses he enters. Trainers are presumed to know the rules of the Division." Specifically, Respondent Solimena is accused under facts that allege that during the period from October 6 through October 30, 1978 horses trained by the Respondent were entered and ran in five separate races at Calder race course. Subsequent to each race a urine specimen was taken from each horse and that each specimen was analyzed by the Petitioner's laboratory. It is further alleged that the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering laboratory reported the results of the tests and that each report showed that each urine sample contained Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic compound.
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon a Notice to Show Cause (Administrative Complaint) filed by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, against Frank Rudolph Solimena. At all times pertinent to the Notice to Show Cause, Frank Rudolph Solimena was the holder of license Nos. K-00257 and K-00863, issued by the Petitioner to the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, enabling Solimena to operate as horse trainer and horse owner, respectively, at the several race tracks located in the State of Florida. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty of the regulation of, among other things, the matters pertaining to thoroughbred horse racing in the State of Florida. The authority for such regulation is found in Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, and those rules promulgated to enforce the provisions of that chapter. Within that body of rules, are Rules 7E-1.06(11)(a) and 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative code, alluded to in the issues statement of this Recommended Order. Those rules as set out in the issues statement shall serve as a basis for determining the facts and reaching the legal conclusions necessary to formulate a decision in this matter and official recognition is taken of the aforementioned rules. The facts in this case show that the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, was acting as a horse trainer on October 6, 1978, at the Calder Race Course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, Myth Master, a horse trained by the Respondent, ran in the second race and finished in second position. Following the race, and on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Myth Master. That urine specimen was subsequently analyzed through a series of tests and the test directed to the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic. The process which occurred in Myth Master after he received the Fentanyl, was that the Fentanyl was metabolized in the horse's system to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, and that latter substance acted as a central nervous system stimulant in the horse during the course of the race. The narcotic Fentanyl, carries the trade name, Sublimaze. The facts in this case show that the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, was acting as a horse trainer on October 13, 1978, at the Calder Race Course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, Turbine Powered, a horse trained by the Respondent, ran in the fourth race and finished in second place. Following the race, and on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Turbine Powered. That urine specimen was subsequently analyzed through a series of tests and the test directed to the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic. The process which occurred in Turbine Powered after he received the Fentanyl, was that the Fentanyl was metabolized in the horse's system to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, and that latter substance acted as a central nervous system stimulant in the horse during the course of the race. The narcotic Fentanyl, carries the trade name, Sublimaze. The facts in this case show that the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, was acting as a horse trainer on October 26, 1978, at the Calder Race Course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, Myth Master, a horse trained by the Respondent, ran in the tenth race and finished in second place. Following the race, and on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Myth Master. That urine specimen was subsequently analyzed through a series of tests and the test directed to the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic. The process which occurred in Myth Master after he received the Fentanyl, was that that Fentanyl was metabolized in the horse's system to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, and that latter substances acted as a central nervous system stimulant in the horse during the course of the race. The narcotic, Fentanyl, carries the trade name, Sublimaze. The facts in this case show that the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, was acting as a horse trainer on October 28, 1978, at the Calder Race Course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, Ladrillazo, a horse trained by the Respondent, ran in the sixth race and finished in first place. Following the race, and on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Ladrillazo. That urine specimen was subsequently analyzed through a series of tests and the test directed to the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic. The process which occurred in Ladrillazo after he received the Fentanyl, was that that Fentanyl was metabolized in the horse's system to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, and that latter substances acted as a central nervous system stimulant in the horse during the course of the race. The narcotic, Fentanyl, carries the trade name, Sublimaze. The facts in this case show that the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, was acting as a horse trainer on October 30, 1978, at the Calder Race Course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, Triple Rhythm, a horse trained by the Respondent, ran in the eighth race and finished in second place. Following the race, and on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Triple Rhythm. That urine specimen was subsequently analyzed through a series of tests and the test directed to the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic. The process which occurred in Triple Rhythm after he received the Fentanyl, was that that Fentanyl was metabolized in the horse's system to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, and that latter substances acted as a central nervous system stimulant in the horse during the course of the race. The narcotic, Fentanyl, carries the trade name, Sublimaze. Each of the horses referred to above was under the care and treatment of Carl J. Meyer, D.V.M., on the dates of the races in question. In addition to treating the horses that are the subject to this complaint, Dr. Meyer had treated other horses for which the Respondent was the trainer, beginning in 1976 and continuing through October of 1978. One of the conditions for which the disputed horses reportedly received treatment was a condition described by Dr. Meyer as Myopathy, and this treatment form was administered to each of the questioned horses on the date of the disputed race event. According to dr. Meyer, Myopathy is a treatment for muscle soreness and is a type of acupuncture in which needles are injected at pressure points over the sore muscles and authorized medications are injected into those muscle areas, to include ACTH, Steroids and Lasix. When the Respondent received one of the billing statements from Dr. Meyer which indicated that horses that were being trained by the Respondent had been treated for Myopathy, the Respondent inquired of Dr. Meyer what Myopathy treatments consisted of. Dr. Meyer replied that you take a needle and put in certain pressure points in the muscle to relieve bursitis and/or pressure. When questioned in the course of the hearing about further details of the treatment for Myopathy, Dr. Meyer was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the origins of the treatment for Myopathy and literature related to that treatment which might have been published through research in veterinary medicine. Within the same time frame that Dr. Meyer claimed to be treating the subject horses for Myopathy, he had purchased the substance, Sublimaze, and by his testimony stated that this narcotic had been used on horses other than those involved in this accusation. The use in the unrelated group of horses was as a pre-anesthetic agent and to treat colic conditions. He claimed to use 10 milligrams as a pre-anesthetic dose and as much as 25 milligrams over a period of time to control the colic condition. The utilization of Sublimaze as a pre-anesthetic agent and for treatment for colic was disputed in the course of the hearing by the testimony of Dr. George Maylin, D.V.M., who also has a Ph.D. in pharmacology. At the time Dr. Maylin gave his testimony, he was an associate professor of toxicology at the New York State College of Veterinary Medicine, Cornell University, Ithica, New York. Dr. Maylin has done extensive research on the effect of Sublimaze as a pre-anesthetic agent and concludes that it is not a predictable anesthetic agent, and that a 10 milligram dosage would not have a desired effect in its use as a pre-anesthetic agent. In dr. Maylin's opinion, 50 milligrams would be the indicated amount. In addition, Dr. Maylins' testing of Sublimaze in a colic model situation pointed out the ineffectiveness of Sublimaze as an analgesic in those colic cases. Finally, Dr. Maylin does not believe that 25 milligrams of Sublimaze over an extended period of time could be effective in treating the colic condition. Other trainers had horses which had been treated by Dr. Meyer around the same time period as those horses of the Respondent, which are the subject of this hearing. Those trainers are Ohayneo Reyes and Edward E. Plesa. Both Reyes and Plesa questioned Dr. Meyer on the subject of Meyer injecting Sublimaze in their race horses. These questions were asked following accusations placed against those trainers for violations similar to those in the current case of the Respondent. The answers given to Reyes and Plesa by Dr. Meyer indicated that he had in fact injected the horses with Sublimaze, but he told them not to worry because the substance could not be detected. Dr. Meyer also testified in the coarse of the hearing that he had placed wagers on some of the horses being treated for Myopathy. An analysis of the evidence leads to the factual conclusion that Dr. Meyer infused each of the horses for which the Respondent stands accused through this Notice to Show Cause, with Sublimaze, otherwise identified as Fentanyl; and that he gave these injections under the guise of a treatment for Myopathy, when in fact the so-called treatment for Myopathy was a ruse to enable Dr. Meyer to administer the Sublimaze. Those acts by Dr. Meyer directed to the horses of the Respondent involved in this accusation, were unknown to the Respondent at the time the injections were administered and nothing that had transpired prior to those administrations placed the Respondent in the position of having reason to believe that Dr. Meyer was pursuing this course of conduct. In summary, although the horses in question ran in the subject races while under the effects of Fentanyl, metabolized to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, it was not through any acts of the Respondent.
Recommendation It is recommended that the action through the Notice to Show Cause against the Respondent, Frank Rudolph Solimena, be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: W. S. Frates, Esquire Frates, Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Richman & Greer, P.A. One Biscayne Tower, 25th Floor Miami, Florida 33131 David M. Maloney, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joel S. Fass, Esquire Colodny and Fass 626 Northeast 124th Street North Miami, Florida 33181 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 79-228 FRANK RUDOLPH SOLIMENA, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact On or about November 1, 1982, Respondent applied for and received a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, number P-5122, as a thoroughbred horse owner. Respondent participated as a horse owner at the 1982-83 race meeting at Tampa Bay Downs, an association licensed by Petitioner. Respondent's trainer was Betty Hilt who was assigned stalls at that race track in barn 21. Tampa Bay Downs is a member of the Thoroughbred Racing Association. The Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau is a private agency which performs investigative and security services at the Thoroughbred Racing Association's member race tracks. In early February, 1983 the Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau assigned two of its Task Force agents, Gary W. Dresser and Anthony Ortero, to investigate allegations from an undisclosed source that Respondent was administering, with hypodermic syringes, medications to horses on the grounds of Tampa Bay Downs. Dresser began undercover surveillance of the Respondent on or about February 4, 1983. Dresser obtained a pari-mutuel occupational license and a job working in barn 20 at Tampa Bay Downs, a barn across from barn 21 and approximately 60 feet away. On February 16, 1983 Dresser and Ortero set up surveillance in an automobile. Only Dresser used binoculars to observe Respondent. Groom Diane Schully exited a stall followed by Respondent. Schully was leading a horse toward the paddock area, and Respondent was walking in the opposite direction toward his truck. Respondent stopped, turned, and called to Schully; Schully and the horse she was leading stopped; and Respondent then walked toward Schully and the horse. As he walked, Respondent removed an object from his coat pocket. Dresser observed what appeared to him to be the plunger of a syringe, but Ortero was not sure that the object in Respondent's hand was a syringe. As Respondent reached the side of the horse, both Dresser's view and Ortero's view were blocked. 6 At approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 21, 1983 Dresser and Ortero again had Respondent under surveillance. They were both sitting in an automobile, and only Dresser was using binoculars. Both agents observed, Respondent exit one of the stalls in barn 21 with trainer Betty Hilt. Both agents saw Respondent carrying a syringe with the plunger pulled out, indicating it was still full of liquid of some type. However, Dresser who was using binoculars does not know if the syringe had a needle attached to it, and Ortero, who was not using binoculars, only assumes the syringe had a needle attached because he saw the sunlight glint off something and assumes that it was a needle on the end of a syringe. Interestingly enough, Dresser saw the syringe in Respondent's right hand, but Ortero saw the syringe in Respondent's left hand. On neither occasion did either agent confiscate or otherwise obtain a syringe that was observed in Respondent's possession, although agents searched the barn area assigned to trainer Hilt after the observation made on February 21, 1983 and found nothing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a final order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent herein. RECOMMENDED and ORDERED this 14th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Elliot Henslovitz, Esquire Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1350 NW 12 Avenue, Room 332 Miami, Fl. 33136 Bruce D. Green, Esquire 2610 Oakland Park Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Fl. 33311 Robert Smith Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering State Office Building 1350 NW 12 Avenue Miami, Fl. 33136
The Issue The issues for disposition in this case are whether Hamilton Downs violated section 550.01215(3), Florida Statutes (2013), by failing to operate all performances specified on its license on the date and time specified, and whether the Division should be estopped from prosecuting Hamilton Downs.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency charged with regulating pari-mutuel wagering activities in Florida pursuant to chapter 550, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the Amended Administrative Complaint, Hamilton Downs held a Quarter Horse Racing pari- mutuel permit issued by the Division, number 0000547-1000, that authorized Hamilton Downs to conduct pari-mutuel wagering on quarter horse races pursuant to chapter 550. On or about March 15, 2013, the Division issued a Permitholder Annual License & Operating Day License (the “operating license”), number 0000547-1001, to Hamilton Downs, which authorized Hamilton Downs to perform 20 regular quarter horse performances from June 18 through 22, 2014, at a rate of four performances a day. Each performance consisted of eight individual races. Thus, the operating license authorized a total of 160 races. In 2012 and 2013, Hamilton Downs conducted licensed quarter horse barrel match races at its facility. When the 2014 operating license was issued, Hamilton Downs intended to conduct a meet consisting of barrel match races. As a result of litigation that culminated several months before the commencement of the Hamilton Downs 2014 racing meet, the Division advised Hamilton Downs that it would not be able to conduct barrel match racing under its quarter horse racing operating permit. However, Hamilton Downs was permitted to conduct “flag-drop” racing during that period of time. From June 18 through 22, 2014, Hamilton Downs conducted the quarter horse “flag drop” racing meet pursuant to its operating license. Flag drop racing as performed at Hamilton Downs involved two horses racing2/ simultaneously on a crude dirt “track” approximately 110 yards in length. The track was straight for about 100 yards, with a pronounced rightward turn to the finish line, and was haphazardly lined with white stakes. The race was started by a person who waved a red cloth tied to a stick whenever it appeared that both horses were in the general vicinity of what the starter perceived to be the “starting line.” There was no starting box or gate. The track was in the middle of an open field. There was no grandstand, though there was a covered viewing area on “stilts” from which the state steward and track stewards could observe the races. The track had one betting window and tote machine in an on-site shed. The only window in the shed was, mercifully, occupied by a window-unit air conditioner. As stated by Mr. Haskell, “nothing about Hamilton Downs is real in terms of racetrack standards.” For several years prior to the 2014 meet, Hamilton Downs shared horses and riders with the racetrack in Gretna, Florida, and the North Florida Horsemen’s Association. Several weeks prior to the commencement of the Hamilton Downs 2014 meet, a schism developed between the groups. As a result, the Gretna racetrack and North Florida Horsemen’s Association prohibited its horses and riders from competing in Hamilton Downs meets. That action stripped Hamilton Downs of most of the horses and riders that it was relying upon to perform in its meet. Mr. Richards had the permitted dates, and was required to race on those dates to remain in compliance. He was able to make arrangements for horses “way down on the eligible list.” They were, for the most part, older horses of lesser quality. Nonetheless, Hamilton Downs did its best to fulfill its permitted slate of races. The pool from which the races were set included 19 horses and six riders. The horses and riders were supplied to Hamilton Downs by the Hamilton Downs Quarter Horse Association (HDQHA). The HDQHA believed it could provide enough horses to handle the meet. The horses, and their owners, were: Precious N Fritz -- Stardust Ranch, LLC Skippers Gold Tupelo -- Stardust Ranch, LLC Business Official -- Stardust Ranch, LLC Cutter With A Twist -- Stardust Ranch, LLC Dun It Precious Gal -- Stardust Ranch, LLC Heavens Trick -- Stardust Ranch, LLC Dancer Blue Ghost -- Amie Peacock Starpion N Skip -- Amie Peacock Twist N to Stardust -- Amie Peacock Docs Lil Jose -- Amie Peacock Dandees Bay Apache -- Amie Peacock Kings Hollywood Moon -- Amie Peacock Lassies Last Chance -- Elaine Tyre Sugars Daisy Bar -- Elaine Tyre Touch of Leaguer -- Elaine Tyre Joys Winning Touch -- Elaine Tyre Jazz Potential -- Emma McGee Sonney Dees Diamond -- Emma McGee Royal King Princess -- Richard McCoy The riders were: Amie Peacock Elaine Tyre Emma McGee Richard McCoy Nicholas McCoy Christine Bradley Each of the owners was licensed by the Division. The riders were mainly local riders. The breeds of the horses complied with state law regarding horses allowed to run in quarter horse races.3/ The horses had their ownership records and identifying tattoos, and their current Coggins forms, which are required to substantiate that they have tested negative for diseases. Mr. Stallings testified that there were no problems regarding the ages of the horses since “that is not something DBPR worries about.” The animal detention areas checked out and were secure. Mr. Taylor inspected the track and found no violations of track setup under the current rules. The horses and riders had access to the track for the three days prior to the meet for purposes of training and acclimating the horses to the track. The races at Hamilton Downs during June 2014 were conducted in the presence of a state steward. The races must be seen to be believed. The 14 events for which video evidence was received show a series of races involving -- as a rule -- tired, reluctant, skittish, or disinterested horses moving at a slow pace down the dust-choked path. There was no marked starting line or finish line. The horses were often yards apart when the red rag-on-a-stick was waved. With one exception (performance 2, race 7), the gait of the “racing” horses ranged between a slow walk and a canter. Horses often simply stood at the starting line before slowly plodding down the track. In one instance, a horse actually backed up, until a bystander took it by the lead, thereafter giving the horse a congratulatory slap on the rump when it began to move in a forward direction. Mr. Haskell noted races in which riders fell off of their horses, or in which a horse left the course. He described numerous races, aptly, as non- competitive because one or both of the entrants walked, including one race (day 3, card 3, race 5) in which the racing steed took 1 minute and 45 seconds to cover the 110-yard course. The overall quality of the videotaped races was about what one would expect of an entry-level campers’ horse show held at the conclusion of a two-week YMCA summer camp. The interest in the series of races by the betting public was commensurate with the quality of the races. Wagers were of the $2.00 variety. Over the course of the 160-race meet, a total of 10 bets were placed, with two of those reportedly placed by a representative of a competing facility in an effort to substantiate wrongdoing on the part of Hamilton Downs. Given the competitive level of the races, a $20 handle seems about right. Mr. Haskell testified that the same horses just kept racing over and over. However, his steward’s report noted that he “refer[ed] to the ‘rule book’ numerous times in the five days pertaining to ages of horses, number of races a horse may race in a limited time, etc., but the rules just didn’t exist.” Mr. Taylor expressed similar concerns with the failure of the horses to “break” at the start of the races, their slow pace, and other issues. He did not make a point of them or bring them to the attention of Hamilton Downs because there was “no rule violation.” Despite the bemused, occasionally embarrassed expressions on the faces of the riders as their horses ambled slowly down the track, the witnesses, including Mr. Haskell and Mr. Taylor, uniformly testified that the riders tried to make sure the races were competitive. Thus, the poor quality of the races cannot be attributed to a lack of effort on their part. “Coupled entries” are those in which horses owned by the same owner compete against one another in the same race. On the second race of the meet, it was discovered that the two horses scheduled to race were both owned by Amie Peacock. Although the racing program had been distributed to all race officials involved, including the state steward, no one noticed the coupled entry. The preponderance of the evidence indicates that the coupled entry was discovered immediately before the start of the race. The racing secretary attempted to alert the starter, but was unsuccessful. Therefore, the race was run.4/ When the coupled entry was discovered, and before the race was made official, a post-race meeting of roughly 30 minutes was held to determine how to proceed. A preponderance of the evidence indicates that the meeting participants included, among others, the state steward, the track stewards, the state investigative specialist, the racing secretary, and the track owner. During the meeting, Mr. Richards offered that the race could be “re-run,” an option that was rejected since there is no authority for re-running a race. Mr. Richards also proposed calling a “no-contest,” which would allow Hamilton Downs to request an additional race from the Division. An additional race is not a re-run of the disputed race, but is a replacement race to be conducted at a different time during the meet. Mr. Richards was familiar with the procedure for requesting an additional replacement race, and was fully prepared to do so. It is not uncommon for such requests to be made in all types of pari-mutuel activities. Mr. Haskell acknowledged the possibility of declaring a no-contest for the coupled entry, and agreed that if he had declared a no-contest, Hamilton Downs could have requested a “make-up date” to be approved by the Division. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Haskell did not declare a no-contest. Rather, he decided to make the race “official.” As a result, Hamilton Downs could not request a make-up race. Mr. Taylor discussed the incident with management of Hamilton Downs, and promised to keep an eye out to make sure a coupled entry did not recur. After the second race of the meet, there were no further instances of coupled entries. Over the course of the meet, Mr. Haskell declared all of the 160 races, including the coupled entry race, to be official, whereupon the winner of the race was determined and results were entered by an Amtote employee into the computer and transmitted to the “hub.” At that point, wagers (if any) were paid out, and the tote was allowed to roll over to the next race. During the June 2014 races at Hamilton Downs, a purse, stake, or reward was offered for the owner of each horse to cross the finish line first. Mr. Richards was frank in his admission that the 2014 race season was important because it allowed Hamilton Downs to qualify for a cardroom license and, if ultimately allowed, slot machines. However, the reason for conducting the meet is of no consequence to the outcome of this proceeding. Hamilton Downs has, subsequent to the 2014 meet, conducted flag drop races at its facility pursuant to operating permits issued by the Division. Within the past five years, the Division has never filed an administrative complaint, suspended a pari-mutuel permitholder, or fined a pari-mutuel permitholder due to a failure to conduct a race at any particular speed. Within the past five years, the Division has never suspended a pari-mutuel permitholder for a violation of section 550.01215 that pertained to a race or races that were made official by a state steward.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 2016.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating pari-mutuel wagering pursuant to chapter 550, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent held a pari-mutuel wagering thoroughbred trainer license, number 260970-1021, issued by the Division in 2001. On August 29, 2008, and at all times material hereto, Respondent was the trainer of record for "Cardiac Output," a thoroughbred racehorse. On August 29, 2008, Cardiac Output was entered, and finished second, in the fifth race at Calder Race Course. Approximately thirty minutes after the conclusion of the race, and in accordance with established procedures, a Division employee collected urine and blood samples from Cardiac Output. The blood and urine samples were assigned numbers 421716B and 421716U, respectively. Cardiac Output's race day specimens were analyzed by the University of Florida Racing Laboratory (the lab), which is retained by the Division to test urine and blood samples from animals racing at pari-mutuel facilities in Florida. The Lab, following applicable procedures, found that the blood and urine specimens contained caffeine, which acts as a central nervous system stimulant and is categorized as a Class Two drug pursuant to the Uniform Classification Guidelines for Foreign Substances.1 In addition, the Lab detected oxilofrine, a cardiac stimulant, in the urine sample. Although oxilofrine is a non-classified drug, it has the potential to cause injury to racehorses, particularly when administered in combination with caffeine. Subsequently, pursuant to section 550.2415(5)(a), the Division split Cardiac Output's race day specimens into primary samples and secondary ("split") samples. The split samples were then forwarded to the Louisiana State University (LSU) School of Veterinary Medicine for confirmatory testing. On July 15, 2009, LSU submitted a report confirming the presence of caffeine and oxilofrine. During the final hearing, Respondent testified that he did not knowingly administer any prohibited substances to Cardiac Output. The undersigned finds Respondent's testimony to be credible. Nevertheless, the "absolute insurer rule," which is described in detail below, requires the undersigned to find as a matter of ultimate fact that Respondent violated section 550.2415(1)(a).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order finding that Respondent violated section 550.2415(1)(a), as described in this Recommended Order; suspending Respondent's license for a period of 30 days from the date of the final order; and imposing a fine of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Clenbuterol is a performance enhancing drug. Ms. Gemmill received Clenbuterol from Dr. Griffith on the grounds of Calder Race Course, a pari-mutuel facility. Dr. Griffith caused the Clenbuterol that he gave to Ms. Gemmill to be kept on the grounds of Calder Race Course, apari-mutue1 facility.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that a Final Order be entered which adopts the findings of fact contained herein and which dismisses the charges contained in the administrative complaint. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1991.
The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline against Respondent's Pari-Mutuel Wagering Occupational License, and other relief for alleged violation of Section 550.2415(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005)?
Findings Of Fact Between May 24, 2005 and June 18, 2005, Respondent held a Pari-Mutuel Wagering Occupational License, number 1102016- 1021, issued by Petitioner. On May 25, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Lips Are Sealed." On May 25, 2005, "Lips Are Sealed" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the second (2nd) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately following the second (2nd) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on May 25, 2005, urine sample number 129287 was collected from "Lips Are Sealed." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129287 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Lips Are Sealed" while participating in the second (2nd) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on May 25, 2005. On June 1, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Red Eyed Fever." On June 1, 2005, "Red Eyed Fever" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the fourth (4th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately following the fourth (4th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 1, 2005, urine sample number 129348 was collected from "Red Eyed Fever." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129348 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Red Eyed Fever" while participating in the fourth (4th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 1, 2005. On June 16, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Stubborn Kind." On June 16, 2005, "Stubborn Kind" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the first (1st) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately after the first (1st) face of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 16, 2005, urine sample number 129469 was collected from "Stubborn Kind." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129469 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Stubborn Kind" while participating in the first (1st) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 16, 2005. On June 17, 2005, Respondent was the trainer of record of a racing greyhound named "Drinktil Hescute." On June 17, 2005, "Drinktil Hescute" was entered, and finished first (1st), in the fifth (5th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track. Immediately following the fifth (5th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound track on June 17, 2005, urine sample number 129479 was collected from "Drinktil Hescute." The University of Florida Racing Laboratory tested urine sample number 129479 and found it to contain Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof. Benzoylecgonine (a metabolite of Cocaine), and/or a derivative thereof, is an impermissible substance, that was carried in the body of "Drinktill Hescute" while participating in the fifth (5th) race of the performance at Pensacola Greyhound Track on June 17, 2005.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered revoking the occupational license held by Respondent, imposing a $5,000.00 fine and requiring the return of the race purses. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Stefan Thomas Hoffer, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Thomas M. Dudley, Sr. 327 Northeast 434 Street Old Town, Florida 32680 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue This case has been bifurcated (as described more fully below). The issues in the present portion of this case are as follows: Whether Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (the "Division"), engaged in undue or unreasonable delay in processing Petitioner, Ft. Myers Real Estate Holdings, LLC's ("Ft. Myers"), application for a quarter horse racing permit. Whether the Division repeatedly denied Ft. Myers' application for a quarter horse racing permit. Whether the Division denied Ft. Myers' petitions for hearing for the purpose of ensuring application of the new law, effective July 1, 2010, that made quarter horse racing permit applications subject to the limitations contained in section 550.554, Florida Statutes (2010).1/
Findings Of Fact Ft. Myers is a Florida limited liability company established for the purpose of obtaining a permit to own and operate a quarter horse racing facility in the State of Florida. It is further the intent of Ft. Myers to operate as a pari-mutuel wagering facility in any fashion allowed by law. The Division is the state agency responsible for reviewing and approving applications for pari-mutuel wagering permits, including quarter horse racing facility permits. In January 2009, Ft. Myers filed an application (the "Application") seeking a permit to build and operate a quarter horse racing facility in Lee County, Florida. The Application was properly filed with the Division. On February, 13, 2009, the Division issued a deficiency letter setting forth several perceived problems with the Application. Ft. Myers submitted a response to the deficiency letter on February 18, 2009. In the response, Ft. Myers addressed each of the deficiencies. As far as can be determined, the Application was deemed complete by the Division sometime after February 18, 2009. However, Ft. Myers, thereafter, contacted the Division and asked that further action on the Application be delayed. The basis for that request was that there were some "hostile bills" against quarter horse racing filed with the Legislature, and there were some pending issues concerning a compact with the Seminole Tribe of Florida. Ft. Myers acknowledges that it requested delays in the review of the Application based upon business reasons. In conjunction with amendments relating to the Indian Gaming Compact, on May 8, 2009, the Legislature enacted Chapter 2009-170, Laws of Florida (also commonly referred to as SB 788), which authorized slot machine gaming for pari-mutuel permit holders located in Miami-Dade County. Chapter 2009-170 was filed with the Secretary of State and approved by the Governor on June 15, 2009, and states in pertinent part: Section 14. Section 550.334, Florida Statutes is amended to read: 550.334 Quarter horse racing; substitutions (2) All other provisions of this chapter, including s. 550.054, apply to, govern, and control such racing, and the same must be conducted in compliance therewith. * * * Section 19. Subsections (4) and (7) of section 551.102, Florida Statutes, are amended to read: 551.102 Definitions.—As used in this chapter, the term: (4) "Eligible facility" means any licensed pari-mutuel facility located in Miami-Dade County or Broward County . . .; any licensed pari-mutuel facility located within a county as defined in s. 125.011, provided such facility has conducted live racing for 2 consecutive calendar years immediately preceding its application for a slot machine license, pays the required license fee, and meets the other requirements of this chapter; . . . * * * Section 26. Sections 1 through 3 of this act and this section shall take effect upon becoming law. Sections 4 through 25 shall take effect only if the Governor and an authorized representative of the Seminole Tribe of Florida execute an Indian Gaming Compact pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 and requirements of this act, only if the compact is ratified by the Legislature, and only if the compact is approved or deemed approved, and not voided pursuant to the terms of this act, by the Department of the Interior, and such sections take effect on the date that the approved compact is published in the Federal Register. Section 14 of the legislation essentially applied a provision to quarter horse racing facilities that already applied to other pari-mutuel facilities, i.e., no new facility could be approved for a location within 100 miles of an existing pari-mutuel facility. The effective date of this legislation, as evidenced in section 26, was conditioned on the execution and approval of a gaming compact between the State of Florida and the Seminole Tribe of Florida. The compacts were subsequently executed by the Governor and the Seminole Tribe of Florida on August 28, 2009, and August 31, 2009, however, they were not ratified by the Legislature, and, thus, they were specifically rendered void as was the remainder of Chapter 2009-170.2/ In consideration of SB 788 and certain business negotiations with another permit holder in Lee County, Ft. Myers amended the Application by changing the location of the project to Florida City, Dade County, Florida. In an amended permit application dated July 27, 2009, and filed with the Division on August 12, 2009, Ft. Myers made the following changes to its initial proposal: Changes were made to the ownership interest of the project; A revised business plan, revised financial projections for year one of operations, and a revised internal organizational chart were included; The proposed site plan was amended to reflect the move to Florida City; and A new construction time line was submitted. Meanwhile, several other entities submitted applications seeking to construct and operate quarter horse racing facilities in different venues around the state. Quarter horse permits were then issued to ELH Jefferson, LLC ("ELH Jefferson"); Gretna Racing, LLC; Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Debary"); and South Marion Real Estate Holdings, LLC, between November 2008 and May 2009. Those approvals were given, in part, based on written assurances from land use attorneys that zoning and other land use approvals (necessary elements for permit approval) could be obtained after permit issuance. After the Division began issuing quarter horse racing permits, however, the Division started to realize that it may not have been requiring a sufficient showing from applicants to meet the statutory criteria for issuance of a permit under section 550.334, Florida Statutes (2008). Notably, although nine quarter horse permits were issued from September 2008 until February 2010, no quarter horse racing permit holder, without an existing facility at the time of permit issuance, had actually utilized a permit to conduct quarter horse racing. Further, both ELH Jefferson and Debary failed to obtain necessary land use approvals after permit issuance, notwithstanding land use attorney opinions that they were obtainable. The Division then began to consider around August 2009, whether it needed more evidence that the land was available for use than opinions from land use attorneys. The Division's re-appraisal began in the course of reviewing the Miami-Dade Airport's application for a quarter horse permit, which asserted that the entire airport property was available for use as a quarter horse facility. The issues associated with the Miami-Dade Airport application, along with the Division's experience that despite assurances, some permit applicants had been unable to obtain land use approvals, caused the Division to determine that it needed more evidence that the land was, in fact, available for use to ensure the statutory requirements for permit issuance were met. At about the same time the Division was re-appraising its method of reviewing permit applications, Ft. Myers decided to change the location of its proposed quarter horse facility from Lee County to Dade County, Florida. In response to the change, the Division sent Ft. Myers a deficiency letter concerning the Dade County site dated September 11, 2009. That letter set out the following pertinent deficiency items: Deficiency #1 That the location(s) where the permit will be used be "available for use." That because previous quarter horse applications have provided opinion letters from land use experts, and those sites have later proven not be to usable for the quarter horse facility, more specific information was required, i.e., The qualifications of the applicant's zoning attorney; A written statement of the attorney's grounds forming his opinion; and A copy of any application for rezoning filed with the City of Florida City, including an update from the City on the status of the application. Deficiency #2 That the location(s) where the permit will be used be "available for use." That the Letter of Intent provided by Ft. Myers is insufficient and that documentation reflecting its control over the property is required, i.e., a purchase agreement. The Division also asks for information regarding Ft. Myers' relationship with the registered owner of the site in question. Deficiency #4 That reasonable supporting evidence be provided that "substantial construction will be started within 1 year" after issuance of the permit. On November 11, 2009, Ft. Myers responded to the Dade County deficiency letter. In its response, Ft. Myers provided the Division the following information: Information about its land use attorney, Jerry B. Proctor, from the law firm Bilzin Sumberg. A letter dated September 18, 2009, from Henry Iier, City Planner for the City of Dade City. The letter indicates that the City has zoning jurisdiction over the subject property and that it allows applications for zoning changes. Tier also states that the timetable for rezoning appears reasonable. An Agreement for Purchase and Sale between Ft. Myers and an entity called Florida City 70 Acres, LLC. The agreement includes a contingency provision requiring implementation of certain provision of SB 788 passed by the 2009 Legislature. Fulfillment of those provisions was a condition precedent to Ft. Myers' commitment to purchase the property. The Division considered Ft. Myers' response to mean that it had made a decision not to provide information about its zoning request status. Had Ft. Myers submitted that information or requested additional time to gather the information, the Application would not have been denied on that basis. The Division found the contingency in the Purchase and Sale Agreement to be a significant impediment to commencement of construction within one year. In fact, the agreement was also contingent on the approval of provisions of SB 788 that may not ever be approved. As such, the agreement failed to meet the requirements for approval. Sometime during the month of December 2009, personnel from the Division contacted another quarter horse permit applicant, North Florida Racing, concerning its pending application. The Division employee advised North Florida Racing that there had been a change in "policy" at the Division concerning one aspect of the application review. Specifically, North Florida Racing was advised that their selected site would have to be proven to be "land available for use" as a quarter horse facility. They were told that the old standard of having a local zoning lawyer's opinion letter would not suffice. Rather, the applicant must show that an application for rezoning had actually been filed. It is not clear from the evidence whether North Florida Racing contacted the Division or whether the Division initiated that contact. Other than the statements in the deficiency letter, Ft. Myers was not directly contacted by anyone from the Division concerning this change in policy. On January 12, 2010, the Division issued a letter denying Ft. Myers' application for a quarter horse permit in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The denial letter provided two bases for the Division's decision: One, that the Application failed to demonstrate that the land is available for use (under its new policy); and two, that the Application failed to provide reasonable supporting evidence that substantial construction of the facility would be commenced within one year of issuance of the permit. The denial letter contained a statement concerning the process for requesting an administrative hearing on the matter. It is the position of Ft. Myers that the Division imposed unauthorized requirements on Ft. Myers' application so that it could use the new law in effect, that the Division imposed non-rule policy on Ft. Myers to delay processing of the application, and that the Division unreasonably and improperly delayed Ft. Myers' application to take advantage of the change in the law. The following Findings of Fact (22 through 45) were proffered by Ft. Myers in the furtherance of their position. Hartman and Tyner, d/b/a Mardi Gras Casino ("Hartman and Tyner"), Calder Casino and Race Course ("Calder"), and the Flagler Magic City Casino ("Flagler") are part of a coalition of South Florida pari-mutuel permitholders (collectively referred to as the "South Florida permitholders") that opposed the expansion of quarter horse racing into Miami-Dade County. Jim Greer, then chairman of the Republican Party of Florida, was a contract lobbyist for Hartman and Tyner. In May of 2008, Greer entered into a two-year contract with Hartman and Tyner that paid him $7,500 per month as a lobbyist. Charles "Chuck" Drago was the secretary of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (the "Department"). Drago was a close friend of Greer. Drago had been the chief of police of Oveido where Mr. Greer had lived and served on the City Commission. Greer and Drago had been fundraisers for Governor Crist. Scott Ross was hired by the Department as a deputy director in April 2009. Ross was hired with assistance from Delmar Johnson, Ross' college friend, who held the position of executive director of the Republican Party of Florida. Johnson worked for Greer. Ross' responsibility included oversight of the Division. David "Dave" Roberts was the director of the Division for approximately eight years. Roberts was division director when a number of quarter horse permit applications were filed with the Division after the 2007 changes in the card room law, which allowed quarter horse racing facilities to have card games. Roberts caused the Division to develop guidelines to govern the review of the quarter horse applications. After Roberts was forced to resign, the Division modified the guidelines to require applicants to show that zoning was in place for racing before the permit was issued. Milton "Milt" Champion was named director of the Division, effective January 4, 2010. He signed the denial of Ft. Myers' quarter horse permits on January 12, 2010, after he had been on the job for eight days. Joseph Helton is an attorney employed by the Division and has served as chief legal counsel to the Division since 2002. Helton has worked as an attorney for the Division for a combined 13 to 14 years. Helton was identified by the Division as its agency representative in this proceeding. Earnest James "Jim" Barnes is employed by the Division as an Investigative Specialist II. Barnes' duties with the Division include the evaluation of applications for quarter horse permits. Barnes was involved in the processing of all quarter horse permit applications. While he was director of the Division, Roberts made all of the decisions on whether to grant or deny a pari-mutuel permit. Neither the secretary, nor the deputy secretary made any decisions on quarter horse applications during Roberts' tenure as director of the Division. Roberts testified that the Division developed guidelines in 2007 to aid in the review of all quarter horse applications after the first of several new applications for quarter horse permits were filed. Roberts explained that the Division had no rules implementing the statutory criteria in 2007, because there had not been any quarter horse applications filed with the Division for a long time. The guidelines for review of quarter horse applications developed under Roberts did not require the applicant to demonstrate that the property was zoned for a racetrack before the permit was issued. The Division interpreted the statutory "location is available for use" criterion to mean that racetrack zoning was "possible to obtain." Roberts noted that another pari-mutuel statute, section 550.055(2), specifically required the applicant for permit relocation to demonstrate that the location is zoned for racing before the Division issued a permit. In contrast, section 550.334 does not specifically require the applicant to demonstrate that racetrack zoning is in place. During Roberts' directorship, the Division would accept a letter from a land use attorney familiar with zoning in the area where the racetrack would be located describing the process by which proper zoning could be obtained as adequate evidence that zoning was obtainable. Consistent with this guideline, deficiency letters issued by the Division under Roberts requested applicants to provide an opinion from an attorney and from a local government official stating that proper zoning for the proposed location was "obtainable." That standard was specifically altered in the September 11, 2009, deficiency letter for Ft. Myers' Dade County proposal. The guidelines for review of quarter horse applications developed under Roberts did not require the applicant to own the land at the time the permit was issued. Rather, the applicant was required to give reasonable assurances that the property was under the control of the applicant by written agreement. The applicant typically satisfied this guideline by submitting a contract for purchase or a lease with the application. Some contracts might include a contingency or condition precedent. For example, the real estate contract in the Gretna Racing, LLC, application listed a number of contingencies that must be met. Roberts received numerous complaints from existing pari-mutuel permitholders (including, in particular, representatives of Hartman and Tyner) about the manner in which the Division was granting quarter horse permits. Ross also made it known to Roberts that he was not in favor of granting quarter horse permits. Roberts, however, believed that he was required to do what the letter of the statute dictated. According to Hartman and Tyner's attorney, John Lockwood, the "special interests" wanted Roberts terminated, because they were concerned with the quarter horse application review process. Lockwood testified that he heard complaints that Roberts gave out quarter horse permits "like candy." Lockwood made his client's concerns about Roberts' interpretation of the quarter horse statute known to Ross. Later, Jim Greer, then a contract lobbyist for Hartman and Tyner, called Ross and asked him to fire Mr. Roberts. Ross met with Roberts and gave him the option of termination or resignation on July 16, 2009, within one week after Mr. Greer asked him to terminate Roberts. Roberts was not given a reason for his termination. Joe Dillmore became the interim director of the Division after Roberts was forced to resign. However, according to Dillmore, Ross was, in fact, the person in charge of all quarter horse permit applications after Roberts left. Ross told Dillmore that he wanted to be informed on decisions at every level of the quarter horse application process. Ross made it known to Dillmore that he believed the 100-mile restriction placed on other pari-mutuel permitholders should also be applied to quarter horse permit applications, even though the quarter horse statute did not impose a location restriction at that time. Ross opposed quarter horse racing because of the Governor's opposition to gambling in general. According to Barnes, Ross wanted to be kept apprised of all action on pending quarter horse permits, including deficiency letters, and any recommendation for approval or denial. Previously, Barnes had never been required to report his daily activities to a deputy secretary. Barnes was assigned to process the Application in October 2009, after the location changed from Lee County to Miami-Dade County. Barnes prepared the deficiency letter issued to Ft. Myers on September 11, 2009. On August 11, 2009, approximately three weeks after Roberts was forced to resign, there was a meeting held at the Calder Race Track in Miami between existing pari-mutuel permitholders and key agency personnel. The attendees of this meeting included representatives of Hartman and Tyner, Calder, and Flagler, the three loudest voices in opposition to the expansion of quarter horse gaming into Miami-Dade County. The agency was represented at the Calder meeting by Secretary Drago, Deputy Secretary Ross, and Mr. Helton. One topic of the Calder meeting was the competitive impact of new quarter horse permits on existing permitholders. In particular, the South Florida permitholders made it very clear at this meeting that they opposed the issuance of any quarter horse permits in Miami-Dade County. The existing pari-mutuel permitholders at the Calder meeting told the Division representatives that the Division should require quarter horse applicants to demonstrate that the proposed location for the permit was zoned for a racetrack before the permit was issued. This interpretation had been advanced in legal challenges filed by existing permitholders (including Hartman and Tyner) before the Calder meeting. However, these legal challenges failed to achieve the desired result before the Calder meeting. On August 12, 2009, the day after the Calder meeting, Ft. Myers amended the Application ("Amended Application") for a quarter horse permit to change the location to Miami-Dade County. Lockwood found out about the Amended Application within days and called Barnes to express his client's extreme displeasure with this change in location. Barnes sent an email to Helton on August 19, 2009, relaying the call from Lockwood stating "don't know what that means in the long run." There was a meeting held in Tallahassee within days of this email between attorneys for the South Florida permitholders (including Lockwood) and attorneys for the Division (including Helton), so the permitholders could express their concerns with the quarter horse review process with Division counsel in person. The Application Review It was the Division's normal practice to provide applicants with deficiency letters so that applicants could be fully aware of any shortcomings and be given an opportunity to correct the deficiencies. It was not uncommon for the Division to issue two or more deficiency letters to an applicant. In the present case, Ft. Myers received a deficiency letter relating to its Lee County site, then received another one when the site was changed to Miami-Dade County. After Ft. Myers responded to the deficiency letter for Miami-Dade County, it reasonably relied upon the issuance of a further deficiency letter if there were remaining deficiencies. Although no additional letter was required, Ft. Myers believed one would be issued if there were further deficiencies. The Division did not issue a second deficiency letter for the Miami-Dade County site. The Division's rationale was that the first letter was clear and unambiguous, and if Ft. Myers did not respond appropriately, then the deficiencies must not be correctable. No one from the Division contacted Ft. Myers' representatives to discuss the continuing deficiencies. Two other quarter horse permit applications were pending at the same time the Application was under review at the agency: Hamilton Downs II and North Florida Racing. Hamilton Downs received its permit on February 4, 2010; North Florida Racing received its permit on March 26, 2010. Counsel for North Florida Racing remembers being told by Mr. Helton at the Division about changes to the Division's interpretation about the need for zoning approval. Counsel sent an email which says in part: "The powers that be seem to be shifting their interpretation of the statutes and rules to require that zoning for the track must be in place before a QH permit can be issued." Thereafter, North Florida Racing changed locations to a location zoned for quarter horse racing, and its permit was ultimately issued. It is unclear from the record whether Helton actually made the quoted statement, and, if so, in what context it was made. Helton could not remember the statement, but does not deny that it could have been made. As to the Hamilton Downs II location, neither of the two deficiency letters issued in that filing stated that the property had to be zoned for quarter horse racing. On November 4, 2009, Hamilton Downs provided the Division with a letter from the Town Council of Jennings stating it would support a zoning change at the proposed site to allow for quarter horse racing and that the zoning could be accomplished within six months. Thereafter, on December 14, 2009, Hamilton Downs submitted a letter from Hamilton County, Florida, stating the proposed site is, in fact, presently zoned for quarter horse racing. There is no credible evidence as to what precipitated Hamilton Downs' sending the Division that letter. The Administrative Hearing Petitions After receiving the denial letter from the Division, Ft. Myers prepared a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing which it filed on January 29, 2010. On February 16, 2010, the Division rejected the Petition on the basis that it failed to identify disputed issues of material fact. Ft. Myers was given leave to amend its Petition within 21 days, i.e., on or before March 8, 2010. Ft. Myers filed its Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on March 8, 2010. The amended Petition was also rejected by the Division, this time on the basis that Ft. Myers did not have standing. The rational for that decision was that inasmuch as the SB 788 provisions could not come into effect and those provisions were a condition precedent to Ft. Myers' purchase agreement for property, Ft. Myers could not move forward on their Application and, thus, did not have standing in an administrative challenge. The rejection of Ft. Myers' Amended Petition was appealed to the First District Court of Appeal. In an opinion dated February 7, 2011, that court summarily reversed the Division's rejection of the Amended Petition. The Court remanded the case to the Division with directions to refer the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings. During the pendency of the appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, Chapter 2010-29 was passed and became law, effective July 1, 2010. The new law contained the 100-mile restriction mentioned above. There is not any location in Florida that would qualify for a new pari-mutuel facility under that limitation. If the original Petition filed on January 29, 2010, had been accepted by the Division, it is possible a final order could have been entered sometime between June 17 and July 26, 2010, had the case proceeded at a normal pace. Thus, it is possible the final order could have been entered prior to the new 100-mile limitation taking effect on July 1, 2010.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, declaring that the 2010 version of section 550.334, applies to the Application filed by Petitioner, Ft. Myers Real Estate Holdings, LLC, for a quarter horse racing permit. IT IS THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNDERSIGNED AND ALL PARTIES THAT THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER WILL UNDERGO EXPEDITED AGENCY REVIEW SO THAT A FINAL ORDER AS TO THIS PORTION OF THE BIFURCATED PROCEEDING WILL BE RESOLVED AS QUICKLY AS PRACTICABLE. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2011.
