The Issue Whether Sam Patterson’s proposed dock project is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) from the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) under Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-4.051(3)(c) and (d).
Findings Of Fact The Parties Mr. Scully resides at 941 Brookdale Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida, Lot 16, adjacent to and south-southeast of Mr. Patterson's residential property. The northern or rear portion of Mr. Scully's lot borders on an artificial canal that is designated a Class III water by Department rule. He does not have a dock per se; he moors his boat against and parallel to a narrow concrete area (and his lot line), separated by buffering material. Mr. Patterson, the applicant, owns the property at 930 Brookdale Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida, Lot 15. Lot 15 is north-northwest and adjacent to Mr. Scully’s property. This residential property is currently leased to others. The residential property (Lot 14) adjacent to and north-northeast of Mr. Patterson's lot is apparently owned by an individual named Meloche. The Department has the jurisdiction to determine whether the proposed project is exempt from ERP requirements. The Proposed Project On or about September 13, 2004, Mr. Patterson filed an application requesting an exemption to replace an existing five- foot by 21-foot (105-square feet) marginal dock in the same location, configuration, and dimensions as the existing dock. He also requested an exemption to install a five-foot by 16-foot (80-square feet) wooden finger pier extending perpendicular to and from the middle of the existing marginal dock. As of the final hearing, the project has been revised such that the wooden finger pier will extend 11.8 feet (rather than 16 feet) and perpendicular from the middle of the marginal dock. Mr. Patterson changed the length of the finger pier to comply with City regulations, which are not at issue in this case. The “Site Plan” is attached to the Department’s Notice of Determination of Exemption. (JE 1). The “Site Plan” shows a one-story residence on Mr. Patterson's Lot 15. The front of the lot measures 100 feet, whereas the rear of the lot (that abuts the canal on the easternmost portion of the lot) is 50 feet in length from south to north. The seawall is one-and-one-half feet in width. The existing marginal dock abuts the seawall running south to north and is 21 feet long and five feet wide. Small concrete platforms abut the marginal dock on the south and north. The Department reviewed the original application and on October 13, 2004, advised Mr. Patterson, in part, that his project was exempt from the need to obtain an ERP under Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-4.051(3)(c) and (d). The Department had not reviewed the change to the project prior to the final hearing. See Finding of Fact 5. Lots 16, 15, and 14 are situated as a cul-de-sac (semi- circle) with the canal north of Lot 16, east of Lot 15, and south of Lot 14. Lot 14 is across the canal from Mr. Scully's Lot 16. There are five properties on each side of the canal, running west to east. The artificial canal runs directly east from Mr. Patterson’s property for an uncertain distance to the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW). Mr. Patterson’s property (Lot 15) is the western end-point for this canal. Mr. Patterson’s eastern property line (fronting the canal) is 50 feet in width. However, the precise width of the canal between Lots 14 and 16 is unclear. Ms. Smith reports (in her site inspection report of March 3, 2005 (JE 3)) that the canal is approximately 50 feet wide. Mr. Patterson testified that Karen Main with the City of Boynton Beach advised him that the consensus opinion of City employees reviewing the issue was that the canal measured 66 feet in width. There appears to be some widening of the canal east of Mr. Patterson’s property line and then the canal appears to straighten-out as it proceeds to the east to the ICW and past the easterly property lines for Lots 14 and 16. See (JEs 1-site plan; 5-aerial). The weight of the evidence indicates that the canal, between Lots 14 and 16, is approximately 60 to 66 feet wide. See, e.g., id. In the past, the prior owner of Lot 15 (Mr. Patterson's property) moored a boat at and parallel to the marginal dock, which means that the bow, for example, faced Lot 14 and the stern faced Lot 16. Mr. Patterson currently owns a 16-foot boat that he wants to moor at the marginal dock. However, he feels that it is unsafe to do so, particularly if Mr. Scully’s boat drifts. Meloche (Lot 14 to the north) has a fixed boatlift, which allows for the elevation of a boat out of the water, with the bow facing west toward and in front of the northern end of Mr. Patterson’s seawall. (JE 4). Mr. Scully moors his boat parallel to the shoreline of Lot 16 and perpendicular to Mr. Patterson’s 50-foot eastern seawall and property line. (JEs 4 and 6). Mr. Scully’s seawall intersects Mr. Patterson’s seawall such that when Mr. Scully’s 22-foot boat is moored at his seawall, it is also in front of the southern end of Mr. Patterson’s seawall. Id. When Mr. Scully’s boat is tightly moored at his seawall, it does not interfere with or block Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock. (JE 6). However, when Mr. Scully’s boat is loosely moored, it drifts toward the center of the canal in front of Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock. (JE 4). With no boat moored at the marginal dock, Mr. Scully is able to freely maneuver his boat to his seawall with limited “backing” of his boat required (stern first). With a boat consistently moored at Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock, Mr. Scully would have to back into his area beside his seawall in order to avoid colliding with that boat. Mr. Patterson’s finger pier would enable him to safely moor a boat perpendicular to the marginal dock. Centering the finger pier at the marginal dock is likely to make it easier for Mr. Patterson and Mr. Scully to navigate to their respective mooring areas, depending on the size of the boats moored by Mr. Patterson and Mr. Scully. (The Department, in reviewing similar exemption requests, does not consider the type and size of the boat(s) to be moored at the proposed dock or adjacent mooring site.) It is preferable for the boats to be moored, in this location, stern first, with the bow facing down the canal from the wake of the boats traveling in the ICW. Centering the finger pier at the marginal dock and mooring Mr. Patterson’s boat on the north side of the finger pier is likely to enable Meloche, Mr. Patterson, and Mr. Scully to moor their boats parallel to each other and avoid collisions.1 Placement of the finger pier at the northern end of the finger pier, while favored over the proposed location by Mr. Scully, is likely to interfere with Meloche’s use of his property and boatlift. With the finger pier centered on the marginal dock and a boat moored to the north, Mr. Scully can maneuver his boat to his seawall by “backing in” stern first. An experienced boater can accomplish this task in two to three maneuvers. Mr. Scully is an experienced boater and has lived on the canal for approximately eight years. Shortening the finger pier from 16 feet to 11.8 feet will not affect Mr. Patterson’s ability to safely moor a boat on the northern side of the finger pier. The Challenge Mr. Scully contends that the placement of the wooden finger pier and the mooring of a sizable boat on the proposed finger pier will interfere with his ability to navigate in and out of the canal in or around his property, and necessarily interfere with his ability to moor his boat adjacent to his property. He also contends that the marginal dock and the finger pier are two docks, not one. Resolution of the Controversy Replacement of the existing marginal dock will consist of replacing the decking and using the existing pilings. The existing marginal dock is currently functional. Reconstruction of the marginal dock and construction of the finger pier will be done by a licensed marine contractor. The licensed marine contractor will use best management practices to avoid water quality problems in the canal during construction. Construction of the proposed project is not expected to adversely affect flood control or violate water quality standards. The proposed project will not impede navigation. But see Endnote 1.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order concluding that Mr. Patterson’s proposed dock project, as revised, is exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2005.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007),1 by refusing to grant an accommodation which would have allowed Ms. Rose Marie Owens to keep a comfort cat in her condominium, and, if so, the amount of damages suffered by Ms. Owens.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Owens was a resident owner of a condominium in Longboat Harbour Condominiums (Longboat Harbour) during the alleged unlawful housing practice. Ms. Owens was a seasonal resident of the condominium from sometime in July 1987 through March 2007. Ms. Owens still owns the condominium at Longboat Harbour with Mr. Hank Airth, her husband. However, Ms. Owens and Mr. Airth purchased a second condominium after the alleged unlawful housing practice, and Ms. Owens and Mr. Airth no longer reside in the Longboat Harbour condominium. Longboat Harbour is a covered, multifamily dwelling unit within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2). The Longboat Harbour condominium owned by Ms. Owens and Mr. Airth was a dwelling defined in Subsection 760.22(4) at the time of the alleged unlawful housing practice. Respondent is the entity responsible for implementing the rules and regulations of the Longboat Harbour condominium association. Relevant rules and regulations prohibit residents from keeping cats in their condominiums. Sometime in May 2006, Ms. Owens requested Respondent to permit her to keep a comfort cat, identified in the record as “KPooh,” as an accommodation for an alleged handicap. Respondent refused the requested accommodation, and this proceeding ensued. In order to prevail in this proceeding, Petitioner must first show that Ms. Owens is handicapped. Neither Petitioner nor Ms. Owens made a prima facie showing that Ms. Owens is handicapped within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(7). Cross-examination of Ms. Owens showed that Ms. Owens suffers from a cardiovascular ailment, osteoarthritis, and a trigeminal nerve condition. Surgery performed sometime in the 1990s improved the nerve condition. After the surgery, all of the medical conditions of Ms. Owens have been successfully treated with various medications, with no significant modification of the medications before and after Ms. Owens acquired KPooh in 2000. The testimony of Ms. Owens during cross-examination shows that Ms. Owens has never been diagnosed as suffering from depression. Nor does that testimony show that Ms. Owens has ever been diagnosed with panic disorders or panic attacks. Finally, the testimony of Ms. Owens during cross-examination shows that Ms. Owens has never been diagnosed with an emotional or psychiatric condition. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that any of the health problems suffered by Ms. Owens substantially limits one or more major life activities. Nor does Respondent regard Ms. Owens as having a physical or mental impairment. Ms. Owens and others testified concerning the medical conditions of Ms. Owens. None of that testimony showed that the medical conditions substantially limit one or more major life activities for Ms. Owens. Mr. Airth drives the vehicle for Ms. Owens most of the time and prepares most of the meals at home. However, Mr. Airth performs both life activities because he wishes to perform them. Neither Mr. Airth nor Ms. Owens testified that Ms. Owens is unable to perform either life activity. Part of the therapy medically prescribed for Ms. Owens is a special bicycle for exercises that will improve some of the medical conditions of Ms. Owens. However, as Ms. Owens testified, “I have not submitted to that . . . [because] I hate exercise.” Ms. Owens admits that exercise therapy would improve some of her medical conditions. Ms. Owens first took possession of KPooh in 2000. KPooh was a stray cat that showed up at the primary residence of Ms. Owens and Mr. Airth in Maryland. KPooh was hungry. Ms. Owens gave KPooh food and adopted KPooh. Petitioner attempts to evidence the alleged handicap of Ms. Owens, in relevant part, with two letters from the primary care physician for Ms. Owens. Each letter was admitted into evidence without objection as Petitioner’s Exhibits 3 and 4. The first letter, identified in the record as Petitioner’s Exhibit 3, is dated May 4, 2006. The text of the letter states in its entirety: Mrs. Owens has been a patient of mine since 1990. I know her very well. It is my opinion that she would suffer severe emotional distress if she were forced to get rid of her cat. I request an exception to the “No Pet” rule in her particular case. I understand that the cat is confined to her home, and that it is not allowed outside to disturb other residents. Petitioner’s Exhibit 3 (P-3). The first letter contains no diagnosis of an existing physical or mental impairment. Nor does the first letter evidence a limitation of a major life activity that is caused by a physical or mental impairment. The first letter opines that Ms. Owens, like many pet owners, would suffer severe emotional distress if she were required to get rid of her pet. However, the letter contains no evidence that the potential for severe emotional distress, if it were to occur, would substantially limit one or more major life activities for Ms. Owens. The second letter, identified in the record as Petitioner’s Exhibit 4, is dated January 2, 2007. The text of the letter consists of the following three paragraphs: Mrs. Rose Marie Owens is my patient. She has been under my care since 1990. I am very familiar with her history and with her functional limitations imposed by her medical conditions. She meets the definition of disability under the various Acts passed by the Congress of the United States since 1973. Mrs. Owens has certain limitations related to stress and anxiety. In order to help alleviate these limitations, and to enhance her ability to live independently, and to use and enjoy fully the unit she owns at Longboat Harbour Condominium, I have prescribed her cat, K-Pooh, as an emotional support animal. This should assist Mrs. Owens to cope with her disability. I am familiar with the literature about the therapeutic benefits of assistance animals for people with disabilities. Should you have questions concerning my recommendation for an emotional support animal for Mrs. Owens, please contact me in writing. P-4. The second letter does not identify a specific physical or mental impairment. The letter does not disclose what health conditions comprise Ms. Owens “medical conditions.” The letter does not describe the “functional limitations” that the doctor concludes, as a matter of law, satisfy the legal definition of a disability. Nor does the letter specify what major life activities are limited by the patient’s medical conditions. The second letter opines that KPooh will enhance the ability of Ms. Owens to live independently. The letter does not opine that KPooh is necessary for Ms. Owens to live independently. There is no evidence that KPooh is trained as a service animal. The two letters from the primary care physician of Ms. Owens are conclusory and invade the province of the trier- of-fact. The two letters do not provide specific and precise factual accounts of the medical conditions of Ms. Owens and the limitations that those conditions impose on major life activities. The two letters deprive the fact-finder of the opportunity to review and evaluate the specific and precise facts underlying the medical and legal opinions reached by the doctor. The two letters deprive the ALJ of the opportunity to independently decide the legal significance of any medical findings, which are not disclosed in either of the letters.2 Petitioner called as one of its witnesses a member of the Board of Directors (Board) for Respondent who had recommended that the Board approve the accommodation requested by Ms. Owens. Petitioner presumably called the witness, in relevant part, to bolster the two letters from the treating physician for Ms. Owens. The witness testified that his recommendation placed great weight on the fact that the doctor who authored the two letters is a psychiatrist. The undisputed fact is that the doctor specializes in internal medicine, not psychiatry. Petitioner attempted to show that Respondent’s stated reasons for denial of the accommodation were a pretext. Petitioner relied on evidence that arguably showed Respondent did not adequately investigate the alleged handicap of Ms. Owens before denying her request for an accommodation. Respondent made adequate inquiry into the alleged handicap when Ms. Owens requested an accommodation. Respondent requested a letter from the treating physician, which resulted in the letter that became Petitioner’s Exhibit 3. Finding that letter less than instructive, Respondent requested a second letter that became Petitioner’s Exhibit 4. Respondent properly determined that letter to be inadequate. In any event, this proceeding is not an appellate review of the past conduct of Respondent. This proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Counsel for Respondent fully investigated the medical conditions and alleged handicap of Ms. Owens prior to the final hearing. The investigation included pre-hearing discovery through interrogatories and requests for medical records.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2009.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondent Thomas Rosati is entitled to the Noticed General Permit and the Letter of Consent to use sovereignty submerged Lands issued by the Department of Environmental Protection ("Department"), which authorize the replacement of an existing private dock with a new private dock in the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating construction activities in waters of the State. The Department also has responsibility to process and act on applications for authorization to use sovereignty submerged lands through a delegation of authority from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board of Trustees"). Rosati owns real property at 2391 Southwest Riverside Drive, Palm City, Florida. He is the applicant for the authorizations at issue in this case. Rosati does not currently own a boat, but he wants to obtain a boat that is large enough to use in the Atlantic Ocean. Petitioner Bryan Fleming owns real property that borders Danforth Creek. He also owns two nearby lots which entitle him to undivided interests in a community dock on Danforth Creek. Fleming owns several boats, including a 23-foot Penn Yan motorboat which he moored at docks on Danforth Creek. Petitioner Diane Haskett owns property that borders Danforth Creek. She has been an avid boater most of her life, but currently only co-owns, with Fleming, a 33-foot sailboat which they do not keep on Danforth Creek. She is a frequent passenger on Fleming's Penn Yan. Notice of Agency Action Rosati arranged for publication of a "Notice of General Permit" in the October 30, 2012, edition of The Stuart News. The notice was in the exact form suggested by the Department in its September 19, 2012, letter to Rosati. The notice reads in pertinent part: STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION NOTICE OF GENERAL PERMIT The Department of Environmental Protection gives notice that the project to remove an existing dock, and relocate and construct a new dock with an access walkway measuring 4 ft. by 392 ft. and ending in an 8 ft. by 20 ft. terminal platform, including two associated 12 ft. by 12 ft. boatlifts (total 1,728 sq. ft. structure, total 2016 sq. ft. preempted area), has been determined to qualify for a noticed general permit. This is the form of publication regularly used by the Department to notify the general public that the Department has determined a proposed project qualifies for a Noticed General Permit and a Letter of Consent. The exact location of the Rosati property was also included in the newspaper notice. Petitioners did not see the newspaper publication. Fleming first became aware of the Rosati dock when he saw it being constructed on January 13, 2013. He went to the Department's offices and inquired about the dock. Petitioners filed their petition for hearing on January 23, 2013, 10 days after receiving actual notice of the Department's agency action on the Rosati dock. Background Facts The east side of Rosati's property borders the St. Lucie River, which is designated a Class III water. The submerged lands in the area of the Rosati property are sovereign submerged lands of the State of Florida. The river bottom in the area is sandy. There are no corals, marine grass beds, or other significant aquatic resources. The south side of Rosati's property borders Danforth Creek. Danforth Creek is a navigable waterbody with normal depths of three feet or more. Rosati's shoreline along the Creek is approximately 275 linear feet in length and his river shoreline is approximately 125 feet. Rosati has a dock on Danforth Creek. It is in a basin that was created by excavating the private upland. The bottom of the basin is not state-owned sovereign submerged lands. Danforth Creek flows into the St. Lucie River near the southeast corner of the Rosati property. At its confluence with the St. Lucie River, there is a shoal or sandbar that most likely formed by the deposition of sediment carried out of the Creek. Rosati had a small (32 feet long) dock on his shoreline on the St. Lucie River. The Noticed General Permit and Letter of Consent allow Rosati to remove this old dock, which he has already done. The shoal at the confluence of the Creek and River restricts navigation in and out of Danforth Creek. Navigation in and out of Danforth Creek is usually impossible during low tides, except in a canoe, kayak, or other vessel requiring only a few inches of water. The most reliable route between the Creek and the River is a narrow channel only 2 to 3 feet deep at higher tides. This channel, which runs close to Rosati's eastern shoreline, shall be referred to hereafter as the "deeper channel." For many years, Fleming regularly used the deeper channel to take his 23-foot Penn Yan motorboat from Danforth Creek into the St. Lucie River and back again. The Penn Yan has a draft of about 18 inches. Using the deeper channel, Fleming could navigate in and out of Danforth Creek every day on the high tides. An unknown boater stuck a white PVC pipe into the river bottom at the side of the deeper channel to indicate its location. The New Dock Rosati's new dock was substantially completed at the time of the final hearing in June 2013. The new dock is four feet wide, 392 feet long, and terminates at a water depth of minus four feet mean low water. The other docks in the area are much shorter. The St. Lucie River in this area is more than 2,000 feet wide. Therefore, the dock extends into the River less than 20 percent of the width of the River. The total dock square footage of Rosati's dock on Danforth Creek and his new dock does not exceed 2,000 square feet. The dock, terminal platform, and boat lifts "preempt" 2,016 square feet of sovereign submerged lands, meaning that the dock excludes public use of this area of river bottom. Rosati's new dock crosses the deeper channel. It would cross the deeper channel even if it were half as long. The Letter of Consent authorizes Rosati to preempt from public use that portion of the deeper channel that lies beneath the new dock. Now, the only route that can be used by boaters wanting to navigate in and out of Danforth Creek is a narrow channel south of Rosati's new dock, between the dock and a spit of land about 15 feet away. This route can become dry at low tide and is only about a foot deep at high tides. This south route was used by Department staff during high tide using a boat drawing 8 to 12 inches of water. At low tide, they were unable to use this route to get from the St. Lucie River into Danforth Creek, but were able to use the deeper channel that now runs beneath the Rosati dock. Fleming would not be able to take his Penn Yan through the route on the south side of the Rosati dock except in rare high water conditions, such as may occur during or after hurricanes or heavy storms. No member of the general public who formerly used the deeper channel in a vessel drawing more than a foot of water would be able to use the south route except in rare high water conditions. In addition to the shallow character of the south route, it is in a narrow space between the Rosati dock and the sand spit. This route is only reasonably navigable by canoes, kayaks, and similar small, shallow-draft vessels. The Department contends that the general public has not been affected by the Rosati dock. However, all persons wishing to navigate in and out of Danforth Creek, including Fleming, other riparian landowners on Danforth Creek, and other members of the boating public are prevented from doing so in vessels which, just prior to construction of the Rosati dock, they could have used to navigate in and out of the Creek. Respondents further assert that the shoal may get worse and the deeper channel may become more shallow. This was mere speculation, with no timeframe offered. Furthermore, it was not shown that the deeper channel would not remain the best means of navigating in and out of Danforth Creek. Rosati's consultant did not make a site visit before submitting the forms for the Noticed General Permit and no Department employee made a site visit before the Department issued its letter of September 19, 2012. Included in the materials submitted by Rosati's consultant to the Department for the Noticed General Permit is an aerial photograph with a white arrow superimposed on the south side of the proposed Rosati dock to indicate a channel or water route from Danforth Creek into the St. Lucie River. The current or historical elevation of the route indicated by the white arrow was not established in the record. It is now overgrown with upland grass and is not an alternative water route for boaters wanting to get in and out of Danforth Creek. The information submitted to the Department by Rosati's consultant did not inform the Department that the best (deepest) route in and out of Danforth Creek would be blocked by the Rosati dock. The information implied that the proposed Rosati dock would not impair navigation in and out of Danforth Creek. Although not shown to be intentional, the information was misleading because it failed to inform the Department of the true site conditions and the impacts on navigation that would be caused by the proposed dock.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order determining that Thomas Rosati qualifies for the Noticed General Permit, and denying the Letter of Consent to use sovereignty submerged lands. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia E. Comer, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Nathan E. Nason, Esquire Gregory Hyden, Esquire Nason, Yeager, Gerson, White and Lioce, P.A. Suite 1200 1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Howard K. Heims, Esquire Virginia P. Sherlock, Esquire Littman, Sherlock and Heims, P.A. Post Office Box 1197 Stuart, Florida 34995-1197 Herschel T. Vinyard, Jr., Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Matthew Z. Leopold, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent Thidadeau is entitled to a Noticed General Permit, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427, and a Letter of Consent, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule, to construct a single family dock in the central embayment of the Loxahatchee River in Palm Beach County.
Findings Of Fact By Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit filed August 14, 2002, Respondent Paul Thibadeau (Applicant) requested a Noticed General Permit (NGP) and Letter of Consent for a single-family dock to be constructed at his home located at 129 River Road, Palm Beach, Florida (Application). The dock would extend from the southern shore of the Central Embayment of the Loxahatchee River, which is Class III waterbody that is also an Outstanding Florida Water and Aquatic Preserve. At the time of the filing of the Application, Applicant's contractors and Respondent Department of Environmental Protection tried various alignments to avoid impacts. Petitioner Board of Commissioners of Jupiter Inlet District (District) is an entity created by the Legislature to operate and maintain the Jupiter Inlet and maintain and preserve the Loxahatchee River. The District's jurisdiction covers the Central Embayment and Applicant's property. The District employs an engineer to inspect the Central Embayment for navigational hazards. Intervenors Andrea Cameron and Jeffrey Cameron and Douglas Bogue reside in shoreline property to the west of Applicant's property. The Camerons and Mr. Bogue live on the same cove that the west side of Applicant's property abuts. Mr. Bogue's parcel is the second parcel to the west of Applicant's parcel, and the Camerons' parcel is the third parcel to the west of Applicant's parcel. Intervenors swim, fish, birdwatch, boat, and otherwise use the area in which Applicant would construct the dock and platform. Applicant has owned his property for a little over seven years. Applicant's property consists of nearly 1.5 acres of land that forms a peninsula jutting into the Central Embayment from the southern shoreline near the Alternate A1A bridge, which marks the east end of the Central Embayment. Applicant owns 1000 linear feet of shoreline. The proposed dock and platform would be constructed on the northwest side of Applicant's property. Applicant currently owns a dock, measuring five feet into the water by 67 feet along the shoreline, in the canal on the east side of his property. The water depth at this dock is only four inches at the lowest tides and less than one foot at mean low water. Seagrasses--mostly shoalgrass and threatened Johnson's seagrass--grow in the vicinity of this dock, and it is a reasonable inference, given the nearby seagrass beds, prevailing shallow depths, shading effect of the present dock, and the relocation of prop and boating disturbances, that seagrass would recolonize the area of the existing dock, after it is removed. Applicant has agreed to amend either the NGP or Letter of Consent to condition the approval of the construction and use of the proposed dock upon the removal of the existing dock. The Application describes a dock that is 270 feet long and four feet wide. At the end of the dock is a 160 square-foot terminal platform. The diagram shows the dock running 110 feet due north from an upland point that is ascertainable only approximately by reference to a concrete sidewalk and mangrove fringe depicted on the drawing. The dock then turns to the northwest and runs 160 feet to the terminal platform, which measures 5.3 feet by 30 feet. Boat-lift pilings are waterward of the waterward edge of the platform. The diagram depicts approximations of water levels, at mean tide, along the dock. The shorter run of the dock ends in water two feet deep, at mean tide. The longer run crosses a long sandbar and terminates between the 3.5- and 4-foot contours. A cross-section in the Application shows mean high water at about 1.0 feet (presumably National Geodetic Vertical Datum, or NGVD) and mean low water at about -0.5 feet NGVD. The cross-section reveals that the waterward edge of the terminal platform is at almost -3.33 feet NGVD and the landward edge of the terminal platform is at about -3.2 feet NGVD. This means that, at mean low water, the water level would be a little more than 2.75 feet deep at the waterward edge of the terminal platform and about 2.75 feet deep at the landward edge of the terminal platform. The pilings, which are waterward of the waterward edge of the terminal platform, are at -3.5 feet NGVD. This means that, at mean low water, the water level would be about 3 feet deep at the most waterward pilings. However, the second slip, which mostly runs along the end of the dock, not the terminal platform, is in shallower water. According to a drawing that is part of the Application, the waterward end of this slip is at the same depth as the landward end of the terminal platform, so it would be in about 2.75 feet of water at mean low water, and the landward end of this slip is at -2.0 feet NGVD, so it would be in about 1.5 feet of water at mean low water. Disagreeing with this drawing, Applicant Exhibit 61 indicates that the shallowest water depth at the second boat slip is at least two feet at mean low water. Although the scale of District Exhibit 62 prevents a precise determination, District Exhibit 62 seems to agree with this value, as well as other landward values, contained in Applicant Exhibit 61. The superior detail of both of these exhibits, as compared to that of the drawing accompanying the application, compels a finding consistent with the deeper water levels reported on Applicant Exhibit 61 and District Exhibit 62. Thus, the water depth, at mean low water, is at least two feet at the second boat slip. DEP environmental scientists visited Applicant's site twice before issuing the permit and snorkeled the area proposed for the dock to find the location that would result in the minimum impacts. On the first visit, the DEP scientists did not record the tide, but, in the second visit, they snorkeled the area at mean low water. After DEP approved the permit, its scientists snorkeled the site a third time, also at mean low water. Applicant has worked closely with DEP at all stages of the permitting process. In fact, early discussions resulted in several different alignments and locations for the proposed dock. After DEP's environmental scientists determined for themselves the location of the seagrass beds in the affected area, Applicant settled on a location and alignment acceptable to the DEP scientists and revised the application (Revised Application). The Revised Application locates portions of the dock deck over some seagrass beds, but adds restrictions, beyond those normally imposed on docks built in Aquatic Preserves, to reduce or eliminate the impacts of the dock on these seagrass beds. The Revised Application narrows the dock deck by one foot to three feet, replaces solid decking with grated decking for the first 200 feet from the shoreline, adds handrails for the first 200 feet from the shoreline, and raises the elevation of the dock deck from five feet to seven feet above mean high water for the first 200 feet from the shoreline. The Revised Application also changes the width of the terminal platform from 5.3 feet to 6 feet and its length from 30 feet to 25 feet. The Revised Application clearly identifies two boat slips: one on the waterward side of the long side of the terminal platform and one perpendicular to the first slip, along the north side of the end of the dock deck. Lastly, the Revised Application reduces the dock deck from 270 feet to 250 feet to the shoreline. The proposed alignment of the dock passes between two relatively small seagrass beds immediately offshore of the northwest side of Applicant's property. The cove contains a large seagrass bed, mostly confined to water depths of less than 1.5 feet at mean low water. A little more than 50 feet of the dock passes over the eastern edge of this large seagrass bed, and the most waterward 40-50 feet of the dock passes over bottom that is uncolonized by seagrass. The seagrass that is traversed by the dock is mostly confined to the long sandbar that the dock would cross. Petitioner presented several alternatives to the present alignment. These are depicted in District Exhibit 79. Petitioner and its witness ultimately selected Alternative F, which would be a shorter dock running to the northeast off the northern tip of Applicant's property. Passing over little, if any, seagrass, this dock would terminate in a hole that is three feet deep at mean low water. However, Alternative F provides Applicant with little better access than he has at present. The northern route to the channel requires several turns and passes over much seagrass. The longer eastern route runs over 600 feet in a narrow, turning channel that contains only 1.5-2.0 feet of water at mean low water. This side of Applicant's property is more exposed to currents and winds than the west side abutting the cove, so accurate navigation of a vessel with the engine trimmed partly up would be more difficult. Channels, especially shallow ones, shift over time and shoal up, especially given this tendency within the Central Embayment. The Central Embayment is a shallow waterbody prone to shoaling due to sedimentation. The main channel through the Central Embayment generally runs along the north shoreline of the Central Embayment, although it runs in a more central location as it approaches the Alternate A1A bridge at the east end of the Central Embayment. Applicant's property, which is close to the A1A bridge, is relatively close to the main channel. A shallow area with interspersed seagrass beds separates Applicant's property from the main channel. Applicant operates a 24-foot boat with a 200- horsepower outboard motor. The boat requires 12 inches of water to float with the engine up and 24 inches of water for the skeg and prop to clear the bottom with the engine down and the boat operating at idle or low speed. To ingress or egress the existing dock, Applicant can operate his boat only within two hours of high tide. To reach the main channel, Applicant must navigate poorly marked, local channels. The longer local channel runs east from Applicant's property and requires several turns. The shorter local channel runs north of Applicant's property and enters the southern access channel at a point near to its junction with the main channel. The southern access channel is an important channel in the Central Embayment, whose shoreline has been densely developed. A long sandbar runs through the center of the Central Embayment. Rather than navigate to the west of the sandbar, most boat operators coming from the south shoreline take the southern access channel, which shortens the time it takes for them to leave the Central Embayment. A mangrove island at the east end of the long sandbar is located immediately north and west of the southern access channel, just west of its junction with the main channel. Directly across from the mangrove island, in a southeasterly direction, is the northwest side of Applicant's property, from which the dock would extend, running toward the southern access channel. Boating traffic in the southern access channel may reach over 100 trips during a 10-hour period on weekends. In the vicinity of the proposed terminal platform, two large, privately installed pilings exist nearly in the center of the southern access channel. The closer of these pilings would be about 95 feet from the proposed terminal platform. One of the pilings marks the junction of the southern access channel with the main channel. The closer piling is between the proposed platform and the mangrove island to the northwest. Boats operate to the south and east of these pilings, typically at planing speeds of at least 20 miles per hour. In the vicinity of the proposed terminal platform, the southern access channel is 120-150 feet wide, and the waterward edge of the platform is about 70 feet from the center of the channel. The bathymetry in the vicinity of the proposed platform reduces the navigational hazard posed by the proposed project. The -3 and -4 feet NGVD contours run parallel along the southern edge of the southern access channel in the vicinity of the proposed terminal. Both contours, on either side of the proposed terminal, take sharp turns landward 25-50 feet on either side of the proposed platform. The effect of this bathymetry is to create a sort of submerged cove for the proposed terminal platform, which is protected from passing boat traffic from the fact that these contours are generally 25-75 feet further waterward on either side of the platform. For instance, at mean tide, boaters approaching the area of the platform would presumably wish to stay in water deeper than three feet, so they would unlikely find the platform to be a navigational hazard. Additionally, an imaginary line extending from the takeoff point of the dock on Applicant's shoreline, along the dock, to a point on the opposite shoreline would run about 13,800 feet. This line would run just east and north of the mangrove island described above. The drawing of riparian lines at this location is much more difficult due to the irregular shoreline and the orientation of the southern access channel. Originally, Applicant proposed a riparian line that ran from the westernmost extent of his property, which is located at the end of the waterway running along the west side of the property. Dutifully running this line perpendicular to the orientation of the southern edge of the southern access channel, Applicant deprived a corner of his neighbor's property of any riparian rights at all. During the hearing, Applicant redrew proposed riparian lines. The appealingly named, "Equitable Allocation" line does more justice to the neighbor by not crossing his property. Instead, this line runs roughly along the middle of the canal- like waterway on the west side of Applicant's property and, at the mouth of this waterway, turning to the northwest to run perpendicular to the southern edge of the southern access channel. The problem with the "Equitable Allocation" line offered by Applicant emerges when it is considered in broader scale, sufficient to encompass not only Applicant and his neighbor to the immediate west, but also that neighbor's neighbor to the immediate west. The "Equitable Allocation" line does no equity to the riparian access of one of the two landowners to the west of Applicant. However, the task in this case is not to draw riparian lines, but to determine whether the proposed dock or platform is within 25 feet of another landowner's riparian line. Applicant Exhibit 62 draws the 25-foot offset line. If the riparian- rights line runs perpendicular to the orientation of the southern access channel (the so-called "Equitable Allocation"), the terminal platform and dock are offset by more than 25 feet from the line. If the riparian-rights line extends property lines without regard to the orientation of the channel, then the platform, but not the dock, would be within the 25-foot offset. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, case law teaches that the location of the channel and property boundaries receive consideration in establishing riparian rights. When based on the larger-scale map of Applicant Exhibit 63, any equitable application of these factors would not result in the establishment of a riparian rights line within 25 feet of the proposed terminal platform or dock. The proposed dock and platform would impact the aesthetic enjoyment of nearby landowners and others using the waters of the Central Embayment. Swimmers and sunbathers set up on the sandbar and throw balls and flying disks. The proposed dock would divide the sandbar into two sections of about 170 feet and 100 feet. The impact of the dock, with its pilings spaced at ten-foot intervals, is unclear on these recreational users, as it is on users of canoes and kayaks, which also occupy these waters. The record does not portray a high-energy, strong-current environment in this area, which is essentially at the mouth of a small cove, so it is difficult to infer that typical currents will create unsafe conditions for swimmers, kayakers, or canoeists around the pilings. Likewise, the record does not establish the net impact of the dock and platform on fish, birds, and other wildlife using the area. The platform covers submerged bottom that is uncolonized by seagrass, and, given its coarse sand and shell hash, as well as the water depths and water clarity, this bottom is unlikely ever to be colonized by seagrass. The portion of the dock that traverses seagrass will shade this vegetation, but the effect of shading is mitigated by the seven-foot elevation of the deck, translucency of the decking material, and near north-south orientation of the deck. The construction of the takeoff of the deck will not require significant alterations to the existing mangrove fringe. The issue of cumulative impacts is not that the average dock in the Central Embayment is 80 feet, and the proposed dock is over three times longer. Nor is it that only two docks on the southern shoreline of the Central Embayment would equal or exceed in length the length of the proposed dock, and one of these two docks serves a planned unit development. The length of the dock is subordinate to the depth of the water to be reached by the dock. The more relevant issue, as to cumulative impacts, is that the proposed dock would extend to water whose depth is -3.5 feet NGVD, and the majority of docks in the Central Embayment terminate in water at least one foot shallower. An estuary whose urbanized shoreline appears almost condominiumized in aerial photographs, the Central Embayment will undergo shoreline development to match whatever DEP permits in its most generous permitting decisions. However, a close examination of District Exhibit 62 reveals numerous examples of docks or platforms terminating in -3.5 or even -4.0 feet NGVD, so the potential of the Letter of Consent generating cumulative impacts, strictly in the termination depths of docks, is small. The most relevant concern, as to cumulative impacts, is the potential for the construction of docks where no docks presently exist and the number of such docks that would need to extend 250+ feet to reach water depths comparable to those reached by the proposed dock and platform. Perhaps landowners abutting such extensive stretches of flats have been discouraged from trying to obtain permits for such lengthy structures. Perhaps Applicant himself was emboldened to seek the present NGP and Letter of Consent due to the permitting of the other single- family dock of comparable length on the southern shoreline. The problem as to this aspect of cumulative impacts is that the record does not support findings as to the number of littoral parcels without docks and the number of such parcels that would require docks of 250+ feet to reach the depths involved in this case. These cumulative impacts, if any, are too speculative to assess. Thus, the analysis of cumulative impacts in this case is necessarily restricted to consideration of the impacts of some additional pressure to construct docks to one-foot deeper water than has historically limited docks and the accumulation of additional impacts to resources, such as seagrass, or recreational uses, such as boating and swimming, from an authorization to build the proposed dock and platform. The record does not support findings of significant adverse cumulative impacts from this proposed activity. Moreover, the elimination of 335 square feet of shallow-water dock and the possible recolonization of seagrass, including threatened Johnson's seagrass, mitigate any cumulative impacts and limit or even eliminate the precedential value of the permitting decisions in this case.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection: Grant the Noticed General Permit. Grant the Letter of Consent upon two conditions: a) the prohibition against any boat mooring to the slip for any period of time, if the boat requires more than two feet of water with its engine in normal operation position and the boat operating at idle or slow speed; and b) the removal of the existing dock prior to the construction of the new dock and platform. DONE AND ENTERED this 25t day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Greg Munson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kevin S. Hennessy Lewis, Longman & Walker, P.A. SunTrust Building 1001 3rd Avenue West, Suite 670 Bradenton, Florida 34205 Thomas F. Mullin Lewis, Longman & Walker, P.A. 1700 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Suite 1000 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Marcy I. Lahart Marcy I. Lahart, P.A. 711 Talladega Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33405 John S. Yudin Guy & Yudin, LLP 55 East Ocean Boulevard Stuart, Florida 34994 Toni Sturtevant Assistant General Counsel Christine A. Guard Senior Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Issues presented here concerned the entitlement of Respondent, Russell D. Horn, Sr., to be granted an environmental permit by Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation, to build a boat stall on an existing dock in Putnam County, Florida. The boat stall's dimensions are ten feet wide by twenty feet deep and the construction would be on the St. Johns River.
Findings Of Fact On July 13, 1981, Russell D. Horn, Sr., who has a residence in Putnam County, Florida, bade application to the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, for the necessary permits to construct a boat stall ten feet wide by twenty feet deep at the site of an existing dock. A copy of the application may be found as Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The dock where Horn applied to build the boat slip is found in the St. Johns River, a navigable water body and waters of the State of Florida in Putnam County, Florida. The application form which was executed by Horn required him to indicate the name of adjacent property owners to the property at which the dock site was located, both upland and adjacent to the uplands. See Rule 17- 4.28(11)(c), Florida Administrative Code. To accomplish this task, the applicant utilized a sketch which he had been provided when he purchased his homesite in the area and indicated to the Department that the adjoining landowners were Milton Kilis and Robert Michal. In fact, Robert Michal was not an adjacent landowner. The adjacent landowner, Milton G. Kilis, wrote to advise the Department that he had no objection to the construction of the boat slip. This correspondence was dated September 11, 1981. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. After reviewing the initial application, additional information was requested by a document entitled "Completeness Summary" which was addressed from the Department to the Applicant Horn. A copy of this "Completeness Summary" requesting additional information may be found as Department's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Through this summary, Horn was requested to provide written authorization from the dock owners. It was also requested that Respondent provide an affidavit of ownership of the upland property adjacent to the dock site. Horn received permission to construct from Frank Scussell and William A. Reaves, persons he understood to be the dock owners. See Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. Horn misunderstood the question related to ownership of upland property and provided a mortgage deed with its attendant description of his home site property in Putnam County, which is at a different location from that of the upland property adjacent to the dock. A copy of that deed and other matters may be found as Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. Department of Environmental Regulation reviewing authorities wrote on the "Completeness Summary" form, Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 1, indicating that the task of seeking written authorization from the dock owners had been achieved and that the affidavit of ownership of upland property owners was satisfactory. In fact, all adjacent property owners had not been notified of the pendency of the application request through the process of Horn's advising the Respondent agency of the names of all adjacent property owners to the uplands and the affidavit of ownership of the upland property owner at the dock site was not filed. During the review process, permission was given by the Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, for the construction of the boat slip. A copy of this permission, by letter dated August 31, 1981, is Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. The Department of Environmental Regulation reviewed the permit application and prepared an application appraisal, which may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. The findings made by that application appraisal related to application review are found to be accurate. In particular the permit application appraisal indicated that the boat slip would be located at the waterward end of the existing dock structure, which existing dock structure accommodated four boats. The appraisal found that the project was located in South Putnam County in the town of Georgetown on the St. Johns River. The permit appraisal found that the project site would be located in the littoral zone of the river about one hundred feet waterward of the mean high water line. No littoral growth was seen at the depth of the proposed construction. Tapegrass, Mexican waterlily and cattail were present near the shore. Several large hardwood swamp trees were present at the shoreline. The project was found to be located in a Water Class III and adjacent waters were Class III according to the appraisal, no significant immediate or long-term adverse environmental impacts were to be expected to occur due to the completion of the boat slip. Horn was subsequently given a construction permit to add the boat stall to the existing dock. A copy of that permit may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. The only specific conditions related to that matter pertain to the necessity for the utilization of turbidity curtains throughout the project for purposes of containing the turbidity that might exceed State water quality standards, The permit was issued on September 22, 1981. After receiving the permit, sometime around October 20, 1981, Horn purchased the necessary lumber to construct the stall and on October 24, 1981, went to the dock site to begin the installation of pilings related to the construction of the boat stall. While placing the pilings on October 24, 1981, an adjoining property owner and Petitioner in this cause, Marshall Wolfe, stood on his dock, that is, Wolfe's dock, and hailed to Horn to stop building. Horn did not know Wolfe before that time and did not know that Wolfe, not Michal, was the adjacent property owner on that side of the dock. On October 28, 1981, Marshall Wolfe and his wife, Ann Wolfe, wrote to the Department in the person of G. Doug Dutton, Subdistrict Manager, and indicated that they were opposed to the issuance of the permit, which is under the number of the permit issued to Respondent, and requested a hearing on the question of the issuance. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Department's Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. On the same date, October 28, 1981, Horn was contacted by the Department of Environmental Regulation and advised of the Wolfe complaint and Horn was told that he would receive a cease and desist order from the Department of Environmental Regulation. On October 30, 1981, Horn returned to the construction site and found four of his neighbors finishing the construction of the stall. In fact, the neighbors did conclude the construction and the boat slip remains in place. A cease and desist letter was mailed on November 2, 1981; however, this letter was not received by Horn immediately. Horn did subsequently learn of the contents of the letter some time in November or December, 1981. A copy of the cease and desist letter may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. On December 13, 1981, an attempt was made at the instigation of Department officials for the Petitioners and Respondent Horn to resolve the controversy. This effort was unsuccessful. As a consequence, a formal hearing was necessary in keeping with the request of the Department that the Division of Administrative Hearings conduct a Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, formal hearing. This request had been made on November 12, 1981, and an initial hearings had been scheduled for February 11, 1982, following consultation between the various parties and the Hearing Officer. At the initial hearing session on February 11, 1982, which was to be held in Palatka, Florida, counsel for Department indicated that the upland property was not owned by Horn and that easement rights to that property were unclear. In view of this fact the hearing was continued until the ostensible upland property owner could be notified of the pendency of the issuance of an environmental permit and be allowed to participate. Notification was subsequently provided by an Intent to Issue Statement, a copy of which may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 9 admitted into evidence. This notification was through the Department at the instigation of the Hearing Officer. The date of notification was February 12, 1982. An order was entered on March 17, 1982, which allowed the intervention of St. Johns Crescent Lakesites, Inc. into the proceedings and that party, in the person of its counsel, Lauren E. Merriam, III, Esquire, participated in the April 15, 1982 hearing. St. Johns Crescent Lakesites, Inc. is the owner of the upland property adjacent to the dock in which Horn had constructed the boat slip. No indication was given that any easement rights were ever granted by that corporation to grant access to the boat slip from the adjacent property. The overall dock area, in terms of square feet, is between 500 and 1000 square feet. Other than the permit application made by Horn, no other permission has been received by the Department to construct the other features of the dock. A further appraisal of the project site subsequent to the September 18, 1981, appraisal has been made. That appraisal was made by the field inspector for the Department. This appraisal by Melvin Rechtor agrees with the project appraisal made by the first field inspector, John Hendricks. The testimony of Melvin Rechtor on environmental impacts of the project are accepted as accurate. Rechtor's testimony established that the project would have an insignificant impact on water quality considerations and would not adversely affect the species or the conservation of fish, marine and wildlife or other natural resources. Rechtor's testimony established that there would be no unreasonable interference with waterward access of adjacent property owners. Rechtor's testimony also established that there would be no navigational hazard nor interference with fishing and swimming by persons using the river.
The Issue The issue is whether ten applications filed by Petitioner, Normandy Shores, LLC, for an exemption from Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) requirements to construct and install ten docks to serve eighteen private boat slips and a letter of consent to use sovereign submerged lands in Indian Creek, within the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve (Preserve), Miami Beach, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings of fact are made: Background The Department is the agency responsible for administering the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 373, Florida Statutes,2 regarding activities in surface waters of the State that may or may not require an ERP. Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3) authorizes the Department to approve exemptions from ERP requirements for the construction of certain docking facilities and boat ramps. In addition, the Department has authority from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund to review and take final agency action on Petitioner's requests for proprietary authorizations. Petitioner is a developer of residential and commercial properties. It owns waterfront land on the eastern side of Normandy Isle at 25-135 North Shore Drive, Miami Beach, Florida. Normandy Isle is surrounded by water, lies just west of Miami Beach, and is accessed by the John F. Kennedy Causeway (also known as 71st Street or State Road 934), which runs between the Cities of Miami and Miami Beach. Normandy Waterway runs in an east-west direction through the center of Normandy Isle, while Indian Creek appears to generally run in a northwest-southeast direction between Normandy Isle and Miami Beach. (Petitioner's property is on the northern half of the island.) Both of these waterbodies are in the northern portion of the Preserve, a Class III and Outstanding Florida Water. The Preserve is a body of water that stretches the length of Miami-Dade County, essentially from Broward County to Monroe County. The property adjoins Indian Creek to the east (the long side of the parcel) and Normandy Waterway to the south (the short side of the parcel) and is situated at the intersection of those two waterways. Petitioner is currently developing the property as Privata Townhomes (Privata), a luxury townhome community. Petitioner holds title to the property and a portion of submerged lands of Indian Creek and Normandy Waterway. The boundaries of the privately-owned submerged lands are accurately depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit 12. The Privata development comprises a total of forty- three, single-family townhomes in seven buildings. Eighteen townhomes are being constructed as waterfront homes along Indian Creek (buildings 1, 2, and 3). Seven are being constructed as waterfront homes along Normandy Waterway (building 4), while the remaining eighteen townhomes (buildings 5, 6, and 7) are not situated on waterfront property. Each waterfront parcel is approximately eighteen linear feet wide and consists of both upland and private submerged lands. The private submerged lands facing Indian Creek run the entire length of the property and extend approximately ten feet from the shoreline. On October 1, 2007, Petitioner filed with the Department ten applications for an exemption and letter of consent to construct ten docks (docks 1 through 10) and eighteen boat slips. The proposed docks will be located on the shoreline extending into Indian Creek and the Preserve. Docks 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 will serve two slips each, or a total of sixteen slips, while docks 3 and 7 will project outward from one single- family parcel each and will be wholly-owned by that respective single-family parcel owner. All of the docks will be spaced less than sixty-five feet from one another. According to Petitioner, the Department has already given Petitioner authorization to construct three docks for the units in Building 4 facing Normandy Waterway to the south, and they are not in issue here. The basis for that authorization, and the distinction between those docks and the ones in dispute here, are not of record. Each of the docks will be built using four pilings with forty square feet of decking. Therefore, each dock will be less than five hundred square feet of surface area over the surface waters. Associated with the docks are eighteen boat slips that will include an additional pile installed approximately thirty feet from the shoreline. The slips and docks are exclusively for the private use of, and will be owned by, the waterfront townhome owners. The eighteen non-water townhome parcel owners will not have any rights to submerged lands owned in fee simple by the purchasers of the waterfront townhomes or the right to use any slip or dock. This is confirmed by Article II, Section 1 of the Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and Easements for Privata Town Homes at Miami Beach (Declaration of Covenants). There have been docks and vessel moorings at the project site for at least forty years. However, the docks do not qualify for automatic grandfathering because a grandfather structure application was never submitted to the Department, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.0081. After reviewing the applications, the Department issued its Notice of Intent on December 13, 2007, as later amended on September 13, 2008, denying all ten applications. Citing Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), the Department asserted that "the proposed docks are part of a multi-family living complex and therefore must be a minimum of 65-ft. apart in order to qualify for the exemption." As to the letter of consent, the Department asserted that based upon the upland development at the site, the proposed docks constituted a private residential multi-family dock or pier, as defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.003(44). In addition, the Notice of Intent stated that the proposed docks fell within the definition of a "commercial/industrial dock," as defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.004(7), and therefore they required a lease (rather than a letter of consent) in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 18- 18.006(3)(c). Thus, the Department takes the position that an ERP and a lease are required before the docks may be constructed. The parties have raised no issues regarding riparian rights. By an amendment to its Notice of Intent issued on September 13, 2008, the Department added as a reason for denying the letter of consent that the docks will cause unacceptable cumulative impacts on the Preserve within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.008. The Development Each townhome occupies three stories of vertical, independent space. No unit is situated over any other unit. Each townhome has a separate entrance through its own front door, and each has its own garage. The townhomes in each building share a single wall. Petitioner stated that this was done because if the units were constructed with a narrow space between them, it would create safety, fire, water moisture, and mold issues. However, there is no cross-access between the units, and there is no penetration (such as common plumbing, fire sprinklers, or electrical conduits) through the load-bearing walls. Even so, the units have various common structural elements such as bearings, bearing walls, columns or walls necessary to support the roof structure, and siding, finish, trim, exterior sheatings (coverings), and other exterior materials. There is a common area that runs the entire length of shoreline between the buildings and the water. Within the common area there is a seawall, sidewalk, pool, and grassy area that are accessible by any member of the Privata Homeowners' Association (Association). According to the Declaration of Covenants, the Association is responsible for painting the exteriors of the buildings, including the walls, doors, and windows; maintaining and repairing the docks and seawalls; and maintaining the common areas. Members who own docks will pay a higher fee to the Association than non-waterfront owners to offset the additional costs associated with maintaining and repairing the docks. Eighteen of the waterfront townhome parcels are currently under purchase and sale agreements. The boat slips were one of the main selling features of the waterfront townhomes. In fact, the sales are contingent on the docks being constructed, and Petitioner concedes that if the docks are not built, the buyers will not be required to close on their contracts. In its Privata marketing brochures, Petitioner refers to "private boat docks" and owners having "a private boat slip right in their own backyard" that is "[a]ble to accommodate vessels up to 40 feet." It is fair to infer from the evidence that the docks were used as a major inducement for customers to purchase the waterfront parcels. Exemption from an ERP Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b)4. provides in relevant part that no permit shall be required for (b) The construction of private docks of . . . 500 square feet or less of surface area over wetlands or other surface waters for docks which are located in Outstanding Florida Waters. . . . To qualify for this exemption, any such structure: * * * 4. Shall be the sole dock constructed pursuant to this exemption as measured along the shoreline for a minimum distance of 65 feet, unless the parcel of land or individual lot as platted is less than 65 feet in length along the shoreline, in which case there may be one exempt dock per parcel or lot. For the purposes of this paragraph, multi-family living complexes and other types of complexes or facilities associated with the proposed private dock shall be treated as one parcel of property regardless of the legal division of ownership or control of the associated property. . . . (Emphasis added) Under the rule, an applicant will not qualify for an exemption from permitting requirements if the upland structure of a project site is a multi-family complex or facility. In those cases, the owner of the project site is allowed to construct one dock per sixty-five feet of shoreline (assuming the size of the dock comports with the rule). The rule specifically provides that the legal division of ownership or control of the property is not relevant in making this determination. The underscored language in the rule is at the heart of this dispute. The parties sharply disagree over whether the Privata development consists of single-family units or whether it is a multi-family living complex. Although the term "multi- family living complexes and other types of complexes or facilities" is not further defined by the rule, the Department has consistently (with one exception cited below) interpreted this provision to include buildings with so-called "attached townhomes." Because the Privata townhomes share a wall with a neighbor, as well as other common facilities, the Department considers each building on the uplands to "house multiple families." Put another way, multiple families will live in each structure (building). On the other hand, if the units were detached and free-standing, even by a few inches, the Department agrees they would probably fall within the category of "individual, detached, single-family homes." The greater weight of evidence supports a finding that the upland project is a multi-family living complex. This is because the project has the attributes of a multi-family complex, such as units sharing a common wall, multiple families living in each building, and common areas accessible for each member of the project. While Petitioner points out that each townhome owner has fee simple title to his or her upland parcel and the ten feet of adjoining submerged lands, the rule specifically provides that the division of ownership and control of the property is immaterial to the ultimate determination of whether the property qualifies for an exemption. Given these considerations, it is found that the project does not meet the requirements for an exemption from ERP requirements under Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b)4.3 Letter of Consent A letter of consent is a form of authorization, but does not by itself determine whether a project is approvable or not.4 In order to qualify for a letter of consent, the docks would first have to be exempt from ERP requirements. As noted in finding of fact 20, they are not. The "18 series rules [in the Florida Administrative Code] are proprietary, essentially, real estate rules" that apply to the use of state owned, submerged lands. (Transcript, page 370). General guidance or "overarching" submerged lands rules are found in Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 18-21, while rules specific to the Preserve are found in Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 18-18. Both sets of rules apply here. The dispute over the letter of consent centers on whether the dock is a "private dock" or a "commercial/industrial dock," as those terms are defined by the rules. The former does not require a lease, while the latter does. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.006 (3)(c)("A commercial/industrial dock on sovereignty lands shall require a lease. Private docks to be constructed and operated on sovereignty lands shall not require a lease of those lands.") A private dock is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.004(18) as a dock located on or over submerged lands, which is used for private leisure purposes for a single family dwelling unit and does not produce income. On the other hand, a commercial/industrial dock is defined in subsection (7) of the same rule as a dock which is located on or over submerged lands and which is used to produce income, or which serves as an inducement to renting, purchasing, or using accompanying facilities including without limitation multi-family residential facilities. This term shall be construed to include any dock not a private dock. Therefore, a dock may constitute a commercial/ industrial dock if it is associated with a multi-family facility; if it is used as an inducement to rent, purchase, or use accompanying facilities; or if the dock does not constitute a private dock, which is used for a single-family upland facility. The more persuasive evidence here shows that the docks are associated with a multi-family facility; they are used as an inducement to purchase the units; and they are not used for a single-family upland facility. For any one of these reasons, then, the docks must be categorized as commercial/ industrial docks. Although the term "multi-family residential facilities" is not specifically defined in Chapter 18-18, another proprietary rule provides clarification of that term. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.003(44). That rule defines the term "private residential multi-family dock or pier" as a dock or pier on a common riparian parcel or area that is intended to be used for private recreational or leisure purposes by persons or groups of persons with real property interest in a multi-family residential dwelling such as a duplex, a condominium, or attached single-family residences or a residential development such as a residential or mobile home subdivision. (emphasis added) As noted earlier, both Chapters 18-18 and 18-21 should be read in conjunction with each other. When doing so, it is found that the proposed docks are associated with "attached single-family residences" (by virtue of sharing a common wall) and fall within the definition of a commercial/industrial dock. Therefore, they do not qualify for a letter of consent. Cumulative Impacts The waterbody in issue here is an Aquatic Preserve, that is, "an exceptional area of submerged lands and its associated waters set aside for being maintained essentially in its natural or existing condition." § 258.37(1), Fla. Stat. The Legislature intended for the submerged lands and associated waters to be maintained "in an essentially natural condition so that its biological and aesthetic values may endure for the enjoyment of future generations." § 258.397(1), Fla. Stat. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.001(1). "Essentially natural condition" is defined as "those conditions which support the continued existence or encourage the restoration of the diverse population of indigenous life forms and habitats to the extent they existed prior to the significant development adjacent to and within the preserve." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.004(10). In determining whether a letter of consent for new docks and piers in the Preserve should be approved, Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.008 requires that the Department consider the cumulative impacts of those projects. The burden rests on the applicant to provide reasonable assurances that the project will not cause adverse cumulative impacts upon the natural systems. In meeting this stringent test, the rule recognizes that "while a particular alteration of the preserve may constitute a minor change, the cumulative effect of numerous such changes often results in major impairments to the resources of the preserve." The rule goes on to identify five factors that the Department must consider as a part of its cumulative impact evaluation. In this case, the Department considered "the number and extent of similar human actions within the preserve which have previously affected or are likely to affect the preserve"; the "similar activities within the preserve which are currently under consideration by the Department"; and the "[d]irect and indirect effects upon the preserve which may reasonably be expected to result from the activity." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.008(1), (2), and (3). The fact that the Department discussed only the first three considerations, rather than all five, in its Amended Notice of Intent does not render its evaluation improper or incomplete, as suggested by Petitioner.5 If authorized, the project will allow eighteen boats to dock at Privata along Indian Creek. Although the marketing brochures indicate that boats up to forty feet in length will use the slips, the evidence at hearing indicates that they will be no more than twenty-five feet in length. The project adheres to best management practices. Also, the number of docks was limited by means of dock-sharing for eight of the ten docks. The docks are designed so that boats will be moored parallel to the shoreline rather than horizontal to the seawall; the docks will be over six feet above mean high water; and the docks will be constructed from materials designed to minimize environmental impacts. As noted above, the Preserve extends from Broward County to Monroe County. Within the Preserve, there are literally thousands of docks, including single docks, multifamily docks, and commercial and industrial marinas. Closer to the Privata project, there are docks, boat lifts, cranes, davits (small cranes used for boats, anchors, or cargo), and marinas located on both sides of Indian Creek. The development along Indian Creek and Normandy Waterway includes commercial, multifamily, and single-family docks. Due to heavy boat traffic and extensive development around Indian Creek, it is fair to say that the project is in a high turbidity area. Besides the applications here, there are "several" other applications now pending before the Department for docks, piers, and slips within the Preserve. Two in-water environmental resource surveys by the Department revealed that resources such as paddle grass, Johnson's grass (a threatened species), shoal grass, turtle grass, manatee grass, soft coral, sponge, oysters, and sea urchins are present in the immediate area. However, it is fair to infer that these marine resources have adapted to the existing conditions and are able to withstand the stress created by the heavy usage. The evidence is sharply in dispute over whether the project is reasonably expected to have direct or indirect adverse impacts on the natural systems of the Preserve. Petitioner contends that because a small number of docks and slips are being proposed, best management practices will be used in constructing the docks and slips, the area around Indian Creek is already heavily developed, and the natural resources in Indian Creek appear to have adapted to the stress created by the other activities, the effect on the Preserve's natural systems will be de minimus. There are literally thousands of similar activities and human actions that have already affected the Preserve and are reasonably expected to continue in the future. Other applications to engage in similar activities are now pending, and it is reasonable to assume that others will be filed. The natural resources in the immediate area are diverse, as described by the Department witnesses, including at least one threatened species. There will be direct and indirect impacts that are reasonably expected to occur from the docks and mooring areas such as increased shading and decreased water quality. When the impacts of the Privata project are viewed in isolation, they can be considered "a minor change." However, the cumulative effect of this and other changes can result in adverse impacts to the natural systems. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18- 18.008. The more credible evidence supports a finding that the proposed activities will cause direct and indirect adverse impacts on the Preserve's natural systems, so that the submerged lands and associated waters will not be maintained "essentially in [their] natural or existing condition." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.001(1). Therefore, in this respect, the requirement of the rule has not been met. Other Projects in the Preserve Petitioner points out that in June 2001, as later modified in April 2002, another project in the Preserve known as Aqua at Allison Island was given an exemption to construct fifteen single-family docks, nine of which were intended for private use and six to serve as shared structures for adjacent property owners. See Petitioner's Exhibits 28 and 29. The project site lies just south of Normandy Isle on Allison Island, which adjoins Indian Creek and involved a similar upland development of attached townhomes. While the Department concedes that this action occurred, no other project of this nature has ever been granted an exemption or letter of consent to construct docks and use state-owned submerged lands within the Preserve. The Department further explained that it "made an error" when it granted an exemption for the project at Aqua at Allison Island, and that with this single exception, it has consistently denied all similar applications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order denying Petitioner's ten applications for an exemption from ERP requirements and a letter of consent to use sovereign submerged lands to construct ten docks and associated slips on Indian Creek in Miami Beach, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2009.
The Issue Whether the Appellant, Devoe L. Moore, has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that development rights in certain real property he owns have vested against the provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property at Issue. On September 18, 1987, Devoe Moore acquired a tract of approximately 28 acres of real estate (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), located on Lake Bradford Road just south of Gaines Street, in the City of Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. The Property was the former location of the Elberta Crate and Box Company. The Property was at the time of purchase, and still is, zoned M-2, Industrial. Development of the Property. Mr. Moore intended to develop the Property consistent with the Property's M-2, Industrial zoning. Mr. Moore intended to build a service/commercial/mini-storage development similar to another such development of Mr. Moore in the City. In December, 1987, Mr. Moore had his engineer prepare grading and drainage plans for the Property. On January 29, 1988, Mr. Moore had an application for an amendment to a stormwater permit, Environmental Management Permit 87-1087, filed with the Leon County Department of Public Works. At that time, Leon County issued such permits for property in unincorporated areas and inside the City's limits. The grading and drainage plans for the Property were filed with the application. Leon County had not been delegated any responsibility or authority to make land-use decisions for the City. The requested amendment to Permit 87-1087 was based on an assumption of Mr. Moore that the Property would consist of 80% coverage with impervious surface. Therefore, the City was aware or should have been aware that Mr. Moore intended to construct a major development on the Property. Such a development was consistent with the zoning on the Property at the time. Neither Leon County nor the City, however, approved or in anyway addressed the issue of whether 80% coverage of the Property with impervious surface was acceptable. Nor did the City or Leon County make any representation to Mr. Moore different from that made by the City's zoning of the Property. Mr. Moore filed a site plan showing a development of 80% coverage with the application for amendment to Permit 87-1087. These plans showed a development consisting of thirteen rectangular buildings, driveways and parking area. The indicated development, however, was not reviewed or in anyway approved by Leon County or the City. On May 6, 1988, a Stormwater Permit, amending Permit 87-1087, was issued to Mr. Moore. This permit only approved the construction of a holding pond and filling on the Property. The issuance of the permit did not constitute approval of any proposed development of the Property. In 1988, Mr. Moore began clearing the Property of buildings on the Property which the City had condemned. Mr. Moore also began filling and grading the Property in 1988, and has continued to do so to varying degrees through July 16, 1991. From January 1989, through August, 1990, SANDCO placed 1,174 loads of fill on the Property. Jimmy Crowder Construction Company has also performed filling and grading work on the Property since 1988. As of the date the City's vesting ordnance was adopted and as of the date of the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings Mr. Moore has not completed filling on the Property. Mr. Moore also has not completed filtration improvements to the storm water hold pond to be constructed on the Property. Additional water treatment facilities on the Property must be constructed to handle runoff from the Property. No roadways, water services, sewer services or electric services have been constructed on the Property. Site preparation on the Property has not been completed so that construction of vertical improvements can begin. At the time that Mr. Moore acquired the Property, only building permits were required for the development of the Property. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore obtained the required building permits. The law was changed, however, to require approval of a site plan. Mr. Moore decided not to submit a site plan at least in part because of the City's work on the sewer main. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that Mr. Moore was prohibited by the City from obtaining site plan approval. The City has not approved or reviewed a site plan for the Property. At the time Mr. Moore purchased the Property, and continuing to the present, a City sewer main which runs along the southern border of the Property has been a problem. The sewer main is a health hazard because it is located in proximity to the surface of the ground and it has numerous leaks. The City indicated that it intended to build a new sewer main across the Property and Mr. Moore agreed to give the City an easement for the sewer main. After Mr. Moore purchased the Property and before February, 1989, Mr. Moore made a number of requests to the City that the City identify the easement it desired and prepare the easement grant so that the City could construct the new sewer main and Mr. Moore could proceed with his development. Requests were also made by some City employees of the City Attorney that the easement be prepared and executed because of the problem with the existing sewer main. In April, 1989, the easement grant was prepared and executed. On August 3, 1990, James S. Caldwell, Assistant Director of the City Water and Sewer Department, wrote the following letter to Mr. Moore: It has been brought to my attention that your are proceeding with construction of a stormwater holding pond on the referenced site [the Elberta Crate Site]. As discussed with you this date and as you are aware, the City has a sewer line on this property. The sewer line would be damaged by your construction activity. The City has designed a relocation and upgrade of the sewer line to be constructed on an easement previously acquired from you. Our schedule for the sewer line construction is completion by January 1, 1991. A review of your stormwater holding pond drawings and the proposed sewer line reveals a potential conflict between the proposed line and the holding pond. We shall have City staff stake out and flag the existing sewer line and the proposed sewer line. We are requesting that your construction activity stay away from the existing sewer line. After stakeout of the proposed sewer line, you may check your stormwater pond plans to assure that there is no conflict. [Emphasis added]. Mr. Moore was also told on other occasions to avoid interfering with the existing sewer line and the construction of the new sewer line. Construction of the new sewer main on the Property was not commenced until January, 1991. The construction had not been completed as of March, 1991. Part of the delay in completing the sewer main was caused by contemplated changes in the location of the sewer main and the possible need for a different easement. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore was told to cease all activity on the Property. Costs Incurred by Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore paid approximately $1,000,000.00 for the Property. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this cost was incurred in reliance upon any representation from the City as to the use the Property could be put other than the existing zoning of the Property. Mr. Moore spent approximately $247,541.22, for demolition of existing buildings, site clearing and grading, engineering costs, fill, permitting fees and partial construction of the stormwater management system for the Property. Mr. Moore also donated an easement to the City with a value of approximately $26,000.00. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that these expenditures were made in reliance upon any representation by the City as to the use to which the Property could be put other than the existing zoning of the Property and the stormwater management permit. Mr. Moore also incurred approximately $100,000.00 in expenditures similar to those addressed in the previous finding of fact for which Mr. Moore was unable to find documentation. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that these expenditures were made in reliance upon any representation by the City as to the use to which the Property could be put other than the zoning of the Property and the stormwater management permit. Development of the Property Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Moore's proposed development of the Property appears to meet the concurrency requirements of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Moore's proposed development of the Property, however, appears to be inconsistent with the 2010 Plan because the Future Land Use Element district in which the Property is located does not permit industrial uses and the intended industrial use of the Property is incompatible with some of the uses to which adjacent property has been put. Procedure. Mr. Moore filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination prior to the filing of the application at issue in this proceeding. That application was denied by the City on October 16, 1991. In the first application Mr. Moore indicated that the Property was to be used for student housing. On or about November 13, 1991, Mr. Moore filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application") (Application VR0295T), with the City. "Devoe L. Moore" was listed as the owner/agent of the Property in the Application. It is indicated that the project at issue in the Application is "[i]ndustrial development of former Elberta Crate and Box Company site by Devoe L. Moore." "Progress . . . Toward Completion" is described as (1) Owner/contractor estimate; (2) Environmental Management Permit; (3) Site preparation from December, 1987, to the date the Application was filed; and (4) Construction of the stormwater system in 1990. In a letter dated February 6, 1991, Mr. Moore was informed that his Application was being denied. By letter dated February 18, 1991, Mr. Moore requested a hearing before a Staff Committee for review of the denial of his Application. On March 11, 1991, a hearing was held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee. The Staff Committee was comprised of Jim English, City Attorney, Mark Gumula, Director of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department and Buddy Holshouser, Director for the City's Growth Management Department. At the conclusion of this hearing the Staff Committee voted 2 to 1 to deny the Application. By letter dated March 19, 1991, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, informed Mr. Moore that the Application had been denied. By letter dated April 4, 1991, to Mr. Gumula, Mr. Moore appealed the decision to deny the Application. By letter dated July 3, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on August 27, 1991. F. Other Projects Approved by the City. Mr. Moore submitted, without objection from the City, other vesting rights applications and final orders concerning such applications which were ultimately approved by the City. All of those cases are distinguishable from this matter. See the City's proposed finding of fact 30.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner should be granted a dredge and fill permit for construction of a multi-family dock in either of the two configurations proposed in its application filed pursuant to Section 403.918 Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Secret Oaks Owners' Association, Inc. is a not-for-profit Florida corporation with its principal place of business in First Cove, St. Johns County, Florida. DER is the State agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing permits under Chapter 403, Florida Statutes and its applicable rules. Martin Parlato and his wife Linda Parlato are the owners of, and reside on, Lot 10, Secret Oaks Subdivision, First Cove, St. Johns County, Florida. They have standing as Intervenors herein under the following facts as found. Petitioner claims rights to dredge and fill pursuant to an easement lying along the southerly boundary of Lot 10 in Secret Oaks Subdivision, which is a platted subdivision in St. Johns County, Florida. The easement runs up to and borders the St. Johns River, a tidal and navigable river in St. Johns County, Florida. Petitioner filed an application for dredge and fill permit with DER on September 18, 1992. The dock was proposed to be five feet wide and 620 feet long including a 20 foot by 10 foot terminal platform and six associated mooring pilings. On November 3, 1992, the Petitioner filed an alternative proposal with DER. That submission proposed construction of an "L" shaped walkway into the St. Johns River to connect the easement with an existing private dock to the north, which dock is owned by the Intervenors. The walkway is proposed to be five feet wide and may extend approximately 80 feet into the river, and then turn north and run parallel to the shoreline a distance of 41 feet to connect with the existing dock. Additionally, the existing dock would be reclassified as multi-family and four mooring pilings would be placed on the south side of the terminal platform. It is undisputed that a DER permit is necessary to construct either dock requested by Petitioner. While Petitioner sought to create an issue regarding a dock that once was located emanating from the easement and connecting with the present dock emanating from Lot 10 in a configuration similar to the Petitioner's proposed auxiliary dock configuration, the previous dock was never permitted and would be subject to DER rules and potential removal orders if it still existed, unless some "grandfathering" legislation or rule protected the structure. No such "grandfather" protections have been affirmatively demonstrated. Instead, it was orally asserted, without any corroborating circuit court orders, that after Petitioner prevailed over Intervenors in circuit court on various real property, riparian rights, and property damage issues due to Intervenors' removal of the old dock, the circuit court had conditioned further relief upon Petitioner obtaining the necessary DER permit. In its Notice of Permit Denial dated January 22, 1993, DER stated several reasons why reasonable assurances had not been given by Petitioners that water quality would not be violated and that the project was not contrary to the public interest, and further stated, by way of explaining how the permit might still be granted, that, "Compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 17- 312.080(1) and (2) can be achieved for either proposal by complying with the following requirements: Determine the legal status of the easement to establish ownership and control; Design a structure to provide a sufficient number of slips to accommodate all members in sufficient depth of water so that the grassbeds will not be disturbed by boating activity, or specifically limit only the area of the dock in water greater than three feet to be utilized for mooring boats or boating activity and record this action in a long-term and enforceable agreement with the Department; Obtain documentation from adjacent landowners that demonstrates they fully recognize and consent to the extent of activity which may occur in the water by either proposal (i.e., single dock or access walkway). Subsequent to the denial of Petitioner's application, Petitioner and DER representatives met and discussed DER's recommendations for reasonable assurances outlined in the Notice of Permit Denial. DER representatives have also orally recommended alternatives for hiring a dock-master or creating assigned boat slips, but DER has received no formal submissions of information from the Petitioner. All of Petitioner's and DER's proposals have not been reduced to writing. No long-term enforceable agreement as proposed by DER in the Notice of Permit Denial has been drafted. The project site is located on the eastern shore of the St. Johns River, three-quarters of a mile north of Cunningham Creek and one mile south of Julington Creek, at First Cove, a small residential community in the extreme northwest of St. Johns County, where the St. Johns River is approximately 2.5 miles wide. Located at the proposed project site are submerged grass beds (eel grass) that extend from approximately 100 feet to 450 feet into the St. Johns River in depths of two to three feet of water. The water at the proposed project site is classified as Class III Waters suitable for recreational use and fishing, but the area is not listed as an Outstanding Florida Water. The grass beds at the proposed project site are important for the conservation of fish and wildlife and the productivity of the St. Johns River. They provide detritus for support of the aquatic based food chain and they provide a unique, varied, and essential feeding and nursery habitat for aquatic organisms. They are valuable for the propagation of fish. Endangered West Indian manatees seasonally graze on the eel grass in this locale during their annual migrations. Absent the replacement of the auxiliary dock, lot owners' primary access to the larger dock is by swimming or boating from the upland of the pedestrian easement to the larger dock. This can mean sporadic interaction with the eel grass. However, DER's experts are not so much concerned with the individual and occasional usages of Petitioner's lot owners but with the type of activity common to human beings in congregate situations encouraged by multi- family docks. The proposed construction of the auxiliary dock does not intrude on the eel grass as the dock does not extend 100 feet from the upland. The grassbeds end some 200 feet east of the west end of the dock. DER experts testified that the time-limited turbidity and scouring associated with construction of either proposed configuration would have very minimal impact, but the continual increased turbidity of the water over the eel grass to be anticipated from multi-family use of either dock may detrimentally affect juvenile aquatic life and the Manatees' feeding ground. The auxiliary dock as proposed provides no facilities for docking watercraft. The permit application provides for a maximum of four facilities for docking watercraft, presumably by tying up to four end buoys. Petitioner intends or anticipates that only four boats would ever dock at one time under either configuration because of planned arrangements for them to tie up and due to an Easement and Homeowners Agreement and Declaration recorded in the public records of the county. Among other restrictions, the Agreement and Declaration limits dock use and forbids jet ski use.1 The permit application seeks a multi alternative dock construction. Petitioner intends to control the use of the dock(s) only by a "good neighbor policy" or "bringing the neighborhood conscience to bear." Such proposals are more aspirational than practical. Petitioner also cites its Secret Oaks Owners' Agreement, which only Petitioner (not DER) could enforce and which Petitioner would have to return to circuit court to enforce. Petitioner has proposed to DER that it will limit all boating and water activity to the westward fifty feet of the larger dock, prohibit all boating and water activity on the auxiliary dock, and place warning signs on the docks indicating the limits of permissible activity, but Petitioner has not demonstrated that it will provide any mechanism that would insure strict compliance with the limited use restrictions placed on the homeowners in Secret Oaks by their homeowners' restrictive covenant. Testimony was elicited on behalf of Petitioner that Petitioner has posted and will post warning signs and will agree to monitoring by DER but that employing a dock master is not contemplated by Petitioner, that creating individual assigned docking areas is not contemplated by Petitioner, and that there has been no attempt by Petitioner to draft a long term agreement with DER, enforceable by DER beyond the permit term. The purpose of the dock is to provide access to the St. Johns River for the members of the Secret Oaks Owners' Association which includes owners of all sixteen lots, their families, and social invitees. Although there are currently only three or four houses on the sixteen lots, there is the potential for sixteen families and their guests to simultaneously use any multi-family dock. Although all sixteen lot owners do not currently own or operate boats, that situation is subject to change at any time, whenever a boat owner buys a home or lot or whenever a lot owner buys a boat. All lots are subject to alienation by conveyance at any time. It is noted that this community is still developing and therefore anecdotal observations of boating inactivity among homeowners before the old dock was torn down are of little weight. No practical mechanism has been devised to limit homeowners' use of the dock(s) if a multi-family permit is issued. Also, no practical mechanism has been devised to exclude any part of the boating community at large from docking there. Thomas Wiley, a DER biologist, accepted without objection as an expert in the environmental impacts of dredge and fill activities, and Jeremy Tyler, Environmental Administrator for DER's Northeast District, also accepted without objection as an expert in environmental impacts of dredge and fill activities, each visited the site prior to formal hearing. They concurred that the application to construct the 620 foot long dock presented the potential for a number of boats to be moored or rafted at the pier at any one time, particularly weekends and holidays, and that multiple moorings might greatly exceed the capacity intended by Petitioner. Wiley and Tyler further testified, without refutation, that over-docking of boats could hinder or block the use of the waters landward of the terminal structures by adjoining property owners. Congregations of power boats at marinas and facilities designated for multi- family use also pose a threat to the endangered West Indian manatees. With regard to alternative two of the application to reconstruct the unpermitted "L" shaped walkway, such a configuration would extend 80 feet of the "mean high water line", then run 41 feet parallel to the shoreline of Lot 10 before attaching to the existing pier and that the parallel portion of the walkway lies immediately adjacent to, and inshore of, the extensive submerged grass beds. According to Wiley and Tyler, it can reasonably be expected that boaters would utilize this walkway as a convenient boat loading/off facility rather than walking to and from the terminal end of the existing 620 foot long dock. Water depths vary from two to three feet offshore of the proposed structure, and the operation of boats, jet-skis, and other watercraft would result in prop scouring of the silt/sand bottom and damage to grass bed areas, degrading water quality and adversely impacting important habitat areas. The DER experts concluded that the applicant had not provided reasonable assurances that the proposed structures would not cause hindrances to ingress and egress or the recreational use of State waters by adjacent property owners, including Intervenors at Lot 10, that grass habitat areas will not be adversely impacted or inshore water quality will not be degraded by boating and related activity. The potential for intensive use of either of the proposed docks could result in a large number of boats and/or water activity at and around the docks. Submerged grass beds occur in waters generally less than three feet deep in areas near the docks. Any boating activity landward of 450 feet from the shore could seriously damage the extensive grass beds that occur there. Boating activity is likely to occur in the areas of the grassbeds if a number of boats are using the dock(s) at the same time or if a boater desires to minimize the length of dock to be walked, in order to reach the uplands. That damage is expected to be from prop dredging and resuspension of bottom sediments onto adjacent grasses. Upon the evidence as a whole, the project is neutral as to the public health, safety, welfare, and property of others, except to the extent it impacts the Intervenors as set out above. The anticipated increase in water-based activities around the proposed dock(s) will cause shifting, erosion and souring that can be harmful to the adjacent grass beds. The anticipated increase in water based activities around the proposed dock will adversely affect marine productivity because the clarity of the water in the area of the grass beds will be decreased. The project may be either temporary or permanent but should be presumed permanent. The project does not affect any significant historical or archeological resources. The current condition of the eel grass beds in the area is lush and valuable as a fish and wildlife habitat. In the course of formal hearing, DER witnesses testified that absent any disturbance of the grassbeds, DER would have no complaints about either proposed project configuration. After considering and balancing the above criteria, it is found that Petitioner has not provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project in either form would not violate state water quality standards and that it would not be contrary to the public interest.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the permit application be denied without prejudice to future applications. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of July, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1993.
The Issue This issue in this case is whether the private Respondents are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs from Petitioner pursuant to Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Because the undersigned is not required or authorized to recommend a disposition on the merits of Singer’s Petition, the fact-findings that follow are limited to those necessary to determine the narrow issue whether an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is proper under Section 120.595(1), Florida Statutes. In addition, as written, the findings below assume the reader’s familiarity with the preceding Preliminary Statement. On July 22, 1999, the Owners submitted an application to the Department seeking approval to build a dock. In a letter dated January 21, 2000, which is included in File 2, the Department informed the Owners that it had reviewed their application “to determine whether [the proposed dock] qualifies for any of three kinds of authorization that may be necessary for works in wetlands or waters of the United States.” This January 21, 2000, letter constituted the first agency action (“First Action” or “FA”) concerning the Owners’ dock. The First Action comprised three distinct determinations (for short, “D1,” “D2,” and “D3”), one for each of the “three kinds of [potentially necessary] authorization[s].” These determinations were: FA-D1: The dock is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (“ERP”). FA-D2: The dock qualifies for consent to use state sovereign submerged lands. FA-D3: Pursuant to a “federal review” performed under an agreement between the Department and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the dock is deemed consistent with the State Programmatic General Permit (“SPGP”) program. As originally designed, and as approved by the Department on January 21, 2000, the Owners’ dock will be referred to herein as the “Approved Dock.” After receiving notice of the First Action, the Owners caused a “Notice of Determination of Exemption” to be published in the February 1, 2000, issue of the Palm Beach Daily Business Review. In pertinent part, this public notice stated: The Department of Environmental Protection gives notice that the [Owners’] project to construct a 125-foot by 4-foot access dock and a 40-foot by 8-foot terminal platform has been determined to be exempt from the requirements to obtain an environmental resource permit. . . . . A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department’s action may petition for an administrative proceeding (hearing) under sections 120.569 and 120.57 of the Florida Statutes. . . . . * * * Complete copies of all documents relating to this determination of exemption are available for public inspection during normal business hours . . . at the [Department’s regional office]. (Owners’ Exhibit No. 4). Following the publication of this notice, an individual named Karrie Webb timely filed a petition with the agency challenging the Department’s approval of the Approved Dock. Her Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing was filed with DOAH on February 17, 2000, initiating Webb. v. Timothy and Hope Delong and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, DOAH Case No. 00-0761 (the “Webb case”). The Webb case proceeded through final hearing, but before a Recommended Order was issued, the petitioner, on January 9, 2001, filed a Stipulation for Dismissal. Consequently, on January 12, 2001, the Administrative Law Judge entered an order closing the file.1 Not long after the conclusion of the Webb case, the Owners submitted a second application to the Department for authorization to build a dock. As described in this second application (which gave rise to File 3), the newly proposed dock (hereafter, the “Redesigned Dock”) differed somewhat from the Approved Dock. Most noticeably, the terminal platform of the Redesigned Dock faced north, towards Singer’s property, whereas the terminal platform of the Approved Dock had faced south. Singer and the Owners disagreed sharply as to whether the differences between the Approved Dock and the Redesigned Dock should be considered “substantial” (as Singer claims) or merely “minor” (as the Owners claim). For present purposes, however, it is neither necessary, nor would it be appropriate, to resolve that particular dispute. What is significant and should be emphasized, however, is that whether or not the Redesigned Dock differed substantially from the Approved Dock, the Owners submitted a new application respecting the Redesigned Dock as if it were a new project, and the Department acted upon the Owners’ second application as if the first one had neither been made nor approved. Thus, in a letter dated February 28, 2001, which is included in File 3, the Department informed the Owners that it had reviewed their application “to determine whether [the Redesigned Dock] qualifies for any of three kinds of authorization that may be necessary for works in wetlands or waters of the United States.” This February 28, 2001, letter constituted the second agency action (“Second Action” or “SA”) concerning the Owners’ dock (though it was, of course, the first agency action on the Redesigned Dock). Like the First Action of the previous year, the Second Action was composed of three distinct determinations (again, “D1,” “D2,” and “D3” for short), one for each of the “three kinds of [potentially necessary] authorization[s].” These determinations were: SA-D1: The re-designed dock is exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. SA-D2: The re-designed dock qualifies for consent to use state sovereign submerged lands. SA-D3: Pursuant to a “federal review” performed under an agreement between the Department and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the re-designed dock is deemed not consistent with the SPGP program.2 The Owners did not cause notice of the Department’s Second Action to be published in a newspaper of general circulation. Armed with the Second Action, the Owners proceeded to have the Redesigned Dock constructed, and it now exists in fact. The existing structure will be referred to herein as the “As- Built Dock,” which, to be clear, was constructed according to the blueprint of the Redesigned Dock. After the construction began, Singer initiated this administrative litigation, the procedural history of which is summarized in the Preliminary Statement. In the course of the litigation, on May 17, 2002, the Department filed both a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction. As the basis for its request that the undersigned relinquish jurisdiction over File 3——that is, the Department’s file supporting the Second Action, which had approved the Redesigned Dock——the Department relied upon a letter dated May 16, 2002, from the Owners’ counsel to the Department’s counsel, which contained the following pertinent text: Please accept this notice as the withdrawal of the application filed by Timothy and Hope Delong in the above matter [namely, File 3]. The Department (with the Owners’ concurrence) contended that because the Owners had voluntarily withdrawn their application, the agency had lost jurisdiction to enter a final order implementing, modifying, or rescinding the Second Action, which had preliminarily approved that application. See, e.g., City of North Port, Florida v. Consolidated Minerals, Inc., 645 So. 2d 485, 486-87 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The undersigned agreed that, by withdrawing their application for approval of the Redesigned Dock, the Owners had divested the Department of jurisdiction in the matter. Accordingly, the undersigned relinquished jurisdiction over File 3. In withdrawing their second application, the Owners materially changed their position and substantially modified the outcome of the most relevant preliminary agency action at issue, namely, the Second Action approving the Redesigned Dock. Indeed, by nullifying the Second Action, the Owners forfeited the only express authorization, albeit a preliminary one, that they had ever obtained from the Department for the Redesigned Dock. Thus, in other words, rather than defend the Department’s preliminary approval of the Redesigned Dock in this proceeding, the Owners elected to rely upon the First Action as a defense against any future claim that the As-Built Dock is an illegal, unpermitted project.3 The Owners’ withdrawal of their second application was intended to resolve, and in fact did resolve, matters raised in Singer’s Petition. The undersigned specifically finds, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the Owners’ change of position was substantial for purposes of Section 120.595(1)(e)3., Florida Statutes.
