The Issue Whether Sam Patterson’s proposed dock project is exempt from the need to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) from the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) under Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-4.051(3)(c) and (d).
Findings Of Fact The Parties Mr. Scully resides at 941 Brookdale Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida, Lot 16, adjacent to and south-southeast of Mr. Patterson's residential property. The northern or rear portion of Mr. Scully's lot borders on an artificial canal that is designated a Class III water by Department rule. He does not have a dock per se; he moors his boat against and parallel to a narrow concrete area (and his lot line), separated by buffering material. Mr. Patterson, the applicant, owns the property at 930 Brookdale Drive, Boynton Beach, Florida, Lot 15. Lot 15 is north-northwest and adjacent to Mr. Scully’s property. This residential property is currently leased to others. The residential property (Lot 14) adjacent to and north-northeast of Mr. Patterson's lot is apparently owned by an individual named Meloche. The Department has the jurisdiction to determine whether the proposed project is exempt from ERP requirements. The Proposed Project On or about September 13, 2004, Mr. Patterson filed an application requesting an exemption to replace an existing five- foot by 21-foot (105-square feet) marginal dock in the same location, configuration, and dimensions as the existing dock. He also requested an exemption to install a five-foot by 16-foot (80-square feet) wooden finger pier extending perpendicular to and from the middle of the existing marginal dock. As of the final hearing, the project has been revised such that the wooden finger pier will extend 11.8 feet (rather than 16 feet) and perpendicular from the middle of the marginal dock. Mr. Patterson changed the length of the finger pier to comply with City regulations, which are not at issue in this case. The “Site Plan” is attached to the Department’s Notice of Determination of Exemption. (JE 1). The “Site Plan” shows a one-story residence on Mr. Patterson's Lot 15. The front of the lot measures 100 feet, whereas the rear of the lot (that abuts the canal on the easternmost portion of the lot) is 50 feet in length from south to north. The seawall is one-and-one-half feet in width. The existing marginal dock abuts the seawall running south to north and is 21 feet long and five feet wide. Small concrete platforms abut the marginal dock on the south and north. The Department reviewed the original application and on October 13, 2004, advised Mr. Patterson, in part, that his project was exempt from the need to obtain an ERP under Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-4.051(3)(c) and (d). The Department had not reviewed the change to the project prior to the final hearing. See Finding of Fact 5. Lots 16, 15, and 14 are situated as a cul-de-sac (semi- circle) with the canal north of Lot 16, east of Lot 15, and south of Lot 14. Lot 14 is across the canal from Mr. Scully's Lot 16. There are five properties on each side of the canal, running west to east. The artificial canal runs directly east from Mr. Patterson’s property for an uncertain distance to the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW). Mr. Patterson’s property (Lot 15) is the western end-point for this canal. Mr. Patterson’s eastern property line (fronting the canal) is 50 feet in width. However, the precise width of the canal between Lots 14 and 16 is unclear. Ms. Smith reports (in her site inspection report of March 3, 2005 (JE 3)) that the canal is approximately 50 feet wide. Mr. Patterson testified that Karen Main with the City of Boynton Beach advised him that the consensus opinion of City employees reviewing the issue was that the canal measured 66 feet in width. There appears to be some widening of the canal east of Mr. Patterson’s property line and then the canal appears to straighten-out as it proceeds to the east to the ICW and past the easterly property lines for Lots 14 and 16. See (JEs 1-site plan; 5-aerial). The weight of the evidence indicates that the canal, between Lots 14 and 16, is approximately 60 to 66 feet wide. See, e.g., id. In the past, the prior owner of Lot 15 (Mr. Patterson's property) moored a boat at and parallel to the marginal dock, which means that the bow, for example, faced Lot 14 and the stern faced Lot 16. Mr. Patterson currently owns a 16-foot boat that he wants to moor at the marginal dock. However, he feels that it is unsafe to do so, particularly if Mr. Scully’s boat drifts. Meloche (Lot 14 to the north) has a fixed boatlift, which allows for the elevation of a boat out of the water, with the bow facing west toward and in front of the northern end of Mr. Patterson’s seawall. (JE 4). Mr. Scully moors his boat parallel to the shoreline of Lot 16 and perpendicular to Mr. Patterson’s 50-foot eastern seawall and property line. (JEs 4 and 6). Mr. Scully’s seawall intersects Mr. Patterson’s seawall such that when Mr. Scully’s 22-foot boat is moored at his seawall, it is also in front of the southern end of Mr. Patterson’s seawall. Id. When Mr. Scully’s boat is tightly moored at his seawall, it does not interfere with or block Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock. (JE 6). However, when Mr. Scully’s boat is loosely moored, it drifts toward the center of the canal in front of Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock. (JE 4). With no boat moored at the marginal dock, Mr. Scully is able to freely maneuver his boat to his seawall with limited “backing” of his boat required (stern first). With a boat consistently moored at Mr. Patterson’s marginal dock, Mr. Scully would have to back into his area beside his seawall in order to avoid colliding with that boat. Mr. Patterson’s finger pier would enable him to safely moor a boat perpendicular to the marginal dock. Centering the finger pier at the marginal dock is likely to make it easier for Mr. Patterson and Mr. Scully to navigate to their respective mooring areas, depending on the size of the boats moored by Mr. Patterson and Mr. Scully. (The Department, in reviewing similar exemption requests, does not consider the type and size of the boat(s) to be moored at the proposed dock or adjacent mooring site.) It is preferable for the boats to be moored, in this location, stern first, with the bow facing down the canal from the wake of the boats traveling in the ICW. Centering the finger pier at the marginal dock and mooring Mr. Patterson’s boat on the north side of the finger pier is likely to enable Meloche, Mr. Patterson, and Mr. Scully to moor their boats parallel to each other and avoid collisions.1 Placement of the finger pier at the northern end of the finger pier, while favored over the proposed location by Mr. Scully, is likely to interfere with Meloche’s use of his property and boatlift. With the finger pier centered on the marginal dock and a boat moored to the north, Mr. Scully can maneuver his boat to his seawall by “backing in” stern first. An experienced boater can accomplish this task in two to three maneuvers. Mr. Scully is an experienced boater and has lived on the canal for approximately eight years. Shortening the finger pier from 16 feet to 11.8 feet will not affect Mr. Patterson’s ability to safely moor a boat on the northern side of the finger pier. The Challenge Mr. Scully contends that the placement of the wooden finger pier and the mooring of a sizable boat on the proposed finger pier will interfere with his ability to navigate in and out of the canal in or around his property, and necessarily interfere with his ability to moor his boat adjacent to his property. He also contends that the marginal dock and the finger pier are two docks, not one. Resolution of the Controversy Replacement of the existing marginal dock will consist of replacing the decking and using the existing pilings. The existing marginal dock is currently functional. Reconstruction of the marginal dock and construction of the finger pier will be done by a licensed marine contractor. The licensed marine contractor will use best management practices to avoid water quality problems in the canal during construction. Construction of the proposed project is not expected to adversely affect flood control or violate water quality standards. The proposed project will not impede navigation. But see Endnote 1.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order concluding that Mr. Patterson’s proposed dock project, as revised, is exempt from the need to obtain an ERP. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2005.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007),1 by refusing to grant an accommodation which would have allowed Ms. Rose Marie Owens to keep a comfort cat in her condominium, and, if so, the amount of damages suffered by Ms. Owens.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Owens was a resident owner of a condominium in Longboat Harbour Condominiums (Longboat Harbour) during the alleged unlawful housing practice. Ms. Owens was a seasonal resident of the condominium from sometime in July 1987 through March 2007. Ms. Owens still owns the condominium at Longboat Harbour with Mr. Hank Airth, her husband. However, Ms. Owens and Mr. Airth purchased a second condominium after the alleged unlawful housing practice, and Ms. Owens and Mr. Airth no longer reside in the Longboat Harbour condominium. Longboat Harbour is a covered, multifamily dwelling unit within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(2). The Longboat Harbour condominium owned by Ms. Owens and Mr. Airth was a dwelling defined in Subsection 760.22(4) at the time of the alleged unlawful housing practice. Respondent is the entity responsible for implementing the rules and regulations of the Longboat Harbour condominium association. Relevant rules and regulations prohibit residents from keeping cats in their condominiums. Sometime in May 2006, Ms. Owens requested Respondent to permit her to keep a comfort cat, identified in the record as “KPooh,” as an accommodation for an alleged handicap. Respondent refused the requested accommodation, and this proceeding ensued. In order to prevail in this proceeding, Petitioner must first show that Ms. Owens is handicapped. Neither Petitioner nor Ms. Owens made a prima facie showing that Ms. Owens is handicapped within the meaning of Subsection 760.22(7). Cross-examination of Ms. Owens showed that Ms. Owens suffers from a cardiovascular ailment, osteoarthritis, and a trigeminal nerve condition. Surgery performed sometime in the 1990s improved the nerve condition. After the surgery, all of the medical conditions of Ms. Owens have been successfully treated with various medications, with no significant modification of the medications before and after Ms. Owens acquired KPooh in 2000. The testimony of Ms. Owens during cross-examination shows that Ms. Owens has never been diagnosed as suffering from depression. Nor does that testimony show that Ms. Owens has ever been diagnosed with panic disorders or panic attacks. Finally, the testimony of Ms. Owens during cross-examination shows that Ms. Owens has never been diagnosed with an emotional or psychiatric condition. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that any of the health problems suffered by Ms. Owens substantially limits one or more major life activities. Nor does Respondent regard Ms. Owens as having a physical or mental impairment. Ms. Owens and others testified concerning the medical conditions of Ms. Owens. None of that testimony showed that the medical conditions substantially limit one or more major life activities for Ms. Owens. Mr. Airth drives the vehicle for Ms. Owens most of the time and prepares most of the meals at home. However, Mr. Airth performs both life activities because he wishes to perform them. Neither Mr. Airth nor Ms. Owens testified that Ms. Owens is unable to perform either life activity. Part of the therapy medically prescribed for Ms. Owens is a special bicycle for exercises that will improve some of the medical conditions of Ms. Owens. However, as Ms. Owens testified, “I have not submitted to that . . . [because] I hate exercise.” Ms. Owens admits that exercise therapy would improve some of her medical conditions. Ms. Owens first took possession of KPooh in 2000. KPooh was a stray cat that showed up at the primary residence of Ms. Owens and Mr. Airth in Maryland. KPooh was hungry. Ms. Owens gave KPooh food and adopted KPooh. Petitioner attempts to evidence the alleged handicap of Ms. Owens, in relevant part, with two letters from the primary care physician for Ms. Owens. Each letter was admitted into evidence without objection as Petitioner’s Exhibits 3 and 4. The first letter, identified in the record as Petitioner’s Exhibit 3, is dated May 4, 2006. The text of the letter states in its entirety: Mrs. Owens has been a patient of mine since 1990. I know her very well. It is my opinion that she would suffer severe emotional distress if she were forced to get rid of her cat. I request an exception to the “No Pet” rule in her particular case. I understand that the cat is confined to her home, and that it is not allowed outside to disturb other residents. Petitioner’s Exhibit 3 (P-3). The first letter contains no diagnosis of an existing physical or mental impairment. Nor does the first letter evidence a limitation of a major life activity that is caused by a physical or mental impairment. The first letter opines that Ms. Owens, like many pet owners, would suffer severe emotional distress if she were required to get rid of her pet. However, the letter contains no evidence that the potential for severe emotional distress, if it were to occur, would substantially limit one or more major life activities for Ms. Owens. The second letter, identified in the record as Petitioner’s Exhibit 4, is dated January 2, 2007. The text of the letter consists of the following three paragraphs: Mrs. Rose Marie Owens is my patient. She has been under my care since 1990. I am very familiar with her history and with her functional limitations imposed by her medical conditions. She meets the definition of disability under the various Acts passed by the Congress of the United States since 1973. Mrs. Owens has certain limitations related to stress and anxiety. In order to help alleviate these limitations, and to enhance her ability to live independently, and to use and enjoy fully the unit she owns at Longboat Harbour Condominium, I have prescribed her cat, K-Pooh, as an emotional support animal. This should assist Mrs. Owens to cope with her disability. I am familiar with the literature about the therapeutic benefits of assistance animals for people with disabilities. Should you have questions concerning my recommendation for an emotional support animal for Mrs. Owens, please contact me in writing. P-4. The second letter does not identify a specific physical or mental impairment. The letter does not disclose what health conditions comprise Ms. Owens “medical conditions.” The letter does not describe the “functional limitations” that the doctor concludes, as a matter of law, satisfy the legal definition of a disability. Nor does the letter specify what major life activities are limited by the patient’s medical conditions. The second letter opines that KPooh will enhance the ability of Ms. Owens to live independently. The letter does not opine that KPooh is necessary for Ms. Owens to live independently. There is no evidence that KPooh is trained as a service animal. The two letters from the primary care physician of Ms. Owens are conclusory and invade the province of the trier- of-fact. The two letters do not provide specific and precise factual accounts of the medical conditions of Ms. Owens and the limitations that those conditions impose on major life activities. The two letters deprive the fact-finder of the opportunity to review and evaluate the specific and precise facts underlying the medical and legal opinions reached by the doctor. The two letters deprive the ALJ of the opportunity to independently decide the legal significance of any medical findings, which are not disclosed in either of the letters.2 Petitioner called as one of its witnesses a member of the Board of Directors (Board) for Respondent who had recommended that the Board approve the accommodation requested by Ms. Owens. Petitioner presumably called the witness, in relevant part, to bolster the two letters from the treating physician for Ms. Owens. The witness testified that his recommendation placed great weight on the fact that the doctor who authored the two letters is a psychiatrist. The undisputed fact is that the doctor specializes in internal medicine, not psychiatry. Petitioner attempted to show that Respondent’s stated reasons for denial of the accommodation were a pretext. Petitioner relied on evidence that arguably showed Respondent did not adequately investigate the alleged handicap of Ms. Owens before denying her request for an accommodation. Respondent made adequate inquiry into the alleged handicap when Ms. Owens requested an accommodation. Respondent requested a letter from the treating physician, which resulted in the letter that became Petitioner’s Exhibit 3. Finding that letter less than instructive, Respondent requested a second letter that became Petitioner’s Exhibit 4. Respondent properly determined that letter to be inadequate. In any event, this proceeding is not an appellate review of the past conduct of Respondent. This proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Counsel for Respondent fully investigated the medical conditions and alleged handicap of Ms. Owens prior to the final hearing. The investigation included pre-hearing discovery through interrogatories and requests for medical records.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2009.
Findings Of Fact The Application On or about November 8, 1994, Raymond and Nancy Swart, Trustees, applied for a permit to construct a private multislip dock facility at their property on Little Sarasota Bay in Sarasota County, DEP File No. 5826007043. As proposed, the dock would consist of: 237' of five foot wide access pier; a terminal dock 45' long and 5.5' wide; and eight finger piers 20' long and three feet wide. All of the structures were proposed to be three feet above mean high water (MHW). Normal construction procedures would be used to "jet" pilings into place, including the use of turbidity screens. As proposed, the dock would provide nine slips for the use of the owners of the nine lots in the Swarts' subdivided property, known as Sunset Place. There would be no live-aboards allowed, and there would be no fueling facilities, sewage pump-out facilities or any other boating supplies or services provided on or at the dock. Under the proposal, verti-lifts would be constructed for all of the slips at a later date. (When boat owners use verti- lifts, there is less need to paint boat bottoms with toxic anti-fouling paint.) As part of the application, the Swarts offered to grant a conservation easement encumbering approximately 400' of shoreline. The Intent to Issue Because Little Sarasota Bay is designated as an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW), and because of concerns regarding the maintenance of its environmental quality, the DEP required that the Swarts submit additional information for review in connection with their application. Specifically, the DEP wanted them to perform a hydrographic study to assure adequate flushing at the site and a bathymetric survey to assure adequate water depths and minimal impacts on seagrasses. After review of the additional information, the DEP gave notice of its Intent to Issue the permit, with certain modifications and conditions. The Intent to Issue would require that the "most landward access pier . . . be extended an additional 15 feet to avoid the mooring of watercraft within seagrasses." It also would require the decking of the main access pier (155' long), which would cross seagrass beds, be elevated to a minimum of five feet above mean high water (MHW). (This would reduce shading and minimize impacts on the seagrasses.) The Intent to Issue included specific measures for the protection of manatees during and after construction. The Intent to Issue specifically prohibited hull cleaning, painting or other external maintenance at the facility. The Intent to Issue specified the width of the 400' long conservation easement (30', for an area of approximately 0.27 acres) and required the Swarts to "plant a minimum of 50 planting units of Spartina patens and 50 planting units of Spartina alterniflora at appropriate elevations imediately waterward of the revetment along the northern portion of the property . . . concurrrent with the construction of the permitted structure." It specified planting procedures and included success criteria for the plantings (an 85 percent survival rate). The Objection On or about March 30, 1995, Raymond and Norma Komarek, the owners of property next to the Swart property, objected in writing to the "magnitude" of the proposed dock facility. They complained that the proposed dock facility "will not enhance anyone's view, but it will create disturbance with noise, night lights, wash and erosion on shore, even possible pollution from up to 35 foot boats." They continued: "We prefer not to live next to a Marina. This appears to be a commercial venture tied to the sale of real estate and/or houses . . .." They conceded that their concerns for manatees had been addressed, but they raised questions regarding the impact on commercial fishermen running crab trap lines, scullers, jet skis, and water skiers. They objected to restrictions on "one's personal rights to use the water by obstruction of navigable waters." They also alleged that the proposed dock facility would be a navigation hazard, especially in fog. The Komareks suggest that the three exempt 125' docks to which the Swarts are entitled under Sarasota County regulations, with the two boats allegedly allowed at each, should be adequate and are all the Swarts should be allowed. The Komareks' objections conclude by questioning the alleged results of alleged "turbidity tests" showing that there is "good action" (apparently on the ground that they believe Little Sarasota Bay has "declined") and by expressing concern about the cumulative impact of future dock facilities if granting the Swart application sets a precedent. The Komareks' Evidence The Komareks were able to present little admissible evidence at the final hearing in support of their objections. Much of the environmental evidence they attempted to introduce was hearsay. Moreover, at best, most of it concerned Little Sarasota Bay in general, as opposed to the specific location of the proposed docking facility. The alleged "turbidity tests" called into question in the Komareks' objection apparently refer to the hydrographic study done at the request of the DEP. The evidence the Komareks attempted to utilize on this issue apparently were the kind of general information about Little Sarasota Bay on which the DEP had relied in requesting the hydrographic study. There was no other evidence presented to contradict the results of the Swart study. While the proposed dock facility would project into the view from the Komarek property looking towards the north (and from the property of the neighbors to the north looking towards the south), there was no other evidence that the proposed dock facility "will create disturbance with noise, night lights, wash and erosion on shore . . .." "[P]ollution from up to 35 foot boats" is "possible," but there was no evidence that pollution is probable or, if it occurred, that the kind and amount of pollution would be environmentally significant. The application clearly is a "commercial venture tied to the sale of real estate and/or houses . . .." But the use of the dock facility would be personal to the owners of lots in Sunset Place; the use would not be public. The Komareks presented no evidence "regarding the impact of the dock facility on commercial fishermen running crab trap lines, scullers, jet skis, and water skiers." Clearly, the dock facility would extend approximately 250' into Little Sarasota Bay. But there was no other evidence either that it would restrict "one's personal rights to use the water by obstruction of navigable waters" or that it would be a navigation hazard. (There was no evidence to support the suggestion made at final hearing that an access dock built five feet above MHW would be a dangerous "attractive nuisance" or that it would be more hazardous than one built three feet above MHW.) Evidence Supporting DEP Intent to Issue Very little pollution can be expected from the actual construction of the dock facility. Primarily, there is the potential for temporary turbidity during construction; but the use of turbidity screens will help minimize this temporary impact. The conditions volunteered in the Swart application, together with modification and additional conditions imposed by the DEP Intent to Issue, limit other potential pollutant sources to oil and gas spillage from the boats using the dock facility. The Swarts' hydrographic study demonstrates that, notwithstanding relatively poor circulation in the general area of Little Sarasota Bay in which the proposed dock facility is located, there is adequate flushing at and in the immediate vicinity of the proposed facility, at least to the limited extent to which pollutants may be expected to be introduced into Little Sarasota Bay from construction activities and use of the facility with the conditions volunteered in the Swart application and imposed by the DEP Intent to Issue. A primary goal of the Komareks' objection is to "downsize" their neighbors' proposed dock facility. They object to its length and its height above MHW. Presumably, they believe that "downsizing" the Swart dock facility would improve their view. If it could not be "downsized," they would prefer that the Swart application be denied in its entirety and that three exempt docks, accommodating two boats each, be built in place of the proposed facility. Ironically, the evidence was that if the Komareks' primary goal is realized, more environmental harm would result. The evidence was that a shorter, lower dock would do more harm to seagrasses, and three exempt docks (even if limited to two boats each) would have approximately three times the environmental impact. Indeed, based on environmental considerations, the DEP Intent to Issue required the Swarts to lengthen the access dock proposed in their application by 15 feet and elevate it by two feet. Lengthening the access dock would move the part of the facility where boats would be moored to deeper water with fewer seagrasses. In that way, fewer seagrasses would be impacted by construction, fewer would be shaded by the mooring of boats, and fewer would be subject to the risk of prop scarring. In addition, the risk of scarring would be reduced to the extent that the water was deeper in the mooring area. Finally, DEP studies have shown that elevating the access dock would reduce shading impact on seagrasses under and adjacent to the dock. Besides having more than three times the environmental impact, exempt docks would have none of the conditions included in the DEP Intent to Issue. Verti-lifts would not be required. Methods of construction would not be regulated by the DEP. Measures for the protection of manatees, before and after construction, would not have to be taken. Hull cleaning, painting or other external maintenance would not be prohibited. Live-aboards, fueling facilities, sewage pump-out facilities and other boating supplies and services would not be prohibited (although County regulation may prohibit some of these activities). Finally, there would be no conservation easement and no planting of seagrasses. The Komareks suggest that County regulation may prohibit construction in accordance with the DEP Intent to Issue. But that would be a question for the County to determine in its own proceedings. All things considered, the DEP Intent to Issue is clearly in the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order granting the application of Raymond and Nancy Swart, Trustees, (the Swarts) for a permit to construct a private multislip dock facility at their property on Little Sarasota Bay in Sarasota County, DEP File No. 5826007043, with the modifications and conditions set out in the Notice of Intent. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Benton and Respondent Maine own adjacent tracts on a dead- end, but navigable, oxbow of the Kissimmee River. The Bentons are weekend and vacation residents, and Maine operates a commercial RV-trailer campsite. To accommodate the needs of his guests for boat launching and landing facilities, Maine constructed a 60 foot pier into the river fronting his property in July, 1982. However, he had not obtained any permits for this construction, and later removed 18 feet of the pier at the direction of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He has applied to DER to obtain after the fact approval of the existing 42 foot pier. He also seeks to extend this pier to 52 feet and to add a 12 foot side dock at the end of the extension. DER has studied the site and reviewed the proposed additional construction. There was no evidence to indicate that the existing pier or the proposed extension would harm the environment or create a navigational hazard. However, the extended pier would occupy fully half of this waterway, which is about 100 feet wide in this area. Petitioner objects to the proposed pier extension on esthetic grounds. Although the pier is constructed at a 90 degree angle to Maine's shoreline, it crosses directly in front of the Benton property. This situation results from the layout of the Benton and Maine tracts which intersect the river at approximately 45 degree angles. An imaginary extension of the Benton and Maine property lines into the river would place much of the existing pier and all of the proposed addition within the Benton extension. The proposed side dock would point toward the Benton property and further aggravate this intrusion. Since the location of the pier is close to the Benton-Maine property line, the proposed side dock's placement would require boats to be launched and landed directly across the Benton waterfront. The Benton property derives its principal value from its waterfront character. Therefore, the degradation of view caused by the pier extension along with the additional boat traffic near the side dock would adversely affect Petitioner's enjoyment of his property.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a permit to John E. Maine approving his existing 42 foot pier in the Kissimmee River, subject to compliance with Section 253.77, Florida Statutes (1983). It is further RECOMMENDED that the application of John E. Maine insofar as he seeks to lengthen the existing pier be denied; but, that application for a side dock extension, if redesigned as stated herein, be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon E. Benton 1280 North West 127 Street North Miami, Florida 33167 Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire and Astrid L. Wistedt, Legal Intern Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John E. Maine Route 1, Box 508 Lorida, Florida 33857 Bert J. Harris, III, Esquire Post Office Box 548 Lake Placid, Florida 33852 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent Thidadeau is entitled to a Noticed General Permit, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-341.427, and a Letter of Consent, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule, to construct a single family dock in the central embayment of the Loxahatchee River in Palm Beach County.
Findings Of Fact By Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit filed August 14, 2002, Respondent Paul Thibadeau (Applicant) requested a Noticed General Permit (NGP) and Letter of Consent for a single-family dock to be constructed at his home located at 129 River Road, Palm Beach, Florida (Application). The dock would extend from the southern shore of the Central Embayment of the Loxahatchee River, which is Class III waterbody that is also an Outstanding Florida Water and Aquatic Preserve. At the time of the filing of the Application, Applicant's contractors and Respondent Department of Environmental Protection tried various alignments to avoid impacts. Petitioner Board of Commissioners of Jupiter Inlet District (District) is an entity created by the Legislature to operate and maintain the Jupiter Inlet and maintain and preserve the Loxahatchee River. The District's jurisdiction covers the Central Embayment and Applicant's property. The District employs an engineer to inspect the Central Embayment for navigational hazards. Intervenors Andrea Cameron and Jeffrey Cameron and Douglas Bogue reside in shoreline property to the west of Applicant's property. The Camerons and Mr. Bogue live on the same cove that the west side of Applicant's property abuts. Mr. Bogue's parcel is the second parcel to the west of Applicant's parcel, and the Camerons' parcel is the third parcel to the west of Applicant's parcel. Intervenors swim, fish, birdwatch, boat, and otherwise use the area in which Applicant would construct the dock and platform. Applicant has owned his property for a little over seven years. Applicant's property consists of nearly 1.5 acres of land that forms a peninsula jutting into the Central Embayment from the southern shoreline near the Alternate A1A bridge, which marks the east end of the Central Embayment. Applicant owns 1000 linear feet of shoreline. The proposed dock and platform would be constructed on the northwest side of Applicant's property. Applicant currently owns a dock, measuring five feet into the water by 67 feet along the shoreline, in the canal on the east side of his property. The water depth at this dock is only four inches at the lowest tides and less than one foot at mean low water. Seagrasses--mostly shoalgrass and threatened Johnson's seagrass--grow in the vicinity of this dock, and it is a reasonable inference, given the nearby seagrass beds, prevailing shallow depths, shading effect of the present dock, and the relocation of prop and boating disturbances, that seagrass would recolonize the area of the existing dock, after it is removed. Applicant has agreed to amend either the NGP or Letter of Consent to condition the approval of the construction and use of the proposed dock upon the removal of the existing dock. The Application describes a dock that is 270 feet long and four feet wide. At the end of the dock is a 160 square-foot terminal platform. The diagram shows the dock running 110 feet due north from an upland point that is ascertainable only approximately by reference to a concrete sidewalk and mangrove fringe depicted on the drawing. The dock then turns to the northwest and runs 160 feet to the terminal platform, which measures 5.3 feet by 30 feet. Boat-lift pilings are waterward of the waterward edge of the platform. The diagram depicts approximations of water levels, at mean tide, along the dock. The shorter run of the dock ends in water two feet deep, at mean tide. The longer run crosses a long sandbar and terminates between the 3.5- and 4-foot contours. A cross-section in the Application shows mean high water at about 1.0 feet (presumably National Geodetic Vertical Datum, or NGVD) and mean low water at about -0.5 feet NGVD. The cross-section reveals that the waterward edge of the terminal platform is at almost -3.33 feet NGVD and the landward edge of the terminal platform is at about -3.2 feet NGVD. This means that, at mean low water, the water level would be a little more than 2.75 feet deep at the waterward edge of the terminal platform and about 2.75 feet deep at the landward edge of the terminal platform. The pilings, which are waterward of the waterward edge of the terminal platform, are at -3.5 feet NGVD. This means that, at mean low water, the water level would be about 3 feet deep at the most waterward pilings. However, the second slip, which mostly runs along the end of the dock, not the terminal platform, is in shallower water. According to a drawing that is part of the Application, the waterward end of this slip is at the same depth as the landward end of the terminal platform, so it would be in about 2.75 feet of water at mean low water, and the landward end of this slip is at -2.0 feet NGVD, so it would be in about 1.5 feet of water at mean low water. Disagreeing with this drawing, Applicant Exhibit 61 indicates that the shallowest water depth at the second boat slip is at least two feet at mean low water. Although the scale of District Exhibit 62 prevents a precise determination, District Exhibit 62 seems to agree with this value, as well as other landward values, contained in Applicant Exhibit 61. The superior detail of both of these exhibits, as compared to that of the drawing accompanying the application, compels a finding consistent with the deeper water levels reported on Applicant Exhibit 61 and District Exhibit 62. Thus, the water depth, at mean low water, is at least two feet at the second boat slip. DEP environmental scientists visited Applicant's site twice before issuing the permit and snorkeled the area proposed for the dock to find the location that would result in the minimum impacts. On the first visit, the DEP scientists did not record the tide, but, in the second visit, they snorkeled the area at mean low water. After DEP approved the permit, its scientists snorkeled the site a third time, also at mean low water. Applicant has worked closely with DEP at all stages of the permitting process. In fact, early discussions resulted in several different alignments and locations for the proposed dock. After DEP's environmental scientists determined for themselves the location of the seagrass beds in the affected area, Applicant settled on a location and alignment acceptable to the DEP scientists and revised the application (Revised Application). The Revised Application locates portions of the dock deck over some seagrass beds, but adds restrictions, beyond those normally imposed on docks built in Aquatic Preserves, to reduce or eliminate the impacts of the dock on these seagrass beds. The Revised Application narrows the dock deck by one foot to three feet, replaces solid decking with grated decking for the first 200 feet from the shoreline, adds handrails for the first 200 feet from the shoreline, and raises the elevation of the dock deck from five feet to seven feet above mean high water for the first 200 feet from the shoreline. The Revised Application also changes the width of the terminal platform from 5.3 feet to 6 feet and its length from 30 feet to 25 feet. The Revised Application clearly identifies two boat slips: one on the waterward side of the long side of the terminal platform and one perpendicular to the first slip, along the north side of the end of the dock deck. Lastly, the Revised Application reduces the dock deck from 270 feet to 250 feet to the shoreline. The proposed alignment of the dock passes between two relatively small seagrass beds immediately offshore of the northwest side of Applicant's property. The cove contains a large seagrass bed, mostly confined to water depths of less than 1.5 feet at mean low water. A little more than 50 feet of the dock passes over the eastern edge of this large seagrass bed, and the most waterward 40-50 feet of the dock passes over bottom that is uncolonized by seagrass. The seagrass that is traversed by the dock is mostly confined to the long sandbar that the dock would cross. Petitioner presented several alternatives to the present alignment. These are depicted in District Exhibit 79. Petitioner and its witness ultimately selected Alternative F, which would be a shorter dock running to the northeast off the northern tip of Applicant's property. Passing over little, if any, seagrass, this dock would terminate in a hole that is three feet deep at mean low water. However, Alternative F provides Applicant with little better access than he has at present. The northern route to the channel requires several turns and passes over much seagrass. The longer eastern route runs over 600 feet in a narrow, turning channel that contains only 1.5-2.0 feet of water at mean low water. This side of Applicant's property is more exposed to currents and winds than the west side abutting the cove, so accurate navigation of a vessel with the engine trimmed partly up would be more difficult. Channels, especially shallow ones, shift over time and shoal up, especially given this tendency within the Central Embayment. The Central Embayment is a shallow waterbody prone to shoaling due to sedimentation. The main channel through the Central Embayment generally runs along the north shoreline of the Central Embayment, although it runs in a more central location as it approaches the Alternate A1A bridge at the east end of the Central Embayment. Applicant's property, which is close to the A1A bridge, is relatively close to the main channel. A shallow area with interspersed seagrass beds separates Applicant's property from the main channel. Applicant operates a 24-foot boat with a 200- horsepower outboard motor. The boat requires 12 inches of water to float with the engine up and 24 inches of water for the skeg and prop to clear the bottom with the engine down and the boat operating at idle or low speed. To ingress or egress the existing dock, Applicant can operate his boat only within two hours of high tide. To reach the main channel, Applicant must navigate poorly marked, local channels. The longer local channel runs east from Applicant's property and requires several turns. The shorter local channel runs north of Applicant's property and enters the southern access channel at a point near to its junction with the main channel. The southern access channel is an important channel in the Central Embayment, whose shoreline has been densely developed. A long sandbar runs through the center of the Central Embayment. Rather than navigate to the west of the sandbar, most boat operators coming from the south shoreline take the southern access channel, which shortens the time it takes for them to leave the Central Embayment. A mangrove island at the east end of the long sandbar is located immediately north and west of the southern access channel, just west of its junction with the main channel. Directly across from the mangrove island, in a southeasterly direction, is the northwest side of Applicant's property, from which the dock would extend, running toward the southern access channel. Boating traffic in the southern access channel may reach over 100 trips during a 10-hour period on weekends. In the vicinity of the proposed terminal platform, two large, privately installed pilings exist nearly in the center of the southern access channel. The closer of these pilings would be about 95 feet from the proposed terminal platform. One of the pilings marks the junction of the southern access channel with the main channel. The closer piling is between the proposed platform and the mangrove island to the northwest. Boats operate to the south and east of these pilings, typically at planing speeds of at least 20 miles per hour. In the vicinity of the proposed terminal platform, the southern access channel is 120-150 feet wide, and the waterward edge of the platform is about 70 feet from the center of the channel. The bathymetry in the vicinity of the proposed platform reduces the navigational hazard posed by the proposed project. The -3 and -4 feet NGVD contours run parallel along the southern edge of the southern access channel in the vicinity of the proposed terminal. Both contours, on either side of the proposed terminal, take sharp turns landward 25-50 feet on either side of the proposed platform. The effect of this bathymetry is to create a sort of submerged cove for the proposed terminal platform, which is protected from passing boat traffic from the fact that these contours are generally 25-75 feet further waterward on either side of the platform. For instance, at mean tide, boaters approaching the area of the platform would presumably wish to stay in water deeper than three feet, so they would unlikely find the platform to be a navigational hazard. Additionally, an imaginary line extending from the takeoff point of the dock on Applicant's shoreline, along the dock, to a point on the opposite shoreline would run about 13,800 feet. This line would run just east and north of the mangrove island described above. The drawing of riparian lines at this location is much more difficult due to the irregular shoreline and the orientation of the southern access channel. Originally, Applicant proposed a riparian line that ran from the westernmost extent of his property, which is located at the end of the waterway running along the west side of the property. Dutifully running this line perpendicular to the orientation of the southern edge of the southern access channel, Applicant deprived a corner of his neighbor's property of any riparian rights at all. During the hearing, Applicant redrew proposed riparian lines. The appealingly named, "Equitable Allocation" line does more justice to the neighbor by not crossing his property. Instead, this line runs roughly along the middle of the canal- like waterway on the west side of Applicant's property and, at the mouth of this waterway, turning to the northwest to run perpendicular to the southern edge of the southern access channel. The problem with the "Equitable Allocation" line offered by Applicant emerges when it is considered in broader scale, sufficient to encompass not only Applicant and his neighbor to the immediate west, but also that neighbor's neighbor to the immediate west. The "Equitable Allocation" line does no equity to the riparian access of one of the two landowners to the west of Applicant. However, the task in this case is not to draw riparian lines, but to determine whether the proposed dock or platform is within 25 feet of another landowner's riparian line. Applicant Exhibit 62 draws the 25-foot offset line. If the riparian- rights line runs perpendicular to the orientation of the southern access channel (the so-called "Equitable Allocation"), the terminal platform and dock are offset by more than 25 feet from the line. If the riparian-rights line extends property lines without regard to the orientation of the channel, then the platform, but not the dock, would be within the 25-foot offset. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, case law teaches that the location of the channel and property boundaries receive consideration in establishing riparian rights. When based on the larger-scale map of Applicant Exhibit 63, any equitable application of these factors would not result in the establishment of a riparian rights line within 25 feet of the proposed terminal platform or dock. The proposed dock and platform would impact the aesthetic enjoyment of nearby landowners and others using the waters of the Central Embayment. Swimmers and sunbathers set up on the sandbar and throw balls and flying disks. The proposed dock would divide the sandbar into two sections of about 170 feet and 100 feet. The impact of the dock, with its pilings spaced at ten-foot intervals, is unclear on these recreational users, as it is on users of canoes and kayaks, which also occupy these waters. The record does not portray a high-energy, strong-current environment in this area, which is essentially at the mouth of a small cove, so it is difficult to infer that typical currents will create unsafe conditions for swimmers, kayakers, or canoeists around the pilings. Likewise, the record does not establish the net impact of the dock and platform on fish, birds, and other wildlife using the area. The platform covers submerged bottom that is uncolonized by seagrass, and, given its coarse sand and shell hash, as well as the water depths and water clarity, this bottom is unlikely ever to be colonized by seagrass. The portion of the dock that traverses seagrass will shade this vegetation, but the effect of shading is mitigated by the seven-foot elevation of the deck, translucency of the decking material, and near north-south orientation of the deck. The construction of the takeoff of the deck will not require significant alterations to the existing mangrove fringe. The issue of cumulative impacts is not that the average dock in the Central Embayment is 80 feet, and the proposed dock is over three times longer. Nor is it that only two docks on the southern shoreline of the Central Embayment would equal or exceed in length the length of the proposed dock, and one of these two docks serves a planned unit development. The length of the dock is subordinate to the depth of the water to be reached by the dock. The more relevant issue, as to cumulative impacts, is that the proposed dock would extend to water whose depth is -3.5 feet NGVD, and the majority of docks in the Central Embayment terminate in water at least one foot shallower. An estuary whose urbanized shoreline appears almost condominiumized in aerial photographs, the Central Embayment will undergo shoreline development to match whatever DEP permits in its most generous permitting decisions. However, a close examination of District Exhibit 62 reveals numerous examples of docks or platforms terminating in -3.5 or even -4.0 feet NGVD, so the potential of the Letter of Consent generating cumulative impacts, strictly in the termination depths of docks, is small. The most relevant concern, as to cumulative impacts, is the potential for the construction of docks where no docks presently exist and the number of such docks that would need to extend 250+ feet to reach water depths comparable to those reached by the proposed dock and platform. Perhaps landowners abutting such extensive stretches of flats have been discouraged from trying to obtain permits for such lengthy structures. Perhaps Applicant himself was emboldened to seek the present NGP and Letter of Consent due to the permitting of the other single- family dock of comparable length on the southern shoreline. The problem as to this aspect of cumulative impacts is that the record does not support findings as to the number of littoral parcels without docks and the number of such parcels that would require docks of 250+ feet to reach the depths involved in this case. These cumulative impacts, if any, are too speculative to assess. Thus, the analysis of cumulative impacts in this case is necessarily restricted to consideration of the impacts of some additional pressure to construct docks to one-foot deeper water than has historically limited docks and the accumulation of additional impacts to resources, such as seagrass, or recreational uses, such as boating and swimming, from an authorization to build the proposed dock and platform. The record does not support findings of significant adverse cumulative impacts from this proposed activity. Moreover, the elimination of 335 square feet of shallow-water dock and the possible recolonization of seagrass, including threatened Johnson's seagrass, mitigate any cumulative impacts and limit or even eliminate the precedential value of the permitting decisions in this case.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection: Grant the Noticed General Permit. Grant the Letter of Consent upon two conditions: a) the prohibition against any boat mooring to the slip for any period of time, if the boat requires more than two feet of water with its engine in normal operation position and the boat operating at idle or slow speed; and b) the removal of the existing dock prior to the construction of the new dock and platform. DONE AND ENTERED this 25t day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Greg Munson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kevin S. Hennessy Lewis, Longman & Walker, P.A. SunTrust Building 1001 3rd Avenue West, Suite 670 Bradenton, Florida 34205 Thomas F. Mullin Lewis, Longman & Walker, P.A. 1700 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Suite 1000 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Marcy I. Lahart Marcy I. Lahart, P.A. 711 Talladega Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33405 John S. Yudin Guy & Yudin, LLP 55 East Ocean Boulevard Stuart, Florida 34994 Toni Sturtevant Assistant General Counsel Christine A. Guard Senior Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Issues presented here concerned the entitlement of Respondent, Russell D. Horn, Sr., to be granted an environmental permit by Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation, to build a boat stall on an existing dock in Putnam County, Florida. The boat stall's dimensions are ten feet wide by twenty feet deep and the construction would be on the St. Johns River.
Findings Of Fact On July 13, 1981, Russell D. Horn, Sr., who has a residence in Putnam County, Florida, bade application to the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, for the necessary permits to construct a boat stall ten feet wide by twenty feet deep at the site of an existing dock. A copy of the application may be found as Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The dock where Horn applied to build the boat slip is found in the St. Johns River, a navigable water body and waters of the State of Florida in Putnam County, Florida. The application form which was executed by Horn required him to indicate the name of adjacent property owners to the property at which the dock site was located, both upland and adjacent to the uplands. See Rule 17- 4.28(11)(c), Florida Administrative Code. To accomplish this task, the applicant utilized a sketch which he had been provided when he purchased his homesite in the area and indicated to the Department that the adjoining landowners were Milton Kilis and Robert Michal. In fact, Robert Michal was not an adjacent landowner. The adjacent landowner, Milton G. Kilis, wrote to advise the Department that he had no objection to the construction of the boat slip. This correspondence was dated September 11, 1981. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. After reviewing the initial application, additional information was requested by a document entitled "Completeness Summary" which was addressed from the Department to the Applicant Horn. A copy of this "Completeness Summary" requesting additional information may be found as Department's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Through this summary, Horn was requested to provide written authorization from the dock owners. It was also requested that Respondent provide an affidavit of ownership of the upland property adjacent to the dock site. Horn received permission to construct from Frank Scussell and William A. Reaves, persons he understood to be the dock owners. See Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. Horn misunderstood the question related to ownership of upland property and provided a mortgage deed with its attendant description of his home site property in Putnam County, which is at a different location from that of the upland property adjacent to the dock. A copy of that deed and other matters may be found as Respondent Horn's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. Department of Environmental Regulation reviewing authorities wrote on the "Completeness Summary" form, Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 1, indicating that the task of seeking written authorization from the dock owners had been achieved and that the affidavit of ownership of upland property owners was satisfactory. In fact, all adjacent property owners had not been notified of the pendency of the application request through the process of Horn's advising the Respondent agency of the names of all adjacent property owners to the uplands and the affidavit of ownership of the upland property owner at the dock site was not filed. During the review process, permission was given by the Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, for the construction of the boat slip. A copy of this permission, by letter dated August 31, 1981, is Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. The Department of Environmental Regulation reviewed the permit application and prepared an application appraisal, which may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. The findings made by that application appraisal related to application review are found to be accurate. In particular the permit application appraisal indicated that the boat slip would be located at the waterward end of the existing dock structure, which existing dock structure accommodated four boats. The appraisal found that the project was located in South Putnam County in the town of Georgetown on the St. Johns River. The permit appraisal found that the project site would be located in the littoral zone of the river about one hundred feet waterward of the mean high water line. No littoral growth was seen at the depth of the proposed construction. Tapegrass, Mexican waterlily and cattail were present near the shore. Several large hardwood swamp trees were present at the shoreline. The project was found to be located in a Water Class III and adjacent waters were Class III according to the appraisal, no significant immediate or long-term adverse environmental impacts were to be expected to occur due to the completion of the boat slip. Horn was subsequently given a construction permit to add the boat stall to the existing dock. A copy of that permit may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 6 admitted into evidence. The only specific conditions related to that matter pertain to the necessity for the utilization of turbidity curtains throughout the project for purposes of containing the turbidity that might exceed State water quality standards, The permit was issued on September 22, 1981. After receiving the permit, sometime around October 20, 1981, Horn purchased the necessary lumber to construct the stall and on October 24, 1981, went to the dock site to begin the installation of pilings related to the construction of the boat stall. While placing the pilings on October 24, 1981, an adjoining property owner and Petitioner in this cause, Marshall Wolfe, stood on his dock, that is, Wolfe's dock, and hailed to Horn to stop building. Horn did not know Wolfe before that time and did not know that Wolfe, not Michal, was the adjacent property owner on that side of the dock. On October 28, 1981, Marshall Wolfe and his wife, Ann Wolfe, wrote to the Department in the person of G. Doug Dutton, Subdistrict Manager, and indicated that they were opposed to the issuance of the permit, which is under the number of the permit issued to Respondent, and requested a hearing on the question of the issuance. A copy of that correspondence may be found as Department's Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. On the same date, October 28, 1981, Horn was contacted by the Department of Environmental Regulation and advised of the Wolfe complaint and Horn was told that he would receive a cease and desist order from the Department of Environmental Regulation. On October 30, 1981, Horn returned to the construction site and found four of his neighbors finishing the construction of the stall. In fact, the neighbors did conclude the construction and the boat slip remains in place. A cease and desist letter was mailed on November 2, 1981; however, this letter was not received by Horn immediately. Horn did subsequently learn of the contents of the letter some time in November or December, 1981. A copy of the cease and desist letter may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. On December 13, 1981, an attempt was made at the instigation of Department officials for the Petitioners and Respondent Horn to resolve the controversy. This effort was unsuccessful. As a consequence, a formal hearing was necessary in keeping with the request of the Department that the Division of Administrative Hearings conduct a Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, formal hearing. This request had been made on November 12, 1981, and an initial hearings had been scheduled for February 11, 1982, following consultation between the various parties and the Hearing Officer. At the initial hearing session on February 11, 1982, which was to be held in Palatka, Florida, counsel for Department indicated that the upland property was not owned by Horn and that easement rights to that property were unclear. In view of this fact the hearing was continued until the ostensible upland property owner could be notified of the pendency of the issuance of an environmental permit and be allowed to participate. Notification was subsequently provided by an Intent to Issue Statement, a copy of which may be found as Respondent Department's Exhibit No. 9 admitted into evidence. This notification was through the Department at the instigation of the Hearing Officer. The date of notification was February 12, 1982. An order was entered on March 17, 1982, which allowed the intervention of St. Johns Crescent Lakesites, Inc. into the proceedings and that party, in the person of its counsel, Lauren E. Merriam, III, Esquire, participated in the April 15, 1982 hearing. St. Johns Crescent Lakesites, Inc. is the owner of the upland property adjacent to the dock in which Horn had constructed the boat slip. No indication was given that any easement rights were ever granted by that corporation to grant access to the boat slip from the adjacent property. The overall dock area, in terms of square feet, is between 500 and 1000 square feet. Other than the permit application made by Horn, no other permission has been received by the Department to construct the other features of the dock. A further appraisal of the project site subsequent to the September 18, 1981, appraisal has been made. That appraisal was made by the field inspector for the Department. This appraisal by Melvin Rechtor agrees with the project appraisal made by the first field inspector, John Hendricks. The testimony of Melvin Rechtor on environmental impacts of the project are accepted as accurate. Rechtor's testimony established that the project would have an insignificant impact on water quality considerations and would not adversely affect the species or the conservation of fish, marine and wildlife or other natural resources. Rechtor's testimony established that there would be no unreasonable interference with waterward access of adjacent property owners. Rechtor's testimony also established that there would be no navigational hazard nor interference with fishing and swimming by persons using the river.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact 1. Rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1 provides: All docking facilities, whether for private residential single-family docks, private residential multi-slip docks, or commercial, industrial, or other revenue generating/income-related docks or public docks or piers, shall be subject to the following standards and criteria: no dock shall extend waterward of the mean or ordinary high water line more than 500 feet or 20 percent of the width of the waterbody at that particular location whichever is less; * * * Pursuant to stipulation, Petitioner has standing, a dock, and upland access to his property. The parties also stipulated that Petitioner's dock is limited by the 500-foot criterion, as the proposed dock extension would not exceed 20 percent of the width of the waterbody. Petitioner's upland property consists of a single family residence and is located adjacent to sovereign submerged lands located in the Gasparilla Island/Charlotte Harbor Aquatic Preserve. He has lawfully constructed a dock extending about 500 feet from the mean high water mark and into the waters of Charlotte Harbor. The consent of use granted Petitioner acknowledges the relative shallowness of the water adjacent to his property and correspondingly limits the draft of vessels to be moored to the dock. At mean low tide, the depth of the water at the end of Petitioner's dock is about two feet. Petitioner requested authorization to extend his dock waterward another 100 feet. On December 15, 1993, Respondents denied the request, in reliance upon the challenged rule and Section 258.42(3)(e)1, which allows the erection in an aquatic preserve of private residential docks for "reasonable ingress and egress of riparian owners." In a separate administrative proceeding, DOAH Case No. 94-2140, Petitioner is contesting the denial of his request to extend the dock. No single family docks in aquatic preserves extend over 500 feet into the water. In Charlotte Harbor, the average length of a single-family residential dock is 200 feet. Nearby Petitioner's dock is a 600-foot long public fishing pier, which was constructed before the subject 500-foot rule was promulgated. From mean high water waterward, the first habitat surrounding Petitioner's dock is an intertidal sand flat that extends about 100-150 waterward from shore. The next habitat is mostly unvegetated submerged bottom with patches of submerged aquatic vegetation that extends from the end of the intertidal sand flat to about 350-400 feet from shore. The vegetation of the latter habitat is mostly Cuban shoal grass, which occurs in no more than four patches of about 50 square feet, in an area measuring 25 feet in both directions from the dock. Last, extending from 350-400 feet waterward to the end of the dock, is a largely unvegetated area with sporadic pieces of attached algae. Unvegetated bottoms play no role in the propagation of fish or wildlife. The biological or scientific value of unvegetated bottoms is unaffected by a dock, although there is some evidence that toxic substances may leach from the construction materials and adversely impact nearby vegetation. However, the dredging caused by boat propellers scouring any form of submerged bottom suspends sediment that can be carried to areas of vegetated bottom, where the increase in turbidity may reduce the penetration of sunlight and thereby harm the aquatic vegetation. In the vicinity of Petitioner's dock, though, there is no evidence of significant prop dredging from recreational boating. The absence of submerged vegetation is more likely a feature of the high-energy shoreline where wave energy disrupts sediments and provides unsuitable habitat. In promulgating the predecessor to Rule 18- 20.004(5)(a)1, the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund attempted to balance interests that sometimes are competing, such as environmental, aesthetic, recreational, and private commercial. There was some concern that previously authorized docks in sovereign submerged lands had infringed upon the riparian access of adjacent upland owners. The 500-foot limitation was not in the original rule, which was promulgated in 1981, but was added by an amendment in 1985. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund tried to set thresholds that would not result in the denial of more than a negligible number of dock applications, based on historic dock application data and predominant vessel lengths of under 27 feet. However, the record does not explain how the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund analyzed the above-described data so as to arrive at the 500-foot limitation now under challenge. Without providing more detail concerning the data and analysis, it is possible that a limitation of 100 feet or 900 feet would have satisfied the considerations stated in the preceding paragraph. Shallow water predominates in the aquatic preserves, and Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund realized that a dock extending no more than 500 feet might not reach water depths that are readily navigable. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund could not rationally adopt a rule to ensure minimum water depths for all docks, and chose the 500-foot limitation evidently to provide an easy-to-administer standard.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the replacement of a dock by Respondent Christner in February 1993, is exempt from the requirement for a permit pursuant to Section 403.813(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1995) 1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rules 40C-4.051(11)(i) and 62-312.050(1)(i) 2/ and, if not, whether: Petitioners waived their right to request an administrative hearing pursuant to Rules 62-103.155(3)(b); Petitioner's have legal standing to challenge the agency action proposing the exemption; and the agency is estopped from reopening its prior determination.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating and permitting residential docks. Since February 1969, Christner has resided at 1655 Misty Dawn Lane, Merritt Island, Florida. The Christner property is adjacent to the waters of Newfound Harbor in Brevard County, Florida. Petitioners have owned property adjacent to Christner since 1990 and resided there until September 1997. Petitioners' property is located at 1665 Misty Dawn Lane. A dock existed behind the Christner property from 1972 until February 1993 (the "original dock"). After constructing the original dock, Christner sold a parcel of his land to Petitioners. After the sale, the original dock was located within 25 feet of the common boundary between the respective properties owned by Christner and Petitioners. In February 1993, Christner contracted with Mr. John Calhoun, Unique Seawall and Dock Systems, to replace the original dock. The replacement dock was completed in February 1993. The replacement dock is in the same location and of the same configuration and dimensions as the original dock. The replacement dock was constructed within the footprint of the original dock. No fill material other than piles was used to replace the original dock. Prior to October 1991, the original dock was in need of repair but was still functional. It provided access to boats moored at the dock. The original dock could still be used for fishing and mooring small boats. Between October 1991 and December 1992, the original dock was rendered non-functional. It was rendered non-functional by a discrete event. The term "discrete event" is not defined by statute or rule. A discrete event includes a storm, flood, fire, or accident. Neither the witnesses nor their records recorded a storm, flood, fire, or accident between October 1991 and December 1992. The term "discrete event" is not limited to a storm, flood, fire, or accident. It can include wind and high water. Wind and high water could have damaged the original dock without damaging newer docks in the immediate vicinity that had the benefit of better construction and were in better repair. The original dock was nearly 20 years old in October 1991 and in disrepair. The damage caused by the discrete event left several large gaps in the original dock. The damage to the original dock between October 1991 and December 1992 could not have occurred without a discrete event. Christner constructed the replacement dock in February 1993 without a permit. In September 1995, Petitioners filed a complaint with the Department. The complaint alleged that the replacement dock was constructed without a required permit. By letter dated October 4, 1995, the Department advised Christner that the replacement dock was an unauthorized single family dock. The Department stated in the letter that the original dock was non-functional in November 1992 and was repaired prior to March 1993 without proper permitting. The letter required Christner to apply for a permit. In October 1995, Christner filed an application for a Noticed General Permit and paid the application fee. After October 4, 1995, the Department determined that the dock was functional prior to its repair and exempt from permitting requirements pursuant to Section 403.813(2)(d) and Rules 40C-4.051(11)(i) and 62-312.050(1). The Department based its determination on representations by Christner and his dock builder that the original dock was repaired with planks before constructing the replacement dock. Christner and his dock builder represented that the planks spanned the gaps in the original dock so that the dock could be used to moor small boats. Christner represented that an individual could walk above the water line on the planks to the boats. On December 8, 1995, Petitioners received actual notice of the Department's determination that the replacement dock was exempt from permitting requirements because the original dock was functional prior to its replacement. An employee of the Department who investigated Petitioners' complaint notified Petitioners and Christner by telephone of the proposed exemption. The Department did not publish written notice of the proposed exemption and did not provide Petitioners with written notice of the Department's action. The Department violated Rule 62-103.155(5) by failing to provide Petitioners with written notice of their right to request an administrative hearing. In December 1995, counsel for Petitioners made several inquiries of the Department to determine how the decision to exempt the replacement dock was made and if it could be changed. Department personnel represented that the case was closed and nothing could be done to change the decision. In December 1995, counsel for Petitioners contacted the Department's office of general counsel concerning a point of entry. A Department employee represented that no review was possible. In its PRO, the Department now proposes that the replacement dock was not exempt from the requirement for a permit. The Department proposes that the original dock was not functional prior to the construction of the replacement dock and that a discrete event did not cause the original dock to be non- functional.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's challenge to the proposed exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of real property known as Lot 6, Block 10, Angler's Park, in Key Largo, Florida. He purchased that property in November of 1986. Petitioner's property is contiguous to sovereign submerged lands in Largo Sound, a sound of the Atlantic Ocean. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida holds title to submerged lands waterward of the mean high water line contiguous to Petitioner's property. The submerged lands contiguous to Petitioner's property lie within the boundaries of John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park. The Board of Trustees dedicated the submerged lands contiguous to what is now Petitioner's property to the Florida Board of Parks and Historical Memorials, now the Division of Recreation and Parks of the Department of Natural Resources, on September 21, 1967. A dock existed on the submerged lands contiguous to Petitioner's property prior to 1967. The entire dock existed at least by 1938. The historic dock was probably one of the oldest docks in Largo Sound. Due to the passage of time and hurricanes, only the pilings and a concrete pad near shore still existed as of 1967. The dock was not rebuilt until 1988. Throughout the years, boats were moored at the dock. After the planking on the dock no longer existed, people still moored their boats to individual pilings. The dock was considered an excellent location for fishing, and people travelled by boat to the location, tying their boats to the pilings to fish. When Petitioner purchased his property, the only structures left on the contiguous submerged lands were thirteen concrete pilings and the concrete pad near shore. Only four of the pilings were sticking up out of the water. The remaining pilings were submerged. The original configuration of the historic dock was easily ascertained by the pilings and concrete pad. After Petitioner purchased his property, he began constructing a residence. He would travel from elsewhere in the Key Largo area by boat, would tie his boat to one of the pilings, and would wade ashore. Petitioner applied to Monroe County for a permit to rebuild portions of the dock. Although Monroe County accepted and retained his permit application fee, he was not issued a permit. Instead, he was told that he should contact the people at Pennekamp State Park. Petitioner then contacted Respondent's employees at Pennekamp State Park about reconstructing portions of the dock. In response to that inquiry Petitioner received a letter dated June 10, 1987, advising him that Respondent was not a permitting agency. That letter further recited two of Respondent's rules prohibiting the removal or destruction of natural features and marine life and construction activities in that state park. Having been frustrated by his attempts to obtain a permit to rebuild the dock from both Monroe County and from Respondent's employees at Pennekamp State Park, Petitioner made no further effort to obtain a permit or authorization from any other state, local, or federal government agency to reconstruct his dock. One day he backed a pickup truck to the edge of the water, hooked up, and raised the closest piling up in the air. Utilizing the existing pilings and adding additional ones, Petitioner rebuilt the dock "going a step at a time." In the course of his rebuilding the dock, Petitioner replaced the wooden decking and fasteners, replaced the wooden stringers and fasteners, added seven new concrete pilings, raised and repositioned several existing concrete pilings, and poured concrete footings for the new pilings. He completed rebuilding the dock in 1989. During the almost one year that he was rebuilding the dock, he worked in plain view of employees of local and state agencies. He was easily observed by the Coast Guard, the Marine Patrol, and the Park Service boats travelling to and through the Marvin D. Adams Waterway located approximately seventy-five feet from his property. No one told Petitioner to stop his construction activities. When it was completed, his dock was 12 feet wide and 84 feet long, 28 feet shorter than the historic dock. Petitioner's entire dock consists of 1018 square feet. Petitioner's dock is in the same location as the historic dock. Petitioner's dock is a private dock, used only by him when he moors his boat there occasionally. In re-building his dock, Petitioner extended it to a distance so that the water depth at the end of Petitioner's dock is four feet mean low water. Additionally, Petitioner left an open space of one to two inches between each plank on the deck so that sunlight could penetrate between the deck planking the entire distance of the dock. Pilings are an integral part of a dock. In 1988 Respondent began conducting a survey of private docks, commercial marinas, and fills, both authorized and unauthorized, within the boundaries of Pennekamp State Park as those boundaries were extended in 1967 to Key Largo. The survey was to be utilized in developing a policy regarding structures within the extended park boundaries. Petitioner's dock was included in that survey. The information which Respondent transmitted to the Governor and Cabinet regarding Petitioner's dock was that it was not authorized, that it was built in 1990, and that the water depth at the mooring area, considered by Respondent to be the terminal end of the dock, was two feet. Respondent did not advise the Governor and Cabinet that a dock had been in existence at Petitioner's property prior to 1967 and as far back as at least 1938, that the concrete pad and thirteen pilings from the historic dock still existed, or that Petitioner had rebuilt the dock in the same location, but shorter, than the historic dock. Further, Respondent did not advise the Governor and Cabinet that its water depth measurement of two feet was not taken at the waterward end of the dock, the way such a measurement is normally done. Respondent did advise the Governor and Cabinet that the access channel to the dock was four feet deep. On April 12, 1990, the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the head of Respondent, approved a policy regarding development encroachments in Pennekamp State Park. The portion of that policy which relates to private docks provides as follows: Private docks must (1) be in existence prior to 1967 within state park waters to receive authorized structure status; (2) all docks within state park waters legally authorized by the Department of Natural Resources or the Board of Trustees during or after 1967 receive status as authorized structures; (3) that all other private docks in existence since 1967 within state park waters that are not legally authorized by Department of Natural Resources or the Board of Trustees have been evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration any authorization issued by state and federal environmental agencies and, using the Florida Keys Marina and Dock Siting Policies and Criteria - 18-21.0041 Florida Administrative Code, as a guideline for reviewing environmental impact on marine communities, designate the structure as either authorized or require removal or modification; and (4) that no future authorizations will be issued for the construction of new private docks in state park waters. Respondent subsequently notified Petitioner that his dock fell into category (3), that it had been evaluated on an individual basis using the Florida Keys Marina and Dock Siting Policies and Criteria, that his dock had an impact on marine communities because it exceeded the size and dimension requirements and did not meet the water depth requirements, and that Petitioner's dock needed to be "modified." Respondent further advised Petitioner that the modifications required included reconstructing his dock to a T-shaped structure rather than Petitioner's rectangular-shaped structure. The new structure would be required to have a four-foot wide walkway with a terminal platform of no more than 160 square feet. Further, Respondent's proposed dock would also extend an additional 28 feet further into Largo Sound than Petitioner's dock. Respondent also required that Petitioner install permanent handrails along the dock in order to convert it to only a swimming/fishing pier, and the mooring of any water craft to the structure would be prohibited. Petitioner has not so modified his dock. There are algae, sea grasses, sponges, coral, and other vegetation and marine life beneath and adjacent to Petitioner's dock, constituting a marine community. Shading has an adverse impact on the growth of sea grasses and marine vegetation. Where shading exists under Petitioner's dock, the submerged land under the dock is nearly barren. However, Petitioner rebuilt the dock in a manner so as to reduce the effect of shading. The dock is 41 inches above water at high tide. The spacing between planks on the deck also allows sunlight to penetrate the water below Petitioner's dock. An underwater videotape of the area beneath and around Petitioner's dock reveals an extensive marine life habitat and nursery. The pilings which have been under water for such a long time have an extensive buildup of sponges and coral which, in turn, provide a habitat for an enormous number of fish. Spiny Florida lobsters live under Petitioner's dock, as do mangrove snapper, barracuda, porkfish, damselfish, reef fish, sea cucumbers, and urchins. In effect, Petitioner has created an artificial reef. Some of the barren areas beneath Petitioner's dock are a result of the halo effect, i.e., the crustaceans and fish living under the dock and in the sponges and soft corals on the pilings only graze so far from their homes in order to avoid predators. This halo effect can also be seen around the free-standing pilings outside of Petitioner's dock area. Even if the planking on Petitioner's dock were removed, the sea grasses would not grow back around the pilings since the grazing organisms would still be present. Although there may be less shading beneath Respondent's proposed dock than exists underneath Petitioner's dock, substantial damage to the marine community beneath Petitioner's dock would be caused by the removal of Petitioner's dock and the building of a new one. It is not clear that the long- term effect of Respondent's proposed dock would have less adverse impact than Petitioner's dock. It is likely, however, that the removal of the present dock, with or without the subsequent construction of Respondent's proposed dock, would have a substantial adverse effect on the healthy marine community now existing beneath and around Petitioner's dock.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered giving Petitioner's dock authorized structure status. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of February, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 and 5-7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4 and 9 have been rejected as unnecessary for determination of the issues involved herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 8 and 10-19 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-7, 9-13, 16-18, 20, 21, 26-31, 33, 36, and 37 have adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 8, 14, 15, 25, 35, 40, and 41 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 22-24 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 32, 34, 38, 39, and 42-44 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this case. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Burgess, Jr., Esquire Syprett, Meshad, Resnick & Lieb, P.A. Post Office Box 1238 Sarasota, Florida 34230-1238 Suzanne B. Brantley, Esquire Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Don E. Duden Acting Executive Director Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 10 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Ken Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 10 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent Roy Voss is entitled to an exemption from the requirement to obtain an Environmental Resource Permit (“ERP”) and entitled to “consent by rule” to use sovereignty submerged lands to install five mooring pilings next to his existing dock in Stuart, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Pirtle is the owner of real property located at 4622 Southeast Boatyard Drive, Stuart, Florida. The property includes a dock that has been operating as a commercial marina for over 20 years. Respondent Voss is the recipient of the authorizations which are challenged by Petitioner. Voss owns the real property located at 4632 Southeast Boatyard Drive, Stuart, Florida, which is located immediately south of Petitioner’s property. Voss has a private dock. The Pirtle and Voss properties are riparian lots on Manatee Pocket, which connects to the St. Lucie River. Both lots have 50 feet of waterfront. The Department is the state agency with the power and duty to regulate construction activities in waters of the state pursuant to chapter 373, Florida Statutes. The Department also serves as staff to the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (“Board of Trustees”) to review and act on certain construction activities on state sovereignty submerged lands under chapter 253. The Pirtle and Voss Docks The Pirtle dock is 101 feet long and is T-shaped. The Pirtle marina operates under a 1991 sovereignty submerged land lease issued by the Board of Trustees. The lease authorizes up to ten boat slips within the leased area. Pirtle has five boat slips on the south side of his dock, which are configured so that boats are moored perpendicular to the dock, usually with their bows pointed toward the Voss dock. The Voss dock is 120 feet long and has an L-shaped waterward end. The “L” extends to the south, away from the Pirtle dock. The Voss dock was built sometime after the Pirtle dock. Voss has moored several boats at his dock, including a 26-foot Grady White with an 8.5-foot beam, a 38-foot boat with a 15-foot beam, and a 42-foot boat a 15-foot beam. The 38-foot and 42-foot boats have each been moored along the north side of the Voss dock (nearest the Pirtle dock) in the past. The parties did not dispute the location of an imaginary “riparian line” running parallel to and generally equidistant between the Pirtle and Voss docks. Before Voss installed the five pilings which are the subject of this case, boats maneuvering into or out of the slips that are on the south side of the Pirtle dock (“the south slips”) often crossed over the riparian line. The Mooring Pilings On August 29, 2012, Voss applied for the authorizations to install five mooring pilings spaced 20 feet apart on the north side of and parallel to his dock. Voss said he intended to use the pilings to moor a new 38-foot boat with a 15-foot beam. Voss could use three pilings to moor a 38-foot boat. The mooring pilings are also farther from Voss's dock than needed to moor a boat with a 15-foot beam. Voss originally proposed to install the pilings on the riparian line. The Department reviewed the proposal and asked Voss to set the pilings back about three feet farther away from the Pirtle dock. The Department issued the authorizations to Voss on October 25, 2012, and he installed the five mooring pilings where the Department directed him to, about three feet inside the riparian line and 20 feet from his dock. The closest distance between the T-shaped end of the Pirtle dock and the nearest mooring piling is about 8.5 feet. Therefore, only boats with a beam (maximum width) less than 8.5 feet can pass this point when attempting to maneuver into or out of the south slips. Pirtle found out about the Voss pilings early in December 2012. He filed his petition for hearing with the Department on December 20, 2012. The timeliness of the petition was not disputed. The authorizations were issued by the Department without first conducting a site inspection to determine what effect the mooring pilings would have on the ability of boats to maneuver into and out of Pirtle’s south slips. After Pirtle filed his petition, four Department employees went to the site in a 21.5-foot boat with a beam of about 7.8 feet. The pilot of the boat, Jason Storrs, had difficulty maneuvering into and out of Pirtle’s south slips and had to be assisted by the other Department employees who stood in the boat and pushed off from the pilings. Without their assistance, the boat would have bumped into the pilings. An inexperienced boater would have greater difficulty attempting to enter or leave one of the south slips. It would be more difficult to maneuver a boat in or out of one of the south slips if Voss had a boat moored along the pilings. In windy and choppy water conditions, a person attempting to maneuver a boat into one of the south slips would risk damage to the boat and possible injury. The proximity of the mooring pilings to the slips on the south side of the Pirtle dock creates an unsafe condition. It is the practice of the Department to treat boating conditions that create a potential for damage to boats and injury to boaters as a “navigational hazard.” Voss's mooring pilings create a navigational hazard. The difficult and unsafe situation created by the mooring pilings would be obvious to boat owners considering whether to lease one of the south slips at the Pirtle marina. The south slips would be unattractive to potential customers of the marina. Pirtle’s ability to operate the south side of his marina is substantially impaired by Voss's pilings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection deny the exemption and consent by rule. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2013.
