Findings Of Fact As a licensed wholesale dealer in cigarettes, respondent filed monthly tax returns on forms furnished by petitioner. The return respondent filed for July of 1977, was notarized on August 10, 1977, and received by petitioner on August 16, 1977. Accompanying the return was respondent's check drawn in favor of petitioner in the amount of $11,927.69. The return for August, 1977, was notarized on September 9, 1977, and received by petitioner on September 12, 1977. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in favor of petitioner in the amount of $12,995.94. The September, 1977, return was notarized on October 14, 1977, and received by petitioner, at the latest, on October 18, 1977. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in favor of petitioner in the amount of $11,845.44. The return for October, 1977, was notarized on November 10, 1977, and received by respondent on November 14, 1977. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $9,891.76. The return for November, 1977, was notarized on December 10, 1977, and received by petitioner on December 13, 1977. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $10,693.80. The return for December, 1977, was notarized on January 10, 1978, and received by petitioner on January 13, 1978. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $16,678.00. The return for January, 1978, was notarized on February 10, 1978, and received by petitioner on February 20, 1978. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $8,657.86. The return for February, 1978, was notarized on March 10, 1978, and received by petitioner on March 13, 1978. Accompanying this return was respondent's check drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $7,115.49. Beginning in March of 1978, respondent made tax payments whenever its Pitney-Bowes cigarette stamping meter was reset by petitioner's cashier, and payments did not accompany respondent's tax returns thereafter. Respondent's return for March, 1978, was notarized on April 17, 1978, and received by petitioner the following day. The return for April, 1978, was notarized on May 17, 1978, and received by petitioner the same day. The return for May, 1978, was notarized on June 9, 1978, and received by petitioner on June 12, 1978. The return for June, 1978, was notarized on July 10, 1978, and received by petitioner on July 12, 1978. The August, 1978, return was notarized on September 7, 1978, and received by petitioner on September 13, 1978. The September, 1978, return was notarized on October 9, 1978, and received by petitioner on October 11, 1978. The October, 1978, return was notarized on November 7, 1978, and received by petitioner on November 21, 1978. The November, 1978, return was notarized on December 8, 1978, and received by petitioner on December 11, 1978. The December, 1978, return was notarized on January 10, 1979, and received by petitioner the following day. The January, 1979, return was notarized on February 10, 1979, and received by petitioner on February 13, 1979. The February, 1979, return was notarized on March 10, 1979, and received by petitioner on March 20, 1979. The March, 1979, return was notarized on April 10, 1979, and received by Petitioner the following day. The April, 1979, return was notarized on May 10, 1979, and received by petitioner on May 16, 1979. The May, 1979, return was notarized on June 14, 1979, and received by petitioner the following day. The June, 1979, return was notarized on July 24, 1979, and received by petitioner on August 2, 1979. Respondent's check No. 1843, dated March 10, 1977, drawn in petitioner's favor, in the amount of $11,264.20, was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1833, dated January 10, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $16,678.20, was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1259, dated March 30, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor, in the amount of $3,187.57, was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1260, dated March 31, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $105.00 was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1203, dated February 20, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor, in the amount of $2,591.19, was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1261, dated April 17, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor, in the amount of $2,159.32, was dishonored by the drawee for insufficient funds. Respondent's check No. 1997, dated November 9, 1978, drawn in petitioner's favor in the amount of $617.40, was dishonored by the drawee for the stated reason that respondent's account had been closed. In a post hearing memorandum, petitioner's counsel conceded that respondent had subsequently made all of its checks drawn in favor of petitioner good.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner revoke Respondent's permit as a wholesale cigarette dealer. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F.X. Purnell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gray Tobacco Company, Inc. 8109 N.W. 33rd Street Miami, Florida
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, G. H. Johnson Construction Company, Inc., is a general contractor with an office in, and doing business in, the State of Florida. During the period from June 1, 1984, through May 31, 1987, the Petitioner did not pay State of Florida use tax on $244,916.62 of items purchased for use in the State of Florida. During the period from July 1, 1987, through July 31, 1988, the Petitioner did not pay State of Florida use tax on $4,344.88 of items purchased for use in the State of Florida. During the period from April 1, 1985, through March 31, 1987, the Petitioner did not pay Hillsborough County local option indigent health care tax and discretionary sales surtax on $37,083.77 of items purchased or used in Hillsborough County, Florida. The tax rate established by Hillsborough County for those taxes was 0.0328767 percent. The tax due was $92.71. The Petitioner did not pay State of Florida intangible tax on $622,634 of accounts receivable on the books of the company as of January 1, 1984. The Petitioner paid State of Florida intangible tax on only $516,690 of $743,865 of accounts receivable on the books of the company as of January 1, 1986. The Petitioner did not pay State of Florida intangible tax on $1,615,661 of accounts receivable and $225,000 of loans to stockholders on the books of the company as of January 1, 1987. The Petitioner did not pay State of Florida intangible tax on $942,449 of accounts receivable and $225,000 of loans to stockholders on the books of the company as of January 1, 1988. On or about March 12, 1989, the Petitioner made a partial payment in the amount of $11,394.14. The letter transmitting the payment both stated that "we wish to contest the interest and penalties which have been accrued" and also requested "that the interest and penalties be waived." The letter concluded: "It is understood that acceptance of this payment constitutes acceptance of the above proposal that the interest and penalties be waived." The DOR accepted the payment without direct comment on the closing remarks in the letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Revenue, enter a final order assessing against the Petitioner, G. H. Johnson Construction Company, Inc.: (1) sales and use tax in the amount of $5,025.05; (2) interest in the amount of $8,236.36 as of September 24, 1992, and accruing at the rate of one percent per month on the $5,025.05 of tax due from that date forward; and (3) penalty in the amount of $5,512.42. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-0285 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The DOR uses additional available information to ascertain, as best it can, where purchases are delivered and used. Those means include, but are not limited to, conferring with the taxpayer and requesting evidence showing delivery and use elsewhere. Rejected as subordinate to facts contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as not supported by any competent evidence and as subordinate to facts contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected in part as conclusion of law and in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. Subordinate clause, rejected as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. Main clause, rejected as conclusion of law. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. In part, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary; in part, rejected as paraphrasing the letter. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not supported by the evidence why the taxpayer sent the March 12, 1989, letter and check. 10.-11. Rejected in part as conclusion of law and in part as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. 12. Not a proposed finding of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Largely subordinate to facts found. In part, conclusion of law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 5.-8. Largely subordinate to facts found. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 9.-10. In part, conclusion of law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 11. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-13. In part, conclusion of law. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. In part, argument. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. In part, argument. Otherwise, subordinate and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Matias Blanco, Jr., Esquire 701 North Franklin Street Tampa, Florida 33602 James McAuley, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Dr. James Zingale Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact For the period of time from January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1989, Co-Op Oil Company, Inc., was a wholesaler and retailer of motor fuel (gasoline) and special fuel (diesel) in the Florida west coast area and held Motor Fuel License Number 09_000447 and Special Fuel License No. 10-003477. During this time, each month Co-Op reported and paid motor fuel and special fuel tax based on the number of "net" gallons purchased during the preceding month. "Net" gallons are an industry standard. They are measured at a temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit. Meanwhile, during the same month, Co-Op sold motor fuel and special fuel through metered pumps and charged customers motor fuel and special fuel tax on the metered gallons sold through the pumps. Both motor fuel and special fuel are volatile. They expand and contract significantly as temperatures rise and fall. Since the temperature in an underground storage tank generally is around 71-72 degrees Fahrenheit, the "gross" gallons of motor fuel and special fuel stored in Co-Op's underground tanks and for resale to customers generally exceeds the "net" gallons it purchased by approximately one percent. Additional expansion, or some contraction, of the fuels can occur in transit from the tank to the metered pump, depending on outside temperature. As a result, the "gross" gallons pumped through the meter and sold to customers can differ from the "net" gallons purchased by Co-Op Oil. "Losses" due to contraction in cold tempertures also can occur, but a reasonable "shrinkage" allowance was factored into the Department's calculations. (Additional losses can occur due to spillage and evaporation. However, tax is still due on fuel lost to spillage and evaporation.) Except for Chapters 206 and 212, Part II, motor fuel taxes after January 1, 1988, the Department has interpreted the applicable statutes to: (1) require Co-Op to report and pay motor fuel and special fuel taxes monthly on the "gross" gallons it sells to its customers, plus any fuel it loses to spillage or evaporation; (2) hold Co-Op, as a licensee who collects more tax on motor fuel and special sold than was paid on the same gallons purchased, to be liable for the difference; and (3) hold Co-Op, as a licensee who purchased gasoline tax free, recorded such purchases at "net," and adjusted sales on its tax returns to "net," and sold such fuel at "gross," to be liable for the difference in tax. The Sampling Method The parties agreed that, due to the voluminous records that would be the subject of a detailed audit of all pertinent transactions, an audit using a sampling method is not only appropriate but also a practical necessity. The parties agreed that it would be appropriate to average the months of July, a hot month, and December, cold month, to obtain a valid and accurate average for the amount of gains (or losses) in volume of motor and special fuel due to expansion (or contraction) from the "net" gallonage purchased for resale through the metered pumps. An audit of the sample months reveals the following pertinent information (expressed in gallons): Month Motor Fuel Special Fuel JULY, 1986 Beginning Inventory 139,777 37,263 Amount of Fuel Purchased 622,543 124,809 Amount of Fuel Sold 639,640 125,591 Ending Inventory 126,740 37,167 DECEMBER, 1986 Beginning Inventory 103,046 33,648 Amount of Fuel Purchased 644,966 112,297 Amount of Fuel Sold 627,361 106,795 Ending Inventory 119,169 39,608 JULY, 1987 Beginning Inventory 88,937 30,769 Amount of Fuel Purchased 485,783 66,382 Amount of Fuel Sold 471,823 73,261 Ending Inventory 109,542 24,378 DECEMBER, 1987 Beginning Inventory 85,210 30,678 Amount of Fuel Purchased 552,977 76,584 Amount of Fuel Sold 535,767 78,667 Ending Inventory 102,497 28,311 JULY, 1988 Beginning Inventory 17,863 Amount of Fuel Purchased 61,499 Amount of Fuel Sold 52,380 Ending Inventory 27,197 DECEMBER, 1988 Beginning Inventory 24,195 Amount of Fuel Purchased 52,492 Amount of Fuel Sold 47,242 Ending Inventory 29,293 JULY, 1989 Beginning Inventory 19,829 Amount of Fuel Purchased 45,817 Amount of Fuel Sold 42,834 Ending Inventory 25,386 DECEMBER, 1989 Beginning Inventory 20,114 Amount of Fuel Purchased 54,323 Amount of Fuel Sold 55,520 Ending Inventory 18,824 (Under Chapters 206 and 212, Part II, motor fuel was taxed on purchases, as reported and paid by Co-Op, after December 31, 1987, so only special fuel totals are shown after that date.) Additional Taxable Gallons: Motor Fuel Adding the beginning inventory and purchases yields the "available fuel" for the month. Subtracting the ending inventory from this figure yields the month's "inventoried fuel accounted for." "Gain" from expansion of fuel above the "net" gallons purchased would equal the difference between a larger amount of fuel sold through the meters, the "metered sales," and a smaller "inventoried fuel accounted for." "Loss" from contraction of fuel below the "net" gallonage purchased (plus other possible losses from spillage, leakage or evaporation) would equal the difference between a larger "inventoried fuel accounted for" and a smaller amount of fuel sold through the meters, the "metered sales." Using the arithmetic operations described in the preceding paragraph on the samples of motor fuel, it can be calculated that Co-Op had gains of: 4,060 gallons for July 1986; 6,645 gallons for July 1987; and 77 gallons for December 1987. In the month of December 1986, there was a loss of 1,482 gallons. The net gain in motor fuel for those months was 9,300 gallons. Meanwhile, the total purchases of motor fuel for those months was 2,306,269 gallons. Comparing the net gain with the total purchases yields a gain or error ratio of .004032487 for motor fuel. The total number of gallons of motor fuel purchased by Co-Op during 1986 and 1987 was 14,190,105. Application of this gain ratio to the total number of gallons purchased yields 57,223 "additional taxable gallons" of motor fuel for 1986 and 1987. Computation of Additional Motor Fuel Tax, Penalty and Interest Multiplying each month's additional taxable gallons by .057 for the Chapter 212, Part II, motor fuel tax, and by .04 for the Chapter 206 motor fuel tax, the total taxes due for motor fuel are $3,262.29 for Chapter 212, Part II, and $2,288.92 for Chapter 206. Computed at 12 percent per annum or 1 percent monthly, interest or motor fuel taxes under Chapter 212, Part II, Fla. Stat., was $2,592.51 through July 28, 1993, with daily interest accruing at $1.07 per day from that day forward. Also computed at 12 percent per annum or 1 percent monthly, interest on the motor fuel tax under Chapter 206, Fla. Stat., was $1,500.15 through July 28, 1993, with daily interest accruing at $.75 per day from that day forward. To calculate the penalty for motor fuel for both Chapter 212, Part II, and Chapter 206, the tax due is multiplied by 25 percent to arrive at total amounts for penalties of $815.57 and $572.23, respectively. Additional Taxable Gallons: Special Fuel Using the same arithmetic operations described for motor fuel, the taxable gains for special fuel can be calculated for the sample months. (Special fuel was taxable upon resale at the pump for the entire audit period, and the sample months are examined for the entire audit period.) These calculations show the total net gain for the eight month sample period to be 3,892 gallons, as follows: Month Gain/Loss Gallons 686 458 488 284 215 152 July, 1986 December, 1986 July, 1987 December, 1987 July, 1988 December, 1988 July, 1989 Gain Gain Gain Loss Gain Loss Gain + + + - + - +2,574 December, 1989 93 Loss - (net gain) +3,892 Meanwhile, the total purchases of special fuel for those months was 594,203 gallons. Comparing the net gain with the total purchases yields a gain or error ratio of .00655 for special fuel. The total number of gallons of special fuel purchased by Co-Op during the years 1986 through 1989 was 3,910,608. Application of the gain ratio for special fuel to the total number of gallons purchased yields 25,614 "additional taxable gallons" of special fuel for 1986 through 1989. Computation of Additional Special Fuel Tax, Penalty and Interest Multiplying each month's additional taxable gallons of special fuel by $.057 per gallon for the Chapter 212, Part II, special fuel tax, and by $.04 per gallon for the Chapter 206 special fuel tax (except for the months July, 1987, through December, 1987, for which they are multiplied by the $.09 per gallon tax during that period of time), yields Chapter 212, Part II, special fuel tax due in the amount of $1,460.32, and Chapter 206 special fuel tax due in the amount of $1,171.76. Computing interest using exactly the same method as for the motor fuel taxes yields interest on the special fuel tax due under Chapter 212, Part II, in the amount of $1,067.32 through July 28, 1993, with daily interest accruing at $.48 per day from that day forward, and in the amount of $858.69 for the special fuel tax due under Chapter 206 through July 28, 1993, with daily interest accruing at $.39 per day from that day forward. The penalty for overdue special fuel tax for both Chapter 212, Part II, and Chapter 206 is calculated at 25 percent of the tax due, for total amounts of penalty of $365.08 and $292.94, respectively. The total of special fuel tax, interest and penalty due as of July 28, 1993, was $2,892.72 for special fuel under Chapter 212, Part II, and $2,323.29 for special fuel under Chapter 206. Rejection of Co-Op's Proposed Alternative Method Co-Op pointed out that for the month of July, 1986, it sold 17,097 gallons more than it purchased, but that for the subsequent sample months it was actually purchasing more gallons than it was selling. Co-Op argues that this demonstrates the payment of tax on 31,695 gallons more than it actually sold. However, a review of each month shows that, although purchases did exceed sales in several months, the ending inventories generally were larger than the number calculated by subtracting metered sales for the month from the total of beginning inventories plus purchases for the month. Actual dip stick measurements of the inventory in the tanks demonstrates a net increase over the computed book inventory of 9,300 gallons for motor fuel and 3,892 gallons for special fuel. In addition, sales of motor fuel for 1986 and 1987 totalled 14,247,541 gallons (8,228,593 for 1986, and 6,018,948 for 1987), while total purchases for that same period were only 14,190,105 gallons. For special fuel, sales of special fuel for 1986 through 1989 totalled 3,962,263 gallons (1,685,959 for 1986, 945,775 for 1987, 721,547 for 1988, and 608,982 for 1989), while total purchases of special fuel were only 3,910,608 gallons. In each case, due to expansion gains in the fuels, sales always exceeded purchases. Local Option Taxes The Chapter 336 local option taxes on motor fuel were not affected by the amendments to Chapters 206 and 212, Part II, effective January 1, 1988. The total that Co_Op reported for motor fuel purchases for the period January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1989, was 24,798,440. Multiplying by the gain ratio for motor fuel of .004032487 yields 100,000 gallons of additional taxable motor fuel. Adding the additional taxable gallons of motor fuel to the 25,614 gallons of additional taxable special fuel yields of 125,614 additional taxable gallons or net gain for the period. Throughout the audit period, the local option tax rate under Section 336.025 was $.04 per gallon for Lake and Lee County and $.06 per gallon for Manatee and Orange County. Polk County started with a $.04 per gallon rate and increased that to a $.06 per gallon rate in September, 1986. Pinellas and Citrus County increased the tax rate from the beginning figure of $.04 per gallon to $.06 per gallon in September, 1987. Because of the difference in rates between counties and the changes of rates within counties, it is necessary to calculate effective tax rates and compute the percentage of reported taxable gallons for Co-Op's business in each of the respective counties, as follows: Ratio of Reported Effective Tax County Gallons Rate .051 .040 .040 .060 Citrus 21 percent Lake 01 percent Lee 03 percent Manatee 11 percent .060 .050 .055 Orange 02 percent Pinellas 37 percent Polk 25 percent Taking the total net gain of 125,614 gallons and multiplying it by the appropriate percentage (i.e., the ratio of fuel sold in an individual county) yields the total taxable gains in each county. To ascertain the additional local option taxes due under Section 336.025, Fla. Stat., the total taxable gains calculated for each county option tax must be multiplied by each county, as follows: County for the purposes of the local effective tax rate for Tax Due Citrus $1,345.33 Lake 50.25 Lee 150.74 Manatee 829.05 Orange 150.74 Pinellas 2,323.86 Polk 1,727.19 Total $6,577.14 The statutory 25 percent penalty on the past due local option taxes amounts to $1,644.29. The statutory interest due on the past due local option taxes amounted to $4,415.33 through July 28, 1993, and has been accruing at a daily rate of $2.16 from that date (the date of the hearing). In sum, as of July 28, 1993, Co-Op owed local option tax under Section 336.025, penalty follows: and interest as Tax $6,577.14 Penalty 25 percent 1,644.29 Interest thru 7/28/93 4,415.33 Total $12,636.76 Interest continues to accrue at the $2.16 daily rate. Of the seven counties in which Co_Op was doing business that had enacted the local option tax under Section 336.025, Fla. Stat., only Lake, Lee and Manatee Counties had enacted the Section 336.021, Fla. Stat., tax of $.01 per gallon. They had only approximately 14.26 percent of the 125,614 additional taxable gallon (net gain) for purposes of local option taxes, or 17,913 additional taxable gallons. Using the statutory 1 percent taxable rate, Co-Op owes the following additional taxes: County Total Tax Percent Ratio Tax Due 8.60 Lake 171.93 5 Lee 171.93 28 48.14 Manatee 171.93 67 115.19 The statutory 25 percent penalty on the additional Section 336.021 local option tax amounts to $42.98. At the statutory rate, interest owing on the additional Section 336.021 local option tax totalled $127.97 through July 28, 1993, with interest accruing at the rate of $.06 per day thereafter. In sum, as of July 28, 1993, Co-Op owed local option tax under Section 336.021, penalty and interest in the amount of $342.88, with interest accruing at $.06 per day from that day forward. Estoppel Since 1957, each month Co-Op reported and paid motor fuel and special fuel tax based on the number of "net" gallons purchased during the preceding month. Four years before the audit which is the subject of this case, Co-Op was audited and was not told that it was in error in reporting and paying motor fuel and special fuel tax based on the number of "net" gallons purchased. However, at all times when Co-Op reported and paid motor fuel and special fuel tax based on the number of "net" gallons purchased, it also collected tax from the ultimate purchasers on the number of "gross" gallons pumped through the meter. Offer to Compromise Penalty The Department, in its Notice of Decision and Notice of Reconsideration offered to compromise the penalty on all taxes from the 25 percent level to a 5 percent level, but Co-Op protested both of these notices. The offer of compromise was only good for the duration of the Closing Agreement which was attached to the Notice of Reconsideration. In light of the prior audit, which did not alert Co-Op that it was reporting and paying taxes incorrectly, it could perhaps initially have been argued by Co-Op that its failure to report and pay these taxes when due was reasonable, and not fraudulent or willful neglect or negligence. But the prior audit cannot justify its decision to contest its liability for these taxes through formal administrative proceedings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding the Petitioner, Co- Op Oil Company, Inc., liable for the following taxes: Ch. 212, Part II, Motor Fuel.--$6,670. 37, with interest accruing at $1.07 per day from July 29, 1993. Ch. 212, Pt. II, Special Fuel.-- $2,892.72, with interest accruing at $.48 per day from July 29, 1993. (3) Ch. 206, Motor Fuel.--$4,361.30, with interest accruing at $.75 per day from July 29, 1993. (4) Ch. 206, Special Fuel.--$2,323.39, with interest accruing at $.39 per day from July 29, 1993. Ch. 336.025, Motor/Special Fuel.-- $12,636.76, with interest accruing at $2.16 per day from July 29, 1993. Ch. 336.021, Motor/Special Fuel.-- $342.88, with interest accruing at $.06 per day from July 29, 1993. TOTAL - $29,277.42, with interest accruing at $4.91 per day from July 29, 1993. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. 1550 J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399- (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: James E. Smith, President Co-Op Oil Company, Inc. 4911 - 8th Avenue South Gulfport, Florida 33707 Ralph R. Jaeger, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to the repayment of funds paid to the State Treasury through overpayment or error, in relation to use taxes? The refund claim is $37,837.91. See Section 215.26, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Rathon Corporation, formerly known as Diversey Corporation, is a Delaware Corporation authorized to do business in Florida. It manufactures various detergents, cleaners, and soaps, and the equipment to dispense those products. The products are marketed in Florida and other states. The customers of the products include hotels, hospitals, factories, and restaurants. The devices that dispense the detergents, cleaners, and soaps are referred to as "feeders." Those feeders can range from simple hand soap dispensers to electronically regulated machines that inject soap into commercial dishwashers. The feeders are loaned to Petitioner's customers at no additional charge for the period of time that the customer continues to purchase the product(s) dispensed by the feeder. These circumstances existed in the period of July 1993 through March 1995. In the period of July 1993 through March 1995, Diversey Corporation, now Rathon Corporation, paid the State of Florida $58,969.22 in use tax associated with the feeders. During the period in question, the Petitioner manufactured the feeders at a facility in Santa Cruz, California. The feeders were not warehoused in the Santa Cruz facility for an extended period. They were prepared for shipment and shipped to customers in the various states, to include Florida and California customers, to be used in the places of business operated by the customers. The feeders being shipped were not packaged with other products. During the period July 1993 through March 1995, the Petitioner not only paid use tax to Florida for the feeders, it paid use tax in forty-four other states and the District of Columbia, based upon the costs of manufacturing the feeders. California was among the other forty-four states. During the period in question, Petitioner accrued and paid use taxes to Florida and California limited to the feeders used by customers in those states, based upon the product sales allocation method it used in relation to the forty-three other states and the District of Columbia. The feeders that were provided to Florida customers were shipped by common carrier. Upon their arrival in Florida no tax had been paid to California pertaining to those feeders. When the feeders arrived in Florida during the period at issue, use tax would be remitted to Florida. Subsequently, the Petitioner paid the State of California a use tax associated with the feeders that had been shipped to Florida customers and upon which a use tax had been imposed by the State of Florida and paid. The California payment is described in detail below. Petitioner had paid Florida use tax on the feeders shipped to Florida customers based on the total manufactured cost of the feeders to Petitioner, including materials, labor, and overhead. The additional use tax paid to California for those feeders was based only on the cost of materials. The overall costs of feeders allocated to Florida for the refund period was $982,803.00. Petitioner remitted a 6% use tax to Florida totaling $58,969.22 for the period in question. In 1996, Petitioner was audited for sales and use tax compliance by the State of California. That audit process included the refund period that is in question in this case, July 1993 through March 1995. Following the audit, the State of California issued a Notice of Determination asserting additional liability for tax and interest that totaled $355,753.95. Petitioner paid that assessment. The California auditor had arrived at the assessment by concluding that Petitioner owed California for 44.57% of all feeders manufactured at Petitioner's Santa Cruz facility. The 44.57% represented all newly manufactured feeders that had been loaned by Petitioner to its customers during the refund period over the entire United States. As a consequence, the assessment of use tax by the State of California included tax on feeders for which Petitioner had paid Florida $58,969.22 in use tax prior to the California assessment of $355,753.95. Petitioner did not apply for credit in California for the portion of the $355,753.95 that would relate to the feeders brought to Florida during the period in question. Petitioner took no action to obtain a credit on the amount paid to Florida as a means to reduce the California tax obligation pursuant to the 1996 audit, because Petitioner had been told that the use tax for the feeders used by Florida customers was legally due in California and not in Florida. In arriving at the determination that 44.57% of the feeders manufactured during the period in question had been loaned to customers within the continental United States, the California auditor took into account that 21.8% of the feeders and feeder parts were sold for export, leaving 78.2% to be used in the United States. Of the 78.2% remaining for the United States, 57% were complete feeders sent to customers within the United States, and 43% were repair parts that were sent to Petitioner's Cambridge Division in Maryland, where those repair parts were being stored for future use. The percentage of 44.57% was arrived at by multiplying 57% times 78.2%, representing the percent of total feeders manufactured for use in the United States that were sent to customers within the United States and not held in inventory as repair parts. Again, California based its use tax for tangible personal property manufactured in that state to include only the cost of materials. Consequently, when the California auditor computed use tax to be collected by California using the 44.57% of total feeders manufactured to be used in the United States by Petitioner's customers in the United States, the California auditor used a cost factor of 55% of overall costs which was attributable to the cost of materials only. The total cost of feeders manufactured by Petitioner in California during the period in question, as related in the California tax audit, was $19,028,714.00. The total cost manufactured for use in the United States was $8,481,098.00, representing 44.57% of the overall cost of manufacturing. When the $8,481.098.00 is multiplied by 55%, representing the cost of materials only, the total costs of the goods subject to the use tax for the period in question is $4,664,604.00. A use tax rate of 7% was applied against the amount of $4,664,604.00. To attribute the portion of use tax paid to California following the 1996 audit associated with feeders that had been sent to Florida during the period in question, the answer is derived by multiplying $982,803.00 by 55% for a total of $540,542.00, and in turn multiplying that amount by 7%, the rate of tax imposed by California. That total is $37,837.91 in use tax that was subsequently paid to California after $58,962.22 had been paid to Florida for use tax on the same feeders. Diversey Corporation sought a tax refund in the amount of $58,977.00, through an application dated August 8, 1996, in relation to the period July 1993 through March. Eventually through the decision by the Respondent in its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial dated July 16, 1997, Respondent refused to grant the refund of $58,977.00. At present, Petitioner requests that it be given a refund of $37,837.91, which represents the portion of use tax paid to Florida that has been duplicated in a payment of use tax to California. Respondent, in its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial entered on July 16, 1997, and based upon the facts adduced at the final hearing, premises its proposed agency action denying the refund request upon the language set for in Section 212.06(1)(a) and (7), Florida Statutes. The determination to deny the refund request was not based upon reliance on Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code. The theory for denying the refund is premised upon Respondent's argument that use tax was due to Florida, "as of the moment" feeders arrived in Florida for use in Petitioner's business operations associated with its customers. Petitioner then paid the use tax to Florida at the time the feeders arrived in Florida. Having not paid California Use Tax prior to paying Florida Use Tax, Respondent concludes, through its proposed agency action, that it need not refund to Petitioner the use taxes it paid to California at a later date. Petitioner had referred to Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, following receipt of the Notice of Proposed Refund Denial issued on December 9, 1996, possibly creating the impression that Petitioner believed that Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, would support its claim for refund. It later developed that Petitioner did not have in mind reliance upon Rule 12A-1.091, Florida Administrative Code, to support its claim for refund. Instead, Petitioner made reference to that rule and specifically Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, as a means to perfect a challenge to Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 15, 1997, claiming that the challenged rule was an invalid exercise of authority. That challenge was assigned DOAH Case No. 97-5908RX. In summary, notwithstanding Petitioner's argument to the contrary, Respondent has never relied upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, or any other part of that rule in its proposed agency action denying the refund request. Absent Petitioner's affirmative reliance upon Rule 12A-1.091(3), Florida Administrative Code, the rule has no part to play in resolving this dispute.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's request for repayment of funds paid to the State Treasury in the amount of $37,837.91, paid as use taxes for all years in question, be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Michael Madsen, Esquire Vickers, Madsen, and Goldman, LLP Suite 101 1705 Metropolitan Boulevard CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1998. Tallahassee, Florida 32308-3765 John N. Upchurch, Esquire James McCauley, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Petitioner's alleged liability for motor fuel and special fuel tax, interest, and penalties, pursuant to Chapter 206, F.S., as set forth in Notice of Proposed Assessments, dated April 1, 1977.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Walker Oil Company is located in Pensacola, Florida and is licensed by the State of Florida under Chapter 206, Florida Statutes, as a dealer in special fuels. The firm is also licensed in the State of Alabama with respect to the sale of both special fuels and motor fuel. The company was formed in 1955 and during ensuing years operated service stations and sold motor fuel and special fuels in the Pensacola and south Alabama area. Its operations were audited yearly during the period 1955 to 1961 by Respondent. In 1972 an audit for the period October 1970 to March 1972 revealed underpayments of special fuel tax in the approximate amount of $600 during the audit period. (Testimony of Walker, Exhibit 5) In July 1975, Respondent's auditor, Clyde Whitehead, commenced an audit of Petitioner's records to determine whether any motor fuel or special fuel taxes were delinquent for the period July 1, 1972 through June 30, 1975. Although Petitioner's records were available to the auditor for the period January 1, 1974 through June 30, 1975, no records were available for the initial 18 month period of the audit from July 1, 1972 through December 31, 1973. Petitioner had filed monthly tax reports with Respondent as to special fuels, but had not submitted any such reports during the audit period for motor fuel. (Testimony of Whitehead, Walker) As a result of the audit, an assessment of $43,356.11, including interest and penalty, for motor fuel taxes incurred during the period January 1, 1974 through June 30, 1975, was asserted against Petitioner. The assessment was based on audit findings that Petitioner had sold 430,866 taxable gallons, but had not remitted the tax to Respondent. Petitioner paid the assessment. C. C. Walker, Petitioner's former president, testified at the hearing that such payment was made in order to secure the dismissal of then pending state criminal charges alleging that Petitioner had "bootlegged" gasoline during the period in question. (Testimony of Walker, Exhibit 2) Pursuant to the audit findings, a Notice of Proposed Assessment for delinquent motor fuel taxes during the period July 1, 1972 through December 1, 1973, in the amount of $20,076.43, including penalty and interest through March 31, 1977, was issued by Respondent on April 6, 1977. On the same date, a Notice of Proposed Assessment for special fuel tax in the amount of $51,022.96, including penalty and interest through March 31, 1977, was also issued to Petitioner. A revised assessment, dated September 19, 1978, deleted certain portions of interest charged on the original proposed assessments. These deletions resulted in the reduction of motor fuel assessment to $12,396.52, and the special fuel assessment to $38,052.90. After the hearing, under date of February 27, 1979, Respondent further reduced the motor fuel assessment to $6,732.22. (Exhibit 1, Hearing Officer Exhibit 1) Due to the absence of Petitioner's records for the first 18 month period of the audit, Respondent based liability for motor fuel and special fuel taxes for that period on an estimate, using audit findings of the second 18 month period of the audit for which Petitioner's records were available. This was the first instance in at least 13 years in which an estimated assessment of fuel tax had been made by Respondent. Respondent had no regulations or established policy for arriving at such an estimate, but its officials testified that they simply tried to be "fair and equitable" in making the determination. (Testimony of Williamson, Thomas, Deposition of Whitehead, Exhibit 3) Respondent's method of estimating Petitioner's motor fuel tax liability was predicated upon relating the known 1974-75 figures on purchases and sales of gasoline and the amount of tax found delinquent during that period, to known purchases of gasoline by Petitioner during the period of the estimated assessment. The audit for the period 1974-75 showed that 60 1/2 percent of Petitioner's gasoline purchases from known suppliers in Florida and Alabama had been sold in Florida. Respondent therefore determined from the sales records of Petitioner's known gasoline suppliers and from tax reports it had submitted to Alabama, that the firm had purchased 4,221,454 gallons of motor fuel during the 1972-73 period. Applying the 60 1/2 percent factor, Respondent's auditor determined that 2,554,259 gallons had been sold in Florida during that period. Since it had been found that Petitioner had sold 430,866 taxable gallons during the 1974-75 period for which tax had not been remitted to the state, which was 7 1/2 percent of its total Florida sales for that period, Respondent applied the same factor to the estimated amount of Florida sales during the 1972-73 period. This resulted in an estimated 191,569 gallons on which Respondent assumed Petitioner had collected but not remitted the motor fuel tax. By multiplying this figure by the 8 cents tax per gallon, it was estimated that Petitioner owed $15,325.52 to the state. This figure was later revised by the February 27th Notice of Adjusted Final Assessment to $10,176.15 plus a 10 percent penalty of $1,017.62. This reduction was based on the fact that approximately 1/3 of Petitioner's total sales of motor fuel during the 1974-75 period was made to one company named Pac-a-Sak, which did not do business with the firm during the first 18 month period of the audit. After deducting the sum of $4,461.55 representing overpayment of interest in the 1974-75 assessment payment, Respondent determined that $6,732.22 was due for motor fuel tax during the 1972- 73 audit period. The original estimated assessment reflects Respondent's acknowledgment that only the lesser amount reflected therein is due. (Testimony of Whitehead, Thomas, Deposition of Whitehead, (Exhibit 3), Exhibits 2, 4B, Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1) Respondent's proposed assessment against Petitioner for special fuel tax and penalty in the total amount of $38,052.90 is derived from audit findings based on availability of Petitioner's records for the 1974-75 portion of the audit period, and on an estimated assessment for the 1972-73 period. Additionally, Petitioner's Florida tax reports for the entire period were used in making the audit. It was determined that Petitioner had purchased 1,510,073 gallons of special fuel in Florida during the 1974-75 period and had sold 1,590,587 gallons in Florida during the same period. The auditor found that Petitioner had sold 156,150 gallons of special fuel for which Petitioner should have collected tax, but did not. The bulk of the untaxed gallonage was sold to Hinesway Trucking Company and Polar Ice Cream Company, neither of which were licensed as special fuel dealers in Florida. Therefore, all of the sales to these two companies were treated as taxable sales, because no resale certificates were obtained by Petitioner when it sold special fuel tax free to those companies. The principal of Hinesway Trucking Company had mistakenly informed Petitioner's office employee that it was licensed as a special fuel dealer when in fact it was not. The audit findings showed that Petitioner had sold a total of 841,855 taxable gallons during the 1974-75 period, for which tax was due in the amount of $67,348.40, but that tax had only been remitted by Petitioner in the amount of $46,809.60, leaving a total tax due of $20,538.80. The total due and payable by Petitioner to Respondent for this period was therefore computed to be $24,443.05, including penalty and interest through June 30, 1975. It is found that the audit correctly reflects Petitioner's special fuel tax liability for the 1974-75 period. (Deposition of Whitehead (Exhibit 3), Exhibit 2, 4A) The estimated special fuel tax for the 1972-73 period was calculated in a manner similar to that of the estimated motor fuel tax assessment. Respondent's auditor determined that Petitioner's taxable sales during the 1974- 75 period were approximately 53 percent of its total sales. He also determined that Petitioner had experienced a 15 percent increase in business in the latter period. It was therefore determined to estimate the sales for the 1972-73 period as being 85 percent of the total sales of 1,590,587 gallons during the later period which resulted in an estimated 1,351,999 gallons sold in Florida during 1972-73. Applying the taxable percentage of approximately 53 percent to this figure led to a finding that 715,577 taxable gallons had been sold by Petitioner. Petitioner had reported the sale of 539,893 taxable gallons; and accordingly, the audit found that additional tax was due on the difference of 175,684 gallons at 8 cents per gallon, resulting in estimated tax due of $14,054.72. Thus, this figure added to the 1974-75 deficiency of $20,538.80 resulted in an alleged special fuel tax deficiency for the audit period in the amount of $34,593.52, plus a 10 percent penalty in the amount of $3,459.38 for a total amount due of $38,052.90. Respondent, in formulating the above estimated assessment for the 1972-73 period, assumed that Petitioner had the same percentage of taxable sales as that for the 1974-75 period. However, approximately 150,000 taxable gallons on which tax had not been collected during the 1974-75 period were sold by Petitioner to Hinesway Trucking Company from about June 1974 through June 1975, under a misapprehension as to its nonlicensed status. Hinesway had not been a customer of Petitioner prior to 1974. Respondent's auditors made no allowances for this unusual situation, nor did it consider the low deficiencies accrued by Petitioner as a result of its 1970-72 audit. (Testimony of Walker, Deposition of Whitehead (Exhibit 3) Exhibit 1-2, 4A) Petitioner's president, C. C. Walker, testified at the hearing that as a result of the "personal vendetta" of an employee of Respondent in harassing Petitioner's customers and releasing unfounded information to the press, plus the instigation of criminal charges against the firm, a great loss of business was caused and severe damage to its reputation in the community. He denied any intentional wrongful acts on the part of the company or any of its personnel and claimed that any Florida sales of fuel for which tax was not paid was due to "human error." (Testimony of Walker)
Recommendation That the proposed assessment of motor fuel tax and penalty, as set forth in Respondent's Notice of Adjusted Final Assessment, dated February 27, 1979, be withdrawn. That Respondent's Notice of Proposed Assessment (adjusted) for special fuel tax and penalty, dated September 19, 1978, be revised to delete inclusion of Petitioner's sales to Hinesway Company as a factor in determining an estimated assessment, and that such revised assessment be asserted against Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 16 day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Davis, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol LL05 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James R. Green, Esquire Seville Tower 226 South Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ACTION NOTICE =================================================================
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act.
Findings Of Fact The underlying proceeding, DOAH Case No. 94-3605, involved Petitioners' challenge to notices of final assessments for fuel taxes. The assessments had been issued by the Department against Nana's Petroleum, Inc.; Emilio Perez d/b/a Nana's Stations; Emilio Perez as Vice President of Nana's Petroleum, Inc.; Edilia Perez as Secretary of Nana's Petroleum, Inc.; Sun Petroleum, Inc.; and Emilio Perez as President and Manager of Sun Petroleum, Inc. At the commencement of the final hearing, Sun Petroleum, Inc., and Emilio Perez as President and Manager of Sun Petroleum, Inc., withdrew their challenge to the assessments against them, and those assessments became final. Five assessments thereafter remained for determination in the underlying proceeding: one against Edilia Perez as secretary of Nana's; one against Emilio Perez as vice president of Nana's; one against Emilio Perez d/b/a Nana's Stations; and two against Nana's Petroleum, Inc. In the Recommended Order and in the Final Order entered in the underlying proceeding, only a portion of one of the assessments against Nana's Petroleum, Inc., was upheld. The Department was substantially justified in issuing its assessments against Petitioners and in initiating this proceeding. Further, an award of attorney's fees and costs for the underlying proceeding would be unjust.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates a Citgo Food Mart in Naples at which it sells gasoline and diesel fuel at retail, provides limited motor vehicle service, and sells food and beverage items. Petitioner issued Respondent retail dealer's fuel license #21- 000828, which authorizes Respondent to sell motor fuel at retail and requires Respondent to collect and remit to Petitioner motor fuel taxes. The principal of Respondent is Jack Stellman. He caused Respondent to purchase the business in April 1993 from the fuel wholesaler, which had purchased it from the previous retailer. The previous retailer had suffered business and personal setbacks that necessitated the sale. Mr. Stellman and his wife, Phyllis, who claims not to be an officer or employee of Respondent despite her considerable involvement, have contributed much personal capital and labor to the new business. Immediately after taking over the business, Mr. and Mrs. Stellman discarded outdated inventory, fired a number of dishonest employees, eliminated prostitution that had been taking place on the premises, added new equipment such as a pressure fryer and hood system, and started advertising. Cash flow was a problem for Respondent from the start. The major improvements were completed by the fall of 1994. By early 1994, however, Mr. Stellman had quit taking a salary from Respondent. Over the 19-month period from August 1993 through March 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Stellman borrowed $140,000 from a variety of sources, including from their retirement plan, from relatives, and on property that they own individually. Despite these infusions of cash, Respondent was unable to stay current with certain important creditors, such as their fuel supplier, the Internal Revenue Service, and Petitioner. In August 1993, the fuel wholesaler began to demand payment on delivery, instead of in 30 days, as it had done previously. The wholesaler shortened the credit terms on fuel after Respondent fell behind in payments shortly after beginning operations. In any event, the change in credit terms involved monthly volumes of typically 40,000-50,000 gallons. The loss of use of money corresponding to the wholesale purchase of this amount of fuel does not begin to explain the tax deficiencies that Respondent ran up. Respondent's deficiencies on its motor fuel tax also began in August 1993. Returns are filed the month following the month for which the motor fuel tax is due. For August 1993, Respondent filed a return in which it underremitted the motor fuel tax by $62.15. The next month, Respondent filed a return in which it remitted $2000 and left an unremitted balance of $2867.49. The next month, Respondent filed a return, but remitted none of the $6077.28 of motor fuel tax due. For November 1993, the next month, Respondent filed a return and remitted $2000, leaving an unremitted balance of $3278.78. For December 1993 through July 1994, Respondent filed returns but remitted no tax. The total tax deficiency for this eight-month period was $58,300.87, or an average of $7287.61. In the 12-month period ending with the July 1994 return, Respondent had failed to remit a total of $70,586.57. For the August, September, and October 1994 returns, Respondent made partial remittances. For August and September, Respondent left unremitted balances of only $15.34 and $84.30, respectively, remitting a total of $11,315.49. For October, Respondent remitted $4827.90, leaving an unremitted balance of $2623.98. For November 1994, Respondent filed a return, but failed to remit any of the $5983.74 due. In the summer of 1994, the Stellmans finally sold their house in New York, but realized less cash than they had expected. In October 1994, the Stellmans applied for a loan on their Florida residence. During the same month, they began negotiations with Texaco to convert their Citgo convenience store into a Texaco outlet. The Stellmans believed that they would receive $225,000 from Texaco, which would be sufficient to pay their fuel wholesaler and Petitioner, convert their service operation into more store space, and acquire additional inventory and working capital. The record does not permit a finding whether $225,000 would cover all of these items. In any event, the Texaco negotiations did not proceed quickly. The fuel wholesaler threatened litigation over the prospective cancellation of its contract to supply Respondent with fuel and oil. And Petitioner's representatives were increasingly unsatisfied with Respondent's lack of progress in paying back taxes. Repeatedly, the Stellmans promised payments that did not materialize. At the same time, Respondent was not remitting motor fuel taxes currently. For December 1994 through March 1995, Respondent did not even file returns. During this four-month period, motor fuel taxes due and unremitted totalled $32,106.59. The total of unremitted motor fuel taxes for August 1993 through March 1995 was now $111,400.52, exclusive of penalties and interest. Penalties for the underremittances for the period August 1993 through March 1995 totalled $60,284.67. Interest for the same period totalled $14,042.88. The total of tax, penalties, and interest was thus $185,728.07. Respondent later reduced this deficiency by paying a total of $323.48 of penalties and $4154.52 of interest, so the current totals are tax of $111,400.52, penalties of $59,961.19, and interest of $9888.36, for a total of $181,250.07. The interest is current through August 1, 1995, and the daily interest thereafter is calculated by multiplying the tax deficiency by 0.000328767. Mr. and Mrs. Stellman claim that the $185,728.07 deficiency arose due to business setbacks, but the business setbacks that they have shown do not account adequately for the deficiency. The Stellmans clearly began the business badly undercapitalized. Mr. and Mrs. Stellman attribute part of the financial problems to bad debts suffered by Respondent. From August 1993 through the end of 1993, the Stellmans pursued seasonal business by offering liberal credit terms, which eventually resulted in worthless accounts receivable. However, the total bad debt was only $15,000. Although hardly meriting mention, except perhaps to reveal their lack of insight, the Stellmans also complain that they lost cash flow due to ill- advised advertising deals into which they entered where they traded fuel for advertising. Even ignoring the benefits derived from such agreements, Respondent traded only about $4000 worth of fuel under these arrangements. Together, these claimed business setbacks of no more than $20,000 constitute less than 18 percent of the taxes, penalties, and interest owed Petitioner. The amount of motor fuel tax that Respondent would have collected on $20,000 worth of fuel would be around $1500. With more zeal than business acumen, the Stellmans attacked the challenge of a new business. Their lack of business sophistication, not fraud, led the Stellmans to convert the motor fuel taxes from current payables to long- term debt, to underreport the amount of fuel pumped on 12 of 19 returns filed with Petitioner during the period in question, and repeatedly to file returns late, so as to lose the collection allowance normally given retail dealers. The unwillingness of Petitioner to become a long term creditor was manifested dramatically when, on May 4, 1995, Petitioner issued an emergency order suspending Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license. The emergency suspension took place after a meeting of Petitioner's Emergency Response Group, which, after reviewing the facts, determined that this was the best course of action to prevent the loss of motor fuel tax. The Stellmans complain that Petitioner did not give them enough time to try to pay the tax deficiencies. However, the record does not justify the Stellmans' demand that Petitioner share their confidence in their ability to take care of this substantial debt. As late as mid-February 1995, the Stellmans were still making unfulfilled promises to pay, as when they assured a Naples employee of Petitioner that Respondent would pay $10,000 by mid-April. This sum was not paid, nor were the motor fuel taxes that Respondent collected at the time even paid currently. In other words, Respondent was still taking the motor fuel tax that it was collecting from customers and applying it to other debts. The Stellmans never told Petitioner what they expected to net from the Texaco agreement. They never explained why the negotiations took so long to conclude. In early 1995, Petitioner's representatives justifiably saw: 1) new financing never resulted in any reduction of the outstanding deficiencies and 2) the outstanding deficiencies continued to grow as Respondent continued to collect motor fuel tax and apply it to other purposes. The record is not entirely clear as to the status of Respondent with respect to unremitted or unpaid taxes in April 1995 and following. Respondent owed $34,861.20 in unremitted sales tax, as of May 1, 1995. However, it appears more likely than not that, during at least part of the period subsequent to May 1, 1995, Respondent remitted and paid to Petitioner its currently accruing tax obligations. With the cessation of fueling operations, these obligations arose from sales of convenience store items, as these sales were unaffected by Petitioner's action against Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license. Since the suspension of the license, the Stellmans have supplied Petitioner with accurate, current information concerning Respondent's tax liabilities, at least to the extent that they possess such information. Respondent's financial condition is precarious, at best. Even assuming that the Stellmans were willing to continue to contribute more money to Respondent, there is nothing in the record to suggest that they have the financial resources to contribute substantial sums beyond a large fraction of the total currently due Petitioner in this case. Such a payment would probably come from a combination of the Stellmans' assets and the assets of friends and family. Their obvious failure to prepare and follow a feasible business plan does not bode well for Respondent's future ability to operate and, at the same time, retire what has become a substantial financial liability owed to Petitioner.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order: 1) suspending Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license for the lesser of six months from the date of the final order or until Respondent pays the sums described in paragraphs 38 and 39 and executes a promissory note with the conditions set forth in paragraphs 38 and 39 and 2) revoking Respondent's retail dealer's fuel license at the expiration of six months from the date of the final order unless Respondent has paid the above-described sums and entered into the above-described promissory note. ENTERED on October 27, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 27, 1995. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-4: adopted or adopted in substance. 5-7: rejected as recitation of evidence and subordinate. 8: adopted or adopted in substance. 9-10: rejected as subordinate. 11: adopted or adopted in substance. 12-18: rejected as subordinate. 19-21: adopted or adopted in substance. 22-23: rejected as subordinate. 24-26: adopted or adopted in substance except the taxpayer is Respondent, not Mr. Stellman individually. 27: rejected as subordinate. 28: adopted or adopted in substance. 29-35: rejected as subordinate. 36-37: adopted or adopted in substance. 38: rejected as subordinate. 39: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 40-43: adopted or adopted in substance. 44: rejected as recitation of evidence. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-7: adopted or adopted in substance, although the "great expense" in paragraph 7 is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 8-10: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. The financial problems were minor. 11: adopted or adopted in substance to the extent relevant. 12-13: rejected as subordinate. 14: rejected as speculative. 15: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 16: rejected as irrelevant. 17: adopted or adopted in substance. 18-19: rejected as subordinate. 20: adopted or adopted in substance. 21: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence except that the filings is rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Francisco Negron, Jr. Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Christian B. Felden Felden and Felden 2590 Golden Gate Parkway Suite 101 Naples, FL 33942
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit (“Tax Credit”) application filed by Petitioner, Florida Power Development, LLC, A Florida Limited Liability Company (“Florida Power”), was eligible for consideration by Respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Office of Energy (“DACS” or the “Department” or “Office of Energy”).
Findings Of Fact Florida Power is a company which produces power by way of burning biomass materials, primarily wood chips, at its energy plant at 10311 Cement Plant Road, Brooksville, Florida. Most of the energy it produces is sold to Duke Energy. The plant had previously been a coal fired power plant, but Florida Power spent $196 million converting it into a renewable energy facility utilizing biomass fuel. JP Morgan is the parent company of Florida Power. The Office of Energy is the state agency responsible for overseeing the Tax Credit program authorized under section 220.193, Florida Statutes (2016).2/ The Department is empowered to review and approve (or disapprove) all Tax Credit applications which it receives. The Office of Energy is located at 600 South Calhoun Street, Suite 251, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001. Applications for a Tax Credit are available on the DACS website, as are the statutes and rules governing the Tax Credit program. The rules specify the date applications are due in each “production year” and set forth the process for filing the applications. Applications addressing the production year at issue in this proceeding of January 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016, were due at the Office of Energy no later than August 15, 2016. Florida Power’s application was not received by the Office of Energy until August 17, 2016, two days after the deadline. As a result, the Department deemed Florida Power’s application ineligible for consideration. Florida Power believes that circumstances surrounding the filing of its application for a Tax Credit excuse or make moot its failure to meet the deadline. Florida Power had filed applications for Tax Credits in prior production years. In 2015, its application was prepared by Tateswood, a company located in Houston, Texas. Tateswood provides management services to several power plants, including several owned by Florida Power. The application was submitted via overnight delivery, i.e., FedEx, from Houston, Texas, to the Office of Energy in Tallahassee, Florida. A senior official from Tateswood, Jeff Winkler, signed the application and had it overnighted to the Department. The application was received timely and approved by the Office of Energy.3/ Florida Power received a tax credit that year of approximately $1.49 million. Around July 28, 2016, Florida Power received the data it needed from Duke Energy to file the Tax Credit application for the 2016 production year (which was less than a full year as the Tax Credit program was expiring). Florida Power’s accountant, Lashauna Filo, also worked for Tateswood in Houston, Texas. She prepared the 2016 application for Mr. Winkler’s signature. Mr. Winkler was traveling, but he was expected to be in Brooksville prior to the application submission deadline. Ms. Filo emailed the application to the Brooksville plant on August 10, 2016, five days prior to the date it was due in Tallahassee. Mr. Winkler signed the application and gave it to Ms. Brown, plant administrator, who was given the task of submitting the application to the Office of Energy.4/ She noted verbiage on the face of the application form which says it can be submitted to the Department via “certified mail or hand delivery.” The due date of August 15 also appeared on the face of the application. Ms. Brown had not been involved with filing a Tax Credit application previously. After conferring with one of her supervisors, Dave Hermanson, she selected the first option--certified mail–-for submitting the application. She typed an envelope, filled out a Certified Receipt form, and put the application into a post office box at the Brooksville, Florida, post office. Ms. Brown did not consider literally hand-delivering the application to DACS because Tallahassee is roughly a four-hour drive from Brooksville, and it seemed there was enough time for the package to get to the Department. Ms. Brown did not understand that “hand delivery” allowed for delivery by overnight courier. Neither Florida Power nor Tateswood have attorneys on staff to provide guidance or assistance in matters such as these. Instead, Ms. Brown relied upon the advice given her by Mr. Hermanson. Unfortunately, the application did not sail smoothly through the USPS system. It was received by a Tampa USPS facility at 8:00 p.m., on August 10, was “coded” for Tallahassee, and departed that facility at 9:43 p.m., the same evening. It arrived at the Adams Street USPS facility in Tallahassee at 1:19 p.m., on August 11. However, the package had been improperly “coded” in the Tampa USPS facility to zip code 32301, rather than to zip code 32399. The 32399 zip code is used for state agencies in Tallahassee. This mis-code by the Tampa office caused the package to be erroneously sent from the Adams Street office to the downtown Tallahassee facility, rather than being processed for a “state agency” delivery. Thereafter, it went to another USPS site, the Lake Jackson facility, where it arrived on August 12. The package did not make it back to the Adams Street facility where it belonged until 5:36 a.m. on August 16-–one day after the submission deadline. The application was delivered to DACS on August 17, 2016, at 9:08 a.m., two days after the deadline. Clearly, Florida Power’s application for a Tax Credit was not timely received by the Office of Energy. However, Florida Power raises several facts which may relate to whether equitable tolling or equitable estoppel principles apply to this situation. Florida Power points out that verbiage on the face of the application itself does not specifically use the words “overnight express” as a means of submitting the application. Florida Power maintains, therefore, that it was misled into believing that physical hand-delivery or certified mail were its only options. Inasmuch as Florida Power had submitted their prior year’s application via FedEx, their claim lacks credence. Furthermore, the rule addressing application submission defines “hand delivery” as “any physical submission of an application to the Office [of Energy] from a representative of an applicant, courier, or a private delivery service.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 5O-2.003(3)(b)2. Florida Power was very familiar with the Tax Credit program, but could not say why it was not familiar with the rules governing that program. Unfortunately, certified mail, Florida Power’s delivery option for the application at issue, does not guarantee delivery by a date certain. Rather, certified mail-–which is processed exactly the same way as non-certified mail-–is merely a means for tracking a letter or package. Thus, a person who mails a letter by way of certified mail assumes the risk that the letter may not be delivered on or before a desired date. It appears that the risk is quite high. A USPS employee testified at final hearing that there are 50 to 70 complaints per day in Tallahassee concerning certified mail and several hundred certified letters may be misdirected each week. Florida Power further argues that the Department has seen several applications submitted via certified mail arrive at DACS late, i.e., after the “received by” deadline. Florida Power asserts that this fact has put DACS on notice that allowing an applicant to submit an application via certified mail constitutes a flaw in the system. The Department maintains that the use of certified mail is a valid way of tracking applications and is feasible. During the development of the rule governing submissions of the applications, no interested party voiced any objection to the use of certified mail as a delivery option. There is no evidence in the record that DACS was previously aware of the magnitude of errors by USPS so that it (DACS) should not include certified mail as an option for submitting applications. One must wonder, as does Florida Power, why there needs to be tracking of the applications at all since the operative date is the date of receipt by DACS. But the Department must deem it necessary for some reason and it is the current state of the law. Florida Power contends in its PRO that there are numerous fallacies in the Department’s rule regulating Tax Credit applications. This proceeding, however, is not a rule challenge brought pursuant to section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The validity or propriety of the rule is not in question. At issue in the instant proceeding is whether Florida Power complied with the duly promulgated and existing rule. DACS is one of the few state agencies which await delivery of its mail from the post office, rather than sending someone to retrieve it from USPS. DOAH is also one of those agencies. While awaiting delivery may delay an agency’s receipt of mail at times, it would not have affected Florida Power in this case because the package was not available for pick-up until August 16, one day after the deadline. There is no requirement in law or rule that any state agency opt to pick up its mail from USPS rather than have it delivered. Florida Power’s lament that DACS could have chosen to have its mail delivered is of no consequence. Some government agencies use the postmark on letters or packages as evidence that the item was timely mailed out; think IRS and April 15, for example. However, the DACS rule requires receipt of the application by the Department; the rule does not currently employ a “submitted by” compliance date. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 5O-2.003(b). When the Tax Credit program was originally initiated, the Department undertook regular rule development. The first rule promulgated by the Department was drafted in July 2012 and was ultimately adopted in the spring of 2013. That version of the rule stated that all applications must be “submitted” by a date certain. Upon receipt of one application after the due date, but which had been “submitted” by the applicant before the deadline, the Department decided it needed to re-think that provision. Rulemaking was recommended in order to amend the language relating to timely filing of applications. During the rulemaking process, which was duly noticed and advertised, DACS received no input from interested parties concerning the proposed amendment to the rule. The amended rule requires applications to be “received by” DACS on or before the deadline established by rule. This amendment eliminated any disputes concerning when an application was “submitted” by an applicant. The current, duly promulgated rule utilizes “received by” rather than “submitted” as the operative date. Florida Power points out that DACS has missed some of its own statutorily mandated deadlines concerning the reporting of Tax Credit information to the governor’s office. Florida Power does not cite to any authority which relieves an applicant from the requirements of a rule when an agency misses its own deadlines. So, that DACS was not timely in carrying out its own mandated duties is irrelevant to whether Florida Power satisfied its required actions. Nonetheless, the Department provided a legitimate rationale for its tardiness, though such reasons are irrelevant to the issue in this case. DACS employees utilize a checklist when reviewing Tax Credit applications. The checklist is just that, a matrix that can be checked off as each element or requirement of the application is reviewed, i.e., date of receipt, signature, application form, etc. The first question on the checklist asks whether the application “was submitted by” the requisite due date. April Groover Combs, who reviewed the Florida Power application using the checklist, simply interpreted the “was submitted by” language as “was received by.” Mrs. Combs had authored the rule and was involved in its amendments, so she understood what was required regardless of how the checklist referred to the items. Florida Power suggests that the internal checklist error somehow invalidates the Department’s actions; it does not. An internal document used by employees is not meant to provide rights to the public. It is not a rule. Thus, any errors within such a document are immaterial.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services upholding its rejection of the Tax Credit application filed by Florida Power as ineligible for consideration. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2017.
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether state and local option taxes may be imposed upon Petitioner, Co-Op Oil Company, Inc. (“Co-Op Oil”), based upon the gallons of fuel sold at retail stations that were not owned or operated by Co-Op Oil, and to which Co-Op Oil did not consign fuel, but that were voluntarily “linked” to Co-Op Oil for reporting purposes via Department of Revenue (“DOR”) Form DR-120.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: During the audit period, Co-Op Oil was a domestic corporation engaged in the business of wholesale and retail petroleum distribution, and held Florida motor fuel tax license No. 09000447. Since the audit period, Co-Op Oil has exited the retail portion of the petroleum distribution business. DOR is an executive agency of the State of Florida. Among other duties, DOR is charged with administration and enforcement of Florida’s fuel tax laws, pursuant to Chapter 206, Florida Statutes. During the audit period, Co-Op Oil was a wholesale petroleum distributor to marinas, commercial fishermen, construction companies, and other businesses not served by retail facilities. Jim Smith, President of Co-Op Oil, testified that beginning in August, 1989, and continuing through December, 1994, Co-Op Oil requested that certain independent retailers to which Co-Op Oil supplied petroleum be “linked” to Co-Op Oil for retail tax reporting purposes. Mr. Smith testified that he made the decision to request linkage for those retail dealers that he believed incapable of correctly reporting the taxes on their own. His purpose was to ensure that all taxes owed to the state were actually reported and paid. Mr. Smith testified that he understood “linkage” to require Co-Op Oil to report and remit all the fuel taxes that Co-Op Oil actually collected on the gallons of fuel it sold to the linked dealers. Essentially, Co-Op Oil collected and remitted taxes on the net gallons of fuel it delivered to the dealers. DOR does not dispute that Co-Op Oil remitted all the taxes that it actually collected on the net gallons delivered to the linked dealers. However, in reporting taxes for the linked facilities, Co-Op Oil did not report “gains” for those facilities. The concept of “gains” is based on the principle that the volume of a volatile substance such as gasoline changes with the temperature. In the petroleum industry, a “net gallon” is based on the volume of a gallon of fuel at 60 degrees. The industry has developed a formula to account for the difference in volume caused by temperatures above or below 60 degrees. Under the adjustments made pursuant to the formula, a “gallon” of gasoline stored at a temperature below 60 degrees is worth more than a gallon stored at a temperature higher than 60 degrees because of its greater compression. The linked facilities in question were located in and around Pinellas County, where the year-round temperature in their underground tanks is significantly greater than 60 degrees, meaning that gasoline stored therein would reasonably be expected to expand after delivery by Co-Op Oil. This expansion would result in the retail facilities being able to sell marginally more gallons of fuel to the ultimate consumers than the net gallons purchased from Co-Op Oil at the wholesale level. This phenomenon of “gains” at the retail level, along with alleged abuses by dealers, led DOR to successfully persuade the Legislature in 1992 to adopt a statutory requirement that retailers who were not also wholesalers or refiners must collect and remit tax on the additional gallons of fuel sold at the retail level. Section 206.41(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), imposing the constitutional gas tax, contained the typical language: If any licensee owns or operates retail stations or has fuel on consignment at retail stations and has sold more fuel than was purchased tax-paid when the fuel was removed from the rack or than was reported to the state when first purchased or removed from storage tax-free, the licensee must report the additional gallons sold and pay the additional tax, due for the month, on his or her local option gasoline tax return or a return designated by the department. The “rack” is that part of a terminal facility by which petroleum products are loaded into tanker trucks or rail cars. Section 206.01(16), Florida Statutes (1995). In practice, the “rack” also refers to bulk plant facilities operated by wholesalers such as Co-Op Oil. Similar language requiring the reporting and payment of “gains” was included in Section 206.60(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)(county gas tax); Section 206.605(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)(municipal gas tax); Section 336.021(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)(county nine cent gas tax); Section 336.025(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)(local option gas tax); and 336.026(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)(State Comprehensive Enhanced Transportation System Tax). The cited sections from Chapter 336, Florida Statutes (1995) also provided that refiners, importers, wholesalers, and jobbers were to be considered as retail dealers when electing to remit the subject taxes on behalf of retail stations they owned or operated, or where they had fuel on consignment. Administratively, DOR accomplished the collection of the tax on “gains” by requiring dealers to base their tax returns on “metered gallons,” i.e., the reading of gallons at the gas pumps used by retail customers. Petitioner conceded at hearing that retail facilities, when filing their own tax returns, were required to calculate the taxes based on metered gallons. A Florida form DR-120 is the form upon which a motor fuel dealer reports the amount of motor fuel sold and the amount of local county option taxes due. On a monthly basis during the audit period, the Petitioner filed form DR-120 with the Respondent. All taxes reported by Co-Op Oil on these forms during the audit period were calculated based on net gallons sold by Co-Op Oil to the linked dealers. A Florida form DR-119 is the form upon which a motor fuel dealer reports the amount of fuel sold and the amount of state taxes due. On a monthly basis during the audit period, the Petitioner filed form DR-119 with the Respondent. All taxes reported by Co-Op Oil on these forms during the audit period were calculated based on net gallons sold by Co-Op Oil to the linked dealers. During the audit period, DOR had in place no formal mechanism by which a wholesaler such as Co-Op Oil could “link” its tax return to that of a retailer that it neither owned nor operated nor to which it consigned fuel. Mr. Smith credibly testified that in 1989 he was instructed by a DOR employee named Mary Ann Moye that such linkage could be accomplished by written notification to DOR and the actual reporting and collection of taxes by the wholesaler on behalf of the retailer. Peter Steffens, a 22-year DOR employee intimately familiar with the evolution and application of the fuel taxes at issue in this proceeding, testified that while “linkage” did not formally exist in statute or rule, DOR in fact treated “linked” retailers as consigned retailers. In other words, when a wholesaler such as Co-Op Oil linked a retailer’s return to its DR-120, the wholesaler would be treated as if it were consigning fuel to that retailer, whether it was collecting tax at the time of delivery or at the time of retail sale. DOR took the position that a wholesaler such as Co-Op Oil steps into the shoes of its linked retailers, and remains in those shoes after it delivers fuel to the retailers. To avoid the loss of taxes that are unquestionably owed, DOR places upon linked wholesalers a continuing responsibility to see that all taxes are reported and paid even after the fuel is physically delivered to the retailers. Given that DOR did not impose linkage on the wholesalers, but only allowed it at the written request of the wholesalers, this was a reasonable requirement. Because the statutes provided that a consignor must pay tax on “gains,” DOR took the position in its audit that Co-Op Oil was also required to pay “gains” for the stations it linked on its DR-119 and DR-120 tax returns for the audit period. Mr. Smith took the position that Co-Op Oil was required to pay tax only on those net gallons it sold to its retailers because, unlike a consignor, Co-Op Oil itself realized no profit from the “gains” of its retail dealer. Mr. Smith questioned the validity of the entire concept of “gains,” but was well aware of DOR’s position on the issue, having litigated an administrative tax assessment proceeding against DOR in 1993 in which “gains” was a central issue. See Co-Op Oil Company, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 93-2019 (Recommended Order, Sept. 22, 1993). Mr. Smith acknowledged that the tax on “gains” might be owed by the retail dealers, but took the position that DOR should seek payment of that tax directly from the retailers. Mr. Smith testified that he assumed that once the dealers were linked to Co-Op Oil, they would be treated as ultimate consumers for his reporting purposes. Mr. Smith admitted that his assumption was based on his reading of the statutes, not on any guidance he had received from DOR. DOR made initial inquiry to Mr. Smith as to the taxes being reported and paid by Co-Op Oil during telephone conversations in December, 1995. By follow-up letter dated January 4, 1996, Charles E. Pate, Senior Tax Specialist with DOR, wrote to Mr. Smith as follows, in pertinent part: It is not intended that the method of reporting you have chosen should reduce the tax liability that would result if each retail dealer were reporting individually on form DR-121. It is necessary that each dealer you are selling to reconstruct the difference between net and gross gallons for the period 7/92 through the present. All applicable state and local taxes will be assessed on the calculated adjustment. Mr. Pate testified that he made several subsequent requests to Mr. Smith for the information regarding the unreported “gains” of the retailers in question. Mr. Pate stated that, despite Mr. Smith's promises, the requested information was never provided by Co-Op Oil. It was undisputed that sales agreements with its retailers gave Co-Op Oil a contractual right to collect from the retailers any additional fuel tax that might become due. Mr. Smith acknowledged that he never supplied the “gains” information to Mr. Pate, but could not recall ever promising to do so, stating that his understanding of Mr. Pate’s letter was that DOR needed to require each dealer to reconstruct their sales for the audit period. Mr. Smith stated that all but three of the retailers in question were out of business, and that he did not attempt to obtain the information from the others. Mr. Smith’s testimony established that he is very knowledgeable as to fuel tax law. In addition to calculating and paying the taxes for his business since at least 1989, he has attended seminars on the subject, served on a task force made up of DOR and industry representatives that drafted changes to the fuel tax laws, and has acted as a legislative lobbyist on tax issues on behalf of his company and the Florida Petroleum Marketers Association. Given his knowledge, it was unreasonable for him to assume that a tax on “gains” otherwise owed by his retailers need not be paid simply because their tax returns were administratively linked with those of Co-Op Oil. DOR did not attempt directly to force the retailers to reconstruct their records. Mr. Pate did inform Mr. Smith that if Co-Op Oil would produce the records, then DOR would pursue the individual dealers. However, no dealer records were ever produced by Co-Op Oil. Mr. Pate was thus forced to assess the tax based on an estimate. He arrived at this estimate by assuming a one percent “gain” on the net gallons reported by Co-Op Oil for the linked retailers. This was a reasonable and conservative assumption, consistent with the industry standards for calculation of “gains.”
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the assessment of additional tax, penalties, and interest against Co-Op Oil. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: James E. Smith, President, Co-Op Oil Company, Inc. 4911 8th Avenue South Gulfport, Florida 33707 John N. Upchurch, Esquire Nicholas Bykowsky, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General Tax Section The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
