The Issue The issues for determination are whether, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, Walter L. Moyer, violated Section 472.033(1)(g) and (h) F.S. and Rule 21 HH-2.01(3) by performing a land survey in a negligent or incompetent manner, without due care and without due regard for acceptable professional standards, and violated Section 472.033(1)(e), (g) and (h) F.S., and Rule 21HH- 2.01(3) and (5) FAC, by providing a false or deliberately inaccurate survey sketch to a client on two separate occasions.
Findings Of Fact Walter L. Moyer has been licensed by the State of Florida as a registered surveyor from approximately August 1977 until present, and holds license number LS 0002828. His address for license purposes is Palm Bay, Florida, in Brevard County. His practice as a surveyor has been primarily in construction-related surveys and lot surveys, with very few parcel surveys. THE CHILCOTT SURVEY (COUNT I) In June 1984, Charles and Robin Chilcott purchased property on Grant Road, in Brevard County, consisting of approximately 1.44 acres of undeveloped land. The Chilcotts acquired the parcel with the intent to construct a home and keep their horses. Shortly after purchase, the Chilcotts retained Moyer to prepare a boundary survey of the parcel. The cost of the survey was $315.00 including $7.50 extra cost for two concrete monuments, rather than iron rods, at the front corners, as requested by the Chilcotts. The survey was performed on July 27, 1984, and Moyer was paid. He furnished the Chilcotts several sketches of survey which he had signed and sealed. In 1985, the Chilcotts hired a contractor, Casey Jones, and commenced building their house. At the request of Casey Jones, Moyer prepared both the foundation and final surveys. These two surveys were added to the boundary survey on September 26, 1985, and November 23, 1985, respectively. At the time that the field work on the foundation and final survey was done, Moyer detected no problems with the monumentation he had initially set in the boundary survey. He did not see any evidence that the monuments had been disturbed. The final survey shows the house to be 17.35 feet inside the east lot line. The Chilcotts wanted at least that distance because the area is zoned agricultural and they did not want the neighbor's livestock close to the house. They also understood that the county required a minimum 10-foot set-back. In connection with the construction of their home, and in reliance upon Moyer's survey identifying their property's boundary, the Chilcotts installed a well and a fence and had approximately 800 feet of sod planted along the east boundary. The Chilcotts have since learned that those improvements are not on their property and that their house is, in fact, only 7.25 feet from the lot line. In May, 1986, David Rothery, a Florida licensed land surveyor, performed a boundary survey of the Donald Waterbury parcel adjacent to and just east of Chilcott's land on Grant Road. Rothery checked and double-checked his field measurements and still found a ten foot discrepancy in the placement of the monuments on the eastern corners of the Chilcott parcel. Those monuments were ten feet too far to the east and were, therefore, placed ten feet within the Waterbury boundaries. He did not observe any indication that the monuments had been moved, and when he placed his corners for the proper boundaries, he found no evidence that monuments had ever been there before. As required, the monuments placed by Moyer had his identification on them. Rothery put a dotted line on his survey with the notation, "Apparent survey error on adjoining property by Walter Moyer Land Surveying". Rothery also called Moyer and told him about the discrepancy. On the morning of May 10, 1986, Moyer went back out to the Chilcott property and discovered that his monuments were ten feet too far to the east. He was in the process of moving them when he was confronted by Charles Chilcott. He told Chilcott that an error was made, that he "dropped ten feet". There was some discussion about possible remedies such as paying for the well and fence to be moved or buying the ten feet from Waterbury. Chilcott did not let Moyer finish moving the monuments. That night, Chilcott, who had never met Moyer before, but had only communicated by phone or in writing, called Moyer's house and confirmed that it was the same person he had seen moving the monuments. That was the last time Chilcott spoke with Moyer. Chilcott called Moyer's house several times over the following months, but always reached Mrs. Moyer and his phone calls were not returned. Moyer did contact Waterbury about purchasing the ten foot strip. Waterbury was concerned about how this would affect his eventual ability to build on his lot and refused to sell. Waterbury is not pressing the Chilcotts about their encroachments; he simply expects to have the matter resolved sometime in the future. By a letter dated 8/18/86, the Chilcotts requested damages of $2,500.00 from Moyer, including an estimate of costs to move the well, fence and a power pole and to replace sod. On September 13, 1986, another letter from Chilcott to Moyer listed the same plus additional damages, for a total demand of $4,025.00. In a letter to Chilcott dated August 27, 1987, Moyer offered to pay the application fee to seek a variance from the setback requirement and offered to provide a final survey and half the cost of moving the well. The letter denied that the problem was Moyer's fault and said that Moyer believes that the markers were moved between the date the survey was completed and the date of the foundation. The Chilcotts rejected that offer. No evidence in this proceeding supports Moyer's contention that the Chilcotts or someone else moved the monuments he originally set in 1984. The evidence does establish a strong circumstantial basis for finding that the monuments were not moved, but were incorrectly placed by Moyer at the time that the boundary survey was completed. Setting the monuments properly is an essential component of conducting a boundary survey. Moreover, when a subsequent final survey is done, it is the duty of the surveyor to assure that the original monuments have not been disturbed during construction and site work by a contractor. Assuming that Moyer is correct in his contention that the monuments were moved after they were set by him, but before the foundation was placed, it was his duty to discover that fact. He did not, since his final survey shows that the house is 17.35 feet from the boundary, whereas the house is, in fact, approximately seven feet from the adjoining property. Except when witness monuments are used, as when a tree or other obstruction sits on a boundary corner, it is a violation of standard surveying practice to place a monument other than where it is shown on the survey drawing. In this instance, the drawing is accurate; as described in the Chilcott deed, the northeast corner of their property is 600 feet from the section corner. There was no need for witness monuments here; yet the east boundary monuments are ten feet off and are 590 feet from the section corner. There is no overlap in the legal descriptions of the Waterbury and Chilcott properties to account for the overlap in monuments discovered by David Rothery, the Waterbury surveyor. Surveying is a system of checking measurements. Both human and equipment errors in the profession are neither rare nor entirely common. Even the most up-to-date electronic equipment is subject to discrepancies. Checking and rechecking field measurements helps alleviate errors. The minimum technical standards developed by and for the profession are intended to reduce errors, although it is not clear that slavish adherence to those principles will absolutely prevent any possibility of error. When errors do occur, the standard of the profession is to work with the client to resolve the problem. In some cases, this may mean the purchase of the client's property or adjoining property if the party is willing to sell. Moyer's limited offers do not meet the established standards of the profession. THE BURGOON-BERGER SURVEYS COUNTS II AND III On August 21, 1986, Moyer signed and sealed a survey sketch of Lot 22, Block 2245, Port Malabar, Unit 44, in Brevard County Florida for Burgoon-Berger Construction Co. The survey of Lot 22 showed the drawing of an improvement within the boundaries of the lot with a notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV 25.86." Next to the date on the survey is the abbreviation, "FND". The survey was submitted to the Palm Bay Building Department on August 26, 1986, the day before the pre-slab inspection. A pre-slab inspection is done before the slab is poured; therefore, at the time the survey was signed and sealed, the concrete slab had not yet been poured. On October 20, 1986, Moyer prepared a sketch of survey of Lot 7, Block 1054, Port Malabar Unit 20, in Brevard County, Florida for Burgoon-Berger Construction Co. The survey sketch indicated an improvement within the boundaries of the lot, with the notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV 26.87". Next to the date on the survey is the notation "FND". The survey was submitted to the City of Palm Bay on October 28, 1986. The pre-slab inspection was done by the City on October 22, 1986. Again, the survey was signed and sealed before the slab was actually poured. The notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV", is commonly understood to mean "foundation, finished floor elevation". "FND" is commonly understood to mean "foundation". Moyer, himself, has used both notations to signify those common usages. Foundation is generally accepted in the land surveying profession to mean something permanent and constructed, like a concrete slab, not bust the ground or wooden form boards used to guide the pouring of the slab. A survey which depicts an improvement with the note, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV", when the floor has not been finished misrepresents the status of the construction of that project. Reviewing personnel at the Palm Bay Building Department rejected the surveys and alerted the City's Flood Plain Administrator. That individual, Maria Parkhurst, reported the incidents to the Department of Professional Regulation. Lots 22 and 7 are both in the flood plain and slab elevation is significant, as the City must assure that federal maximum elevation requirements are met. The City requires the submission of surveys containing slab elevation data. Banks also rely on foundation surveys submitted by contractors in order to determine the state of construction before the release of a foundation draw. That is, before the contractor is entitled to partial payment for his work, the bank needs to know if the work has been done. Both Moyer and his client, Bergoon-Berger, intended the notation in these cases to mean "finished form", not "finished floor". Burgoon-Berger had Moyer perform a survey after the wooden form boards were constructed, but before the concrete slab was poured, in order to assure that the house was placed properly on the lot. The survey was somehow submitted prematurely to the city, whereas because Moyer and his client intended that the poured slab be re-surveyed before the sketch was submitted. When the survey for Lot 7 was resubmitted to the City on October 31, 1986, the slab had been poured and, while the elevation remained the same, the size of the fireplace foundation was slightly smaller. The notation, "FOUNDATION FF ELEV" remained the same, with nothing on the face of the survey sketch to indicate that this later version was the finished floor, rather than the finished form. Moyer no longer uses these abbreviations. A survey is not valid until it is signed and sealed, but once it is signed and sealed, it signifies to the client and to the public at large that the information provided therein is true and accurate. The standard of professional land survey practice dictates that abbreviations which are not commonly accepted should be explained on the face of the drawing. The professional standards also dictate that even if a client asks for certain information on a survey, in anticipation that other third parties might rely on the survey the professional should either refuse to indicate improvements that do not exist yet or indicate unambiguously that the improvements are intended, but still under construction. Notwithstanding Bergoon-Berger's and Moyer's intentions with regard to the two surveys at issue, Moyer failed to meet professional standards when he signed and sealed those surveys and released them to his client.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final Order be issued finding Respondent guilty of Counts I, II and III of the Amended Administrative Complaint and placing him on probation for a period of two years, under such conditions as the Board may deem appropriate, including, but not limited to the participation in continuing professional education courses and the pursuit of a reasonable resolution to the Chilcott's boundary problems arising from the Respondent's negligence in performing their survey. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of December, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1987. APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings on the parties' proposed findings of fact. Petitioner (Count I) Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraph 2. 3-4. Adopted in Paragraph 3. Incorporated in Part in Paragraph 1., as to the limitation of experience, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in Paragraph 3. Adopted in part in Paragraph 3, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 9-10. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 4. 14-18. Adopted in Paragraph 3 and 4. Adopted in Paragraph 11. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted in Paragraph 5. Adopted in Paragraph 11. 23-28. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Adopted in part in Paragraph 8, however the accurate date is May 10, 1986, and the evidence is inconclusive as to whether Moyer spoke to either of the Chilcotts before coming back. This fact is not material. 32-33. Adopted in Paragraph 8. 34. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 35-37. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 8. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 9. Adopted in part in Paragraph 9, otherwise rejected as unsubstantiated by competent evidence and immaterial. Adopted in Paragraph 6. 42-43. Rejected as cumulative. 44. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 10. 45-47. Rejected as cumulative. 48-49. Adopted in Paragraph 12. 50-51. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 13. Rejected as cumulative. 54-55. Adopted in Paragraph 14. (Counts II and III) Adopted in Paragraph 1. Adopted in Paragraph 15. Adopted in Paragraph 16. 4-6. Adopted in Paragraph 17. Adopted in Paragraph 20. Adopted in Paragraph 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 18. Adopted in Paragraph 25. Adopted in Paragraph 18. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 25. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 25. Respondent Adopted in Paragraph 1. 2-5. Addressed in Background. Adopted in Paragraph 2. Adopted in Paragraph 3. 8-11. Rejected as immaterial. 12-13. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted in Paragraph 5. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Adopted in part in Paragraph 7. Adopted in Paragraph 7. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence, except for the fact that the Chilcott house is 7 feet from the boundary. That fact is adopted in Paragraph 6. 19-20. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 8. Adopted in Paragraphs 9, 10, and 14. Adopted in Paragraph 10. Rejected, except as adopted in Paragraph 10. 24-25. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph 11. Adopted in part in Paragraph 14, otherwise rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 13. Rejected as immaterial. While the boundary depiction is accurate, the placement of the house is in error on the final and foundation surveys and, of course, the markers are erroneously set. 30-33. Addressed in Background. 34. Adopted in Paragraphs 15 and 17. 35-36. Adopted in part in Paragraph 22, otherwise rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 37-38. Rejected as immaterial. 39. Adopted in Paragraphs 19 and 22. 40-44. Rejected as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: DAVID R. TERRY, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 JAMES P. BEADLE, ESQUIRE 5205 BABCOCK STREET N. E. PALM BAY, FLORIDA 32905 ALLEN R. SMITH, JR., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 TOM GALLAGHER, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 WILLIAM O'NEIL, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Based upon my review of the entire record, including the transcript of the proceedings and documentary evidence, I make the relevant findings of fact. At all times material to the Administrative Complaint filed herein, Respondent, John D. Holt, was licensed as a Professional Land Surveyor in the State of Florida and held License No. 0002665. On July 28, 1986, the Board of Professional Land Surveyors entered a Final Order in Case No. 0059729 (DOAH Case No. 86-4449), a prior disciplinary action against Respondent. The Final Order in DPR Case No. 0059729, adopted and incorporated a stipulation executed by the Department of Professional Regulation and John D. Holt on April 18, 1986. A copy of the Final Order was mailed to Respondent. The Final Order in DPR Case No. 0059729 placed Respondent on probation for twenty-seven months. During the course of the twenty-seven month probation, the Final Order required Respondent to pay an administrative fine of $750.00. This fine was to be paid within thirty days from the date the Final Order was filed. Also, the Final Order required Respondent to complete the first available seminar on the Minimum Technical Standards held within his area and to submit twenty-five (25) surveys accompanied by field notes at designated intervals. With regard to the submission of surveys, the relevant part of the stipulation provides that the Respondent shall ...submit to the Board at the end of three (3) months of probation, and again, at the end of nine (9) months, 15, 21, and 27 months of probation, five (5) land survey projects each, accompanied by field notes. As regards these 25 land surveys and field notes, it is Respondent's responsibility to ensure that such reports are submitted to the Executive Director of the Board in compliance with this paragraph in a timely manner. Respondent paid the $750.00 administrative fine as required by the Final Order. However, Respondent failed to complete the first available seminar on Minimum Technical Standards as required by the Final Order. In fact, there was no evidence that Respondent completed any seminar on the Minimum Technical Standards prior to the end of his twenty-seven month probationary period. Respondent failed to submit the requisite number of surveys and field notes for review by the Board within the time specified by the Board's order. The evidence shows that Respondent submitted no surveys or field notes for Board review during the twenty-seven month probationary period. By Final Order entered on February 5, 1990, in DPR's Case Nos. 106764 and 107454, the Board suspended Respondent's license for a period of twenty-four months. Pursuant to the Stipulation, which was incorporated in to the Final Order, the suspension was stayed to allow for a twenty-four month period of probation, during which time the Respondent was to meet certain conditions. The Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 106761 and 107454 imposed three requirements on Respondent. First, Respondent was to pay an administrative fine of $2500.00 no later than thirty (30) days after the Final Order was filed. Second, during the first six months of probation, the Respondent was to provide verification of successful completion of a continuing education course in the Minimum Technical Standards. Third, within the first six months of probation, Respondent was to complete and return to the Board, the Board's study guide. It is undisputed that Respondent, although not present at the informal hearing, received a copy of the Final Order in these cases. The Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 106764 and 107454 provided that within thirty days following the verification of successful completion of the Minimum Technical Standards seminar, the Board's consultant would randomly select six surveys performed by the licensee for submission and review by the Board. If the surveys submitted by the consultant to the Board were found to substantially comply with the Minimum Technical Standards, the Respondent would be released from probation at that time. If the surveys were found by the Board not to comply with the standards, the Board had the option of either lifting the stay and imposing the suspension, or directing the Board consultant to randomly select an additional six (6) surveys performed by the licensee for review by the Board. If the second set of surveys were found not to comply with standards, the stay of suspension would be lifted and the license would be suspended for the remainder of the twenty-four month period. Contrary to the Administrative Complaint and the Disciplinary Worksheet for Case Nos. 106764 and 107454, the Final Order in these cases did not require Respondent to submit six (6) surveys with field notes and record plats to the Board by August 6, 1990. Therefore, Respondent's failure in this regard does not constitute a violation of the Final Order in Case Nos 106764 and 107454. Notwithstanding the error in the Administrative Complaint and Disciplinary Worksheet for Case Nos. 106764 and 107454, it still remains that the actual terms of the Final Order in Case Nos. 106764 and 107454 were completely disregarded by the Respondent. According to the evidence presented, Respondent failed to pay the $2,500 administrative fine which was due on March 8, 1990 as required by the Final Order. Respondent did not attend a Minimum Technical Standards seminar by August 6, 1990. Also, Respondent did not complete and submit to the Board the study guide which was due August 6, 1990. With regard to payment of the administrative fine, Paragraph 11 of the Stipulation states the following: Any fine imposed shall be paid no later than 30 days after the date of the filing of the Board's Final Order arising out of the informal hearing. If the Board shall impose a fine to assure payment of same, the following clause shall be in effect: the Respondent's licensure shall be suspended effective as of the date of the filing of the Board's Final Order imposing the fine, provided however, the effect of the suspension is stayed for 30 days thereafter; if Respondent shall cause payment of said fine to be actually received by the Board within said 30 days, then the suspension imposed shall be automatically lifted upon payment of upon receipt of payment of said fine.... As a result of Respondent's failure to attend a Minimum Technical Standard's seminar, the condition precedent to the consultant randomly selecting six surveys performed by the licensee was not met. Therefore, the Board consultant was unable to request or select surveys performed by the Respondent for submission to the Board for evaluation and review. Violations of the provisions or conditions of probation of the Final Order are expressly addressed in the Stipulation which was incorporated into the Final Order. Paragraph 14 of the Stipulation provides in relevant part the following: Failure of the licensee to comply with any of the terms of probation may result in a lifting of the stay and imposition of the suspension at the Board's discretion. . . On May 14, 1990, Respondent was put on notice by the Department Professional Regulation that he was in violation of the terms of the Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 106764 and 107454 for failure to pay the $2500 administrative fine. By letter dated May 25, 1990, Respondent was notified that his license was suspended as of May 22, 1990, for failure to comply with terms of the Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 10674 and 107454, in that he failed to pay the fine of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00). The letter, received by Respondent on May 30, 1990, indicated that the Board voted to lift the stay and Respondent's licensed was suspended until further action of the Board. This action by the Board was consistent with the provisions of the Final Order. Although the Final Order in Case Nos. 106764 and 107454 provided that "compliance of the licensee after the suspension might result in another stay and continued probation," Respondent never complied with any of the conditions set forth in the Final Order. Therefore the suspension was never stayed and remained in effect. Respondent notified the Board that he filed for bankruptcy and was told that the administrative fine of $2,500.00 may be dischargeable. However, the evidence indicates that Respondent's bankruptcy petition was not filed until 1991, while the administrative fine was due in March, 1990, the preceding year. Thus, Respondent was not entitled to any relief from this obligation at the time it was initially due. Even if the administrative fine of $2,500.00 was discharged by the May 21, 1991 Order of the Bankruptcy Court, which released Respondent from all dischargeable debts, the other terms of the Final Order in Case Nos. 106764 and 107454, are not affected by the Order of the Bankruptcy Court. In his testimony, Respondent admitted that although the administrative fine might be dischargeable in bankruptcy, the other requirements imposed by the Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 10674 and 107454 were not dischargeable on this basis. Respondent violated the provisions of the Final Order in DPR Case No. 59729 and the Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 106764 and 107454.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner revoke Respondent's license to practice land surveying. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of October, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 95-1271 & 95-1272 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1-2. Accepted and incorporated. Paragraph 3. Accepted, except evidence does not support subsection (b). Paragraphs 4-19. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate and unnecessary Paragraph 20. Accepted, except evidence does not support that Discipline Action Worksheet accurately reflects a provision of the Final Order. Paragraphs 21-26. Accepted, and incorporated to the extent not subordinate and unnecessary. Paragraph 27. Accepted, and incorporated, except evidence does not support that Respondent was told that administrative fines were dischargeable. Paragraph 28. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Miriam S. Wilkinson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Mr. John D. Holt 925 Azure Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33414 Angel Gonzalez Executive Director Board of Professional Land Surveyors 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire General Counsel Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether or not Respondent has violated Sections 472.033(1)(a), and (h), and 455.227(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rules 21HH-2.001(3) and 21HH-6.003, Florida Administrative Code, by failure to comply with a valid Final Order of the Board of Professional Land Surveyors.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged, in conjunction with the Board of Professional Land Surveyors, with the responsibility to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Chapters 455 and 472, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. At all times material to the Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent Bertin C. Tash was licensed as a professional land surveyor in the State of Florida, holding license number LS 0002292. By Final Order entered December 31, 1985, the Board of Professional Land Surveyors issued a Final Order in case number 0049353 (previously DOAH Case No. 85-0285), a prior disciplinary action against Respondent. Among other terms of that Final Order, Respondent was placed on probation for twenty-seven months and further was required during the course of that twenty-seven month probation to: ... submit 25 surveys representative of his land surveying practice which shall be accompanied by field notes and record plats to the board for its review. Additional information regarding the surveys may be requested. Five surveys shall be submitted within three months from the filing of this final order; thereafter, five surveys shall be submitted at six month intervals during the period of probation. Respondent shall attend the first available continuing education seminar in his area on the minimum technical standards within 12 months from the filing of this order or as soon after as possible. Evidence of Respondent's attendance and successful completion of the course shall be furnished to the board through the proctor or instructor of the continuing education course... (Emphasis supplied.) It is noted that although the "certificate of service" for the copy of the Final Order admitted in evidence as part of Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is unsigned, Respondent admitted receipt thereof, that no appeal was taken therefrom, and that he understood the terms of the Final Order. Twenty-seven months from December 31, 1985 would fall on April 1, 1987. Twelve months from December 31, 1985 would fall on January 2, 1986. Respondent initially complied with the Final Order by submitting two sets of five surveys, the second in December, 1986. However, some type of dispute arose between Respondent and the Board's monitor of Respondent's probation about whether the monitor could require corrections to be done by Respondent to those surveys already submitted and about whether or not Respondent could be required to submit his field notes for the surveys. Respondent seems to have resisted the clear language of the Final Order (see emphasized language in Finding of Fact No. 4, supra) upon a personal belief that these requirements were unconstitutional, invaded his privacy, or exposed him to ethical charges by his clients. There is nothing in the record, to support this ideation of Respondent, and eventually, Respondent altered his position. Respondent did not submit any further surveys until November, 1988 after the instant case was already in progress, at which time he had modified some of his views with regard to field notes. He then attempted to comply with the Final Order by submitting corrected surveys. However, in error, he sent these surveys not to the Board, but to the attorney for the Department of Professional Regulation where they were retained. This submittal was considerably beyond the April 1, 1987 probationary period and whether considered corrections of the second five surveys or an additional five surveys would not constitute the twenty-five surveys required by the prior Final Order. The Respondent failed to complete a seminar on minimum technical standards between the entry of the Final Order on December 31, 1985 and the date of formal hearing on December 14, 1988. Petitioner submitted proof that such courses were available in West Palm Beach, Respondent's hometown, on May 20, 1987, and in adjoining Broward County on May 21, 1988. Clearly, neither of these courses was available to Respondent during the probationary time frames set out in the Final Order and Findings of Fact Nos. 4 and 5 supra. Petitioner submitted no proof of the availability of other such courses during the appropriate time frames, but it appears undisputed that these were the only qualifying courses "in his area" and that the Board would have accepted Respondent's late completion of either course as his compliance with the continuing education requirement in the Final Order. The Board even went so far as to reserve space for Respondent at the May 21, 1988 course in Broward County. Respondent's testimony that he was too ill to attend the May 30, 1987 course is unrefuted. Respondent's testimony that he had, no private means of transportation to the May 21, 1988 course is also unrefuted but he did not show unavailability of public transportation. Moreover, Respondent testified that until the date of formal hearing, he had resisted, upon grounds of his personal ethical ideation, the concept of learning from, or submitting himself to critiques by, any local professionals who conducted continuing education seminars in land surveying.
Recommendation That the Board of Professional Land Surveyors enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of two counts of violating Section 472.003(1)(h) Florida Statutes, and imposing a three-month suspension of Respondent's license, subject to an extension of such suspension to a maximum of one year or until Respondent completes the continuing education course required by the prior Final Order, whichever comes first, and imposing thereafter three years' probation to follow immediately upon the lifting of the suspension, during which three years' probation Respondent shall be required to submit an appropriate number of surveys to be determined by the Board for review by the Board. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-3108 The following constitute specific rulings upon the parties' respective Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF) pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's PFOF: 1-5 are all accepted. Respondent's PFOF: PFOF 1 discusses the nature of several exhibits and objections ruled upon in the course of formal hearing, does not constitute a relevant or material proposed fact and is not dispositive of any issue at bar. The same subjects are addressed within the RO at FOF 3-4 and 8 to the degree they impinge on this proceeding. PFOF 2 is rejected in part and accepted in part in FOF 8 to the degree it comports with the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. PFOF 3 is accepted in part in FOF 6. The remainder of the proposal is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, and not comporting with the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. PFOF 4,5,7 and 8 are rejected as mere argument of position or legal argument. PFOF 6 is accepted in part in FOF 7. The remainder of the proposal is rejected as immaterial or mere argument of position or legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: George W. Harrell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bertin C. Tash 5100 Spruce Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33407-2846 Allen Smith, Jr. Executive Director Board of Professional Land Surveyors 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32299-0750 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is registered with the Board as a land surveyor. He holds registration number 2027. During October, 1976, Harold J. Read, Jr., a construction contractor, retained the Respondent to make a survey of lots 9067 and 9068, on block 294, in the Florida Shores subdivision, unit number 10, located in Volusia County, Florida. The lots were owned by Read, and it was his intention to construct a house on the lots for resale. Read needed the survey in order to clear the land, and to properly locate the house on the lots. On October 8, 1976, a survey team employed by the Respondent went to the site to perform the survey. The lots are located on Royal Palm Drive. The southeast corner of the lots is located 120 feet from the corner of Royal Palm Drive and 26th Street. The survey team located the concrete monument or survey marker at the northwest corner of Royal Palm and 26th Street, and set a "tin tab" in the middle of Royal Palm Drive extending directly across the street from the permanent monument. A "tin tab" is a metal disc approximately twice the size of a quarter which is used by surveyors to make appropriate markings in the middle of streets. The tin tab is nailed into the street. The survey team then measured 120 feet along the center of Royal Palm Drive and set a tin tab which was directly across from the southeast corner of the lots. The team then measured 80 feet further along Royal Palm Drive and set a tin tab to designate the northeast corner of the lots. All of the lots in the Florida Shores subdivision are 40 feet by 125 feet, therefore the two lots owned by Read had an 80 foot frontage on Royal Palm Drive. The team measured directly from the tin tabs over to the edge of the Royal Palm Drive right-of-way and located the corners of the lots. Spaces were cleared and iron pipes were placed in the ground to mark the corners. Next to each pipe, a four foot long piece of wood lath was placed approximately eight inches in the ground, and yellow flags were tied to the stakes. These stakes were placed at the corners in order to allow the owner to easily see the locations of the corners. Four foot long stakes were used because the lots had not been cleared and the growth was rather heavy. When the southeast and northeast corners were located in this manner, the survey team performed a similar operation to locate the southwest and northwest corners. The team did not determine these corners by measuring 125 feet from the eastern corners because of the thickness of the underbrush. Instead, the team measured down 26th street 125 feet, and set the western corners walking along a cleared electrical wire right-of-way. Iron pipes and wood stakes with yellow flags were placed at each of the western boundaries. The survey team was at the site for approximately one and one half hours. Iron reinforcing rods which appeared to be markings from previous surveys were found at at least two of the corners, and in order to set the iron pipes, the survey team needed to clear underbrush. On October 13, 1976, Harold Read, several of his employees, and a dozer operator who he had hired to clear the lots appeared at the lots to clear them, and to locate the house. They found stakes somewhat shorter than those placed by the surveyors. One of the Board's witnesses testified that these stakes had yellow flags tied to them, but the rest of the witnesses testified that the flags were orange. At least two, and possibly three of the stakes were located next to iron pipes which appeared to be the corner markers. Read assumed that these stakes marked the corners, and he instructed the dozer operator to clear the property accordingly. After the lots were cleared, Read, with his employees, located the house on the lot so that there would be approximately ten feet between each end of the house and the northern and southern boundaries of the lots. Read then commenced to build the house, and in January, 1977, the house was nearly completed. In order to complete financing arrangements the lending institution that had been utilized by Read requested that the lots be resurveyed in order to assure that the house was appropriately located. On January 29, 1977, the Respondent went to the lots to perform the resurvey. He found that the lots had been cleared twenty feet too far south, and that the house had been located so that it encroached by ten feet into the lot which directly adjoined Read's lots to the south. He checked and found that the tin tabs placed by his crew were still in the center of Royal Palm Drive designating what would have been the correct boundaries of the lot. He did not find the pipes that would have marked the correct corners, so he reset pipes at the appropriate corner locations. Thereafter the Respondent checked the information with his survey team, and verified that the original survey had been done correctly. He then contacted Read about the discrepancies. Read, the Respondent, and several others visited the site later that day. The Respondent denied, and continues to deny, that the original survey was conducted improperly. Read has consistently maintained that he correctly followed the stakes that were at the site. No explanation was offered at the hearing, and it does not appear that any of the parties have evidence which would explain how the stakes and pipes came to be moved from the correct locations on October 8, when the survey was conducted, to incorrect locations on October 13, when the lots were cleared, and the house was located. It affirmatively appears from the evidence that the Respondent's crew properly performed the survey and that the Respondent was not responsible for the stakes being moved. Evidence contrary to this finding has been considered and rejected.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Andrew T. Edgemond, committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed against Respondent's land surveyor's license.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged, in conjunction with the Board of Professional Surveyors and Mappers, with the responsibility to license, regulate, and discipline land surveyors in the State of Florida. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed land surveyor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number LS 0002347. Respondent was initially licensed as a land surveyor in 1971 and has practiced land surveying in Plant City, Florida for more than twenty years. On or about March 22, 1989, Respondent was contacted by a client who requested that Respondent prepare a survey specifying the location of certain mono form boards. Mono form boards are temporary structures and are not fixed improvements, although they may be used to indicate where fixed improvements will be located. The client indicated that the survey was needed immediately because the client was to have a slab of concrete poured before the next morning. Prior to conducting the survey, Respondent asked his client for a legal description of the property on which the form boards were located. The client provided Respondent with a copy of a building permit which contained a reference to a preliminary plat. Respondent then went to City Hall in Plant City, Florida where he obtained a preliminary plat which included the property on which the form boards were located. After leaving the City Hall, Respondent went to his office to determine where the property was located. In researching the files in his office, Respondent found a boundary survey which included a property line which was coincident with the property the client had asked him to survey. Having obtained the building permit, preliminary plat, and the boundary survey, Respondent went into the field to measure the location of the form boards. Upon returning to his office, Respondent prepared a survey which indicated the location of the mono form boards. The survey, dated March 22, 1989, was signed and sealed by Respondent. On the survey was the following: "SPECIFIC PURPOSE SURVEY" "FOR BUILDING PERMIT PURPOSES ONLY" The survey drawing contained a preliminary description as follows: PRELIMINARY DESCRIPTION Lot 22 of WALDIN LAKE UNIT 55 as per "Preliminary Plat" on file in City Engineers office, City of Plant City, Florida. Respondent made the decision to designate the survey a specific purpose survey after he reviewed Rule 21HH-6.002, Florida Administrative Code. After reviewing the various types of surveys outlined in the rule, Respondent concluded that a survey done solely to provide a client with the location of mono form boards that were already in place came within the definition of a specific or special purpose survey. A specific or special purpose survey is one that is performed for specified purposes and does not come within the definition of other types of surveys outlined in Rule 21HH-6.002, Florida Administrative Code. The specific purpose survey allows the surveyor to perform a survey that meets the client's particular need. However, a specific purpose survey may not be used to circumvent the law and must conform to the minimum technical standards. The Department's position is that a specific purpose survey was inappropriate in the instant case. Moreover, even if a specific purpose survey was appropriate, the Respondent's survey failed to meet the minimum technical standards. With regard to the type of survey performed by Respondent, the Department's expert witness, Lewis Kent, testified that Respondent's use of the specific purpose survey in this case was improper. Although this was his opinion, Mr. Kent candidly admitted that he was not sure what Respondent was requested to do by the client. Mr. Kent further testified that standard practice requires that boundary surveys be performed prior to new construction. Apparently, Mr. Kent believed that the situation in this case involved new construction. Based on that belief, he concluded that Respondent was obligated to perform a boundary survey. Notwithstanding this conclusion, no authority was cited for this proposition. In fact, evidence was presented that the Plant City Building Department did not require a boundary survey as a condition of issuing a building permit for commercial projects, such as the proposed project of Respondent's client. At one point, Mr. Kent stated that the Respondent was required to perform a boundary survey of the entire 1,539.523 acre tract, even though the tract had already been surveyed. During the course of his testimony, Mr. Kent retreated from this position and indicated that Respondent was not obligated to retrace the entire tract, but should have retraced enough of the tract to tie his survey to a legal corner. Notwithstanding the Department's position that the specific purpose survey was inappropriate in this case and that Respondent should have performed a boundary survey, its expert witness testified that a boundary survey was not the only way to locate the mono form boards. During his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Kent indicated that perhaps the type of survey that Respondent should have performed was a "construction layout survey" as that term is defined in Rule 22HH-6.002 (6)(c), Florida Administrative Code. In regard to the second allegation, the Department asserted that even if the survey was appropriately designated a specific purpose survey, the survey failed to meet the minimum technical standards. Specifically, the Department alleged that Respondent's specific purpose survey failed to include an adequate legal description and a legend which included abbreviations used in the drawing. According to the Department's expert witness, the legal description on Respondent's specific purpose survey failed to meet the minimum technical standards in that the description on the face of the survey referred only to a preliminary plat, which by its very nature is subject to change. However, at the time Respondent prepared the specific purpose survey, the subdivision had not yet been platted. The Department's position is that the minimum technical standards required that the survey include a phrase describing the legal metes and bounds, and show the location of the mono form boards in relation to a boundary line. According to the Department's expert, as presently drawn, another surveyor could not reproduce this survey without first obtaining a copy of the preliminary plat referred to on the survey. Richard Hinson, the expert witness for Respondent has been a licensed land surveyor in the State of Florida since 1982. During that time, Mr. Hinson has performed several hundred boundary surveys in Plant City, Florida and over a hundred surveys for building permit purposes. The testimony of Mr. Hinson conflicted directly with the testimony of Mr. Kent. It was Mr. Hinson's testimony that in the instant case, a specific purpose survey is appropriate. Based on what Respondent's client requested, a measurement showing the location of the mono form boards, the survey was appropriately designated a specific purpose survey. The Department asserted that, at a minimum, Respondent was obligated to do a boundary survey of Lot 22. However, in this situation, a boundary survey of preliminary Lot 22 would have made no difference in the location of the mono form boards because Lot 22 did not exist when Respondent prepared the survey. With regard to the preliminary description on the survey, based on Mr. Hinson's opinion, the specific purpose survey prepared by Respondent meets the minimum technical standards. While the survey does not recite or go back to a corner for the description, the description given is that it relates to the preliminary plat. With respect to the use of a specific purpose survey, Mr. Hinson's opinion was that, in this case, it was appropriate for Respondent to perform a specific purpose survey to measure the location of form boards. This opinion was based on two factors, both of which were present in this case. First, prior to performing the survey, the surveyor must have reviewed the following: a boundary survey, a building permit with a legal description describing Lot 22 according to a preliminary plat, and a copy the preliminary plat showing Lot 22. Second, the surveyor must have determined that the preliminary plat was rendered out of the boundary survey. In this case, prior to performing the specific purpose survey, Respondent utilized a boundary survey of the tract, which included Lot 22 as shown on the preliminary plat, and determined that the preliminary plat was rendered from that survey. After assuring himself that the preliminary plat was rendered from the boundary survey which he reviewed, Respondent went to the site and proceeded to measure and draw the location of the mono form boards in his field notes. Respondent's survey shows Lot 22 and notes that this is a preliminary description based on a preliminary plat. The preliminary plat is referenced on the survey. The drawing, which depicts the location of the mono form boards, measures the distance from the boundary of Lot 22 to Old Sydney Road and to Sydney Road. The drawing also measures the distance of the mono form boards from the boundary lines of Lot 22. The accuracy of these measurements were undisputed by the Department. Based on Mr. Hinson's opinion, Respondent's decision to designate the survey in the instant case as a specific purpose survey was appropriate. Also, with respect to the preliminary description that appears on the face of the survey, the survey meets the minimum technical standards. The specific purpose survey prepared by Respondent fails to meet the minimum technical standard set forth in Rule 21HH-6.003(5), Florida Administrative Code. That rule requires that the abbreviations used on the drawing be noted within a legend on the face of the drawing. In this case, the abbreviations used on the survey are not noted on a legend or anywhere else on the survey. No evidence was presented to indicate that the specific purpose survey performed by Respondent inaccurately depicted the location of the mono form boards. Neither was evidence presented which even claimed to indicate that the survey prepared by Respondent failed to comply with the client's request. Respondent has been a licensed land surveyor in the State of Florida for twenty-four years, and there is no evidence that he has been subjected to disciplinary action on any prior occasion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Land Surveyors and Mappers, enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 472.033(1)(h), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $250.00 RECOMMENDED that Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1159 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Statutes, (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1-3. Accepted and incorporated. 4-5. Accepted. 6. Accepted and incorporated. 7-9. Accepted. 10. Rejected as statement of rule. 11. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. 12. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 13. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. 14. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 15. Rejected as argument. 16. Accepted and incorporated. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 20. Rejected as argument. 21-22. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted. Accepted except at time of survey the lots were preliminary. Rejected as argument. 26-27. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 28. Accepted except statement that Respondent was obligated to retrace part of the survey is rejected. 29-31. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. Accepted. 34-35. Rejected as argument. 36. Accepted. 37-40. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. 41. Accepted. 42-43. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected as conclusion of law. 46-48. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted and incorporated. Unsupported by record evidence. 3-7. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as conclusion of law. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary. 1-3 of page 2. Rejected as conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Miriam S. Wilkinson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Mark W. Reagan, Esquire P.O. Box 321028 Cocoa Beach, Florida 32932 Angel Gonzalez, Executive Director Board of Professional Land Surveyors 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether a development order adopted by Respondent City of Marathon by Resolution PC00-09-04 is consistent with the comprehensive plan, land development regulations, and statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent City of Marathon (Marathon) was incorporated on November 30, 1999. It adopted as its land development regulations (LDR) the LDRs of Monroe County in effect at the time of Marathon's incorporation. Marathon is within The Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. This case involves a development order that Marathon issued to Respondent Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc. (BB). As Planning Commission Resolution 00-09-04, the development order authorizes BB to add 12 motel rooms to an existing motel in return for imposing certain restrictions on the use of wet slips at its adjacent marina that is part of the same motel/marina development. The restrictions require the removal of cable television connections from 12 slips and limitation upon vessels using these 12 slips to those without plumbing facilities. For the remaining wet slips at the marina, the development order requires BB to limit their use to no more than 18 vessels at one time and to provide mandatory sewage pumpout for these vessels. At various points in the record and this recommended order, references to a "transfer" of 12 marina slips for 12 motel rooms refer to the conditions set forth in this paragraph. BB owns 7.39 acres of upland and 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom in Marathon at mile marker 49.5 (Subject Property or, as developed, Banana Bay). The Subject Property runs from U.S. Route 1 to the water. The Subject Property contains 60 motel rooms in two buildings, a conference room, a motel office, support buildings, three apartments suitable for employee use, and a marina. The marina includes 40-50 slips, depending upon the size of the moored vessels. The Subject Property is zoned Suburban Commercial (SC) and Mixed Use (MU). About 2.4 acres (104,544 square feet) running about 350 feet from U.S. Route 1 is SC. About 4.99 acres (217,364 square feet) is zoned MU. The additional 2.67 acres of adjacent bay bottom are also zoned MU, although the submerged acreage is unimportant for reasons discussed below. Twenty-five of the motel rooms are in SC, and 35 of the motel rooms are in MU, although the distinction between zoning districts is also unimportant for reasons discussed below. LDR Code Section 9.5-267 authorizes ten "rooms" per ”acre" as "allocated density" for motel uses in SC and MU and 15 "rooms" per "buildable acre" as "maximum net density" for motel uses in SC and MU. (There is no difference between "hotels" and "motels" in this case; all references to "motels" include "hotels.") Three fundamental questions emerge concerning the application of these two density limitations to this case. The first is whether BB must satisfy both the "allocated density" and "maximum net density" limitation. This is not a difficult issue; BB's proposal must satisfy each of these density limitations. The second question is what is included in the areas under each of these density limitations. Notwithstanding the use of "gross acres" in the "allocated density" formula, it is necessary to net out certain areas--just less than is netted out in the "maximum net density" formula. The third question is what constitutes a "room." When applied to marine-based units, the definition of a "room" presents a difficult and important issue. As a whole, the LDRs imply that no marine-based dwelling units should count as "rooms," but one provision specifically requires the inclusion of "live-aboard" units in density calculations. The first question requires little analysis. As noted below in the discussion of the two types of areas, "allocated density" and "maximum net density" provide two separate measures of the intensity of use of land. The allowable density for "maximum net density" is never less than the allowable density for "allocated density" because "maximum net density" is a safeguard to ensure that, after netting out from the parcel those areas reserved for open space, setbacks, and buffers, the intensity of use will not be excessive. Nothing whatsoever in the LDRs suggests that Marathon may issue a development order for a proposal that satisfies the "maximum net density," but not the "allocated density." These two densities limitations operate in tandem, not in the alternative. The calculation of the "allocated density" requires consideration of the second and third questions identified above. The issue of area seems straightforward. LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-3) defines "density or allocated density" as "the number of dwelling units or rooms allocated per gross acre of land by the plan." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-4) defines "maximum net density" as "the maximum density permitted to be developed per unit of land on the net buildable area of a site, as measured in dwelling units or rooms per acre." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(G-4) defines "gross area" as "the total acreage of a site less submerged lands and any dedicated public rights-of-way." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(N-4) defines "net buildable area" as "that portion of a parcel of land which is developable and is not open space required by section 9.5-262 or 9.5-343 or required minimum bufferyard under article VII division 11 or required setbacks under section 9.5-281." The area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is greater than the area of land involved in determining "maximum net density." But the area of land involved in determining "allocated density" is itself a net amount. The LDRs expressly require reducing the gross areas by any submerged land and dedicated public rights-of-way. However, any reasonable application of the LDRs also requires reducing the gross areas used for the motel "allocated density" calculation by the minimum areas required to support other uses on the Subject Property. If the only use of the Subject Property were motel rooms, the "allocated density" limit of ten units per acre (10:1) would allow 73.9 rooms. But the Marathon Planning Commission Staff Report dated September 18, 2000, correctly netted from the Subject Property the land areas required to support the commercial aspects of the hotel and the commercial apartments. These reductions leave a total of 5.86 acres available to support the motel rooms. At a density of 10:1, the Subject Property could therefore support a total of 58 motel rooms. The Planning Commission incorrectly used the 15:1 ratio for "maximum net density" in concluding that the Subject Property could support a total of 67.65 motel rooms. Evidently, the Planning Commission used the "maximum net density" because it was not using "gross area" or "gross acres" (the terms are synonymous under the Code) in calculating the area. The netting reduction necessary to calculate whether BB's proposal satisfies the "maximum net density" limitation would require the calculation of the area of the Subject Property that must be devoted to open space, setbacks, and buffers. The Planning Commission probably undertook this step in calculating the "maximum net density" for the Subject Property, as its figures seem to include unstated deductions for the 20 percent open space plus another factor, probably for setbacks and buffers--all of which are discussed in its report. However, the Planning Commission erroneously neglected to apply the "allocated density" limitation to the "gross acres," exclusive of submerged land, public rights-of-way, and the minimum land required to support the other upland uses. As noted above, doing so would have yielded no more than 58 motel rooms. At present, the Subject Property contains 60 hotel or motel rooms. The Subject Property therefore cannot support the addition of another 12 hotel or motel rooms, given its "allocated density" of only 58 rooms. In general, BB justifies the addition of 12 rooms to the front motel by arguing that it is only transferring these units from the 12 existing wet slips. It is unnecessary to determine whether a transfer under these facts is lawful when, if these 12 slips count as units, the Subject Property is already 14 units over its "allocated density." The resolution of the third question--what constitutes a "room"--dispenses with this argument. Thirty of the existing 40-50 boat slips in the marina have water, electric, and cable hook-ups and are presently used for some form of habitation. Most vessels berth at the marina for two or three days, although the average stay is slightly over one month. The average stay at the 30 slips offering utilities, though, is two to three months. Typically, two persons use a vessel berthed at the marina for more than a couple of days. BB seals the discharge ports of all vessels mooring at the marina for any appreciable period of time. BB provides a sewage pumpout service for these and other vessels. The wastewater from the marina operations goes to a septic tank, in contrast to the wastewater from the motel operations, which goes to an onsite package plant. Persons mooring at the marina for at least two months normally obtain telephone service and may obtain cable television service, in addition to the potable water and electrical services provided by BB. The marina also provides rest rooms, laundry facilities, showers, a bar, limited food service, and a mail box. However, BB rules require that all persons berthing at the marina register a permanent address because the slips are "not considered permanent housing." At the request of the Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority and the Monroe County Planning Department, BB has limited rental agreements at the marina to a maximum of one month, although some persons enter into back-to-back rental agreements. Persons staying more than one week often have cars. Contrary to BB's contentions, none of these slips provides additional density for the Subject Property, and therefore the 12 slips are not available for transfer to the motel. For the same reason, as discussed below, the proposed transfer of the 12 units would also violate the Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO). In two respects, the record reveals that the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland residential uses might facilitate the achievement of important land use planning objectives. First, the wastewater collected from the marina is directed to a septic tank, and the wastewater collected from the motel is directed to a package plant. Absent a significantly reduced flow from the marine-based residential use, the upland residential use would therefore impact the adjacent waters to a lesser extent. Second, marine-based residential users may be more reluctant to evacuate for an approaching hurricane than upland residential users. Absent a significantly greater number of visitors during hurricane season if the 12 units were taken from the marina slips and added to the motel, the upland residential use might therefore facilitate timely hurricane evacuation of the vulnerable Keys. However, the record was relatively undeveloped on these two points, and these possible advantages to the conversion of marine-based residential uses to upland-based residential uses do not override the LDRs. The LDRs may treat the more intense residential use associated with "live-aboards" differently than the less intense residential use associated with other moored vessels. Although the LDRs' treatment of "live-aboards" may not be entirely consistent, any inconsistency is irrelevant in this case because the moored vessels at the Banana Bay marina do not qualify as "live-aboards." As stipulated for the purpose of this case, LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-4) defines a "transient residential unit" as "a dwelling unit used for transient housing such as a hotel or motel room, or space for parking a recreational vehicle or travel trailer." LDR Code Section 9.5-4(D-31) defines a "dwelling unit" as "one (1) or more rooms physically arranged to create a housekeeping establishment for occupancy by one (1) family with separate toilet facilities." LDR Code Sections 9.5-4(D-23) through 9.5-4(D-30) identify the various types of dwellings that may contain "dwelling units.” These dwellings are, respectively, detached zero-lot-line dwellings, multifamily apartment dwellings, attached dwellings, detached individual dwellings, duplex dwellings, commercial apartment dwellings, rooftop dwellings, and townhouse dwellings. The frequent references to "open yards" in these definitions precludes the application of these definitions to moored vessels, even "live- aboards." The exclusion of all moored vessels, including "live-aboards," from density calculations is also suggested by two other portions of the LDRs. As is typical, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 provides that the mechanism for enforcing density limitations is in the issuance of building permits, but this enforcement mechanism is of doubtful use in regulating vessel moorings, which do not typically involve the issuance of a building permit. Also, the density definitions discussed above both refer to the development of various types of residential uses on "land." Moreover, none of the zoning districts established in Marathon's LDRs measures the intensity of marina uses, including vessels moored for extended periods as live-aboards, by imposing some sort of marine density limitation, either by including the moored dwelling units or the submerged acreage. Because the LDRs did not intend to include such marine-based uses in density calculations, LDR Code Section 9.5-267, which is a table setting forth "allocated densities" and "maximum net densities," covers only upland-based uses, including recreational vehicle or campground spaces per acre, and does not extent to marine-based uses, such as live-aboard marina slips. However, two provisions in the LDRs require density calculations to include "live-aboards." LDR Code Section 9.5-308, which seems to be an older provision in the LDRs, provides that "each live-aboard shall count as a dwelling unit for the purpose of calculating density limitations in the district in which it is permitted." Better incorporated into the present regulatory scheme of the LDRs, LDR Code Section 9.5-120.1 defines a "residential dwelling unit" as a "dwelling unit," including a "transient rental unit," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(T-3), and "live-aboard vessels," as defined in LDR Code Section 9.5-4(L-6). However, LDR Code Section 9.5-4((L-6) states that a "live-aboard vessel" is "any vessel used solely as a residence or any vessel represented as a place of business, a professional or other commercial enterprise, or a legal residence." The record does not suggest that any of the moored vessels were used "solely" as a residence, as distinguished, for instance, from a vessel used for residential and recreational purposes, or that any of the mixed-use vessels served as the occupants' legal residence. Absent a finding that the moored vessels constitute "transient residential units," ROGO does not support this proposed transfer of residential uses from marine-based to upland-based. LDR Code Section 9.5-123(f)(3) authorizes the transfer of an existing "residential dwelling unit" from one site to another within the same subarea. However, LDR Code Section 9.5-122 defines a "residential dwelling unit" to extend only to "live-aboards." For the reasons already discussed, the less intense residential uses associated with the vessels moored at Banana Bay's marina preclude their treatment as "residential dwelling units" eligible for transfer to the motel. Petitioner has proved that the development order is materially inconsistent with the LDRs. LDR provisions governing the density and intensity of residential development go to the heart of effective land use planning, especially in an area as sensitive as the Keys. For these reason, it is unnecessary to consider the consistency of the development order with the more general provisions of Marathon's comprehensive plan, on which Marathon's LDRs are based.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order denying the request of Banana Bay of Marathon, Inc., to approve the transfer of 12 slips to 12 rooms in a motel on the Subject Property. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara L. Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Charles Canaday, General Counsel Office of the Governor Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1001 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Mitchell A. Bierman Weiss Serota 2665 South Bayshore Drive Suite 420 Miami, Florida 33133 James S. Mattson James S. Mattson, P.A. Post Office Box 586 Key Largo, Florida 33037
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been licensed to practice land surveying in Florida at all times relevant to this proceeding. However, between January 31, 1983 and August 27, 1983, his license was inactive due to his failure to renew. His license was reinstated automatically upon payment of the $80 biannual renewal fee in August, 1983, along with payment of a $20 late fee levied by Petitioner. On May 12, 1983, while his license was inactive, Respondent signed a boundary survey in his capacity as a registered land surveyor which included the following certification: "I hereby certify that the plat shown hereon is a true and correct representation of a survey of the property described in the caption thereof, made under my direction, and is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief, and there are no encroachments unless shown." The property at issue was surveyed by Mr. Teddy O. Potter, who has a surveying business in West Palm Beach, but is not licensed as a land surveyor. Respondent is a former business associate of Potter's and certified the drawing as a favor to Potter. Respondent had not visited the property or participated in the boundary survey in any way. His certification was based on his inspection of the drawing and faith in Potter whom he had earlier trained. The property is owned by Mr. Thomas Burdsall who originally retained Potter to survey the property for mortgage purposes in 1979. The survey at issue here was required for the construction of a warehouse. Burdsall again contacted Potter who updated his 1979 drawing without resurveying the property. It should be noted that Respondent was not involved in the earlier survey, which was certified by another Potter associate. Utilizing Potter's boundary markers and the drawing certified by Respondent, Burdsall's contractor laid out the building and began construction. Potter then did a third (tie- in) survey revising the May 12, 1983 survey to show actual building placement. This tie-in survey revealed no encroachment. Subsequent to the tie-in survey, City inspectors observed what they believed was encroachment by the partially completed structure. A meeting was held and Potter agreed to call in a registered land surveyor to conduct a resurvey. Potter retained Mr. Robert Turso, a registered land surveyor, who conducted the resurvey and confirmed the suspected encroachment. As a result, it was necessary to remove and rebuild portions of the newly constructed building at considerable expense to the owner, Thomas Burdsall. The testimony of Petitioner's expert witness established that the survey certified by Respondent failed to meet certain minimum technical standards recognized in the land surveyors' profession which are set forth in Rule 21HH-6.03, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C). Specifically, the following deficiencies were identified: 21HH-6.03(4), F.A.C., requires that reference to all bearings be shown and clearly stated. In the subject survey drawing, no bearings were shown. 21HH-6.03(6), F.A.C., requires the survey to comply with the real property description and all discrepancies with the boundary corners from the boundary lines shown by the survey are to be indicated. Here, the corners were not shown nor were the discrepancies between those corners and plat dimensions shown. 21HH-6.03(7), F.A.C., requires all angles to be shown directly on the drawing or by bearings or azimuths. In this survey, no angles were shown. 21HH-6.03(8), F.A.C., requires that the intersection and the distance to the nearest intersection be shown. These requirements were not met. 21HH-6.02(10), F.A.C., requires adjoining lots and blocks be shown in surveys of lots in recorded subdivisions. This requirement was not met. 21HH-6.03(18), F.A.C., requires monuments to be found or set. This was not accomplished, and no corners were shown on the drawing to be found or set. 21HH-6.03(19), F.A.C., requires boundary monuments be appropriately constructed, identified and set. This was not accomplished here.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's license as a land surveyor for a period of four months. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of November, 1984 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Shields, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Allen R. Smith, Esquire Executive Director Board of Land Surveyors 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ralph G. Purvis Post Office Box 16084 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph W. Lawrence, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The central issue in case no. 91-7302 is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint dated October 14, 1991; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed. The central issue in case no. 91-8259 is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint dated November 11, 1991; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to this case, Respondent has been licensed as a land surveyor in the State of Florida, license no. LS Respondent signed and sealed three surveys for property belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Michael Lengfellner. Those surveys (received in evidence as Petitioner's exhibits 2, 3, and 4) were prepared and certified by Respondent to be in compliance with the Minimum Technical Standards found in Section 472.027, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 21HH-6, Florida Administrative Code. With regard to Petitioner's exhibit 2, the survey drawing shows a 90 degree right angle corner at the northeast property corner when that angle should have been depicted at the southeast corner. The plat for the property shows the 90 degree corner at the southeast corner. Further, the survey reflects incorrect bearing and distances along the easterly property line. Additionally, the angular data provided for the non-radial side of the property lines is not shown on the survey. When a non-radial line is shown, additional information must be given to clarify the dimensions. Such information is not shown on Petitioner's exhibit 2. With regard to Petitioner's exhibit 3, the Respondent, again, did not provide the non-radial line angular data. More specifically, no data was depicted showing the delta, radius, and arc, or chord bearing or angle. With regard to Petitioner's exhibit 4, the Respondent, again, omitted the non-radial line data described above. Further, while Respondent's field notes state the survey was tied to a permanent reference monument, that information was not depicted on the survey drawing. Bearings for the well- defined line relied upon by Respondent were not indicated on the drawing. The survey drawing also did not compare the measured direction and distances in relation to the recorded direction and distances. Finally, this survey failed to provide a legend for abbreviations used in the drawing. Any abbreviation not listed by rule must be explained in a legend. Respondent signed, sealed and certified the survey drawing identified as Petitioner's exhibit 7. With regard to Petitioner's exhibit 7, the Respondent failed to depict the partial lot distances in the survey drawing. The fractional parts of the lots (lots 14 and 15) were not shown on the drawing. Fractional parts of a lot excluded from the surveyed description should be dimensioned. Respondent did not show the distance to the nearest street line or identifiable reference in Petitioner's exhibit 7. Nor did the survey drawing depict the distance to a well defined corner or block corner. In short, the survey did not reference an identifiable point. The Respondent did not provide a legend for the survey drawing, Petitioner's exhibit 7, which explained all abbreviations used on the drawing. The fence depicted on the west boundary of the lots is not related to the boundary lines. Since the fence is pertinent to the survey, the relationship of the fence to the boundary lines should be explained on Petitioner's exhibit 7. Respondent failed to refer Petitioner's exhibit 7 to a specific well- established line. Respondent did not disclose the type of survey performed on Petitioner's exhibit 7. Respondent signed, sealed, and certified the survey drawing identified as Petitioner's exhibit 9. With regard to Petitioner's exhibit 9, Respondent failed to identify the type of road (public or private) depicted on the survey. Further, the first course of the legal description was not shown on the survey drawing. Even if the first course were an easement, it should be depicted on the drawing to reflect the property's access interest as that property is described in the legal description for the parcel. The errors or omissions noted above catalog the instances where Respondent failed to comply with the minimum technical standards for surveys.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Professional Land Surveyors enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of having violated Section 472.033(1)(h), Florida Statutes, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1500.00. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO CASE NOS. 91-7302 AND 91-8259 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY PETITIONER: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are accepted. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are rejected as comment, argument, or irrelevant. The first sentence of paragraph 7 is accepted, the remainder rejected as conclusion of law or recitation of rules. Paragraphs 8 through 11 are accepted. Paragraph 12 is rejected as a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 13 through 17 are accepted. Paragraphs 18 and 19 are rejected as conclusion of law. Paragraph 20 is accepted. Paragraph 21 is rejected as statement of the rule, not fact at issue. Paragraph 22 is accepted except as to the conclusion of law of the violation. Except as to the conclusion of law and the recitation of the rule, paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraphs 24 and 25 are accepted. Except as to the conclusion of law regarding a violation and the recitation of the rule, paragraph 26 is accepted. Except as to the conclusion of law regarding a violation, paragraph 27 is accepted. Except as to the conclusion of law regarding a violation and the recitation of the rule, paragraph 28 is accepted. Paragraph 29 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the evidence; the paragraph is vague as it does not specify to which "above abbreviations" it refers. Paragraphs 30 and 31 are accepted. Paragraph 32 is rejected as comment, not fact in dispute. Except as to the conclusion of law regarding a violation, paragraph 33 is accepted. Except as to the conclusion of law regarding a violation, paragraph 34 is accepted. Except as to the conclusion of law regarding a violation and the recitation of the rule, paragraph 35 is accepted. Except as to the conclusions of law regarding violations and the recitation of the rule, paragraphs 36 through 42 are accepted. Paragraph 43 is rejected as comment or irrelevant. Except as to the conclusions of law regarding violations and the recitation of the rule, paragraphs 44 through 51 are accepted Paragraphs 52 and 53 are rejected as repetitive, comment, or irrelevant. Except as to the conclusions of law regarding violations and the recitation of the rule, paragraphs 54 through 65 are accepted. Paragraphs 66 through 71 are rejected as argument, conclusion of law or comment. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: William S. Cummins Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Gary D. Hunt 247 Lake Ellen Drive Casselberry, Florida 32707 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angel Gonzalez, Executive Director Board of Professional Land Surveyors 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Narcisco J. Ramirez, held land surveyor license number LS0002779 issued by petitioner, Department of professional Regulation, Board of Professional Land Surveyors. Respondent currently operates a land surveying firm known as South Atlantic Services of Florida, Inc. located at 7350 Southwest 41st Street; Miami, Florida. Respondent received a two year degree in civil engineering from City College of San Francisco in 1969 and has worked for various firms as a land surveyor in the Miami area since 1971. He has been a registered land surveyor in Florida since July, 1975. In March, 1984, respondent was contacted by a real estate salesman and requested to perform a "boundary survey" and "sketch" of a parcel of land owned by one M. P. Smith McNiely. The land in question involved various lots, including Lots 23, 25-30, 34-36 and 38 located in a subdivision known as DeSoto Heights which lies adjacent to Southwest 304th Street, Southwest 105th Terrace, and Southwest 168th Street in Dade County, Florida, just north of the City of Homestead. The property was to be sold, and the survey was intended to assist the seller in determining a sales price on the property. Ramirez interpreted the request to mean that only a "preliminary sketch" would be initially done, and if requested by the owner, a "complete survey" would be performed at a later date. He was paid $650 for the initial work, and expected an additional fee of $2,500 to $3,000 for the complete survey. According to Ramirez, a preliminary sketch is not as accurate as a complete survey, has substantially less information, may contain errors, and does not require a certification by the surveyor that it meets all required professional standards of surveying. Ramirez assigned the field work to an employee named Roberto Collado, who no longer lives in Florida. The field work consisted of determining the property corners, and providing a sketch to the real estate salesman. Ramirez did not certify that minimum technical standards had been met but did sign and seal the drawing on March 22, 1984. At the same time he provided the following certification: I HEREBY CERTIFY: that the attached sketch of survey represents a recent survey made under my direction, and is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. There are no encroachments unless shown thereon. Ramirez also added the following in bold lettering: NOTE: BOUNDARY SURVEY ONLY. No elevations secured or any other featured at the owners representative s request. A short time later, Frank Makowski, also a registered land surveyor and a former professional colleague of Ramirez some ten years earlier was contacted by an attorney (David Liebman) who was handling the sales transaction of McNiely's property. The closing was being held up because Ramirez's survey reflected a house sitting on both lots 36 and 37. Makowski was requested to verify the encroachment onto lot 36, and to ascertain the true location of the property boundaries. Makowski initially contacted Ramirez and requested a copy of his sketch and field notes. These were supplied by Ramirez, who gave no indication to him that the work was only "preliminary" in nature. Makowski then sent out a field team to survey the property. It found that the west boundary on the Ramirez survey was actually thirty-three feet off, which caused the purported encroachment on lot 36. The sketch made by Ramirez was deficient in a number of respects as established by uncontradicted expert testimony. To begin with, the parties have stipulated that the survey did not comply with the minimum technical standards for land surveying as set forth in Chapter 21HH- 6, Florida Administrative Code. These include Rules 21HH- 6.03(1), (2), (4), (6)-(8), (12), (18)-(20), and 21HH- 6.06(1), Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the administrative complaint. For example, it contained no certification, did not reflect all bearings and angles, and monumentations were not set. In short, the Ramirez survey technique and procedure was not in conformance with the procedure required by generally accepted and prevailing standards of land surveying. Moreover, even though it was identified as a "boundary survey;" expert testimony established that the project was indeed a survey within the meaning of the term and it had to meet such technical standards or plainly provide a disclaimer to indicate that such standards were not met. In September, 1983, respondent was engaged by an engineering firm to "secure ground elevations along the above property (Southwest 168th Street and Southwest 192nd Avenue, Dade County) and then relate said elevations to a Dade County Bench Mark," and to "prepare a sketch of survey showing said existing ground elevations." For this he was to be paid $150. The property was owned by Alfred and Linda Wilson. Ramirez first obtained by telephone a bench mark on September 30, 1983; from the Dade County Surveying Department and then sent a field crew to complete the task. The bench mark he selected was across a canal and some three-quarters of a mile from the property in question in an area with heavy undergrowth. This made an accurate measurement more difficult to perform. The accuracy of vertical control surveys (elevations) is essential since this determines whether a parcel of land must have fill added in order to install a septic tank and well. It also affects the flood insurability of a home. Such surveys are subject to the minimum technical standards of the profession, as adopted by agency rules, unless the survey is a "specific purpose survey." In that event the same must be clearly stated on the face of the survey. In this case Ramirez, merely noted on the face of the sketch: "preliminary sketch, only elevations are included in this sketch of survey, no horizontal distances were measured nor controls set and distances shown along the sketch are for location purposes only." He also certified that "the elevations shown refer to a National Vertical Geodetic Datum of 1929, Bench Mark, were secured by us under my direction and are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief." Ramirez considered the project to be a "special purpose sketch" and therefore did not believe he had to certify that minimum technical standards had been met. Indeed, he conceded that such standards had not been met in preparing the documents. Makowski was requested to perform a survey on the Wilson property on June 12, 1984 to verify the accuracy of Ramirez s survey. He found the actual elevations to be approximately two feet lower than those reflected on Ramirez's sketch. 2/ The accuracy of Makowski's findings was corroborated by a survey previously performed by another surveyor in 1979. That survey, which is a public record on file with the Dade County Subdivision Control Department, indicated that because of the property's low elevation, fill was required to meet flood criteria. Through the testimony of Makowski and another expert land surveyor, James E. Beadman, it was established without contradiction that Ramirez's work failed to comport with minimum technical standards of the land surveying profession. For example, Ramirez had insufficient field notes, he used too few turning points, and did not perform a loop closure. Further, there is no bench mark description or certification by Ramirez on the survey, and Ramirez used a Linker rod to transfer elevations from one bench mark to another in contravention of accepted standards. Had Ramirez desired to qualify his elevation survey in accordance with agency rules, he should have identified his survey as a topographic survey and indicated that improvements were not located. By calling it an elevation survey, Ramirez did not change its true character of being a topographic survey. Rule 21HH-6.06, Florida Administrative Code, requires that when a survey is not performed, a surveyor should "state that such sketch is not a survey" on the face of the sketch. All other surveys must meet minimum technical standards, and by signing and sealing the drawings, a surveyor certifies as such. Ramirez justified his work in the McNiely project as being simply preliminary in nature. If he conducted a complete survey at a later time, he would then obtain more information, and correct any errors present on the initial drawings. Similarly, he viewed the Wilson survey as a special purpose sketch," and one not requiring compliance with minimum technical standards. Ramirez has performed hundreds of surveys in the past fifteen years; and there is no evidence of any formal disciplinary action having been instituted against him for negligence or misconduct. Both surveys were eventually performed in an accurate manner by Makowski. There were no complaints filed against Ramirez by either client. The complaint herein stems from Makowski who reported the alleged violations to petitioner after reviewing Ramirez's work.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as set forth in the conclusions of law portion of this orders and that he be fined $1000 and placed on two years probation. All other charges should be DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearings Hearings DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 7th day of August, 1985.
