The Issue Should discipline be imposed by the State of Florida, Board of Medicine (the Board), against Respondent's physician assistant's license for alleged inappropriate conduct in relation to Patient T.S.?
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts: Petitioner is the state department charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.43, Florida Statutes; Chapter 456, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this Complaint, Respondent was a licensed physician assistant within the State of Florida, having been issued license number PA 3346 on May 28, 1997. Respondent's address of record is 2608 Maywood Street, Eustis, Florida 32726-2063. Respondent is a physician assistant at Care First of Central Florida (hereinafter "Care First"), 15050 U.S. Highway 441, Eustis, Florida 32726. Patient T.S., (a.k.a. T.B.), and her daughters had been patients of Care First for several years for various family medical matters. On or about November 16, 2004, Patient T.S. met Respondent for the first time when Patient T.S. accompanied Patient R.P., her significant other, to Patient R.P.'s appointment with Respondent at Care First. During Patient R.P.'s appointment, Patient T.S. discussed a problem she was experiencing with fibromyalgia (a condition that causes widespread muscle and soft tissue pain and tenderness, especially in the trunk, neck, and shoulders). Respondent suggested Patient T.S. make an appointment with him for a checkup of her condition. Patient T.S. made the appointment for the following day, November 17, 2004, and attended her appointment accompanied by Patient R.P. Respondent thoroughly and appropriately examined Patient T.S. on November 17, 2004. On or about November 26, 2004, Patient T.S. presented herself unattended to Care First with complaints of coughing and chest congestion. Respondent met with Patient T.S. in an examination room with no other persons present. Respondent returned to the examination room, gave Patient T.S. some medication for her condition, and exited the room.1/ Prior Disciplinary History: There was no indication that Respondent had been accused of any prior wrongdoing involving his practice as a physician assistant.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2006.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 458.331(1)(g), (j), (m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.20 and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Ronald L. Cohen, M.D. (Dr. Cohen), is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0024014. Dr. Cohen's last known address is 7800 West Oakland Park Boulevard, Suite 216, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Dr. Cohen's area of practice is urology, and he is board certified. He has been practicing in Fort Lauderdale since 1976. During his years of practice, he has enjoyed an excellent professional reputation. Between on or about July 2, 1990, through on or about May 16, 1992, Dr. Cohen treated Patient R.G. for various complaints. On or about July 2, 1990, Patient R.G., a thirty-four year-old female with a history of chemical dependency from the age of twelve for which she first underwent treatment in or about 1986, presented to Dr. Cohen with voiding complaints including post void dysuria, frequency, urgency, and urgency incontinence. However, such information about chemical dependency was unknown to Dr. Cohen until a subsequent time. Patient R.G. did not reveal to Dr. Cohen either her history of chemical dependency or treatment of that dependency. Dr. Cohen performed a physical examination of Patient R.G. wherein Dr. Cohen dilated Patient R.G.'s uretha. Dr. Cohen noted that Patient R.G.'s urinalysis was entirely within normal limits. Dr. Cohen then diagnosed Patient R.G. with urethritis, urthrel stenosis, and trigonitis. Dr. Cohen prescribed Patient R.G. a three-day supply of Noroxin and pyridium to improve Patient R.G.'s symptoms. Noroxin is an antibacterial agent indicated for the treatment of adults with complicated urinary tract infections. Pyridium is an analgesic agent indicated for the symptomatic relief of pain, burning, urgency frequency and other discomfort arising from irritation of the lower urinary tract mucosa. Patient R.G.'s symptoms persisted. On or about July 13, 1990, Patient R.G. underwent a cystoscopy, urethal dilation, and hydraulic bladder distention by Dr. Cohen at Outpatient Surgical Services in order to rule out interstitial cystitis. Dr. Cohen's postoperative impressions were as follows: Interstitial cystitis (inflammatory lesion of the bladder) and urethral stenosis. On or about July 17, 1990, Patient R.G. presented to Dr. Cohen's office in severe pain secondary to the cystoscopy and bladder distention. At that time, Patient R.G. complained of feeling bloated suprapubically. Dr. Cohen instilled dimethyl sulfoxide to relieve Patient R.G.'s pain. Patient R.G.'s symptoms were subsequently temporarily resolved. On or about January 19, 1991, Patient R.G. next presented to Dr. Cohen with complaints of a recurrent episode of urinary frequency and burning on the previous day. Shortly thereafter, in early 1991, Dr. Cohen asked Patient R.G. to go to lunch. Dr. Cohen and Patient R.G. subsequently began a social relationship which included sexual intercourse. At the time that Dr. Cohen initiated the relationship with Patient R.G. he was aware of the prohibitions against such conduct, knew he had choices available to him, but declined to exercise professional self-discipline. Dr. Cohen did exercise influence as Patient R.G.'s physician for the purpose of engaging in sexual relations. Dr. Cohen has never had a sexual relationship with any other patient. On or about April 8, 1991, Dr. Cohen wrote a prescription for thirty units of Valium 10 mg. for Patient R.G. who had at that time complained to Dr. Cohen of anxiety due to marital difficulties. Valium is defined as a legend drug by Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains diazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Valium is indicated for the management of anxiety disorders or for the short-term relief of symptoms of anxiety. Dr. Cohen's medical records of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition do not include any reference to the Valium prescription and therefore the records fail to justify his prescription of Valium, a controlled substance indicated for the treatment of anxiety, to Patient R.G. On May 16, 1992, Dr. Cohen wrote a prescription for thirty units of Prozac 20 mg. Prozac is defined as a legend drug by Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Fluoxetine Hydrochloride which is not a controlled substance. Prozac is indicated for the treatment of depression. Dr. Cohen's medical records of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition do not include any reference to the Prozac prescription and therefore the records fail to justify his prescription of Prozac. Dr. Cohen inappropriately prescribed Prozac, a legend drug indicated for the treatment of depression. Prozac, however, was not indicated in the treatment of Patient R.G.'s urologic condition, interstitial cystitis. Dr. Cohen admitted to having prescribed Prozac to Patient R.G. as a favor so that Patient R.G. did not have to see her psychologist for said prescription. Dr. Cohen admitted to having a sexual relationship with Patient R.G. Dr. Cohen, by virtue of his sexual relationship with Patient R.G. and his inappropriate prescribing of Prozac for Patient R. G., failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Dr. Cohen underwent an evaluation by Thomas J. Goldschmidt, M.D., a specialist in neurology and psychiatry, in conjunction with Richard Westberry, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist. Dr. Goldschmidt issued a report on their evaluation in which he stated: We see no evidence of any exploitative tendency regarding Dr. [Cohen] in his relationship with this patient. There is no evidence of any sexual addiction component. And we do not feel that his is behavior that is likely to reoccur or compromise his ability to practice urology. We see this as an isolated incident that Dr. [Cohen] approached in a very naive fashion and was primarily orchestrated by the dynamics of a sexually provocative, aggressive female who proposed a sexual act that was nonthreating (sic) to the patient while simultaneously providing ego gratification for longstanding, underlying emotional conflicts dealing with castration fears and anxiety. Dr. Cohen voluntarily entered into a contract with the Physician's Recovery Network to assist him in dealing with his despondency and depression. Dr. Cohen continues to see Dr. Westberry on a weekly basis for his despondency. Dr. Cohen has never had any disciplinary action taken against his license nor has he been dismissed from any position at a hospital at which he had staff privileges. Dr. Cohen has staff privileges at four hospitals. Dr. Cohen was Vice Chief of Staff at one of the hospitals until he voluntarily resigned that position when this case surfaced in order to avoid embarrassment to the hospital.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Dr. Cohen violated Sections 458.331(1)(g), (j), (m), (q) and (t) as set forth in Counts 1-5 in the Administrative Complaint, and imposing a $5,000 fine for the violations of Sections 458.331(1)(g) and (j), Florida Statutes and a $5,000 fine for violations of Sections 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statues, for a total of $10,000, and placing Dr. Cohen on probation for two years under terms and conditions to be set by the Board of Medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-3274 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-9: Accepted. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12-14: Accepted. Paragraph 15: Rejected as irrelevant because the administrative complaint did not state such a violationas it related to the valium but only as to the Prozac. The violation relating to valium was the record keeping. Paragraphs 16-19: Accepted. Paragraph 20: Accepted except as to the valium. The administrative compliant did not allege such a violationas it related to valium. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 4: Accepted as to his professional reputation. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 5: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 6: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is unnecessary. Paragraphs 7-13: Accepted. Paragraph 14: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 15: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Dr. Cohen is the party whoinitiated the social relationship with R.G. when heasked her out to lunch. He was physically attracted tothe patient and that is why he asked her out. Paragraph 16: Accepted. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found because Dr. Cohen did prescribe medication forR.G. which had nothing to do with the complaints forwhich she was seeing Dr. Cohen. Paragraph 18: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. See paragraph 17. Paragraphs 19-22: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 23: The first and second sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The thirdsentence is accepted to the extent that he has enteredcounseling. Paragraphs 24: Accepted to the extent that he is in counseling and that such a relationship will not likelyoccur again. Paragraph 25: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 26: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance that such a relationship is unlikely to happen in the future. Rejected to the extent that it implies that R.G. gavefree, full informed consent to the sexual activity. Paragraphs 28-29: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 31-34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 36-39: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald G. Korman, Esquire Korman, Schorr and Wagenheim The Dart Building 2101 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 400 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire 2851 Remington Green Circle, Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32308-3749 Albert Peacock, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6506 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Agency For Health Care Administration Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jerome W. Hoffman General Counsel Agency For Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Harry William Rinehart, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. This Petition was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 20, 1981, as transmitted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department has requested the Division to conduct a formal hearing in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The final hearing in this cause was conducted on September 29, 1981. In the course of the final hearing, the Petitioner did not testify but did offer a witness in his behalf, one Dr. Robert M. Berland, a staff psychologist in the forensic program at the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida. The Petitioner submitted eighteen (18) exhibits. Respondent called as its witnesses, Robert Alcorn, Clinical Director for the mentally disordered sex offender program at the Florida State Hospital; Michael Denny, Petitioner's attending clinical psychologist at Florida State Hospital and Michael Pomeroy, another attending clinical psychologist at Florida State Hospital who had worked with the Petitioner. Respondent submitted nine (9) exhibits. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with the orders of court and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). During that time, the Petitioner has resided at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. Although the Petitioner has been subjected to a full range of treatment opportunities, his progress in the recognition of and ability to deal with the underlying condition which caused him to be placed in this program has reached its zenith. In the face of this circumstance, the Respondent has made preliminary determination that it has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner, through the program in which he is enrolled. Additionally, it has been concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. Thus, the Petitioner has requested the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order. Rinehart was committed to the custody of the Respondent on May 24, 1979, the Court having found him to be a mentally disordered sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). He was received into the program at the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, on June 18, 1979, and has undergone treatment beginning on that date. The objectives of the treatment program were to deal with Rinehart's underlying condition until he no longer evidenced himself to be a menace to society in terms of sexual "acting out" or until it was concluded that he could no longer be treated. The program at Florida State Hospital has as its central focus the utilization of group therapy with adjunctive programs of recreational and occupational therapy and some individual therapy and relies heavily on a patient's self-motivation. Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 4, admitted into evidence, are clinical summaries of the Petitioner's condition during the course of his treatment. As can be seen in the initial evaluation of November, 1979, the petitioner had made minimal progress in the program and had offered little participation. (He had come into the program in a circumstance where he was placed on suicidal precaution.) In these early phases of the treatment, the patient was distant and withdrawn and wrote notes in the group therapy sessions as opposed to communicating orally. His attitude was childish and immature and he was prone to "horseplay" and to breaking rules of the unit, for which violations he was placed in seclusion. It was difficult in the 1979 year for the therapist assigned to the Petitioner's case to establish goals for his improvement in the group setting and as a consequence an attempt was made to use individual therapy sessions to address the particular needs of the patient. By March, 1980, at the time of the next staffing of the patient to determine his progress, again minimal progress had been demonstrated; however, there had been some increase in participation in the group programs, two or three weeks prior to the staffing. The patient still had a maladaptive coping style and had problems controlling his anger and depression and still had a tendency to "act out," that is to say be involved in inappropriate behavior. At the conclusion of the March, 1980, staffing it was intended that another evaluation be made within ninety (90) days. By June, 1980, a decision had been reached to change the primary therapist for the Petitioner, from a female to a male therapist, due to the fact that the Petitioner utilized the sessions with the female therapist to seek her attention in an unacceptable way. In June, 1980, Michael Pomeroy became the therapist for the Petitioner. Pomeroy served until May, 1981. Pomeroy is a clinical psychologist. Pomeroy was replaced by Michael Denny, another clinical psychologist at the hospital and Denny worked with the patient from May, 1981, through July, 1981. Denny replaced Pomeroy when Pomeroy left the sex offender unit. In the overview, by April, 1981, when the staffing was held, Rinehart was no longer evidencing the same form of childish behavior that he had shown initially; however, the staff at the hospital was uncertain whether this change had been promoted by the aging process and maturity associated with that process or due to the therapy afforded. In the April staffing a discussion was made on the question of the twenty-five (25) year minimum sentence which the Petitioner was facing for the offense which had caused his placement in the program. By that time, i.e., April, 1981, the staff had more or less reconciled itself to the fact that Rinehart was going to make little progress in coming to some understanding of, and dealing with, the underlying sexual difficulty. Consequently, beyond April, 1981, for a period of up to one year, it was intended that an effort should be made to assist the Petitioner in coping with a prison environment. This plan of treatment came about as a result of a discussion between staff and the Petitioner's attorney. The emphasis of this coping mechanism was to assist the Petitioner in choosing friends in a prison environment; the types of behavior to avoid in prison; an effort to share experiences from people who had been in a prison environment and who were in the sex offender program and to give the Petitioner some vocational training skills which would avoid his confinement without any outlet. The April, 1981, plan was put into effect but it was interrupted in July, 1981, due to an indictment placed against the Petitioner for an alleged homicide involving a staff member at Florida State Hospital. This caused another staffing conference to be held on July 29, 1981, at which point a decision was reached which was to exhaust treatment on the Petitioner and have him returned to court. Subsequent to that date, the Petitioner has been in the maximum security building of the hospital for reasons of security and for reason that his attorney did not wish the hospital staff to talk to the Petitioner. Therefore, the Petitioner has not been involved in the sex offender program since late July, 1981. After the Florida State Hospital had decided to exhaust treatment on the Petitioner, a discussion was held between the directors of other programs in the State dealing with sex offender problems and it was the consensus of those other program directors that they could not assist in treating Rinehart's condition and a determination was reached at the Departmental level to exhaust treatment. The testimony of psychologist Pomeroy established that the Petitioner was angry when Pomeroy took over as the Petitioner's primary therapist from the former therapist Carol Ford. The Petitioner expressed his anger by wearing sunglasses at the group therapy sessions. After a time, the Petitioner began to show some maturity and to evidence a change in attitude. The Petitioner was receiving instruction from a special teacher during this period to assist him in coping with his educational deficit. He still continued to manipulate the female aides by pouting and acting inappropriately. Pomeroy responded to this by treating the Petitioner as he would other adults and the Petitioner seemed to respond to being treated as an adult as opposed to being treated as a child. The Petitioner participated in ward government in the sex offender program and became more social. Nevertheless, he continued to have problems choosing the right kind of friends and had a tendency to choose those persons who would not aid him in becoming a more responsible individual. Pomeroy was in accord with the decision in April, 1981, to assist the Petitioner in his need to cope with the prison environment and the value of such a pursuit; however, as early as April, 1981, Pomeoy correctly identified the fact that the psychosexual problems of the Petitioner would not be alleviated by further treatment in the sex offender program and to that extent that element of the treatment had been exhausted in the spring of 1981. Pomeroy's observations of the Petitioner while Pomeroy was the primary treating psychologist included the observation that the Petitioner would not talk in a group therapy session beyond expression interest in his problem as opposed to in-depth discussion of that problem. Pomeroy did find the Petitioner to be helpful to other members of the group. Once or twice the Petitioner entered into some discussion of the Petitioner's problem. At this time, Pomeroy is of the persuasion that to keep the Petitioner in the sex offender program would be counterproductive. Staff psychologist Denny, when he began treating the Petitioner as primary therapist instituted a regimen that would include individual therapy once a week for one hour a week and two times a week for one hour in each session as a group therapy treatment modality. Denny had reviewed the patient's records up to the point of his involvement as primary therapist and had discussed the case with therapist Pomeroy and other staff members. On May 20, 1981, an attempt was made by Denny to have the Petitioner share his life history with fellow patients in the patient's group and to try to assist the Petitioner in understanding his personality style. All these matters were in preparation to allow the Petitioner to adjust to incarceration in the penal system and learn to cope with that incarceration. In June, 1981, in the Denny group sessions, the Petitioner began to discuss his parents and the crime which had placed him in the sex offender program and began to express to me concern about why he committed the crime. This occurred in two sessions. After that, the Petitioner began to participate less and less in the sense of discussing his problems with other members of the group. On July 6, 1981, at the time of a staffing, the emphasis as established through Denny's testimony was to impress upon the Petitioner his need to share the history of his life and to question others on his assumptions and to work on relating himself to others either in positive or negative exchanges. These concerns, in terms of the treatment of the Petitioner, were efforts toward the goals of teaching the Petitioner to let others know how he felt about certain events in the past and to question others when he was unsure about his premise and to share similarities in his circumstance and the circumstance of others. The Petitioner's performance in July, 1981, prior to the time of the indictment, was minimal. He shared less and less of his life's experiences in that time sequence. In one of these July therapy sessions, the Petitioner was very unresponsive and in the course of that session smashed a ping-pong ball which was part of the sports equipment of the unit. The efforts which have been mentioned previously which dealt with teaching the Petitioner vocational skills were successful during the time of Denny's treatment of the patient, in that the patient attended small engine repair classes and profited from that experience. The Respondent has a so earned a graduate equivalency diploma. By late June and early July, according to Denny, whose observations are accepted as factual, the patient was no longer motivated to deal with his underlying sexual problem and the hospital had exhausted all appropriate treatment. The patient, at that time, was still a sexual menace and there was still a likelihood of the patient committing other sexual crimes. In summary, his progress in rehabilitation of the underlying sexual deviancy was minimal. There is some evidence of record indicating problems dating from 1973, and at various times thereafter, of seizure disorders on the part of the Petitioner. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 16.) The Florida State Hospital was aware of the history of those matters and although the patient has complained of numerous headaches and been treated for those headaches with aspirin substitute during his stay at the Florida State Hospital, the patient has not complained of seizure circumstances during this period nor has he appeared to have had any form of seizure during the hospitalization at the Florida State Hospital. (His last problem with seizures dates from late 1978.) Moreover, testimony revealed that any past problems the Petitioner has had with seizure type events did not hinder the treatment of the Petitioner at the Florida State Hospital. (See also Respondent's Exhibits 5 through 9.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Harry William Rinehart, and that said Harry William Rinehart be returned to the committing court for further disposition. 1/ DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1981.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent’s license as a psychologist in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Board of Psychology was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and professional discipline of psychologists in Florida. Respondent is and has been licensed as a psychologist in Florida and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Psychology. During the period April 11, 1995, through August 7, 1995, Respondent was employed as a psychologist at the University of South Florida Counseling Center for Human Development. In that capacity, Respondent saw the Complainant, K.R., on several occasions and established a psychologist-client relationship with her. At the initial visit of K.R. to his office, Respondent conducted an initial intake evaluation of her and, in his client notes, defined the goal of his continued treatment of her as being to assist Ms. K.R. in stabilizing her depression; and to clarify her needs and patterns with regard to her career and relationships. Upon completing the intake evaluation of K.R., Respondent referred her to himself as treating therapist, and between the initial meeting and the end of August 1995, met with her approximately thirteen times. Review of Respondent’s notes regarding his sessions with K.R. reveals that they discussed her relationship with her parents; her relationships with men; her ability to deal with her emotions, her anxiety, and depression. K.R. relates that during many of their sessions, Respondent told her she had nice legs and was very sexy. He also told her of his personal life, including his dissatisfaction with his marriage, and it appears that he met with her outside his professional office on a purely social basis. K.R. claims Respondent told her not to tell anyone about their friendship outside the clinic. The relationship between Respondent and K.R. culminated in their engaging in sexual intercourse which resulted in her becoming pregnant. The pregnancy was subsequently aborted. As a result of their relationship, K.R. filed a complaint against Respondent with the Board of Psychology relating the sexual nature of their relationship. Subsequent to the filing of K.R.’s complaint against Respondent, and the Agency For Health Care Administration’s (Agency) filing of an Administrative Complaint against him, the Agency deposed Dr. George J. Rockwell, Jr., a retired psychologist with a specialty in school psychology. Dr. Rockwell did not meet with Respondent or speak with him in any capacity. He examined the file collected in this case regarding the allegations against Respondent, and from his review of all the material, concluded that Respondent had established a psychologist/patient relationship with K.R. This relationship involves trust and the generation in the patient of a basic belief that the psychologist has the skills and knowledge that would assist the patient in dealing with whatever problems he or she has. The patient develops the ability to talk to a non- critical, non-judgmental person in an effort to help him or her deal with their problems or concerns. The psychologist has the responsibility to create an emotionally safe environment for the patient. In this process the patient is often made vulnerable. The patient must be open with the psychologist and feel comfortable in sharing emotions and incidents which he or she would most likely not be able to share with others. It is without question a special relationship, and in Dr. Rockwell’s opinion, it is unlikely that a patient will work with a psychologist and not form that special relationship. This special relationship places upon the psychologist special responsibilities toward the patient. These include abiding by the laws and rules relating to the practice of psychology; having respect for the patient; and keeping all matters confided by the patient confidential. In addition, the psychologist has the responsibility to comport himself or herself in a manner so as to maintain a professional relationship and distance with the patient. Specifically, sexual relationships between a psychologist and his or her patient are normally prohibited as being beyond boundaries that should not be crossed. It is the psychologist’s responsibility to set the limits on behavior so as to prevent an inappropriate relationship from developing. This applies even if the patient initiates sexual advances. These advances would not excuse the psychologist from professional responsibility toward the patient. In the event the psychologist detects what appear to be inappropriate sexual advances from the patient, the psychologist had a duty to discuss this with the patient; talk about the nature of the psychologist/patient relationship; and explain that such a relationship would not be appropriate. The constrictors on the professional are even more specific in the event the psychologist finds himself or herself sexually attracted to the patient. Under no circumstances should the professional act on those feelings, but should evaluate the situation to ensure that those feelings are in no way interfering with the therapeutic relationship. There is absolutely no situation which Dr. Rockwell can think of in which it would be appropriate for a therapist to engage in sexual relations with a patient, either during or after termination of a therapy session. Inappropriate sexual contact between a therapist and a patient can have severe and deleterious effects on a patient. These might include feelings of guilt and depression, based on the patient’s belief that the inappropriate behavior was his or her fault. The patient might also feel embarrassment and be reluctant to undergo further treatment. Further, the patient would most likely lose trust in the involved therapist and potential other therapists. Dr. Rockwell concluded that notwithstanding Respondent’s contention that he saw K.R. solely for the purpose of career counseling, and at no time entered a psychologist/patient relationship with her, Respondent’s clinical notes regarding K.R. clearly indicate a professional psychologist/patient relationship was formed. An independent review of the records supports that conclusion, and it is so found. Even were the counseling limited solely to career counseling, it would still constitute counseling, the conduct of which is covered by the standards of the profession. Here, however, Dr. Rockwell is convinced that Respondent’s conduct toward K.R., as alleged, constituted sexual misconduct in the practice of psychological counseling which fell below the minimum standards of performance and professional activities when measured against generally prevailing peer performance. It is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Psychology enter a final order in this matter finding Respondent guilty of all Counts in the Administrative Complaint, and revoking his license to practice psychology in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Maureen L. Holz, Esquire Williams & Holz, P.A. 211 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 O. C. Allen, Qualified Representative 314 West Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Dr. Kaye Howerton, Executive Director Board of Psychology 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Amy M. Jones, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703
The Issue The issues in this case, as set forth in the Prehearing Stipulation, are as follows: Whether Respondent was terminated from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count I] Whether Respondent failed to update his practitioner profile within fifteen days of the filing of the order terminating him from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with T.J.[1/] for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with T.J.; [Case No. 14-1342, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with M.B. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with M.B.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with C.J. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with C.J.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with D.K. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with D.K.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with A.H. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with A.H.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] and Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with S.D. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with S.D. [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II]
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Medicine (the “Department”) is the State agency responsible for licensing and monitoring physicians in the State of Florida. The Department regulates the practice of medicine in accordance with section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Unless specifically stated otherwise herein, all references to Florida Statutes will be to the 2014 codification. Respondent is a licensed Florida physician, certified in the area of pain management, holding license number ME 97134. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was practicing medicine at one of two locations: the Back Authority for Contemporary Knowledge, (a pain management clinic known as the “Back Center” located in Melbourne, Florida); and Advantacare (in its Altamonte Springs and Daytona Beach offices). Respondent was employed at the Back Center from January 2008 through September 2011, and at Advantacare from March 2012 through April 2013. Respondent provided pain management services for numerous patients during his tenure at each of the clinics. While at the Back Center, he saw 50 to 60 patients per day in an 8-hour workday, doing about 15 medication injections per day. At Advantacare he was seeing about 30 patients per day. By all accounts, Respondent is a skilled and proficient pain management physician. At Advantacare, Respondent would see patients for regular office visits at the Altamonte Springs office on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday; Wednesday would be set aside for administering injections under a fluoroscope, described as sort of a C-shaped X-ray machine, performed at the Daytona Beach office. None of the sexual behavior alleged in the Administrative Complaints occurred during injections performed under fluoroscope. A general policy existed at the Back Center that required physicians to have another facility employee (medical technician, nurse, other) present in an examination room when a physician was providing care to a patient not of the same gender as the doctor. This “chaperone” policy is standard in the health care industry. There is no credible evidence that Respondent was ever shown the Back Center’s policy in writing, although it is probable the policy was accessible on the website of the entity (Osler Corporation) that owned the Back Center for a period of time. As a practicing physician, Respondent was also presumed to be aware of and to follow the chaperone policy and he admitted knowing about the policy in general. Respondent was, however, verbally apprised of the policy by his supervisor, Dr. Hynes, by the clinic operations manager, Mr. Pachkoski, and by the chief administrative officer, Cathy Bird. Respondent acknowledged that it was best to have another person in the examination room if he was providing treatment to a female patient. If no chaperone was available, it was his stated practice to keep the door open. Respondent did not feel like assistants were always available to chaperone, but neither his supervisor (Dr. Hynes) nor a co-physician (Dr. Zaidi) remembers Respondent complaining that staff was not available at the Back Center. The testimony of all six complainants in this case contradicts Respondent’s contention; each of them said they were treated by Respondent (alone) in a room with the door closed. When asked directly whether he ever treated female patients at the Back Center in a room with the door closed, Respondent admitted that it happened on occasion. The best and most persuasive evidence in this case is that a chaperone policy did exist and that Respondent did not follow the policy. Between September 2008 and January 2013, Respondent treated six female patients who are the subjects of the Department’s Administrative Complaint. Each of the patients is identified only by their initials in an attempt to maintain their confidentiality and privacy. The six patients will be addressed in chronological order based on the dates of their alleged mistreatment by Respondent. Patient S.D. Patient S.D. was a patient of Respondent between September and December 2008. S.D.’s status as a patient was stipulated to by the parties.2/ While she was Respondent’s patient, S.D. was also an employee of the Back Center. During the period of time Respondent was treating S.D., they engaged in a series of emails which could be construed as very sexual in nature. For example, on September 23, 2008, Respondent and S.D. had the following email exchange: S.D. – “You buying Dinner….Or am I your [f***ing] dinner????”Respondent – “What do you think? I want u as breakfast, lunch and dinner. My precious love.” S.D. – Ok so what am I going to eat LOL??? Let me guess a protein shake”Respondent – “If I shake it hard enough yes.” Then, on September 25, the two had this email exchange:Respondent – “NO I WANT U TO FEED ME!!! AND NO YOU R NOT GOING THERE!!! ABSOLUTELY NOT!!! I’M UR MAN AND I SAY NO.”S.D. – “Then act like it and stop flirting with the [f***ing] skank!”Respondent – “WHY? GETTING JEALOUS SWEETHEART?”S.D. - “No I guess I have no reason to be.” Respondent – “EXACTLY, YOU HAD ME AT LUNCH AND LEFT TO GO TO WORK. SO YOU CAN’T SAY ANYTHING, PRECIOUS.” Respondent denies that the exchange of emails with S.D. suggests anything of a sexual nature. He said, e.g., that in his Iranian culture, talking about eating someone was tantamount to saying you cared deeply for them. Respondent’s denial of the sexual nature of the emails is not persuasive. S.D. did not testify at final hearing nor was her testimony preserved by way of a deposition transcript. The Department offered into evidence an exhibit comprised of various emails between S.D. and Respondent, two of which were discussed above. At least one co-worker, Lizamar Korfhage (a physician’s assistant at the Back Center), heard S.D. yell loudly in the office--as S.D. was being terminated from employment--that she (S.D.) and Respondent were having sexual relations. Cathy Bird, former chief administrative officer at the Back Center, had discussed the alleged affair with S.D. during several conversations before S.D.'s employment with the Back Center ended. Bird also talked with Respondent about the situation after S.D. was fired from the Back Center. Respondent was concerned that S.D. would tell Respondent’s wife about the affair and sought Bird’s guidance in the matter. Based upon the entirety of the clear and convincing evidence presented, Respondent was involved in a sexual relationship with S.D. at some point in time when S.D. was also a patient of the Back Center. Patient T.J. Patient T.J. was a 37-year-old patient when she saw Respondent at the Back Center on October 29, 2010. T.J. had seen Respondent professionally some 16 or so times previously. No inappropriate conduct had occurred on any of those visits. On the October 29 visit, T.J. was escorted into an examination room by a nurse as usual. Respondent came in and, after examining her, suggested that trigger point injections might help alleviate her pain, which she described as being a “2” on a scale of 1 to 10.3/ She agreed to the plan of treatment. Respondent had T.J. sit on an armless stool and lean her arms and head onto a desk. Respondent stood on her left side and began administering injections into her neck. As he leaned against her body, T.J. felt what she described as Respondent’s erect penis rubbing on her upper arm or shoulder. She felt like Respondent was intentionally rubbing her in what she later concluded to be a sexual manner. When he finished the injections, Respondent did not act any differently than usual. T.J. felt like something “weird” had just happened, but decided not to report it because she was not completely sure about her perceptions. Respondent, in contradiction to T.J.’s testimony, said he generally stayed four to five inches away from his patient when administering the injections, but would sometimes come into contact with them. T.J. returned for a follow up visit on November 24, 2010, receiving another injection by Respondent. She reported no misconduct by Respondent on that date. On December 23, 2010, T.J. returned to the Back Center for additional treatment. This time, her pain was radiating all the way down to her buttocks area and was described as a “3” out of 10. She was again escorted to an examination room to wait for Respondent. Respondent came in and closed the door, as was his usual practice during T.J.’s visits. After examining her, Respondent suggested injections for sacroiliac joint pain. T.J. was told to lie on the examination table on her left side. Respondent had T.J. lower her jeans to just below her knees. She had her left leg out straight and her right leg bent at the knee and across her left leg. Respondent then began to press his fingers on different parts of her inner thigh searching for the source of her pain. The pain was centered between her knee and buttocks area, and Respondent made an injection in that area. Respondent then had T.J. roll over to her right side as he pulled the table slightly away from the wall and placed himself between the wall and the table. Respondent began pushing on her inner thigh again, starting at her knee and moving upward toward her buttocks. As he did that, his tone of voice changed and he began panting. He continued to touch and probe her thighs as his hands went higher until he ultimately touched her vagina. T.J. immediately said, “That’s it” and quickly got off the examination table and pulled up her jeans. Respondent appeared sweaty and red-faced, looking to T.J. like a person who had just engaged in sex. T.J. then began to consider whether Respondent’s behavior during the October 29, 2010, visit had indeed been sexual in nature as well. She concluded that it was, and decided not to see Respondent for treatment in the future. She did not, however, report either of the incidents to the Back Center immediately. She ultimately did so, telling physician's assistant Korfhage about the incident some 10 months later. After seeing a report on television in 2013 that Respondent had been accused by another patient of sexual misconduct, she decided to make a report to the police about her own experiences with Respondent. When the police did not prosecute, she contacted an attorney in order to file a civil action against Respondent. T.J. appeared to be honest and forthright during her appearance at final hearing. Her testimony about her version of the events was credible, clear, and convincing. In his testimony at final hearing, Respondent did not specifically refute T.J.’s testimony so much as he explained how his normal process would not allow for the kind of touching T.J. alleged to have occurred. Respondent did not specifically or directly deny touching patient T.J.’s vagina, saying only that there would be no reason to do so. Patient D.K. (also known as D.W.) D.K. was a regular patient of Respondent and the Back Center. She had an appointment on January 13, 2011, to see Respondent for pain she was experiencing in her lower back and sides. On previous visits to the Back Center, Respondent had done localized injections to help D.K. deal with the pain. On those visits, she had simply rolled her pants down below her waist and leaned against the examination table in order for Respondent to do the injections. On the January 13 visit, she was told to lie on the table and pull her jeans down to her knees while Respondent went to prepare the medications. Respondent returned, closing the door as he came into the room. Respondent began injecting medications into her back and both sides. He then moved lower and administered injections into her thighs although she had not complained about any pain in that area. Respondent then moved her jeans down to her ankles and began administering injections into her calves. While he was injecting her, she felt him rubbing his erect penis against her thighs and heard his breathing get heavier. She could also feel Respondent lean closer to her and felt his breath on her thighs as he injected her calves. After the injections were complete, D.K. said Respondent was sweating, flushed, and “looked like my husband after we’ve had intercourse.” D.K. left the office and returned to her car. She immediately began to mentally process what had occurred to her, but did not immediately tell anyone at the Back Center. She was shocked and upset by the event but waited a few days before telling her husband what had happened. She then reported the events to someone at the Back Center. The Back Center asked her to come in so she could discuss the situation with Dr. Hynes, medical director of the Back Center. Later, D.K. made a complaint to local law enforcement about the incident. D.K. has also contacted an attorney to look into filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. In response to the complaint by D.K., Dr. Hynes mandated that Respondent have a medical assistant with him during any contact with female patients. Despite the prohibition, Respondent continued to see female patients in an examination room without others present. He was confronted several times by the site operations manager about this violation, but Respondent did not change his behavior. D.K. was a credible witness. She provided a clear and unequivocal description of what transpired during her visit to the Back Center on January 13, 2011. Patient C.J. Patient C.J. presented to the Back Center experiencing pain as a result of shrapnel wounds received while she was serving in the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. C.J. did not testify at final hearing so her physical demeanor could not be assessed. Her deposition transcript was admitted into evidence over objection. In May 2011, C.J. was referred to the Back Center by her treating physician at Patrick Air Force Base. She took the referral, called the Back Center, and was assigned to Respondent for pain management services. C.J. went to the Back Center on May 4, 2011. She was experiencing significant pain and was physically uncomfortable. C.J. was processed in by a receptionist and then led to an examination room by a female employee. The employee took C.J.’s blood pressure, gathered some personal information, and left the room. On that date, C.J. was wearing jeans, a blouse, and open- toed shoes. She had on “full underwear” that day. Respondent came into the room and examined C.J. as she sat on the examining table. He advised C.J. that an injection might benefit her. As C.J. remembered it, the injection was to be in the side of her neck, and then in her back or hip. Respondent left the room to obtain the medications as C.J. waited. Upon his return to the room, Respondent injected Depo- Medrol 40 mg, Toradol 30 mg, Lidocaine 2% 0.5 mL, and Marcaine 0.5 mL into the left side of her neck. After the initial injection, Respondent left the room while the medication took effect. C.J. began to feel very relaxed and sleepy. Respondent recollects that C.J. complained of feeling light-headed, but does not believe any medication he injected would have caused that to happen. Respondent later returned to the room and prepared to give C.J. another injection into her hip area. She sat up on the table as Respondent pulled one end of the table slightly away from the wall.4/ After moving the table, Respondent had C.J. lie down on her side, lift her blouse, and unbuckle her jeans. She then slid her jeans and underwear down past her hips as directed. At that point, Respondent began injecting a solution into C.J.’s hip. As the injection was proceeding, she felt Respondent slide his hand over her hip and “in my groin area.” While doing that, Respondent’s crotch was pressed against C.J.’s buttocks. C.J. felt what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her buttocks as he administered the injection. After the injection was completed, Respondent came around from behind the table and told C.J. she would need to come see him again in a few weeks. C.J. got up from the table and began to realize that “something was not right” about the treatment she had just received. When C.J. went to the front desk to check out, she asked a nurse to identify the medications which had been injected but was unable to get that information. C.J. then left the Back Center and immediately called her nurse case manager at Patrick Air Force Base to report what had occurred. Her nurse advised C.J. to call 911 to report the incident; C.J. did so as she walked out to her car in the parking lot. A policeman arrived some 20 minutes later and took her statement. The officer then went inside to talk to Respondent. He said Respondent appeared to be surprised and shocked by C.J.’s allegation. The police decided not to file any charges against Respondent based on C.J.’s complaint. The reporting police officer (Middendorf) seemed to question C.J.’s veracity or truthfulness on the day of the incident. He said C.J. was upset and seemed lethargic, except when she was talking on the telephone to “one of her superiors.” According to Middendorf, C.J. acted consistent with someone who may be under the influence of drugs. He did acknowledge that C.J. had just come out of a pain management clinic. Middendorf also felt C.J. was either confused or not telling the truth concerning where Respondent had allegedly touched her. C.J., who was obviously distraught at the time, indicated both her pubic area and her outer thigh when she told Middendorf that Respondent had touched her “groin.” Middendorf challenged her about that and C.J. became defensive and argumentative. He did not provide any credible testimony as to why he believed she might be lying to him. His statement that C.J.’s voice changed when she was talking to her office on the phone is not conclusive evidence that she was not telling him the truth. C.J. never returned to the Back Center. She obtained pain management treatment elsewhere. Inasmuch as C.J.’s demeanor could not be judged because she did not appear in person, her testimony must be considered using other factors. In this case, the testimony was very similar to the facts described by other patients of Respondent concerning their treatment by him. The events as described by C.J. were believable and convincing, especially when compared to the allegations by other alleged victims. Neither C.J. nor any of the other alleged victims/complainants has talked to other alleged victims about their experiences, so there does not appear to be any collusion between the victims. Patient M.B. Patient M.B. was already a regular patient at the Back Center when she first saw Respondent on July 7, 2011. Respondent’s notes in M.B.’s chart indicate the patient was presenting for “initial evaluation” that day, but that was not correct; she had already been seen several times by other physicians at the Back Center. M.B. had chronic lumbalgia (low back pain) and lower extremity dysesthesia (a burning sensation) which was increasing progressively. Respondent examined M.B., discussed his findings, and scheduled a follow-up appointment for August 2, 2011, at which time he gave her an injection of 1% Xylocaine with approximately 30 ml of Lidocaine 1% on both of her side hips. He also injected a block with a solution containing 2 ml of Marcaine 0.5%, 2 ml of Lidocaine 2%, and 2 ml of Depo- Medrol 80 mg into M.B.’s joints. M.B. reported no suspicious or untoward behavior by Respondent during the July 7 and August 2 appointments. On August 29, 2011, M.B. returned to see Respondent. She presented with pain in her hips and left side. Nurse Bobbi McDonald escorted M.B. to the examination room and took her vital signs before leaving. Respondent came into the room, alone, and closed the door. At that visit, M.B. was wearing khaki mid-thigh cargo shorts, a blouse that tied around her neck, and bikini underwear. Respondent asked about her pain, touched points on her body to identify the exact pain locations, and adjusted her back manually. He then suggested injection of a steroid as a stop-gap measure prior to scheduling her for a fluoroscope injection later. M.B. agreed to the plan. Respondent left the examination room to get the medication. When he returned, he was alone and again he closed the door. Respondent told M.B. to pull her shorts down below her waist and to cover herself with a paper gown. She pulled her shorts and underwear down about halfway across her buttocks, which was lower than she would normally pull them for fluoroscope injections. Respondent began to clean the area for the injection and asked M.B. to pull her garments down further, below her buttocks. Respondent then pulled the table out from the wall and he went between the table and the wall. He injected M.B.’s hip about five times with a solution containing Depo Medrol 80, Toradol 60, Lidocaine, and Marcaine 1 ml. As he injected her, M.B. could feel Respondent’s groin touching her hip. She could feel what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis rubbing against her in a back and forth motion. By this time, her paper gown had fallen off, exposing her buttocks and vaginal area. After the last injection, M.B. felt Respondent’s fingers touching her vagina. As she pushed upward to get off the table, M.B. felt Respondent touch her vagina again. She got off the table, pulled up her pants, and sat down as the doctor began talking to her. M.B. did not say anything to Respondent. She immediately believed that she had been sexually assaulted, but was too confused and shocked to say anything to anyone. M.B. did not initially report Respondent’s behavior to the Back Center. She later reported her allegations to the Melbourne Police Department and also filed a civil lawsuit against Respondent and the Back Center. (M.B. would continue to return to the Back Center, but did not see Respondent again for any of her treatments.) M.B.’s testimony was not as immediately believable as that of some of the other witnesses. Based on her personality, fear of the process, or some other factor, she seemed to be fairly emotionless in describing the incident. However, inasmuch as her testimony was corroborated by what other patients had experienced, her clearly enunciated statements are convincing. Further, M.B. exhibited extreme visual cues as to her intense dislike for Respondent at the final hearing. The testimony of M.B. alone would not be clear and convincing evidence of any wrongdoing by Respondent. However, her testimony is corroboration of and support for the testimony of other victims. Respondent's employment at the Back Center was terminated shortly after M.B.'s appointment with him. There is no evidence as to Respondent's employment from September 2011 until he went to Advantacare in March 2012. Patient A.H. Patient A.H. presented to Advantacare (Daytona Beach office) on January 9, 2013, in an effort to address pain she was suffering as a result of an automobile accident that occurred in October 2012. She wanted to reduce her pain while also reducing the amount of medications she was taking. A.H. had a job which required driving, so she needed to be as drug-free as possible. A.H. was escorted to the examination room. She remembers that Respondent came in, closed the door, and propped it shut. Respondent remembers the door to that room being open, that it would open by itself unless something was placed against it. The medical technician assigned to Respondent said the door did not have any problems, but it would always be half open. There is no corroborated evidence as to whether the door to the room was open, closed, or ajar when A.H. was being examined. Respondent examined A.H. and began to show her some exercises and stretches that he thought might alleviate some of her pain. As she was sitting in a chair being shown how to stretch, A.H. felt Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her back. She quickly told Respondent “I’ve got it” in order to stop his actions. She got up quickly and moved to another chair in the office. A.H. clearly described what she had felt and had no confusion or doubt about what happened. Her testimony about the incident was credible. Respondent then told A.H. to lie on the table on her side with her arms stretched out in front of her. Despite what had just happened, A.H. complied with his directions.5/ When she got into position, Respondent had A.H. move her body over to the very edge of the table and began to manipulate her back. As his hands continued down her back, she felt his hands go down inside her panties. As this happened, she could feel Respondent “humping” her, grinding his groin area against her backside. Respondent then told A.H. to change positions on the table, moving her feet to the opposite end. Amazingly, she again complied with his instructions. Respondent began touching her upper thigh near her vagina and “did the same thing he had done before.” At that, A.H. quickly moved off the table and onto a chair, where she sat rigid and refused to move. Respondent seemed calm and relaxed, showing no sign of having acted inappropriately. A.H. did not tell anyone at Advantacare about the incident on that day because she could not fully grasp what had happened. As she began to understand the situation better, she was worried about reporting the incident because it would be her word against the doctor’s. A.H. did tell another doctor (Dr. Jacobson) about the incident when she saw him the next day for a regularly scheduled appointment. Dr. Jacobson had been an employee with Advantacare and presumably relayed A.H.’s allegations to the center. A.H. also reported the incident to the Board of Health and to law enforcement. She later contacted an attorney about filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. A.H. did not return to Advantacare for treatment after this event because of the traumatic impact of the incident. Respondent has no independent recollection of A.H. as a patient, but said he did not touch her inappropriately. A.H.’s testimony was believable. She was a credible witness and articulated her testimony clearly. It is strange that A.H. would continue to obey Respondent even after he had touched her inappropriately, but she was obviously a compliant person, especially as it relates to physicians. Respondent’s defenses to allegations by patients Respondent claims he never saw a written chaperone policy at the Back Center but that he knew that it existed. According to him, there was insufficient staff available to make it possible to comply with the policy. Respondent’s testimony in this regard is rejected as being contrary to better, more persuasive evidence. Respondent said he was on several medications for “five or six years” prior to the final hearing, including Zoloft for mild depression, Lisinopril for hypertension, and Toprol for hypertension. One of the possible side effects of those medications is impotence or erectile dysfunction. However, during the time he was taking these drugs, Respondent fathered his two children. There is no competent evidence that Respondent suffered from impotence or erectile dysfunction during the time of any of the allegations about sexual misconduct. Respondent usually wore a lab coat when treating patients. The coat is long and had large pockets in the front, at about groin level. Respondent would keep empty syringes in his coat pocket. He suggests that female patients who said they felt his erect penis were actually feeling the syringes. His suggestion is not very plausible or persuasive. Respondent demonstrated at final hearing the normal physical stance he took when doing an injection of a patient in an examination room setting. He suggested that his body would be turned at a 45-degree angle from the patient rather than facing them directly, thus eliminating the possibility of full frontal contact with the patient. He also said that he generally stood four or five inches away from the patient, but might come into contact with the patient occasionally. Neither the statements nor his demonstration were persuasive. Respondent’s contention is that each and every one of the patients who alleged sexual misconduct was lying. He suggests that patient D.K. was overweight and thus would not have sexually aroused him. Also, he maintains that her description of the injections being performed while Respondent was rubbing against her would have necessarily resulted in horrible pain at best or a broken needle at worst. He claims that since patient M.B. was married to a policeman, she would have necessarily taken photographs of her numerous injections to preserve a record and she would have complained immediately. Her failure to do so, he suggests, impugns her testimony. Respondent contends that patient T.J.’s tardiness in reporting her allegations suggests the allegations were false. Respondent refutes A.H.’s allegations on the basis that there was a disagreement as to the physical layout of the medical office. Respondent contends there is no evidence that patient S.D. (his alleged lover) was his patient, even though there is a stipulation to that effect. Despite these speculative defenses, the evidence presented by the alleged victims is credible and accepted as fact. Failure to update practitioner profile A letter dated March 27, 2013, advising Respondent of his termination from participation in the Medicaid Program, was mailed to Respondent at two separate addresses: 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard, Suite 610, Melbourne, Florida 32901, i.e., the address of the Back Center, and 930 South Harbor City Boulevard, Melbourne, Florida 32901, the address for Osler (the company with whom the Back Center merged at some point in time). The letter to 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard was received on April 1, 2013, and an acknowledgement was signed by Chandra Carrender, a Back Center employee. Respondent’s employment with the Back Center had been terminated some 16 months previously, i.e., in August 2011. The letter mailed to 930 Harbor City Boulevard was returned as undeliverable. The termination letter provided Respondent notice of his right to contest the decision. He was given 21 days from receipt of the letter to file a Petition if he wanted to challenge the termination. Respondent did not file a challenge, so on or about June 21, 2013, a Termination Final Order was filed by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), setting forth Respondent’s termination from participation in the Florida Medicaid Program. The termination was issued pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes. By law, Respondent was required to update his Florida practitioner profile within 15 days of receipt of the Termination Final Order. The Termination Final Order was mailed to Respondent, return receipt requested, at two different addresses: The 930 South Harbor City Boulevard address and the 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard address. Respondent denies having received the letter or TFO until just prior to the formal administrative hearing in this matter. Licensed physicians in the State of Florida are required to maintain a current address of record with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) and the Department of Health. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided evidence as to what Respondent’s official address of record was at the time the TFO and the letter were sent to Respondent at the two Harbor City Boulevard addresses. According to the deposition testimony of Michael West of the AHCA Medicaid Program Integrity office, the notices were sent to Respondent’s “address of record” per section 409.913(6), Florida Statutes. West’s testimony, however, did not specify what address that was. It might be logically presumed that one or both of the Harbor City Boulevard addresses were the “address of record,” because that is where the notices were mailed. However, there is no clear and convincing evidence as to Respondent’s official address of record at the time the Termination Final Order was mailed. The statutory section referred to by West states: Any notice required to be given to a provider under this section is presumed to be sufficient notice if sent to the address last shown on the provider enrollment file. It is the responsibility of the provider to furnish and keep the agency informed of the provider’s current address. United States Postal Service proof of mailing or certified or registered mailing of such notice to the provider at the address shown on the provider enrollment file constitutes sufficient proof of notice. Any notice required to be given to the agency by this section must be sent to the agency at an address designated by rule. Respondent did not update his Florida practitioner profile because he claims never to have received a copy of the TFO or the letter. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided direct evidence of Respondent’s “address last shown on the provider enrollment file” as of March 27, 2013.6/ Other factual considerations Respondent was terminated from employment at the Back Center in September 2011. The termination occurred as follows: T.J. reported the alleged October 29, 2010 incident in April 2011. Dr. Hynes was already aware of another incident (from D.K. in January 2011). Dr. Hynes met with Respondent to discuss his alleged behavior. Respondent denied the allegations, saying that people just seem to like him and take advantage of him. He said the patients were lying about the incidents. Dr. Hynes mandated at that time that Respondent have a chaperone in the examining room with every female patient. Rather than being allowed to exercise “medical judgment” like other doctors in the clinic, Respondent was ordered to always use a chaperone with all female patients. After patient C.J.’s allegations came to light in May 2011, Dr. Hynes told Respondent that three times was enough; something had to be done. The Back Center commenced preparation of a termination letter. The letter was to tell Respondent that, pursuant to his Employment Agreement, the Back Center was providing him the 180-day notice of termination of employment “without cause.” The purpose of that letter was to allow Respondent time to find a job and not have a blemish on his record. One of the bases for the termination letter was that Respondent had been referred to the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN) for counseling to address his behavior. Dr. Hynes presumed Respondent was obtaining that counseling. However, when C.J. reported the incident on May 4, 2011, Dr. Hynes found out that Respondent had not been going to PRN as he had previously indicated. At about the time the 180-day letter was being drafted, another incident (by patient M.B.) was reported to the Back Center. Upon hearing of that allegation, Dr. Hynes verbally fired Respondent, effective immediately, with cause. The 180-day letter was not actually delivered to Respondent until after the verbal termination, so the letter was moot when it arrived. Respondent did not tell his next employer, Advantacare, that he had been terminated from employment by the Back Center. He also did not advise Advantacare about the sexual allegations made by patients at the Back Center. In summary, Respondent engaged in activities of a sexual nature with patients at the Back Center in December 2010, January 2011, May 2011, and August 2011 (in addition to his relations with S.D. in 2008–2010). He engaged in sexually related touching of a patient at Advantacare in January 2013. His employment with the Back Center was terminated in September 2011; his employment with Advantacare was terminated in April 2013. Former patients of Respondent expressed dismay that he was being charged with the violations set forth in the Administrative Complaint. They found Respondent to be a caring and professional doctor. It is clear Respondent did not treat all his patients the same way he treated the victims identified herein. Some of his co-workers said they did not see Respondent engage in any of the alleged actions. They did not receive any complaints from other patients. Respondent obviously has a stellar reputation with some of his patients and co-workers. That status, however, does not excuse his behavior with the victims in the present cases. It is also alleged that Bobbi McDonald was a rumor-mongerer and a liar. She appeared credible at final hearing and there is no competent, substantial evidence to support the dispersions cast by others. It should be noted that several witnesses identified by Respondent were displeased with the manner in which they were questioned by Department personnel prior to the final hearing. The witnesses expressed extreme discomfort when Department employees (attorneys) suggested that Respondent was “an addict” or a sociopath. While a state agency is bound to pursue all claims against individuals which it is responsible for licensing and monitoring, it is improper to harangue or disparage such persons in order to sway potential witnesses’ testimony. Upon full review of the evidence in this case, the potential witnesses who complained about the Department’s aggressive nature did not provide substantive testimony on the issues of this case. Thus, any harm which may have resulted from the Department’s statements would not affect the final decision herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Health revoking Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D.’s license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order assess the cost of investigating and prosecuting this case, and that payment of such costs be assessed against Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2014.
