The Issue At issue is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaints and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The parties Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board (Department), is a state agency charged with the duty and responsibility for regulating the practice of contracting pursuant to Section 20.165, Florida Statues, and Chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Richard M. Golfman, was, at all times material hereto, licensed by the Department as a certified general contractor, having been issued license number CG C032860, and authorized to engage in the practice of general contracting as an individual.1 The Feinstein project (DOAH Case No. 00-0599) On or about October 30, 1998, Respondent entered into a written contract with Norman and Sheila Feinstein to furnish the materials and perform the labor necessary to enclose and remodel the screened patio, and to build a rock garden, at their home located at 5468 Northwest 20th Avenue, Boca Raton, Florida, for the sum of $5,000. At the time, the Feinsteins paid Respondent $1,500 as the initial payment (deposit) under the terms of the contract. The contract Respondent presented and the Feinsteins executed on October 30, 1998, did not include Respondent's license number, nor did it contain a statement concerning consumers' rights under the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. Following execution of the contract, Respondent made repeated promises to construct the rock garden; however, it was not until November 10, 1998, that Respondent appeared on-site and constructed the rock garden, albeit not to the Feinsteins' satisfaction. Subsequently, Respondent had some high-hat electrical fixture cans and a bundle of furring strips delivered to the home for the patio project but, thereafter, despite repeated requests, refused to perform any work on the project or refund any money to the Feinsteins. The value of the labor and materials Respondent invested in the rock garden, as well as the cost of the building materials (the high-hat fixtures and furring strips) delivered to the job-site, was $250, a sum considerably less than the $1,500 the Feinsteins had entrusted to Respondent under the terms of their agreement. The Burres/Berger project (DOAH Case No. 00-0600) On or about November 23, 1998, Respondent submitted a written proposal to Tanya Burres to furnish the materials and perform the labor necessary to replace the existing roof on her home located at 7270 Montrico Drive, Boca Raton, Florida, for the sum of $22,125. The proposal was a one-page preprinted form. In the upper left there appeared, printed immediately following Respondent's handwritten name, the following: THE GOLFMAN GROUP, INC. P.O. Box 811926 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 The proposal did not include Respondent's license number, nor did it contain a statement concerning consumers' rights under the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. At the time the proposal was submitted, Tanya Burres was under contract to sell the home to Drs. Glenn Berger and Michelle Fiorillo, husband and wife (the Bergers), and Ms. Burres had agreed to split with the Bergers the cost of a new roof for the home. At the time, Ms. Burres had suggested the Respondent as a contractor to perform the work (because he had previously done satisfactory work for Ms. Burres); however, it was understood that the employment of any contractor was subject to the Bergers' approval. That the Bergers' agreement was required before any such employment would be accepted was clearly conveyed to Respondent. On November 23, 1998, Tanya Burres signed the proposal and gave Respondent a check payable to his order in the sum of $1,106.25, representing her half of the ten percent deposit called for by the proposal. The Bergers, however, declined to accept the proposal, and refused Respondent's request for the balance of the deposit. Rather, the Bergers, having received adverse information from the Department regarding Respondent's record, preferred to employ a different contractor, and Ms. Burres accorded the Bergers a monetary credit at closing (on the purchase of the home) for one-half the cost to re-roof the home. When the Bergers informed Ms. Burres (shortly after she signed the proposal on November 23, 1998) that they would not agree to use Respondent, Ms. Burres attempted to stop payment on her check; however, the check had already been cashed. Thereafter, Ms. Burres attempted on numerous occasions to contact Respondent by telephone and by his pager, but Respondent failed to return any of her calls or messages. To date, Respondent has failed to account for or return Ms. Burres' deposit of $1,106.25. The costs of investigation and prosecution As of February 25, 2000, the Department's costs of investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with any attorney's time, totaled $234.85 for DOAH Case No. 00-0599 (the Feinstein project) and $195.65 for DOAH Case No. 00-0600 (the Burres/Berger project.) Previous disciplinary action At hearing, the Department offered proof that, on two prior occasions, Respondent had been subjected to disciplinary action by the Construction Industry Licensing Board (the Board). (Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) The first occasion is reflected in the terms of a Final Order of the Board, dated August 4, 1987, which found Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint (which were not revealed at hearing beyond what may be inferred from the terms of the Final Order), and resolved that Respondent suffer the following penalty: Respondent's licensure is hereby suspended for ten (10) years. Provided, Respondent may obtain termination of said suspension at anytime, without further action by the Board, upon providing the Board's Executive Director with a certified bank check in an amount sufficient to cover and pay a fine of five hundred dollars ($500), and the bad check alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and all service charges in connection therewith, and all other fees accruing as of the date Respondent seeks said termination of supervision. The second occasion Respondent was subjected to disciplinary action is reflected in the terms of a Final Order of the Board, dated July 18, 1997, which approved a stipulated settlement of certain complaints then pending before the Board. That Final Order approved the dismissal of a number of counts contained in five Administrative Complaints then pending before the Board and, as to the remaining counts, agreed (without Respondent admitting or denying the allegations of fact contained in the Administrative Complaints) to the following penalty: 3. FINE AND COSTS: Respondent shall pay a fine of Nine Hundred dollars ($900.00) and costs of Eight Hundred fifty One dollars ($851) to the Board within thirty (30) days of the filing of the Final Order. Said payment shall be in the form of a cashier's or certified check and shall be made payable to the "Construction Industry Licensing Board." To assure payment of the fine and costs, it is further ordered that all of Respondent's licensure to practice contracting shall be suspended with the imposition of the suspension being stayed for thirty (30) days. If the ordered fine and costs are paid in compliance with the terms set forth above, the suspension imposed shall not take effect. However, should payment not be timely made, the stay shall be lifted and Respondent's license shall be immediately suspended. Upon payment of the fine and costs in full, the suspension imposed shall be lifted. Respondent apparently satisfied the fines and costs imposed by the foregoing orders. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered adopting the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and which, as a penalty for the violations found, imposes an administrative fine in the total sum of $13,500.00, revokes Respondent's licensure, orders that Respondent pay restitution to Norman and Sheila Feinstein in the sum of $1,250.00 and to Tanya Burres in the sum of $1,106.25, and assesses costs of investigation and prosecution (through February 25, 2000) in the total sum of $430.50 against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, William Losciale, was a licensed registered pool contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license number RP-0032951, by the State of Florida, and was the qualifier of Lynn Pools. On June 9, 1987, Respondent entered into a contract with Kevin D. Foy for the construction of a pool with a screen enclosure on Mr. Foy's property for the sum of $12,000.00. On August 12, 1987, Mr. Foy made his final payment to the Respondent for the pool and enclosure and all related work. On June 9, 1987, Respondent entered into a contract with Harold Orcutt for the construction of a pool with a screen enclosure on Mr. Orcutt's property for the sum of $18,015.00. On August 1, 1987, Mr. Orcutt made his final payment to the Respondent for the pool and enclosure and all related work. On May 12, 1987, Respondent entered into a contract with Ann McAuley for the construction of a pool with a screen enclosure on Ms. McAuley's property for the sum of $14,204.08. On September 18, 1987, Ms. McAuley made her final payment to the Respondent for the pool and enclosure and all related work. At the end of September, 1987, the Respondent entered into an oral contract with Paragon Aluminum Products, Inc. to have Paragon Aluminum Products, Inc., install the pool enclosure at the Foy residence, pursuance to the Respondent's contract with the Foys. The total Paragon contract price was $3,975.00 which was to be paid by the Respondent to Paragon within two weeks of October 6, 1987, which was the completion date. The Respondent failed to pay that amount in a timely manner. On or about July 16, 1987, the Respondent entered into an oral contract with Paragon Aluminum Products, Inc. to have Paragon Aluminum Products, Inc., install the pool enclosure at the Orcutt residence pursuant to the Respondent's contract with the Orcutts. The total Paragon contract price was $4,910.00, which was to be paid by the Respondent to Paragon within two weeks of the first part of August, 1987, which was the completion date. The Respondent made a partial payment on August 17, 1987, of $3,015.00 and the balance of $895.00 was not paid in a timely manner. On or about July 20, 1987, the Respondent entered into an oral contract with Paragon Aluminum Products, Inc. to have Paragon Aluminum Products, Inc., install a pool enclosure at the McAuley residence pursuant to the Respondent's contract with Ms. McAuley. The total Paragon contract price was $4,321.00 which was to be paid by the Respondent to Paragon within two weeks of August 5, 1987, which was the completion date. The Respondent made a partial payment on September 12, 1987, of $2,704.08 which left a balance of $1,616.92 which was not paid in a timely manner. When the Respondent failed to timely pay Paragon Aluminum Products, Inc., at the end of the foregoing jobs, an officer of Paragon contacted the Citrus County Building Department in an effort to have that department aid her in collection of the monies owed. The Respondent admitted to an investigator of the Department of Professional Regulation on June 7, 1988, that he was having cash problems in relation to the three jobs, that all work had been completed, but due to those cash flow problems, Paragon had not been paid in full. The Respondent signed a personal promissory note for the full amount due to Paragon. No liens were ever filed by Paragon. The Respondent's county license was suspended the Citrus County Licensing Board on May 11, 1988, until he was able to show financial responsibility to that board. That suspension was lifted by the Citrus County Licensing Board on October 12, 1988. Respondent has previously been disciplined by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, enter a Final Order and therein penalize the Respondent, William Losciale, as follows: Assess a fine of $1500 for the violation of Section 489.129(1)(i) Dismiss the remaining charges made in the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1989.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the license of Frederick B. Mee d/b/a B & M Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Service, Inc., be suspended until satisfactory proof of his personal finances is received by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: David Linn, Esquire Post Office Box 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Frederick B. Mee 1123 El Dorado Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Mr. J. K. Linnan Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 8621 Jacksonville, Florida 32211
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination, as defined by the Florida Fair Housing Act, Chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes, against Petitioner, on the basis of her age and/or handicap.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 73-year-old woman on a fixed income. She suffers from congestive heart failure, for which she takes medication. She has been treated one time for an allergic reaction to pesticides, but an on-going allergy to pesticides was not proven. She lives alone in a mortgaged home in the County of Volusia. Respondent James A. Whittaker has been the Housing Manager for Respondent County of Volusia Community Service Group (Group) only since 1998. Respondent Group is part of the Community Services Department of the Volusia County government. The Group receives grants, lets construction bids/contracts, and provides low-cost funding to pay for maintenance/repair/improvement work on the homes of low-income homeowners in Volusia County. There is no age factor involved in the Group's determination of a homeowner's eligibility. Eligibility is determined based almost entirely upon income. The vehicle for Volusia County's maintaining/ repairing/improving low-income homes is called a "rehabilitation loan." The normal sequence of events for a homeowner is to: apply for eligibility; be determined eligible by the Group; be placed on a waiting list; rise to the top of the waiting list; sign a Rehabilitation Loan Agreement; and participate in a home inspection/pre-bid conference in the home. After this, the Group bids out a contract and accepts a bidder. Then, the successful bidder repairs the home and is paid by the Group. Homeowners over 62 years of age are not required to pay back any of the money; younger homeowners are required to repay 50 percent. Effective in the autumn of 2000, the Group, on behalf of the County, began to require, as part of the Rehabilitation Loan Agreement, that each homeowner execute permission for a timed lien on the home which would protect 50 percent of the Group's investment if, within a specified time period after the work is completed, the homeowner rents, sells, or vacates the real property which has been improved at public expense. The time period for each lien is based on the amount of the loan. Larger loans result in longer lien periods. There is a similar provision for a lien if the homeowner dies within a specified period and the new client is less than 62 years of age. In the case of death of a homeowner, accommodations with regard to the lien can be made for familial heirs less than 62 years of age who inherit from homeowners over 62 years of age. (R-1) In 1994, Petitioner sought housing assistance/a rehabilitation loan from the Group. She filled out the necessary application paperwork and was determined to be eligible for assistance. Her name was placed on a waiting list ranked solely by the date she was deemed eligible. At that time, the immediacy of her repair needs was not part of her ranking or that of any other applicant. She was told the Group would get to her in approximately two years. Before Petitioner's name moved to the top of the waiting list so that her repair/maintenance problem could be assessed, and possibly addressed, by the Group, her name was either removed from the list inadvertently or because she did not respond to periodic notification(s) that she must affirmatively state whether she still wished to remain on the list or not. Mr. Whittaker did not work in any capacity that would have permitted him to remove her name prior to 1998. There is no proof that Mr. Whittaker or his predecessor(s) did any affirmative act at any time to remove her name, let alone removed her name for a discriminatory reason. Between 1994 and 2000, Petitioner was required to sign up several times to get back on the list. She found this confusing and unfair. She has complained about this to many people. By 2000, the hole in Petitioner's floor, which she had originally approached the Group to fix, had become substantially larger than it was when she first applied. She maintains that this was because the hole had gone unattended from 1994 to 2000. She blames the Group for the interim deterioration of her house. (P-2, P-3) Petitioner also has had roofing problems. She maintains that the Group's delay in addressing her roofing problems has caused minor roofing damage to increase to substantial water damage inside the home. She testified that the original problem was exacerbated when an inspector stepped through a room ceiling weakened by rain coming through the roof into the attic. It was proven that she currently has a bad leak in her dining room, and considerable damage to the ceiling and dry wall, but it was not proven when or how this problem began. Petitioner has a particular kind of roofing shingle that she wants replaced and warranted, and she does not want to accept any substitutes. (P-2, P-3) Sometime in 2000, in response to Petitioner's complaints, Ms. Herrin, the Housing Coordinator in Mr. Whittaker's office, went to Petitioner's home to determine what Petitioner's situation was, because none of her papers could be located. Ms. Herrin assisted Petitioner in making out and submitting new application papers. Petitioner was declared eligible and placed on an emergency repairs waiting list. In response to Petitioner's complaints, a County Inspector came to her house. Upon this inspector's recommendation, the Group paid for someone to do a temporary repair to Petitioner's floor. This inspector may have been the person who stepped through Petitioner's ceiling, but Petitioner's testimony is not clear in this regard. The floor repair was admittedly only a temporary one, and Petitioner does not like it. She is concerned about people and animals crawling under her house and losing her insurance as a result. On February 24, 2000, the Group sent Petitioner a letter, over the signature of a staff assistant, stating that Petitioner's name was being removed from the emergency waiting list because the inspection had determined that no emergency existed, and that Petitioner would be retained on the regular rehabilitation list and receive assistance when her name reached the top of that list. (P-4) In response to Petitioner's continued complaints, on March 24, 2000, Mr. Whittaker reported to the SHIP Analyst at the Florida Housing Finance Corporation that the Group had stabilized Petitioner's bedroom wall and caulked the areas around her window. An inspector had explained to Petitioner the work that had been done and needed to be done and that the present temporary repairs would be sufficient until she became eligible for a substantial rehabilitation loan. (P-1) Petitioner has not refuted this information. The materials forwarded by the Commission to the Division show that Petitioner prepared her discrimination charge, based on age and disability, on August 21, 2001, stating that the last discrimination had occurred on "July 31, 2001 and continuing." The charge bears no signature of Petitioner and no date stamp by the Commission. However, these pleadings show that Petitioner objected to the designation of her problems as "non-emergency," and further show that she does not want to sign the lien agreement required of all participating homeowners. At hearing, Petitioner pointed out that a lien was not required when she first applied in 1994 and, indeed, was not required prior to the autumn of 2000, but whether the contract to repair/improve Petitioner's home, described below, was bid before or after she filed her charge of discrimination, is not clear on the record. At some point in time after autumn 2000, Petitioner was offered a rehabilitation loan to make major repairs and improvements to her home. Petitioner objected to some of the terms and conditions of the loan, including but not limited to the lien requirements, and refused to sign the County of Volusia Rehabilitation Agreement. (R-1) Assuming that she would eventually sign the agreement, the Group went ahead and bid out the work for the rehabilitation of Petitioner's home. Charles Coleman, the building contractor who was awarded the bid, required that Petitioner move out of the house while the contracting work was being done. This is such a common requirement by contractors that the Group has pre-printed Temporary Relocation Notices, which staff merely fill out to specify dates for the respective participant-homeowners to be in and out of their houses and which instruct them to pack up any breakables and valuables for that interim period. The form letter is applied to all applicants by the Group, regardless of which contractor makes the request. The Group, like the contractors, fear liability if a homeowner is hurt or any damage is done to his or her possessions during construction. Also, a construction crew cannot proceed in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner with laymen, including the homeowner, present on a project. Petitioner refused to temporarily vacate her house while the contractor did the rehabilitation work. Ms. Herrin met with Petitioner five times to explain the health considerations of Petitioner remaining in the house during construction, but this is not sufficient, in light of the remainder of the evidence, to support a finding that anyone associated with the Group or the County perceived Petitioner to be "handicapped," as defined by the applicable statutes. Petitioner maintained to the Group, and further maintained at hearing, that plaster dust would not bother her. Despite the obvious danger of construction to someone with congestive heart failure and pesticide allergies, Petitioner continued to insist upon remaining in her home for the duration of the construction. She also testified that her doctor believed it more stressful for her to "run back and forth" than to stay in the house during the construction. Petitioner did not establish that her doctor was aware of the lengths to which the Group was willing to go to make other living arrangements for her, which are detailed below; but based upon Petitioner's testimony, the undersigned is forced to conclude that Petitioner has not established that her medical condition(s) substantially limit one or more of her major life activities. Contractor Coleman refused to do the work if Petitioner remained in the house during construction, so on November 20, 2001, Mr. Whittaker wrote a letter (R-3) to Petitioner explaining that Mr. Coleman would need Petitioner to be out of her home for only nine days and that his crew would move all her furniture into a storage box and keep it on her property while the work was being done. He pointed out that all her home's electricity and water would be shut off during the nine days of construction. He stated that Petitioner could move back into her house after the primary work was finished. This letter's explanation comports with the rather lengthy list of repairs on which the contractor had bid, which, in addition to fixing Petitioner's roof and floor, included some plumbing and replacement of major kitchen appliances. (P-5, R-3) While it is possible that repair costs could run so high that the Group would not replace Petitioner's stove and refrigerator, apparently that determination would have had to wait until construction was underway. In other words, Petitioner wanted a new stove and refrigerator but might not have gotten them due to the existing funding scheme. However, it is clear that the Group and Mr. Coleman agreed to make sure that Petitioner got the best warranty possible on the type of shingle she was requesting; that her wishes with regard to her interior doors were met; and that her other requests were honored wherever they did not offend either the legal requirements for construction contracts or building permits/codes. (P-5, R-3) Mr. Whittaker's November 20, 2001, letter also advised Petitioner that the second lowest bid was $5,000 more than Mr. Coleman's bid; that the third lowest bid was $6,000 more than Mr. Coleman's bid; and that the second and third lowest bidders would require Petitioner to be out of her house for 60 days, or neither of them would do the job. Petitioner has not refuted any of this information. (R-3) At hearing, it was shown that Petitioner has a grown son residing in Volusia County, with the potential to house her during construction. It was not shown that he would be able to house Petitioner during construction. However, in his November 20, 2001, letter, Mr. Whittaker offered to find Petitioner a place to stay for the nine days' duration of construction. (R-3) After Petitioner repeatedly refused to leave her home for the nine days of construction, Mr. Coleman withdrew his bid on the project. Prior to filing her discrimination complaint on or about August 21, 2001, Petitioner complained a lot about delays and paperwork, but she never stated or wrote to anyone with the County or Group that she felt she had been discriminated against. In hearing, when first asked why she thought she had been turned down for a rehabilitation loan, she replied, "I don't know," but later she stated it was because of her age and heart condition. When first examined about Mr. Whittaker's involvement in this case, Petitioner stated that she had never met or talked to Mr. Whittaker, but later in the hearing, she insisted that at some undesignated time, Mr. Whittaker screamed at her over the phone that he would never fix her house or allow his inspectors to enter it because she had written Governor Bush about him. Mr. Whittaker credibly denied making such a statement, and his letters in evidence demonstrate his efforts to work with Petitioner, not against her. Even if Mr. Whittaker had made the statement of which he is accused, such a reason as "retaliation for calling the Governor" would not be probative of discrimination on the basis of age or handicap. On January 28, 2002, Mr. Whittaker wrote Petitioner offering to rebid the job if she would cooperate by leaving the house just during primary construction. The letter requested that Petitioner let him know what her intentions were by February 12, 2002, or he would close her file. (R-4) On February 13, 2002, Mr. Whittaker answered a letter from Petitioner's attorney, informing him that in order for Petitioner to participate in the rehabilitation program, she would have to agree to vacate her premises until the contractor had completed a substantial portion of the work and that he, Mr. Whittaker, could not rebid the project until Petitioner complied. (P-7, R-5) On March 20, 2002, the Commission returned a Determination of No Probable Cause against Petitioner. On April 9, 2002, Petitioner filed her Petition for Relief. On April 12, 2002, the Director of the County of Volusia Community Services Department wrote a final time to Petitioner stating that because she refused to relocate temporarily from her home for just nine days, the contractor had relinquished the bid, and accordingly the Director was closing her file. (R-6)
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief and Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Jerome D. Mitchell, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 400 South Palmetto Avenue Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 2002. Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Randell H. Rowe, Esquire County of Volusia 123 West Indiana Avenue Deland, Florida 32720-4613 James L. Whittaker, Housing Manager County of Volusia Community Service Group 123 West Indiana Avenue, Room 203 Deland, Florida 32720-4611 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) properly dismissed this matter for lack of jurisdiction.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, as a first-time home buyer, applied for and was pre-approved by Cendant Mortgage Corporation d/b/a/ Century 21 Mortgage for a mortgage loan. The loan, in the amount of $28,687.00, was to be insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). In February 2003, Respondent agreed to sell Petitioner his home. They agreed that Petitioner would pay Respondent $29,000.00 for the house. Respondent subsequently stated in writing that he agreed to sell his house to Petitioner for that amount. On March 5, 2003, Petitioner signed a form entitled No Brokerage Relationship Disclosure. The form made it clear that Century 21 Prime Property Resources, Inc., a local real estate agency, and its associates did not have a brokerage relationship with Petitioner. There is no evidence that the professional services of a licensed real estate agent was involved at all in this case. However, the local Century 21 real estate office gratuitously sent a few documents on Petitioner's behalf by facsimile transmission to Century 21 Mortgage in New Jersey. Respondent did not use the sales facilities or services of Century 21 for any purpose. On March 7, 2003, Cheryl Barnes, a certified appraiser, completed an appraisal of the property. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and/or FHA required the appraisal in order for Petitioner to receive the loan insured by FHA. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent was required to pay for the appraisal. In a letter dated March 10, 2003, Century 21 Mortgage advised Petitioner that the closing date was scheduled for April 16, 2003. The letter enclosed additional forms that Petitioner needed to complete in order to close the loan. The Housing Department, Division of Planning and Development, in Sumter County, Florida, sent Petitioner a letter dated March 19, 2003. The letter advised Petitioner that she was eligible for an award of Supplemental Household Income Protection funds to cover the down payment and closing costs on the loan. Subsequently, Respondent refused to sign any papers related to the sale of the house. The loan could not be closed without Respondent's cooperation. Petitioner had placed $250 in an escrow account with Century 21 Mortgage. The mortgage broker refunded all of the money in the escrow account to Petitioner after Respondent refused to sign any more paperwork. Finally, there is no evidence of the following: (a) that Respondent owned more than three single-family houses at any one time; (b) that Respondent sold more than one single- family home within any 24-month period; (c) that Respondent had an interest in the proceeds from the sale or rental of more than three single-family houses at any one time; and (d) the sale of the subject house did not involve the posting, mailing, or publication of any written notice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Susan M. Parker 3840 East County Road 478 Apartment D-30 Webster, Florida 33597 Paul Moore 2396 County Road 608 Bushnell, Florida 33513
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: During the development stage of a condominium project, known as Lake Villas Condominium, in Altamonte Springs, Florida, First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando foreclosed on some forty (40) units of the project. At that time, approximately in November of 1975, thirty-one (31) units already had fee- simple owners or were under a lease/purchase option and they were not involved in the foreclosure proceedings. Mr. David McComb, a vice-president and mortgage loan officer with First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, was given the responsibility of assuring the completion of the remaining units, selling the units and setting up a homeowners' association for the Lake Villas Condominium. The petitioner Lake Villas Condominium Association's five-position board of directors was originally comprised of three members who were personnel of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, so that First Federal would have majority control at a time when it held the ownership to the majority of the units. In June of 1976, thirty-seven of the seventy-one units had been sold to individuals. Thereafter, the composition of the petitioner's board of directors changed and the individual-unit owners held the majority of the five positions. Mr. McComb, as a representative of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, remained on the board of directors and continued First Federal's attempts to sell the remaining unsold units. First Federal retained a sales representative who lived in one of the condominium units, operated her sales office from one of the vacant units owned by First Federal and was paid a real estate commission when she sold a unit. The sales contract on the last of the units owned by First Federal was closed on December 12, 1977. Prior to mid-1976, the Florida Power Corporation account for seven or eight common element meters was in the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, doing business as Lake Villas Condominium Association, and the billing statements were mailed to the Orlando office of First Federal Savings and Loan. In June or July of 1976, after the majority of units had been purchased by individual owners and majority control of the board of directors was obtained by the individual owners, Mr. McComb of First Federal placed a telephone call to the respondent's Winter Park office. The purpose of this call was to inform respondent that First Federal wanted the account name and address for the seven or eight meters changed and to inform respondent that the Lake Villas Condominium Association had taken over responsibility for the accounts. Mr. McComb spoke on the telephone to a female who handled commercial accounts for the respondent's Winter Park office and informed her that he wanted the name of First Federal Savings and Loan taken off the account and the bills to be mailed to the Lake Villas Condominium Association at a post office box in Altamonte Springs. The female to whom Mr. McComb spoke took down the information regarding the account numbers and change of billing names and addresses, and told him she would take care of it. Mr. McComb did not inquire about a rate adjustment, and no discussion was had concerning rates for the seven or eight meters. Following the June or July, 1976, discussion between Mr. McComb and a female at the respondent's Winter Park office concerning a change in billing name and address, the billing statements were sent and received at the post office address of the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. in Altamonte Springs. Approximately one year later, in mid-1977, Mr. McComb was forwarded some delinquent notices on the seven or eight meters. They had originally been sent to the petitioner's post office box in Altamonte Springs, but were thereafter forwarded to Mr. McComb's attention at First Federal. Mr. McComb noticed that, although the post office address had been changed, the accounts were still in the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando. He then placed another telephone call to the respondent's Winter Park office, spoke with a female in the commercial department and requested that the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando be removed from the account and that the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. be inserted as the new-named customer. The female informed Mr. McComb that this request would be taken care of and that nothing further need be done. No inquiry by Mr. McComb or discussion was had concerning a rate adjustment for these seven or eight meters. Electricity for the individual living units of the Lake Villas Condominiums are separately metered. In addition, there are seven or eight separately billed meters which service the common areas of the condominium, such as the two swimming pools, the internal street and sidewalk lighting, the clubhouse and small post lamps for an open green area. From at least April of 1979 through October of 1980, no commercial activity occurred in any of the condominium units. In April of 1979, Mr. O. K. Armstrong became the manager of the Lake Villas Condominiums and was responsible for the association's financial transactions. He noticed in May of 1979 that the bills for the seven or eight subject meters contained the name of First Federal Savings and Loan of Orlando, though they did list the condominium's post office box number for the address. After speaking with Mr. McComb about the matter, Mr. Armstrong telephoned a Mr. Harbour at the respondent's Winter Park office. It was during this discussion that petitioner, through Mr. Armstrong, learned that the seven or eight common element meters might qualify for a residential, as opposed to the higher commercial, rate. Thereafter, the rates for the seven or eight meters were changed by Florida Power Corporation from commercial to residential. The request of Mr. Armstrong for a retroactive application of those residential rates to January 1, 1976, which would amount to a refund of all amounts paid in excess of the residential rates from that date, was denied by Mr. Harbour, respondent's office manager in Winter Park. During the hearing, the petitioner verbally amended the request for retroactive application of the residential rate from January 1, 1976, to July of 1976.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition filed by the Lake Villas Condominium Association, Inc. be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Mapp Hunter, Pattillo, Marchman, Mapp and Davis Post Office Box 340 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Blair W. Clack Assistant Counsel Post Office Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Arthur Shell Public Service Commission Legal Department 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Tribble, Clerk Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Polly Leggitt on the basis of her handicap, violating Sections 760.23(1), (2) and (7)(a), Florida Statutes (1992). If discriminatory conduct has been proven, whether quantifiable damages, or other allowable remedies, have been proven under Section 760.35(3)(b), Florida Statutes. Whether Florida Commission on Human Relations’ failure to conclude its investigation within one year requires dismissal of the complaint/charge; and Whether Florida Commission on Human Relations’ delay has prejudiced the Respondent and whether the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of violation of the statute of limitations or laches.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.30, Florida Statutes (1995). If Petitioner is unable to obtain voluntary compliance with sections 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes, or has reasonable cause to believe a discriminatory housing practice has occurred, Petitioner may institute an administrative proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes on behalf of the aggrieved party. On February 3, 1993, Leggitt filed a complaint with the Petitioner, and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The complaint names Carole Naylor, Property Administrator, as the person who discriminated against her. On March 24, 1993, the Petitioner notified Regency Place Apartments and Carole Naylor that the complaint had been filed, and stated that within 100 days the Petitioner would investigate the complaint and give notice whether there was or was not reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. The Notice further provided that a final administrative disposition of the complaint would be completed within one year (on or about February 3, 1994). A Notice of Determination: Cause and Issuance of an Administrative Charge was made and issued by document dated and served on August 28, 1996. It named Regency Place Apartments; Carole Naylor, Property Administrator; Frank Cutrona, Property Manager; and Robert Stitzel, Owner. The notice was issued more than one year after the filing of the complaint. Respondent was the developer and owner of Regency Place Apartments in Melbourne, Florida, at all times relevant. Respondent hired Frank Cutrona as manager of Regency Place Apartments and was the manager during the relevant period. Respondent hired Carole Naylor as a clerical worker and gave her the title of Property Administrator. On September 9, 1992, Regency Place Apartments located in Melbourne, Florida, responded to a letter of inquiry from Polly Leggitt, and offered certain apartments for rent. The letter of September 9, 1992, was signed by Frank Cutrona and his wife (resident managers) offered a $100.00 discount, and invited Leggitt to visit the complex. At that time, Leggitt was a resident of Richardson Apartments located in Fort Myers, Florida. Leggitt indicated that she wanted to leave that area and move to Brevard County, Florida. On or about October 11 or 12, 1992, Leggitt visited the apartment complex and was shown an upstairs one-bedroom apartment, by a woman who she did not identify. Leggitt did not advise the woman that she had a disability, and Leggitt did not have a seeing-eye dog with her at that time. Leggitt found that the price and location of the apartments were suitable to her needs. Leggitt wanted to move to Regency Place because the apartments were accessible to all that was important to her. She used a guide dog at the time to help her with traffic. There was a veterinary clinic nearby; a light to cross the street; a bus stop so that she could get the mall; and a bank and grocery store directly across the street. Leggitt did not contact the apartment complex again until after Christmas of 1992, at which time she called and spoke to a person she believed was Frank Cutrona, the apartment manager. Leggitt was sent an application which she filled out and returned sometime after January 8, 1993. On the application she noted in the place where it requested information about automobiles, “None- (legally blind - no license)”. The application form requested information regarding pet ownership and indicated that there would be a separate application for pets. She wrote in the application that she had a guide dog, and that federal and state laws prohibited discrimination by charging a fee for guide dogs. The application stated that she was self-employed and obtained $281.34 per month in Social Security disability income. In the application, she stated “Mom pays rental and ut’s” (presumably utilities). The proposed monthly rental for a one-bedroom apartment was $380 per month, plus utilities. Leggitt sent a deposit and application fee on or about January 11, 1993. No specific amount of contribution towards Leggitt’s income was shown for her mother on the application. By letter dated January 18, 1993, Leggitt’s application was declined, citing the unavailability of the kind and location of the apartment which she desired and insufficient income to qualify. The letter was signed by Carole Naylor, “Property Administrator.” The original cashiers check for the deposit was also returned. Subsequent conversations took place between Leggitt and Frank Cutrona regarding her ability to pay and whether or not her mother’s income could be considered for credit requirements. Leggitt asked him to speak to her mother. Leggitt stated that she did not submit any information regarding her mother being a co-signer. Polly testified “[t]hey told me they would send her an application.” Christine Puchalski testified that she knew Leggitt as a resident of the apartment complex where she was a resident manager. In response to an inquiry by an unknown person calling on behalf of Regency Place Apartments, Puchalski stated that she did not go into any details other than that Leggitt paid her rent on time, that she did not have any returned checks, and there were no problems with Leggitt’s tenancy. By letter of January 28, 1993, Leggitt was advised that her application was not approved, stating that “We require the tenant/occupant to have sufficient income to qualify. Your mother living out of state, and not occupying the apartment would preclude her income from being part of the calculation.” This letter was signed by Carole Naylor, Property Administrator. Leggitt acknowledged that her application was not very specific as to income and that there were times that her mother paid rent directly to the apartment complex and sometimes she sent the sum directly to her. Following the rejection of her application, Leggitt moved to Titusville, Florida, to an apartment that was not accessible for her handicap. This apartment was on a very dangerous road, with no reliable public transportation and three miles to the grocery store. She had to buy a bicycle and risk her life on the dangerous road leading to the apartment, to buy groceries. She lived there eight-and-a-half months before moving to Merritt Island, Florida. Regency Apartments, containing 219 units, was built by Robert Stitzel in 1983 and owned by him until it was sold on April 30, 1993, to a third party corporation. The contract to sell the property had been executed in December, 1992. Frank Cutrona had worked for Stitzel between 4 and 6 years. He died on December 26, 1996. Carole Naylor did not work in the rental office. She made no judgments regarding the rental of the apartment, nor the creditworthiness of the prospective tenants. Her title “Property Administrator” appears to be a title only. Her duties were administrative, typing, and bookkeeping. She composed and typed the two letters that were sent to Leggitt, but the contents of the letters were given to her by Cutrona. She had no conversations with Polly Leggitt or Frances Leggitt. Robert Stitzel made no judgments regarding the tenants. Regency Apartments would require income equaling three times the gross rental. The creditworthiness and the determination of who would rent apartments was left solely with the resident manager. The proposed rent for a one-bedroom apartment was $380. Therefore, three times that amount equals $1,140.00. Respondent demonstrated that many disabled people had lived in the apartment complex. There was a person who was legally blind. There were amputees and physically challenged people of many different disabilities over the years. Accommodations were made for people with disabilities by Cutrona and such costs for these accommodations were paid by Regency. It does not appear that Regency Apartments is a legal entity. The owner of the apartment complex at the time of the alleged discrimination was Regency Place, Ltd., a Florida limited partnership, which no longer owns the apartment complex. Frank Cutrona is deceased, and his estate has not been made party to this proceeding. Cutrona has been described as a caring, disabled man who was kind and considerate of his tenants with disabilities and made innovative accommodations for their benefit. The specific reasons or motivations for the rejection of the application by Cutrona cannot be clarified because of his death in December, 1996. Respondent was aware that the complex could not discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex or disabilities. The Petitioner has made a prima facie case of discrimination in that Leggitt is a handicapped person, who is otherwise qualified to rent the apartment, and she suffered a loss of a housing opportunity, under circumstances which lead to an inference that Respondent based its action solely upon her handicap. Respondent presented evidence that Regency’s requirement of gross income equaling three times the monthly rent had not been satisfied by Leggitt’s mother’s agreement to contribute $550 per month. Leggitt’s income of $281.34, plus her mother’s contribution, would come to $831.34 per month. Three times the monthly rent was $1,140, thus rendering their income short by $308.66 per month. The motivation for rejecting the application is recited in those letters which stated that the apartment which Leggitt wanted was not available, and Leggitt did not have sufficient income to qualify. There is no evidence of a discriminatory motive on the part of Cutrona, Naylor, Stitzel, or Regency Apartments, other than conjecture. There is no evidence that suggests the reasons given were not true at the time the letters were written or that they were merely pretextual. Further, it does not appear from the evidence that any discriminatory motive has been proven. There is nothing in the evidence that proves that Leggitt’s legal blindness was a cause of the rejection of her application. There is no evidence of any act or conduct which would suggest discriminatory conduct or a discriminatory animus by any of the persons named as Respondents. Taken as a whole, the credible evidence indicates that the sole basis for rejecting her application was the unavailability of the unit that she requested, and her failure to satisfy management of her financial ability to meet the financial requirements of Regency Apartments. Although Leggitt testified as to her inconvenience caused by the denial of her application, there is no evidence of any quantifiable damages.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order denying the relief sought and dismissing the petition filed in this matter. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Evelyn Davis Golden, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Ms. Polly Leggitt 505 Landings Way, Apartment Number 12 Merritt Island, Florida 32952 Mike Krasny, Esquire Krasny & Dettmer Post Office Box 428 Melbourne, Florida 32902-0428
Findings Of Fact The land encompassed within the mobile home park known as Mohawk Village was purchased by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, a corporation owned and controlled by the Tanner family. The majority of the stock in Respondent is owned by the oldest son; another son is president of Respondent; and the father, L. William Tanner, served as "consultant" to the corporation. This tract was initially divided into some 700-odd lots which were being sold to the public in 1980 as mobile home sites. The land was purchased from North Orlando Sewer and Water Company, which agreed to provide sewer and water services to the subdivision and to have these facilities in place by January 1, 1981. Respondent never registered with the Petitioner in accordance with Chapter 498, Florida Statutes. North Orlando Sewer and Water Company failed to provide sewer service to this development and none of the home sites were available for occupancy January 1, 1981, as promised to buyers by Respondent. Without sewer service it became necessary to go to septic tanks and this required larger lots per mobile home site. The tract was replatted to provide 300-odd lots despite the previous sale of smaller lots to buyers. These buyers were advised their lots would have to be swapped and when some objected and demanded their money back, without success, Petitioner was made aware of the development and investigated. The investigation led to the entering of a Cease and Desist and Consent Order (Exhibit 1). Therein Petitioner essentially agreed to forego action against Respondent for prior violations of Chapter 498, which Respondent contended it was subject to; and Respondent agreed to cease all leasing until the site was ready for occupancy, to provide Petitioner with copies of all leases in effect, as well as copies of all future leases executed, to deposit funds received from buyers in escrow until after receipt of a certificate of occupancy, and to take necessary steps to ensure all future leases fall within the statutory exemptions set forth in Section 498.025(1)(g), Florida Statutes. L. William Tanner was paid a consulting fee by Respondent "in the ballpark of $100,000." In addition, he was to own the companies that provided utilities to the park (after default by North Orlando Sewer and Water Company), and furnished porches, decks, built walkways, roads, etc. Following the Consent Order funds were received payable to Tanner-controlled companies that were not deposited in the escrow account. These funds were not lease payments but came from the lessees for sewer and water hookups, porches, decks, etc. Mohawk Village received its first certificate of occupancy on 14 January 1982. Between 17 April 1981, when the Consent Order was entered, and 14 January 1982, lot leases were sold to Gould on 30 November 1981; to Herring on 12 September 1981; and to Roberts on 14 January 1982 (Exhibit 6). The sales to Gould and Herring were clearly during the period Respondent had consented not to sell leases. Exhibit 1 authorized Respondent to renegotiate and relocate current lessees to new mobile home sites under a plan to use alternate utility services from those initially to be provided by North Orlando Sewer and Water Company "if such plan is implemented at no additional cost to the individual lessees." Those who had bought leases under the original scheme agreed to pay $29 per month to lessor. Leases sold after the decision to use septic tanks where the number of lots was reduced from 700-odd to 300-odd, provided the lessees would pay the lessor $59 per month. Respondent advised the earlier lessees that they would have to pay $59 per month in lieu of $29. When they objected and demanded refunds of what they had paid, some of them were promised refunds but to date very few have received any refunds. Changing their rental fee from $29 to $59 violated the Consent Order. The only change in the lease before and after the execution of the Consent Order was the change of this monthly rental payment. Since the original lease did not qualify for exemption under Section 498.025(1)(g), Florida Statutes, the amended lease, which merely changed the monthly rental fee, did not qualify for exemption. Leases on these lots were sold at prices ranging from $1,000 to $7,000. At no time relevant hereto did Respondent hold a dealer's license to deal in or sell mobile homes (Exhibit 3) There was no valid reservation program established by Respondent pursuant to Section 498.024, Florida Statutes, nor did Respondent apply for or receive approval of a public offering statement for Mohawk Village (Exhibit 2). All leases sold provided, in addition to a habitable lot, that the seller would provide recreational facilities. Those leases sold in 1980 promised a lot on which the buyer could move his mobile-home by January 1, 1981. Not only was the deadline missed but also Respondent has provided no recreational facilities. One witness who sold her home and bought a mobile home could not move it to the site in accordance with the contract because of lack of utilities and was forced to acquire another residence. Although proper demand was made she has been refunded none of her purchase money. According to his testimony, L. William Tanner has developed about one hundred subdivisions throughout the United States since 1946. Some 20 such subdivisions have been developed by him in Florida. He is aware of the Florida statutes regulating the subdivision and sale of lands, and contends that the Mohawk Village subdivision is exempt because Petitioner does not have jurisdiction over 99-year leases. He further contends that the monthly rental payments of $29 or $59 for 99 years brings the price paid for the lots to more than $50,000, thereby exempting them from the provisions of Chapter 498. Prior to the commencement of this hearing, Mohawk Village was transferred to Gould, who had been involved in supplying mobile homes to lot purchasers in the park. According to Tanner's testimony "it was not much of a sale" with him insisting Gould and Mohician Valley (apparently the new name for the mobile home subdivision) acknowledging existing mortgage, the Consent Agreement with Petitioner, and the obligation to refund the monies. No documentary evidence was presented to show that Tanner or his immediate family does not continue to own controlling interest in this mobile home park.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether David Bumgarner (Respondent) should be assessed a penalty for an alleged failure to obtain workers' compensation coverage for his employees.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency designated to enforce the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2008),1 which requires that employers in Florida obtain workers' compensation coverage for their employees. The Respondent is a sole proprietor based in North Carolina and doing business as "Builders and Assemblers." On February 25, 2009, Ira Bender, an investigator employed by the Petitioner, observed ten men assembling the iron-and-steel frame for a single story storage building being constructed at 7253 Gasparilla Road, Port Charlotte, Florida. The Respondent was present at the time Mr. Bender observed the workers, and Mr. Bender asked the Respondent about the project. The Respondent advised Mr. Bender that he was the owner of the company constructing the building, that the ten men erecting the building frame were his employees, and that they were being paid $10.00 per hour. Mr. Bender, accompanied by the Respondent, then spoke to each of the ten men at the work site and obtained their names and other relevant information. The Respondent provided to Mr. Bender a copy of a certificate of insurance from "Acord" bearing policy number BNUWC0108275. Mr. Bender reviewed the Petitioner's "Coverage and Compliance Automated System" (CCAS) database and information contained on the National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") website. Both sources are routinely used to monitor and review workers' compensation coverage. Neither the CCAS database nor the NCCI website indicated that the Respondent had workers' compensation coverage valid within Florida for any of the ten employees at the work site or that the Respondent had a valid exemption from coverage for any employee. After discussing the collected information with his supervisor, Mr. Bender issued a Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment dated February 25, 2009. The Respondent subsequently provided a copy of his workers' compensation policy to the Petitioner. The policy information page attached to the policy is an NCCI-issued form identified as "WC 00 00 01 A." The Respondent's policy's information page provides, in relevant part, as follows: 3.A. Workers Compensation Insurance: Part One of the policy applied to the Workers Compensation Law of the states listed here: NC * * * C. Other States Insurance: Part Three of the policy applies to the states, if any listed here: All states and U.S. territories except North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, Wyoming, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin islands, and states designated in Item 3.A. of the Information Page. Administrative rules adopted by the Petitioner and referenced elsewhere herein explicitly state that the coverage identified in the Respondent's policy information page is not valid within the State of Florida. Mr. Bender also issued a Request for Production of Business Records on February 25, 2009. Other than the previously referenced insurance certificate and policy, no further business records were provided to the Petitioner by the Respondent. Mr. Bender subsequently forwarded the case to Lynn Murcia, the Petitioner's penalty calculator. Because the Respondent failed to provide business records sufficient to enable computation of a penalty, Ms. Murcia computed the penalty based on an imputed payroll as provided by Florida law. The NCCI publishes the "SCOPES Manual," which contains a commonly-used system of occupational classifications used to determine workers' compensation requirements. In Florida, the SCOPES Manual has been adopted by incorporation into the Florida Administrative Code. The SCOPES Manual identifies the erection of steel or iron frames for buildings not in excess of two stories under classification code 5059. The Respondent's employees were engaged in such activities, and Ms. Murcia therefore properly classified the Respondent's employees under code 5059. Ms. Murcia utilized the SCOPES classification in determining the imputed payroll applicable to this case and, thereafter, computed the penalty according to a worksheet that has been adopted as an administrative rule by the Petitioner. The worksheet is routinely used to calculate penalties applicable to employers who fail to obtain workers' compensation coverage for employees. Based on Ms. Murcia's calculations, the penalty was identified as $1,764,643.98, as was set forth in an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 31, 2009. Ms. Murcia's calculation of the applicable penalty, including her reliance on the applicable SCOPES classification codes and the imputation of the Respondent's payroll, was not disputed at the hearing. Her testimony has been fully credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order assessing a penalty of $1,764,643.98 against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2009.
