The Issue The issue presented in this case is whether Respondents' foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondents were first licensed as a family foster home in April 1994. As a result of Respondents' obtaining a foster home license, the Department put in their care: M.A1.A and M.Au.A, brother and sister; and, J.H. and L.H., brother and sister. M.Au.A was nine years old and her brother M.A1.A was eight years old. J.H. was eight years old and his sister, L.H., was five years old. J.H. and L.H. were later adopted by their foster parents, Robert and Irene Holmes. J.H. was born September 2, 1991. He was, and is, a very troubled young man. Schizophrenia runs in his biological family and his mother abused chemicals during her pregnancy. He is diagnosed with Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and has episodes of violence, aggression, unpredictability, poor impulse control, and agitation. He is likely to be pre-schizophrenic and, given his behavior, could develop full schizophrenia in the future. Even though only diagnosed with ADHD and in addition to stimulant medication prescribed for his ADHD, J.H. takes several psychotropic medications generally prescribed for manic and depressive behavior and other mood disorders. However, these drugs do not seem to fully control his behavior. Because of his aggression and severe behavior problems, J.H. has been involuntarily committed multiple times and has been repeatedly recommended for a residential, therapeutic foster home placement. Unfortunately, for various reasons, the Department has not provided J.H. a residential, therapeutic foster home placement. On October 7, 1999, the Department received an allegation of abuse against Respondents. The allegation involved J.H. The allegations involved alleged favoritism of L.H. over J.H., abandoning J.H. with teachers, emotional abuse, and not wanting him in their home. The Department's investigation, on very tenuous evidence, verified abuse for neglect - abandonment; neglect - failure to protect; abuse - other mental injury; neglect - inadequate supervision; and abuse - confinement/bizarre punishment. The report further found some indication of medical neglect and other physical injury-threatened harm. Because of the abuse report, the Department took L.H. and J.H. into shelter care on October 8, 1999, and filed a dependency action regarding J.H., Case No. 99-628-CJ. Additionally, based on the verified findings of the abuse report, the Department revoked Respondents' foster home license. By Order of the Circuit Court dated July 12, 2000, the dependency action was dismissed for lack of evidence and an utter lack of co-operation by Department's personnel and witnesses during the dependency action. J.H. was returned to Respondents' home and has remained with them to date. L.H. was returned to Respondents' home sometime before her brother's dependency action was concluded. Put simply, at the hearing, none of the allegations of the abuse report or facts supporting the verified findings were supported by the evidence since only uncorroborated hearsay was introduced at the hearing. Moreover, even though the evidence was hearsay, many of the allegations appeared from all the testimony to have been taken out of context and given meanings which were not warranted when their context was known. Significantly, the Department did not call J.H. to testify about any of these allegations. To the contrary, the testimony of various witnesses indicated that Respondents did, in fact, keep a very neat, tidy, and orderly foster household and that J.H. was not abused or neglected. The evidence presented by Respondents and the testimony of their witnesses indicate that J.H. was provided a safe environment. The teachers provided temporary care during the period of time alleged to be when Respondents were neglecting J.H. by being out of town. The witnesses, including the teachers, stated that the plan was that they would care for J.H. until the return of Respondents. Furthermore, there was never any indication that the child was mistreated or neglected or left without care by Mrs. Holmes after returning from a wedding out-of-state. Finally, there was no evidence of noncompliance with any treatment plan, that the multiple involuntary commitments were in any way mentally abusive of J.H., or that the quiet times J.H. needed to calm himself were intended to be time-out punishment or were inappropriate or bizarre punishments of J.H. Because the allegations of abuse were not established, there is no basis on which to revoke Respondents' foster home license. Therefore, Respondents are entitled to their foster home license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order not revoking Robert and Irene Holmes' family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith J. Ganobsik, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Charles P. Vaughn, Esquire 120 North Seminole Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450-4125 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue At issue is whether Petitioner’s foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner holds a bachelor's degree in social work from Florida International University. Since his graduation in December 1995 he has been steadily employed in a variety of positions which involve dealing with foster children and special education students. Davis' employment included work for the Department as a foster care counselor and a protective investigator. In addition, he has a long history of involvement in his church, including teaching Sunday school and volunteer work with youth in the community. Relatives, including a mother and sister, live in the area and are supportive of his desire to continue as a foster parent. For all these reasons, the Department held high hopes for Davis as a foster parent when he sought and received a foster home license in the fall of 2001. Notwithstanding his extensive experience with exceptionally needy children Davis was required to and did attend the 30-hour training course required of all new foster parents. Davis, like all foster parents, entered into a detailed contractual agreement with DCF which sets forth the obligations of foster parents and states that non-compliance will lead to revocation of the license. The contract is lengthy, but for purposes of this case it suffices to say that it obligates foster parents to provide adequate, age-appropriate supervision at all times. In order to assist the foster parents in fulfilling this and other obligations, DCF is contractually obligated to support foster parents in a number of ways. The foster parent must be informed in as much detail as is available to DCF of a child's special needs or limitations. If the child is taking prescribed medication, DCF is obliged to provide the medication when the child is brought to the foster home, along with instructions for administering the drug. DCF is also required to exercise professional judgment when placing a child in a foster home to assure, to the extent possible, that the foster parent is capable of managing the child. Shortly after Davis was licensed, DCF assigned to him a particularly difficult child, K.N. At the time K.N. was brought to Davis on December 4, 2001, the child, a boy, was 12 years old. Davis was informed that K.N. was on medication, but DCF did not provide the medication. Davis made several efforts to secure the medication for K.N., but he was not successful. At the time K.N. was placed in Davis' home, Davis already had one foster child, D.L. Davis had previously committed to D.L. and to other neighborhood teenagers to take them in his van to the Soul Bowl high school football game in Tallahassee on December 9, 2001. The trip was uneventful until the return drive. During the trip back from Tallahassee, K.N.’s difficult behavior irritated the other children. In the ensuing horseplay, K.N. ended up with his pants down for approximately the final hour of the return trip. Details of the incident are impossible to state with certainty. The Department presented no testimony of any individual with personal knowledge of the incident. Davis and a teenage girl who was on the trip testified to their recollections. The undersigned, having carefully viewed their demeanor under oath, credits their testimony as candid; they were clear and precise with regard to elements of the day that they did recall, and honest in stating where their recollections were imprecise. The Department repeatedly asserts that K.N. was "naked" but the use of this word, as it is commonly understood, is unsupported by any competent evidence. It cannot be ascertained from the record, for example, whether K.N. was wearing underwear as well as pants, and if so, were the underwear pulled down as well? The only direct testimony regarding whether or not K.N.'s genitals were exposed to the other children was offered by Davis, who believes that K.N.'s genitals were always covered. K.N. and D.L. denied any improper touching to DCF's investigator, according to his written report. After years of driving youth from his church and community on field trips, Davis, like anyone who drives carloads of children, had learned to filter out background noise in order to focus on safe driving. Yet, like anyone responsible for a vanload of kids, he also had to remain cognizant of behaviors in the back seat(s). At some point, Davis became aware that there was an issue concerning K.N.'s pants. Davis, as well as the teenage passengers in the car, acting on Davis' instructions, made efforts to convince K.N. to get his pants back up. K.N. refused. It was raining for at least a portion of the time while Davis was attempting to deal with the situation from the driver's seat. The testimony offered by Davis on his behalf establishes that the situation among the children, particularly K.N., could have been dealt with more aggressively and with better results. The wiser course would have been for Davis to pull over, rearrange seating, verbally re-direct K.N. and the other passengers, and, as a last resort, summon the police. It is equally clear that Davis was the only adult in the car and responsible to deliver the children home safely on a rainy day. He had tuned out the back seat noises to focus on driving when it seemed reasonable to do so, and, once aware of the situation with K.N.'s pants, decided to manage it as best he could from the driver's seat and get everyone back home as quickly as possible. The situation was resolved when Davis drove his van to the north Dade home of Davis’ sister, who had a good rapport with K.N. K.N. complied promptly with her instruction that he get himself properly dressed. Soon after the trip, K.N. related a lurid and untruthful version of events to a third party. A complaint against Davis to the state's child abuse hotline resulted. Davis felt mistreated by the DCF investigator who was dispatched to look into the allegations. Davis perceived that the investigator had prejudged the complaint and deemed Davis to be guilty of participating in and/or allowing sexual abuse of K.N. Rather than complain to the supervisor of the investigator who offended him, Davis made another bad decision---he refused to honor the investigator's request that he provide the names and whereabouts of the other passengers in the van. Davis' failure to provide this information immediately was not deemed by DCF as a serious enough offense to warrant immediate removal of the foster children. Nor did it prejudice DCF in these proceedings, for Davis did provide the names to DCF well in advance of the final hearing. Davis' refusal to provide the names when first asked to do so was self-defeating in the extreme, for the passengers were in a position to corroborate what the investigator was told by both foster children: that Davis had not provoked the removal of K.N.'s pants, and had made efforts to ameliorate the situation as soon as he became aware of it, and was successful to the extent that the other children cooperated with his request to encourage K.N. to pull his pants up, which K.N. was fully capable of doing. The Department contends that "there is no amount of additional training or any other remedial action (short of license revocation) that would alleviate the Department's concern about [Davis'] ability to provide proper care and supervision to foster children." This contention is rejected for two reasons: First, although the substance of DCF's investigation was completed by December 12, K.N. remained in Davis' home until December 17, at which time Davis realized that he was not capable of handling K.N.'s behaviors and returned him to the custody of his foster care counselor. Second, Davis requested and received DCF's permission to keep his other foster child, D.L. "through the holidays." That time frame was generously interpreted by DCF staff; they did not take D.L. from Davis' care until February 8, 2001. Davis is appropriately regretful that he was not adequate to the task at hand on December 9. He also understands the inappropriateness of failing to fully cooperate with DCF's investigation in a timely fashion. Although the future is impossible to predict, it is reasonable to credit Davis' word that he has learned from these mistakes. Davis is willing to unconditionally accept additional training, supervision, and assistance from DCF.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing the April 1, 2002, charges against Davis. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Travis Davis 2922 Northwest 92nd Street Miami, Florida 33147 Rosemarie Rinaldi, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josefina Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioners' foster home license should be revoked for one or more of the reasons set forth in the notice of intent to revoke issued by the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) on February 3, 2003.
Findings Of Fact The Delissers have been licensed to operate a foster home for many years. The Delisser foster home was relicensed on June 15, 2002. During 2001, Janet Goodman worked for the Department and made a number of visits to the Delisser foster home during the second half of 2001. During the course of those visits, Bobette Delisser admitted to Janet Goodman that she needed some respite care for child K.D., because K.D. and Bobette Delisser had engaged in a physical altercation. On one occasion, the child K.D. was in respite care for three months. The child K.D. was also placed in respite care on other occasions.3 During the first half of 2002, Paula Wilson (Wilson) was employed by the Department as a Protective Investigator. In March of 2002, Wilson was assigned to finish an investigation involving the child K.D. During the course of finishing the investigation, Wilson spoke to Bobette Delisser. During one of their conversations, Bobette Delisser admitted to Wilson that she (Bobette Delisser) had hit the child K.D. over the head with a white sneaker shoe. Bobette Delisser sought to justify or to minimize the seriousness of striking the child K.D. by stating, about K.D., "Well, she's retarded." Wilson also investigated another backlogged case concerning a child named T.J. The child T.J. had a black eye and a couple of small bruises on the upper part of her buttocks. The black eye and the bruises on T.J. resulted from an accident when T.J. fell down. The circumstances of the fall did not involve any neglect or intentional act by the Delissers.4 During the course of her investigations at the Delisser foster home, on one visit to the Delisser home Wilson found the child J.W. in a port-a-crib, without adult supervision, face down in a bowl of noodles. During the same visit, when Bobette Delisser entered the room, she picked up the child J.W. by the child's arm, stating she did not think it would hurt the child. In October of 2002, Protective Investigator Amy Gregory (Gregory) investigated allegations of abuse to the child J.W. Gregory observed a cluster of oval shaped bruises on J.W.'s arm. The bruises appeared to be consistent with the child having been picked up by the arm. The child J.W. also had unexplained bruising on her head. During the course of her investigation, Gregory observed an adult granddaughter of the Delissers, who lived in the foster home at that time, pick up the child J.W. by an arm and swing the child to her hip. This conduct by the granddaughter, in conjunction with prior similar conduct by Bobette Delisser, and in conjunction with the cluster by bruises described above, indicates that the child was harmed by inadequate supervision and by neglect of the Delissers. In November of 2002, Kristine Krtausch wrote a review of the Delisser's performance as foster parents based on her observations at their home and on conversations with the Delissers. During the observations by Krtausch, the Delissers appeared to be overwhelmed in their attempts to care for the children in their home. She also observed that the Delissers sometimes failed to use positive discipline; she observed them locking children outside and belittling the children. Krtausch also observed that the child T.J. was always treated differently from the other children. The Delissers tended to be short with T.J., as well as to frequently "put her down," rather than be supportive of T.J. The Delisser's were aware of the Department's Discipline Policy and they agreed to abide by that policy. The Department's Discipline Policy prohibits corporal punishment and derogatory remarks.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services issue a final order in this case revoking Petitioners' license to operate a foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses, their demeanor while testifying and the entire record complied herein, the following relevant facts are found. Respondents, Robert and Melody Chinnici, completed their foster care parent training program during September 16, 1991 (MAPP), and were thereafter licensed as foster care parents in October 1991. The MAPP training included Petitioner's discipline policy which is in the form of a written statement that was given to and acknowledged by Respondents. During times material, Respondents were entrusted to care for foster children Tonya Wilson, a 13-year-old, who resided with Respondents from approximately October 1991 through May 1992, and Jonathan, who was approximately 10 years of age. During this time frame, Respondents' natural son, Christopher Chinnici, also resided with them. During times material, Respondents used a form of "time out" to discipline the foster children when they were disruptive in church. The time out procedure utilized was one whereby the disruptive child would stand and face the wall for periods of five to fifteen minutes. When "time out" was imposed, the church services were over and most of the parishoners had left the parish. On at least one occasion, Respondent, Melody Chinnici, discussed with a foster parent a means of circumventing Petitioner's disciplinary policy respecting the pulling of foster children's hair. There was no evidence that Respondents in fact circumvented HRS' policy. Respondents attempted to serve meals to their foster children in an orderly fashion. During the course of serving meals, there was no evidence that Respondents withheld or otherwise utilized food as a means to discipline foster children in their care. Likewise, Respondent Melody Chinnici did not administer corporal punishment to foster children in her bedroom out of the view of other children.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a final order rescinding its proposed revocation of Respondents' foster care license and issue said licence forthwith assuming Respondents comply with other relevant criteria for the reissuance of their foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of July 1993. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-6751 Ruling on Petitioner's proposed recommended order. Paragraph 3, adopted as modified, paragraph 4, recommended order. Paragraph 4, rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 5, recommended order. Paragraph 5, adopted as modified, paragraph 4, recommended order. Paragraphs 6 and 7 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraphs 6 & 7, recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond R. Deckert, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District Six Legal Office W. T. Edwards Facility 4000 West Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Blvd. Tampa, Florida 33614 Robert and Melody Chinnici, pro se 5244 De Milley Road Polk City, Florida 33868 Robert Powell, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Slye, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioners were licensed to operate a family foster home. Their most current license was effective through April 7, 2004. Petitioners have served as foster parents for about five years. There has been no report of child neglect or child abuse in their foster home prior to the time period relevant here. A. H. is a 10-year-old male. At all times relevant here, A. H. was in the fourth grade. Sometime prior to October 3, 2003, Respondent removed A. H. from his mother's custody and placed him in an initial foster home. A. H.'s first foster home shall be referred to hereinafter as the Gs' foster home. Thomas Munkittrick worked for Respondent as a family service counselor. A.H. was one of Mr. Munkittrick's clients. A. H. had separate visitations with his mother and father on October 6, 2003. Mr. Munkittrick supervised both visits. During a visit to the Gs' foster home on October 14, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick noticed a rash on A. H.'s stomach. The rash appeared to be a ringworm. Mr. Munkittrick did not observe any bruises on A. H.'s arms. On or about October 15, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick spoke to Petitioners to determine whether they would accept A. H. in their home as a foster child. For reasons that are not clear, Respondent changed A. H.'s placement to Petitioners' foster home that same day. On October 16, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick took A. H. to see a medical doctor at Express Care of Belleview. Mr. Munkittrick and A. H.'s mother were present for the medical examination, during which A. H. removed his shirt. Mr. Munkittrick did not observe any bruises on A. H.'s arms. A. H.'s medical record dated October 16, 2003, indicates A. H. had a scratch/bruise on his nose, a ringworm on his stomach, and a rash on his wrist. According to the doctor's notes, A. H. reported that he accidentally injured his nose while playing football with Petitioners' dogs. The doctor's notes do not refer to any bruises on A. H.'s arms. On October 23, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick visited A. H. in Petitioners' home. Mr. Munkittrick saw no visible marks or bruises on A. H. Instead, Mr. Munkittrick observed what he believed was dirt on A. H.'s arms. Mr. Munkittrick also observed that A. H. was slightly flushed from playing outside with Petitioners' dogs, two large Doberman Pinchers. During a visit to Petitioners' home on October 30, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick observed multiple bruises on both of A. H.'s wrists and arms. The bruises were round and as large as quarters. There were no scratch or bite marks on A. H.'s arms. Prior to October 30, 2003, Petitioners had not advised Respondent about the bruises on A. H.'s arms. During the October 30, 2003, home visit, Petitioner R. B., the foster mother, indicated that she had never seen the bruises on A. H.'s arms before Mr. Munkittrick pointed them out. She relied on A. H. to explain how he was injured. During the hearing, Petitioner R. B. admitted that she saw blue/purple bruises on A. H.'s arms for the first time two or three days after his medical examination on October 16, 2003. Despite the inconsistency of Petitioner R. B.'s statements, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner R. B. had no first-hand knowledge as to the cause of the bruises. Her testimony that she did not cause the bruises on A. H.'s arms is credible. On October 31, 2003, Mr. Munkittrick went to A. H.'s school to photograph the bruises on his arms. He then took A. H. for an examination by Respondent's child protection team. The examination included an evaluation of the bruises by an advanced registered nurse practitioner. The nurse was qualified by training and experience to assess pediatric injuries resulting from physical and sexual child abuse. The nurse was unable to reach a conclusion as to the exact source of the bruises. She could not rule out that they were self-inflicted. However, the nurse's testimony provides competent evidence that the bruises on A. H.'s arms were consistent with being grabbed by another person and that they were inconsistent with injuries resulting from roughhousing with dogs. Bruises heal in stages identified by colors beginning with red and ending with brown before they disappear. The colors of bruises in order of healing are red, blue, purple, green, yellow, and brown. In general, a bruise is: (a) red within one to two days of infliction; (b) blue within one to four days of infliction; and (c) yellow/green from the fifth or sixth day up to the tenth day after infliction. A. H.'s bruises ranged in color from red to yellow/green to yellow. The yellow and yellow/green bruises were located on both of A. H.'s upper extremities. He had two forearm bruises with a red component. It is highly unlikely that A. H. received the bruises prior to October 6, 2003. It is more likely that the injuries causing the bruises were inflicted approximately one to two weeks prior to October 31, 2003, i.e., between October 18, 2003, and October 31, 2003. A. H. was living in Petitioners' home and attending public school during this period. On the evening of October 31, 2003, Respondent's staff decided to move A. H. to a third foster home. Respondent's child protective investigator took A. H. back to Petitioners' home to pick up his clothes and belongings. Petitioner R. B. became excited and increasingly emotional when she learned that Respondent was changing A. H.'s placement to another foster home. Petitioner R. B. began yelling, in A. H.'s presence, that he was a liar and a "schizo" just like his "schizophrenic mother." The child protective investigator had to ask A. H. to leave the room when Petitioner R. B. began calling him and his mother names. Petitioner R. B.'s behavior on the evening of October 31, 2003, was inappropriate. However, the deputy sheriff, who was assisting with the change in placement, did not make any arrests. On the evening of October 31, 2003, and during the hearing, Petitioner J. B., the foster father, admitted that he had seen the bruises on A. H.'s arms sometime during the week before October 31, 2003. On both occasions, Petitioner J. B. stated that A. H. was crazy. Petitioner J. B. had no first-hand knowledge as to the cause of the bruises. During the hearing, Petitioner J. B. provided credible testimony that neither he nor his dogs caused the injuries. In order to operate a foster home, foster parents must undergo training on an annual basis. The training includes knowing when to advise Respondent about injuries to their foster children. The requirement to report injuries is a part of the annual service agreement signed by Respondent's staff and foster parents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order revoking Petitioners' foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: J. B. (Address of Record) R. B. (Address of record) Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification from employment as a family foster home parent.
Findings Of Fact In 1989, Petitioner intervened in a fight that was taking place on the premises of an condominium complex managed by Petitioner and his wife. In order to stop the fight, Petitioner picked up a broom handle and hit one of the participants. Several months later, Petitioner was charged with aggravated assault. In August of 1990, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. The circuit judge accepted Petitioner's plea, withheld adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence, and placed Petitioner on probation for four years. In October of 1990, the circuit judge entered an order reducing Petitioner's probation from four years to two years. The circuit judge modified Petitioner's probation to delete the requirement that Petitioner make restitution in July of 1992. At the conclusion of the two year period, Petitioner successfully completed his probation. In February of 1995, Petitioner's daughter was injured in a domestic dispute in her home. When Petitioner arrived at his daughter's residence, the police directed him to wait outside. When Petitioner refused to cooperate, the police arrested him. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner did not assault the police officers. The state attorney filed an information in April of 1995 charging that Petitioner resisted arrest without violence. In the mean time, Petitioner and his wife filed an application to become foster parents. Respondent's review of the application revealed that Petitioner previously served two years probation for aggravated assault. Respondent also became aware of Petitioner's pending charge for resisting arrest without violence. On or about July 12, 1995, Respondent notified Petitioner that he was disqualified from being licensed as a family foster home parent because of the 1989 felony offense for aggravated assault. Petitioner requested exemption from disqualification. On or about September 8, 1995, Respondent conducted an exemption hearing to consider Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification. The exemption review committee was particularly concerned about Petitioner's pending case. By letter dated September 18, 1995, Respondent denied Petitioner's request for exemption. Petitioner requested a formal hearing by letter dated September 27, 1995. In October of 1995, Petitioner signed a deferred prosecution agreement in which he admitted that the facts alleged in the information charging resisting officer without violence to his person were true and correct. The state attorney dismissed the 1995 case charging that Petitioner resisted arrest without violence on January 30, 1996. On or about February 19, 1996, Respondent conducted a second hearing to consider Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification. The exemption review committee confirmed their original decision to deny Petitioner an exemption. Petitioner is the parent of two living adult children and one deceased adult child. He has been interested in helping young people all of his adult life. Over the years, Petitioner has been a positive role model for the youth in his community as well as his own children. Petitioner and his wife have always provided a stable family environment for their family with an emphasis on the development of a strong work ethic. Together they valiantly faced the challenge of coping with a severely disabled child until his death. Both of them are committed to giving of themselves and sharing their home with children in need. Petitioner seeks to become a family foster home parent for children with special needs. Specifically, the children have a DSM-III diagnosis for a mental health disorder and been identified as presenting exceptionally challenging behaviors. Working with emotionally handicapped children requires a particularly high degree of patience. Children with behavior problems create confrontational situations; therefore, the foster parent of such children must maintain a calm demeanor regardless of the circumstances. Petitioner's reputation as a man of integrity and a productive member of society is commendable. However, his responses to two emotional situations in 1989 and 1995 create a question whether he would always react appropriately to the "acting out" behavior of children. Petitioner has not provided clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an exemption from disqualification from employment as a family foster home parent.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification from employment as a family foster home parent. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 1996. APPENDIX CASE NO.95-5618 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of facts proposed by Respondent in its proposed findings of fact. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Petitioner did not file Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Accepted in Findings of Fact 5 of this Recommended Order. 2-3. Accepted in Findings of Fact 6 of this Recommended Order. 4-5. Accepted in Findings of Fact 7 of this Recommended Order. 6. Accepted in Findings of Fact 8 of this Recommended Order. 7. Accepted in Findings of Fact 9 of this Recommended Order. First sentence accepted as restated in the preliminary statement of this Recommended Order. 8A, 8B, and 8C accepted as restated in Findings of Fact 2, 4 and 8 respectively. 8D--accept that C.L. disputes his guilt; greater weight of evidence shows C.L. pled nolo contendere to aggravated assault and served term of probation; greater weight of evidence shows C.L. signed a deferred prosecution agreement admitting the facts involving the charge of resisting arrest without violence. 8E accepted in Findings of Fact 10 and 11 of this Recommended Order. 8F accepted in Findings of Fact 12 of this Recommended Order. Accepted in Findings of Fact 13 of this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: C. L. (Address of Record) Ellen D. Phillips, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 210 North Palmetto Avenue Suite 412 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building 7, Suite 728 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Petitioner should be granted a foster home license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Kate Shaw, applied for a license to operate a family foster home. By letter dated November 18, 1998, the Department notified Petitioner that based on findings in FPSS Abuse Report No. 92-069954, the Department was denying her application for a license to provide foster care. Furthermore, the letter advised Petitioner that she had the "right to request an [a]dministrative [h]earing to review the Department's decision and to request an exemption." FPSS Abuse Report No. 92-069954 named Petitioner as the perpetrator of abuse upon her 13-year-old daughter, Crystal Fishburne (Crysal)/Ms. Fishburne). That report was classified as confirmed in July or August 1992. The incident which was the subject of the abuse report occurred on the evening of July 3, 1992, and was reported to the abuse hotline on that same evening. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the agency previously responsible for investigating reports of child abuse, assigned a child protection investigator to investigate the subject report. On July 4, 1992, the investigator assigned to the case went to Petitioner's home and interviewed Petitioner and her daughter, Crystal. During the interviews, both Petitioner and her daughter told the investigator that Petitioner had hit Crystal with an extension cord the prior evening. Welts or marks were left on Crystal's legs, arms, and back as a result of Petitioner's hitting her. As a part of the investigation, these marks were photographed. However, no medical examination was ever conducted. On July 4, 1992, after the investigator interviewed Petitioner and Crystal, she tried to take Crystal to the Family Services Program for a cooling-off period, but Crystal refused to go. After the investigation, an abuse report was prepared finding that Petitioner had hit Crystal several times with an extension cord leaving linear and looped marks on the daughter's legs, arms, and back. Petitioner has never denied that she hit Crystal with an extension cord on the evening of July 3, 1992. However, during the investigation and at the hearing, Petitioner disputed two statements that Crystal made to the investigator on July 4, 1992. First, Crystal reported that Petitioner had hit her with an extension cord on one other occasion. Second, with regard to the July 3, 1992, incident, Crystal stated that her step-father had held her down while her mother hit her. At hearing, Ms. Fisburne (Crystal) provided credible testimony that the aforementioned statements were not true, but were made only because she was angry and wanted to get away from her mother. At the time of the July 1992 incident and during the two years prior thereto, Crystal was a difficult child who refused to follow Petitioner's directions, did whatever she wanted to do, and threatened to call the police if Petitioner "did anything" to her. Crystal exhibited numerous behavior problems. Crystal became violent with Petitioner; routinely skipped school; left home for days at a time; and stole Petitioner's car twice within a one-month period. The first time Crystal stole Petitioner's car, she kept it for one day; the second time Crystal stole the car, she kept it three days. When Crystal ran away from home, she would often return to Petitioner's house during the day when no one was at home and break in and steal food and money. Also, in one instance, Crystal broke into someone else's house. On the day of the incident, Petitioner was "pushed to the limit" and resorted to the use of corporal punishment as a means of redirecting her daughter's behavior. Petitioner expressed regret about hitting her daughter with an extension cord. However, she believed that corporal punishment was appropriate given the seriousness of Crystal's behavior, the length of time Crystal had been exhibiting this behavior, and the ineffectiveness of other disciplinary methods, such as placing Crystal on restrictions and giving her extra chores to perform. Prior to the July 3, 1992, incident, Petitioner had sought help in dealing with Crystal's behavioral problems from various community resources. At the suggestion of a school counselor, Petitioner arranged for counseling for Crystal. However, after several sessions, the counseling was discontinued because Crystal was uncooperative. In Crystal's words, referring to the counselor, "I didn't want to talk to the man." When Crystal ran away from home, Petitioner contacted the Sheriff's Office but was told that it could provide no assistance because there was no law against a child running away from home. However, Petitioner was told by the Sheriff's Office that since Crystal was a minor, whenever she came home, Petitioner would have to allow her to return. Finally, during one or more of Crystal's episodes, Petitioner attempted to take her to the detention center for a 72-hour cooling-off period. These efforts were likewise unsuccessful because the detention center refused to accept Crystal. Other than the incident referred to in the FPSS Abuse Report No. 92-069954, Petitioner has not been the subject of an abuse report. Since the July 1992, Petitioner has been employed in several jobs that involve working with children. She was employed as a house parent in a home for teenage mothers and their babies; a back-up parent for the Department of Juvenile Justice to children who were removed from their home; and a substitute teacher. Despite the discrepancies in statements made by Petitioner and her daughter and in FPSS Abuse Report No. 92-069954, there is no evidence that Petitioner requested a hearing to have the abuse report expunged or amended as required in Section 415.504(4)(d)1.b., Florida Statutes (1991). Because the report was never challenged, FPSS Abuse Report No. 92-069954 remains and is properly deemed a confirmed report of abuse. Furthermore, there is no indication that Petitioner ever applied for or was granted an exemption from disqualification as provided in the Florida Statutes. In light of the confirmed report of abuse naming Petitioner as the perpetrator of abuse against a child and in absence of the Department's granting an exemption from disqualification, the Department properly found that Petitioner failed the required screening and thus, properly denied her application for a foster home license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a family foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kate Shaw 619 38th Street South St. Petersburg, Florida 33711 Amy V. Archibald, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 100 Largo, Florida 33778-1630
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Children and Family Services should revoke the foster care license of Joey and Donna Tolbert.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, the home of Joey and Donna Tolbert was licensed by the Department as a foster home. They were initially licensed provisionally in December of 1998 for one year. They received a regular license in 1999 and retained a regular license until December 1, 2000, when they were issued license number 1200-008-2, a child specific license with a capacity of two children. The Relicensure Process Prior to issuing the child specific license, two Department employees of the Department, Mary Martin, a relicensing counselor for foster homes, and Ann Brock, a family services counselor, conducted a relicensing visit to the Tolbert's home on October 12, 2000. Donna Tolbert was present but Joey Tolbert was out of town. During the home visit, a Bilateral Service Agreement (Agreement) was signed by Mrs. Tolbert and Ms. Martin. The Agreement was signed and dated by Mr. Tolbert and again by Ms. Martin on October 17, 2000. The relicensing visit resulted in a Foster Home Relicensing Summary written by Mary Martin. The Summary recommended that the Tolberts be issued a regular license effective December 1, 2000 through December 1, 2001, for the capacity of two children. The Summary was signed by Mary Martin on October 26, 2000, and read in pertinent part as follows: The Tolbert family is an invaluable asset to this Department. They have made themselves available on a regular basis for the placement of children when needed. Both Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert are experienced in childcare and they have three (3) children with special needs whom they adopted prior. They should not be asked to take numerous children with severe behavioral problems or teenagers. It appears Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert have satisfied the Florida Administrative Code, Chapter 65C-15, requirements. It is respectfully recommended that the Tolbert family be issued a REGULAR license, effective December 1, 2000, through December 1, 2001, for the a capacity of two (2) children, ages birth (0) through twelve (12) years of either gender. Children with severe behavioral problems and teenagers are not to be placed in the Tolbert home. However, Ms. Martin later wrote an addendum to the licensing summary. According to Ms. Martin, she was asked by her supervisor, Jill Green, to write the addendum. The addendum is undated but references the October 12, 2000, home relicensing visit that resulted in her original recommendation. There is also an entry dated October 16, 2000, which is a date prior in time to her signature to the original relicensure summary, and an entry dated November 17, 2000. The addendum relates to matters concerning the Tolberts and their adopted son, Mi.1/ Richard Messerly has worked for the Department for approximately 22 years and works in protective investigations in Pensacola. From June 1999 through September 2001, he was the program operations administrator for the central licensing unit of the Department. In that position, he had authority over foster care licensure. He supervised Mary Martin and her supervisor, Jill Green. Mr. Messerly signed Ms. Martin's relicensure summary on December 4, 2000, and initialed both pages of her addendum. He also created a written history of the Tolbert foster home which concluded with a recommendation that the Tolberts' foster home license be revoked: SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATIONS The Tolbert family has a positive licensing history of capably caring for many of our foster children. However, a serious change has occurred in the family's willingness to work with our staff, including rebuffing our attempts to offer them assistance with the disruption of an adoptive placement. The Tolberts have attempted to convince others that they had been requesting assistance for M for a very long period of time and that this is flatly not borne out in licensing records. The matter was never brought to our attention until the visit in October 2000, at which time the matter was promptly referred to the adoptions unit, who responded promptly. Since that time the family has not cooperated with any attempts to assist them in that matter, and they seem to be insensitive to M's plight, and are completely focused on regaining their prior licensed status, as if nothing had happened. Contacts with Pat Franklin, Kathi Guy, Sally Townsend and others reflect the absence of any prompt attempts to get help dealing with M's behaviors, yet many requests were made regarding foster children in their care with similar problems during the same time frame. It appears the family was more focused on attending the needs of foster children to the exclusion of sensitivity to their own (adopted) child's cries for help. Even when the needs were identified, the family was unwilling to become involved in attempts to remedy the problems and appeared to have given up on the child. I am very uncomfortable with the inappropriate position this family has taken in regard to our family safety staff, as well as licensing staff, and do not see how we can hope to interact positively with them given their recent radical behaviors and threats. I feel that they have violated the Bilateral Service Agreement and have failed to "Treat all members of the foster care team with respect and courtesy." I recommend that we revoke the license using the violation of the agreement in conjunction with their other oppositional behaviors, omissions, and misrepresentations reflected in family safety foster care and adoptions records. On December 1, 2000, Mr. Messerly signed a letter on behalf of Charles Bates addressed to the Tolberts which read: Dear Mr. And Mrs. Tolbert: Your home has been relicensed for the continuance placement of D and M.R. only. No other placements or overcapacity requests will be authorized at this time. A regular license is issued for twelve months pending the outcome of matters presently before the Circuit Court. If you have questions or wish to discuss this further, please contact Jill Greene, Foster Care Licensing Supervisor at (850)- 595-8451. On June 4, 2001, Mrs. Tolbert met with Charles Bates, District Administrator for District 1 of the Department. This meeting was at Mrs. Tolbert's request regarding her foster care licensure status. During that meeting, Mrs. Tolbert complained to Mr. Bates about certain adoption case workers. On August 24, 2001, Charles Bates sent a letter to the Tolberts notifying them of the revocation of their license. The letter reads in pertinent part as follows: RE: Revocation of Foster Home License. Dear Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert: This letter is to inform you that the Department of Children and Families has made a decision to revoke your foster home license. The basis for this decision is your failure to comply with Florida Administrative Code 65C-13 and the Bilateral Service Agreement (form CF-FSP 5226) which you executed. Florida Administrative Code 65C-13.009(1)(e)5. states: Work in a partnership. Develop partnerships with children and youth, birth families, the department, and the community to develop and carry out plans for permanency. Florida Administrative Code 65C-13.010(1)(c)1. states: Substitute care parents are expected to work cooperatively with the counselor as a member of a treatment team in seeking counseling, participating in consultation, and preparing and implementing the performance agreement or permanent placement plan for each child. Florida Administrative Code 65C-13.010(4)(i) states: The substitute care parents must be able to accept supervision by department staff and participate in and support case plans for children in their homes. Specifically, substitute care parents must be included in the development of performance agreements or permanent placement plans, and in the carrying out of these plans. As part of your foster care licensing, you executed a bilateral Service Agreement. The Bilateral Service Agreement that you signed enumerated the Administrative Code responsibilities and detailed responsibilities of foster parents. The paragraphs violated are listed below in pertinent part: h. To notify the department immediately of a potential change in a family composition, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child's well- being. Obtain authorization from the department prior to spending money for which repayment is expected. To accept the direction and supervision given by department to assist in caring for the foster child. To work cooperatively with the department to attend scheduled meetings to discuss the child and his family and to meet the needs of the child. To treat all members of the foster care team (i.e., the department, child's family, and GALS) with respect and courtesy. As stated in the service agreement, non-compliance with any of the above provisions can result in termination of the service agreement and may also result in the department revoking the home's license. You have failed to comply with the above code citations and service agreement provisions in that you have accused departmental staff of failing to disclose complete information to you and of misrepresenting statements that you have made. You have not worked cooperatively with the department employees who offered to assist you and your child; and have not worked in partnership with the department. Specifically, you have previously stated you were obtaining therapy for a child, didn't agree with the therapist's recommendation, and were obtaining a psychiatric evaluation and assessment for the child, when in fact you did not do any of those things. A review of the department records reflected concerns you mentioned to the department in October 2000, regarding your child's disruptive behavior. However you would accept no assistance even though the department offered extensive assistance. You surrendered your adopted child later that same month. Further, you have stated to a department employee that Ms. Peggy Custred and Ms. Sally Townsend should not work for the department, have accused them of wrongdoing, and have stated that you "will have their jobs." You have failed to treat members of the department with respect and courtesy. Given the above problems, I find that it would not be in the children's best interests to continue licensing your foster home and am permanently revoking your license. The Tolberts as foster parents The overwhelming evidence shows that the Tolberts were excellent foster parents. Jane Crittenden, licensing supervisor for the Department, who was a foster care supervisor at the times material to this proceeding, acknowledged that the Tolberts received the award of Foster Parents of the Year in May of 2000 for the year 1999. She also acknowledged that as far as she knew, the Tolberts excelled as far as their work as foster parents; the foster children in their care did quite well; the Tolberts always seemed to provide a loving, nurturing home to foster children placed there; the Tolberts were called on by the Department to take extra children beyond their cap, which they agreed to do; and the Tolberts cooperated with her and her case workers during the period of time she worked with them. Arlene Johnson, a former guardian ad litem for a foster child in the Tolberts' home from December 1998 until July 1999, visited the Tolbert home about twice a week during that time. She has been in a lot of foster homes and described the Tolberts' home as "the best one I've been in." Gerald Reese, a family service counselor for the Department, worked with the Tolberts over a period of 6 to 7 months in 1999 and 2000 while he was a case worker. During that time, Mr. Reese did not have problems dealing with the Tolberts, did not observe any instance in which the children were not adequately provided for, and observed that the foster children in the Tolberts' home were happy. Richard Messerly acknowledged that the Tolberts were exemplary foster parents as far as the care they provided to the foster children in their care. Mr. Messerly also acknowledged that the only staff the Tolberts had problems with were particular members of the adoption staff, not the Department's foster care staff. The wallpaper expense Carlita Bennett was employed by the Department from 1986 until March of 2002. When she was working for the Department in the capacity of a foster parent recruiter in May of 2001, she sent an e-mail message to Mary Martin regarding the Tolberts which contained the following: 11/04/99 A restitution claim form was submitted by Mrs. T for damage to wallpaper caused by 2 yr. Old. The bill total was $1,151.04 to replace wallpaper in living room, dining room, kitchen and hall. PS Counselors were not made aware of the damage until repairs were made. According to Ms. Bennett, it is regular procedure for someone from the department to go out to a foster home and look at damage before repairs are made. The Bilateral Services Agreement requires the foster parents to obtain authorization from the Department prior to spending money for which repayment is expected. According to Ms. Bennett, this policy was not followed in this instance. Ms. Bennett did not explain why she sent the e-mail message on May 30, 2001, to Mary Martin referencing an incident that took place two and one-half years earlier. According to Mrs. Tolbert, a former two-year-old foster child in her care ripped the wallpaper in the dining room and the living room. Her dining room, kitchen, and hallway are all one color. According to Mrs. Tolbert, she gave an estimate of the repair work to Shiela Campbell, an employee of the Department. Richard Messerly acknowledged that this matter of the expense for wallpaper would not in and of itself have resulted in the Department revoking the Tolberts' foster care license. At most, the Department would have only talked to the Tolberts had there not been other issues about which the Department was concerned. Notification to Department of change of condition The August 24, 2001, revocation letter from Mr. Bates alleged that the Tolberts failed to notify the Department of a potential change in conditions in the home that might affect the well-being of foster care children in the home. This allegation relates to behavior problems of the Tolberts' adopted son, Mi. The Tolberts adopted Mi. in September of 1998. They signed surrenders of Mi. in November of 2000. The Tolberts' surrender of Mi. was central to the Department's decision to revoke the Tolbert's foster care license.2/ Mi. began having serious behavior problems in 1999. Mrs. Tolbert recalls telling Gerald Reese, the foster care worker assigned to the Tolberts at that time, about problems with Mi. Mr. Reese acknowledged that Mrs. Tolbert mentioned to him problems she was having with Mi. to which he responded that she should bring it to the attention of the adoption case worker. The Tolberts' adoption case worker was Sally Townsend. Mrs. Townsend recalls that Mrs. Tolbert stopped by her office three times when Mrs. Tolbert was in the Ft. Walton Beach Service Center to see other department employees. Mrs. Townsend acknowledged that Mrs. Tolbert told her of behavior problems with Mi. the first time she stopped by Mrs. Townsend's office. The second time Mrs. Townsend recalls that Mrs. Tolbert told her Mi.'s behavior problems were better. The third time, however, Mrs. Tolbert informed Mrs. Townsend that Mi.'s behavior was much worse. Mrs. Tolbert remembers these encounters with Mrs. Townsend differently. According to Mrs. Tolbert, she met with Mrs. Townsend approximately 10 times during which she spoke to her about Mi.'s behavior problems. According to Mrs. Townsend's case notes, Mrs. Tolbert told her on October 24, 2000, that Mi. was urinating all over the house, had gotten a butcher knife out of a drawer in the kitchen, and shoved a puppy's head under a piece of furniture. Evidence was presented at hearing regarding whether or when the Tolberts received notice that Mi. had significant problems before he was adopted by the Tolberts. However, what is important for purposes of this proceeding is when was the Department notified of Mi.'s problems. The Department knew of Mi.'s previous problems prior in time to the Tolberts adopting Mi. and were told as early as 1999 that the Tolberts were experiencing behavior problems with Mi. Kathi Guy is an adoption program specialist for the department. She met with the Tolberts immediately after Mrs. Tolbert met with Mr. Bates on June 4, 2001. On June 21, 2001, she wrote a memorandum to Charles Bates concerning the issues relating to the Tolberts. Regarding the issue of the Tolberts' responsibility of notifying the Department of Mi.'s behavior in relation to the foster children in the home, Ms. Guy wrote, "It is unclear what responsibility the Tolberts had to inform Central Licensing of M's behaviors that may have had injurious effects on foster children in their care." Working in partnership The June 24, 2001, revocation letter alleges that the Tolberts failed to work in partnership with the Department and did not obtain certain services for Mi. although they were offered. It is important to remember that the provisions to which Mr. Bates' revocation letter references are part of the Bilateral Services Agreement that pertained to the Tolberts' role as foster parents. However, Mi. was their adopted son, he was not a foster child at that time. Further, there is ample evidence in the record that the Tolberts sought and received services for Mi. over time, although they were in disagreement with the Department regarding certain services during the time immediately preceding the surrender of Mi. Marianne Vance is a first grade teacher. Mi. was in her class for two years. According to Ms. Vance, Mi. received testing in school for learning disabilities and for "everything possible." When Mi.'s behavior problems became worse during his second year in Ms. Vance's class, Mrs. Tolbert sought assistance from the school. The school counselor worked with Mi. and Mrs. Tolbert. According to Ms. Vance, the Tolberts did everything possible in seeking help or assistance.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order rescinding its revocation of the Tolberts' foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2002.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's foster home license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact From August 24, 2004, and throughout the period material to this proceeding, Petitioner Jannifer Thompson ("Thompson") and her husband, Dalkeith, held a license that authorized them to operate a family foster home under the supervision——and within the regulatory jurisdiction——of Respondent Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF"). Like all licensed foster parents, Thompson and her husband had entered into a written contract with DCF known as the "Bilateral Service Agreement" ("Agreement"), most recently as of April 30, 2006. This Agreement, by its terms, "reflect[ed] standards of care that are current requirements in Florida [law]." On September 14, 2006, a counselor named Elboney Ojobor, who was employed by a private agency to whom DCF had delegated various responsibilities pursuant to contract, made a routine quarterly visit to Thompson's home. Ms. Ojobor was covering for a colleague (Rondalyn Woulard) who was on maternity leave; she had not met Thompson previously. While interviewing Thompson, Ms. Ojobor learned that Thompson was the only adult living in the home at the time, and that Thompson was getting divorced from Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor understood this to mean that Mr. Thompson had moved out of the home permanently. In fact, Mr. Thompson was away from the home then not because he had moved to another residence ahead of a divorce, but because his job with a shipping company had required him to be out of town for an extended period. Nevertheless, the couple was estranged; Mr. Thompson would leave the marital home for good in the middle of October 2006. Ms. Ojobor's visit was not the first occasion on which Thompson had notified DCF (through its private-sector agent) that her marriage to Dalkeith was in trouble. During an earlier home visit (probably around June 2006, during the quarter immediately preceding Ms. Ojobor's visit in September), Thompson had told her regular counselor, Ms. Woulard, that she might divorce Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor was not aware of this previous communication, however, and thus she reported the apparent change in circumstances (Mr. Thompson's absence) to her supervisor. The upshot was that on September 15, 2006, Ms. Ojobor called Thompson to inform her that, if she were to continue operating the foster home as a single parent, she would need to obtain a new license. As it happened, whatever steps Thompson took thereafter to become re-licensed came quickly to naught because, in early October 2006, DCF received an allegation that children in Ms. Thompson's home were being physically abused. Having brought up the abuse report, the undersigned believes it necessary here to interrupt the narrative flow of the findings, to call attention to some important points. The most serious charge against Thompson in this case is that she used "excessive" corporal punishment on foster children in her care. The accusation is not that Thompson was found by some other agency or investigator to have abused a foster child or children. The distinction is critical. Because DCF has alleged that Thompson used corporal punishment excessively, it is not sufficient (or even necessary) for DCF to prove that someone else, after investigating allegations of abuse, concluded that Thompson had inflicted some sort of physical injury on a foster child. Rather, DCF must prove that Thompson, in fact, actually used corporal punishment, which is a different fact. Indeed, that someone else found Thompson guilty of physical abuse is not especially probative, in this de novo proceeding, of the salient factual dispute, namely whether Thompson used corporal punishment on foster children.2 Against this backdrop, the undersigned finds that, on October 9, 2006, DCF referred a report of abuse concerning Thompson to the local Child Protective Team ("CPT"). DCF requested that the CPT examine the allegedly abused foster child and make an assessment of the situation. One member of the CPT who took part in this particular assessment was Karl Dorelien. Though not a medical provider, Mr. Dorelien was present for the medical examination of the child in question, whose name is T. P. The examination was performed by an advanced registered nurse practitioner ("ARNP"). Mr. Dorelien testified at hearing. The ARNP did not. At the time of the examination, Mr. Dorelien saw some bruising on T. P.'s forearm. T. P. told Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP that she had been struck by a belt. The CPT did not independently investigate T. P.'s statement. Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP accepted at face value T. P.'s statement about the cause of her injury. The ARNP found that T. P.'s wound was "not accidental." (Mr. Dorelien specifically denied having the expertise to ascertain whether a bruise was caused accidentally or intentionally. There is, it should be added, no persuasive evidence that the ARNP possesses such expertise, either.) Based on the medical examination, the CPT concluded that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (It is not clear how the CPT determined that Thompson——as opposed to someone else——caused T. P.'s injury.3) The evidence shows, in short, that the CPT found Thompson had caused bodily injury to T. P., a foster child then in her care, whom (the CPT determined) Thompson had hit with a belt. There is, however, no persuasive evidence upon which the undersigned independently can find that Thompson actually hit T. P. with a belt (or otherwise). How can this be? First, no one claiming to have personal knowledge of the matter testified at hearing that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (T. P. was not called as a witness.) Thompson denied having perpetrated the alleged misdeed. Second, although there is competent and credible evidence (Mr. Dorelien's testimony) that T. P.'s forearm was bruised, the only evidence as to the cause of this injury was hearsay: (1) T. P.'s statements to the CPT revealing that she had been struck with a belt and (2) the ARNP's opinion (which Mr. Dorelien repeated at hearing) that the wound was not accidental. This uncorroborated hearsay is not a legally sufficient basis for any finding of fact, and even if it were, the undersigned, as the trier of fact, would give it too little weight to support a finding.4 Finally, even if there were sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that T. P. had been struck with a belt (and there isn't), there yet would be nothing but Mr. Dorelien's ambiguous testimony concerning the substance of T. P.'s out-of-court statement, coupled with inference or speculation (based on uncorroborated hearsay), tending to establish that Thompson did the striking. Again, such "proof" is neither legally sufficient nor, in any event, logically persuasive enough to support a finding that Thompson was at fault for the child's injury. DCF alleges that, in addition to striking T. P. with a belt (which allegation was not proved, as just found), Thompson also spanked J. D. F. and his brother, O. F. Both of these boys, respectively aged 8 and 7 years at the time of hearing, testified against their former foster mother. Each claimed that Thompson had spanked him with a belt. As witnesses, however, the boys did not inspire confidence in the truth of their accounts. Each gave testimony that was confusing, sometimes inconsistent, and lacking in precision. Neither one seemed distinctly to remember the important events at issue, much less any of the details surrounding them, causing the undersigned to wonder, at times, whether the boys were independently recalling the underlying events or, rather, testifying from the memory of what someone might have told them was alleged to have occurred. Doubtless many of these boys' shortcomings as witnesses stemmed from their youth and immaturity. Even so, all witnesses, regardless of age and experience, must be measured according to the same standards of credibility; the bar can be neither lowered nor raised to conform to a particular witness's capacity for giving testimony, for doing so would put a thumb on the scales of justice. At bottom, the accounts of J. D. F. and O. F., though not inherently incredible, nevertheless lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to produce in the undersigned's mind a firm belief or conviction that Thompson had spanked them with a belt. The undersigned hesitates to say more than that such is a possibility. Against the shaky testimonies of the boys was offered the decidedly stronger testimony of their sister, Sancia Jeantil, who swore that while she was living in Thompson's home (which admittedly was not at all times her brothers were there), she never saw Thompson spank either J. D. F. or O. F. She further testified that neither of her siblings had ever complained to her about being beaten. The undersigned has accorded considerable weight to Ms. Jeantil's testimony, because it seems unlikely that she would prevaricate to protect Thompson at her brothers' expense. Although Ms. Jeantil was not always present in the home, her testimony, which the undersigned accepts, is persuasive proof of the pertinent negative proposition, i.e. that Thompson did not use corporal punishment on the boys. Thompson herself testified at hearing and denied having used corporal punishment on J. D. F., O. F., or any other foster child. Mr. Thompson, too, testified that corporal punishment had not been used on any of the foster children in their home. Thompson's own child, J. T., said the same. None of these witnesses conclusively proved the negative of DCF's allegation regarding corporal punishment, but then again it was not Thompson's burden to disprove the charge. What these witnesses did do, effectively, was establish a credible, if simple, theory of innocence: Thompson never beat the foster children in her care. The undersigned has determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence as a whole fails to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, that Thompson used corporal punishment on any of the foster children under her care. Aside from the allegations regarding corporal punishment, DCF has charged Thompson with the lesser offense of failing immediately to notify DCF that her husband had moved out of the home. The evidence shows, however, that Thompson satisfied her duty to notify DCF concerning changes that might affect the life and circumstances of the foster children residing in her home. To recap, briefly, the material facts, Thompson informed DCF's agent, Ms. Woulard, of the possibility that she and Dalkeith might divorce; thus, DCF was on actual notice of a potential change in Thompson's marital status. Thompson likely gave DCF this advance warning in June 2006; in any case, she spoke up long before Dalkeith established a new residence and before the divorce proceeding commenced. There is no clear proof that the couple's situation had changed materially as of September 14, 2006, when Mr. Ojobor visited the home. Without question, Mr. Thompson was away at that time——but he worked for a shipping company and thus extended absences were part of his routine. Having all the evidence of record in view, the undersigned is not convinced that Mr. Thompson had "moved out" of the home as of mid-September 2006 in the sense of having permanently relocated from that residence, which is what DCF maintains. While there is some evidence that such was the case, there is also persuasive evidence that Mr. Thompson did not leave the home for good until October 2006——evidence sufficient to preclude the undersigned from finding, without hesitancy, that DCF's allegation is accurate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DCF enter a final order approving the renewal of Thompson's foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2007.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Michael and Pamela Gary's licensure to provide foster care should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, the Petitioners operated a foster home in Dade City, Florida. On or about June 17, 2002, an abuse report was received that led to an investigation of the Petitioners' foster home. An allegation that the children were left unattended in a van was not supported by any evidence. During the investigation, the investigator heard of an incident during which one of the foster children housed in the Petitioners' home "pulled a knife" on one of the Petitioners' biological daughters. The evidence establishes that one of the foster children in the house was standing outside and was throwing rocks at a glass window. One of the Petitioners' biological daughters told the foster child to stop throwing the rocks. From within his clothing, the foster child pulled out a dirty knife he had apparently taken from the kitchen. Pamela Gary was present at the house but was outside at the time of the incident and apparently responded to the commotion. The child was told to drop the knife and he complied. Ms. Gary called law enforcement officers who responded to the scene. The foster child was removed from the home and committed for observation under the Baker Act. After the brief commitment, during which time the child's behavior became controlled by medication, he returned to the Petitioners' home where his behavior has improved. There is no evidence that anyone was injured during the "knife incident." During the investigation, the investigator was told that at some point, one child fell while jumping on the bed and fractured an arm. The evidence establishes that a child jumping on a toddler bed approximately 18 inches high fell from the bed and broke an arm. Neither of the Petitioners was present at the time of the accident. A caretaker who allegedly does not speak English was watching the children. The broken arm that resulted from the fall was clearly an accident. The evidence fails to establish that the child's injury was related to any abuse or neglect on the part of the Petitioners or any appropriate caretaker acting on their behalf. According to Ms. Gary, the caretaker (who allegedly speaks Spanish) communicated with children who were unable to speak English. The evidence fails to establish how the Petitioners communicate with the caretaker if, as the Respondent suggests, the caretaker speaks only Spanish and the Petitioners speak only English. There is no evidence that the Petitioners are unable to communicate with the caretaker. The Respondent asserts that the number of children housed in the Petitioners' foster home (13) exceeds the number permitted under their license. The evidence fails to support the assertion. The abuse report lists 18 children as being present in the home during the investigation. Pamela Gary testified that five of the children identified as being residents of the home were visiting on a particular day to swim in the Gary pool when the investigator came to the house. The five visiting children were not residents of the home. Ms. Gary's testimony was not contradicted and is accepted as credible. Of the remaining 13 children, six were the biological or adopted children of the Petitioners, leaving seven foster children. The number of children in a foster home can exceed the permitted number through a system of waivers from licensed capacity that considers familial relationships between children and previous foster care placements. Neither of the Respondent's witnesses credibly testified that the number of actual residents in the Petitioners' foster home exceeded their licensed capacity including waiver placements. The investigator cited the upstairs portion of the Petitioners' home as being unclean and with the odor of urine. Pamela Gary testified that the only part of the house located on the second floor were bedrooms occupied by two teenaged girls and that the girls may not have picked up their clothing. Ms. Gary testified that the odor of urine was likely related to a cat litter box that had not been cleaned that morning. Ms. Gary's testimony was not contradicted and is accepted as credible. The investigator cited the Petitioners' pool as unclean. Pamela Gary testified that the pool liner was black, and that the pool was not unclean. Ms. Gary's testimony was not contradicted and is accepted as credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing the proposed revocation of the Petitioners' licensure to provide foster care. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Gary Pamela Gary 33025 Ranch Road Dade City, Florida 33523 Frank H. Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 314 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
