The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) Whether Respondent violated Subsection 489.127(1)(f), Florida Statutes, by engaging in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor without being registered or certified; and, if so, (2) what penalty should be imposed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and testimony of the witnesses presented, the following facts are found: Crestwood Construction Corporation (Crestwood Construction) was established about six years ago and is located in Port Charlotte, Florida. At all times material to the proceeding, Respondent, Edward Kolba, was president of Crestwood Construction. When Crestwood Construction was established and at all times relevant hereto, Marc Lusardi was the vice-president and the qualifying contractor for the company. Respondent is not currently nor has he ever been a licensed contractor in the State of Florida. On or about August 28, 1998, Respondent as president of Crestwood Construction, entered into a contract with Robert and Doris LaBar to construct a house at 27421 Neaptide Drive, Charlotte County, Florida. The contract price for the construction was $79,994.00. At or near the time Mr. and Mrs. LaBar and Respondent were negotiating the construction contract, Respondent gave the impression that he was the contractor responsible for supervising the construction of the LaBars' house. Consistent with the impressions or representations of Respondent regarding his responsibilities for the LaBar project, Respondent did, in fact, oversee most of the project. At the time Crestwood Construction and the LaBars entered into the contract, Mr. Lusardi, the company's qualifying contractor, did not reside in Florida but in Colorado. Moreover, during most of the time the LaBar home was under construction, Mr. Lusardi was not in Florida. Furthermore, the only part of the LaBar project that Mr. Lusardi oversaw was the construction of the foundation. Respondent acknowledged that at all other times, Mr. Lusardi was out of state. In Lusardi's absence, Respondent became responsible and/or assumed responsibility for overseeing the construction of the LaBars' house. Respondent has had extensive work experience in the construction industry. However, Respondent admitted and did not dispute that he is not a registered or certified contractor in the State of Florida. The investigative costs for the Department of Business and Professional Regulation in this case, excluding costs associated with any attorney's time, were $213.08.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended a final order be entered (1) finding that Respondent violated Section 489.127(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and (2) imposing an administrative penalty of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian A. Higgins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Edward Kolba Post Office Box 8014 Port Charlotte, Florida 33949-8014 Marc S. Lusardi 2101 South Ocean Drive Hollywood, Florida 33019 Marc S. Lusardi 182 East Byrd Drive Pueblo, Colorado 81007 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
The Issue Are Rules 60A-2.001(10) and 60A-2.005(7), Florida Administrative Code, valid exercises of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact On December 22, 1991, the Respondents made amendments to Rules 60A- 2.001 and 60A-2.005, Florida Administrative Code, related to the certification of a "minority business enterprise" to engage in business with the State of Florida. With the amendments, a definition for the term "regular dealer" was created, which states in pertinent part: 60A-2.001 Definitions. . . . (10) 'Regular dealer' means a firm that owns, operates or maintains a store, warehouse, or other establishment in which the material or supplies required for the performance of the contract are bought, kept in stock, and regularly sold to the public in the usual course of business. To be a regular dealer, the firm must engage in, as its principal business and in its own name, the purchase and sale of products. . . . The amendments included other requirements that a "minority business enterprise", as defined at Section 288.703(2), Florida Statutes, must meet to be certified to participate in the Respondents' Minority Business Program. (The definition of "minority business enterprise" was changed by Section 288.703(2), Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.). The change does not effect the outcome in the case.) As promulgated December 22, 1991, Rule 60A-2.005(7), Florida Administrative Code states in pertinent part: The applicant business shall establish that it is currently performing a useful business function in each specialty area requested by the applicant. For purposes of this rule, "currently" means as of the date of the office's receipt of the application for certification. The applicant business is considered to be per- forming a useful business function when it is responsible for the execution of a distinct element of the work of a contract and carrying out its responsibilities in actually performing, managing, and supervising the work involved. The useful business function of an applicant business shall be determined in reference to the products or services for which the applicant business requested certification on Form PUR 7500. When the applicant business is required by law to hold a license, other than an occupational license in order to undertake its business activity, the applicant business shall not be considered to be performing a useful business function unless it has the required license(s). In determining if an applicant business is acting as a regular dealer and that it is not acting as a conduit to transfer funds to a non- minority business, the Office shall consider the applicant's business role as agent or negotiator between buyer and seller or contractor. Though an applicant business may sell products through a variety of means, the Office shall consider the customary and usual method by which the majority of sales are made in its analysis of the applicability of the regular dealer require- ments. Sales shall be made regularly from stock on a recurring basis constituting the usual operations of the applicant business. The proportions of sales from stock and the amount of stock to be maintained by the applicant business in order to satisfy these rule requirements will depend on the business' gross receipts, the types of commodities sold, and the nature of the business's operations. The stock maintained shall be a true inventory from which sales are made, rather than by a stock of sample, display, or surplus goods remaining from prior orders or by a stock main- tained primarily for the purpose of token compliance with this rule. Consideration shall be given to the applicant's provision of dispensable services or pass-through operations which do not add economic value, except where characterized as common industry practice or customary marketing procedures for a given product. An applicant business acting as broker or packager shall not be regarded as a regular dealer absent a showing that brokering or packaging is the normal practice in the applicant business industry. Manufacturer's representatives, sales representatives and non-stocking distributors shall not be considered regular dealers for purposes of these rules. In passing the rules amendments, the Respondents relied upon authority set forth in Sections 287.0943(5) and 287.0945(3), Florida Statutes. Those statutory sections are now found at Sections 287.0943(7) and 287.0945(6), Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.). Those provisions create the general and specific authority for the Minority Business Advocacy and Assistance Office to effectuate the purposes set forth in Section 287.0943, Florida Statutes, by engaging in rule promulgation. As it relates to this case, the law implemented by the challenged rules is set forth at Section 287.0943(1)(e)3, Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.), which establishes criteria for certification of minority business enterprises who wish to participate in the Minority Business Program contemplated by Chapter 287, Florida Statutes. That provision on certification was formerly Section 287.0943(1), Florida Statutes. In assessing a minority business enterprise application for certification, the Respondents, through that statutory provision: [R]equire that prospective certified minority business enterprises be currently performing a useful business function. A 'useful business function' is defined as a business function which results in the provision of materials, supplies, equipment, or services to customers other than state or local government. Acting as a conduit to transfer funds to a non-minority business does not constitute a useful business function unless it is done so in a normal industry practice. Petitioners, Expertech and Mechanical, had been certified to participate in the Respondents' Minority Business Program, but were denied re- certification through the application of Rules 60A-2.001(10) and 60A-2.005(7), Florida Administrative Code. Marsha Nims is the Director of Certification for the Commission on Minority Economic and Business Development, Minority Business Advocacy and Assistance Office. In her position, she develops policy on minority business enterprise certification. As such, she was principally responsible for developing the subject rules. In particular, as Ms. Nims describes, the purpose in developing the rules was to address the meaning of a "conduit" set forth at Section 287.0943(1), Florida Statutes, in an attempt to insure that improper advantage was not taken by persons using certified minority businesses to enter into contractual opportunities with the State of Florida. In promulgating the rule, the Respondents spoke to representatives who were involved with unrelated minority business enterprise certification programs. One person from whom the Respondents had obtained ideas was Hershel Jackson, who processed certifications for the Small Business Administration in its Jacksonville, Florida office. This individual indicated that the Small Business Administration had developed a "regular dealer rule" that required individuals who sought minority certification from the Small Business Administration to make sales from existing inventory. This conversation led to the utilization of federal law as a guide to establishing the rules in question. At 41 CFR 50-201.101(a)(2), the term "regular dealer" is defined as: A regular dealer is a person who owns, operates, or maintains a store, warehouse, or other estab- lishment in which the materials, supplies, articles, or equipment of the general character described by the specifications and required under the contract are bought, kept in stock, and sold to the public in the usual course of business. It can be seen that the definition of "regular dealer" set forth in Rule 60A-2.001(10), Florida Administrative Code, is very similar to the federal definition. In addition, the Respondents used the Walsh Healey Public Contracts Act Interpretations at 41 CFR 50-206 for guidance. The provision within the Walsh Healey Public Contracts Act that was utilized was 41 CFR 50-206.53(a). It states: Regular Dealer. A bidder may qualify as a regular dealer under 40 CFR, 50-201.101(b), if it owns, operates, or maintains a store, warehouse, or other estab- lishment in which the commodities or goods of the general character described by the specifi- cations and required under the contract are bought, kept in stock, and sold to the public in the usual course of business. . . . The Petitioners presented witnesses who established the manner in which their respective industries carried out normal industry practices involving fund transfers to non-minority businesses from minority and non- minority businesses. Joseph H. Anderson is the President of Suntec Paint, Inc. (Suntec), which does business in Florida. Suntec is a non-minority corporation. It manufactures architectural coatings (house paints). Suntec sells and distributes its paint products through its own stores, through other dealers who have stores, and through sales agents. The sales agents would also be considered as manufacturers' representatives. Suntec's relationship with its manufacturer's representatives is one in which Suntec has an agreement with the representatives to sell the paint products to the representatives at negotiated prices which may be discounted based upon volume of sales. The representatives then sell the products to end users at a price that may be higher than the price between Suntec and the representatives. The representatives are responsible for marketing the product to customers. The products manufactured by Suntec are inventoried for distribution, or in some instances, made to order for distribution. The maintenance of inventory is principally for the benefit of the retail outlets controlled by Suntec. Suntec prefers not to maintain inventory because it ties up raw materials, warehousing space, and requires personnel to be engaged in the management and shipment of those products. If the product is "picked up" more than once in the process, it costs more money. Therefore, Suntec distributes inventory through the representatives by direct shipping from the manufacturer to the end user. Suntec's arrangement with its representatives is one in which the customer pays the representative for the product and the representative then pays Suntec. The representatives for Suntec do not ordinarily maintain inventory of the paint products, because this avoids having the representatives handle the product and then reship the product to the end user. By the representative handling the product, it would add expense to the transaction. Suntec, in selling its products through representatives and shipping directly from the manufacturer to the end user, is pursuing a practice which is normal in its industry. Suntec's arrangement with dealers unaffiliated with Suntec who have stores, provides the independent dealers with inventory. Nonetheless, there are occasions in which the independent dealer will place a large order with Suntec; and Suntec will ship the product directly to the end user. That practice is a frequent practice and one that is standard in the industry. Suntec has two minority businesses who serve as manufacturers' representatives and other manufacturers' representatives who are non-minorities. The minority representatives are Expertech, located in Gainesville, Florida, and All In One Paint and Supply, Inc. (All In One), also located in Gainesville. The two minority representatives for Suntec maintain some stock of paint. The inventory amount which All In One maintains was not identified. Within a few months before the hearing, Expertech had purchased 60 gallons of paint from Suntec. It was not clear what the intended disposition was for the paint. Thomas Rollie Steele, the Branch Manager for Bearings and Drives, serves as Sales Manager for that company in its Florida operations. Bearings and Drives has its corporate offices in Macon, Georgia. The company has thirty locations throughout the southern United States, with five different divisions. It specializes in industrial maintenance products and some services. Bearings and Drives is a non-minority firm. In its business Bearings and Drives has manufacturing arrangements or agreements to represent other manufacturers. As representative for other companies who manufacture the products which Bearings and Drives markets, Bearings and Drives is expected to solicit sales. The agreements with the manufacturers which Bearings and Drives has, establish price structures, terms and conditions, and shipping arrangements. Bearings and Drives serves as representatives for the manufacturers in a distinct service area. Bearings and Drives buys products from the manufacturers and resells the products to Bearings and Drives' customers. Bearings and Drives derives compensation by selling to customers at a price higher than the product was sold to them. The price at which products are resold by Bearings and Drives is controlled by market conditions. Bearings and Drives maintains some product inventory; however, in excess of 50 percent of the products sold are shipped directly from the manufacturer to the customer. The direct shipment improves the profit margin for Bearings and Drives by not maintaining an inventory and saving on additional freight expenses, taxes paid on existing inventory and labor costs to be paid warehouse personnel. Bearings and Drives uses a direct delivery system to its customers that is scheduled around the time at which the customer would need the product sold by Bearings and Drives. This arrangement is a standard industry practice. Aileen Schumacher is the founder, President, and sole owner of Expertech. This Petitioner had been certified through the Minority Business Program prior to the rule amendments in December, 1991. When the Petitioner, Expertech sought to be re-certified, it was denied certification in some business areas for failure to maintain sufficient levels of inventory. Expertech sells and distributes technical supplies, such as pollution- control equipment, laboratory equipment, hand tools, and other technical supplies. It specializes in the sale and distribution of safety equipment. Expertech does not provide services. The areas in which Expertech has been denied re-certification relate to the sale of laboratory supplies, paint, and pollution-control equipment. In marketing products Expertech buys directly from manufacturers, except in the instance where they cannot access the manufacturer directly and must operate through a distributor. Expertech tries to maintain as little inventory as possible and to have the commodities it sells shipped directly from the manufacturer to the end user. In addition to ordinary sales, Expertech takes custom orders for products not maintained in inventory by the manufacturer, which are directly shipped from the manufacturer to the customer. In Expertech's business dealings as a manufacturer's representative, wherein it arranges for direct shipments, it is performing in a manner which is standard in the industries in which it is engaged. Otto Lawrenz is the sole proprietor of Mechanical. Prior to the rules changes in December, 1991, Mechanical had been certified as a minority business enterprise. The attempt to re-certify was denied based upon the fact that Mechanical did not stock products and was serving as a manufacturer's representative in selling heating and ventilation equipment. Mechanical sells to mechanical contractors and sheet-metal contractors as a representative for the manufacturer. Mechanical bids on construction jobs and "takes off" the amount of equipment needed in setting its price quotes. If the submission of the price quotation is successful, Mechanical receives a purchasing order from the contractor, as approved by the project engineer. The equipment is then ordered by Mechanical, and delivered by the manufacturer to the job site or the contractor's home office. Mechanical does not maintain a warehouse or a store. The end user pays Mechanical within 30-60 days from the time that the equipment is delivered to the end user. Mechanical then pays the original manufacturer an agreed upon price. Generally, Mechanical sells special-order equipment. This type of equipment would be difficult to inventory since it is being custom-ordered and the units that are ordered are large in size. In addition, the variety of parts involved in these projects makes it difficult to stock them.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for certification as a minority business enterprise should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Omni Outdoors, Inc., a for-profit corporation located in Coral Springs, Florida, is engaged in the business of commercial landscaping and irrigation. It was incorporated on September 19, 1995, by Bruce Reeb. When incorporated, Petitioner issued its 100 shares of stock as follows: 24 shares to Bruce, 26 shares to his wife Terry, 24 shares to Kevin McMahon, and 26 shares to Kevin's wife Michele. Accordingly, the Reebs and the McMahons each own 50 percent of the business. Both Reebs and both McMahons became the 4-member Board of Directors. Bruce became the president and the secretary of the corporation, and Kevin became the vice-president and the treasurer. According to the corporation's By-laws, the President is the chief executive officer of the corporation, responsible for the general supervision of its business. Bruce is a certified general contractor in the State of Florida and is the qualifier for Petitioner. Kevin holds an irrigation license and is the qualifier for Petitioner in that area. Bruce handles estimating, pricing, and proposal preparation and presentation. Kevin runs the field operations and purchasing of materials. In October 1996 Terry quit her job as a flight attendant to begin working for Petitioner, handling accounting and personnel matters. Her name was added to the corporation's bank accounts as an authorized signature. Bruce and Kevin remain as authorized signatures on the accounts, and only one signature is required for the corporation's checks. She was given the title "chief executive officer" of the corporation in January 1997, a position authorized by an amendment to the By-laws in March 1997. She was given a smaller salary than Bruce or Kevin, who were paid the same amount. Kevin's wife Michele has never been involved in the day- to-day activities of the corporation. She has never received a salary from the business. In January 1997 Terry filed an application with Respondent for the corporation to be certified as a minority business enterprise, under the status of "American Woman." Around the time the corporation filed its application, Terry's salary was increased to $600 per week so she would be making the same as Kevin, and Bruce's salary was decreased to $400 per week. Even after Terry's full-time employment by the corporation, the signatures of her husband or of Kevin continue to appear on corporate obligations, such as an indemnity agreement and corporate promissory notes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for certification as a minority business enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry M. Reeb, Chief Executive Officer Omni Outdoors, Inc. 1742 Northwest 112 Terrace Coral Springs, Florida 33071 Joseph L. Shields, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast The Hartman Building, Suite 307 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Edward A. Dion, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast The Hartman Building, Suite 307 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Douglas L. Jamerson, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast The Hartman Building, Suite 303 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue The issues presented are whether Respondent, Smallwood Design Group/Smallwood Landscape, Inc. (Smallwood or the company), owes Petitioner $12,817.17 for agricultural products and, if so, whether the surety is liable for any deficiency.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation licensed by the Department as a “dealer in agricultural products,” within the meaning of Subsection 604.15(2), Florida Statutes (2006) (agricultural dealer).1 The license number and business address of Petitioner are 68954 and 3930 14th Street North, Naples, Florida 34103. Smallwood is a Florida corporation licensed by the Department as an agricultural dealer pursuant to license number 68513. The sole shareholder and registered agent for Smallwood is Ms. JoAnn Smallwood. The business address for Smallwood is 2010 Orange Blossom Drive, Naples, Florida 34109. Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) is the surety for Smallwood pursuant to bond number 21BSBCI1473 issued in the amount of $100,000 (the bond). The term of the bond is December 9, 2005, through December 9, 2006. Petitioner conducts a garden center business that, in relevant part, sells agricultural products, defined in Subsection 604.15(1). Petitioner sells products at wholesale and retail to businesses and consumers in the Naples area. Smallwood purchased agricultural products from Petitioner from 1983 until sometime in 2006. The purchases were made in the ordinary course of Smallwood's architectural landscape construction and horticultural management business (landscape business). The terms of purchase required payment from Smallwood within 30 days. Any monthly balance that remained unpaid after 45 days was subject to interest at a monthly rate of 1.5 percent and an annual rate of 18 percent.2 With one exception, Smallwood paid Petitioner within 60 days of delivery. The exception to Smallwood's payment history with Petitioner is the subject of this proceeding. From May 11 through September 26, 2006, Smallwood did not pay Petitioner $12,817.17 for 66 invoices involving 440 items (pallets or pieces) of sod that Petitioner delivered to Smallwood.3 The sod consisted of varieties identified in the record as: Floratam, Seville, Zoysia, Croton, and Fountain Grass.4 Smallwood does not deny that Petitioner should be paid $12,817.17. However, Smallwood alleges that Petitioner has filed its claim against the wrong party. Smallwood alleges that, on June 13, 2006, another corporation purchased the assets of Smallwood, including the right to conduct the landscape business in the name of Smallwood, and assumed Smallwood's liability to Petitioner for any prior purchases. Subsequent purchases are allegedly the obligation of the successor corporation. Ms. Smallwood filed a Response to Amended Claim with the Department on January 7, 2007 (the Response). The Response identifies the successor corporation as Spartan Partners, Inc., an Illinois corporation, located at 350 Pfingsten Road, Suite 109, Northbrook, Illinois 60062 (Spartan), and alleges that Petitioner’s claim is not valid because: [Smallwood] sold its assets and has not been engaged in business since June 13, 2006. Specifically, pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement, [Smallwood] sold its assets (including its name) to Spartan . . . , and thereafter, Spartan continued operating the business for a period of time and then sold some of the assets and ceased operations. (emphasis supplied) Smallwood . . . does not have knowledge of the accounts of Spartan, which continued doing business under the Smallwood name after the sale of assets on June 13, 2006. If items purchased from [Petitioner] have not been paid for, Spartan is the responsible and liable party. (emphasis supplied) The Response filed in January of 2007 was not the first time Petitioner had seen the Smallwood defense. Smallwood sent Petitioner a form letter, dated September 14, 2006, that: contained a salutation addressing “All Vendors of [Smallwood],” referenced the "Termination of Credit Arrangements and Guaranties," and was signed by Ms. Smallwood on behalf of Smallwood (notice letter). The notice letter provided in relevant part: The purpose of this letter is to advise you that the assets of [Smallwood], including the company name, were sold to Spartan . . . as of June 13, 2006. Since [Smallwood] sold all of its assets, that corporate entity is no longer actively engaged in any business. The business known as [Smallwood] is now conducted by [Spartan]. (emphasis supplied) As a result of the sale of assets and the fact that [Smallwood] is no longer actively engaged in business, the relationship or agreement you had with that particular corporate entity is hereby terminated and of no further force and effect. If you are continuing to do business with [Spartan], you should, if you have not done so already, make or confirm your business arrangements with that entity. Furthermore, if I signed any document that could be construed as a personal guaranty of payment for any obligations of [Smallwood], please consider this letter to be a formal revocation, cancellation and termination of any such document. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner's Exhibit 3 (P-3). Part of the Smallwood defense is supported by the evidence. Smallwood did sell its assets to Spartan. The Asset Purchase Agreement between Smallwood and Spartan was admitted into evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 (P-2). The Agreement shows that Spartan purchased the assets of Smallwood on June 13, 2006, for $1.030 million, of which $883,602.11 was allocated to accounts receivable due the seller. The seller is identified in the Asset Purchase Agreement as Ms. Smallwood and the company. The seller received $895,500.00 in cash at the closing. The remaining part of the Smallwood defense involves two allegations. First, Smallwood alleges that Spartan assumed a liability of $3,834.43 for 23 purchases of sod by Smallwood from May 11 through June 13, 2006. Second, Smallwood alleges that Spartan owes Petitioner $8,982.74 for 43 purchases of sod from June 14 through September 26, 2006. If the evidence were to support both allegations, the result may effectively deprive Petitioner of an administrative remedy. The corporate documents attached to the Asset Purchase Agreement do not show that Spartan complied with the bond and license requirements in Subsection 604.19 prior to conducting the landscape business in the name of Smallwood. Spartan sold the assets needed to satisfy a judgment against Spartan, Spartan is a foreign corporation, and Spartan no longer conducts the landscape business in Florida. It would be unnecessary to determine whether Smallwood or Spartan is liable for the $12,817.17 if: the terms of the bond were to allow an assignment of the bond to Spartan, and the Asset Purchase Agreement were to show that the bond was one of the contracts assigned to Spartan or one of the assets purchased by Spartan. The bond would cover both Smallwood and Spartan in such a case, and a determination of which shell hid the proverbial pea would be moot. A copy of the bond did not find its way into the record. Petitioner did not submit a copy of the bond for admission into evidence, and the Department did not transmit a copy of the bond when the agency referred the matter to DOAH. The copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement admitted into evidence does not include a schedule of the contracts assigned to Spartan or a schedule of the assets sold to Spartan. A finding that Spartan expressly assumed Smallwood's liability to pay Petitioner $3,834.43 for sod delivered from May 11 through June 13, 2006, is not supported by the evidence. In relevant part, the Asset Purchase Agreement provides: At Closing, Purchaser shall assume those liabilities of Company specifically defined and listed on the Schedule 1.6(b) attached hereto (“Assumed Liabilities”), and Purchaser shall not assume, incur, guarantee, or be otherwise obligated with respect to any liability whatsoever of Company other than as so stated. . . . (emphasis not supplied) Purchaser shall cause Stockholder [Ms. Smallwood] to be released as guarantor or obligor under the Assumed Liabilities. . . . P-2 at 2. Schedule 1.6(b) is missing from the copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement that was admitted into evidence. Even if a complete exhibit were to show that Spartan assumed Smallwood's liability to Petitioner, neither of the respondents submitted evidence or cited legal authority to support a finding that such an assumption released Smallwood from its obligation to Petitioner or otherwise extinguished that obligation. Nor is there any evidence that Petitioner acquiesced in an assumption by Spartan or otherwise released Smallwood from the obligation to pay Petitioner for sod delivered prior to June 13, 2006. The remaining allegation in the Smallwood defense is that Spartan, rather than Smallwood, purchased the sod Petitioner delivered between June 13 and September 26, 2006. It allegedly is Spartan that owes Petitioner $8,982.74. The remaining allegation implicitly argues that, after June 13, 2006, Smallwood was no longer a viable corporation with the legal capacity to purchase sod from Petitioner because the asset sale resulted in what courts describe as a “de facto merger” of Smallwood into Spartan or a “mere continuation of business” by Spartan. The law pertaining to these two doctrines is discussed in the Conclusions of Law, but certain factual findings are relevant to both doctrines. The Smallwood defense is a mutation of the doctrines of "de facto merger" and "mere continuation of business," either of which have been utilized by courts to hold a successor corporation liable for the obligations of the corporate predecessor. The Smallwood defense takes the relevant judicial doctrines a step further. The defense implicitly assumes that if a "de facto merger" or "mere continuation of business" occurred as a result of the asset sale, Smallwood "merged" into Spartan, and Smallwood was no longer a viable corporate entity with the legal capacity to purchase sod from Petitioner. Two facts preclude the application of either judicial doctrine to the sale of Smallwood's assets. First, there is no commonality or continuity of ownership interests between Smallwood and Spartan. Spartan did not acquire some or all of the stock of Smallwood, and Ms. Smallwood did not become a shareholder in Spartan. The two corporations do not share common directors or officers. The second fact involves the purchase price paid for the Smallwood assets. The purchase price does not suggest a cozy relationship between Smallwood and Spartan that otherwise may have persuaded a court to disregard the separate corporate existence of Smallwood after the asset-sale. No evidence suggests that the price paid was not the fair market value of the Smallwood assets negotiated at arms length between a willing buyer and a willing seller. Smallwood remained in existence as a viable Florida corporation after the asset-sale on June 13, 2006. No legal impediment prevented Smallwood from purchasing sod from Petitioner, and Smallwood had the legal capacity to do so. The purchases may have breached the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement, but the legal capacity of Smallwood to purchase sod from Petitioner is not driven by contractual arrangements between Smallwood and private third parties. Smallwood remained in existence as a Florida corporation at least through January 7, 2007, when Ms. Smallwood filed the Response with the Department. The Response does not allege as a factual matter that Smallwood had been liquidated and was no longer in existence as a Florida corporation; or that the $895,500 the seller received for the sale of assets was not in corporate solution and available to pay invoices submitted by Petitioner. The Response merely states that Smallwood was not actively engaged in the conduct of business. Smallwood was actively engaged in the landscape business after June 13, 2006. Smallwood maintained its customary banking account; continued to issue checks imprinted with the company name; paid Petitioner for goods that Petitioner delivered to Smallwood before May 11, 2006; accepted without objection or disclaimer 43 invoices totaling $8,982.74 that were billed to the company for sod delivered to the company at the company's business address; issued the notice letter to its creditors; and purported to terminate credit agreements and guarantees. Prior to receiving the notice letter, Petitioner had no reason to believe that Smallwood was not conducting the landscape business. The face of Smallwood remained unchanged. Ms. Smallwood continued to operate the landscape business pursuant to a long-term employment contract with Spartan. Spartan signed Mr. Keith Whipple, another key employee of Smallwood, to a similar contract. Copies of the employment contracts are attached to the Asset Purchase Agreement.5 Between June 13 and September 14, 2006, Ms. Smallwood continued to sign Smallwood checks imprinted with the company name and issued on the Smallwood business account. Ms. Smallwood signed the checks as the authorized representative of Smallwood. Smallwood accepted 35 invoices issued to the company for $7,007.13 and deliveries of the sod at the company's customary business address. The notice letter was dated September 14, 2006, but Petitioner received the letter on or about September 26, 2006. Between September 14 and 26, 2006, Smallwood accepted eight invoices for sod purchased for $1,975.61. The evidence does not show when Smallwood actually mailed the notice letter, and Petitioner did not stamp the notice letter with the date it was received. The chief operating officer for Petitioner testified at the hearing but does not recall the date Petitioner actually received the notice letter. However, the witness testified that Petitioner stopped all sales to Smallwood immediately upon receipt of the notice letter to allow time for Petitioner to complete a credit check of Spartan. The trier of fact finds the relevant testimony to be credible and persuasive. The failure to timely disclose the identity of Spartan as a successor entity operating in the name of Smallwood misled Petitioner, if not other creditors.6 Between June 13 and September 26, 2006, Petitioner extended credit for purchases of $8,982.74 before Petitioner had the opportunity to ensure the credit worthiness of Spartan and, if desired, to obtain a written guarantee from the individual officers and shareholders.7 Smallwood, rather than Spartan, purchased sod from Petitioner from May 11 through September 26, 2006. Smallwood owes Petitioner $12,817.17. Hartford does not claim that the terms of the bond do not ensure payment of the purchases made by Smallwood. Hartford’s sole objection in its PRO is that the bond proceeds must be paid directly to the Department rather than to Petitioner. Hartford correctly cites Subsection 604.21(8) in support of its objection.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Smallwood to pay $12,817.17 to Petitioner, and, in accordance with Subsection 604.21(8), requiring Hartford to pay over to the Department any amount not paid by Smallwood. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2007.
The Issue The issue before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) in this proceeding is whether to grant the Petition for Establishment of the Pine Island Community Development District (Petition), dated September 9, 2003. The local public hearing was for purposes of gathering information in anticipation of quasi-legislative rulemaking by FLWAC.1
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of JEDI Enterprises, Inc., for certification as a minority business enterprise be APPROVED. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas G. Brown, Esquire Florida National Bank Bldg. 301 First Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Mark A. Linsky, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064
