The Issue Whether the Petitioners' application for a license to provide foster home care for dependent children should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners applied for licensure from Respondent as a Family Foster Home in 1995; the application was subsequently amended to a Therapeutic Foster Home. Respondent began the preparation of the Family Portfolio and Petitioners began Pre-Service Training. Petitioners attended and completed the required 21 hours of pre-service training for prospective foster family parents, called Group Preparation and Selection, GPS-MAPP. on June 12, 1995. Petitioner Carmen Delvalle also attended and completed a 40 hour pre- service training for prospective medical foster parents. During this time, in anticipation of being licensed, Petitioners made modifications to their home and purchased furniture that would accommodate the placement of foster children. Respondent, in preparing the Petitioners' Family Portfolio, determined that Petitioners had previously been licensed in Westchester County, New York, as foster parents from May 1987 through December 1988. The inquiry with the county Foster Home Resource Unit revealed that Petitioners' home was closed by mutual decision between Petitioners and the county Department of Social Services. The Department would not recommend that Petitioners be relicensed based on the appearance that Mrs. Delvalle was overwhelmed by the needs of foster children, which resulted in frequent relocation of children placed in her care, and appeared to be unable to understand and cope with the needs of typical foster children. Petitioner Carmen Delvalle testified that Petitioners' termination as foster parents in New York was not due to being overwhelmed by the needs of the children. Rather, it was due to the fact that Petitioners were housed in a walk-up apartment and their neighbors were constantly complaining about the noise the children would make. In addition, they received very little support and training from the Department of Social Services, and the Department was constantly placing 5 and 6 children in her home when they were only licensed to care for three children at a time. Petitioners now feel that they are better prepared to serve as foster parents because they both love children; their own children are now adults and they can give a lot of time and attention to any foster children placed in their home; they are better qualified and trained now, and can deal with the special demands of caring for foster children and medically challenged foster children. The Respondent's Senior Program Analyst prepared the Family Portfolio for the Petitioners, which included two in-home interviews. She was also Petitioners' MAPP trainer. Her evaluation of the Petitioners' application was that they did not meet the standards of Respondent, as set forth in Chapter 10M- 6, Florida Administrative Code, because of her concern that Petitioners could not cope with the stresses of being a foster parent seven days a week, twenty- four hours a day. Respondent's Licensing Administrator Marlene Richmond reviewed the completed Family Portfolio pertaining to the Petitioners and called for a staffing review of their file. She also interviewed Petitioner and determined that, although sincere, Petitioners did not exhibit an understanding of the training they received. They also could not articulate how they would respond to the pressures they would be under once a foster child was placed in their home. In her opinion, Petitioners did not meet the standards. Petitioners are caring, sincere people who wish to offer themselves and their home for the care of children in need of foster care. Petitioners' house meets the physical standards set out by Respondent, and the Petitioners have completed the required pre-service training. However, Petitioners have not articulated an understanding or exhibited the capability to take on the "role" to be successful foster parents. Petitioners do not meet the standards for licensure as foster home or a medical foster home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a final order DENYING Petitioners' application for licensure as a foster home for dependent children. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Antonio Delvalle pro se Carmen Delvalle pro se 7933 Toler Court Orlando, Florida 32822 Laurie A. Lashomb, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's foster home license should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact From August 24, 2004, and throughout the period material to this proceeding, Petitioner Jannifer Thompson ("Thompson") and her husband, Dalkeith, held a license that authorized them to operate a family foster home under the supervision——and within the regulatory jurisdiction——of Respondent Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF"). Like all licensed foster parents, Thompson and her husband had entered into a written contract with DCF known as the "Bilateral Service Agreement" ("Agreement"), most recently as of April 30, 2006. This Agreement, by its terms, "reflect[ed] standards of care that are current requirements in Florida [law]." On September 14, 2006, a counselor named Elboney Ojobor, who was employed by a private agency to whom DCF had delegated various responsibilities pursuant to contract, made a routine quarterly visit to Thompson's home. Ms. Ojobor was covering for a colleague (Rondalyn Woulard) who was on maternity leave; she had not met Thompson previously. While interviewing Thompson, Ms. Ojobor learned that Thompson was the only adult living in the home at the time, and that Thompson was getting divorced from Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor understood this to mean that Mr. Thompson had moved out of the home permanently. In fact, Mr. Thompson was away from the home then not because he had moved to another residence ahead of a divorce, but because his job with a shipping company had required him to be out of town for an extended period. Nevertheless, the couple was estranged; Mr. Thompson would leave the marital home for good in the middle of October 2006. Ms. Ojobor's visit was not the first occasion on which Thompson had notified DCF (through its private-sector agent) that her marriage to Dalkeith was in trouble. During an earlier home visit (probably around June 2006, during the quarter immediately preceding Ms. Ojobor's visit in September), Thompson had told her regular counselor, Ms. Woulard, that she might divorce Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor was not aware of this previous communication, however, and thus she reported the apparent change in circumstances (Mr. Thompson's absence) to her supervisor. The upshot was that on September 15, 2006, Ms. Ojobor called Thompson to inform her that, if she were to continue operating the foster home as a single parent, she would need to obtain a new license. As it happened, whatever steps Thompson took thereafter to become re-licensed came quickly to naught because, in early October 2006, DCF received an allegation that children in Ms. Thompson's home were being physically abused. Having brought up the abuse report, the undersigned believes it necessary here to interrupt the narrative flow of the findings, to call attention to some important points. The most serious charge against Thompson in this case is that she used "excessive" corporal punishment on foster children in her care. The accusation is not that Thompson was found by some other agency or investigator to have abused a foster child or children. The distinction is critical. Because DCF has alleged that Thompson used corporal punishment excessively, it is not sufficient (or even necessary) for DCF to prove that someone else, after investigating allegations of abuse, concluded that Thompson had inflicted some sort of physical injury on a foster child. Rather, DCF must prove that Thompson, in fact, actually used corporal punishment, which is a different fact. Indeed, that someone else found Thompson guilty of physical abuse is not especially probative, in this de novo proceeding, of the salient factual dispute, namely whether Thompson used corporal punishment on foster children.2 Against this backdrop, the undersigned finds that, on October 9, 2006, DCF referred a report of abuse concerning Thompson to the local Child Protective Team ("CPT"). DCF requested that the CPT examine the allegedly abused foster child and make an assessment of the situation. One member of the CPT who took part in this particular assessment was Karl Dorelien. Though not a medical provider, Mr. Dorelien was present for the medical examination of the child in question, whose name is T. P. The examination was performed by an advanced registered nurse practitioner ("ARNP"). Mr. Dorelien testified at hearing. The ARNP did not. At the time of the examination, Mr. Dorelien saw some bruising on T. P.'s forearm. T. P. told Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP that she had been struck by a belt. The CPT did not independently investigate T. P.'s statement. Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP accepted at face value T. P.'s statement about the cause of her injury. The ARNP found that T. P.'s wound was "not accidental." (Mr. Dorelien specifically denied having the expertise to ascertain whether a bruise was caused accidentally or intentionally. There is, it should be added, no persuasive evidence that the ARNP possesses such expertise, either.) Based on the medical examination, the CPT concluded that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (It is not clear how the CPT determined that Thompson——as opposed to someone else——caused T. P.'s injury.3) The evidence shows, in short, that the CPT found Thompson had caused bodily injury to T. P., a foster child then in her care, whom (the CPT determined) Thompson had hit with a belt. There is, however, no persuasive evidence upon which the undersigned independently can find that Thompson actually hit T. P. with a belt (or otherwise). How can this be? First, no one claiming to have personal knowledge of the matter testified at hearing that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (T. P. was not called as a witness.) Thompson denied having perpetrated the alleged misdeed. Second, although there is competent and credible evidence (Mr. Dorelien's testimony) that T. P.'s forearm was bruised, the only evidence as to the cause of this injury was hearsay: (1) T. P.'s statements to the CPT revealing that she had been struck with a belt and (2) the ARNP's opinion (which Mr. Dorelien repeated at hearing) that the wound was not accidental. This uncorroborated hearsay is not a legally sufficient basis for any finding of fact, and even if it were, the undersigned, as the trier of fact, would give it too little weight to support a finding.4 Finally, even if there were sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that T. P. had been struck with a belt (and there isn't), there yet would be nothing but Mr. Dorelien's ambiguous testimony concerning the substance of T. P.'s out-of-court statement, coupled with inference or speculation (based on uncorroborated hearsay), tending to establish that Thompson did the striking. Again, such "proof" is neither legally sufficient nor, in any event, logically persuasive enough to support a finding that Thompson was at fault for the child's injury. DCF alleges that, in addition to striking T. P. with a belt (which allegation was not proved, as just found), Thompson also spanked J. D. F. and his brother, O. F. Both of these boys, respectively aged 8 and 7 years at the time of hearing, testified against their former foster mother. Each claimed that Thompson had spanked him with a belt. As witnesses, however, the boys did not inspire confidence in the truth of their accounts. Each gave testimony that was confusing, sometimes inconsistent, and lacking in precision. Neither one seemed distinctly to remember the important events at issue, much less any of the details surrounding them, causing the undersigned to wonder, at times, whether the boys were independently recalling the underlying events or, rather, testifying from the memory of what someone might have told them was alleged to have occurred. Doubtless many of these boys' shortcomings as witnesses stemmed from their youth and immaturity. Even so, all witnesses, regardless of age and experience, must be measured according to the same standards of credibility; the bar can be neither lowered nor raised to conform to a particular witness's capacity for giving testimony, for doing so would put a thumb on the scales of justice. At bottom, the accounts of J. D. F. and O. F., though not inherently incredible, nevertheless lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to produce in the undersigned's mind a firm belief or conviction that Thompson had spanked them with a belt. The undersigned hesitates to say more than that such is a possibility. Against the shaky testimonies of the boys was offered the decidedly stronger testimony of their sister, Sancia Jeantil, who swore that while she was living in Thompson's home (which admittedly was not at all times her brothers were there), she never saw Thompson spank either J. D. F. or O. F. She further testified that neither of her siblings had ever complained to her about being beaten. The undersigned has accorded considerable weight to Ms. Jeantil's testimony, because it seems unlikely that she would prevaricate to protect Thompson at her brothers' expense. Although Ms. Jeantil was not always present in the home, her testimony, which the undersigned accepts, is persuasive proof of the pertinent negative proposition, i.e. that Thompson did not use corporal punishment on the boys. Thompson herself testified at hearing and denied having used corporal punishment on J. D. F., O. F., or any other foster child. Mr. Thompson, too, testified that corporal punishment had not been used on any of the foster children in their home. Thompson's own child, J. T., said the same. None of these witnesses conclusively proved the negative of DCF's allegation regarding corporal punishment, but then again it was not Thompson's burden to disprove the charge. What these witnesses did do, effectively, was establish a credible, if simple, theory of innocence: Thompson never beat the foster children in her care. The undersigned has determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence as a whole fails to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, that Thompson used corporal punishment on any of the foster children under her care. Aside from the allegations regarding corporal punishment, DCF has charged Thompson with the lesser offense of failing immediately to notify DCF that her husband had moved out of the home. The evidence shows, however, that Thompson satisfied her duty to notify DCF concerning changes that might affect the life and circumstances of the foster children residing in her home. To recap, briefly, the material facts, Thompson informed DCF's agent, Ms. Woulard, of the possibility that she and Dalkeith might divorce; thus, DCF was on actual notice of a potential change in Thompson's marital status. Thompson likely gave DCF this advance warning in June 2006; in any case, she spoke up long before Dalkeith established a new residence and before the divorce proceeding commenced. There is no clear proof that the couple's situation had changed materially as of September 14, 2006, when Mr. Ojobor visited the home. Without question, Mr. Thompson was away at that time——but he worked for a shipping company and thus extended absences were part of his routine. Having all the evidence of record in view, the undersigned is not convinced that Mr. Thompson had "moved out" of the home as of mid-September 2006 in the sense of having permanently relocated from that residence, which is what DCF maintains. While there is some evidence that such was the case, there is also persuasive evidence that Mr. Thompson did not leave the home for good until October 2006——evidence sufficient to preclude the undersigned from finding, without hesitancy, that DCF's allegation is accurate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DCF enter a final order approving the renewal of Thompson's foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2007.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the petitioner's request to be an adoptive or foster parent should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing family foster homes pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and for establishing minimum standards which must be met by prospective adoptive parents, pursuant to section 63.022, Florida Statutes. In September 1995, Ms. McNeal telephoned the Adoption Information Center at its advertised toll-free number, 1-800-96Adopt, to obtain information about adopting a child. She was sent a packet of materials, which included a section entitled "Adoption and the African-American Child." The Adoption Information Center also suggested she contact One Church, One Child of Florida for further information. Ms. McNeal was encouraged about her chances to adopt an African- American child when she read in the materials provided to her by the Adoption Information Center that some agencies will accept applicants for adoption who are single and who receive public assistance. Ms. McNeal is the single mother of a twelve-year-old daughter and has been on public assistance for the past two years. Ms. McNeal called One Church, One Child and told the representative that she wanted to become a foster or adoptive parent. This request was passed from One Church, One Child to Priscilla Knight, a Family Support Worker with the Department, who acts as liaison between the Department and One Church, One Child. Ms. Knight is a member of a unit within the Department responsible for recruiting and training prospective foster and adoptive parents. When she is contacted by a person who is interested in becoming a foster or adoptive parent, she invites them to an orientation meeting where more detailed information is provided. If the person is still interested, an initial visit will be made to the home of the prospective foster or adoptive parents, and, if the results of the initial visit are satisfactory, the prospective foster or adoptive parents are referred to the required Model Approach to Partnerships in Parenting ("MAPP") training. This procedure was followed in evaluating Ms. McNeal's request. The family income is one of the factors the Department looks at to evaluate the suitability of persons to become foster or adoptive parents. Ms. McNeal is not employed, and her income consists of $50.00 per month in child support for her twelve-year-old daughter and $241.00 per month in Aid to Families with Dependent Children payments. She also receives $201.00 per month in food stamps. Her monthly expenses consist of $19.00 per month for rent in government subsidized housing, $40.00 per month for electrical service, $30.00 per month for telephone service, and $300.00 per month for food, for a total of $389.00. This leaves $103.00 per month for all other expenses she and her daughter incur. Ms. McNeal's income is barely sufficient to provide for her and her daughter's stability and security, and it would not be sufficient to meet the needs of the family should she receive a foster or adoptive child.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying the request of Tara McNeal to be accepted as a foster or adoptive parent. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May 1996.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents' child- placing agency license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and monitoring child-placing agencies. The Center, whose address is 1602 East Third Avenue, Tampa, Florida, received its initial child-placing agency license from DCF in 2004. The license was renewed October 12, 2006. Susan Morgan has been the director of the Center since its inception. DCF contracts with HKI to provide community-based child welfare services in Hillsborough County. HKI contracts with Camelot Community Care for the performance of adoption related services. DCF received complaints about Respondent and issued an Administrative Complaint with the following categories of violations: A foster parent home study was finalized after only one home visit lasting half an hour. The home study document indicates four home consultations for that client. Files relating to clients were left in an unsecured environment at the Center with unauthorized persons having access to them. An adoptive home study was completed without a visit being made to the prospective adoptive parents' home. Respondent lost or misplaced paperwork from clients which contained confidential information. Respondent failed to timely provide foster parents with a copy of their foster parent licenses once the licenses were issued. Regarding the first violation, two home studies are required to finalize a foster parent home study. The subject family was provided a template for filling in information about their home. This is a reasonable means of gathering information about a family. The family was directed to fill in the template using the third person format (so that anyone reading the document might infer that someone other than the family had written the information). Morgan did not visit the home at issue, but did send her associate (Wendy Martinez) who conducted a brief 30 to 40-minute visit. The home study was signed by Morgan and dated March 13, 2007, some four or five weeks prior to Martinez's visit. The home study included the following table concerning visits and consultations: Contact Information Inquiry Date 01/05/06 Inquiry Home Visit 02/10/06 Initial Home Consultation 03/15/06 MAPP Graduation 02/26/06 2nd Home Consultation 04/02/06 Final Home Consultation 03/08/07 Date Application Signed 03/08/07 The table seems to indicate a single home visit on February 10, 2006, and three home "consultations" on later dates. Morgan says the date of the home visit is a typographical error; it should say April 18, 2006, i.e., the date of Martinez's visit. Morgan admits only one home visit was made, but says the home study was not final. Her testimony on that topic is not credible. The home study appears complete, has references to several home visits and/or consultations, and is signed by Morgan subsequent to the dates appearing in the aforementioned table. DCF considers the references to home consultations to be tantamount to home visits. Inasmuch as at least two home visits are required for a foster parent home study, this interpretation makes sense.1 A discussion of the differences, if any, between home visits and home studies follows. There was much testimony at the final hearing as to whether a home visit and a home study are the same thing. Each of the experienced social workers and managers who testified (other than Morgan) seemed to believe the two were synonymous. Even the two witnesses called by Respondent to address the issue opined that home visit and home consultation mean essentially the same thing. Respondent introduced definitions from The Social Worker's Dictionary, but there is nothing in those definitions to suggest they apply to foster care or adoption situations. None of the social workers who testified indicated they would rely on that source to define home visits versus consultations. The home study at issue appears to suggest that four home visits/consultations were conducted, when in fact only one (of the required two) was done. The second category of rule violation concerns unsecured client records. Files belonging to clients of child- placing agencies are extremely confidential in nature. Respondent moved into a new office in the Ybor City section of Tampa during September 2006. The office was shared with a company that specializes in estimating construction project costs. The estimating company had two employees, a receptionist and the owner of the company. The office was set up so that the receptionist was in the same room as Respondent's employee, Martinez. Morgan had a separate office for herself, and the owner of the estimating company had an office upstairs. The Ybor City office had been inspected by DCF in October 2006 and was found to be sufficient for its intended purposes. A client, Angela Ferguson, visited the Center in early April 2007. Morgan was not present when Ferguson arrived, but Martinez was there, as were employees from the other business. Martinez called Morgan on the client's behalf so that Morgan could come to the office. While waiting for Morgan, the client noticed 50 to 60 file folders lying around the office. Some of the files belonged to other clients whose names were visible to Ferguson. Some of the files were probably forms and other non- confidential documents. The client files were not locked in a cabinet or otherwise protected from persons using Respondent's office. On or about May 2, 2007, another client, Jennifer Moody, also visited the Center to get her file (so that she could transfer to another adoption agency). She walked into the office and found the estimating company's receptionist, but no one from the Center was there. The receptionist called Morgan because Moody wanted to wait for her to arrive. While waiting, Moody observed files lying around the office in plain view. When Ferguson expressed her concerns to DCF about the way files were being handled, a licensing specialist was sent out to investigate. DCF employee Melissa Leggett made an unannounced visit to the Center on May 16, 2007, at 10:00 in the morning. Martinez was in the office when Leggett arrived; Martinez called Morgan for Leggett, and Morgan arrived shortly thereafter. Leggett noticed confidential files lying around the office, including files for some clients who she personally knew. Leggett advised Morgan that the files would have to be protected by placing them in a locked file cabinet or locked room. Morgan agreed to remedy the situation and seems to have done so by the date of the final hearing. Files are now being protected from public scrutiny. Each employee of the estimating company has signed a Confidentiality Office Policy agreeing to keep all records of the Center confidential. The third category of violation concerned an adoptive home study for Moody (the same client who had visited the Center). The home study for this family was also sent in blank template form with instructions to fill it out using the third person. Moody filled out the form and sent it back to Morgan. In April 2006, Moody and her husband were scheduled to attend a meeting with prospective adoptee children at Splitsville, a Tampa bowling alley. In order to attend such meetings, prospective adoptive parents must have a home study completed in advance. This serves the purpose of making sure that such parents actually qualify as adoptive parents before they are exposed to the children. The home study for Moody and her husband was finished by Morgan in time for the Moodys to attend the Splitsville function. Although several home visits were scheduled, each of them was cancelled due to various circumstances. No home visit was ever made. However, the home study was completed and signed by Morgan with a recommendation that the family be approved to adopt. The recommendation section of the home study included as its basis: "Based on MAPP training, personal interviews, home consultations . . .". The home study contains a thorough description of the home, including the pool and yard, presumably based on details provided by the Moodys. Moody decided to terminate her relationship with Morgan and the Center after not hearing from Morgan during the period of July through November. As stated earlier herein, Moody picked up her file, which included the signed home study, from the Center. Morgan maintains the home study was still a "work in progress" at that time. However, it had already been signed and was dated April 18, 2006. (Moody was scheduled to attend the Splitsville event on April 22, 2007, and would have needed a completed home study in order to attend.) By Morgan's own admission, she was never in the home of Moody and did not "effectively or efficiently manage" that client's case. It was, as Morgan admitted, wrong to sign the home study without having visited the home. It appears the home study was finished so that the family could attend the MAPP event. The next category of violation had to do with lost or misplaced paperwork. A child placing agency must protect all information provided to it by clients so that confidentiality is maintained. LaClair and her husband submitted a large packet of information to Morgan as part of their attempt to adopt a child through the Center. The information was lost or misplaced by the Center on at least two (but possibly three) occasions. The submitted information contained extremely confidential information, including: marriage licenses, divorce decrees, birth certificates, social security numbers, military identification numbers, and insurance information. The last category of violation concerned failure by Respondent to timely provide licenses to approved foster parents. One of Respondent's clients, Barry Plesch, indicated a long interval between verbal approval and receipt of his paper license. However, he could not quantify the number of times nor specifically remember what dates he may have called Respondent to ask about the license. Another client, Brad Farber, made numerous requests for his license. When he expressed an urgent need for it, the license was produced forthwith. On May 17, 2007, Morgan met with representatives of HKI to discuss the Moody home study and the situation relating to confidential records. At that time, Morgan admitted to falsifying the Moody home study. Morgan acknowledged the gravity and severity of that mistake. She did explain that her office was undergoing reorganization at the time of Leggett's visit, which was the reason so many files were lying around the office.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services upholding the revocation of Respondent's child-placing agency license. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent's foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact There is no dispute that, at all times material hereto, Ms. Azulphar had a foster home license issued by the Department. Ms. Azulphar became a foster parent in January 1999. As with all new foster parents, Ms. Azulphar was required to complete 30 hours of Model Approach to Partnership Parenting (MAPP) training. Among other things, the MAPP training involves discussions regarding duties and responsibilities of a foster parent, the sexual problems of foster care children, and what to do if a foster care child runs away. Ms. Azulphar and the Department entered into a Bilateral Service Agreement regarding foster care. Both of them agreed to abide by the terms of the Bilateral Service Agreement. The Bilateral Service Agreement provided, among other things, the following: The Department's responsibilities to the foster parents include: * * * j. Support will be shown by responding within 24 hours to telephone messages, written correspondence or any other requests the foster parents may have. * * * Commitment to the Child The decision to accept a child into the home is a major one. . . Most foster children have experienced severe emotional, sexual and/or physical abuse as well as trauma. It is not unusual for children who have been sexually abused to act out in sexual inappropriate ways. Foster parents must be aware that these children need extra monitoring, teaching and showing of appropriate affection in order to grow into healthy children. . . By accepting a child into the home, the foster parent(s) agree to the following responsibilities: * * * d. To ensure that the child has supervision appropriate to his/her age and developmental level. * * * Foster parents have responsibilities and duties to both the department [sic] and the child. Responsibilities to the department [sic] include: * * * k. To notify the Department immediately if a child runs away, is missing or does not return home, even if the foster parent knows where the child is. * * * s. To know where and with whom the child is staying and the type of supervision the child is receiving when foster parents approve an outing or overnight activity. . . Non-compliance with any of the above provisions can result in termination of this service agreement by either the foster parents or the Department. Non-compliance with any of the above [sic] provisions may also result in the department [sic] revoking the home's license to provide foster care pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. . . . Any person living with a foster parent is subject to a background check by the Department because such person would have contact with any foster child placed with the foster parent. Such person must not have a disqualifying criminal record1 in order for the person to remain in the foster home during the licensure of the foster home. Ms. Azulphar had a tenant, Louis Bryant, who lived in an attached room to her home, which was converted from a garage. He had his own private entrance to his room. In January 2002, the Department informed Ms. Azulphar that Mr. Bryant, not only had a criminal record, but also had a disqualifying criminal drug record and that, therefore, if she wanted to keep her license, he would have to move. Ms. Azulphar informed Mr. Bryant that he had to move. Mr. Bryant moved, and Ms. Azulphar provided documentation to the Department indicating that he had moved. Ms. Azulphar described Mr. Bryant as a long-time friend and someone that she had relied upon when she first came to the United States. Mr. Bryant was also Ms. Azulphar's former supervisor. Further, even though he was a drug addict, who was skinny and dirty, smelled bad, and needed reminding to bathe, Ms. Azulphar described Mr. Bryant as the only person upon whom she could call when she had an emergency. She also indicated that Mr. Bryant was a handy man who performed repairs for her. Ms. Azulphar admitted that, as to Mr. Bryant, she was a "co-partner." She further admitted that Mr. Bryant was someone she "needs to continue what she was doing." In spite of her reliance upon Mr. Bryant as indicated, Ms. Azulphar showed a willingness to comply with the Department's requirements by requiring Mr. Bryant to move. On or about May 8, 2002, a foster child, F.D.,2 was placed with Ms. Azulphar. F.D. was 12 years of age at the time. F.D. was a special needs foster child because she had a history of being sexually abused at an early age and because F.D.'s father was deceased and her mother had voluntarily surrendered her parental rights. F.D. was the subject of disciplinary action at school. She was suspended for ten days from school for pulling a knife on another student. During the suspension, Ms. Azulphar took F.D. to work with her. F.D. left Ms. Azulphar's workplace without Ms. Azulphar's permission and knowledge. F.D. called her friends who came to Ms. Azulphar's workplace and F.D. left with them. Ms. Azulphar discovered that F.D. was dating a young man who was much older than F.D. Ms. Azulphar believed that the young man was approximately 26 years of age because he "looked" 26 years of age and F.D.'s friends were dating young men who also looked 26 years of age. Ms. Azulphar believed that the young man was among the friends that F.D. contacted to leave Ms. Azulphar's workplace. Also, during F.D.'s suspension, on the afternoon of May 16, 2002, her Guardian Ad-Litem came to Ms. Azulphar's home to visit F.D. The Guardian Ad-Litem knocked but no one answered. F.D. emerged from a neighbor's house. Ms. Azulphar had left F.D. alone at home. Ms. Azulphar had instructed F.D. to wait for the Guardian Ad-Litem at home and to not go outside of the home. Ms. Azulphar talked with the Guardian Ad-Litem on the telephone that same day. She expressed to the Guardian Ad-Litem that she wanted F.D. out of her home. That evening on May 16, 2002, F.D. became so distraught and volatile that she took a knife and threatened to harm herself. Ms. Azulphar called the Department's emergency telephone number and was told to call the Crisis Center for Mobile Children (CCMC). Ms. Azulphar telephoned CCMC, which told her how to talk to F.D. Ms. Azulphar did as she was instructed and F.D. did not harm herself. The next day, May 17, 2002, sometime in the evening after bedtime, which was around 9 p.m., F.D. slipped out of Ms. Azulphar's home. Ms. Azulphar had taken a sleeping pill and was not aware that F.D. was gone. Around 4 a.m. on May 18, 2002, Ms. Azulphar received a telephone call from F.D., who wanted Ms. Azulphar to come and get her. Ms. Azulphar did not want to drive at that time because she had taken the sleeping pill, so Ms. Azulphar asked F.D. to have an adult come to the telephone. Ms. Azulphar believed that F.D. was at a party because of the background noise that she heard, which sounded like a party. Ms. Azulphar recognized that the person who came to the telephone was not an adult, but Ms. Azulphar requested that F.D. be permitted to stay at the person's home until 6 a.m. when she (Ms. Azulphar) would pick-up F.D. F.D. did not wait for Ms. Azulphar. She returned to Ms. Azulphar's home before Ms. Azulphar could get her. Ms. Azulphar did not call the police when she discovered that F.D. was leaving her (Ms. Azulphar's) workplace with the young man who was 26 years of age and when she received the telephone call from F.D. The reason that Ms. Azulplhar did not call the police is that she believed that the police would do more harm than good to F.D., that F.D. had had enough trouble, and that F.D. was a Haitian as she was. After F.D. returned to Ms. Azulphar's home on May 18, 2002, Ms. Azulphar contacted the Guardian Ad-Litem and requested the removal of F.D. from her home. The Guardian Ad-Litem reported the incident to the court and the court ordered an investigation and the removal of F.D. from Ms. Azulphar's home. The Guardian Ad-Litem did not know the results of the court's investigation. During the time that F.D. was in Ms. Azulphar's home, Ms. Azulphar also had, in addition to her own child, T.A., two other foster children, A.A. and her sister, V.A.3 All of the other children agree that F.D. could not be trusted, was a thief, and did not tell the truth. After F.D. was removed from her home, Ms. Azulphar had another foster child placed in her home, who ran away. However, this time, Ms. Azulphar contacted the police and the Department when she discovered that the child had run away. Sometime during the first two weeks that F.D. was placed with Ms. Azulphar,4 the Department's social worker for F.D., Luis Muriel, was making arrangements with Ms. Azulphar to pick-up F.D. Ms. Azulphar requested Mr. Muriel to come to her workplace since F.D. would be there with her; however, he wanted Ms. Azulphar to leave F.D. at home alone. Ms. Azulphar reminded him that she was not to leave F.D. at home alone. However, Mr. Muriel instructed Ms. Azulphar to leave F.D. at home alone and informed Ms. Azulphar that he would be arriving at her home in 30 minutes. Ms. Azulphar contacted a male friend, who was approximately 50 years of age, for assistance and requested that he wait at her home for Mr. Muriel, who would be arriving in 30 minutes. However, she instructed her friend to wait outside in his car, not in her home, and he agreed to do so. When Mr. Muriel arrived at Ms. Azulphar's home and knocked on the door, Ms. Azulphar's friend opened the door. Ms. Azulphar's friend had not complied with her instructions and had gone into her home while F.D. was in the home. The Department had not performed a background check on Ms. Azulphar's friend. There was no reason for the Department to perform a background check on Ms. Azulphar's friend since it was never intended by Ms. Azulphar that he would have contact with the foster children placed with her. As to the incident, Ms. Azulphar had made it clear to her friend that he was not to go inside the home. On May 29, 2002, around 8 p.m., the licensing counselor for Ms. Azulphar's case, Reynaldo Gonzalez, made an unannounced visit to her home after being contacted by F.D.'s Guardian Ad-Litem regarding F.D.'s situation. By that time, F.D. had been removed from Ms. Azulphar's home. Mr. Gonzalez noticed a car parked outside of the house. He knocked on the door. The foster child A.A., who was approximately 15 years of age at the time, looked through the window and informed Mr. Gonzalez that Ms. Azulphar was not at home. Mr. Gonzalez returned around 8:30 p.m. and A.A. was still at home alone. Ms. Azulphar had left A.A. at home alone. However, Mr. Gonzalez's primary concern was not A.A.'s being at home alone. On the following day, around 6:20,5 Mr. Gonzalez returned to Ms. Azulphar's home because the Department had received anonymous information that no food was in the home. The same car was parked outside Ms. Azulphar's home, but the front of the car was parked in a different direction. Ms. Azulphar was not at home, but a relative, who was there, permitted Mr. Gonzalez to enter. Mr. Gonzalez found that there was adequate food in the home. None of the foster children were at home; they were with Ms. Azulphar. Mr. Gonzalez's testimony failed to indicate whether the car was parked along the street or in the driveway. An inference is drawn that the car was parked along the street. Ms. Azulphar voluntarily admitted to Mr. Gonzalez that Mr. Bryant was the owner of the car. She wanted Mr. Bryant to park his car outside her home to make it look as if someone were at home because her home had been burglarized when no one was at home. Further, on one of the days referred to, Mr. Bryant's car was either in disrepair or out of gas.6 According to the Department, Mr. Bryant should not have parked his car in front of Ms. Azulphar's home on the street. However, the evidence fails to demonstrate that such conduct by Mr. Bryant involved contact with the foster children. Ms. Azulphar admits that, at times, Mr. Bryant accompanied her shopping even when the foster children were with her. Ms. Azulphar also admits that Mr. Bryant has cut her grass, but only when she was at home. Ms. Azulphar testified that she obtained the approval of the Department for cutting the grass even though no Department witness recalled approving the action. Ms. Azulphar's testimony is found to be credible. Ms. Azulphar used poor judgment as it relates to Mr. Bryant. At first, Ms. Azulphar believed that, even though Mr. Bryant could not continue to be a tenant, she could continue to have Mr. Bryant to assist her with some things. She now knows that, as long as she has foster children, the Department does not want him to be around the children at any time. Ms. Azulphar believed that nothing was wrong with Mr. Bryant parking or leaving his car at her house. Now, she knows that the Department does not want him to be near her home when she has foster children. A.A. and V.A. were removed from Ms. Azulphar's home when the Department decided to revoke her foster home license. Both A.A. and V.A. want to return to Ms. Azulphar's home. Ms. Azulphar's daughter is in complete agreement with her mother being a foster parent and wants A.A. and V.A. to return.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing the revocation action of the foster home license of Marie Claire Azulphar. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners should be licensed to operate a foster home in Marianna, Jackson County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Respondent licensed Petitioners to operate a foster home in Respondent's District No. 9, West Palm Beach, Florida, beginning in 1995 through April 1, 2000. The Department of Health, under its Children's Medical Services Program, licensed Petitioners as medical foster parents for almost two years of that time. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioners had five children living with them in West Palm Beach, Florida. Two boys, aged six and three, were Petitioners' adopted sons. A two-year-old boy, A.B., and his one-year-old sister, T.B. were medical foster children. C.S. was a two-year-old female foster child. In August 1999, Petitioners bought a home in Respondent's District No. 2, which includes Marianna, Jackson County, Florida. Mr. Mayes is a carpenter and intended to make repairs to the home before moving his family to North Florida. Petitioners knew their foster home license in District No. 9 was not transferable to District No. 2. Therefore, they applied for a foster home license in District No. 2. Petitioners wanted their three foster children to move with them to Mariana, Florida. Petitioners hoped to adopt C.S. and to keep A.B. and T.B. in the same placement until another family adopted them. All of the foster children had been in Petitioners' home since they were a few days old. A.B. was a very active two-year-old child. He regularly climbed out of his crib. On one occasion he climbed up on the stove and turned on the burners. He seemed to "have no fear." In the fall of 1999, Mrs. Mayes requested Respondent to provide her with behavior management assistance for A.B. Because Petitioners were planning to move out of District No. 9, Respondent decided to wait until A.B. was settled after Petitioners' move to perform the behavior management evaluation. In the meantime, Petitioners could not keep A.B. in his highchair during mealtime. They had difficulty keeping him in his crib. They bought a safety harness and attempted to use it to keep A.B. in his crib on one occasion and in his highchair on another occasion. A.B. was able to wiggle out of the harness on both occasions. Petitioners subsequently discarded the harness. They resorted to tightening the highchair's feeding tray in order to keep A.B. still long enough to feed him. Petitioners never used and never intended to use the harness to punish A.B. Petitioners usually disciplined the children by placing them in timeout for one minute per year of age. Timeout for Petitioners' foster children usually meant being held in Mrs. Mayes' lap. Mrs. Mayes admitted using the safety harness on A.B. during a telephone conversation with Respondent's medical foster care counselor in January 2000. The counselor informed Ms. Mayes that foster parents are not allowed to use a harness to restrain foster children. Prospective foster parents must participate in and complete training classes designed by Respondent. Persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent teaches prospective foster parents during this training that children should never be restrained by a harness. Petitioners have taken these training classes. If A.B. and the other children were free to go into a bedroom, they would pull everything out of the chest of drawers. They would flush objects down the toilet in the bathroom. Mr. Mayes put a hook-type latch on the door to the Petitioners' bedroom, A.B.'s bedroom, and the bathroom in the hall. The primary purpose of the door latches was to keep the children out of unsupervised areas of the home. Petitioners never used the door latches as a means of discipline. On two occasions Mrs. Mayes latched the door to A.B.'s room while he was in the room asleep. The first time she latched the door while she went to the mail box in front of her home. The other time, she latched the door while she bathed another child who had a doctor's appointment later that afternoon. On both occasions, A.B. was locked in his room for only a few minutes. Petitioners knew that they needed permission from Respondent in order to take A.B., T.B., and C.S. out of the state on vacations. On several occasions, Respondent's staff gave Petitioners permission to take the foster children to North Florida for short visits during the time that Mr. Mayes was remodeling the home. Respondent's staff approved these short visits as if they were vacations. Petitioners knew that they needed to be licensed in Respondent's District No. 2 before Respondent's staff in District No. 9 could approve the permanent transfer of the foster children. At the same time, the Respondent's staff in District No. 2 could not license Petitioners until they actually made the move with all of their furniture. Petitioners discussed their dilemma with several members of Respondent's staff in District No. 9. During these conversations, Petitioners asked Respondent if they could take the children with them and treat the time that they would be temporarily unlicensed as if it were a vacation. At least one member of Respondent's staff responded that treating the move initially as if it were a vacation was "an option that could be explored." Respondent's staff subsequently advised Petitioners that under no circumstances could the foster children move to Jackson County, temporarily or permanently, until Petitioners were properly licensed. Petitioner's never attempted to deceive Respondent; to the contrary, they were openly looking for an acceptable way to take the foster children with then when they moved. They never intended to circumvent the proper licensing process. Based on Petitioners' former experience with Respondent, they believed that treating the move as a vacation would be an appropriate way to solve what was otherwise a "catch twenty-two" situation. By letter dated March 14, 2000, Respondent's staff in District No. 2 advised Petitioners that they would receive a provisional foster home license as soon as information furnished by Petitioners and copies of Petitioners' file from the licensing unit in District No. 9 could be sent to Respondent's office in Panama City, Florida. Respondent removed the three foster children from Petitioners' home just before Petitioners moved to Jackson County on April 1, 2000. In a memorandum dated April 19, 2000, Respondent listed Petitioners' home as one of two medical foster homes in Jackson County, Florida. Despite the representation in this memorandum, Respondent issued the letter of denial on June 5, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners a foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James Mayes Gail Mayes 4561 Magnolia Road Marianna, Florida 32448 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe, Suite 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether HRS should grant the Petitioner's application a license to operate a foster care home for dependent children.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Christopher Murphy, is a single male, born July 27, 1966. He wants to be a foster care parent for up to two teenagers, same sex, including those with a history of having been abused. In approximately September, 1994, the Petitioner approached the Children's Home Society (CHS), located in Orlando, Florida, to inquire about applying for licensure to operate a foster care home for dependent children. CHS is and was under contract with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) to screen prospective licensees. The screening process included, among other things: interviews with the Petitioner; a home study; review of written personal references on behalf of the Petitioner; evaluation of the Petitioner's participation in the HRS-approved Model Approach to Partnerships in Parenting (MAPP) program. After conducting its training and screening of the Petitioner, CHS recommended the Petitioner for licensure "for two children, same gender, ages 12 to 18 years," and the Petitioner filed his application for licensure on or about May 3, 1995. The Petitioner and the "relief persons" he designated in his application underwent background screening, and no disqualifying information was found. However, by letter dated July 11, 1995, HRS gave notice of intent to deny the Petitioner's application for the following reasons: According to Florida Administrative Code Chapter 10M-6, it is the opinion of the Department that based on your own experience with depression, your single lifestyle and your sexual orientation that your desire to be a foster parent is not in the best inte- rest of the children in the custody of Health and Rehabilitative Services. You have indicated that you have doubts about your ability to work with HRS in seeking rehabilitation of the families with children in foster care, that you have limited patience with bureaucracy, and that you would not like to see the foster children in your care return to their parents. Professional counseling to relieve distress over your sexual orientation did not resolve that issue. These consider- ations lead HRS to believe that it would not be in the best interest of children in state custody to be placed with you in foster care. The Petitioner's Mental and Emotional Status The evidence is that the Petitioner experienced some difficulties growing up as one of ten siblings. His mother was very religious but, at the same time, appears to have been a strict disciplinarian and, at times, almost "cruel" to the children. In addition, the Petitioner tended to be a loner during his early years. He was physically weak and was susceptible to being bullied by other children. In addition, he played differently from other boys his age, preferring to spend his time reading Jane Austen and the Bronte sisters rather than playing with friends. As the Petitioner grew older, he increasingly recognized signs that he was homosexually oriented. These signs disturbed him because a homosexual orientation was contrary to his desires and to what he understood to be the morals of his family and religion. When the Petitioner went to college in the mid-1980's, he still would have been considered a "social isolate," and the combination of stresses from leaving home, living on his own at college and dealing with his sexual orientation resulted in depression requiring individual psychotherapy and medication (at first Impramine and later, in 1992, Prozac). Dealing with his mother's death in 1988 caused the depression to recur, but the Petitioner was able to recover with the help of the psychotherapy and medication. Since 1988, the Petitioner has suffered periodic bouts of mild depression. (Medication he takes for rapid heartbeat tends to cause some depression as a side effect.) However, the Petitioner's major depression is in remission, and he has been able to control the mild depression by the appropriate use of medication. The Petitioner's physicians advise him to continue on medication and seek therapy as necessary. In recent years, the Petitioner has resolved his conflicted feelings about his mother, as well as many of the conflicts he had with members of his family. The Petitioner also has made great strides to resolve his conflicted feelings about his sexual orientation. At the same time, he still rejects the values and lifestyle of the gay world and continues to accept most of the basic tenets of traditional values and lifestyle. As a result, there is no indication that the Petitioner is trying to use the foster parent program in order to make a political statement about gay rights. However, the difficulty the Petitioner will continue to face is that traditional society does not necessarily always accept him. This probably will make being a foster parent more difficult for the Petitioner. The Petitioner also has made considerable progress making and maintaining viable personal relationships. He has been able to work responsibly and well in the positions he has held with Universal Studios in Orlando and has made and maintained several positive and valuable friendships through work and elsewhere. In the words of a licensed psychologist who evaluated him in August- September, 1995, the Petitioner is "on the mend" in this regard; by this he meant that the Petitioner is making good progress in the right direction. If major depression were to recur, the Petitioner obviously would have difficulty persevering, and probably would be unable to persevere, in seeing a foster child through to the end of his or her temporary placement. But in recent years the Petitioner has been able to control depression by appropriately using his antidepressant medication, monitoring himself for symptoms of depression, and seeking appropriate therapy as needed. As long as he continues to do so, it is not anticipated that major depression will recur. HRS has licensed others with mental and emotional status similar to the Petitioner to be foster parents. It is true that there is a possibility that the stress of being a foster parent could cause the Petitioner's depression to recur. In many ways, teenage is the most difficult age bracket for foster care, and abused teenagers can present even greater difficulties. But HRS maintains control over the children to be placed with the Petitioner, and an effort could be made not to place the most difficult foster care challenges with the Petitioner, at least initially. In addition, HRS and the Petitioner could cooperate in monitoring the effects that the stress of being a foster parent have on the Petitioner. There is a good chance that the Petitioner's depression will not recur as a result of being a foster parent. The Petitioner's Parenting Experience The Petitioner has no children of his own and has no parenting experience. He grew up in a family of ten children but tended to spend much of his time apart from them. The Petitioner did some baby-sitting during his teens. But otherwise, through his college years, the Petitioner did not exhibit much inclination or desire to be around or work with children. The Petitioner changed as he reached adulthood. He now has a very strong desire to help teenage children by acting as their foster parent. In recent years, he has had the opportunity to work with families having their pictures made at the Universal Studios park in Orlando and has found that he had success interacting with the young members of those families. While he has not had much experience taking care of teenagers, he also has enjoyed spending considerable time in recent years interacting with the young children of friends and other family members. (Living in the a vacation center, many siblings and other members of his family have taken advantage of the opportunity to visit him since he moved to Orlando.) The Petitioner seems to interact well with the children in several arenas--facilitating play, sharing snacks and meals, helping with homework, going on picnics and other outings, suggesting and participating in other positive family activities. His friends' children like him, and his friends trust him with tending to their children. On the other hand, the Petitioner's experience taking care of children is limited. The Petitioner's experience as the sole caretaker responsible for children is relatively sparse and of relatively short duration. While the Petitioner has done some baby-sitting for family and friends, most of the time he has spent with children has been while their parents were around. The Petitioner has not had occasion to be responsible for children overnight or for extended periods of time (certainly not for 24 or more hours). He also has not had much other experience working with children in other settings. He has not, e.g., worked or volunteered as a counselor for church or civic youth groups or camps. Due to the nature of the Petitioner's experience with children, and his lack of experience with teenagers, it is not certain that the Petitioner will succeed as a foster parent of teenagers, or children of any age. It also is not certain that the Petitioner himself will thrive as and enjoy being a 24- hour a day foster parent. It would be desirable both for the Petitioner and for the children to be placed with him for the Petitioner to get more experience before beginning to act as a foster parent. But, on the other hand, the same probably could be said for most first-time parents. It is hard to truly know what it is like to be a parent until you become one. HRS has no non-rule policy establishing clear minimum experience standards for licensure as a foster parent. HRS has licensed others to be foster parents with as little or less parenting experience compared to the Petitioner. The licensing administrator who testified for HRS stated that HRS never has issued a provisional license to a first-time applicant and that HRS would not issue one for the purpose of evaluating the provisional licensee while the licensee gains additional parenting experience. The Petitioner's Ability to Be a "Team Player" On the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet" for various sessions of the Petitioner's MAPP training, the Petitioner wrote: (Needs as a Result of Meeting 2) I am intolerant of those who hurt children and may have a difficult time holding back and/or editing my language in their company (during visits). I have limited patience with bureaucracy. If something is not getting done, I will do it myself regardless of who gets offended. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 5) I probably will assume I am a better parent than the child's birth parents, and I don't think I'll want the child to return to his biological family. As CHS conducts MAPP training, prospective foster parents are encouraged to use the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet" to honestly express their deepest concerns about their ability to succeed as foster parents. Then, the trainers help the trainees deal with those concerns. CHS' MAPP trainers believed that, during the course of the training sessions, the Petitioner was able to work through his concerns and grow through the training process. He was open to the trainers' ideas and actively participated in the sessions. In their estimation, the Petitioner's comments, even when in the fifth session, should not be taken as an indication that the Petitioner would not be able to work in partnership with HRS and birth families as a team player. The licensing administrator who testified for HRS was not familiar with how CHS conducted MAPP training and was not in a position to conclude, as she did, that the Petitioner's statements on the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet," in and of themselves, show that the Petitioner will not be able to work in partnership with HRS and birth families as a team player. The Petitioner has had no difficulty working within the bureaucracy at Universal Studios. He has had good relationships with his supervisors and has had no difficulty accepting their authority over him. Nothing about his employment experience would indicate that the Petitioner would have difficulty working in partnership with HRS and birth families as a team player. The Petitioner's Single Life Style On the "Strengths/Needs Work Sheet" for various sessions of the Petitioner's MAPP training, the Petitioner wrote: (Needs as a Result of Meeting 2) I am responsible, but do not lead a structured life. I eat when I'm hungry, sleep when I'm tired, have ice cream for breakfast . . . (Needs as a Result of Meeting 3) I may not be able to go out all night and do things as spontaneously as I do. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 5) It's just me - one on one. If I had a spouse to back me up when making rules or administer- ing discipline, things would be easier. On the other hand, the Petitioner also counted among his strengths: (Needs as a Result of Meeting 3) It's just me. . . . A foster child has only one person to adjust to. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 4) I have no other people living in my home and can devote a majority of my free time to my foster child. (Needs as a Result of Meeting 5) As a single male with no children, I will be the only one affected. These comments indicate an awareness on the Petitioner's part that his life will change if one or two foster children are placed in his home. As he recognizes, being single will make it more difficult in some ways, but somewhat easier in other ways. What can make being a single foster parent most difficult is not having the emotional and intellectual support and help of another adult in the home. A single foster parent must attempt to compensate by having adult family and friends who are willing and able to serve some of those needs. Several of the Petitioner's friends are willing and able to serve in this role for the Petitioner. All have met HRS's screening requirements. One thing a single foster parent cannot replace is the inability to demonstrate (and teach through) a successful marriage. But this inability clearly is not disqualifying. The Petitioner's Sexual Orientation HRS's notice of intent to deny the Petitioner's application mentioned the Petitioner's sexual orientation. But at final hearing HRS took the position that sexual orientation itself was not a ground for denial of the Petitioner's application. While not disqualifying in itself, being a homosexual foster parent undeniably will present special problems. First, it already has been mentioned that it can be a challenge for a homosexual to function in traditional society, and trying to function as a foster parent in traditional society surely will present its own special challenges. Along those lines, it is foreseeable, e.g., that a foster parent's homosexuality could be unacceptable to the birth family. In addition, since unmarried cohabitation by two or more adults is disqualifying, the Petitioner would be restricted to living alone. Lastly, many foster parents later adopt children placed with them, but the Petitioner will not be able to because homosexuality is disqualifying for purposes of adoption.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order issuing the Petitioner a license to operate a foster home for up to two children, same sex, ages 12 to 18 years of age. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings 27th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4150 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Rejected that he applied for a license then; he initiated the screening process and preservice training at that time. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 2.-4. Accepted and incorporated. 5.-8. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 9. The characterization "extensive" is rejected as not proven; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 10.-12. Accepted and incorporated. 13. The date "July 11, 1996" is rejected as contrary to the evidence. (It was 1995.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 14.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 17. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 18.-22. Conclusions of law. Accepted and incorporated. Conclusion of law. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted and incorporated. 4.-6. Conclusions of law. 7.-9. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (The first testimony referred to Noll's knowledge of whether the Petitioner was on medication at the time of the hearing. Noll was not "pressed" for the additional testimony; he was just asked a different question.) Rejected as contrary to the evidence that Noll "failed to follow through." Also, subordinate and unnecessary, as the question for determination is whether the evidence at final hearing supported licensure. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (Again, the question for determination is whether the evidence at final hearing supported licensure.) Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that he did not present any experience in his application; he presented more at final hearing after being informed that HRS included experience in the "single lifestyle" ground for the July 11, 1995, notice of intent to deny. Again, the question for determination is whether the evidence at final hearing supported licensure. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; he presented more at final hearing. See 13., above. 15.-16. Generally, accepted. The Petitioner's exact statements are incorporated. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that the Petitioner's purpose was to "avoid working with birth families." (The gist of Noll's discussion with the Petitioner appears to have been that foster parenting older children generally makes reunification less of a concern; either reunification would not be a viable option or, if considered, the older child would have more say in the matter. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but, as previously ruled, subordinate to the ultimate issue for determination, and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Ann E. Colby, Esquire 305 Elkhorn Court Winter Park, Florida 32792 Laurie A. Lashomb, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz Acting Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600
Findings Of Fact The Respondents operated a "therapeutic foster home" in Lee County, North Fort Myers, Florida. A therapeutic foster care home such as this is licensed to accept and care for emotionally disturbed children such as the 9- year-old girl, T.P., involved in this case and, as such, has a mental health technician from the Department available for consultation should such assistance be needed. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged, as pertinent hereto, with administration of the foster care program mandated by Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, and the above-cited chapter of the Florida Administrative Code. The child involved in this dispute, "T.P.", is a 9-year-old girl who has been diagnosed as emotionally disturbed. The Respondents were aware that she was an emotionally disturbed child when she was placed in their home with one other foster child and were also aware that theirs was a licensed therapeutic foster home with a mental health technician available for consultation. They failed to make use of the services of that technician in dealing with the child's problem involving enuresis and ecopresis. This child's medical problem, involving incontinence of bowel and bladder, is related to the child's emotional disturbance. Because of the nature of this problem and its psychological ramifications, it is even more critical than with ordinary children that slapping or hitting as a punishment for bed- wetting or soiling of clothes or bedding should be avoided. If the child is so punished for incontinence, then the child's guilt feelings or feelings of inadequacy for having "accidentally" soiled bedding or clothes is greatly aggravated. On February 10, 1982, the Respondent, Russell Ostrander, administered corporal punishment to the child T.P. on two occasions, leaving multiple black and blue marks or bruises on the buttocks and thighs of this child "because she was messing in her britches." The child, either later that day or one or two days thereafter, visited with her natural mother who observed the bruises and reported the matter to Mrs. Parker, the Petitioner's first witness, who is a "district intake counselor." Mrs. Parker, and/or the other HRS personnel testifying for the Petitioner, felt that an instance of child abuse had occurred and removed the child from the foster home. The despondent admitted spanking the child on several occasions, but did not believe he could have caused the bruises shown in Exhibits 1 and 2. The Respondents admitted however that the child was spanked as punishment for "messing in her britches."
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, the evidence in the record, it is therefore RECOMMENDED: That the license of Janet and Russell Ostrander to operate a foster home be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony N. DeLuccia, Esquire District Legal Counsel Post Office Box 06085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906 Russell and Janet Ostrander Rt. 2, Box 382 Ruden Road North Fort Myers, Florida 33903 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes. Mrs. Sampson operated a Childrens' Medical Services ("CMS") medical foster home for children with special medical, emotional and physical needs, and was licensed by the Department as either a CMS medical foster home or as a regular foster home from 1990 until November 1997. At some point in 1996 or 1997, Mrs. Sampson voluntarily ceased operating as a CMS medical foster home, but continued to operate as a regular foster home. There was conflicting evidence as to the precise date of this change, but the date is not relevant to this phase of the bifurcated proceeding. On March 2, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint that sought to revoke Mrs. Sampson's foster care license. On October 6, 1999, the Department filed an Amended Administrative Complaint. The Department also denied Mrs. Sampson's application to adopt one of the foster children in her care. Mrs. Sampson requested a formal administrative hearing on both the revocation of her foster care license and the denial of her adoption application. The cases were consolidated, and a formal administrative hearing was held over several dates in April, May, and June 2000. Mrs. Sampson prevailed on all issues in the consolidated cases. A Recommended Order in her favor was entered on August 11, 2000. A Final Order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Recommended Order was entered on October 2, 2000. Mrs. Sampson contends that she is a "small business party" as defined in Subsection 57.111(3)(d)1.a, Florida Statutes, which provides that the term "small business party" includes: A sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time that action is initiated by a state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments. . . . At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was domiciled in the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was licensed as a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN"). The determinative issue is whether Mrs. Sampson's operation of a foster home establishes her as the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business or professional practice. Mrs. Sampson initially operated her medical foster home for the benefit of one child, who was admitted to Tampa General Hospital while Mrs. Sampson worked there as a contract nurse. The child was born prematurely and was not expected to live longer than six weeks. Mrs. Sampson became a licensed foster parent to take this child home and care for him. Under her care, the child thrived. Though he survived the initial crisis, the child continued to require full-time nursing care. Mrs. Sampson was not able to return to full-time employment as a contract nurse outside the home. Mrs. Sampson testified that she advised the Department's case workers that she would need to take in additional medical foster children to supplement her income while she worked at home caring for the children. Over a period of eight years, the Department placed at least 14 medically needy foster children in Mrs. Sampson's home. The Department establishes foster home care board rates, which are standard reimbursements to foster parents for the expenses incurred for the foster children, such as food, clothing, medical care, and transportation. The board rates are minimums that can be increased by the Department if the needs of the foster child cannot otherwise be met. Mrs. Sampson received an enhanced board rate for at least some of the children in her care. The Department conducts orientation meetings for and training of prospective foster parents. The Department emphasizes that the purpose of foster parenting is to provide temporary surrogate parenting for the foster children. The prospective parents are informed that they are considered volunteers and will not be paid for their services. The parents are told that the board payments are for the childrens' expenses. Foster parents sign an agreement acknowledging that the board payments are "on behalf of the child." Rule 65C-13.011(4), Florida Administrative Code, expressly provides that substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure the stability and security of their own families without reliance on the board payments, and that the substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care before receiving a board payment. If the Department removes a child from a foster home, the board payment to the foster payment ceases. If the child is placed with a new foster parent, then the board payment goes to the new foster parent. In addition to the regular and enhanced board payments, a CMS medical foster parent may receive payments from Medicaid as reimbursement for medically necessary services rendered to the foster children. Mrs. Sampson was a designated Medicaid provider from April 1992 through March 1997. Mrs. Sampson contended that these Medicaid payments were for the nursing services she provided to the children, just as physicians receive Medicaid payments for treatment of eligible patients. However, medical foster parents are not required to be licensed medical professionals. Mrs. Sampson offered no evidence that the Medicaid payments were for her services as an LPN, or that private, residential LPN services even qualify for Medicaid reimbursement absent prior authorization. CMS-administered medical foster care services are authorized for Medicaid reimbursement, and the best evidence is that Mrs. Sampson was reimbursed as a medical foster care provider, not as an LPN. The Department established that Mrs. Sampson did not hold herself out as running a business, nor did she report as income on her federal tax return the payments received in connection with providing foster care. Mrs. Sampson testified that she hired part-time employees to assist her in caring for the children, but she did not withhold federal income tax or Social Security taxes from their pay and did not file W-2 wage statements for them. Mrs. Sampson explained her failure to report her board payments as income by reference to 26 U.S.C. s. 131, which excludes foster care payments from reportable gross income. This citation justifies her failure to report, but also supports the Department's contention that foster care payments should not be considered business income. Mrs. Sampson implicitly conceded that her foster home did not possess any of the common indicia of a business. Her chief contention was that from 1970 to 1990, she worked as an LPN through nursing agencies, caring for sick children in hospitals or in their homes, and that from 1990 to 1997, she worked as an LPN caring for medical foster children in her own home. In other words, Mrs. Sampson contended that by operating the foster home, she was continuing to practice her profession in a different setting. She gave up the income from her practice as an LPN through nursing agencies in favor of the income she received as an LPN acting as a medical foster parent.
