Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints filed pursuant to the laws of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. (Official recognition taken of Section 20.30, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes). Respondent is now, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed real estate salesman in Florida having been issued license No. 0199126 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued Respondent was as a non-active salesman with a home address of 6312 Balboa Lane, Apollo Beach, Florida 33570. During times material, Respondent was the owner and sole stockholder of Computer Real Estate Sales, Inc. During times material, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman in association with Computer Real Estate Sales, Inc. located at 600 West Jefferson Street, Brooksville, Florida 33512. During early March, 1986, Respondent caused to be ordered a termite treatment to be performed in March, 1986 on property owned by Richard E. Atkinson (Atkinson) located at 21476 Chadfield Street in Brooksville. The subject property treated for termites was being managed by Respondent through his company, Computer Real Estate, Inc. Respondent was previously the owner of that property as well as four other rental properties that he sold to Atkinson. Respondent caused the property management account of Atkinson to be debited by the sum of $380.00 to pay for the termite treatment performed by Bray's Pest Control (Bray's). (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). Respondent failed to pay the $380.00 to Bray's for the termite treatment nor did he later credit Atkinson's property management account when he failed to pay Bray's for the termite treatment. To collect payment for the termite treatment, Bray's was forced to file a civil complaint against Respondent in county court, Hernando County. On February 25, 1987, a final judgment was entered against Respondent in the amount of $391.40 plus costs of $36.00 and interest computed at the rate of 12% from March, 1986 until paid. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 5). Subsequent to entry of the judgment and despite Bray's efforts to collect the award, Respondent failed and refused to satisfy the final judgment until an initial payment was made on March 5, 1989 and the balance due was paid on July 13, 1989. Respondent's contention at hearing that he was simply stockholder and not liable for the obligations of Computer Real Estate Sales, Inc., was rejected based on a review of pleadings filed which indicated that he was sole stockholder during times material and that several contractors relied upon his representation, as owner of Computer Real Estate Services, Inc., to make payments for debts and obligations incurred by that company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, it is RECOMMENDED: The Petitioner enter a final order imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,000.00 payable to the Florida Real Estate Commission within 30 days of the entry of the final order herein or Respondent's real estate license shall be revoked. In the event that Respondent pays the above referred $1,000.00 fine to Petitioner within 30 days of entry of the final order herein, Respondent's real estate license No. 019916 be placed on probation for a period of (1) one year. 2/ DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the state of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated in accordance with those statutes. Respondent is now and was at all times associated with this administrative complaint a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0251002 under the authority of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent's last license was issued as a real estate broker with the firm of Eastern Marketing, Inc. which is located at 17841 U.S. Highway 441, 3 Mount Dora, Florida 32757. RESPONDENT'S ROLE At the time of the hearing, Respondent had been involved in the real estate profession for approximately 18 years. This real estate practice has been exclusively in the state of Florida. In addition to being a real estate broker, Respondent is licensed as a general contractor in Florida and as a mortgage broker in the state. His general contractor's license is a certified license. At times relevant to this inquiry, Respondent was a real estate broker with Collins and Associates, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm. He also had affiliation with Collins Builders, Inc., a licensed general contracting firm. He was a one half owner in Tallahassee Properties, a Florida general partnership in which the other ownership was held by W. Ronnie Collins, Respondent's brother. All of these firms did business in Florida and particular as these firms are involved with the issues in dispute, they did business in Tallahassee, Florida. At times relevant to this inquiry, Respondent was involved in a sales promotion program which has been referred to as a trade-in program. In essence, this program was designed to allow persons who had purchased residences from a firm or through affiliated Collins companies to turn over the initial residence to Tallahassee Properties in exchange for a new home bought from Collins Builders, Inc. with the builder using the real estate services of Collins and Associates, Inc. to sell the new home. The house that was being traded was deeded to Respondent or one of the companies with which he was affiliated. In this case, the company with which Respondent was affiliated with which had property deeded to it was Ralco, Inc. Those persons who were trading one home for another had been solicited by Collins and Associates, Inc. as a realtor in an advertising program. No realtor was involved in making commissions associated with the closing that took place between the sellers who were trading in a home and Tallahassee Properties, Respondent and Ralco, Inc. with whom he was affiliated. This arrangement was designed to stimulate sales of the new home being purchased. The traded homes typically had mortgages. Tallahassee Properties not only took possession of the traded or exchanged homes but was responsible for the activities associated with the closing of the transaction, to include assumption and payment of mortgages associated with the exchanged property. As grantee on the deeds in the traded homes Respondent and Ralco, Inc. were also responsible for assumption and payments. As Respondent identified in his testimony, he and his brother W. Ronnie Collins; Collins and Associates, Inc.; Collins Builders, Inc. and Tallahassee Properties were anticipated as being the individuals to apply for the assumption of loans with the lending agencies who held the mortgages on the traded property. W. Ronnie Collins was also one of the names in the overall scheme in which the traded-in property could be placed as grantee. Approximately 80 homes were traded over a period of 6 or 7 years. The properties in dispute in this case were among them. Respondent had authorized Tallahassee Properties and in particular his brother W. Ronnie Collins as managing partner of that partnership, to place the properties in Respondent's name, W. Ronnie Collins' name or any of several companies affiliated with Respondent in furtherance of identifying a grantee that the mortgage holder would allow to assume the mortgage. Respondent's expectation was that Tallahassee Properties and the title company involved in the closing of the transaction associated with the traded property would facilitate the assumption arrangement with the mortgage holder. The title company used in the cases that are at issue here was Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. In the closings for the traded homes, which are at issue in this case, the evidence presented at hearing which may be relied upon for fact finding did not reveal what attempts were made to have the mortgage holders for the traded homes ultimately accept the substitution of Respondent, his brother or one of the companies with which he was affiliated as parties responsible for the existing mortgages on the traded properties. The reason which Respondent gave for allowing his brother, W. Ronnie Collins to act in his behalf in Tallahassee Properties was that he felt that it was impossible for him to involve himself in that business and its day to day process and at the same time be active in Collins and Associates, Inc. and Collins Builders, Inc. Therefore, he allowed W. Ronnie Collins to act for him in the business of Tallahassee Properties. This explanation has not been disputed and being tenable is credited as true. In accepting deeds related to the traded property, as will be described in the individual instances that follow, Respondent recognized that he had obligated himself to take the responsibility for assumption of and payment of the mortgage. Respondent has no direct knowledge of whether any of the trade-in transactions were followed up by gaining permission from the mortgage holder to allow someone other than the original mortgagor to become responsible for the mortgage payments. The contracts for obtaining the traded-in homes were executed by Tallahassee Properties. Nonetheless, as described, Respondent was given a deed to some of the properties purchased, to include properties in dispute here. Respondent never orally or in writing advised the sellers of the traded property that the routine mortgage payments associated with the traded property and the overall mortgage obligation would no longer be the responsibility of those sellers. In one of the cases which is at issue here involving the trade-in property of John M. and Jeanne B. Miller, Respondent stated that he received their traded property as grantee on the deed. In fact Ralco, Inc. was grantee. When asked about whether he had assumed the obligation for the mortgage that existed on that home, Respondent replied that he had assumed the loan. When asked if he explained the fact to that assumption to the Millers, he pointed out that he had never talked to the individuals. When asked if he had directed anyone in any of his companies or his real estate company in particular to explain the details of the transaction, Respondent pointed out that Collins and Associates, Inc. as realtor, and as a licensed broker had trained each associate to explain all of the rules and procedures associated with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA, VA and HUD loans and that Respondent as the broker of those associates would expect that the associates would explain everything to the Millers. Whether the Millers were informed about such matters by Collins and Associates, Inc. employees was not proven. The traded in properties were rented, repaired and sold or kept in inventory by Tallahassee Properties. After purchase of the traded-in properties, Respondent's expectations as a partner in Tallahassee Properties was that the partnership would take possession of the properties and manage them and make payments on existing mortgages associated with any of those properties. Respondent believes that until the latter part of 1985 when he and some of his operations were involved in a Chapter 11 Federal Bankruptcy declaration, payments on the existing mortgages for traded properties were being made, in that had it not been so that he would have been notified. The record offers no proof that can be relied upon to satisfactorily corroborate or rebut this assumption on his part. The Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding was not caused by problems associated with the traded properties. Ralco, Inc. was not involved in the bankruptcy. Some of the traded properties in question were owned by Ralco as grantee. Although Ralco was not involved in the bankruptcy, it was unable to make payments because of the bankruptcy in that the houses in question had a negative cash flow and Respondent was unable to take funds from the bankruptcy court and place them with Ralco, Inc. to make the payments on mortgages that existed on the traded properties. Collins Builders, Inc. and Collins and Associates, Inc. were not involved in the closings of the traded property. Their involvement was with the new house being purchased following the trade. The closing associated with the new house under purchase was a separate closing and Collins and Associates, Inc. received a real estate commission for its participation. None of the exact details of the solicitation process by Collins and Associates, Inc. in which homeowners were encouraged to trade existing residences on other homes built by Collins Builders, Inc. were made known, so that it might be understood whether Collins and Associates, Inc. promised to make the attempt to have the lender accept a substitute for the original mortgagor on the mortgage indebtedness, to include the possibility of the outright release of the original mortgages from the debt obligation. Therefore, that solicitation process has no part to play in examining the issue of Respondent's conduct associated with the closings of the traded homes. In the latter part of 1985, following the filing of the petition under Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Laws, Respondent and Duval First Corporation with which he was affiliated were granted an order of relief on December 23, 1985 in Case Nos. 85-07179B and 85-07178C, respectively in the United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division. As part of the disposition in front of the bankruptcy court, the bankrupt estates and Real Estate Financing, Inc. agreed that the bankruptcy estates would surrender certain properties and the automatic stay in all expressed injunctions associated with those properties were lifted. The bankruptcy court held that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 506, Real Estate Financing, Inc. would not be entitled to an unsecured claim against the bankrupt estates for debts secured by the lien on those properties. Those properties had been encumbered by a first mortgage in favor for Real Estate Financing, Inc. The Court found that the value of those properties was equal to or exceeded the debts secured by the mortgage lien of Real Estate Financing, Inc. as of the date of the Order for Relief. In that Order for Relief, Real Estate Financing, Inc. was allowed a secured claim for the full extent of the debt due as of the date of the Order for Relief plus interest accrued up to the extent of the value of each property and up to the date of November 18, 1986. The bankruptcy court did not hold that Real Estate Financing, Inc. was entitled to any unsecured claim for any pre-petition debt that was secured by the lien on its mortgages. Among the properties affected by this action were those properties of David Walsh, Troy Brewer, Sam Hinson, Harold C. Miller, Peter Hartman, and John Miller, all of whom are listed as individuals whose transactions with Respondent are found in the Administrative Complaint and about which Respondent is said to have violated the aforementioned disciplinary provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. By this arrangement in bankruptcy court, Respondent hoped to avoid the circumstance by which the mortgage was foreclosed leaving a deficiency against the original mortgagor/homeowner of the traded-in property which would in turn lead to some claim against the bankruptcy estates for the amount of the deficiency. Nonetheless, Real Estate Financing, Inc. proceeded to foreclose on its mortgages as subsequently discussed in commenting on the individual counts to the Administrative Complaint pertaining to individual homeowners. While the bankrupt estates would have preferred to deed back the property in lieu of foreclosure, it accepted the foreclosures given the protections to the bankrupt estates that have been identified in this discussion. It should also be mentioned that two of the accounts in the Administrative Complaint pertaining to Eric Larsen and Robert Aubin, to be discussed, were not part of this arrangement in the bankruptcy court associated with Real Estate Financing, Inc. At the closings on the traded homes in question some explanations about the mortgage assumptions were made by persons who may have been representing Tallahassee Properties or other Collins affiliates, but these persons are not clearly identified in the record as to their actual position with those organizations and how Respondent was accountable for their remarks. Those remarks will be discussed in the assessment of the individual counts that follow. Respondent, following the petition for bankruptcy in his own name and that of companies with which he was associated, wrote to advise homeowners who had traded in their homes about his perception of the homeowners' status following that bankruptcy. These letters were written on February 18, 1986 on stationary of the Respondent and were signed by him. In this correspondence, which is the same format in all instances, he would make reference to the date upon which the transaction closed at which time the homeowner deeded over the traded property to Respondent or a company with which he was affiliated. He described the existence of the prior mortgage to Real Estate Financing, Inc. with a loan number and the existence of the paragraph 17, "due on sale" clause and, according to the letter, that the loan was not paid off at the time of the closing and the assertion that the lender would not allow the assumption of that loan by Respondent or one of his companies. Again this record is silent on the subject of what attitude the lender held about this, or even the matter of whether an attempt was made to have the lender accept a new obligor. He described how the lender was not considering Respondent or his company as purchaser but that the original mortgagor was being considered. This was taken to mean that Respondent was trying to express that the lender was looking to the original mortgagor as a responsible entity on the mortgage. The letter described how Respondent or one of his companies had been renting and making payments since the time of closing until December 23, 1985 when declaration of the Petition in bankruptcy went forward. It described how the Respondent and his companies were unable to continue funding payments related to the mortgages on the traded property which was in the name of the homeowners who had traded the property. The letter went on to describe how the payments would be brought current until February 28, 1986. The letter is interpreted to suggest that beyond that point, the property would either be deeded back to the original owner or the lender would foreclose. The letter expressed a preference by Respondent that because, interpreting the letter again, there was no cash flow that he preferred to see the property deeded back to the original owner. The name Bobbie May was given as a contact person and a telephone number provided for the homeowners to call regarding the return of the property back to the original homeowner. The letter goes on to describe an apology from Respondent to the homeowners. Movaline Hill who was a property manager for Tallahassee Properties traded in homes, to include the homes in discussion in the Administrative Complaint, offered her testimony at hearing. The principal business of Tallahassee Properties as established in her testimony was to rent homes. Ms. Hill advertised the property for rent, collected the rent, made payments on existing mortgages on the homes, and took care of maintenance matters. Tallahassee Properties took the rent and put the payments in escrow. One of the homes that Ms. Hill was involved with had belonged to David Walsh. It was a traded home and she had discussed with Walsh getting payment cards or coupons for the mortgage that existed on the traded home. The mortgage company had sent these cards or coupons to Walsh and Hill desired to have them so that the payments on the mortgage could be made. In this connection, Hill wrote Walsh a letter. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 20. It indicates enclosure of a recorded deed on the traded property of Mr. Walsh showing Respondent as having the title in his name. It further states that Mr. Walsh should sign and mail a pre-prepared letter to Real Estate Financing, Inc. telling that lender to change the mailing address and requesting new payment cards. The letter describes that Real Estate Financing, Inc. did not know that the title was no longer in Mr. Walsh's name and that the lender would not transfer the mortgage to anyone and asks Walsh not to send the copy of the deed to the Respondent to the lender. Emphasis is placed in this correspondence on not sending that information to the lender. Ms. Hill was not instructed by anyone to write the letter. The reason why Ms. Hill said that she put an indication in the letter that the transfer of the mortgage could not be done was based upon her assertion that she had been told this by the lender. What connection Respondent had with the letter, if any, was not established. The cards that she received from Mr. Walsh on coupons for payments would have his name struck over and Respondent's name placed on it and Hill would send the check to the mortgage company for payment of the mortgage. With Real Estate Financing, Inc., Ms. Hill was sending one or two checks per month that dealt with 15 or 20 mortgages. There would be a lump sum payment with account numbers and backup materials sent with the check. The backup materials would include the payment cards or coupons. During Ms. Hill's tenure with the Tallahassee Properties, she says that she kept the mortgage payments current. No evidence was presented to the contrary which is competent. From this it is found that mortgage payments were kept current for a period of time which is not specifically shown. She received no contact from the mortgage companies on the topic of any assumption packages for these loans being assumed. She did receive some coupon books with the Respondent's name affixed. Those latter circumstances were not shown to be associated with any of the traded properties that are at issue in this case. Charles O. Middleton testified at the hearing. He had worked in 1981, 1982 and up to September, 1983, with Capitol Abstract and Title, Inc. which served as a closing agent on traded properties that were picked up by Tallahassee Properties. His recollection of the events is that, as closing agent for the title company, he worked from a contract which identified the terms of the transaction. His recollection is that the transactions associated with a trade property and the new home being purchased after trade was handled together. This is in contrast to the understanding of those homeowners whose traded properties are the subject of this Administrative Complaint and Respondent. The explanation by those homeowners and Respondent that two separate closings were held, one for the traded property and one for the newly purchased property is accepted as factually correct. Middleton recalls that explanations were given by him as closing agent concerning the nature of the transaction to include the matters of the paragraph 17 "due on sale" clause. He describes this arrangement as involving an affidavit or hold harmless agreement that had to be signed. This included the initialing of the paragraphs within that agreement by the buyer and the seller. Again, none of the homeowners who sold traded property that is described in the Administrative Complaint recalls such explanations and documents and their recollection is deemed more creditable and is accepted in lieu of the comments by Mr. Middleton. Likewise, the document for purposes of explanation which was offered as Respondent's Exhibit 8 containing disclaimers about the paragraph 17, "due on sale" clause, while admitted, offers no insight into the nature of what the homeowners were told in the cases that are at issue here because it isn't the same form that Middleton recalls using in the transactions he participated in as closing agent and hasn't been shown to be a form used in any of the cases here. Middleton explained that in the transactions he was involved in, the homeowners were provided a copy of every document to be utilized in the closing and that the original documents had their pages turned while the copies for the homeowners were being examined at the same time. A brief explanation would be given about each document and the homeowners were asked if they wished to take some time to read the documents and to ask any questions. Middleton as closing agent would offer to answer questions or put them in touch with the lender and let the lender answer questions. In Middleton's estimation, it was the closing agent's responsibility to make sure that necessary documents were presented to the lenders in the assumption of the mortgage for the traded in property. Respondent had not instructed Middleton in any of the closings on the topic of what to do with closing documents that were used at the time of transaction. Middleton said that he was unable to produce any of the documents of explanation concerning the closings which he participated in for Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. because he has no access to those files. Middleton identified the fact that in a circumstance in which a home had a mortgage and an assumption was called for, an assumption packet would be customarily ordered at the time of the request for assistance in the closing, which he refers to as an order. Middleton identifies the fact that he is only vaguely familiar with the transactions that are at issue in this Administrative Complaint. He thinks he may have closed some of them but he has no specific recollection about that. As a consequence, he has no worthwhile knowledge of how many of those transactions had assumption packages completed. COUNT I Samuel Hinson, Jr. owned property in Arbor Hills which he had bought from Collins Builders, Inc. on June 30, 1982. This house was taken in trade for a house on Starmount. This Starmount home was also purchased from Collins Builders, Inc. and Collins and Associates, Inc. served as the real estate firm for the purchase of the new home as agent for the seller. Andrew Jackson Federal Savings financed the new purchase. The traded in home was sold to Tallahassee Properties with Capital Abstract and Title, Inc., serving as closing agent according to documents presented at hearing. Mr. Middleton did not appear for Capital Abstract at that closing. In the purchaser's closing statement, W. Ronnie Collins is shown as the representative for Tallahassee Properties. Two warranty deeds were made from Hinson in selling his Arbor Hill property. In deeding his Arbor Hill property on May 20, 1983, one of those went to the Respondent and the other to Tallahassee Properties. In both warranty deeds, the grantee promised to assume and pay an existing mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. The existing mortgage on the Arbor Hills property had the paragraph 17 clause which absent certain exceptions allowed Real Estate Financing, Inc. at its option to declare all sums secured by the mortgage to be immediately due and payable, if the property was sold or transferred without prior written consent from the lender. None of the exceptions pertained to this transaction between Hinson and either Respondent or Tallahassee Properties. The paragraph 17 clause also stated that the mortgage holder was considered to have waived its option to accelerate if prior to the sale or transfer, the mortgage holder reached agreement with the purchaser in writing that the credit of the purchaser was satisfactory to the mortgage holder, thus allowing the purchaser to become responsible for the mortgage. In that instance, interest payable on the sum secured by the mortgage would be at the rate requested by the mortgage holder. The mortgagor, Hinson, would be released from all obligations under the mortgage note if the purchaser was substituted on prior written approval. Hinson went into the transactions involving the sale of his Arbor Hill house and the purchase of the Starmount house with the impression that he had to sell the Arbor Hill house in order to purchase the Starmount house. This was his surmise. Money realized in the sale of the Arbor Hill house was used as a down payment for the Starmount home. Petitioner believed that he had an arrangement to purchase the Starmount home with Ralph Collins. In reality, he was purchasing the home from Collins Builders, Inc. with Collins and Associates, Inc. being the seller's broker. In Mr. Hinson's mind, Respondent and Collins Brothers, Inc. and the then Collins real estate firm through Century 21 were all the same. Going into the transaction, Hinson was not familiar with Tallahassee Properties and its business purpose. Respondent was at both closings, the closing to sell the Arbor Hill house and the closing to purchase the Starmount home. No one discussed the matter of the assumption of the mortgage associated with the Arbor Hills house during the course of the closing of that home. Hinson got the impression from events that Respondent had bought his Arbor Hills house and that everything was being paid off. This impression was not based upon anything Respondent said to him. Hinson, after the closings, requested his insurance company to write to First Alabama concerning the cancellation of his homeowners policy on Arbor Hills. His understanding was that the insurance company sent a letter to do this and that First Alabama sent back a letter saying that they needed certain information. That latter correspondence was then taken to the Respondent. Respondent, under those circumstances, stated to Hinson that it was a mistake and that he would handle it, but that it would take some time to get some of the paper work done. Respondent did not comment to Mr. Hinson on that occasion that he had not assumed the mortgage for the Arbor Hill property nor did he indicate that none of the companies with which he was affiliated had assumed the mortgage. Respondent made no comment whatsoever about assumption of the mortgage in this conversation shown by facts presented at hearing. Hinson then got a new payment book from First Alabama, which he received a couple of days after the insurance letter. This was taken to Respondent and Respondent said that he would take care of it, that it was just a mistake. Again, what was meant by this remark was not developed at hearing. Hinson got one of the February 18, 1986 letters from Respondent that has been referred to previously. Having received this correspondence, Hinson complained to the Tallahassee Board of Realtors. Out of the process of his complaint, Hinson met with Keith Kinderman, Respondent's counsel and the Respondent together with Eric Hoffman, counsel to Hinson. Respondent told Hinson he would help get information and that his counsel, Mr. Kinderman would help in getting some form of restitution and help clear Hinson's name and seek relief from the Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. who had closed the Arbor Hill home. In attempting to obtain a Visa credit card and a Sears credit card, Hinson has been denied that credit. The reason given for the denial is the circumstance associated with the Arbor Hills home and non-payment of the mortgage. The exact circumstance of the Arbor Hills property, concerning who holds it now was not proven at hearing by evidence that can be relied upon for fact finding. COUNT II David P. Walsh and Leila DeJarnette Walsh, his wife bought a home in Huntington Woods from Collins Builders, Inc. on December 23, 1981. This home was financed through Real Estate Financing, Inc. and carried a mortgage from that lender. The mortgage included a paragraph 17 whose language was the same as the Hinson home financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. The Walshes traded in the Huntington Woods property for a home on Faversham Drive which was financed by Citizens and Southern Mortgage Company. Separate closings were conducted. One was for the sale of the Huntington Woods property with Respondent receiving a warranty deed for that property which property was to be taken over by Tallahassee Properties. The second closing was associated with the sale of the Faversham Drive property from Collins Builders, Inc. to the Walshes. In executing the warranty deed in favor of Respondent as grantee pertaining to the Huntington Woods property, a condition of the warranty deed was an agreement by the grantee to assume the mortgage held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. and pay Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. through some person other than Middleton was the closing agent at the transaction involving the sale of the Huntington Woods property, according to documents at the hearing. Both that sale and the purchase of the Faversham Drive property took place on March 30, 1983. The Walshes signed a document reference the escrow account held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. on its Huntington Woods property. There is no indication whether this was or was not signed by Tallahassee Properties or the Respondent and sent to the Real Estate Financing, Inc. pertaining to funds in the escrow account and insurance coverage being transferred from the Walshes to Tallahassee Properties or Respondent as contemplated by the form. The separate closing associated with the Faversham Drive property was done through Tallahassee Title Company. Respondent was at the closing associated with the homes. Mr. Walsh is not in a position to pay for mortgages on two homes. Mr. Walsh's understanding of the trade in of his Huntington Woods home for the Faversham Drive home was to the effect that he could buy a new home from the transaction and that he would no longer be liable for the traded home, that all paperwork would be taken care of. Some salesman involved in these transactions made these remarks to Mr. Walsh; however, he doesn't know who that person was. Consequently, it is not possible to attribute responsibility for those remarks to Respondent. Subsequent to the closings, the Walshes received correspondence purportedly from First Alabama having to do with Real Estate Financing, Inc.'s mortgage held on the Huntington Woods' property. This correspondence of April 4, 1983, by its terms, reminds the Walshes that the mortgage holder has received notification of cancellation of the homeowner's policy and that the Walshes were to provide insurance coverage at all times. What the real circumstances of the homeowners policy was is not proven by competent evidence. In connection with the transactions, Mr. Walsh describes that he felt that he was dealing with a reputable real estate broker and that they had his best interest in mind. He was not represented by counsel at the closings. Mr. Walsh received one of the February 18, 1986 letters from Respondent as previously described. Mr. Walsh hired a lawyer to try to address the situation of the Huntington Woods property without success in the endeavor. To his knowledge the Huntington Woods property has been foreclosed on. No proof which is competent has been presented in the hearing to describe the exact nature of the developments with the property. Nonetheless, Mr. Walsh has had problems receiving credit twice since that time. Before the situation with the property he had never had credit problems. Mr. Walsh was proceeding in these transactions on the basis on the belief that Tallahassee Properties and the Respondent were the same entities. COUNT III Troy A. Brewer and Tina J. Brewer, his wife purchased a home from Collins Builders, Inc. in Huntington Woods on December 30, 1981. This home was financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. A mortgage was given by the Brewers in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. and it included a paragraph 17 assumption clause as described in the Hinson mortgage financed by that lender. On March 25, 1983, the Brewers traded their Huntington Woods property for a home on Faringdon Drive. The seller of the Faringdon Drive property was Collins Builders, Inc. In these transactions, the Huntington Woods property was deeded to Respondent with the provisor in the warranty deed that Respondent would assume and agree to pay for the mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. Mr. Brewer is not in a position to meet mortgage payments associated with two mortgages; one on the Huntington Woods property and one on the Faringdon Drive property. Therefore, he would not knowingly obligate himself to assume mortgages associated with both of those properties. In the transactions associated with the traded property and new home purchased, Mr. Brewer proceeded on the basis that the first home was being taken over by the Respondent and that the mortgage would be paid off after a month or so as a means for him to purchase the second home. What led him to believe this is not clear. Mr. Brewer's recollection is that he was told that everything would be taken care of and he would not have to worry about anything and there wouldn't be any problems about the house being traded and that he could stay in the home that he was selling until the new home had been built and that once built, all transactions would be taken care of. Both the traded property and the property being purchased were financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. He was not represented by an attorney in these matters. Some undisclosed realtor had told Mr. Brewer he could have an attorney but that he really didn't need one. As shown in the testimony of Mr. Brewer given at hearing, he had spoken to Respondent at closing. He also had conversations with Jackie Collins whom he believed to be a representative of Respondent. Jackie Collins was understood by Mr. Brewer to be a realtor. Again, the exact nature of the affiliation of Jackie Collins to the Respondent or his companies was not established in this hearing. Mr. Brewer did state that at the closing he was told by Respondent that there would be no problems. The nature of that remark was not further developed under interrogation of the witness. Nor was the matter of Mr. Brewer's comment to the effect that he had questioned the fact that his first mortgage on the Huntington Woods home was not assumable and had made that question known at the closing, other than to state that in response "they" had assured him everything would be taken care of and he wouldn't have to worry about it. This was associated with some remarks to the effect that Mr. Brewer should not worry that "we" would take it all in and that "they" would transfer everything over and take it out of the Brewers' name, again not pursued as to who "they" and "we" were and whether Respondent was a "they" or "we" or was in attendance when a "they" or "we" made the comments if he was not a "they" or "we." On this subject, Mr. Brewer was of the understanding that the transfer of the mortgage from Mr. Brewer to Respondent had in fact been tentatively approved by Real Estate Financing, Inc. but this was not proven by competent proof either. Mr. Brewer received one of the February 8, 1986 letters from Respondent as previously described. He in turn composed a letter of complaint concerning the transactions associated with the traded property. The complaint is dated March 31, 1986 and is addressed "To whom it may concern". As a result of the non-payment of the Huntington Woods property, Mr. Brewer received a letter purportedly from First Alabama for Real Estate Financing, Inc. dated February 13, 1986 that indicated that payment for the mortgage in the Brewer property had not been paid in January and February, 1986 and under paragraph 18 of the mortgage, Mr. Brewer was being notified of the failure to make payments and the possibility of the pursuit of these delinquent payments through legal means. Whether the assertions in this unauthenticated hearsay document are true was not proven by competent evidence. Beyond that date, in an action in which Respondent and the Brewers were named as defendants, Federal National Mortgage Association by and through its agent Real Estate Financing, Inc. obtained a Summary Final Judgment of foreclosure on the Huntington Woods property on June 1, 1988. This points out that the Brewers were not released from the mortgage obligation as envisioned by paragraph 17. It does not address what attempts were made by Respondent or his companies to gain their release. As a result of the foreclosure, Mr. Brewer has had problems with his credit. Notwithstanding the foreclosure on the Huntington Woods property, there has been no deficiency judgment entered against Mr. Brewer, to his knowledge. COUNT V On November 30, 1983, Collins Company of Pensacola, Inc. conveyed property at Eldorado Drive in Pensacola, Florida to Harold C. Miller, Jr., a Collins employee. That property was subject to a mortgage from Real Estate Financing, Inc. which included a paragraph 17 as included in the facts pertaining to the Hinson transaction involving that lender. This house was purchased because of a transfer of Mr. Miller to Pensacola as a condition of his employment with the Collins Company. The Collins Company of Pensacola was responsible for paying the mortgages during that time frame. In conversation with Respondent, it was determined that Miller would buy the house and the Respondent would buy it back and in the interim, Mr. Miller would live rent free. On May 23, 1985, a quit claim deed was executed by Mr. Miller in favor of the Respondent returning possession of the Pensacola home. Because Respondent had told Mr. Miller that Respondent would make payments on this home, Mr. Miller did not make any payments. Mr. Miller speaks of a contract that was in writing and was involved in the closing on the Pensacola home when it was purchased and that there was a promise to assume the mortgage held by Real Estate Finance, Inc. This comment is made in a deposition of Mr. Miller which was entered as Exhibit 71 by the Petitioner. Whether this refers to an assumption by the Respondent or someone else is not clear. As pointed out by the deposition testimony, more importantly, this contract was not produced then and is not available now for consideration in the deliberation of this case. Mr. Miller bought another house from Collins Construction in Leon County which is at Foxcroft. At the time of the deposition it was occupied by Susan, Mr. Miller's wife. Real Estate Financing, Inc. sued the Respondent and Harold C. Miller, Jr. and Susan F. Miller, his wife, in a foreclosure associated with the Pensacola property and received a Final Judgement for foreclosure on May 11, 1988. This points out that the Millers were not released from the mortgage obligation. By the circumstances, Mr. Miller was persuaded that the Respondent would take care of the mortgage on the Pensacola home until it was paid off. What the payment history was on the mortgage prior to foreclosure has not been established in this record. In terms of any promises from Respondent about further obligations on the mortgage on the Pensacola home, Mr. Miller describes that Respondent never told him that he was relieved of that obligation or that he wasn't. Mr. Miller did not question the Respondent about this because he trusted him. COUNT VI On September 25, 1981, Collins Builders, Inc. sold a home to Peter A. Hartmann at Grantham Lane in Tallahassee, Florida. Mr. Hartmann borrowed money from Real Estate Financing, Inc. to purchase that home secured by a mortgage that included paragraph 17 the language of which is the same as in the Hinson transaction with Real Estate Financing, Inc. That property was subsequently deeded to Respondent on March 25, 1983. In the deed Respondent as grantee promises to assume and pay the Real Estate Financing, Inc. mortgage on the property. The Hartmann property upon which Real Estate Financing, Inc. held a mortgage was foreclosed upon in a suit by Federal National Mortgage Association by and through its agent Real Estate Financing, Inc. against Respondent and in Peter A. Hartmann. Action was taken by order of court on May 3, 1988 and the property sold on May 27, 1988 as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale from the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Second Judicial Court in and for Leon County, Florida. This points out that Mr. Hartmann was not released form the mortgage obligation. There is a potential for a deficiency judgement against Mr. Hartmann following that sale. The details of the Hartmann transaction were not presented at hearing through his testimony or anyone else. COUNT VII On April 22, 1982, Collins Builders, Inc., sold John A. Miller and Jeanne B. Miller, his wife, a home in Lakewood Estates. That home was secured by a mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. It contained a paragraph 17 which had the language set out in the Hinson transaction with Real Estate Financing, Inc. which has been described. The home at Lakewood Estates was traded for a home in Huntington Woods II. Those transactions took place on March 2, 1984, and on that date the Millers executed a deed to Ralco, Inc., one of Respondent's companies. The warranty deed contained language to the effect that Ralco, Inc. promised to pay on the mortgage held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. Bobbie G. May signed the contract for sales and purchase as representative of Ralco, Inc. The Huntington Woods II property that was bought by the Millers was bought from Collins Builders, Inc. with Bobbie G. May serving as representative for Collins Builders, Inc. in the contract for sale and purchase. The payments were not made as promised by Ralco, Inc. and Respondent sent the Millers one of the February 18, 1986 letters as previously described. Ultimately, Florida National Mortgage Association through Real Estate Financing, Inc. sued Ralco, Inc. and the Millers in foreclosure and obtained a summary Final Judgement of Foreclosure against those defendants. This points out that the Millers were not released from the mortgage obligation. This as with other foreclosures does not speak to attempts by Ralco, Inc. to be allowed to assume the mortgages in a novation. The property at Lakewood Estates which had been traded in was then sold June 28, 1988, as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale from the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida. That judgment against the Millers is shown on the credit report of John Henry Miller. Mrs. Miller understood that the mortgage payments on the traded home would be made until the property was sold by Ralco, Inc. Visits to the neighborhood where that traded home was found did not indicate any activities toward the sale by way of for sale signs. No one was living in the traded home at that time. The Millers were not represented by counsel during the course of the closings associated with the two homes. They were represented in the foreclosures suit. In reference to the credit circumstance of the Millers, in trying to buy a vehicle they had been denied credit once. They were eventually able to buy the vehicle. The Millers had been told when purchasing the initial home at Lakewood Estates that the reason for buying it would be the possibility of being able to trade for a larger home at some later date if needed. Again, it is not clear who made those statements to the Millers. On the day before the closing of the traded home, Mrs. Miller spoke with Sissie Collins whom she understood to be affiliated with Respondent or one of his companies. The record does not show what that affiliation would have been, if anything. In this conversation with Sissie Collins, Mrs. Miller pointed out to Ms. Collins that the loan with Real Estate Financing, Inc. was not assumable without qualifying. Moreover, Mrs. Miller believed that Respondent did not qualify for the loan and that it was not assumable unless he did. Sissie Collins stated that this was not a problem and that Real Estate Financing, Inc. or First Alabama allowed Respondent to assume a mortgage and make the payments until the property was sold and the mortgage was paid off and that Real Estate Financing, Inc. was fully aware of the circumstance. Whether this was true or not was not proven by competent evidence. What Respondent knew about these matters wasn't shown either. At the time of hearing, the Millers had not been called upon to pay any deficiencies associated with the foreclosure of their Lakewood Estates property. COUNT VIII Eric R. Larsen and Young Oak Larsen, his wife, purchased a home from a Collins Company in Huntington Woods Unit II. That house was eventually traded for a home in Cross Creek. The traded home was deeded to Respondent with the promise that Respondent would assume an existing mortgage on the Huntington Woods Unit II property which is owed to Andrew Jackson State Savings and Loan Association and make payments. The closing associated with the traded property took place on December 2, 1982. The new home was being purchased through the same lending institution as the traded home. The Larsens were not represented in the closings associated with the traded home and the purchased home. The closing of the traded home took place in offices of the Respondent's business. The second closing for the purchased home took place at the Andrew Jackson Federal Savings. When Mr. Larsen asked why the deed for his Huntington Woods II property was being made to the Respondent, he was told that it was to facilitate the assumption of the mortgage. By his remarks, Mr. Larsen is not clear on whether the Respondent attended the closing associated with the traded property. He does recall someone whose name is Chip who he thought was the real estate broker who worked with Respondent was at the closing. No further indication of who this man named Chip might be as to association with Respondent or his companies was shown in this record. The Larsens received a February 18, 1986 letter from Respondent as previously described, when the problems occurred about payments for the traded property, and at that time the mortgage was shown as being held by Colonial Mortgage Company. Mr. Larsen also received a letter on April 8, 1987, purportedly from Colonial Mortgage Company, which states that Mr. Larsen is not released from liability on the traded property and some comment about assumption packages having been sent on various dates and reminds Mr. Larsen that the loan could not be assumed without the prospective purchaser's credit having been approved. The letter describes other perceptions about the ability of the Respondent to take over responsibility for the mortgage on the traded property. All of the matters set out in this unauthenticated correspondence are hearsay and they cannot form the basis of fact-finding in terms of whether Respondent or his companies were ever allowed to assume the mortgage on the traded property. People who had a direct knowledge of the mortgage circumstance with Colonial Mortgage Company pertaining to this traded property as with other traded property on which a lender held mortgages and sent letters have not been presented to explain that circumstance by competent evidence. Likewise, the outcome of what has happened with the traded property in the Larsen transaction has not been proven by competent evidence. The explanation of the outcome with that property is hearsay which may not be used as a basis for fact finding. COUNT IX Robert R. and Patricia A. Aubin, husband and wife, traded property under the program which Respondent was affiliated with for taking in one residence and selling another. Mr. Aubin thought that this kind of transaction was common and that led to his telling his financing institution that the same builder was taking back the original home in order to build Mr. Aubin another house, thinking that this might simplify the transaction. In speaking to someone about the obligation to deal with the existing mortgage on the traded property, he identifies the person he was talking to as Ed Hines. Again, it is not clear what Mr. Hines' association was with the Respondent and his companies. The traded home was going to be given to Tallahassee Properties. Mr. Aubin was not certain of the arrangement Respondent had with his individual companies. Ultimately, there was a problem with the payments on the house that had been traded in. Respondent wrote the Aubins one of the February 18, 1986 letters reference the property at Huntington Woods Unit I. An arrangement was being made whereby Real Estate Financing, Inc. received $3,704.48 from Ralco, Inc. by a check of June 26, 1986. That check was issued after Ralco, Inc. conveyed the traded property back to the Aubins on June 17, 1986 and this resolved the problem for the Aubins.
Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of October, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-3850 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed fact-finding offered by the parties. PETITIONER'S FACTS Paragraph 1 is utilized. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. 4-5. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are set out in the findings of fact. 6-10. Paragraphs 6-10 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 11 has not been proven. Paragraph 12 is correct in terms of Hinson's decision to convey the property; however, what Hinson was allowed to believe concerning the matter of assumption as it might show culpability on the part of the Respondent has not been proven. This matter set forth in paragraph 13 has not been proven. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 15 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 16 has not been proven as to any financial losses due to dishonest acts or false promises of the Respondent. Hinson was found to have been denied credit cards. The latter sentence in paragraph 16 is speculation and not fact. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 18 in the suggestion that the Respondent through his real estate office and salesmen made representations and promises to the Walshes was not proven in the sense that persons involved with the Walshes and the transaction to trade in the home were not sufficiently identified to understand how those persons were affiliated with the Respondent. Paragraph 19 is accepted as to the documents and promises by the Respondent. Again, what the association was of the other person identified as the salesman may have been is not clear in this transaction. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 21 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 22 is not proven in the first sentence. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 23 was not proven. Paragraph 24 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 25 is subordinate to facts found except in its suggestion that the Walshes had been deceived in the sense of the idea of the mortgage not having been assumed or attempts made to have it assumed. Paragraph 26 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to facts found except as it identifies the nature of the salesperson and what the affiliation was with Collins and Associates insufficient proof was made to show the true nature of the position of the salesperson in Collins and Associates, Inc., if any, and what Respondent had in mind and any instructions to this person who was reportedly the salesperson. Paragraph 29 is subordinate to facts found as to promises in the document system responsibilities of Respondent. Otherwise it is not accepted. Paragraph 30 is subordinate to facts found except as to its suggestion that deceit has been proven relating to the Respondent's attempts to have the mortgage assumed. Paragraph 31 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 34 is subordinate to facts found except as to the suggestion that this problem of the foreclosure dissolved the marriage. Paragraph 35 in its first sentence is contrary to the Impression of the facts. There was a discussion and a decision reached to buy the house, whether Respondent was acting as a real estate broker individually or as a builder developer is unclear. Whether he made his employee buy the house or directed him to is not accepted as a fact. Paragraph 36 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 37 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 38 was not proven on the issue of whether Respondent applied for an assumption. The Final Judgment of closure was proven. Paragraph 39 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found in a suggestion of an agreement to take over the Huntington Woods property. Reference to the allegations and the foreclosure petition are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute and do not constitute an explanation of how Respondent may have carried out his promise to take over responsibilities for the mortgage and the traded property which is the true issue. Likewise, paragraph 42 where it is acknowledged in that suit the agreement to assume the mortgage does not answer the issue of whether attempts were made to bring about that assumption. Paragraph 43 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 44 and its suggestion as to any intended action on the part of a mortgage insurer has not been proven by competent evidence. Paragraph 45 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 47 in the suggestion of activities by a salesperson of Collins and Associates has not been shown in terms of the affiliation with the Respondent's companies or with the Respondent in terms of the details of that affiliation sufficient to show that Respondent is culpable for any acts of his employees. Respondent through Ralco, Inc. had agreed to assume and pay for the existing mortgage on the traded property. Paragraph 48 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 49 is subordinate to facts found. Suggestion by counsel that Respondent's admission of 86 coincide with the fact finding in paragraph 50 is erroneous as is reference to page 11 in the transcript which speaks of the admissions. Paragraph 51 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 52 is subordinate to the facts found with the exception that the Respondent was not shown to have been deceitful in saying that the mortgage had not been allowed for assumption in that no competent proof was offered as to the attitude of the lender concerning the assumption. Paragraph 53 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 54 is correct in terms of the credit report on foreclosure, otherwise it is rejected as heresay. Paragraph 55 is inaccurate when it suggests that proof was made that Respondent did not take care of the assumption in the Larsen trade-in property. Paragraph 56 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 57 constitutes legal argument. RESPONDENT'S FACTS 1-7. Paragraphs 1-7 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence of Paragraph 8 is contrary to facts found. The remaining sentences within paragraph 8 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 9 is subordinate to facts found. In paragraph 10, Charles Middleton was not shown to have been the closing agent for Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. in the transactions which are at issue here. In paragraph 11, Respondent was responsible for applying for the mortgage assumptions but the proof was not made that he did not do so or that he did. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 13 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 14 is hearsay and may not form the basis of the fact finding. Paragraph 15 is hearsay and may not form the basis of the fact finding. Paragraph 16 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 18 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 19 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 20 is not accepted. Paragraph 21 is not accepted. Paragraph 22 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 23 is not relevant. Paragraph 24 is the reputation of the Respondent is only relevant if culpability has been shown. It has not been. 25. Paragraph 25 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 26 is not accepted in terms of what position Chip Miller held and what capacity he was acting in when involved in the Hinson transaction as employee of Collins and Associates, or Tallahassee Properties or exactly what capacity. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 29 is heresay and not accepted. Paragraph 30 is contrary to the impression of the credit circumstance of Mr. Hinson. Whatever the current credit report may say, Mr. Hinson's credit had been hurt. Paragraph 31 is true. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to the facts found except for deprivation of credit. Paragraph 33 is not necessary to the resolution of dispute. Paragraph 34 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 35 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 36 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 37 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 38 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 39 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found, except as to credit. Paragraph 42 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 43 is subordinate to facts found, except in its suggestion of what capacity Sissie Collins really served which is not established. Paragraph 44 is subordinate to facts found, except not proven that mortgage assumption tentatively approved. He did make representations as the mortgage grantee. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 47 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 48 is contrary to facts found. There is no paragraph 49. Paragraph 50 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 51 is subordinate to the facts found, except as to credit. Paragraph 52 is subordinate to the facts found. 53.-55. Paragraphs 53-55 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 56 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 57 is subordinate. Paragraph 58 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 59 is subordinate to the facts found. 60.-62 Paragraphs 60-62 are subordinate to the facts found. 63.-64. Paragraphs 63-64 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 65 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 66 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 67 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 68 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 69 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 70 is subordinate to the facts found. 71.-72. Paragraphs 71-72 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 73 in the first sentence is subordinate to the facts found. The second sentence has to do with whether Andrew Jackson gave preliminary approval for the assumption of the mortgage on the traded property and is heresay not accepted. Paragraph 74 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 75 is subordinate to the facts found. 76.-77. Paragraphs 76 and 77 are accepted as true but are not needed. 78.-79. Paragraphs 78-79 are subordinate to the facts found. 80. In this instance and all that have discussed before, Respondent did make representations through the February 18, 1986 letters. 81-82. Paragraphs 81-82 are subordinate to facts found. 83. Paragraph 83 is subordinate to facts found. 84.-85. Paragraphs 84-85 are subordinate to facts found. Suggestion that the paragraph 86 relates back to initial paragraphs is acknowledged and accepted in the manner that has been described in the discussion at the paragraphs set forth in the proposed fact finding. Paragraph 87 is legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 James H. Gillis, Esquire DPR-Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32817 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Eaton, Davis, Marks, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Keith Kinderman, Esquire 906 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a real estate broker should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been a licensed real estate sales associate since 2000. His license number is 693538. Most of Petitioner’s work in the real estate industry has involved business transactions, but he has also handled transactions involving residential properties. On August 23, 2004, Petitioner filed an application for licensure as a real estate broker. Petitioner disclosed in the application that, in July 2003, his sales associate license was suspended by the Commission for 30 days and that he was placed on probation for a period of six months. That disciplinary action was based upon a single incident that occurred on or about November 7, 2001. Petitioner agreed to the disciplinary action as part of a “Stipulation” to resolve an Administrative Complaint charging him with fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), and with having operated as a broker without a license in violation of Sections 475.42(1)(a) and 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2001). The Administrative Complaint contained the following “essential allegations of material fact,” which were admitted by Petitioner as part of the Stipulation: On or about November 7, 2001, Respondent, a seller’s agent, facilitated a purchase and sale transaction between Buyer and Seller. On or about November 7, 2001, [Petitioner] was not registered with a broker.[1] The transaction referenced above failed to close. Buyer released a $1,000.00 payment to Seller. [Petitioner] submitted the $1,000.00 payment to Seller. [Petitioner] instructed [Seller] to execute a check in the amount of $500.00 payable to “Cash.”[2] [Petitioner] accepted the $500.00 payment as his own payment for services. The Final Order adopting the Stipulation was filed with the agency clerk on June 25, 2003. Petitioner’s suspension commenced on July 25, 2003, which is “thirty days from the date of filing of the Final Order.” The suspension ended 30 days later, on August 24, 2003. Petitioner’s probation ran “for a period of six (6) months from the Effective Date [of the Stipulation],” which was defined as the date that the Final Order was filed with the agency clerk. As a result, the probation period ran from June 25, 2003, to December 25, 2003. Petitioner was required to complete a three-hour ethics course and a four-hour escrow management course during the probation period, which he did. Petitioner has not been subject to any other disciplinary action. Petitioner has taken several continuing education courses in addition to those required as part of his probation. He is working towards certification by the Graduate Realtor Institute. Petitioner has taken the classes necessary to become a real estate broker, and he passed the broker examination. Petitioner has worked for broker Phillip Wetter since March 2005. Petitioner manages the day-to-day operation of Mr. Wetter’s brokerage firm. His responsibilities include preparing listings, negotiating contracts, and handling escrow funds. He has been involved in over 50 successful real estate transactions under Mr. Wetter’s supervision. According to Mr. Wetter, Petitioner is meticulous in his work, including his handling of escrow funds, and he always makes sure that he “dots all his ‘I’s’ and crosses all his ‘T’s’.” Petitioner acknowledged in his testimony before the Commission and at the final hearing that what he did in November 2001 was wrong. He credibly testified that he has learned from his mistake. In his testimony before the Commission and at the final hearing, Mr. Wetter attested to Petitioner’s honesty, ethics, good moral character, as well as his qualifications to be a broker. That testimony was unrebutted and is corroborated by the letters of support from Petitioner’s former clients that are contained in his application file, Exhibit R1. Mr. Wetter’s opinions regarding Petitioner’s fitness for licensure as a real estate broker are given great weight. Those opinions are based not only on his personal observations as Petitioner’s current qualifying broker, but also on his personal experience with Petitioner representing him in several business transactions while Petitioner was working for other brokers.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order approving Petitioner’s application for licensure as a real estate broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. During times material herein, Respondent, George May, was a licensed real estate broker (License No. 00056693) whose principal business address is 2300 West Oakland Park Boulevard, Suite 202, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311. On April 24, 1980, George Aro, a licensed real estate salesman, was employed by Respondent and entered into an employment agreement whereby salesman Aro, while acting in his capacity as a real estate salesman, would receive a sixty percent (60 percent) share of commission fees paid when salesman Aro was the procuring cause of a realty transaction which resulted in the payment of a commission. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 1). On August 29, 1980, salesman Aro discussed, negotiated, and obtained a contract for purchase whereby Peter Licato agreed to purchase a vacant lot in Palm Beach County, Florida. The transaction closed during September, 1980, with Respondent receiving a commission of approximately $300.00 on the Licato transaction. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 2). Pursuant to the employment agreement entered between Respondent and salesman Aro, Messr. Aro demanded his pro-rata share of the commission paid, which was received by Respondent. Respondent refuses to account for, or otherwise deliver to salesman Aro any portion of the commission received from the Licato transaction. On August 9, 1980, salesman Aro, while acting in his capacity as salesman with Respondent, negotiated and obtained a contract of the sale of a vacant lot in Palm Beach County, Florida from seller, Mrs. Nicholas Deickmann to purchaser, Hooshang Abid. The transaction closed sometime during September of 1980, and Respondent received a commission of approximately $330.00. Pursuant to the party's employment agreement, salesman Aro demanded his pro-rata share of the commission received, and Respondent refuses to remit or otherwise deliver to salesman Aro his portion of the commission received. In this regard the Respondent does not dispute and stipulated that salesman Aro was the procuring cause of the above-referred-to transactions, and admits that the commissions were received. Respondent's Defense Respondent defended his failure to account for or otherwise deliver to salesman Aro commissions received from the above transactions on the theory that salesman Aro failed to attend the closings of the above transactions, or that salesman Aro obligated his firm to pay certain expenses which were connected with the closing, which were not authorized. Respondent's defense was considered by the undersigned and rejected for lack of proof. Moreover, the undersigned advised Respondent during the hearing herein that the proper procedure to seek redress from salesman Aro for those claims asserted herein, which were not a part of the subject administrative complaint, is through the filing of a written complaint properly executed, with the Board of Real Estate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's real estate broker's license be suspended for a period of two (2) years. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of August, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Huskins, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. George May 2300 West Oakland Park Blvd. Suite 202 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311
Findings Of Fact Respondent Shaughnessy is a licensed real estate broker in Florida, holding license number 0079279 at all material times. He has been a real estate broker for 18 years. Respondents Conifer Consulting Group, Inc. and Conifer Realty Group, Inc. are corporations registered as real estate brokers, holding license numbers 0271201 and 0271202, respectively. In January 1992, Mr. Shaughnessy answered a want ad seeking a sales manager for single-family and condominium sales for Respondent Conifer Consulting Group, Inc. Mr. Shaughnessy received an interview with Scott Spence, the minority owner of both Conifer corporations. Following a successful interview, Mr. Shaughnessy interviewed with Bruce Houran, the majority owner of the Conifer corporations. Mr. Spence was the marketing director of the Conifer corporations. A civil engineer, Mr. Houran had provided the money for the businesses and relied on Mr. Spence's expertise in a wide variety of business matters, including the real estate operations. Following a successful interview with Mr. Houran, Mr. Shaughnessy had a final interview with Mr. Spence and Mr. Houran. At the conclusion of the third interview, the three men agreed that Mr. Shaughnessy would join the Conifer corporations as a sales manager, devoting his efforts to managing the sole salesperson working for the Conifer corporations at Bocilla Island Club in Bokeelia. In return for his efforts, the Conifer corporations agreed to pay Mr. Shaughnessy the sum of $350 weekly plus certain expenses. During the course of the interviews, Mr. Shaughnessy mentioned that he was a licensed real estate broker. The Conifer corporations were employing Ms. McClaran as their registered broker, but she had in reality only lent her license to the Conifer corporations in return for a portion of the sales and rental commissions. Following the interviews, and outside the presence of Mr. Shaughnessy, Mr. Houran expressed interest to Mr. Spence in replacing Ms. McClaran with Mr. Shaughnessy. Pursuant to this plan, Mr. Houran sent a letter to Ms. McClaran, with a copy to Mr. Spence but not Mr. Shaughnessy, terminating her employment with the Conifer corporations. The letter states that they have hired Mr. Shaughnessy as a "sales manager with a Broker's license" and adds that he will be providing his license to the Conifer corporations. Pursuant to the employment contract with Ms. McClaran, the letter gives her 90 days' notice, and she continued to earn commissions on sales contracts executed during that time. Unfortunately, no one told Mr. Shaughnessy that he was the new broker for the Conifer groups. Ms. McClaran's name continued to appear on the door to the real estate offices, even after the 90 days had expired. The Conifer corporations never had business cards printed up showing Mr. Shaughnessy as the broker, nor did Mr. Shaughnessy or anyone else hold Mr. Shaughnessy out as the broker for the companies. In late October 1992, the Conifer real estate salesperson contacted the Florida Real Estate Commission to inquire as to the status of her pending application to become a broker. She learned that the Conifer corporations were no longer properly licensed, as their license had expired in March 1992. The salesperson contacted Mr. Houran and told him about what she had learned. Mr. Houran called Mr. Shaughnessy and informed him of the licensing situation. Mr. Shaughnessy immediately began the process of placing his broker's license with Conifer Realty Group, Inc. (Mr. Houran decided not to continue to involve Conifer Consulting Group, Inc. in real estate activities.) Mr. Houran appointed Mr. Shaughnessy as an officer of Conifer Realty Group, Inc. on October 23, 1994. On November 4, 1992, Mr. Shaughnessy filed with Petitioner a Request for Change of Status to effect the necessary change. Only when Mr. Shaughnessy filed the paperwork with Petitioner did his rate of compensation change. His old pay rate of $350 weekly was replaced by a new arrangement in which he received an equity interest in future developments created by either Conifer corporation. In late October or early November 1992, Mr. Shaughnessy also began the process of creating an escrow account for Conifer Realty Group, Inc. Previously, all escrow monies had been deposited in the general operating account of the corporation. No one performed monthly reconciliations of escrow monies, although no monies were ever lost. Working as quickly as possible to transfer sales and rental escrow monies into the new account, Mr. Shaughnessy received the first bank statement for the account around December 6, 1992, performed the required reconciliation, and determined that the escrow account was in good order and balanced. By the time of an inspection from one of Petitioner's investigators on December 4, 1992, there was no sign on the door of the real estate office at Bocilla Island Club. However, at that time, neither Conifer corporation had any relationship with the developer of the units, nor was either Conifer corporation conducting business of any sort out of this office. The salesperson who had discovered the problem had resigned, had formed a new company, had assumed Conifer's responsibilities for sales and rentals, and was using the old office at the Bocilla Island Club. Until the time of the filing with Petitioner in November, Mr. Shaughnessy was never aware, nor could he have reasonably been aware, that his broker's license was to be used to qualify the Conifer corporations. Communications had broken down between Mr. Houran and Mr. Spence or Mr. Spence and Mr. Shaughnessy. In any event, Mr. Shaughnessy never agreed to place his license with either Conifer corporation until October 1992. At all material times during which Mr. Shaughnessy's broker's license was placed with the Conifer corporations, the escrow account was maintained and properly reconciled. There is no evidence that the signage was improper at anytime, except possibly in connection with the real estate office operated by the former salesperson. However, the Conifer corporations are liable for the substantial period of time during which they operated without an escrow account. Although no money was lost or unaccounted for, management's casual attitude toward serious legal responsibilities is manifest in the sloppy way that the Conifer companies handled the transition between brokers and the improper relationship that they earlier maintained with Ms. McClaran. As a result of her involvement in the matter, Ms. McClaran, who was an inexperienced broker and personal friend of Mr. Spence, had her broker's license suspended for 90 days. It is a matter of some mitigation that Mr. Spence is no longer involved with either Conifer corporation and that Mr. Houran reasonably expected that his noninvesting co-owner would provide something of value to the companies--namely, his expertise in real estate matters, including licensing. The absence of injury to the public, although irrelevant to the issue of liability, is another factor in mitigation, as is the quick action taken by the corporations, through Mr. Shaughnessy and at Mr. Houran's direction, to correct the situation as soon as it was brought to their attention.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against William P. Shaughnessy; finding Conifer Realty Group, Inc. and Conifer Consulting Group, Inc. guilty of failing to maintain an escrow account and operating as a broker without holding a valid and current license as a broker; imposing an administrative fine of $4000 against the Conifer companies, jointly and severally; and issuing a reprimand against both companies. ENTERED on April 20, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on April 20, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-8: adopted or adopted in substance. 9: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 10-12: adopted or adopted in substance. 13: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence and subordinate except for fact that there was no escrow account, which is adopted. 14-15: adopted or adopted in substance. 16: to the extent of implication that the office was that of a Respondent, rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-8 and 10: adopted or adopted in substance. 9: the state of mind of Respondents, as well as their degree of culpability, has been addressed in the recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Steven W. Johnson BPR, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street N308 Orlando, Florida 32802 Leonard P. Reina Forsyth, Brugger 600 Fifth Avenue, South #210 Naples, Florida 33940
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Steven Hall, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate salesman and broker. Upon February 15, 1984, he became licensed as a broker. The Respondent was registered with and employed by J. Arnold Ausley Realty from March 31, 1983 to February 15, 1984. J. Arnold Ausley was a licensed real estate broker and operated as Ausley Properties during times pertinent hereto. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensure and practice of realtors in the State of Florida and enforcing the practice standards for realtors embodied in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. On February 4, 1984, the Respondent, in his capacity as a licensed salesman for Ausley Properties, arranged a contract between Champak Bhoja and Kishor Patel, as purchasers of a certain piece of real estate owned by one John D. Gilbert. In connection with that contract the Respondent obtained a $2,000 check as a deposit from Mr. Patel. At Mr. Patel's request the Respondent held this check without negotiating it awaiting Patel's instruction that sufficient funds were on deposit to honor the check. The Respondent waited four weeks and received no such instructions from Mr. Patel. The Respondent therefore contacted Patel, who was in Nebraska at the time, to tell him that he felt legally obligated to deposit the check. The check was deposited and was returned for insufficient funds. On March 19, 1984, Mr. Patel gave the Respondent a replacement check in the amount of $2,000. Mr. Hall asked Mr. Patel to make the check out to him since he had in the meantime become a broker and wanted credit for this transaction in his own business. He also informed Mr. Patel that he would need to use the money for his own personal expenses, in the nature of a "loan." Mr. Patel, however, made the check out to the "Ausley Properties Escrow Account." The Respondent and Mr. Patel had been involved in other business ventures together during the course of which Mr. Patel had already lent the Respondent, on different occasions, a total of approximately $4,000. This course of dealing was continued in the present instance, from the Respondent's viewpoint, when the Respondent informed Mr. Patel that he needed the $2,000 for personal expense purposes and would pay it back as a loan. He believed Mr. Patel assented to that arrangement at the time. The sales contract at issue ultimately failed to be consummated due to Mr. Pate1 and Mr. Bhoja not meeting the required contingency regarding debt financing. Approximately fifteen days after the contract's closing date passed, Mr. Patel made a demand upon the Respondent for the return of the $2,000 deposit. The Respondent failed to return it at that time but assured Mr. Patel that he would repay the money and needed more time to obtain the necessary funds. The Respondent had not deposited the check in the Ausley Properties Escrow Account because such an account did not exist, although the Respondent had urged Mr. Ausley on a number of occasions to set up such an account. The Respondent rather cashed the $2,000 check and used the proceeds for his own benefit, as he had informed Patel he would do. He used the money to meet certain operating expenses and personal expenses, being in severe financial straits at the time. Pate1 knew he was experiencing financial difficulties and had lent him the previously mentioned $4,000 to help him with operating expenses and personal expenses during the pendency of the closing of their various other real estate ventures. The Respondent informed Patel he would use the subject $2,000 for similar purposes, however, the record does not clearly reflect that Patel consented to this, as opposed to his intent that the money be placed in an account as his deposit of consideration for the contract. His testimony to this latter effect is borne out by the fact that in spite of the Respondent's request that the check be made out to him personally, instead Patel made it out to the "Ausley Properties Escrow Account." That account did not exist but the method of drafting the check reveals his intent that the money was to be used as a deposit. In any event the Respondent made no misrepresentation to Mr. Patel as to what he intended to do with the money, but at the same time he did not deposit it in an appropriate account to be held as a deposit toward the purchase of the property involved in the sales contract. Patel made numerous demands for the money and each time Respondent acknowledged this and the other debt to Patel and promised to pay. He ultimately began paying back a small portion of the indebtedness to each of his creditors starting out at a rate of $10 per month. Ultimately, the Respondent paid the entire $2,000 predicated on receipt of his 1985 income tax return.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Petitioner finding that the Respondent has violated Section 475.25(1)(b),(d,)(e) and (k) only to the extent delineated in the above conclusions of law and that his real estate broker's license be subjected to a six months suspension. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of August, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Steven R. Hall 8880 Old Kings Hwy., Apt. 30-W Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Michael Sheahan, Esquire Two South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings Slocum Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Florida Rea1 Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected, although the evidence establishes that Patel intended the funds to be escrowed. Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected as not comporting with the charges in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact:* Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted, but irrelevant to the charges. Accepted Accepted Accepted as to the first sentence only. The second sentence concerning Patel's response is not clearly supported by record evidence. Accepted Accepted Accepted * Although Respondent is proposed findings are accepted, some are inculpatory, some are not material and some support the conclusion that no fraudulent conduct was committed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Donald E. Swagler is now and was at all times material a licensed real estate broker or broker/salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0139756, in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint, respondent Donald Swagler was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker for and an officer of respondent Swagler Realty, Inc., which is now and was at all times material a corporation licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0169035, in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material, Fern Z. Taylor was a licensed real estate broker with an office in Bonita Springs, approximately a twenty-minute drive south from the offices of Swagler Realty Company in Ft. Myers. On April 10, 1980, Andrew W. Kuchmaner was working part-time as a licensed real estate salesman in the employ (as that term is defined in Section 475.01(2), Florida Statutes) of Swagler Realty Company. Kuchmaner was a new salesman and had not yet had occasion to present a buyer's purchase offer to a client seller. During the early months of 1980, Kuchmaner was also working in the employ of, and receiving a salary from, Jim Walter Homes Company. Philip R. and Susan B. Workman first met Kuchmaner in January or February 1980 while visiting a Jim Walter's Homes sales office in Ft. Myers where he was working in his capacity as a Jim Walter Homes salesman. Kuchmaner advised the Workmans to find and purchase a lot for the Jim Walter home they had selected, and then they could purchase the Jim Walter home. Jim Walter Homes Company requires lot ownership prior to building one of their homes. Prior to selecting a lot, the Workmans had already decided on the Jim Walter home they were going to purchase, and Kuchmaner was going to do the paperwork for Jim Walter. Throughout the first quarter of 1980, the Workmans searched for a lot on which to construct their home in the Bonita Springs area of southern Lee County. During their search, the Workmans came upon a vacant lot with a sign saying it was for sale by Fern Z. Taylor. Upon seeing her real estate for sale sign, the Workmans went to Fern Taylor's office to inquire about the property and seek her assistance in their purchase of a lot in the Bonita Springs area. Fern Taylor advised the Workmans that, in addition to the lot they had already seen bearing her sign, she had Dust that morning listed and had for sale another lot in the Bonita Springs area which they would be interested in seeing. Earlier that same morning, Taylor took a long distance telephone call from a Charles A. Bennett, a resident of Arizona. Bennett said he had a lot he wanted to sell and gave Taylor the price ($7,000) and a description--Lot 20, Block E, Rosemary Park No. 2, in Bonita Springs. Bennett had not seen the property in some time and gave no landmarks or street address for Taylor's guidance. Back in 1925, Rosemary Park No. 2 was subdivided into eight blocks of 24 140' x 50' lots each and two larger blocks containing 16 larger 162' x 300' lots each. One of the smaller lots bore the legal description: "Lot 20, Block E of Rosemary Park No. 2 according to the Plat thereof recorded in Plat Book 6 at Page 30, of the Public Records of Lee County. This is the lot Bennett owned and was trying to sell. It is located on First Street. In 1926, Rosemary Park No. 2 was re-subdivided. The two larger blocks of the prior subdivision were re-subdivided into eight blocks of 24 140' x 50' lots each. Unfortunately, in a stroke of singular lack of vision, the new blocks and lots were designated with the same letters and numbers already assigned to the smaller blocks and lots in the original 1925 subdivision. As a result, there is another lot in Rosemary Park No. 2 designated as Lot 20, Block E: Lot 20, Block E, Rosemary Park, resubdivision of the East 1/2 of No. 2, according to the plat thereof, as recorded in Plat Book 8, Page 32, in the Public Records of Lee County, Florida. This other Lot 20, Block E, is owned by the Fyfes of Maine and is on Fifth Street. Taylor, who was quite busy, quickly checked a plat book in her office to locate the lot and the tax rolls to attempt far to verify Bennett's ownership and left to put her sign on the lot she thought Bennett owned and was trying to sell. Through a combination of the confusing legal description, the incomplete description and paucity of information Bennett gave Taylor, and Taylor's admitted negligence, Taylor put her for sale sign on the Fyfes' lot on Fifth Street instead of on Bennett's lot on First Street. Taylor had no listing agreement with the Fyfes, and the Fyfes' property was not for sale. Fern Taylor drew a map for the Workmans providing them with directions to this purportedly newly listed lot on which she had placed her "For Sale" sign. In reliance on Fern Taylor's map and representations as to her listing agreement, the Workmans drove to the Fifth Street lot and viewed the property as well as Fern Taylor's "For Sale" sign. Approximately one week after seeing the Fifth Street lot, the Workmans summoned Andrew Kuchmaner to Bonita Springs to view the lot and give them his opinion as to how the Jim Walter home they had previously selected would sit on the lot. The Workmans had their minds pretty well made up that they wanted to purchase the Fifth Street lot before summoning Kuchmaner. Kuchmaner never took the Workmans to any property but, upon their request, traveled to Bonita Springs to meet them and was thereupon shown the Fifth Street lot. While viewing the Fifth Street lot, Kuchmaner advised the Workmans that the Jim Walter's home they had selected would sit nicely on that lot. He also told the Workmans for the first time that he had a real estate license and would be glad to help them out with placing an offer for the lot on their behalf. The Workmans used Kuchmaner to make their $6,000 offer on the lot to save time because it was late in the afternoon and they lived in North Ft. Myers. When Fern Taylor first met Kuchmaner, he had been represented to her by the Workmans as a Jim Walter salesman. Kuchmaner went to Taylor's office and requested she prepare the contract because he would have to go all the way back to Ft. Myers to write it up. Taylor provided Kuchmaner with the legal description "Lot 20, Block E, Rosemary Park #2" and advised him he would have to write his own contract. Kuchmaner also proposed to Taylor that they not tell Swagler or Swagler Realty about the sale so they could divide Swagler's quarter of the 10 percent commission ($150 of the total $600 commission). Taylor refused and told Swagler what had happened. Swagler had an angry confrontation with Kuchmaner and was about to fire him, but Kuchmaner begged for a second chance and promised not to try to cut Swagler out of a commission again. Swagler relented and kept Kuchmaner on as a salesman. Kuchmaner filled out a contract on a Swagler Realty form and brought it to Donald Swagler for his review. He advised Swagler that he had gotten the legal description from Fern Taylor and had been to see the property. Swagler generally does not sell property in the Bonita Springs area and is not familiar with the area. He relied on Taylor to provide an accurate legal description of the property being sold. Kuchmaner hand delivered the contract offering to purchase the Bennett parcel to Taylor. Taylor checked the contract before she sent it to Bennett to see that the legal was the same that she had, and it was. She also checked it again when it was sent back from Bennett. Fern Taylor had received and checked the contract, title insurance binder, seller's closing statement and a copy of the warranty deed from Bennett to Workman prior to the closing The Workmans had the property they thought they were purchasing surveyed by William R. Allen, a registered and licensed land surveyor. He received the request to survey the property from Susan Workman. Over the phone, she advised Mr. Allen she had purchased a lot in Rosemary Park, Specifically lot far 20, block E. Mr. Allen informed Mrs. Workman that there are two Block E's in Rosemary Park and that they should be careful. He inquired as to which street she had purchased property on and was told, "We're on Fifth Street." Allen surveyed the Fifth Street lot and certified his survery, using the actual legal description of the Fifth Street (Fyfes') lot. Allen never saw any document with the legal description of the Bennett lot. Fern Taylor did not know that the Workmans had ordered a survey and did not see a copy of the survey until well after the closing. Although she attended the closing, she saw no discrepancies among the documents cursorily reviewed at the closing. Neither did the Workmans or the closing agent. The evidence was not clear whether there was a copy of the survey among the documents at the closing. The lender (Jim Walter Homes) and the title insurance company got a copy of the survey before closing. Neither of their professionals noticed that the legal description on the survey (the Fyfe lot) did not match the legal description on the deed and other documents (the Bennett lot). When a real estate broker has placed his sign ("For Sale") on a parcel of property, it is a reasonable conclusion that he is authorized to sell that parcel. It is customary for a broker to rely on the listing broker to provide a correct legal description for the property they have listed. At no time before the closing did Swagler or Kuchmaner have reason to suspect that the Workmans were purchasing a parcel of property different from the parcel they believed they were purchasing. Neither Swagler nor Kuchmaner were at the closing of the Workmans' purchase. But their presence would not have made any difference. It is not the real estate broker's or salesman's lob to scrutinize the documents being signed to make sure the legal descriptions on all the documents match (unless he has reason to believe the legal descriptions might be wrong.) He has the right to rely on the other professionals--the listing broker (especially since Fern Taylor was familiar with the Bonita Springs area and Swagler was not), the lender's attorney, the title company, the closing agent and, if any, the surveyor and the buyer's attorney. Fern Taylor and perhaps others were culpably negligent. Swagler and Kuchmaner were not. What happened to the Workmans is not their fault.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against respondents, Donald E. Swagler and Swagler Realty Company, in this case. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of February, 1987 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3502 These rulings on proposed findings of fact are made in compliance with Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-4. Accepted and incorporated. 5. Rejected as contrary to facts found. (Kuchmaner did not "solicit" or "obtain" them.) 6.-14. Accepted and incorporated. 15. Rejected as contrary to facts found. (Taylor's "investigation" or "attempt" to ascertain the legal description was deficiently and negligently performed.) 16.-17. Accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as incomplete ("compare the deed" with what?); second sentence, rejected because it was not proved Taylor had access to a copy of the survey before the closing. Rejected as unnecessary and potentially misleading. (A Final Judgment was entered; Taylor paid the portion against her; the other defendants have not paid the portions against them.) Rejected. Swagler Realty Company was a defendant in the case; Donald E. Swagler was not. 21.-24. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proved whether they "failed," "refused" or "neglected." (The fact is that neither has paid the Workmans any money in satisfaction of the portion of the Final Judgment against Swagler Realty Company.) Accepted but unnecessary. B. Respondents' Proposed Findings Of Fact. 1. Accepted but unnecessary. 2.-10. Accepted and incorporated. 11. Accepted but unnecessary. 12.-23. Accepted and incorporated. 24.-28. Accepted and incorporated. 29. Accepted but unnecessary. 30.-36. Accepted but cumulative. 37.-42. Accepted and incorporated, along with additional findings. 43. Accepted but unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Fl 32802 J. Michael Hussey, Esquire 3443 Hancock Bridge Parkway Suite 501 North Ft. Myers, Fl 33903 Van B. Poole Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Fl 32301 Wings S. Benton, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Fl 32301 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Fl 32802
