Findings Of Fact The applicant for site approval is Downtown Heliport Corporation, Inc., a corporation with headquarters in Orlando, Florida, engaged in operating heliport facilities throughout Florida and other states. Its related company is Bulldog Airlines, which owns and operates helicopters for hire. Robert Uttal is President of both companies. On January 4, 1990, Downtown Heliport Corporation filed its application for site approval by the Department of Transportation (DOT), proposing to establish a .23 acre (10,000 square feet) helicopter pad within the jurisdictional territory of the Canaveral Port Authority. The Port Authority had already approved a land use permit and lease for the applicant on July 19, 1989 and November 14, 1989. The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) also gave its approval. In a letter dated January 10, 1991, addressed to McDonald Smith, Director of Operations, Downtown Heliport Corporation, the FAA granted approval of the subject heliport under the following conditions: All operations are conducted in VFR weather conditions. The landing area is limited to private use. All approach/departure route helicopter operations are conducted in an area from 090 degrees clockwise to 160 degrees and from 250 degrees clockwise to 330 degrees using the touchdown pad as the center of a compass rose. The takeoff/landing area is appropriately marked. A nonobstructing wind indicator is maintained adjacent to the takeoff/landing area. The approval letter provides, in pertinent part: This determination does not mean FAA approval or disapproval of the physical development involved in the proposal nor is it based on any environmental or land-use compatibility issue. It is a determination with respect to the safe and efficient use of airspace by aircraft and with respect to the safety of persons and property on the ground. In making this determination, the FAA has considered matters such as the effect the proposal would have on existing or planned traffic patterns of neighboring airports or heliports, the effects it would have on the existing airspace structure and projects or programs of the FAA, the effects it would have on the safety of persons and property on the ground, and the effects that existing or proposed man-made objects (on file with the FAA) and known natural objects within the affected area would have on the heliport proposal. The FAA cannot prevent the construction of structures near a heliport. The heliport environs can only be protected through such means as local zoning ordinances or acquisitions of property rights. (DOT Exhibit #4) On January 30, 1990, Bronson Monteith, DOT District Aviation Specialist, inspected the proposed site and found it feasible for the proposed use and consistent with the requirements of DOT Rule Chapter 14-60, F.A.C. More specifically, he reviewed the facility diagram provided by the applicant and determined that the size of the pad, the location of the pad and the air corridor were appropriate. He considered that the Port Canaveral and FAA approval established compliance with ground and air safety standards. He determined from his inspection that existing structures would not interfere with an 8:1 glide slope to and from the pad. Once cleared from the pad the helicopters will use an existing ships' channel as the flight path. Mr. Monteith considered the distance of the streets from the heliport and the objects around it, including trees, the parking area and any major buildings that would be occupied. There are no schools close to the site. A Notice of Intent to issue a site approval for the proposed heliport was issued by the Department and advertised in an area newspaper; notices were sent, as provided in Rule 14-60, F.A.C. John Monteith conducted a public meeting, received comments and submitted a report to the DOT Aviation Bureau in Tallahassee recommending site approval. The heliport application, documentation and comments from the public meeting were reviewed by the Department's Licensing Coordinator and the Aviation Office Manager, and they determined that the application met all requirements under Chapter 330, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-60, F.A.C. for site approval. Site approval order no. 91-17 imposes the following conditions: All operations are to be conducted in VFR weather conditions. Operations are limited to private use. There are to be no flights over the City of Cape Canaveral. That the provisions in FAA Airspace Approval letter dated January 10, 1991, be complied with. Traffic patterns and operational procedures are subject to review by this Department prior to licensing or relicensing. (DOT Exhibit #9) Bulldog Airlines and Downtown Heliport Corporation intend to comply with, and enforce the conditions imposed by DOT. The flight path will be at 800 feet elevation along the corridor until the final approach for landing or takeoff, and that final approach will only be over the port itself. It will not include any flights over the Trident nuclear submarine or over storage tanks. The heliport will be private, primarily for the use of Bulldog Airlines, who flies for NASA, for the Port Authority, for various governmental agencies, including environmental monitoring agencies, and for other private hire. The heliport is open only to commercial pilots, will be used during daylight hours and only under conditions which allow for visual, noninstrument flying. Bulldog Airlines commenced operation in 1985 and has never experienced an incident, accident, or any notice of violation from the FAA, DOT or local law enforcement agencies. Because of its safety record it is able to maintain $100 million liability insurance. McDonald Smith, Director of Operations for Bulldog Airlines, is a pilot with approximately 10,000 hours of flight time. He also inspected the site and is aware of existing structures. In his opinion the flight corridor is wide enough to fly a helicopter, even if it is necessary to avoid unforeseen obstacles. Norma Townsend is a resident of the City of Cape Canaveral, approximately one-half mile south of the proposed site. She has attended the series of public meetings which preceded the DOT's proposed decision. She has amassed an impressive array of letters, maps, tapes and other documents related to the proposed site. She describes herself as a citizen and is neither a pilot nor trained in safety. Ms. Townsend is concerned about the existence of the nuclear submarine base, fuel storage tanks and other hazardous materials in the proximity of the proposed site. She feels that no amount of care by the pilots will insure that a helicopter in an emergency might not collide with an existing structure, with disastrous results. She has heard that used parts are sold for new, causing a helicopter to drop from the sky. She believes that ultra-light airplanes, low flying airplanes and weather balloons will provide extraordinary flying hazards in the Port Canaveral area. She suspects that no meaningful study was done by any agency prior to approving the site. Ms. Townsend presented no witnesses to substantiate these concerns and relies on her own common sense. In many instances this would be sufficient, but here the agency and applicant presented knowledgeable, competent expertise in support of a finding that the site is appropriate. Anything is possible, but instances of helicopters dropping out of the sky are virtually unheard of. Pilots are conscious of ultra-light planes and other possible obstacles to flying. Even large birds are a hazard. Heliports are routinely sited near or on top of buildings, in downtown areas or other places where traffic and population are congested. Helicopters are highly maneuverable, and for that reason are relied on in providing transportation and observation in circumstances where planes or ground vehicles are prohibited, for example after a hurricane or after a fire or other calamity. The substantial weight of evidence establishes that the proposed heliport at Port Canaveral can and will be safely operated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its final order finding that site approval order no. 91-17 is valid and appropriate. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 18th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1991. Copies furnished: Robert R. Uttal Downtown Heliport Corporation, Inc. P.O. Box 621148 Orlando, FL 32862-1148 Joy C. Salamone, Mayor City of Cape Canaveral P.O. Box 326 Cape Canaveral, FL 32920 Karen S. Andreas, Commissioner Brevard County Board of County Commissioners 900 E. Merritt Island Cswy. Merritt Island, FL 32952 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Dept. of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Norma E. Townsend P.O. Box 883 Cape Canaveral, FL 32920-0883 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue Whether American Airlines committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination charges filed by Petitioners and, if so, what relief should Petitioners be granted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the extensive factual stipulations set forth in the parties' February 23, 2006, Corrected Joint Prehearing Stipulation2: Petitioners are both Hispanic. Hispanics represent a substantial portion of the workforce in American's maintenance department at Miami International Airport (MIA). Among these Hispanic employees in the maintenance department are those who occupy supervisory positions. American’s Vice-President for Maintenance, Danny Martinez, is Hispanic. As aviation maintenance technicians for American, Petitioners' job duties, as set forth in the written job description for the position, were as follows: In addition to the work specified for the Junior Aviation Maintenance Technician, an Aviation Maintenance Technician's responsibility also includes the following: troubleshooting, individually or with Crew Chief, management or professional direction, disassembly, checking and cleaning, repairing, replacing, testing, adjusting, assembling, installing, servicing, fabricating, taxing or towing airplanes and/or run-up engines, de-icing aircraft, required to maintain the airworthiness of aircraft and all their components while in service or while undergoing overhaul and/or modification. Certifies for quality of own workmanship, including signing mechanical flight releases for all work done on field work. In those work positions where stock chasers are not utilized and/or available at the time may chase own parts. May have other Mechanic personnel assigned to assist him/her in completing an assignment. Works according to FAA and Company regulations and procedures and instructions from Crew Chief or supervisor. Completes forms connected with work assignments according to established procedures and communicates with other Company personnel as required in a manner designated by the Company. Performs the following duties as assigned: cleaning of aircraft windshields; connection/removing ground power and ground start units; pushing out/towing of aircraft and related guideman functions, fueling/defueling, de-icing of aircraft. At all times material to the instant cases, Petitioners were members of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) and covered by a collective bargaining agreement between American and the TWU (TWU Contract), which contained the following provisions, among others: ARTICLE 28- NO DISCRIMINATION, AND RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND COMPLIANCE The Company and the Union agree to make it a matter of record in this Agreement that in accordance with the established policy of the Company and the Union, the provisions of this Agreement will apply equally to all employees regardless of sex, color, race, creed, age, religious preferences, status as a veteran or military reservist, disability, or national origin. The Union recognizes that the Company will have sole jurisdiction of the management and operation of its business, the direction of its working force, the right to maintain discipline and efficiency in its hangars, stations, shops, or other places of employment, and the right of the Company to hire, discipline, and discharge employees for just cause, subject to the provisions of this Agreement. It is agreed that the rights of management not enumerated in this Article will not be deemed to exclude other preexisting rights of management not enumerated which do not conflict with other provisions of the Agreement. * * * Copies of the Peak Performance Through Commitment (PPC) Program will be available to all employees upon request. Any changes to the PPC Program will be provided and explained to the TWU prior to implementation. ARTICLE 29- REPRESENTATION * * * The Union does not question the right of the Company supervisors to manage and supervise the work force and make reasonable inquiries of employees, individually or collectively, in the normal course of work. In meetings for the purpose of investigation of any matter which may eventuate in the application of discipline or dismissal, or when written statements may be required, or of sufficient importance for the Company to have witnesses present, or to necessitate the presence of more than the Company supervisor, or during reasonable cause or post accident drug/alcohol testing as provided in Article 29(h), the Company will inform the employee of his right to have Union representation present. If the employee refuses representation, the supervisor's record will reflect this refusal. At the start of a meeting under the provisions of Article 29(f), the Company will, except in rare and unusual circumstances, indicate the reason that causes the meeting and then provide an opportunity for the employee and his Union representative to confer for a reasonable period of time. Following that period, the 29(f) meeting will be reconvened and continue until concluded by the supervisor. Before written notification of discipline or dismissal is given, an employee will be afforded the opportunity to discuss the matter with his supervisor. If he desires, he will have a Union representative in the discussion. . . . * * * ARTICLE 30- DISMISSAL An employee who has passed his probationary period will not be dismissed from the service of the Company without written notification of that action. The notification will include the reason or reasons for his dismissal. Appeal from dismissal will be made, in writing, by the employee within seven (7) calendar days after receiving the notification and will be addressed to the Chief Operating Officer, with a copy to the appropriate Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating Officer will fully investigate the matter and render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than twelve (12) calendar days following his receipt of the appeal, unless mutually agreed otherwise. A copy of the written decision will be provided to the Union. * * * If the decision of the Chief Operating Officer is not satisfactory to the employee, the dismissal and decision will be appealed in accordance with Article 30(c), provided, however, the appeal must be submitted within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of the decision rendered by the Chief Operating Officer. An appeal from the decision of the Chief Operating Officer will be submitted to the appropriate Area Board of Adjustment in accordance with Article 32. . . . * * * ARTICLE 31- GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE An employee who believes that he has been unjustly dealt with, or that any provision of this Agreement has not been properly applied or interpreted, or against whom the Company has issued written disciplinary action, may submit his grievance in person or through his representatives within seven (7) calendar days. The grievance will be presented to his immediate supervisor, who will evaluate the grievance or complaint and render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than seven (7) calendar days following his receipt of the grievance. . . . If the written decision of the immediate supervisor is not satisfactory to the employee whose grievance is being considered, it may be appealed within ten (10) calendar to the Chief Operating Officer, with a copy to the appropriate Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating Officer will fully investigate the matter and will render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than twelve (12) calendar days, unless mutually agreed otherwise, following his receipt of the appeal. . . . If the decision of the Chief Operating Officer is not satisfactory to the employee, the grievance and the decision may be appealed to the System Board of Adjustment, as provided for in Article 32. * * * ARTICLE 32- BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT * * * Area Board of Adjustment, Discipline and Dismissal Cases * * * (2) Each Area Board will be composed on one member appointed by the Company, one member appointed by the Union, and a neutral referee acting as Chairman. . . . * * * Procedures Generally Applicable to the Boards * * * Employees and the Company may be represented at Board hearing by such person or persons as they may choose and designate. Evidence may be presented either orally or in writing, or both. The advocates will exchange all documents they may enter and the names of witnesses they may call in their direct case not later than ten (10) calendar days prior to the date set for hearing. Nothing in this paragraph will require either advocate to present the documents or the witnesses provided above during the course of the hearing. The advocates will not be restricted from entering documents or calling witnesses that become known subsequent to the ten (10) ten calendar day exchange, provided a minimum of forty-eight (48) hours notice is provided to the other party and a copies are submitted to the other party prior to the presentation of the direct case. The party receiving the late document or witness has the option to postpone the hearing in light of the new document or witness. Upon the request of either party to the dispute, or of two (2) Board members, the neutral referee will summon witnesses to testify at Board hearing. The Company will cooperate to ensure that all witnesses summoned by the board will appear in a timely fashion. Reasonable requests by the Union for employee witnesses will be honored. The requests for witnesses will normally not be greater than the number, which can be spared without interference with the service of the Company. Disputes arising from this provision will be immediately referred to the Director of the Air Transport Division and the Vice President-Employee Relations, or their respective designees, for resolution. A majority of all members of a Board will be sufficient to make a finding or a decision with respect to any dispute properly before it, and such finding or decision will be final and binding upon the parties to such dispute. . . . * * * ARTICLE 36- MEAL PERIODS Meal periods will be thirty minutes, except when a longer period is agreed upon between the parties. Meal periods will be scheduled to begin not earlier than three (3) hours after commencement of work that day and not later than five hours after commencement of work that day. The commencement of work is from the start of the employee's regular shift. If an employee is not scheduled for a meal period within the foregoing time span, the meal period will be provided immediately before or after it. In the event that a meal period has not been provided in accordance with the foregoing, the employee is then free, if he so desires, to take his meal period. At all times material to the instant cases, American had Rules of Conduct for its employees that (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU Contract) were applicable to TWU- represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners. These Rules of Conduct provided, in pertinent part, as follows: As an American Airlines employee, you can expect a safe and productive workplace that ensures your ability to succeed and grow with your job. The rules listed below represent the guidelines and principles that all employees work by at American. Attendance * * * During your tour of duty, remain in the area necessary for the efficient performance of your work. Remain at work until your tour of duty ends unless you are authorized to leave early. * * * 17. Work carefully. Observe posted or published regulations. * * * Personal Conduct * * * 34. Dishonesty of any kind in relations with the company, such as theft or pilferage of company property, the property of other employees or property of others entrusted to the company, or misrepresentation in obtaining employee benefits or privileges, will be grounds for dismissal and where the facts warrant, prosecution to the fullest extent of the law. Employees charged with a criminal offense, on or off duty, may immediately be withheld from service. Any action constituting a criminal offense, whether committed on duty or off duty, will be grounds for dismissal. (Revision of this rule, April 10, 1984) * * * Violations of any of the American Airlines Rules of Conduct (listed above) . . . could be grounds for immediate termination depending of the severity of the incident or offense and the employee's record. . . . At all times material to the instant cases, American had a Peak Performance Through Commitment Policy (PPC Policy) to deal with employee performance and disciplinary problems. The policy, which (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU Contract) was applicable to TWU-represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners, provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Peak Performance Through Commitment (PPC) is a program that fosters ongoing communication between managers and employees. It encourages managers . . . to regularly recognize outstanding performance and to work together with employees to address and correct performance issues fairly. For the few employees whose performance does not respond to regular coaching and counseling, the following steps advise them that continued performance problems have serious consequences, ultimately leading to termination: -First Advisory for employees with problem performance or conduct who do not respond to coaching or counseling. -Second Advisory for employees whose performance fails to respond to initial corrective steps. -Career Decision Advisory for employees whose problem performance or conduct warrants termination. They are given a paid Career Decision Day away from work to consider their future and continued employment with American Airlines. -Final Advisory for employees whose problem performance or conduct requires termination, or those who have failed to honor the Letter of Commitment signed after their Career Decision Day. Please note that steps can sometimes be skipped, in instances where the nature of the conduct is very serious. It is your responsibility as an employee to know the company's rules of conduct and performance standards for your job, and to consistently meet or exceed those standards. In the event that your performance does not measure up to the company's expectations, your manager will work with you to identify the problem and outline steps to correct it. * * * SERIOUS INCIDENTS OR OFFENSES Some violations of our guiding principles and rules of conduct will result in immediate termination. For example, insubordination, violating our alcohol and drug policy, abusing travel privileges, aircraft damage, violations of the work environment policy, and job actions could be grounds for immediate termination, depending on the severity of the incident and the employee's record. Hate-related conduct and dishonesty will always result in termination. In cases when immediate termination may be appropriate but additional information is needed, the employee may be withheld from service while an investigation is conducted. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioners' regular shifts were eight and a half hours, including an unpaid, thirty minute "meal period" (to which TWU-represented bargaining unit members were entitled under Article 36 of the TWU Contract). Although they were paid to perform eight hours of work during their eight and a half hour shifts, TWU-represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners, were, in practice, allowed to take up to an hour for their meals, without penalty. TWU-represented bargaining unit members "clocked in" at the beginning of their shift and "clocked out" at the end of their shift. They were expected to remain "on the clock" during their "meal periods" (which, as noted above, were to be no longer than one hour). During his eight and a half hour shift which began on July 30, 2004, Petitioner Castellanos was assigned to perform a "routine 'A' [safety] check" on a Boeing 757 aircraft, an assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [aviation maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully" approximately four hours to complete. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the Quench nightclub, Mr. Castellanos was two hours and 15 minutes into his shift. During his eight and a half hour shift which began on July 30, 2004, Petitioner Pena was assigned to perform "PS checks" on two Boeing 737 aircraft, an assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [aviation maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully" at least six hours to complete. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the Quench nightclub, Mr. Pena was three hours and 45 minutes into his shift. Walter Philbrick, an investigator in American's corporate security department, covertly followed Petitioners when they left MIA that evening and kept them under surveillance until their return almost four hours later. Petitioners did not clock out until following the end of their shifts on July 31, 2004. In so doing, they effectively claimed full pay for the shifts, notwithstanding that, during the shifts, they had been off the worksite, engaged in non-work- related activity, for well in excess of the one hour they were allowed for "meal periods." Mr. Philbrick prepared and submitted a report detailing what he had observed as to Petitioners' movements and conduct during the time that they had been under his surveillance. Mike Smith is American's maintenance department station manager at MIA. He is "responsible for the entire [American] maintenance operation in Miami." Mr. Smith assigned his subordinate, Anthony DeGrazia, a day shift production manager at MIA, the task of looking into, and taking the appropriate action on behalf of management in response to, the matters described in Mr. Philbrick's report. Neither Mr. Smith nor Mr. DeGrazia is Hispanic. Mr. DeGrazia met separately with both Mr. Pena and Mr. Castellanos. The meetings were held in accordance with the provisions of Article 29(f) of the TWU Contract. Before conducting the meetings, Mr. DeGrazia had reviewed Mr. Philbrick's report. Mr. Castellanos stated, among other things, the following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he was trying to complete his assignment as fast as possible because he wanted to have an alcoholic beverage; that evening, he was "away from work" for approximately four hours, which he knew was wrong; and he and Mr. Pena had engaged in similar activity on perhaps six or seven previous occasions. Mr. Pena stated, among other things, the following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he was "off the field" for three to four hours, which he knew was not "okay"; this was something he had done "sometimes" in the past; and American was a "great company" to work for. Based on his review of Mr. Philbrick's report and the information he had obtained from Petitioners, Mr. DeGrazia concluded that Petitioners had committed "time clock fraud" in violation of Rule 34 of American's Rules of Conduct and that they therefore, in accordance with American's policy that "dishonesty will always result in termination" (as expressed in the PPC Policy), should be terminated. Before taking such action, Mr. DeGrazia consulted with Mr. Smith and "someone" from American's human resources department, who both "concurred" with Mr. DeGrazia that termination was the appropriate action to take against Petitioners. On August 12, 2004, Mr. DeGrazia issued Final Advisories terminating Petitioners' employment. The Final Advisory given to Mr. Castellanos read, in pertinent part, as follows: On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled tour of duty was 2230-0700. During your scheduled shift you were assigned to complete an A-check on a 757 aircraft. At approximately 0045, Corporate Security observed you leaving the premises and going into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While there, you were observed at the bar drinking from a plastic cup. You were observed leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving towards the airport. By your own account, you returned to the airport approximately 0400. During a company investigation, you admitted to leaving the premises, during your scheduled tour of duty and going to a restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages. Additionally, when asked how it was possible for you to complete your assignment in such a short amount of time you stated that you were, "trying to complete the job as fast as I can because I was getting the urge of getting a drink." Based on the above information I have concluded that your actions fall far short of that which may be reasonably expected of our employees and are a direct violation of American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules 3, 4, 17, and 34 . . . . In view of the above rule violations your employment with American Airlines is hereby terminated effective today, August 12, 2004. * * * The Final Advisory given to Mr. Pena read, in pertinent part, as follows: On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled tour of duty was 2100-0530. During your scheduled shift you were assigned to complete two PS-checks on 737 aircraft. At approximately 0045, Corporate Security observed you leaving the premises and going into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While there, you were observed at the bar drinking from a plastic cup. You were observed leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving towards the airport. By your own account, you returned to the airport approximately 0400. During a company investigation, you admitted to leaving the premises, during your scheduled tour of duty and going to a restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages. Additionally, when you[] were asked if it is acceptable to go to lunch for 3-4 hours you stated, "no, according to Company Rules, it's not OK." Based on the above information I have concluded that your actions fall far short of that which may be reasonably expected of our employees and are a direct violation of American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules 3, 4, and 34 . . . . In view of the above rule violations your employment with American Airlines is hereby terminated effective today, August 12, 2004. * * * That Petitioners were Hispanic played no role whatsoever in Mr. DeGrazia's decision to terminate them. Mr. DeGrazia terminated Petitioners because, and only because, he believed that they had engaged in dishonesty by committing "time clock fraud." Mr. DeGrazia has never encountered another situation, in his capacity as a production manager for American, where an aviation maintenance technician over whom he had disciplinary authority engaged in conduct comparable to the conduct for which he terminated Petitioners. No one has ever reported to him, nor has he ever observed, any aviation maintenance technician other than Petitioners taking "meal periods" that were longer than an hour while remaining "on the clock." Petitioners both grieved their terminations pursuant to Article 31 of the TWU Contract. Neither of them advanced any allegations of anti-Hispanic discrimination in his grievance. Petitioners' grievances were ultimately denied on September 9, 2004, by William Cade, American's managing director for maintenance. Petitioners appealed the denial of their grievances to the American and TWU Area Board of Adjustment for Miami, Florida (Board), in accordance with Article 32 of the TWU Contract, which provided for "final and binding" arbitration of disputes arising under the contract. A consolidated evidentiary hearing was held before the Board on April 28, 2005. At the hearing, Petitioners were represented by counsel. Through counsel, they called and cross- examined witnesses, submitted documentary evidence, and presented argument. Neither of them testified. The Board issued a decision on June 27, 2005, denying Petitioners' grievances. The TWU Board member dissented. The Discussion and Opinion portion of the decision read, in pertinent part, as follows: There is no dispute that the rule violations by grievants['] actions on July 30, 2004 constituted time card fraud and violation of rules relating to remaining at work. This was not some minor taking of time, such as overstaying lunch for a shortened period. It was a well-planned event. They had with them a change of clothes - in effect "party clothes" apropos to a late night-early morning South Florida nightclub. They had even done this several times before. Once at this nightclub they actually drank very little. Grievant Pena had two drinks and grievant Castellanos appeared to have just one. In fact, when he was later tested after his return to work almost five hours later, the result was negative for drugs and alcohol. Clearly, they failed to remain at work for their tours of duty in violation of Rules 3 and 4. These rules, however, do not by themselves call for immediate discharge nor do any of the Company documents relating to rules, such as its PPC, refer to them as serious violations that would incur discharge. The seriousness here concerns the grievants' badging out after their eight-hour tour and being paid for eight hours, almost five of which they did not work. There is no question that this is time card fraud and as such it involves dishonesty that is covered by Rule 34's "dishonesty of any kind." Numerous arbitrators for the parties have found such conduct to be violative of Rule 34 and have concluded that stealing time from the Company is dishonesty that requires immediate dismissal. * * * [T]he grievants engaged in this misconduct on multiple occasions that involved more than half of their shift being spent at a nightclub. And they knew it was wrong as they readily admitted when finally caught. Mitigation based on the grievants' EAP involvement is insufficient to overcome and reduce in any fashion their core responsibility to be honest employees and abide by all Company rules and regulations. The Company made this clear enough in its current Drug and Alcohol policy, and, as seen, other Boards have found it reasonable, as does this Board. To all of this the Union argues that there are other mitigating factors - seniority, disparate treatment, failure to consider employment records and a common practice permitting employees to extend lunch breaks. As to the latter, there is no evidence that any employee has been allowed to stay away from work for almost five hours with the knowledge or consent of management at any level. There is some evidence of employees overstaying the break by 30 minutes, of employees going for food for the crew and arriving back late and even some two-hour absences. None of this is comparable to the grievants' conduct. Nor is the evidence concerning supervisor Delgadillo enough to warrant the finding of a practice. She was not Pena's supervisor. She called grievant Castellanos' cell, but that alone does not mean that she knew he was off several hours at that point socializing and drinking in Coconut Grove on July 30 or at other times. She may have gone out with them while she was a mechanic, but the evidence does not show that she went for these long journeys to drink and socialize at a night club. Most importantly, the grievants never claimed a practice existed but instead readily admitted at the 29(f)s that their conduct was wrong and they violated Company rules. As to the disparate treatment incidents, although the dishonesty issue appears similar, different treatment only becomes disparate when the employees being compared also have factual situations and records that are similar. The comparators here did not leave work on more than one occasion, or on any occasion, for four hours or more to drink and socialize in a nightclub. Thus, Mora's 45-minute late punch-in resulted from his retrieving his drivers' license; he then immediately informed management of what he did. He did not have to be put under security surveillance for this type of conduct occurring in the past. Although his 30-minute extended lunch was part of the practice referred to above, it hardly qualifies as like conduct when compared to the grievants' activities. The claim by Vizcaino that he was sick when he used his Company travel privilege is the type of violation referred to the Travel Abuse Committee under a rule penalizing employees by suspending their travel privileges. The facts of that incident and the reasoning of this committee are not known to make any clear and relevant comparison. Even if accepted as a valid comparison, it is only one employee incident that by itself is insufficient to show that management disparately treated these grievants. Nor is their any proof that Rule 34 was involved in either of these situations. Manager DeGrazia disclosed that he did not consider the grievants' prior record or their seniority. He explained that the seriousness of their conduct was sufficient for his decision. The Board fully recognizes that the grievants cooperated during the investigation, had no prior discipline, and had seniority from 1989 and 1996. Each of these factors is significant in assessing the suitability of the penalties. But it is well established by the parties and even in arbitration cases involving outside parties, that in light of the gravity of time card fraud, these factors need not be evaluated. The Chairman notes nonetheless, that seniority and work records cannot be entirely ignored. But here, the grievants' propensity in the past to engage in this same outlandish conduct, and to do so undetected, significantly minimized, for mitigation purposes, much of their good record and seniority. Petitioners subsequently filed employment discrimination charges with the FCHR, alleging for the first time that their terminations were products of anti-Hispanic discrimination. There has been no persuasive showing made, in support in these allegations, that the decision to terminate them was motivated by anything other than legitimate business considerations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding the American not guilty of the unlawful employment practices alleged by Petitioners and dismissing their employment discrimination charges. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings are fact are determined: In this examination for licensure challenge, petitioner, Mason L. Flint, contends that he is entitled to a higher score on the March 1994 deputy pilot examination for the Port of Jacksonville. The examination is administered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR) on behalf of respondent, Board of Pilot Commissioners (Board). Although the original petition challenged the grade in twelve respects, petitioner now contends that only two items are in issue, item 21 relating to the local knowledge part of the examination, and item 270 relating to the aids to navigation part of the examination. Both are true-false questions. Unlike the more than fifty other professional licensure examinations administered by the DBPR, the seven-part pilot examination requires a candidate to achieve a minimum passing grade on each part, but candidates doing so then compete with each other for vacant positions. In other words, if only one position at a particular port is open, the candidate achieving the highest score above the minimum passing grade is the only candidate receiving a license. In this case, three deputy pilot positions were available at the Port of Jacksonville, and thus the candidates having the three highest scores among those exceeding the minimum passing grade would be given a license. Petitioner finished sixth on the original grading, but after having his examination regraded by the Board prior to hearing, he was ranked number four. By this challenge, he seeks to have his grade changed on items 21 and 270 so as to raise his ranking to number three. In order to preserve the confidentiality of Item 21 for future examinations, it is suffice to say that the item required a response of true or false concerning limitations on vessels leaving the Talleyrand Docks in Jacksonville, Florida. The examination answer key shows true as the correct response. In preparing all questions pertaining to local knowledge, including item 21, the Board's consultant used the U. S. Coast Pilot, a compilation of operational guidelines governing the movement of vessels in the St. Johns River (and Port of Jacksonville). The specific source of authority for item 21 was paragraph (16) on page 153 of the 1993 edition of the U. S. Coast Pilot. That paragraph reads in pertinent part as follows: (16) Outbound vessels: Vessels with a draft of over 23 (sic) feet sailing between Main Street Bridge to, and including, U. S. Gypsum Co. Pier, shall get underway after 1-1/2 hours after flood current with a cut off time at the beginning of ebb current . . . Because Talleyrand Docks lies between the Main Street Bridge and the U. S. Gypsum Company Pier, this paragraph has application to vessels leaving those docks. The 1993 version of the U. S. Coast Pilot contained a typographical error. Rather than "23" feet, the guidelines should have read "32" feet. To correct this error, paragraph (16) was revised in mid-March 1994, or the same month the examination was given, to provide that any vessel drawing more than 32 feet would be subject to the above movement restrictions. However, candidates were advised that only revisions to the U. S. Coast Pilot through January 1, 1994, would be included in the March 1994 examination. Besides the limitation described in paragraph (16), two other paragraphs on the same page of the U. S. Coast Pilot made reference to the correct 32 foot limitation. In addition, the Guidelines of Vessel Movements on St. Johns River, which form the basis for the data in the U. S. Coast Pilot, used the correct 32 foot limitation. Candidates familiar with those provisions should have been on notice that a typographical error existed in paragraph (16). Although the Board's suggested response is arguably correct, the more persuasive evidence shows that the statement in item 21 was confusing and unclear due to the typographical error in the U. S. Coast Pilot and the conflicting provisions on the same page of the source material. Thus, item 21 does not reliably measure the specified area of competency. Under these circumstances, a candidate should be given credit for either a true or false response, or alternatively, the question should be discarded in calculating a candidate's final score. Accordingly, petitioner's grade should be adjusted in this respect. Petitioner has also contended that only a false response is correct since the question implies that a restriction exists because of its use of the words "up to the beginning of ebb current." The evidence shows, however, that a candidate could reasonably reject that suggested implication and properly make a true response. Item 270 requires a true or false response to a statement regarding identifying marks or buoys marking a channel. The item identifies a set of conditions and then states that such a marking "could" properly be made. The examination answer key shows true as the correct response. The primary source of authority for item 270 is 33 CFR 62.43. According to that federal regulation, buoys marking the side of a channel (lateral aids) are always a solid color, and all solid color buoys marking a channel are numbered. The regulation goes on to provide that, in addition to a number, all solid color numbered buoys may also carry a letter suffix to aid in their identification, or to indicate their purpose. They cannot, however, be identified by letter only, but only by number and letter. Because the more credible and persuasive evidence shows that the question, as stated on the examination, clearly suggests that only a letter could be used for identification of a sidemark buoy, the correct response should be false. Therefore, petitioner should be given credit for his answer. The record is not altogether clear as to how changing petitioner's overall grade will impact his ranking. According to the DBPR psychometrician who is in charge of the pilot examination development, both petitioner and the third ranked candidate gave the same response on one of the challenged questions. On the other item, the two gave different responses, but if either response is deemed to be a correct response, it would have no bearing on their overall ranking. The pychometrician added that if an item is challenged and credit given to the protesting candidate, the answer key is changed and all candidates' scores are adjusted to reflect the change in the answer key.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board regrading petitioner's examination consistent with the above findings and conclusions. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5327 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 4-5. Rejected as being unnecessary. 6-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 14-27. Partially accepted in findings of fact 3-8. 28-39. Partially accepted in findings of fact 9-11. Respondent: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 9-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 12. Rejected. See finding of fact 11. Note: Where a proposed findings has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejcted as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordiante, not supported by the evidence, or cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: Mason L. Flint 1605 Brookside Circle East Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Wellington H. Meffert, II, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack L. McRay, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Susan J. Foster, Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0773
Findings Of Fact Port Largo Airport, Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida has been operated as a public airport under DOT license (p-1) and a zoning variance (R-2) since 1973. A recent rezoning of the R-2U (residential two-family) area of the airport to private airport (P-10) has not been finalized. The most recent lease of the property was executed July, 1977 for a period of five years (P-4) The Port Largo Airport has one asphalt runway oriented nearly north/south that is more than 65 feet wide and 2,100 feet long (P-1 and 3). Between the west side of the runway edge and an airplane parking area there is 30 feet of unpaved area; on the east side at least 20 feet of unpaved area exists between the runway and the ocean. The full length of the paved and unpaved area appears to he on a long, narrow breakwater or strip of land 150 feet wide and 2,400 feet long with the Atlantic Ocean on the east and a wide canal on the west (P-9) The south end of the runway is approached over the water, while the north end has a clump of mangroves 15 feet high a distance of 360 feet from Runway 19's displaced threshold. The height and location of the mangroves from the displaced threshold is such that there is an elevation angle of 2 degrees 17 feet 19 inches and an offset angle of 5 degrees 42 feet 28 inches (P-1).
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the renewal license application of Port Largo Aero and Marine, Inc. for the Port Largo Airport be granted and License No. 3778 continued in effect to its termination date of January 31, 1981. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HAROLD E. SMITHERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph B. Allen, III, Esquire 604 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040 Joe L. Sharit, Jr., Esquire 255 Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 2295 Winter Haven, Florida 33880
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice, discrimination based on age and/or national origin, and/or retaliation against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Findings of Fact1 Petitioner,[Victor Bracamonte (Petitioner or Mr. Bracamonte)] is an [Hispanic] Peruvian man. His date of birth is September 14, 1955. Petitioner began working for Respondent, [Commercial Interior Contractor Corp. [(Respondent or CIC)] in Spring 2006 [on April 6, 2006] as a Superintendent. Respondent, a Florida corporation, has been in business since 1984. The Company is an interior finishing contractor, assisting private corporations and governmental entities with refinishing, renovations, or other projects. Eloise Gonzalez (Cuban; d/o/b- 8/17/62) is the founder and owner of Respondent. Ms. Gonzalez and three individuals work at Company's corporate office, which is located at 2500 N.W. 39th Street, Suite 100, in Miami. The rest of the Company's employees work at a contract [site] at the Miami International Airport("MIA"). In 2006, Respondent signed a contract with Parsons Odebrecht Joint Venture ("POJV") to perform certain general site requirement work related to the construction of new terminals and concourses at MIA. POJV is the general contractor that MIA assigned the overall task of building the new terminals. Respondent employees have worked on this project from 2006 through the present, acting as a support team for POJV with tasks such as lifting equipment, operating forklifts, and cleaning. Respondent employees at the POJV project are divided into two teams, with each team responsible for a different work area (one team in areas from Terminal B to Terminal C, and the other team in areas from Terminal C to Terminal D). Each team consists of Carpenters and General Laborers and is headed by a Superintendent. CIC also employs Operators at the POJV project, who drive a sweeper machine around the entire worksite and remove debris. Respondent does not have any employees at MIA who supervise the Superintendents, nor does the Company have anyone at the worksite that instructs the teams what needs to be done each day. The specific work of each of Respondent's teams on the POJV project is directed by management personnel from POJV. Ms. Gonzalez works out of the Company's corporate offices, which are approximately seven miles from MIA, and so she is not there to direct and control the daily activities of personnel on the POJV project. Ms. Gonzalez seldom visits the actual worksite, and estimates that she is there perhaps once every month or so. Ms. Gonzalez visits with POJV corporate personnel two or three times per month at their offices at MIA (which are in trailers at the airport), but this is at a location separate from the actual worksite. The purpose of those visits is to discuss general business items with POJV. Ultimately, Ms. Gonzalez relies on her Superintendents to be her eyes and ears at the worksite, and, of course, on POJV personnel (since they are the client and are directly involved in overseeing the work). As a result, decisions by Ms. Gonzalez to discipline and/or terminate employees are typically based on the information, recommendations, and/or requests of her Superintendents and/or POJV personnel. Since the POJV project takes place at the airport, employees have to be given clearance to work on the private property of MIA. Each employee must have various badges to access the airport and the project. For example, employees need an MIA Customs Identification badge, which gives them clearance to pass through the security area (. . . a separate commercial security area for workers, airport personnel, and other individuals providing service(s) to the airport), and a North Terminal Development badge, which gives them clearance to access the project itself. A Superintendent also needs a driver's badge, to allow them to drive a vehicle on private airport property. Respondent does not make the decisions about whether to give and/or take away a badge to anyone. The badges are issued by MIA (specifically, the Miami-Dade Aviation Department) and/or U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Respondent's employees meet at the employee parking lot at MIA in the morning, and each team drives to the worksite in a separate Company van. There are only a few Company employees who are allowed to drive the van(s). The vans travel from the parking lot, to the security area, and then to the worksite. Anyone driving the van at any time on airport grounds or anywhere else is required to follow any and all driving rules, such as following speed limits. On January 22, 2010, Petitioner was arrested at MIA by the Miami-Dade County Police. Petitioner was accused of stealing gas. He signed a Complaint/Arrest Affidavit on that same date. Petitioner's airport work badges were taken away by MIA as a result of his arrest. Petitioner has not worked for Respondent since the date of his arrest. Of the 24 current employees of Respondent, 10 of them are over the age of 40. Of these current employees, three of them are older than Petitioner: (1) Pedro Araujo (d/o/b - 6/7/54); (2) Moises Herrer (d/o/b - 7/11/53); and (3) Isidro Lopes (d/o/b - 7/6/48). One additional employee is only eight days younger than Petitioner: Edwin Torres (d/o/b - 9/22/55). Between Spring 2006 and January 2009 (the period of Petitioner's employment), the only other Peruvian employee terminated by Respondent was Marco Samanamud, whose employment was terminated in November 2008. Additional Findings of Fact2 Petitioner alleged that, in addition to discriminating against him based on age, Ms. Gonzalez discriminated against him because he is from Peru. He said he earned $25.32 an hour, when the prevailing rate for a superintendent was $31. Wages were set by the MIA aviation authority in the contract for services with CIC, not by Ms. Gonzalez. She has had contracts for work at the airport for twenty years. Before he worked for Respondent, Petitioner was employed by prior airport subcontractors doing the same kind of work for ten years. To explain why Ms. Gonzalez hired him but discriminates against Peruvians, Petitioner alleged that hiring him helped her get the contract for CIC. On November 18, 2008, Marco Samanamoud, who was also Peruvian, drove Petitioner in a CIC van, to a 1:30 p.m., eye doctor's appointment because he was going to have his pupils dilated. While he was still at the doctor's office, Petitioner received a call from Ms. Gonzalez who wanted to know who was driving the van. He told her that it was Marco Samanamoud. Marco Samanamoud, who is also Peruvian, was the only employee on their crew, other than Petitioner, who was allowed to drive the 12-passenger van. The van was equipped with a GPS e-mail alert notification system that had reported by e-mail that the van was going 88 and 95 miles an hour in streets that had a 60-mile-per- hour speed limit. Petitioner called Mr. Samanamoud who said he was back at work at MIA and denied that he had been speeding. Both he and the Petitioner questioned the accuracy of the GPS e-mail alerts because both were received at 2:16 p.m., from two different locations. They had no knowledge, however, about the frequency of the e-mail alert transmissions. Petitioner and Mr. Samanamoud both testified that they each tried to tell Ms. Gonzalez that it was a mistake and the GPS system could not be correct. Both said that, when they talked to her, she made derogatory comments about Peruvians, including having said something about not wanting to work with Peruvians, about being fed up with Peruvians, and that Peruvians had caused her too many problems. Based on Mr. Samanamoud's prior record of speeding and reckless driving, Ms. Gonzalez told Petitioner to fire Mr. Samanamoud. Petitioner refused Ms. Gonzalez' directive to terminate Mr. Samanamoud's employment with CIC until she prepared a written warning and threatened to fire both of them. Petitioner said he had no choice but to fire Mr. Samanamoud even though he believed that to be an unlawful act of discrimination based on national origin. CIC employees routinely borrowed gasoline-powered saws from other companies working at the airport. On January 22, 2009, the foreman for one of the companies called Petitioner and requested the return of one of the saws. Petitioner instructed a CIC employee, Roberto Santiesteban, who was driving the CIC van, to go outside the airport check point to return the saw. After he returned the saw, Mr. Santiesteban received a radio call from Petitioner telling him to pick up six POVJ workers to bring them to their work site. Petitioner said POVJ wanted the workers inside as quickly as possible because they were "already on the clock" earning $31.00 an hour. Mr. Santiesteban, who had returned the gas saw on the fifth level of the employee's parking deck, supposedly replied that he did not have room in the van for six workers who had tool boxes and ladders. Petitioner then told him to make room by taking Petitioner's car keys from the van, opening the trunk of Petitioner's personal vehicle and leaving the gasoline there. Petitioner's vehicle was parked in a remote area of the fourth deck where employees' cars were not supposed to be parked. When Petitioner was arrested on January 22, 2009, the police confiscated his MIA employee badges. Initially sympathetic to him, Ms. Gonzalez subsequently received an e-mail and read the police report that made her believe that Petitioner had been stealing gasoline for some time. After Petitioner was unable to work and was discharged, he was replaced by a person who is Cuban. After Petitioner's case was nolle prossed in April 2010, he asked Ms. Gonzalez to initiate an ID confiscation hearing to help him get the badges and she refused. Ultimate Findings of Fact The evidence supports a finding that Petitioner, Mr. Bracamonte, was ordered to terminate the employment of Mr. Samanamoud not because he was Peruvian, but because Ms. Gonzalez had a legitimate business interest in avoiding liability for his speeding and reckless driving. The evidence supports a finding that Petitioner, Mr. Bracamonte, was not the victim of discrimination based on age based on Stipulated Finding of Fact, paragraph 16. The evidence supports a finding that Petitioner, Mr. Bracamonte, was terminated from employment because he could not work on the MIA project after his badges were confiscated, not because of his age or because of his national origin. The evidence supports a finding that Ms. Gonzalez was not willing to help Petitioner get the badges necessary to work at MIA because she received information after his arrest that tended to convince her that Petitioner had been stealing gasoline over a period of time.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for relief in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2010.
Findings Of Fact The Garemore airport is located in Marion County and is known as the Greystone Airport. The Garemores were issued a private airport license for the period September 24, 1980, through September 30, 1981, and have made timely application for annual renewal of this license. Neighboring property owners and residents who objected to grant of the initial license also object to renewal. Generally, their objections concern excessive noise and unsafe aircraft operations. Several Petitioners raise and breed thoroughbred horses on property adjacent to the airport. They fear for their personal safety and the well-being of these horses and other livestock. These Petitioners also contend that aircraft noise and low flying upset their animals and interfere with mating. However, Respondent introduced opposing evidence, and Petitioners' contention was not established as factual. Through unrebutted testimony, Petitioners established that crop dusters routinely originate operations from Greystone Airport, and that crop dusting chemicals are stored on the site. About six months ago, a crop duster taking off from Greystone Airport dumped his chemical load on a Petitioner's property and subsequently crashed on this property. Petitioners also argue that the airport glide slope does not meet accepted criteria and that runway surfacing is inadequate. Respondent DOT has recently inspected the facility and through the testimony of its airport inspector, demonstrated that the glide slope has been measured and meets the 20 to 1 requirement set forth in Section 14-60.07, Florida Administrative Code. The runway is not surfaced and Petitioners contend it is not hard enough for aircraft operations during the rainy season. As evidence of this, they cite an incident where a visiting airplane ground looped on landing and appeared to lose a wheel. This incident did not establish a runway deficiency, however, nor did Petitioners offer evidence that the runway surface fails to meet any statutory or rule standard. Petitioners related numerous examples of low flying, night flying and acrobatic maneuvering at and near the Greystone Airport. They contend that these activities along with the concentration of World War II and antique aircraft, and the crop dusting operations, have made this a commercial facility.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the private airport license issued to James and Geraldine Garemore be renewed subject to a restriction against crop dusting operations. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Clark Hardwick 900 Northeast 100th Street Ocala, Florida 32677 Charles and Terry Kerr 8149 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32670 Mr. John P. Edson 8610 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32671 Sherry and Vince Shofner Post Office Box 467 Anthony, Florida 32617 Frank and Carol Constantini 8545 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32670 Mr. James B. Banta, Sr. 9349 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32670 Ms. Deborah Allen 8263 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32671 Mr. Worthy E. Farr, Jr. 8215 West Anthony Road, Northeast Ocala, Florida 32671 Mr. Michael J. Stavola Post Office Box 187 Anthony, Florida 32617 Frances Spain Post Office Box 128 Anthony, Florida 32617 Ms. Beatrice Shepherd Post Office Box 215 Anthony, Florida 32617 J. W. Houston 900 Northeast 100th Street Ocala, Florida 32670 John F. Welch, Esquire Post Office Box 833 Ocala, Florida 32678 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Suite 562 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted a license for a private airport some four miles east of Dundee, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Frank J. Drewniany, Petitioner, is the owner of 153 acres of undeveloped land some 4 miles east of Dundee, Florida, which he proposes to develop and on which he proposes to operate a private airport. On October 28, 1988, Petitioner applied for a site permit and license for a private airport (Exhibit 1). The application provided the information required by statute and the rules of the Department of Transportation (DOT), Respondent. This information included evidence of Applicant's right to so use the property, a list of airports within 15 miles of the proposed facility, mailing addresses of all landowners within 1000 feet of the proposed facility, FAA airspace approval and the prescribed fees. The proposed site was inspected by John Roeller, the Florida DOT airport program administrator in the district office having jurisdiction over the area. This inspection revealed the site to be adequate for the proposed airport; the airport, if constructed, would conform to minimum standards of safety; the local zoning was appropriate for the airport; the Applicant had provided a list of all airports and municipalities within 15 miles of the proposed airport and all property owners within 1000 feet of the proposed airport; and that safe air traffic patterns can be worked out for the proposed airport. Following this inspection Roeller, on October 31, 1988, executed the prescribed certification that the site is feasible for the proposed use and can meet the requirements set forth in Chapter 14-60, Florida Administrative Code (Exhibit 5). By letter dated August 22, 1988, the Federal Aviation Administration (Exhibit 6) determined the proposed airport would not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace by aircraft if operations are conducted in VFR weather conditions and the landing area is limited to private use. By Notice of Intent to issue site approval dated March 22, 1989 (Exhibit 7), the DOT published the intent to issue the requested permit and advised protestors would be allowed to air their views at a public meeting on May 10, 1989. Following this public meeting, Site Approval Order 89-13 (Exhibit 8) was issued, a hearing was requested to contest the issuance of the requested license and these proceedings followed. Intervenors presented evidence of a general concern for the safety of residents living in the vicinity of the airport and hearsay evidence regarding crashes of private planes in various areas of the United States. No evidence was presented by Intervenors to rebut the evidence that the Applicant had complied with the requirements for site approval and licensure contained in Chapter 14-60, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered granting Frank J. Drewniany a license to operate a private airport at Latitude 28 -00'-40" North and Longitude 81 -31'40" West, subject to restrictions established by the FAA and DOT to insure safe air patterns are established for the proposed private airport. ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger W. Sims, Esquire Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas J. Patka, Esquire Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33601 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas J. Hirt 1 Cypress Run Sun Air Country Club Haines City, Florida 33844 Ben G. Watts Interim Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact The site of the proposed airport (known as "Bean Patch Airport") is a triangular-shaped tract adjacent to the extension of Berryhill Read in Santa Rosa County. Mapoles purchased the property after a favorable preliminary inspection report by DOT engineer, Hobby Grice. Mapoles then filed applications for approval with DOT and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The proposed runway is oriented generally east to west (080/2600). Runway length is approximately 2,200 feet. However, the effective length allowing for the required 15-feet glide path clearance over a road near the east end is 1,900 feet for west landing. Without removal of trees on the west approach, the effective runway length for west landing would further be reduced to 1,400 feet. Effective length of the east runway is 2,200 feet. Runway width is 100 feet. Petitioners have measured the proposed runway and contend that the correct length is 2,037 feet. This was not shown to be an accurate measurement of the runway as it is currently planned. Even if correct, however, it appears that Mapoles could still obtain the 1,800 feet required by Section 14-60.07, FAC, provided the trees are removed on the west approach. The proposed runway is not level and has a low spot which fills with water during periods of heavy rain. Mapoles has commenced grading the area, but it was not demonstrated that this has corrected the drainage problem. Although there is no requirement that a private, grass runway be level, Petitioners correctly point out that standing water or mud on a runway constitutes a safety hazard. Petitioners contend that an east/west oriented runway is undesirable. They argue that prevailing winds from the north in winter and the south in summer would create crosswind conditions for takeoffs and landings. However, velocity is under seven knots most of the time, and would not materially affect landing or takeoff safety. Further, users of the airport are trained in dealing with various wind conditions and would presumably avoid landing or taking off during periods when there is a crosswind hazard. Petitioners point out that several private and military airfields are located in the general area. In addition, the Commander of Training Air Wing 5 (U.S. Navy) is opposed to the Bean Patch Airport due to the projected reopening of Wallace Field, also in the vicinity. However, the FAA received no request from the Navy regarding Wallace Field and granted its approval for the proposed airport with certain restrictions. These conditions have been incorporated in the site approval order. Further, there was no evidence to indicate that Bean Patch Airport traffic or traffic patterns would pose any hazard to air safety. Petitioners contend that nearby gas and power lines also pose threats to safety. The gas line is located on the side of a road separated from the runway by the homesites discussed below, and thus does not present a safety hazard. The power line is located to the side of the runway extension and is not a direct hazard to flight. However, the traffic patterns ultimately adopted should avoid passing over this power line, if possible. Other potential problems raised by Petitioners concern the lack of immediately available emergency services. However, these services are available in nearby communities and Mapoles should make an early determination as to which fire department and ambulance service to contact in the event of an emergency. Mapoles intends to use the airport for personal pleasure and business. He also plans to sell 14 homesites on the tract and would include the right to utilize the airport with property ownership. He has proposed limiting transient aircraft at the field to a maximum of eight. Petitioners argue that Mapoles' proposed use of this airport will destroy the residential character of their community. They are further concerned with Mapoles stunt flying and his practice of landing on state roads, both of which they regard as reckless. The latter problem, if it exists, relates to Mapoles licensing as a pilot and not as an airport owner. The residential character of the community may well be changed by the airport. However, there are no applicable zoning restrictions and most of the anticipated problems (human and animal health, distraction of automobile drivers) are highly speculative. The concern for children playing on the runway is valid, and such activity has already been observed. Petitioners appropriately recommend installation of a fence if the airport is authorized.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent Department of Transportation enter a final order amending Site Approval Order No. 81-04, by adding the following conditions: Site preparations will include provisions for adequate drainage of the runway. Approval by the Department of Transportation is required prior to licensing. Fencing of the runway, taxiway and aircraft parking area will be accomplished prior to licensing. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary M. Callaway, Esquire Post Office Box 3697 Pensacola, Florida 32506 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 T. Sol Johnson, Esquire Post Office Box 605 Milton, Florida 32570 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REEVES, et al., Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-371 H. BYRD MAPOLES and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent. /
