The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible for a waiver of his 1996 conviction for cruelty to animals in order to receive a pari- mutuel wagering occupational license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an applicant for a pari-mutual wagering occupational license who wishes to be licensed as a greyhound owner in Florida. Respondent is the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering, an executive agency of the State of Florida created by Section 20.165(2)(f), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's application, filed June 27, 2002, candidly disclosed a previous felony conviction of cruelty to animals. On or about June 20, 1996, Petitioner was, in fact, found guilty of a third degree felony (cruelty to animals: refusing medical care to a greyhound) under Section 828.12(2), Florida Statutes, by a jury in the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for Volusia County in Case No. 96-30581CFAES. He was 26 years old at the time. Petitioner's conviction for cruelty to animals arose from the death of a greyhound puppy named "He's My Denny." The puppy was in Petitioner's care at the Daytona Beach Kennel Club. "He's My Denny" was bred and raised to be a racing greyhound. As a result of his aforementioned felony conviction, Petitioner served 57 days in the Volusia County Jail and the balance of five years via out-of-state probation. Petitioner entered into a Consent Order with the Division, whereby he was declared to be ineligible for any pari- mutuel occupational license under Section 550.105, Florida Statutes, for three years. On July 1, 2002, after his three-year suspension had run, Petitioner requested a waiver of his conviction of cruelty to animals, for the purpose of re-licensure. Stephen Toner, an Investigator for the Division, interviewed Petitioner on August 5, 2002, regarding his request for a waiver. During the interview, Mr. Toner completed a waiver interview form. Each page, with the exception of the last page of the form which contained Mr. Toner's comments, was initialed and dated by Petitioner. In commenting upon the interview and its form at hearing, Petitioner expressed concern that Mr. Toner had misunderstood him during the interview when he said something to the effect of "If I had known there would be this much trouble with such serious consequences, I would have just put the dog down." I accept that Petitioner meant, by this, or similar language, that he would have humanely euthanized "He's My Denny," rather than allowing the beast to suffer. However, this information is largely irrelevant. Petitioner received the Division's letter of license denial on September 20, 2002. The National Greyhound Association will not permit Petitioner to register a greyhound for racing purposes in any state unless the State of Florida will re-license him. Therefore, Petitioner is effectively precluded from his chosen line of work throughout the United States, by Florida's denial of his occupational license application. After being denied re-licensure by the Division, Petitioner received a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights, dated October 25, 2002. The Certificate states, in pertinent part: "grants [Petitioner] restoration of civil rights, except the specific authority to possess or own a firearm for any and all felony convictions in the State of Florida." Petitioner testified, without refutation, that, except for his cruelty to animals conviction, he has had no other trouble with the law except that when he was 19 years old, he was caught driving without a license and represented himself to police as his older brother, who did have a driver's license. At hearing, Petitioner did not list, or elaborate on, any signs of good moral character or rehabilitation since his 1996 Florida conviction for cruelty to animals.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for a pari-mutuel occupational license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: David J. Gibby 6278 Stanleyville Drive Rural Hill, North Carolina 27045 Joseph M. Helton, Jr., Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issue is whether Proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-2.026(4) and (6) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, pursuant to sections 120.52(8) and 120.56(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to chapter 550, Florida Statutes, Petitioner Second Chance operates jai alai games at its facility in Marion County, and Petitioner WFA owns and operates a greyhound permit and summer jai alai permit at its facility in Miami-Dade County. Petitioner WFA also indirectly owns a summer jai alai permit at the Miami Jai Alai in Miami-Dade County and owns partial interests in two jai alai permits operated at the Dania Jai Alai facility in Broward County. Pursuant to chapter 550, Intervenor owns and operates a jai alai permit at its facility in Seminole County, where it conducts live jai alai permits. Petitioners and Intervenor are regulated by the proposed rules that they challenge in these cases. Proposed rule 61D-2.026(4) (the Court Rule) provides: Jai alai games must be conducted on a three-walled court meeting the following requirements: The side wall must be at least 175 feet long and at least 35 feet in height; The front wall and back wall must be at least 35 feet in width and height; The front wall must be made of granite. All courts must have sufficient overhead coverage to ensure for the operation of scheduled performances. All courts must have a live viewing area for games. Proposed rule 61D-2.026(6) (the Roster Rule) provides: "Jai Alai permit holders must utilize a rotational system of at least eight different players or teams." The rulemaking authority cited for the Court Rule and the Roster Rule is sections 550.0251 and 550.105(3) and (10)(a). The law implemented cited for the Court Rule and the Roster Rule is sections 550.0251, 550.105, and 550.70.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner was an employee of Respondent and, if so, whether Respondent is guilty of an act of employment discrimination against Petitioner, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns four ranches in Florida, including the Yeehaw Plantation near Yeehaw Junction, as well as a ranch in Texas and a ranch in Georgia. Respondent employs about 80 persons in its Atlanta offices and at its various ranches. The Yeehaw Plantation includes 7000 acres of hunt courses, gun dog kennels, and horse stables. To address deficiencies in its gun dog operations at the Yeehaw Plantation, Respondent retained Robin Watson to perform a kennel evaluation in early 2015. A citizen of the United Kingdom, Mr. Watson has earned an international reputation as a breeder, trainer, and handler of gun dogs, mostly British Labradors, and has trained dogs throughout the world. In the United Kingdom, Mr. Watson has served as the highest-level judge for field trials of hunting dogs, and he and his dogs have won several championships. Following the kennel evaluation, Respondent extended Mr. Watson an offer of full-time employment to train its gun dogs and provide his British Labradors for use in Respondent's hunting operations. Upon receipt of the employment offer, Mr. Watson informed Respondent that he could accept the job only if he could be joined by Petitioner, who had accompanied him on the kennel evaluation. Petitioner is a female citizen of the United Kingdom and is of British origin. Respondent agreed to this condition and, to induce Mr. Watson's acceptance, also agreed to pay the visa-application and relocation expenses of Mr. Watson and Petitioner. Respondent retained counsel to assist with Mr. Watson's visa. Based on his world-class qualifications as a gun dog trainer, Mr. Watson applied for, and obtained, an 0-1 visa, which is reserved for persons with "extraordinary ability." Petitioner did not qualify for an 0-1 visa, but obtained a B-2 visa, which is reserved for visitors and does not allow employment in the United States. Due to its involvement in securing the visas, Respondent was aware at all times of the type of Petitioner's visa and its prohibition against employment. In August 2015, Petitioner and Mr. Watson moved from the United Kingdom to Florida, where they occupied, as part of Mr. Watson's employment package, a house on the ranch. Mr. Watson's supervisor was Bud O'Connor, who is Respondent's ranch administrator. A majority of Mr. O'Connor's time is spent at Respondent's four Florida ranches, but he also visits Respondent's ranch in Texas and ranch in Georgia. While at the Yeehaw Plantation, Mr. O'Connor met with Mr. Watson an average of once weekly. At some point roughly coinciding with complaints voiced by a principal of Respondent in connection with a recent hunt, Mr. O'Connor became dissatisfied with Mr. Watson's work. Part of the dissatisfaction involved Petitioner, whom Mr. O'Connor described as "joined at the hip" with Mr. Watson. Petitioner accompanied Mr. Watson even on the hunts, where the support truck was to have been occupied only by Mr. Watson, as the dog handler, and two employees whose duties were to handle the horses. Mr. O'Connor's frustration with the situation is exemplified by his assumption that, when Mr. Watson drove the trailer off a small bridge on the ranch while talking on his cellphone, he must have been talking to Petitioner, who was not present with him at the time. Mr. O'Connor eventually directed Mr. Watson not to allow Petitioner to join them on the hunts. Mr. Watson objected on the ground that she was his secretary and worried that she would be displeased. But Mr. O'Connor was adamant and, in mid- 2016, also forbade her from attending meetings in the Yeehaw Plantation office. While living at Yeehaw Plantation, Petitioner helped Mr. Watson with the dogs, as she had done before and has done after his employment with Respondent. However, at all times, Petitioner provided her services as a volunteer. At no time did Respondent agree to employ her. Foremost among the reasons not to employ Petitioner was the illegality of such employment: Respondent's operation features the internal controls of a large corporation, so that it would be impossible for one or two persons to conceal an illegal employment decision within the corporate ranks. At no time did Respondent agree to, or in fact, compensate Petitioner directly or indirectly through Mr. Watson. The above-described relocation expenses and housing were inducements to Mr. Watson to accept Respondent's job offer. In July 2016, Respondent provided Petitioner health insurance, but as a dependent of Mr. Watson, whom she had married earlier in the month. In November 2017, Mr. Watson informed Mr. O'Connor that he was quitting, as he did the following month. The timing of Mr. Watson's departure at the start of quail hunting season presented a problem for Mr. O'Connor, who reminded Mr. Watson of the provision of his agreement with Respondent that called for repayment of the relocation expenses in the event of an early termination. Notably, Mr. Watson did not respond that he was entitled to an offset for the services that Petitioner had provided.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Robert E. Rigrish, Esquire Bodker, Ramsey, Andrews, Rollins, Winograd, & Wildstein 3490 Piedmont Road Northeast, Suite 1400 Atlanta, Georgia 30305 (eServed) Rachael J. Watson 2921 Old Farm Road Lancaster, South Carolina 29720 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Richard Tortora (Tortora), held pari-mutuel wagering occupational license number 0066650, as a thoroughbred trainer. Tortora has been licensed since 1979, and has not previously been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding. Tortora was a participating trainer during the 1956 thoroughbred meet at Calder Race Course, an association authorized to conduct thoroughbred racing in the State of Florida. On August 2, 1986, Tortora was the trainer of the horse "Chief Again," the winner of the fourth race at Calder Race Course that day. Immediately following the race, the Division, consistent with its standard practice, took a urine sample from "Chief Again" for analysis by the Division's laboratory. The parties have stipulated that the chain of custody of the urine sample was not breached, and that the urine sample was properly taken, packaged and delivered to the Division's laboratory for testing. The parties have further stipulated that a portion of the urine sample was delivered to Dr. Richard Sams, Equine Testing Laboratory, College of Veterinary Medicine, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, for testing on behalf of Tortora, and that such sample was properly taken, packaged, and delivered. Upon analysis, the urin sample taken from "chief Again" proved positive for the presence of the drug butorphanol, a schedule 3 narcotic. Butorphanol is a potent analgesic, traditionally used to control the intestinal pain associated with equine colic. In therapeutic dosage, butorphanol renders the animal immobile, however, at low dosages it will act as a stimulant. In reaching the conclusion that "Chief Again" was shown to have raced with the narcotic butorphanol in his system, the evidence offered on behalf of Tortora, through Drs. Sams and Maylin, has not been overlooked. Such evidence failed, however to detract from the credible and compelling nature of the Division's proof. The Division's analysis was composed of sequential screening procedures designed to initially identify the presence of an unusual substance and ultimately identify the compound. Throughout the Division's initial procedures, the urine taken from "Chief Again" was consistently identified as containing an opiate with characteristics consistent with those of butorphanol. Ultimately the Division subjected the sample to gas chromatographic/mass spectral analysis. This refined analysis confirmed the presence of butorphonal. The consistency of the Division's findings at all levels of its testing provides compelling evidence that the urine sample taken from "Chief Again" did contain the narcotic butorphonal. Following the Division's testing, Tortora requested that it furnish the balance of the urine sample taken from "Chief Again", approximately 2om1, to Dr. Richard Sams for analysis. Dr. Sams subjected the sample to gas chromatographic/mass spectral analysis and found no evidence of butorphanol. While finding no evidence of butorphanol, Dr. Sams did not conclude that the sample did not contain the narcotic, but merely that he was unable to detect its presence. According to Dr. Sams, the limited volume of urine available for testing compromised his ability to detect the presence of butorphanol. He affirmatively concluded, however, that the Division's data was properly prepared and adequate to support a positive finding of butorphanol in the sample. Dr. Maylin's testimony was premised on a review of Dr. Sams' and the Division's written test reports, he undertook no independent analysis, and was not privy to any testimony offered at hearing. Dr. Maylin opined that if butorphanol were present Dr. Sams should have detected it and, based on certain assumptions, that the Division reported a false finding because of laboratory contamination. Dr. Maylin's opinions are rejected. Dr. Sams is familiar with the equipment and procedures he utilized. He of all people is most familiar with the capabilities and reliability of that analysis. Dr. Maylin's opinion that the analysis ran by Dr. Sams had more import than Dr. Sams ascribed to it is not credible. Dr. Maylin's opinion that the Division reported a false finding is likewise not credited. Dr. Maylin's opinion was predicated on the assumption that proper testing procedures were not followed. Dr. Maylin's assumptions were incorrect. While "Chief Again's" urine was found to test positive for butorphanol, Tortora denies any knowledge of how the narcotic could have been introduced into the horse's system. According to Tortora he was unfamiliar with this narcotic until these charges were brought, and "Chief Again" was not under any medical treatment. Tortora offered no evidence, however, of what provisions he took, if any, to supervise or otherwise protect "Chief Again's" integrity.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether, and how, the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC) should discipline the Respondent, Theresia Helton, on charges that she: failed to account and deliver rental payments and deposits; was culpably negligent and in breach of trust in her dealings regarding rental property; failed to escrow rental payments and deposits; failed to properly reconcile her escrow account; and failed to make transaction agreements and bank statements available for inspection.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the events giving rise to the Administrative Complaint in this case, the Respondent, Theresia Helton, held two Florida real estate broker licenses (BK 3077530 and BK 3248280) and was the owner and qualifying broker for 1010 Apartments, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm. However, on May 22, 2013, FREC entered a Final Order suspending those licenses for five years. The Final Order is on appeal by the Division, which seeks to revoke the Respondent's licenses, as recommended by the Administrative Law Judge in that case. Eileen and Ernest Armitage ("the Armitages") reside in New Jersey and own a condominium located at 15599 Latitude Drive, Bonita Springs, Florida ("the property" or "condo"). In 2010, the Armitages began communicating with the Respondent and asked her to find a tenant for the property. In return for the Respondent's services, the Armitages verbally agreed to pay her a commission of ten percent of the annual gross rent. In September 2010, the Respondent obtained a tenant, Marion Ward Bentson, to rent the property for $1,400 a month and pay a security deposit in the amount of one month's rent. The Respondent filled in a form lease to begin on September 14 of that year. On September 8, 2010, the lease was signed by Ms. Bentson and by the Respondent on behalf of the Armitages (in one place as their agent, and in another as landlord). The Respondent collected the $1,400 security deposit and $700 prorated first month of rent from Ms. Bentson. The lease directed the tenant to mail future rent payments to "Ilene [sic] Armitage/1010 Apartments, Inc." at the brokerage's address in Naples. The Respondent then submitted the lease to the homeowners association (HOA) for approval. The lease was approved by the HOA on September 14, 2010, and became effective on that date. The Respondent kept the $2,100 collected from the tenant in payment of the $1,680 commission, plus other charges. Some details of the 2010 transactions remain unclear. The Armitages testified that the Respondent sent the lease to them and that they made corrections, signed the corrected lease, and returned it to the Respondent. The Respondent testified that the HOA sent the lease to the Armitages after approval and that no corrected lease signed by the Armitages was returned to her. A corrected lease was introduced in evidence. It indicates that Eileen Armitage corrected the spelling of her name, clarified that the Armitages were the landlord under the lease, clarified that future rent and notices were to be sent to the Armitages in New Jersey, initialed the changes, and signed the corrected lease on September 15, 2010. The corrected lease apparently was not presented to the HOA for approval, and it is not clear what happened to it. It is, however, clear from the evidence that the parties' subsequent conduct was consistent with the corrected lease, and that the Armitages had no complaints about the Respondent's conduct with respect to the Bentson lease. In July 2011, Ms. Bentson stopped paying rent and gave notice that she was moving out. The Armitages contacted the Respondent and asked her to help them find a tenant to replace Ms. Bentson. It was agreed verbally, or assumed, that the Respondent again would be paid a commission of ten percent of the annual gross rent. The Armitages testified that there also was a verbal agreement that the commission on the Bentson lease would be prorated, entitling the Armitages to a refund. The Respondent denied that there was any agreement to prorate the Bentson lease commission. On this disagreement, the Respondent's testimony was more believable. The Armitages remained in communication with the Respondent while she attempted to find a new tenant. At the end of August 2011, Laurie Ungar contacted the Respondent regarding the Armitage property, and the Respondent arranged for Mrs. Ungar to see the condo. Mrs. Ungar noted that there were scuff marks on the walls, trash that needed to be removed, and carpet and a patio deck that needed cleaning. She expressed her interest in renting the condo, if those items were corrected. The Respondent reported to the Armitages, who were under the impression that the condo already was in good condition and did not agree to spend money for additional repairs. The Respondent decided to proceed with the lease negotiations and arrange for whatever work would be needed to satisfy the Ungars. The Respondent met with Mrs. Ungar on August 31, 2011, and negotiated on behalf of the Armitages. The Respondent filled in a form lease to begin on September 21, 2011. Mrs. Ungar signed for herself and her husband and gave the Respondent a check for $75 for the HOA application fee. The lease identified "Ilene [sic] Armitage" as landlord and provided for notices to be sent to her, although no contact information was included for her. The Respondent signed as landlord in one place on the form and as agent in another. She also initialed the lease as landlord. By checks dated September 1, 2011, Mrs. Ungar gave the Respondent $500 for the first month's prorated rent, $1,500 for the following month's rent, a security deposit in the amount of $1,500, and a pet security deposit in the amount of $250. The Respondent reported to the Armitages that the Ungars signed the lease. She then sent someone to touch up the scuff marks on the walls and clean up the apartment. Either the Armitages or the HOA apparently asked for a pet fee from the Ungars, which they delivered to the Respondent by check dated September 13, 2011. The Respondent then submitted the lease to the HOA for approval. The lease was approved by the HOA on September 19, 2011. The Ungars moved in at 3 a.m. on September 21, 2011. When the Ungars arrived, they still were dissatisfied with the condition of the condo. The walls had been touched up with the wrong color paint, so it looked like graffiti. There was still trash at the condo, and the patio deck and carpet still needed cleaning, in their opinion. They contacted the Respondent, who came over with a can of paint and removed some of the trash. The Ungars remained very dissatisfied with the condition of the condo. Shortly after the Ungars moved in, the Armitages began asking the Respondent for a copy of the lease. For reasons not clear from the testimony, they did not receive the lease or any money from the Respondent and became increasingly agitated about it. At the end of the month, the Armitages received a final bill from the utility company. When they inquired, they were told that the utilities had been transferred to another payor, who was occupying the condo. They contacted the Ungars directly, and the Ungars told them that they still were dissatisfied with the condition of the condo and wanted to terminate the lease at the end of October and get their deposits refunded. The Armitages told them that they did not have the deposits, as the Respondent still had not forwarded them any money. Mr. Ungar went to the Respondent's office, told her about the conversation with the Armitages, and demanded a refund of the deposits. She told him she already had sent the money to the Armitages. On October 6, 2011, the Respondent emailed the Armitages to report her conversation with Mr. Ungar and tell them it was up to them if they wanted to let the Ungars out of the lease, but that she had earned her commission. She stated that she had cleaned up the condo for the Ungars after the Armitages had declined and had mailed the Armitages a check for $1,500, which was what was left of the moneys paid by the Ungars after deducting her commission in the amount of $1,800, a cleaning fee of $150, another $150 for pressure-washing the patio deck, a painting fee of $200, and another fee of $200 for cleaning and hauling out trash. There was no evidence that those sums actually were incurred by the Respondent or that any of the work had been done, except for the poor touch-up of the scuff marks on the walls. After the Respondent sent the email, she thought better of sending the $1,500 check since both the Armitages and the Ungars were claiming it. The money remained in her operating account. She believed she was entitled to keep the balance of the $4,000 paid by the Ungars. She did not notify FREC of any deposit dispute. On October 7, 2011, the Armitages emailed the Respondent to again ask for a copy of the signed lease and listing agreement. On October 10, 2011, they emailed to again ask for the signed lease and ask for the invoices for the work done (or at least contact information for the vendors). By email dated October 12, 2011, they followed up to again request the information. They got no response from the Respondent, except to say that she did not mail the check referred to in the email on October 6, 2011. The Armitages and Ungars renegotiated the lease. The Armitages reduced the monthly rent to pay the Ungars for painting, cleaning, and other work they did at the condo to make it satisfactory to them. The Armitages sued the Respondent and settled for $2,700, which was paid by check dated July 12, 2012. The Armitages used $2,000 from the settlement to return deposits to the Ungars. During the Division's investigation, the Respondent was asked to provide a copy of her agreement with the Armitages and her escrow bank account records. There were no such records. Later, a subpoena was issued for the records for the Respondent's operating account, which were produced. There was no evidence that the Division asked for the records for the operating account before issuing the subpoena. The Respondent's license is suspended until May 21, 2018, because the Division proved charges that in the fall of 2010, she was culpably negligent, in violation of section 475.25(1)(b), and failed to account and deliver, in violation of section 475.25(1)(d)1. The Respondent is the single mother of two daughters, whom she was supporting by income earned as a real estate broker, as well as child support payments. The Division has incurred costs in the amount of $825 in prosecuting this case against the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: finding the Respondent guilty as charged in Counts I through V of the Administrative Complaint; revoking her licenses; and assessing costs in the amount of $825. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2013.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether, in making an award of a lease for office space, the Respondent acted according to the requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact In February, 1993, the Department of Labor and Employment Security ("Department") issued a Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal No. 540:0969 ("RFP") seeking to lease approximately 18,684 square feet of office space in Jacksonville, Florida, for a period of six years. The space was to house the Office of Disability Determinations ("ODD"), which processes disability claims and determines whether claimants are eligible for Social Security and Supplemental Income benefits. The office has minimal contact with the general public. The RFP provided that all bids were subject to conditions stated within the RFP. Bids not in compliance with RFP conditions were subject to rejection. RFP Article D, General Provisions, Paragraph 8 provides as follows: The Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals for reasons which shall include but not be limited to the agency's budgetary constraints; waive any minor informality or technicality in bids' to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the state, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. A pre-bid conference was conducted by the Department on February 16, 1993. Representatives from the vendors involved in this proceeding attended the conference. Bids were opened on March 5, 1993. The Department received five responses, three of which were deemed to be responsive and which were evaluated. The remaining two responses were determined to be nonresponsive and were not evaluated. On or about March 10, 1993, based on the evaluations, the Department proposed to award the bid to Koger Properties, Inc. On or about March 17, 1993, the Department notified the vendors of the intended award. The Petitioners filed timely notices protesting the intended award. TOWNCENTRE PROPOSAL Paragraph 13 sets forth conditions to which a bidder must agree in order to be awarded a bid. Subsection "a" of the paragraph states, "[i]f successful, bidder agrees to enter into a lease agreement on the Department of General Services Standard Lease Agreement Form BCM 4054 (Attachment F - Do not complete)." The copy of the Department of General Services Standard Lease Agreement Form which was included in the RFP was a poorly reproduced copy. Article III of the Lease Agreement Form provides as follows: III HEATING, AIR CONDITIONING AND JANITOR SERVICES 1.a. The Lessor agrees to furnish to the Lessee heating and air conditioning equipment and maint(illegible) in satisfactory operating condition at all times for the leased premises during the term of the lease at the (illegible) of the Lessor. b. The Lessor agrees to maintain thermostats in the demised premises at 68 degrees Fahrenhe(illegible) the heating season and 78 degrees Fahrenheit during the cooling season; and certifies that boilers the(illegible) been calibrated to permit the most efficient operation. The Lessor agrees to furnish janitorial services and all necessary janitorial supplies for the leased (illegible) during the term of the lease at the expense of the Lessor. All services required above shall be provided during the Lessee's normal working hours, whic(illegible)marily from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday excluding state holidays. Also attached to the RFP was a copy of an addendum to the lease, also poorly reproduced. The addendum provides as follows: Article III, Paragraph III Addendum for Full Service Lease The lessor and lessee mutually agree that the described prem(illegible) leased in this lease agreement shall be available to the department (lessee) for its exclusive use twenty four (24) (illegible) per day, seven (7) days per week during the lease term. T(illegible) space to be leased by the department will be fully occupied during normal working hours from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Mo(illegible) through Friday, excluding holidays, Saturdays and Sundays, (illegible) may be fully or partially occupied during all other periods (illegible) time as necessary and required at the full discretion of th(illegible) department. Accordingly, services to be provided by the le(illegible) under the terms of the lease agreement, including electrici(illegible) other utilities, will be provided during all hours of occup(illegible) at no additional cost to the department (lessee). Although the copy of the lease agreement and addendum included in the RFP were poorly reproduced, it is clear that the addendum modifies the paragraph of the lease agreement related to provision of heating, air conditioning and janitorial services to require that HVAC services be provided throughout the premises during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. The proposal submitted by Towncentre included an "Attachment Z" which states as follows: The following represent exceptions and/or clarifications to the terms of the Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal Form ("RFP") for the referenced Lease. Except as noted herein, Bidder shall comply fully with the terms of the RFP..." Item #7 of Attachment Z states as follows: The Building in which the space is offered is serviced by central heating, ventilating and air conditioning; therefore, no separate thermostats will be provided in the space other than in the computer room. However, the required temperature standards will be maintained and satisfied. The computer room HVAC shall be available 24 hours a day. Otherwise, after-hours HVAC is billed at $80 per hour. Attachment Z also included additional exceptions to the provisions of the RFP. Contrary to the requirements set forth in the addendum attached to the lease form included in the RFP, the Towncentre proposal included additional charges for after hours uses. The Department determined that the Towncentre proposal was nonresponsive and disqualified the proposal from further consideration. Because the Towncentre proposal includes HVAC charges which are specifically prohibited under the terms of the RFP, the Towncentre proposal is nonresponsive to the RFP. Towncentre asserts that other sections of the RFP indicate that, within the leased premises, only the computer room is required to be heated or cooled on a continuous basis. Vendors had an adequate opportunity to direct questions regarding the RFP to Department officials. There is no evidence that Towncentre sought clarification from the Department related to this matter prior to submitting the bid proposal. In the notification to Towncentre that the bid had been determined to be nonresponsive to the RFP, the Department identified the other exceptions as additional reasons for the determination of nonresponsiveness. At hearing Towncentre introduced no evidence related to the remaining items included within Attachment Z. BRYAN SIMPSON JR. FOR P.V. ASSOCIATES The Simpson bid was deemed to be responsive and was evaluated. The evaluations were performed by three Department employees, Dorea Sowinski, Albert Cherry, and Tom Mahar. On March 9, 1993, the evaluators visited the physical locations of the three responsive bids. (Although the bid had been declared nonresponsive, they also visited the Towncentre site, apparently as a courtesy.) The Simpson space is located in downtown Jacksonville. After completion of the site visits, the evaluators separately and independently completed their evaluation sheets. The evaluators awarded a total of 262 points to Koger Properties and 248 points to Simpson. Page 7 of the RFP sets forth the evaluation criteria which were considered in awarding evaluation points. The RFP stated as follows: The successful bid will be the one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Rental, using Present Value methodology for basic term of lease (See D, General Provisions Items 3 and 4) applying the present value discount rate of 5.6 per cent. (Weighing: 35) Conformance of and susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization and to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid. (Weighing: 20) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the Departmental operations planned for the requested space. (Weighing: 20) Offers providing contiguous space within preferred boundaries. (Weighing 5) Frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation within one block of the offered space. (Weighing 15) Availability of adequate dining facilities within one mile of the offered space. (Weighing: 2) Proximity of offered space to the clients served by the Department at this facility. (Weighing: 3) Proximity of offered space to other Department activities as well as other public services. (Weighing: 0) TOTAL POINTS: 100 Simpson asserts that the evaluators acted improperly in awarding points in categories 3, 5, 6 and 7. Category 3 relates to the effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the Departmental operations planned for the requested space. Although Simpson asserts that category 3 is vague and ambiguous, there was no objection to the category prior to the submission of the bid responses and the announcement of the proposed lease award. Each evaluator could award up to 20 points in this category for a total of 60 available points. Koger was awarded 55 points. Simpson received 27 points. As to individual evaluators awards, Tom Mahar awarded Simpson five points, Albert Cherry awarded Simpson ten points, and Dorea Sowinski awarded Simpson 12 points. Based on the written memo dated March 10, 1993, identifying the reasons for the recommended bid award, two of the three evaluators considered the Koger space to be located in a safer area than the Simpson facility, and, at least in part, based their point awards on this factor. The two evaluators cite minimal anecdotal information in support of their opinions. The evaluators undertook no investigation related to safety issues and there are no facts to support their opinions. Their award of points for "environmental factors" is arbitrary. Category 5 relates to the frequency and availability of public transportation within one block of the offered space. Each evaluator could award up to 15 points in this category for a total of 45 available points. Both Koger and Simpson received the maximum 45 points. RFP Page Two, question 8 provides as follows: Public Transportation availability: BIDDER RESPONSE: (Check appropriate box) Taxi , Bus , Frequency of service closest bus stop . Both Koger and Simpson indicate service by taxi and bus. The Koger proposal indicates a frequency of service as "8 BUSES" and the closest bus stop as "IN FRONT OF BUILDING ON WOODCOCK DRIVE." Simpson indicates a frequency of service as "15 minutes" and the closest bus stop as "front of building." The Department asserts that the Koger level of transportation access, albeit less than that serving the Simpson site, is satisfactory and therefore entitled to an award of all points available. Simpson asserts that the greater availability of public transportation to the Simpson site should result, under the terms of the evaluation criteria, in Simpson receiving more points than the Koger site for this category. The evaluation criteria clearly requires consideration of both the frequency and availability of satisfactory public transportation. Simpson asserts that in considering the transportation category, the evaluators should have reviewed local public transportation schedules. Review of such schedules establishes that the Simpson site is served more frequently by public bus transportation than is the Koger site, and further establishes that the number of bus routes directly serving the Simpson property far exceeds the routes serving the Koger site. Simpson did not include the schedules in the RFP response. The Simpson site is also located nearby the downtown public transportation transfer station at which point many, perhaps all, local bus routes connect. Simpson did not denote the location of the transfer station in the RFP response While the evaluation committee is not required to consider the bus schedules in reviewing bid proposals, the evaluation committee failed to consider the substantially greater frequency and availability of public transportation to the Simpson site relative to the Koger site, as set forth in the respective RFPs. The Department's position is contrary to the specific criteria identified in the RFP. The award of equivalent points for transportation access to both Simpson and Koger is unsupported by fact or logic and is arbitrary. Category 6 relates to the availability of adequate dining facilities within one mile of the offered space. Each evaluator could award up to two points in this category for a total of six available. Koger was awarded six points. Simpson received one point. When the evaluators rated the adequacy of dining facilities, they considered only those dining facilities which were located within two blocks of the offered space. Such is contrary to the clear terms of the RFP. The Department offered no rationale for the decision to amend the RFP criteria after submission of the proposals. The Simpson RFP response states only that there are adequate dining facilities within walking distance of the offered facility. The Koger response states that there are "three (3) sandwich shops within walking distance in the Koger center and other numerous restaurants within one (1) mile." As to individual evaluators awards, Tom Mahar awarded Simpson one point, while both Albert Cherry and Dorea Sowinski awarded Simpson zero points. Mahar's award was based on his opinion, again based on alleged safety concerns, that employees would be hesitant to walk to nearby restaurants and that driving and parking presented a problem in the downtown location. Cherry voiced a similar opinion. As to alleged safety concerns, Mahar and Cherry again based their opinions on minimal anecdotal information, supported by neither fact nor logic. Neither evaluator undertook any factual analysis of the safety issues relative to the proposed site. Their award of points for this category is arbitrary. On the other hand, Sowinski did not see any restaurants close to the Simpson site during the site visit. In excess of 40 restaurants are located within one mile of the Simpson site. The restaurants provide a variety of dining options both as to expense and fare. Sowinski's failure to observe restaurants located across the street from the Simpson site is, although difficult to understand, apparently a simple mistake on her part. Category 7 relates to the proximity of offered space to the clients served by the Department at this facility. Each evaluator could award up to three points in this category for a total of nine available. Simpson offered no evidence that the determination of points awarded for category 7 was inappropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a Final Order DISMISSING the protest filed by Towncentre Venture, and WITHDRAWING the proposed award of lease contract based on the Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal No. 540:0969. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASES NO. 93-2015BID and 93-2106BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner Towncentre Venture Towncentre Venture's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 4. Rejected, second sentence is irrelevant. 5-7. Rejected, irrelevant. Taken as a whole, the RFP indicates that HVAC services are to be provided throughout the leased premises during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. The evidence fails to establish that the vendors were confused about the terms of the RFP. There were apparently no related questions addressed to Department personnel during the pre-bid conference or at any time subsequent to the conference and prior to the bid opening. 10. Rejected. Not supported by the document cited which does not identify the attachment by letter. 13. Rejected, irrelevant. The standard form lease included in the RFP was a sample document. None of the blank spaces were completed. 16. Rejected, irrelevant. The attendees at the conference were provided an opportunity to inquire as to all matters. There were apparently no questions asked related to the RFP's requirement that HVAC services be provided throughout the facility during all hours of occupancy at no additional cost to the Department. 17-18, 20-21. Rejected, irrelevant. The terms of the RFP are clear. 19. Rejected, irrelevant. The terms of the addendum for full service lease clearly indicate that such HVAC services were to be provided at no additional charge, not just in the computer room, but throughout the entire leased facility. 22. Rejected. The Towncentre bid was nonresponsive to the terms of the RFP. Petitioner Bryan Simpson, Jr., for P. V. Associates P. V. Associates' proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of the evidence which establishes that the RFP was issued seeking space for the Jacksonville Office of Disability Determinations. 4, 23, 24. Rejected, unnecessary. Respondent Department of Labor and Employment Security The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 17. Rejected. The decision to award equivalent points for public transportation access fails to reflect the substantially greater access provided to the Simpson site and is arbitrary. 20-21. Rejected, not supported by greater weight of evidence which establishes no evidence that safety concerns were based on a reasonable evaluation of facts. There are no facts to support the conclusion that the Simpson location if less safe than the Koger site. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Gooding, Acting Secretary Suite 303, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Thomas M. Jenks, Esquire Pappas and Metcalf, P.A. 1 Independent Drive, Suite 3301 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Nathan D. Goldman, Esquire Marcia Maria Morales, Esquire 200 Laura Street Post Office Box 240 Jacksonville, Florida 33202 Edward Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue Whether the respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Dr. Allen is, and has been at all times relevant to this proceeding, a licensed veterinarian in the State of Florida, having been issued license number VM 0003475 by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. The Department is the licensing authority for persons who seek to practice veterinary medicine in Florida. The Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering ("Division") is a subdivision of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. It is the licensing authority for the pari-mutuel wagering industry, with the responsibility for issuing occupational licenses to persons connected with racetracks, including veterinarians. The Division does not have jursidiction to issue or discipline licenses to practice veterinary medicine in Florida. Three stewards are assigned to a racetrack to ensure that the rules of racing are followed; one is employed by the state and two by the racing association at the particular pari-mutuel facility. The stewards have the authority to impose discipline upon persons who have pari-mutuel wagering occupational licenses if they find that the rules have been violated. On December 21, 1993, Dr. Allen was working at Calder Race Course as a veterinarian, and he was fined $500.00 in a ruling of the stewards at the Tropical Park at Calder Race Course for violation of Calder Racing Association Rule 1.21(4). The fine was imposed for Dr. Allen's failure "to conduct his business in a proper manner as an equine veterinarian in regard to the keeping of his records and the filing of bills." The charge which was the subject of the stewards' ruling derived from testimony Dr. Allen gave during a stewards' hearing regarding a positive drug test on a race horse named Ski Robbery. The charges at issue in the hearing were not brought against Dr. Allen but against the trainer of Ski Robbery. However, during the course of his testimony at the hearing, Dr. Allen admitted that he had added money to a bill submitted to the trainer for services rendered to Ski Robbery. On January 31, 1994, the Division filed an Administrative Complaint against Dr. Allen's pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, alleging violation of several of the Division's rules. In its Administrative Complaint, the Division alleged, among other things, that Dr. Allen had admitted to padding his bill to an owner/trainer by administering only one of the several drugs listed on the bill and that Dr. Allen had included an entry on a Veterinary Report of Medication filed with the state which was, by his own admission, false. On June 7, 1994, Dr. Allen entered into a Consent Order with the Division to settle the case and avoid further litigation. The Division of Pari- Mutuel Wagering agreed to accept a fine of $1,000 from Dr. Allen in full resolution of the matters contained in the Administrative Complaint. The Consent Order expressly stated that Dr. Allen did not admit liability or culpability with regard to the charges alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Board of Veterinary Medicine enter a Final Order finding Jonathan S. Allen guilty of violating section 474.214(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), imposing an administrative fine of $500.00 for this violation, and dismissing Count II of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of March 1996. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March 1996.
Findings Of Fact Nancy Boles owns and has operated Happy Days Guest Ranch for some 14 years. This facility is licensed as an ACLF and has no record of complaints other than those contested at this proceeding. On or about March 4, 1987, DHRS received a report from an undisclosed source that a resident at the Happy Days Guest Ranch ACLF had been abused by the proprietor, Nancy Boles, and an investigator was sent to the ACLF. Apparently the allegation was that Respondent had slapped a resident. At this time there were approximately 6 residents at the ACLF. After talking to these residents and with Respondent, the investigator, Katherine Massaro, concluded that a substantiated report of abuse had occurred. The HRS Division of License and Certification was notified and a decision was made to relocate the six residents and place a moratorium on further admissions to the ACLF. Additionally, Respondent's application to renew her ACLF license was denied. No evidence was presented that the HRS Division of Adult Services, filed a notification of a confirmed report of abuse against Respondent and placed her on the abuse register. Accordingly, this is not a proceeding challenging a confirmed report of abuse of the aged but is a license revocation proceeding. It is apparent that HRS notified the State Attorney's Office of the alleged abuse and the charges disposed of in Exhibit 1 were preferred. No adjudication of guilt was made in that case. Petitioner's eye witnesses to the alleged abuse were two elderly women. The younger, Mardell Surrency, whose deposition is Exhibit 2, was 75, and the other, Alice Beasley, whose deposition is Exhibit 3, was 86. Both of these women testified that they saw Respondent slap Fowler Simmons, another resident of the ACLF who is senile or has other mental impairment that led these witnesses to conclude that mentally Simmons was "real bad" with the mind of a child who had to be told everything to do. Both witnesses gave an indication (pantomined) of how Respondent slapped Simmons. Unfortunately, a verbal description of this act is not contained in their deposition. Surrency testified that Beasley "was 86 years old so she didn't pay much attention to anything." Beasley, on the other hand, testified that she and "Modelle" were sitting alongside each other when the incident occurred and she and "Modelle" had often talked about how mean Respondent talked to Simmons. Neither ever saw any bruise on Simmons' face or body or ever saw Respondent strike Simmons other than this one time. Both testified Respondent told Simmons to not sit there "like a damn fool." Respondent's version of the incident was that she did indeed slap Simmons, but gently on the mouth, to get him to eat the meal she had prepared. She demonstrated a very light slap with the palm of her hand on the lips. This evidence is deemed more credible than the often rambling and disjointed testimony of the two female residents of the ACLF.
