The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Michael Crudele, should be disciplined for alleged violations of the statutes and rules governing the conduct of insurance agents.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Michael Crudele, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in Florida as a life insurance agent and as a life and health insurance agent. The Respondent was the agent-of-record on two American Life and Casualty Insurance Company (American Life) annuities purchased by Mary Clem, one in the face amount of $30,000 dated October 28, 1992, and the other in the face amount of $20,000 dated December 28, 1992. Clem was 84 years old at the time and a widow. The annuities represented more than 80 percent of her life savings. The Respondent became agent-of-record on these annuities at the request of Charles Perks, a good friend and former fellow Metropolitan Life agent. Clem had been an insurance customer of Perks since approximately 1985. When Clem complained to Perks that "the bottom fell out of interest" on her certificates of deposit, he suggested the American Life annuities as a safe alternative that paid higher interest. But Perks was not an authorized agent for American Life, so he asked the Respondent to participate in the sales and split the commissions. In 1992, the Respondent became involved in the Zuma Engineering Co., Inc., a startup tire recycling venture. After being introduced to Zuma, the Respondent became very enthusiastic about its prospects. He invested $30,000 in Zuma, received stock in return for his investment, and became a thirty percent owner. He also became involved in all aspects of the startup business, from promoting the business to the public, to raising capital from and working with private investors, to cleaning up Zuma's recycling facility. He understood that he was a corporate director, but corporate filings with the Secretary of State indicate that he was a vice-president from October 27, 1993, until March 20, 1994. The Respondent not only solicited investors himself, he participated in recruiting a sales force. As part of this effort, he recruited his friend Charles Perks. In late 1993 and early 1994, Perks and the Respondent approached Mary Clem to solicit her investment in Zuma. It is not clear from the evidence how the solicitation of Mary Clem proceeded. It is believed that Clem may have initially contacted Perks around the time of the anniversary date of the $30,000 annuity to complain that she had been notified of a drop in the interest rate paid by the annuity. Mary Clem received a guaranteed 5.75 percent interest, plus a one percent interest "bonus" for a total of 6.75 percent interest during the first year of her two American Life annuities. The "bonus" interest automatically terminated at the end of the first year. In addition, the evidence was that the standard interest guarantee decreased to five percent starting with the second year. It is not clear when Clem received notice of the decrease in the interest guarantee or whether she received notice from American Life as to the elimination of the interest "bonus," but it is found that by December 2, 1993, Clem knew the interest rate on her $30,000 annuity was being decreased to five percent for the second year of the annuity. It is possible that she also knew by then that the interest on her $20,000 annuity was being decreased to five percent as well. Perks saw Mary Clem's dissatisfaction with the American Life annuities as an opportunity to sell Zuma promissory notes to her. On or about December 2, 1993, Charles Perks approached Mary Clem and sold her a $10,000 promissory note issued by Zuma. On its face, the promissory note was dated December 3, 1993, and paid twelve percent interest, with a single balloon payment of principal and interest due on June 3, 1995. The evidence was that the Respondent did not participate in this transaction on December 2, 1993. Mary Clem does not recall, and both Perks and the Respondent testified that the Respondent was not present. The Respondent testified that he was not even aware of this $10,000 Zuma note until the Department's Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint on or about July, 1996, but this testimony is rejected as not being credible. It is found that the Respondent knew about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 promissory note either on December 2, 1993, or soon thereafter. It is found that by December 2, 1993, or shortly thereafter, Clem complained to both Perks and the Respondent about the interest on her annuities. It is found that all three of them discussed Zuma promissory notes as an alternative investment. Contrary to the Respondent's testimony, it is found that, if he did not already know about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note by then, the Respondent would have learned of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note during these discussions. It also is found that, based on those discussions, Clem decided to surrender her $20,000 annuity and use the money to buy Zuma promissory notes. It is found that Perks and the Respondent helped Clem with the surrender of her $20,000 annuity. It also is found, contrary to the Respondent's testimony, that Perks and the Respondent assisted in arranging for Clem to be able to purchase a Zuma promissory note in the face amount of $20,000 for the net cash surrender value of the $20,000 annuity, after deduction of premium tax and surrender penalty. When American Life was notified of Clem's desire to surrender the $20,000 annuity, the company contacted the Respondent and asked him to "conserve" the annuity, i.e., dissuade Clem from surrendering it. It is found that, if he did not already know about it by then, the Respondent would have learned of Clem's intentions to buy Zuma promissory notes when he contacted her on behalf of American Life to comply with American Life's request that he attempt to conserve the annuity. It also is found that, if he did not already know about Clem's purchase of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note, he would have learned of the $10,000 Zuma promissory note at this time. By letter dated January 24, 1994, American Life responded to Clem's request to surrender her $20,000 annuity. American Life's letter advised Clem that she was entitled to principal and $69.67 in interest, less premium tax in the amount of $213.69 and surrender charges in the amount of $1,625.65, for a net of $18,230.33. A check for the net amount was enclosed. A copy of American Life's January 24, 1994, letter was sent to the Respondent as the agent-of-record. On or about February 1, 1994, Perks and the Respondent went to Clem's home to complete the purchase of a $20,000 Zuma promissory note. The Respondent testified that, since all of the arrangements had been made in advance, the Respondent's role in the transaction was solely as "corporate director and verifier" on behalf of Zuma; however, the Respondent also would receive $900 of the $2,000 commission paid by Zuma on the transaction. Meanwhile, his additional role as American Life's agent required him to attempt to "conserve" the annuity policy. At one point, the Respondent testified that, as "corporate director and verifier," he inquired into Clem's assets (presumably to ascertain if the investment was appropriate for her). But he also testified that he assumed her assets were unchanged from 1992, raising a question as to whether the Respondent undertook any inquiry into Clem's assets on February 1, 1994, at all. At another point, the Respondent testified that he understood Mary Clem to have $200,000 in assets. See Department Exhibit 6. But, if so, those assets consisted of her home, the annuities and the $10,000 Zuma promissory note. It is found that the Respondent had no reason to believe she had any other assets. The Respondent also testified that he did not determine from his alleged inquiry into Clem's assets, and did not know, that Clem already had purchased a $10,000 Zuma promissory note. As previously found, it is considered incredible that the Respondent did not already know by February 1, 1994, that Clem had purchased the $10,000 Zuma promissory note; it is all the more incredible that he would not have learned of it from a diligent inquiry into Clem's assets for purposes of determining the appropriateness of the $20,000 Zuma investment. Mary Clem testified that the Respondent and Perks touted the safety of the Zuma investment as well as the higher interest it paid. The Respondent testified that, although acting in the conflicting roles described in the preceding finding, he discussed the differences between the two investments, including the risk of the Zuma investment. The Respondent testified that he read to Mary Clem from a written disclosure statement that defined Zuma's promissory notes as being a "risk investment," but no written disclosure statement was introduced in evidence. In any event, the "verification" was a mere formality; as the Respondent knew full well, Clem already had decided to buy the promissory note. Clem wrote a personal check in the amount of $18,230, and Perks and the Respondent gave her Zuma's $20,000 promissory note bearing twelve percent interest. The note was erroneously dated February 1, 1993, and erroneously stated on its face that the single balloon payment of principal and interest was due on February 1, 1995. The note was supposed to have a 24- month term from February 1, 1994, to February 1, 1996. (This discrepancy would lead to problems later. See Findings 32-33, infra.) In view of the conflict of interest inherent in the Respondent's multiple roles in the transaction, it is found that the Respondent did not make a good faith inquiry into appropriateness of the Zuma investment for Mary Clem and did not fully disclose the risk associated with it, as compared to the American Life annuity. If the Respondent disclosed the risk, it is found that he did not do so fully and clearly, again probably due to the conflict of interest inherent in his multiple roles. Neither Mary Clem nor her late husband had ever invested in any stocks, mutual funds or even bonds. Before Mary Clem invested in the American Life annuities, she and her late husband always invested in certificates of deposit. While it is true that Clem wanted higher interest than she was getting on her annuities, she also wanted safety and security. It is found that, if the Respondent had fully and completely disclosed the risk of investing in Zuma promissory notes, Mary Clem would not have invested in them. Mary Clem also surrendered her $30,000 American Life annuity and used the money she received to buy another Zuma promissory note. The Respondent claimed not to have known anything about the third Zuma note, and the Department was not able to prove that he did. It is not clear exactly when Clem decided to surrender her $30,000 annuity and buy a third Zuma note. It was before March 3, 1994, the date of the American Life letter responding to Clem's request to surrender her $30,000 annuity. American Life's letter advised Clem that she was entitled to principal and $16.04 in interest, less premium tax in the amount of $324.71 and surrender charges in the amount of $2,474.92, for a net of $27,216.41. A check for the net amount was enclosed. As with Clem's request to surrender her $20,000 annuity, American Life contacted the Respondent and asked him to try to "conserve" the annuity. The Respondent also received a copy of American Life's March 3, 1994, letter as the agent-of- record. The Respondent admitted that he telephoned Clem on or about February 28, 1994, to try to conserve the annuity but that Clem was adamant. He claimed that Clem did not tell him what she intended to do with the money and that he did not ask. The meeting at which Clem bought the third Zuma promissory note took place on March 10, 1994. Mary Clem thought the Respondent was there but could not swear to it. Perks also testified that he thought the Respondent was there. The Respondent testified that he definitely was not there and did not know the transaction took place. By that time of the meeting on March 10, 1994, the Respondent had become suspicious and distrustful of Zuma's principals. They had diluted his thirty percent share of the company to a mere 0.3 percent. In addition, the Respondent did not think that the principals were following the business plan they had "sold" the Respondent, and which the Respondent in turn had "sold" to private investors, including Mary Clem. By early March 1994, the Respondent began to take steps to attempt to protect the investors in Zuma, including himself, and force Zuma to follow its business plan. Eventually, he emptied Zuma's accounts and placed the funds in the trust account of the lawyers he hired to sue Zuma and its principals to enjoin them to follow the business plan. The court ruled against the Respondent and required him to return the money to Zuma. The Respondent paid his lawyers' fees out of his own pocket. Based on the timing of events, it seems probable that the Respondent did not meet with Perks and Clem on March 10, 1994. By that time, he was becoming deeply involved in his dispute with Zuma and its principals. It is less clear that the Respondent was completely ignorant of Clem's intention to use the money from the surrender of the $30,000 American Life annuity to buy a third Zuma note, but he may well have lost track of Mary Clem and her intentions in the midst of his dispute with Zuma and its principals. It had been arranged before the March 10, 1994, meeting for Clem to be able to purchase a Zuma promissory note in the face amount of $30,000 for the net cash surrender value of the $30,000 annuity, after deduction of premium tax and surrender penalty. The Respondent denied participating in making these arrangements or having any knowledge of them. A similar arrangement already had been made for the $20,000 annuity and Zuma note, and it is conceivable that Perks did not require the Respondent's participation to arrange it for the $30,000 annuity and Zuma note. It is found that the evidence did not prove the Respondent's participation. On March 10, 1994, Clem wrote a personal check in the amount of $27,2126.41, and received Zuma's $30,000 promissory note dated March 10, 1994. On its face, the note paid twelve percent interest, with quarterly payments of $900 interest and the principal payable on March 10, 1996. The Respondent contacted Mary Clem in June or July, 1994, to inquire about her Zuma investment. Clem told him everything was fine. In December 1994, the notes were revised to show Mary Clem's daughter as a beneficiary on the notes in the event of Clem's death. The revised $20,000 note preserved the erroneous issuance and due dates. See Finding 21, supra. The $900 interest payment due on the $30,000 Zuma note on March 1995, was seriously past due. In addition, no payments were made on the $20,000 note. On April 1, 1995, the $20,000 note was renewed upon payment of $6,200 interest and penalties. Under the renewal note, monthly interest payments of $200 were due, and a balloon payment of principal and remaining interest was due on September 1, 1995. By mid-1995, Zuma was in default again, and Clem received no payments after August 8, 1995. Zuma paid Clem a total of just $23,400 on the three promissory notes. The Respondent conceded that there was a high risk of losing one's entire investment in Zuma and that someone investing in Zuma had to be prepared to lose the entire investment. He also conceded that Mary Clem should not have invested the bulk of her life savings in Zuma. He also conceded that it would have been significant to know, and he should have wanted to know, the extent of Clem's investment in Zuma before increasing her investment in Zuma.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Michael Crudele, guilty of violating Sections 626.611(7), 626.621(3), and 626.621(6), Florida Statutes (1993); and (2) suspending his license and eligibility for licensure as a life insurance agent and as a life and health insurance agent for six months. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1998.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether the Respondent's licenses as an insurance agent in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed in this case.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Department of Insurance was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of insurance professionals and the regulation of the insurance industry in this state. Respondent, Harold R. Leiffer, was licensed by the state as a life and health (debit) agent, a life agent, a life and health agent, a general lines agent, and a public adjuster (for fire and allied lines, including marine casualty and motor vehicle damage and mechanical breakdown insurance), and was engaged in the practice of the insurance profession under those licenses in Florida. In January, 1991, Donna L. Devor, at the time, the owner of Cobra Construction Co., a corporation, was contacted by the Respondent after she received a bid for the construction of a fire station in Florida. Ms. Devor had previously known the Respondent as an insurance agent through a company she was associated with to which he had provided construction bonds in the past. On this occasion, in January, 1991, according to Ms. Devor, Respondent called to say he was with a new company and could get her the bond she needed to support the bid she had been awarded. Ms. Devor invited him over to talk about it and they discussed it. Again, he indicated he would be able to get her the bond she needed. The next day, when he came back with the preliminary paperwork, he asked for a check in the amount of $850.00. According to Ms. Devor, he indicated that of that sum, $500.00 was to cover setup fees and other fees by the bonding company and $300.00 was to go to DSI, his agency. In response, Ms. Devor gave him a check for $850.00 made payable, at his request, to ICI, Respondent's other company, after which he left with the forms she had signed, some in blank. When he left, he promised to process the paperwork immediately in response to her stressing the urgency of the need for the bond. After several days passed with no response, Ms. Devor attempted to contact Respondent by phone but was unable to reach him. When she finally was able to speak with him, he asked her to come to his office to discuss the bonding company's requirement that she place her house as collateral for the bond. Ms. Devor immediately declined to do this but nonetheless went to his office at DSI to talk with him. When she arrived, he immediately called the bonding company which again requested she place her house as security, and she again refused. When this happened, Respondent asked her to come back the next day as he would try another source for the bond. When she contacted him the following day, he indicated he could get the bond from an Atlanta firm but she would have to go there to pick it up. She agreed to do this and Respondent, in addition, asked for a financial statement which she arranged to have provided. Ms. Devor flew to Atlanta and was met there by Respondent who drove her to the bonding company's office. When she met with company officials, she was told they imposed a coinsurance requirement of $100,000.00 in the company's name be put up by her and she did not have this cash available. Respondent, she claims, knew this. Nonetheless, she was furnished an office and a telephone to try to get the money but was unable to do so and as a result, the bonding company declined to issue the bond. After that failure, she returned to Orlando and, realizing that Respondent was apparently unable to help her, started to look for another bonding company. She called Respondent's secretary several times attempting to reach him to get her money back but, when she was unable to do so, finally sent him a letter requesting the return of her $850.00 payment. Respondent failed to respond to that letter and she continued to try to reach him, unsuccessfully, by phone. Finally, she was able to contact DSI's owner who indicated she had never heard of Ms. Devor and asked she be shown proof that the bond premium was paid. When Ms. Devor sent a copy of the check she had given to Respondent, the owner evidenced some dissatisfaction with Respondent but failed to refund the money. Ms. Devor continued to try to reach Respondent by phone without success. When she found where he lived, she wrote him another letter asking not only for the return of the amount she had paid him but also for reimbursement of expenses she had incurred in flying to Atlanta. She received neither. However, about a week or so later, she received a call from Respondent on her answering machine which left no return number. She was thereafter unable to again contact Respondent nor did she ever receive reimbursement of her payment to him. The $850.00 check was endorsed by Respondent with his own name and deposited to his personal account, Number 1307004115, at the Orange Bank in Winter Park, Florida. According to Mr. Leach, Vice-President of security operations for Pinnacle Insurance in Carrolton, Georgia, the company to which Ms. Devor flew at Respondent's request, the company file for Cobra Corporation shows no bond was ever issued to that company. Florida does not allow a charge for setup fees in any case, and he would not have received one in connection with this application even if the bond had been issued. It is company policy not to charge a fee of any kind if a bond is not issued. Only if the application is approved and the applicant then withdraws is a fee charged. In any case, the premium on a $100,000.00 bond such as that sought here would be $2,500.00. Respondent at one point owned Statewide Insurance and sold it to DSI, the company with whom he was associated at the time he took the bond application from Ms. Devor. His story of the transaction differs somewhat from that of Ms. Devor, however, in that he denies calling her to solicit her business. Instead, he claims, she called him and begged that he get her the bond she needed for this contract. In fact, he claims, she said she'd do anything she had to do, or pay any fee necessary, to get the bond. When he explained what the fees would be, she agreed to them. Respondent contends he got the bond through United American Security in Boston, which charges a setup fee of $500.00. When Ms. Devor, however, could not live with the company's conditions, indicating she could not get the required additional credit from her bank, she rejected that condition and Respondent agreed to try with Pinnacle. It is, he claims, Ms. Devor, who suggested they go to Atlanta where Mr. Mathieson, the representative of the insurance company at the time, imposed the requirement for collateral. He also contends she agreed to this. Afterwards, he asserts, Ms. Devor claimed to have gotten a bond without collateral from a company in Ft. Lauderdale which she presented to the contracting party. From the check for $850.00 which Respondent received from Ms. Devor, he paid $500.00 to United American as its setup fee, and $250.00 to Pinnacle for its fees. Respondent did not provide a cancelled check as evidence of either payment, however. He cannot account for the additional $100.00. In any case, he contends, after Ms. Devor requested a refund, he contacted both United American and Pinnacle to request reimbursement, but both refused because, they claimed, they had accepted her and had done credit checks on her. Respondent claims that Ms. Devor was offered two bonds, both of which she rejected because she did not want to put up the collateral or security requested by the bonding companies. He went to the companies under those conditions because, he contends, she had previously stated she would accept conditions, implying she would do anything necessary to get the bonds. In support of Mr. Leiffer's assertions, he introduced an enrollment form with United American Contractor's Association signed by Ms. Devor which indicates Cobra Construction Corp. applied for enrollment in the association and submitted a check for $500.00 as an enrollment fee. He also introduced a contractor's questionnaire reflecting the payment of a $250.00 application setup fee with Pinnacle to cover underwriting reviews and efforts in establishing a bond account. Ms. Devor, however, while admitting her signature appears thereon, does not recall having signed either document, contending that they may have been among those documents Respondent asked her to sign at the beginning of their relationship regarding this bond, some of which she signed in blank. Respondent, who had previously been with DSI and had just recently gone with ICI, nonetheless could give no reasonable justification for placing the $850.00 fee paid to him by Ms. Devor in his personal bank account and not in the account of one of the two companies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint in this case, alleging misconduct by Respondent, Harold Rush Leiffer, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence not a FOF. Second sentence accepted but evidence was presented by Respondent to show that Respondent signed an application for membership in UACA ($500.00) and with some other unspecified concern for 1 $250.00 setup fee. Balance of paragraph accepted. Rejected as unproven by clear and convincing evidence. FOR THE RESPONDENT: No Proposed Findings of Fact submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Harold R. Leiffer 2026 St. George Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by the Department as a limited surety bail bond agent. He was employed by and authorized to write bail bond business for County Bonding Agency. When Respondent was hired by County Bonding Agency, the office procedures for receiving and accounting for all paperwork and money were explained to him by Deolinda E. Stolowilsky, the owner and operator, and Olympia Delgado, the office manager. Licensed employees were issued a certain number of bail bond powers of attorney on Monday of each week. Each agent was given a "pay sheet" listing the number of each power of attorney. When a power was used, the agent would write on the pay sheet next to that power the defendant's name, the amount of the bail bond, and the date the power was executed. On the following Monday each agent would turn in all files with executed bail bonds. All unused powers of attorney would be re-issued to the agent and any additional needed powers would be issued. The agent's compensation was computed based on the amount of bail bond business the agent had performed during the preceding reporting period. Each Monday when files with executed bail bonds were turned in to County Bonding Agency, all premiums received by the agent for those executed bonds were required to be turned in with the executed bonds. The office manager would make a notation on the outside of that defendant's file that the premium had been paid. Some of the agents working for County Bonding Agency routinely watched to make sure that the office manager made the proper notation on the file when they gave her money. County Bonding Agency did not give its agents receipts for the money received from them. Although County Bonding Agency had an informal policy that an agent receiving a large amount of money should turn that money in on the same day or the following day, there was no specificity for what would constitute a large amount of money. Further, there was no particular consequence for failure to accommodate the owner's preference that such be done. Much of County Bonding Agency's business was written in its office rather than at the jail. In other words, much of the money received by County Bonding Agency came from indemnitors coming to the office and paying the premium there. When that occurred, the agent sent to the jail to execute the bond received no premium money since the money had already been paid at the office. On June 20, 1998, Respondent went to County Bonding Agency. He turned in files and premiums and was issued powers to be used for future bonds. On June 23, Respondent went to County Bonding Agency and was issued new powers. Thereafter, office manager Delgado began telephoning Respondent and writing to him stating that he had failed to turn in the premium money for five defendants. She also filed a police report and contacted the Department alleging that Respondent had failed to turn in money that he had collected. On July 20, 1998, a courier delivered to County Bonding Agency from Respondent folders for six defendants. The folders did not contain any money. On July 22, Respondent went to County Bonding Agency to turn in his beeper, receipt book, and unused powers. The bond money for four defendants is at issue in this proceeding. Their folders were among the six delivered by courier to County Bonding Agency. At the final hearing, Delgado admitted that one of the six defendants was an office bond, and she could not remember one of the defendants. The four at issue are Alain Yara, Seon T. Carter, Demetrius Robertson, and Stanley Bailey. The Department's exhibits admitted in evidence at the final hearing include the paperwork for those four defendants. The paperwork for Yara includes a receipt for $300 and a collateral receipt. Both are signed by Respondent and dated June 21, 1998, two days before Respondent went to County Bonding Agency and was issued new powers. The paperwork for Carter contains a premium receipt for $550 (10 percent of the $5,500 bond) dated June 21, 1998, and signed by Respondent and a collateral receipt signed by "Curly" for what appears to be the same $5,500. The paperwork for both Robertson and Bailey contain premium receipts and collateral receipts dated June 24, 1998. All four receipts are signed "Curly." "Curly" is the nickname of Irwin Stolowilsky. At the final hearing, Delgado admitted signing Curly's name to receipts for bonds when the premium money was received by the office and the agent went to the jail only to obtain the remaining paperwork and write the bond. Delgado is not licensed by the Department and, therefore, she is not authorized to receive premiums for bail. Accordingly, when guarantors came to County Bonding Agency's office to pay premium money, she signed Curly's name, representing that a licensed person rather than an unlicensed person had in fact received the money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent not guilty and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against him in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Miguel J. Alvarez 8501 Northwest 8th Street Apartment 311 Miami, Florida 33126 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed insurance agent, committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a licensing and regulatory agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility and duty to enforce the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, which consists of Chapters 624-632, 634, 635, 641, 642, 648, and 651, Florida Statutes. See Section 624.307(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent has been continuously licensed in the State of Florida as a life insurance agent (a 2-16 license) and a general license agent (a 2-20 license) since March 1974, and continuously as a RPCJUA insurance agent (a 00-17 license) since March 1993. On November 4, 1996, Respondent was charged with possession of cocaine in violation of Section 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes. This charge, filed in Palm Beach County Circuit Court and assigned Case Number 96-12206 CFA02, is a third degree felony. On May 14, 1997, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of cocaine, which was accepted. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Respondent was placed on probation for a period of 18 months. The terms and conditions of Respondent's probation included working at a lawful occupation, intensive drug and alcohol evaluation, successful completion of any recommended treatment, payment of a fine in the amount of $250.00 and court costs in the amount of $461.00, performance of 100 hours of community service, random testing for the use of alcohol and drugs, six months' suspension of driver's license, and DUI school. Respondent successfully completed his probation on November 13, 1998. Respondent continued to work as an insurance agent during the term of his probation. Respondent voluntarily reported the incident to State Farm shortly after its occurrence. As a result, State Farm placed Respondent on probation and conducted a series of random alcohol and drug tests, which Respondent satisfactorily completed. Section 626.621(11), Florida Statutes, provides that the following constitutes grounds for the discretionary discipline of an agent's licensure: (11) Failure to inform the department in writing within 30 days after pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted or found guilty of, any felony or a crime punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more under the law of the United States or of any state thereof, or under the law of any other country without regard to whether a judgment of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of the case. Respondent failed to report to Petitioner within 30 days of doing so that he entered a plea of nolo contendere to a third degree felony charge of possession of cocaine in Case Number 96-12206 CFA02 on May 14, 1997. On or about March 18, 1998, Respondent applied for licensure as a Variable Annuity Insurance Agent (a 2-19 license). That application contained Question 18, which provides as follows and to which Respondent answered "yes": Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not a judgment of conviction has been entered. As a result of his answer to Question 18, Petitioner started an investigation, with which Respondent fully cooperated. As a result of that investigation, Petitioner learned the details of Respondent's plea in the criminal proceeding. Respondent testified, credibly, that he did not timely report the entry of his plea in the criminal proceeding because he did not know he was required to do so. 1/ Respondent has continuously worked as an insurance agent licensed by Petitioner in the State of Florida since March 1974. Respondent has been continuously appointed by State Farm and has built up a successful insurance business. This proceeding is the first disciplinary proceeding brought against Respondent's insurance licenses. There have been no other complaints filed by anyone in this state against Respondent's insurance licenses. Respondent's insurance licenses have not been previously disciplined in the State of Florida. The testimony of Respondent's witnesses established that he enjoys a good reputation for honesty, trustworthiness, truthfulness, and integrity in his community. He has engaged in charitable works, including work with the food bank, the Guardian Ad Litem Program, and Brazilian Indians. Respondent's witnesses also established that they had been pleased with their business dealings with Respondent, and that he has the ability and trustworthiness to successfully engage in the business of insurance. Respondent testified that State Farm will terminate his appointment as an agent if his license is suspended. Respondent testified that he will lose his business and his employees will lose their employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and guilty of violating Section 626.621(11), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint. It is further recommended that Respondent's licensure as an insurance agent be suspended for two months for the violation of Count I and for three months for the violation of Count II, to run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Theodore L. Aubuchon, Jr., has been licensed by the Department of Insurance as a general lines agent and limited surety agent for a period of approximately 12 years. Other than the instant Administrative Complaint and its attendant Emergency Order of Suspension, Respondent has never been the subject of an Administrative Complaint or the subject of disciplinary action by the Department of Insurance. Respondent was served with an Emergency Order of Suspension in November of 1985, to which he failed to respond, and as of the date of the hearing in this cause, his licenses as a general lines agent and as a limited surety agent have been suspended since November of 1985. Pioneer Bonding & Insurance Agency, Inc. (hereinafter "Pioneer"), was formed in 1963 by its first president, Respondent's grandfather. Respondent's father took over control of the company in approximately 1965, and Respondent succeeded to the position of president in 1979. Respondent remained as an employee of Pioneer and its president until some time in 1985. Pioneer acted as a general agent for American Druggists' Insurance Company (hereinafter "ADIC") from 1973 until approximately March of 1984, pursuant to an agency agreement. That agreement specifically sets forth the respective responsibilities of ADIC and Pioneer as it pertains to the bail bond business, including but not limited to the processing of claims, reports, disposition of collateral, and the return of collateral. All counts of this Administrative Complaint deal with bonds underwritten by ADIC. By letter dated October 3, 1983, ADIC advised Petitioner that Respondent d/b/a Pioneer had satisfactorily performed all duties as general agent for ADIC, that no claims were outstanding against Respondent, that any claims preceding the date of the letter were forever waived by ADIC, and that all funds collected were being maintained in accordance with the law. Shortly after the letter of October 3, 1983, ADIC advised Respondent that it was exercising its 120-day option for termination of its agency agreement. Upon being so advised, Respondent began negotiating with ADIC in an attempt to enter into a limited agency agreement solely for the purpose of servicing outstanding and continuing bonds beyond March of 1984. No formal limited agency agreement was ever consummated, and by May 29, 1984, ADIC employee Norman Stotts had been sent by ADIC to handle the transition, to audit Pioneer's books and records regarding ADIC bonds, and to essentially take control over all bonds written by Pioneer on behalf of ADIC. Because no limited agency agreement regulating the servicing of outstanding and continuing bonds was entered into between them, both ADIC and Pioneer sought to control the disposition of collateral and to resolve forfeitures. ADIC at no time gave any written directions to Pioneer as to the manner in which collateral was to be disposed of upon the termination of the agency agreement between them. Further, as of June 1984, Norman Stotts was in possession of the books and records of Pioneer on behalf of ADIC. In June of 1984, ADIC filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Pioneer, Respondent, and others. On August 24, 1985, that federal court issued an injunction prohibiting the release of any funds previously received by Pioneer or by Respondent in connection with the issuance of ADIC bonds. ADIC voluntarily dismissed the federal litigation on July 8, 1986. On April 30, 1986, the Court of Common Pleas in Franklin County, Ohio, issued an Order of Liquidation and Injunction against ADIC, which Order had the effect of prohibiting the disbursement of funds or collateral held by any agents or brokers of that company. On the following day, pursuant to a motion filed by Petitioner, the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, Florida, issued an Order Appointing Ancillary Receiver for purposes of liquidation, which Order also contained an injunction directed against ADIC agents. On January 7, 1983, Karla Myers obtained a surety bond in the amount of $5,000 for Robert Myers Painting, Inc. with ADIC as surety. Respondent signed the surety bond as agent for the surety. Similarly, Respondent signed the collateral security receipt as attorney-in-fact for ADIC. By its terms, the surety bond expired February 28, 1985. By an unnotarized letter dated March 5, 1985, the Tri-County Painters and Decorators Joint Trade Board, Inc. released Robert Myers Painting, Inc. from the surety bond, which letter was received by Karla Myers on March 8, 1985. Subsequent to March 8, 1985, Karla Myers made numerous telephone calls to Pioneer to obtain the return of her $5,000 in collateral. She was advised by employees at Pioneer that Respondent was no longer employed at Pioneer, and on one occasion, Myers contacted Respondent at his home. Respondent advised her that he would need to confer with his attorney regarding the matter. By March, 1985, Respondent was no longer in control of the books and records of Pioneer, with those books and records being in the control and custody of Norman Stotts. A notarized release, along with the original copy of the Collateral Security Agreement, was not provided by Karla Myers to Respondent or Pioneer in order to secure the release of the $5,000 in collateral, and Pioneer and Respondent were already engaged in litigation with ADIC, Respondent having been advised by his attorney not to discuss that litigation. On approximately August 20 1986, ADIC authorized Respondent to return the Myers collateral. Respondent then obtained the authorization of Petitioner, and the collateral was returned to Myers in August of 1986. On August 10, 1983, Pioneer accepted from Antonio and Jane Mininni $10,000 as collateral for a beverage wholesaler's bond underwritten by ADIC. A subsequent increase in the bond to $15,000 was required by the Florida Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. On April 9, 1985, ADIC advised Mininni d/b/a Old Bridge, Inc., that its bond was being cancelled effective June 10, 1985, and that there would be a 90-day waiting period before the collateral would be returned. That waiting period would have expired on September 10, 1985, after the entry of the federal injunction. On June 13, 1985, the Old Bridge, Inc. bond was transferred from ADIC to Southland Insurance Company in order that Old Bridge, Inc. would continue to have the state-required coverage. Mininni participated in and approved that transfer. At all times Old Bridge, Inc. had coverage for the total amount of coverage it had purchased. In August of 1986, Mr. and Mrs. Mininni on behalf of their business, Old Bridge, Inc., executed a release releasing Pioneer, ADIC, and Respondent; the federal court litigation had been dismissed; Respondent obtained authorization from ADIC and from Petitioner to return to Old Bridge, Inc. its collateral; and the collateral was returned. On behalf of a client, attorney Sam Pendino needed to make arrangements for collateral on four bail bonds. In a telephone conversation with Respondent, Pendino advised that he wanted an attorney, rather than an insurance company, to hold the collateral under an escrow agreement. Respondent suggested the name of attorney Terence T. O'Malley, Sr. Pendino subsequently satisfied himself that O'Malley was a licensed attorney authorized to practice law in the State of Florida, and on January 13, 1984, an escrow agreement was entered into by and between Pendino and O'Malley under which O'Malley became the escrow agent for the collateral. That escrow agreement was later signed by Respondent on behalf of ADIC. Pendino and O'Malley physically put the collateral, with an approximate value of $100,000 made up of $57,500 in cash and the balance in precious metals, into a safe deposit box which they rented on the same day that the escrow agreement was signed. Respondent was not a signator on the safe deposit box and was not present at the time the actual transfer of the collateral took place. No evidence was offered to indicate that Respondent ever came into possession of any of the collateral. Under the terms of the escrow agreement, O'Malley was responsible for returning the collateral with no further authorization needed upon the discharge of the bonds for which the collateral had been placed. The bonds were discharged on September 3, 1985, after entry of the federal court injunction. Pendino contacted O'Malley, but O'Malley failed to return the collateral. Pendino filed a lawsuit against O'Malley. He included Respondent as a defendant because Respondent had signed the escrow agreement. According to Pendino's attorney who was the only witness to testify on Petitioner's behalf regarding this transaction, at all stages of the litigation Respondent was disassociated from O'Malley's position, had agreed to the return of the collateral, and had requested the Court to enter orders returning the collateral to Pendino. By the time of the final hearing in this cause, O'Malley had already been held in civil contempt of court and there was presently pending an indirect criminal contempt proceeding regarding false testimony given by O'Malley as to the location of the collateral in question. Respondent, on behalf of Pioneer and ADIC, wrote a bail bond in the amount of $250,000 to guarantee the appearance of John Lee Paul, Sr., in the Circuit Court of St. Johns County, Florida. Certain real property in Georgia was placed as collateral for the bond. The bond was subsequently ordered forfeited, and judgment was entered against ADIC on January 16, 1984. The real property which was the collateral for the bail bond was sold, and the proceeds were transferred to the general operating account of Pioneer. On June 20, 1984, the legal representative of ADIC and Pioneer, the Assistant State Attorney, the St. Johns County Attorney, the Clerk of the Circuit Court for St. Johns County, and the attorney for the Clerk of the Circuit Court entered into a stipulation for a payment schedule on that final judgment. The payment schedule set forth in that stipulation was approved by the Court on June 21, 1984. Since that time, the bond has been paid in full. It is a common practice for a surety company, with the approval of the Court, to arrange an extended payment schedule when such a large bond has been estreated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed against him, dismissing that Administrative Complaint with prejudice, and immediately reinstating Respondent's suspended licenses. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of April, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-0660 Specific rulings as to Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are as follows: Adopted. Rejected as being immaterial. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as being immaterial. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Adopted. Specific rulings as to Respondent's proposed findings of fact are as follows: Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Adopted as to Respondent's licensure; remainder rejected since marital status and education are irrelevant. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Adopted. Rejected as being secondary. Rejected as being secondary. Rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard L. Greitzer, Esquire Post Office Box 1778 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33302-1778 Lealand L. McCharen, Esquire 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether, for the reasons alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated February 10, 1984, the Petitioner should revoke the Respondent's license and eligibility for licensure as an insurance agent or impose some lesser penalty authorized by statute.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits admitted into evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact: 1/ On June 16, 1982, the Respondent, Shelby Dewey Blackman, executed an Application for Qualification as Nonresident Life Agent, which application he thereafter caused to be filed with the Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer. In that application Mr. Blackman stated that his residence address and his business address in his state of residence were both "2549 New York Avenue, Pascagoula, Miss. 39567." (Pet. Ex. 1; Tr. 12-13) The Department of Insurance and Treasurer does not issue Nonresident Life Agent licenses to people who are in fact residents of the State of Florida. Such licenses are only issued to people who are nonresidents of this state. Applicants for Resident Life Agent licenses are required to take an examination prior to licensure. Applicants for Nonresident Life Agent licenses are not required to take an examination prior to licensure. The Department would not have issued a Nonresident Life Agent license to Mr. Blackman if the Department had known that Mr. Blackman was a Florida resident. (Tr. 14) As a result of the filing of the application described above, the Department issued to Mr. Blackman a license as a Nonresident Life and Health Agent for the American Sun Life Insurance Company, which was the only company he was authorized to write insurance for in the State of Florida. When Mr. Blackman received his license, the license listed the name of the the only company he was authorized to write insurance for in this state. Licensees who are authorized to represent more than one insurance company in this state receive a separate license for each company they are authorized to represent. Mr. Blackman had only the one license to represent one company. (Pet. Ex. 1 and 2; Tr. 14-18) At all times material to this case, Mr. Blackman was a resident of Santa Rosa County, Florida. Specifically, Mr. Blackman was a resident of Santa Rosa County, Florida, at the time he applied for and was issued a Nonresident Life and Health Agent license and at the time of writing the four insurance applications which are described hereinafter. (Pet. Ex. 3; Tr. 20-21, 53) Continental Bankers Life Insurance Company of the South does not currently hold, and has never held, a Certificate of Authority to write insurance in the State of Florida. In November of 1982 Continental Bankers Life Insurance Company of the South was licensed to write insurance in the State of Alabama and Mr. Blackman was authorized by Continental to write insurance for Continental in the State of Alabama. (Pat. Ex. 8; Tr. 24-25) During November of 1982, Mr. Blackman wrote four applications for health insurance policies to be issued by the Continental Bankers Life Insurance Company of the South. One was an application dated November 2, 1982 from Mr. Thomas J. Barrow. Another was an application dated November 4, 1982, from Mr. Jimmie R. Williams. The last two were applications dated November 12, 1982, from Mr. Henry E. Marshall and Mr. Ercy L. Henderson, respectively. All four of the applications were written and signed in Jay, Florida. No part of the transactions which culminated in the writing of the four applications took place in the State of Alabama. On three of the applications Mr. Blackman wrote that the application was written and signed in Brewton, Alabama, and on one of the applications Mr. Blackman wrote that the application was written and signed in Flomaton, Alabama. The statements that the applications were written and signed in Alabama were false statements that Mr. Blackman knew to be false statements. (Pet. Ex. 4, 5, 6, 7; Tr. 37-38, 42, 49, 53-54) The false statements written on the four applications described above were relied upon by the Continental Bankers Life Insurance Company of the South and were, therefore, material misrepresentations. If Mr. Blackman had truthfully written on the applications that they were written and signed in the State of Florida, Continental would not have issued policies on the basis of those four applications because Continental was not licensed to write insurance in the State of Florida. The MM-6 policy is an insurance policy that Continental markets in Alabama and the false statements on the applications which indicated that the policies were applied for and completed in Alabama induced Continental to issue the policies. (Tr. 25-27, 32, 34-35)
Recommendation For all of the reasons set forth above, and particularly because of Mr. Blackman's demonstrated disregard for the truth, I RECOMMEND that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order revoking Mr. Blackman's license and eligibility to hold a license. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of July, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9575 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1984.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner application for licensure as a resident life, variable annuity and health agent should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for issuing licenses "authorizing a person to be appointed to transact insurance or adjust claims for the kind, line, or class of insurance identified in the document." §§ 626.015(9) and 626.112(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Prior to December 4, 2002, Mr. Porras was licensed in Florida as an insurance agent. He was also part-owner of The Garpo Group, Inc. ("Garpo Group"), an insurance agency. On October 18, 2002, the Department (formerly the Department of Insurance) and Mr. Porras entered into a Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order ("Settlement Stipulation") as a result of an investigation by the Department that resulted in allegations of wrongdoing on the part of Mr. Porras. In the Settlement Stipulation, Mr. Porras agreed to surrender his agent's licenses to the Department. Mr. Porras did not admit in the Settlement Stipulation that he committed the acts alleged by the Department. A Consent Order was entered on December 4, 2002. The Consent Order incorporated the terms of the Settlement Stipulation and provided that the surrender of Mr. Porras's licenses "shall have the same force and effect as a revocation pursuant to Section 626.641, Florida Statutes"; that Mr. Porras "shall not engage or attempt or profess to engage in any transaction or business for which a license or appointment is required under the insurance code or directly or indirectly own, control, or be employed in any manner by any insurance agent or agency . . . ."; and that Mr. Porras "shall not have the right to apply to the Department for another license under the Insurance Code within two (2) years of the effective date of revocation." Neither the Settlement Stipulation nor the Consent Order included a deadline by which Mr. Porras was required to divest himself of his ownership interest in the Garpo Group. On April 24, 2003, a Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Agreement") was executed whereby Mr. Porras, Eduardo Garcia, Mayda Garcia, and Luis Garcia, who were identified as the principals of the Garpo Group, agreed to sell the Garpo Group to Jose Peña and Peter Rivero. The Agreement included a purchase price of $50,000.00, payable in an initial deposit of $20,000.00, with the remaining balance to be paid "in monthly installments of no less than $500.00 (Five Hundred Dollars), and no more than $2,500.00 (Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars)." A Special Condition of the Agreement provided that Mayda Garcia, "Shareholder/Registered Agent/General Agent/Director," and Luis Garcia, "Shareholder/Director," would "remain in Corporation in their current capacity until final payment for sale of business is paid." Mr. Porras retained an interest in the monthly payments to be made by Mr. Peña and Mr. Rivero for the purchase of the business. In accordance with the terms of the Consent Order, Mr. Porras surrendered his license and did not subsequently engage in the transaction or solicitation of insurance. Mr. Porras did not exercise any control over the Garpo Group after entry of the Consent Order. Mr. Porras worked for the Garpo Group as a bookkeeper from May 2004 through October 2004.3 He was paid $175.00 per week, and his duties included reconciling the Garpo Group's bank accounts, entering deposits in the system, and cutting checks on the Garpo Group accounts.4 It can be reasonably inferred from the evidence presented by Mr. Porras regarding his understanding of the terms of the Consent Order that Mr. Porras was aware when he accepted employment with the Garpo Group that the terms of the Settlement Stipulation and of the Consent Order prohibited him from any involvement in the business of the Garpo Group, including employment "in any manner."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding that Lorenzo Alejandro Porras violated the terms of a Consent Order entered by the Department of Financial Services and denying his application for licensure as a resident life, variable annuity, and health agent, pursuant to Section 626.611(13), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2006.
