The Issue Case No. 97-3049 Did Respondent conduct business as a private investigative agency during the period of January 1, 1997, through April 7, 1997, without a Class “A” Private Investigative Agency License in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes? Did Respondent perform the services of a private investigator during the period of January 1, 1997 through April 7, 1997, without a Class “C” Private Investigator License in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes? Case No. 97-3096 Did Respondent conduct business as a private investigative agency during the period of January 1, 1997, through April 7, 1997, without a Class “A” Private Investigative Agency License in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes? Did Respondent perform the services of a private investigator during the period of January 1, 1997, through April 7, 1997, without a Class “C” Private Investigator License in violation of Section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of investigating and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Case Number 97-3049 Respondent Dormal Cavilee was not licensed as a private investigator in the State of Florida and did not possess a State of Florida Class “C” Private Investigator license at any time material to this proceeding. Respondent Dormal Cavilee was not licensed as a private investigative agency in the State of Florida and did not possess a State of Florida Class “A” Private Investigative Agency license at any time material to this proceeding. During the period of January 1, 1997, to April 7, 1997, Respondent Dormal Cavilee performed private investigations, as defined in Section 493.6101(17), Florida Statutes, for Geoffrey A. Foster, attorney-at-law and for Dwight M. Wells or Deborah Wells (Wells), attorneys at law. While performing private investigations for Foster and Wells during the period of January 1, 1997 to April 7, 1997, Respondent Dormal Cavilee was under contract and was not solely and exclusively employed by Foster or by Wells. Additionally, an employer-employee relationship did not exist between Foster or Wells and Respondent Dormal Cavilee in that neither Foster nor Wells deducted federal income tax or social security tax, or furnished any health or retirement benefits to Respondent Dormal Cavilee. Case Number 97-3096 Respondent Mary Cavilee was not licensed as a private investigator in the State of Florida and did not possess a State of Florida Class “C” Private Investigator license at any time material to this proceeding. Respondent Mary Cavilee was not licensed as a private investigative agency in the State of Florida and did not possess a State of Florida Class “A” Private Investigative Agency license at any time material to this proceeding. During the period of January 1, 1997, to April 7, 1997, Respondent Mary Cavilee performed private investigations, as defined in Section 493.6101(17), Florida Statutes, for Dwight M. Wells or Deborah Wells (Wells), attorneys at law. While performing private investigations for Wells during the period January 1, 1997, to April 7, 1997, Respondent Mary Cavilee was under contract and was not solely and exclusively employed by Wells. Additionally, an employer-employee relationship did not exist between Wells and Respondent Mary Cavilee in that Wells did not deduct federal income tax or social security tax, or furnish any health or retirement benefits to Respondent Mary Cavilee. Case Numbers 97-3049 and 97-3096 A billing statement from Respondent Dormal Cavilee and Respondent Mary Cavilee dated March 1, 1997, to Dwight M. Wells, shows the date of investigation, the person performing the investigation (either Dormal Cavilee or Mary Cavilee), the amount of time involved in performing the investigation, the hourly rate and the total amount charged. The billing statement shows that the investigations are related to the defense of Grady Wilson in Case Number CF93-5094-A1XX, a criminal case in Polk County, Florida. Nothing on the billing statement indicates that it is a statement for private investigations furnished by a private investigative agency referred to as Criminal Defense Investigations. The Motion for Payment of Costs filed by Dwight M. Bell in Case Number CF93-5094-A1XX provides in pertinent part: That the following expense was incurred during the investigation, discovery process, pre-trial preparation and trial of this cause: Criminal Defense Investigations $2,500.00 Both the Order Approving Additional Funds for Investigation Costs dated March 3, 1997, and the Order Approving Motion for Payment of Costs refer to the payments as payment for investigations performed by criminal defense investigations. Neither Respondent Dormal Cavilee nor Respondent Mary Cavilee advertised as providing, or engaged in the business of furnishing private investigations, notwithstanding language in the motion and orders referred to above which was apparently referring to the type of services being performed rather than private investigations being furnished by a private investigative agency. On April 7, 1997, a Cease and Desist Order was issued to both Respondent Dormal Cavilee and Respondent Mary Cavilee. The record indicates that both Respondent Dormal Cavilee and Respondent Mary Cavilee honored the Cease and Desist Order and cease performing any private investigations other than in an employer-employee relationship with Wells. Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, did not apply to such activity. See Section 493.6102, Florida Statutes. Neither Respondent Dormal Cavilee nor Respondent Mary Cavilee attempted to “cover-up” any of their activities when questioned by the investigator for the Department. Respondents knew or should have known that their activity in regards to investigations for Foster and Wells required that they be licensed under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. However, there appeared to be some confusion on the part of the Respondents as to whether their relationship with the defense attorneys required that they be licensed under Chapter 493, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and review of Rule 1C-3.113, Florida Administrative Code, concerning disciplinary guidelines, range of penalties, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it is recommended that the Department in Case Number 97-3049 enter a final order: (a) dismissing Counts I, II, and IV of the Administrative Complaint; (b) finding Respondent Dormal Cavilee guilty of the violations charged in Count III and V of the Administrative Complaint, assess an administrative fine in the amount of $300.00 for each count for a total of $600.00. It is further recommended that the Department in Case Number 97-3096 enter a final order dismissing Counts I and III of the Administrative Complaint; and finding Respondent Mary Cavilee guilty of the violations charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, assess an administrative fine in the amount of $300.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capital, Mail Station Four Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Dormal Dean Cavilee 1900 Queens Terrace Southwest Winter Haven, Florida 33880 Mary Louise Cavilee 2768 Janie Trail Auburndale, Florida 33823
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a Class "CC" (private investigator intern) license should be denied on the grounds set forth in the Department of State, Division of Licensing's (Department's) May 4, 1992, denial letter to Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is 31 years of age and has resided in Palm Beach County his entire life. He is now, and has been for the last few years, self-employed as certified process server in Palm Beach County. After receiving his certification, he applied for and obtained a State of Florida license to carry a concealed firearm. Petitioner has been married to his present wife for approximately a year. He and his wife have an infant daughter and are expecting another child. This is Petitioner's second marriage. His first marriage ended in a bitter divorce. Petitioner has had several brushes with the law in the past, all of which occurred prior to the termination of his first marriage. In 1980, Petitioner was arrested for, and subsequently charged in Palm Beach County Circuit Court Case No. 80-5141CF with, carrying a concealed firearm, resisting arrest with violence and battery on a police officer. Pursuant to the terms of a plea bargain agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to the charge of resisting arrest with violence and the remaining charges against him were dropped. Adjudication of guilt on the resisting arrest charge was withheld and Petitioner was placed on three years probation. In 1984, while still on probation, Petitioner was arrested for, and charged in Palm Beach County Circuit Court Case No. 84-4810MM with, possession of under 20 grams of marijuana, a misdemeanor. He was adjudicated guilty of this offense after entering a guilty plea to the charge and sentenced to time served. Petitioner's commission of this misdemeanor marijuana possession offense also resulted in a finding that he had violated the conditions of his probation in Case No. 80-5141CF. Based upon this finding, Petitioner's probation was extended an additional two years. In accordance with the recommendation of his probation officer, Petitioner was discharged from his probation on January 9, 1986, more than five months prior to the date it was due to expire. In 1989, Petitioner was separated, but not yet divorced, from his first wife, Theresa. Theresa was living in the home she and Petitioner had shared prior to their separation. Petitioner was living in a trailer on his parent's property. Theresa had changed the locks on the doors in an effort to prevent Petitioner from entering the marital home. She had also obtained a court order enjoining Petitioner from harassing her. In late June or early July of 1989, Petitioner and Theresa reconciled. Theresa gave Petitioner a key to the marital home and invited him to move back in and live with her again. Petitioner accepted the invitation. The couple lived together peaceably and without incident for approximately a week. On the morning of July 8, 1992, however, Petitioner and Theresa had an altercation that abruptly put an end to their reconciliation. The altercation began when, using the key Theresa had given him the week before, Petitioner opened the front door to their home and went inside. Petitioner was tired inasmuch as he had spent a sleepless night in the hospital room of his ill grandmother. He intended to go directly to his bedroom to try to get some sleep. Theresa was home, but she was not alone. She was with another man. As Petitioner walked through the doorway and into the home, Theresa confronted him. She had a firearm in her hand. The gun was pointed in Petitioner's direction and was very close to his face. Petitioner pushed the firearm aside and headed upstairs to his bedroom. Theresa followed close behind Petitioner, threatening to shoot him. In the bedroom was a jewelry box that contained a wedding ring that Petitioner had given Theresa to wear. 1/ Petitioner took the box. He then exited the bedroom, walked downstairs and went out the front door with the jewelry box still in his possession. Theresa unsuccessfully attempted to prevent Petitioner from getting into his car by pulling his hair and trying to choke him. As Petitioner drove off, Theresa shot at his car. Based upon erroneous information provided by Theresa about this incident, Petitioner was arrested for strong armed robbery, breaking and entering by forced entry, battery on a spouse and violating the terms of the injunction that Theresa had obtained against him. 2/ No formal charges, however, were filed against Petitioner as a result of the incident. The aforementioned injunction was subsequently vacated retroactive to the day before the incident. It appears that, although he may have run afoul of the law when he was younger, Petitioner has since matured and transformed himself into a responsible, honest and law-abiding citizen.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Petitioner should not be denied licensure as a private investigator intern on the grounds cited in the Department's May 4, 1992, denial letter, as amended at hearing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of October, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1992.
Findings Of Fact During April or May 1988, Respondent solicited business as a private investigator from two credit unions in Hillsborough County, Florida. He approached employees of the credit unions and held himself out as a private investigator by discussing repossession services he could provide. He distributed a brochure and introductory materials describing the fees charged and services provided by Recovery, which included missing persons, child custody, investigations, escorts, surveillance, as well as repossessions. According to two former employees of Recovery, these solicitations continued through the Summer of 1988. The materials distributed to these credit unions by Respondent included a purported license number A-8700255 for Recovery issued by Petitioner on February 26, 1988. In fact, this license was a forgery, and had never been issued to Recovery. The license number shown on this forgery is that of another private investigative agency, the Boucher Agency located in Lutz, Florida. Respondent employed Janice Boucher during April and May 1988, for the specific purpose of using her license to operate Recovery. During an investigation into these matters in May 1988, Respondent gave to Petitioner's special investigator, Daniel Cabrera, a business card showing the name of Recovery with Boucher's license number. The card states that Recovery is "licensed," and includes the name of Respondent, as chairman. Finally, Respondent's business card represents that Recovery is specializing in collateral recovery. Respondent was responsible for, and ordered another employee of Recovery to prepare a forged license for Recovery using Boucher's license. Respondent was the owner of Recovery, at all times material hereto. Boucher did not authorize or participate in this forgery. In May 1988, Respondent obtained a Hillsborough County occupational license for Recovery which states it is for a "private investigative agency, Lic. A-8700255." The private investigative agency number shown on this occupational license is for the Boucher Agency, not Recovery. Neither Respondent nor Recovery have ever been licensed by Petitioner to engage in the business of a private investigative agency, and have never possessed either a "Class A" private investigative agency license, or a "Class C" private investigator license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000 on Respondent, Jack Warren. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE No. 88-4313) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 4. 3-4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2. 5-6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3,5. 9-10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 4, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Timothy Jansen, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Jack Warren 1502 East Trampnell Road Plant City, Florida 33566 Ken Rouse, Esquire General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, should grant the Petitioner’s application for a Class “C” Private Investigator license and the application he filed as President on behalf of Info, Inc., for a Class “A” Private Investigative Agency license.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner’s Class “C” Application The Petitioner applied for his Class “C” Private Investigator license on April 29, 1996. The application included the Petitioner’s Affidavit of Experience, which represented the following qualifying experience: employment with Telephonic Collections, Inc., from 3/91 to 9/93, during which employment the Petitioner devoted himself full-time to: “credit and asset investigations for recovery of debts; did skip-tracing full-time to locate subjects for debt recovery; utilized collection network and data base information.” Joseph Apter, President of Telephonic Collections, Inc., was listed as the individual who could verify this employment. employment with Telephonic Info, Inc., from 9/93 to 2/96, during which employment the Petitioner devoted himself full-time to: “administrative processing of investigation files; computer data base research and information recovery; computer preparing or reports; administrative dutys [sic] in investigation agency.” Joseph Apter, President of Telephonic Info, Inc., was listed as the individual who could verify this employment. employment as an auxiliary policeman with the City of West Haven, Connecticut, from 1965 to 1967, during which employment the Petitioner devoted himself part-time as follows: “received police training and performed assignments as required.” The Petitioner did not specify how much time was devoted to those duties. Captain Stephen D. Rubelman was listed as the individual who could verify this employment. Processing of the Petitioner’s Applications The Respondent began the process of verifying the information in the Petitioner’s Class “C” application on May 8, 1996, when it had referred the Petitioner’s fingerprint card to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) for a criminal history. The Respondent subsequently began its own verification of the information in the application by telephoning Apter. On June 26, 1996, the Respondent telephoned Apter, who verified the representations in the Petitioner’s application as to his experience with Telephonic Collections. Specifically, Apter stated that Telephonic Collections was a collection agency and that, for two years and five months, “100% of the applicant’s job was skiptracing [sic] individuals with delinquent accounts for the purpose of collecting the money owed to creditor.” Since this experience exceeded minimum requirements, no further verification was considered necessary, and the Respondent awaited the criminal history report from the FDLE. While the Respondent was awaiting the criminal history report from the FDLE, the Petitioner telephoned the Respondent to inquire as to the status of his application. On August 2, 1996, after being told the status, the Petitioner filed an application as president on behalf of Info, Inc., for a Class “A” Private Investigative Agency license. Eventually, on August 27, 1996, the Respondent received the Petitioner’s criminal history report from the FLDE, and it showed no reason not to grant the Petitioner’s applications. But earlier in August, Garry Floyd, an investigator in the Respondent’s Tampa office, learned that the Petitioner had filed applications for licensure. From prior dealings with the Petitioner and Apter, Investigator Floyd was unaware that the Petitioner had any qualifying experience. To the contrary, during a June 1994, investigation Floyd was conducting into unlicensed activities by employees of Telephonic Info, a licensed private investigation agency, the Petitioner emphatically denied that he was conducting investigations for the company. The Petitioner told Floyd that the Petitioner did not know how to conduct an investigation and did not want to know how; he said his role in the company was strictly administrative. Investigator Floyd obtained a copy of the Petitioner’s applications and saw the Petitioner’s representations as to his experience with Telephonic Info as well as Telephonic Collections. Since those representations did not comport with statements the Petitioner made to Floyd in June 1994, and did not comport with Floyd’s understanding as to the nature of the Petitioner’s experience, Floyd recommended on August 13, 1997, that the Respondent allow him to investigate further before approving the Petitioner’s applications and issuing any licenses. During his investigation, Floyd obtained statements from three individuals thought to be former employees of Telephonic Collections to the effect that they had no knowledge of any skip- tracing or other investigative work being conducted by the Petitioner. All three—C.J. Bronstrup, Jason Gillard, and Duncan Tate—thought that the Petitioner’s role was strictly administrative. Investigator Floyd also was aware that Apter’s applications for renewal of his Class “C” and Class “A” licenses had been denied due to what Floyd understood to be a felony conviction. (Although Apter’s testimony on the criminal charges against him was confusing, it would appear that he entered a plea on the felony charge, and adjudication was withheld. There apparently also were unconnected charges of perjury against him, but the disposition of those charges is not clear from Apter’s testimony.) Finally, Investigator Floyd also recalled that Apter once told Floyd that Apter thought he might have the beginnings of Alzheimer’s disease. For these reasons, Investigator Floyd recommended that the Respondent not credit the Petitioner with any qualifying experience from his employment with Telephonic Collections and also recommended that the representations on the application regarding that employment experience be considered fraudulent misrepresentations. When the Petitioner’s experience with Telephonic Collections was called into question, the Respondent attempted to verify the Petitioner’s experience with the City of West Haven Police Department but was unable to contact Stephen Rubelman at the telephone number given in the application. (According to the Respondent’s witness, “the phone rang off the hook.”) Then, on September 26, 1996, the Respondent telephoned the City of West Haven Police Department but was informed that the Respondent’s employment there between 1965 and 1967 was too old to verify. For these reasons, on September 27, 1996, Investigator Floyd recommended that the Respondent deny the Petitioner’s applications. On October 7, 1996, the Respondent mailed the Petitioner a letter giving notice of intent to deny the Petitioner’s applications. The letter was addressed to the Petitioner as president of INFO, Inc., at “13575 - 58 Street North, Clearwater, Florida 34620.” This mailing was returned undelivered on October 14, 1996, and the letter was returned undelivered. On October 15, 1996, the letter was re-sent in another envelope to “Post Office Box 1241, Largo, Florida 34649,” the mailing address on the Class “A” application. But apparently this time the mailing was returned for postage. The envelope was meter-stamped on October 26, and was received by the Petitioner on October 29, 1996. Verification of Petitioner’s Qualifying Experience The Petitioner did not directly dispute the testimony of Investigator Floyd as to what the Petitioner told him during Floyd’s June 1994, investigation. See Finding 5, supra. Instead, the Petitioner testified essentially that he in fact knew how to do skip-tracing and conduct investigations, having been taught and trained by Apter, and that the Petitioner had extensive experience doing skip-tracing and conducting investigations working for Telephonic Collections, which was a debt collection agency. While not directly disputing Floyd’s testimony as to what the Petitioner said to Floyd, the Petitioner alleged that Floyd may have been biased against him (due to his association with Apter) and suggested that Floyd knew or should have known that the Petitioner knew how to do investigation work because Floyd once asked the Petitioner to get some information for him and watched as the Petitioner placed a pretext call. Regardless of Floyd’s alleged bias or pertinent knowledge, it is found that Floyd accurately related what the Petitioner said to him and that the Petitioner’s purpose in making those statements was to avoid any further investigation into whether the Petitioner also was participating in unlicensed investigative activities during his employment by Telephonic Info. Even assuming that the Petitioner did skip-tracing and investigations for Telephonic Collections, it is clear from the testimony that the Petitioner did not do skip-tracing and investigations full-time, 100 percent of the time, as represented in the Class “C” application and as verified by Apter upon telephone inquiry. At final hearing, Apter testified that, when he verified the Petitioner’s experience for the Respondent on June 26, 1996, he did not mean that the Petitioner had no other duties but rather that the Petitioner did no collection work— i.e., the collection employees would take the information the Petitioner developed from his skip-tracing and asset location efforts and telephone the debtors to try to get satisfaction of the debt. Apter conceded that the Petitioner also had administrative duties. It is the Respondent’s policy, when an applicant has employment experience in a full-time job that involves some investigative work or training in addition to other duties, to credit the applicant for a pro rata amount of qualifying experience based on the quantifiable percentage of time devoted to the investigative work or training. It could not be determined from the evidence what percentage of the Petitioner’s work at Telephonic Collections was devoted to skip-tracing and investigation work and how much was administrative. The Petitioner and Apter testified that Apter trained the Petitioner in skip-tracing and investigation work and that the Petitioner did a substantial amount of skip-tracing and investigation work from March 1991, through September 1993; but both conceded that the Petitioner also had administrative duties. Apter did not break down the Petitioner’s time spent between the two. The Petitioner made a rough approximation that 25 percent of his time was spent on administrative matters. Sharon Jones, who worked for both Telephone Collections and Telephone Info, testified that the Petitioner did some skip-tracing work, as well as other duties, between June through September 1993, but she also could not estimate the percentage of time spent between the two. Other witnesses, including Bronstrup and Tate, were not aware that the Petitioner was doing any skip-tracing at all during the times they were working for Telephonic Collections. (Bronstrup worked there for approximately ten weeks between March and June 1993; Tate worked there from February 1993, through the time it became Telephonic Info in September 1993.) In partial response to the testimony of Bronstrup and Tate, the Petitioner suggested that it was not surprising for them not to be aware of the Petitioner’s skip-tracing and other investigative work because much of it was done at the Petitioner’s home after hours and because most of the employees were treated on a “need to know” basis. (The Petitioner also contended that Bronstrup did not spend much time at work for Telephonic Collections, as he also had another part-time job and did some personal investigation work on the side.) But even if it is true that the Petitioner did much of his skip-tracing and other investigative work at home after hours, only the Petitioner and Apter even knew about it, and the amount of time the Petitioner spent doing investigative work at home clearly was not verified. The Petitioner continues to maintain that he stopped doing any skip-tracing or investigative work after Telephonic Collections, the debt collection agency, ceased doing business and became Telephonic Info, the private investigation agency. As for the Petitioner’s experience as a part-time auxiliary policeman with the City of West Haven police department, the application does not give any indication as to how much time, if any, the Petitioner spent doing investigation work or being trained in that work. The Rubelman affidavit introduced in evidence to verify his experience likewise does not give that kind of information. It only states generally that the Petitioner received training in and assisted in police work. It does not indicate that any of the training or work was in investigations. It also indicates that no records of the Petitioner’s employment exist and that Rubelman cannot reconstruct even the months the Petitioner worked, much less what the work consisted of. Although it is not clear, at final hearing it appeared that the Petitioner may have been claiming credit for work he did collecting Telephonic Info’s accounts receivable. However, the amount of any such work was not quantified. It also appeared at final hearing that the Petitioner also was claiming credit for doing background investigations on prospective employees of Telephonic Info. However, the Petitioner also did not quantify the amount of any of this work. Alleged Fraud or Willful Misrepresentation The Petitioner stated in the Affidavit of Experience in his Class “C” application that the “approximate percentage of time devoted to” the qualifying skip-tracing and investigation duties listed for his employment with Telephonic Collections from March 1991 to September 1993 was “full time.” This statement clearly was false. All of the witnesses confirmed that the Petitioner spent at least some time doing administrative work; several thought that was all the Petitioner was doing. The Petitioner conceded in his testimony at final hearing that at least 25 percent of his time was devoted to administrative work, and it is found that the actual percentage probably was much higher. Unlike Apter, the Petitioner made no attempt to explain his false representation, and it is found to be a fraudulent or willful misrepresentation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a final order denying both the Petitioner’s Class “C” license application and his Class “A” license application. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Harry P. Schlenther 12155 Meadowbrook Lane Largo, Florida 33774 Kristi Reid Bronson, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Sandra B. Mortham, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(n), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I, II, IV and V of the Administrative Complaint by subcontracting with individuals named therein to provide private investigative services at a time when they were not licensed as a Class "A" investigative agency. Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(n), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count III of the Administrative Complaint, by allowing an improperly licensed person, John Polk, to direct the activities of licensees, or exercise operational control over the regulated activities of Morse Security Group, Incorporated. Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count VI in the Administrative Complaint, by failing to report to the Department the termination of persons listed in that count. Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(s), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, by directing the activities of licensees, thereby acting as a manager, subsequent to the voluntary deactivation of his Class "C" private investigator's license and Class "M" private investigative/security agency manager's license. Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, by misrepresenting his agency by advertising in the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory 1993, that his agency is "Florida's largest and oldest private investigative agency", when it is not. Whether Respondent violated Section 493.6118(1)(r), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, by failing to certify the completion or termination of the internship of William J. Smithberger when he had the duty as a sponsor to do so.
Findings Of Fact Morse Security Group holds a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License, Number AOO-00919, effective June 30, 1993, which was originally issued in 1976, and is currently active. Harvey Morse, the principal of Respondent, holds a Class "C" private investigator license, number COO-008861, effective November 24, 1992, which was originally issued in 1975, and was placed on inactive status by the Department on January 21, 1993. Harvey Morse also was issued a Class "DI" Security Officer Instructor License, No. DI89-00348, effective January 8, 1993, a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License, No. GOO-11067, effective December 6, 1991, which was placed on inactive status with the Department on January 21, 1993, and a Class "M" Private Investigative/Security Agency Manager license No. M85-00112, effective August 7, 1992, which was placed on inactive status with the Department on January 21, 1993. Craig Hull became employed with Respondent in February of 1993, as a part-time investigator. Hull worked under the direct supervision and control of Respondent, and held himself out to the public as an employee. When Hull entered into his contractual employment agreement with Respondent, he was given a vacation/sick day policy document noting his status as a full-time employee of Respondent. Hull executed an Employment Agreement which referred to him as the "employee" and also referred to him as an "independent subcontractor" for the purpose of withholdings. At the time of Hull's employment with Respondent, he held a Class "C" private investigator license. In all aspects of Hull's employment with Respondent, he conducted himself, and was treated as an employee. Hull did business for Respondent under the Respondent's corporate name; held himself out to the public as being Respondent's employee; signed contracts on behalf of Respondent; received letters and correspondence as an employee; was directed when and were to show up for work; how to answer to the telephone; when to answer the telephone; and in all other respects was under the direct control and supervision of Respondent. During the course of employment with Morse Security Group, Hull possessed no occupational license, business cards, stationery, telephone listing, brochures or printed material that identified him as having any relationship with Respondent other than employee and filed no fictitious name with the Department of State. In dealing with clients and the general public, Hull held himself out as an employee of Respondent and his business cards indicated that he was an employee of Respondent. Of the five cases that Hull handled on behalf of Respondent, he at no time attempted to limit the Respondent's liability to any of those clients by asserting that he was an independent contractor, or had any other relationship with Respondent other than employee. Respondent never identified Hull to others an anything other than an employee. At no time did Respondent attempt to limit its general liability to the public as to Hull's employment by the use of the term subcontractor. Respondent never attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the public by the use of the term subcontractor as to Hull's employment. Respondent's liability insurance in effect from 1991 through 1994, specifically covered Hull as an employee of Respondent. John K. Polk was employed by Respondent from February 5, 1992 through March 27, 1993. At the inception of Polk's employment, he entered into an employment contract with Respondent. The agreement for employment was entitled "Employment Agreement", and consisted of twelve paragraphs. Throughout the employment agreement Polk is referred to as employee and Respondent is referred to as employer except in paragraph 10. Paragraph 10 informed Polk that as employee he would be regarded as a subcontractor or independent contractor for the purposes of taxes, workers' compensation, licenses, permits, and insurance. During the course of Polk's employment his relationship with Respondent was governed by the employment agreement. In addition to the employment agreement signed by Polk, he received a separate document entitled, "Employee Vacation/Sick Leave Policy". The vacation/sick leave document further identified and regulated Polk as an employee. During the course of Polk's employment with Respondent Polk did not maintain a separate general liability policy. At no time during the course of Polk's employment with Respondent did Respondent attempt to limit its liability to its clients by treating Polk as anything other than as an employee. Polk never attempted to use the fact that the term "subcontractor" had been used in paragraph 10 of the employment agreement in order to limit Respondent's liabilities to clients. Polk's employee fidelity bond questionnaire for State Farm Fire and Casualty Company Insurance was submitted by Respondent listing Polk as an employee, and Polk was covered under the policy for any acts of negligence of omissions. During the period of Polk's employment with Respondent he held no separate occupational license. Polk's business cards and stationery was provided by Respondent, and identified Polk as an employee of Respondent. The business telephone employed by Polk during his employment with Respondent was identified as Respondent. Polk worked under the direct supervision and control of Respondent. At all times Polk held himself out as an employee to Respondent's clients. During the course of his employment with Respondent, Polk was covered under Respondent's general liability policy for any acts of negligence or omission committed by Polk. Randy Morgan was employed with Respondent as an investigator from January 1, 1991, to approximately December, 1992. Morgan did not have a written contract for employment with the Respondent. Morgan was compensated by the case on an hourly basis by Respondent. Morgan was responsible for withholding his own Social Security and federal income taxes. Morgan considered himself as an employee of Respondent, and was under the supervision and control of Respondent. At all times during the course of his employment Morgan held himself out as an employee of Respondent, not as a subcontractor. Robert O. Sutley was employed by Respondent from November of 1992, until approximately March, 1993. During his employment with Respondent, Sutley held "DD", "B", and "G" licenses from the Department. Sutley entered into an employment agreement with Respondent which consisted of twelve paragraphs entitled "Employment Agreement". Within the employment agreement, the term "independent contractor" was a term used in relation to the workers' compensation and the withholding of taxes. Respondent did not attempt to limit its liability to the general public in regard to Sutley. Throughout the course of his employment with Respondent, Sutley held himself out as an investigator employee of Respondent. During his employment with Respondent, Sutley was under the supervision and control of Respondent. Respondent was contacted on a cold call by Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory for the purposes of advertising. After negotiations, Respondent caused to be issued an advertisement in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. Respondent initially instructed Martindale-Hubbell to advertise that Respondent was "one of the oldest and largest investigative agencies in Florida". The basis for the requested advertisement that Respondent was one of the oldest and largest was Respondent's purchase of a statewide detective agency, which had been in business in Florida since the 1950's, and that Respondent has an affiliate office in Europe and other parts of the United States. Pinkerton's of Florida has been licensed in Florida as an investigative agency since 1968. Pinkerton's has employed over 25 investigator employees on an annual basis over the last five years. Prior to its publication in Martindale-Hubbell, Respondent was not aware of the contents of the advertisement. The ad, as published, stated that the Respondent was the oldest and largest investigative agency in Florida. Respondent became aware of the contents of the advertisement upon receipt of the complaint filed against him by the State. Respondent then sent a letter to Martindale-Hubbell, inquiring why the advertisement read "Florida's oldest and largest private investigative agency", as opposed to "one of Florida's largest and oldest private investigative agencies" as previously instructed by Respondent. Martindale-Hubbell acknowledged that the final draft of the advertisement had been done without Respondent's approval and that an error had been made by Martindale-Hubbell in the advertisement, as it appeared in their publication. Respondent instructed Martindale-Hubbell to cease further advertisement. Respondent reported on his letterhead stationery to the Department the termination of the following persons: Colard, Crews, Fitzgerald, Martin, Morgan, Polk, and Stebbins within the statutory time limit. When Respondent was advised by Mr. Matlack that the computer printout from the Department showed that the above named people were still on a list indicating that they were associated with Respondent, Respondent sent another letter dated April 27, 1993 to the Department advising them of the termination of those listed individuals. As of October 15, 1993, the above named persons were still listed as in Respondent's employ. During the period from January 1, 1993 to April 1993, Harvey E. Morse voluntarily deactivated Class "C" Private Investigator's License and Private Investigative Security Agency Manager's License. Morse voluntarily deactivated licenses upon his graduation from the police academy and his association with the Florida Highway Patrol as a full time auxiliary trooper. Upon voluntary deactivation of Morse's licenses, Morse notified each of the company's employees that Morse would not be involved in any more investigations, and that the employees were to receive their direction from either Dwayne Rutledge or Maria Morse. Morse continued to engage in non-regulated functions such as marketing, sales, computer functions, bookkeeping, and payroll and teaching, training and instruction. During the periods of voluntary deactivation of his license, Morse would run a driver's license record on the computer, receive a printout, and hand it to an employee. Morse refrained, however, from being involved in an investigation based upon that printout. Morse has refrained from involvement in any regulated activities from the time that he voluntarily deactivated his license. Once Morse voluntarily deactivated his license, the primary person responsible for investigations and management of employees was Dwayne Rutledge. During the period from September 1992 to January 1993, Harvey E. Morse supervised and trained John Polk. Morse was always available by way of pager or cellular phone, and in constant contact with John Polk during that time period. Further, Respondent installed a two-way radio system so that Morse could talk with and supervise John Polk on a constant basis. Morse was never more than 60 miles from John Polk during his internship from September 1992 till January 1993, and Morse was in daily contact with John Polk in regard to pending investigations, new matters, old matters, and the general business of the Respondent's office. On several occasions during the above stated time period, Polk would communicate with Morse while he was on patrol in a Florida Highway Patrol vehicle, and ask questions of Morse concerning how investigative matters should be handled. Polk was afforded certain latitude by Morse to make administrative decisions on a day-to-day basis as his training progressed, and Morse placed more confidence in Polk's abilities in certain areas. However, Morse still oversaw those decisions. At all times, Polk's supervision of Respondent's employees was under the direct supervision and control of Morse or other licensed managers in Respondent's employ. The purpose of the Respondent's purchase of a two way radio system was twofold: One, to communicate with other investigators during the course of an investigation; and the other was to afford constant communication among Morse, the office managers, Dwayne Rutledge and Maria Morse, and the investigators, in case of a question would arise in the performance of their duties. Rutledge, as well as Maria Morse, became employed as office manager(s) shortly after 1990, and both he and Mrs. Morse were continuously available to the employees and oversaw, in conjunction with the Morse, the performance of their regulated duties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is WHEREFORE, it is RECOMMENDED: Petitioner having failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated those sections as alleged in Counts I through IX of the Administrative Complaint, it is hereby recommended that said Counts be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3890 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Petitioner waived the filing of proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Accepted in substance: Count I, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18; Count II, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22; Count IV, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8; Count V, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18; Count VIII, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; Count VI, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2 (in part), 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9; Count VII, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; Count III, unnumbered paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12. Rejected as argument or conclusory: Count I, unnumbered paragraphs 2, 21; Count IV, paragraphs 9; Count V, paragraph 2(in part); Count VII, paragraphs 4; Count III paragraphs 4, 9. Rejected as redundant or surplusage, or irrelevant and immaterial: Count II, unnumbered paragraphs 13, 18, 19; Count IV, paragraph 5; Count VI, paragraph 4. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol Mail Station-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 William J. Sheaffer, Esquire William J. Sheaffer, PA. 609 East Central Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32801 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue As to each case, whether the Respondents committed the offenses alleged in the respective administrative complaints and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Robert C. Seitz, held a valid Class "C" Private Investigator License, Number C88-00643 and Respondent, Investigative Services International, Incorporated (ISI), held a valid Class "A" Investigative License. Mr. Seitz is the president of ISI. All acts described in this Recommended Order committed by Mr. Seitz were in his capacity as an employee and officer of ISI. CASE NO. 95-3553 On December 30, 1994, Mr. Seitz executed a contract on behalf of ISI by which he agreed that his agency would perform investigative services for Jacqueline Alfaro. The nature of the investigation was the surveillance, videotaping, and documentation of the activities of Ms. Alfaro's sister-in-law. Ms. Alfaro suspected that her sister-in-law was engaged in an extramarital affair and wanted proof of her suspicions to give to her brother, who was incarcerated on federal drug charges. Ms. Alfaro gave to Mr. Seitz a retainer of $1,000 in cash, as requested by Mr. Seitz. The contract for services executed by Ms. Alfaro authorized ISI to bill for the expenses of computer research. Petitioner asserts that Ms. Alfaro provided Mr. Seitz with all pertinent information that was required for the investigation and that additional computer research was not necessary. Mr. Seitz testified, credibly, that some computer research was appropriate to assist him in preparing for his surveillance of Ms. Alfaro's sister-in-law by identifying suspects and possible locations of meetings. Consequently, it is concluded that some of the computer research done by Mr. Seitz was appropriate. In addition to the computer research that was in furtherance of the investigation, Mr. Seitz conducted computer research on his own client. The computer research on Jacqueline Alfaro was inappropriate and was not in furtherance of the investigation of the sister-in-law. The records of ISI for the Alfaro investigation consists of a bookkeeping entry that merely reflects that expenses in the lump-sum amount of $100.00 were incurred for computer research. This record is insufficient to substantiate what was being billed. 1/ Mr. Seitz testified that his company's records of the expenses for the computer research excluded the time he spent researching his own client. This testimony is accepted and, consequently, it is concluded that Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the bill to Ms. Alfaro 2/ included expenses for inappropriate computer research. The contract authorizes charges for mileage incurred outside of Dade County at the rate of 45 per mile. Ms. Alfaro was told by Mr. Seitz that she would not be charged mileage because the investigation would be exclusively within Dade County. The bill submitted to Ms. Alfaro included a charge for mileage of $33.75 incurred on January 5, 1995. This mileage was purportedly incurred for 75 miles driven by Mr. Seitz in Broward County. There was also a billing of $32.50 for one-half hour driving time on the same date. Respondent's testified that he was spending time on a weekend with his family in Broward County when he was summoned by Ms. Alfaro back to Dade County. He further testified that he billed for only the mileage he incurred while in Broward County traveling to Dade County. This explanation is rejected as lacking credibility for two reasons. First, January 5, 1995, fell on a Thursday, not on a weekend. Second, it is doubtful that Mr. Seitz would have traveled 75 miles going from Broward County to Dade County. It is concluded that Ms. Alfaro was inappropriately billed for the 75 miles that Mr. Seitz allegedly drove in Broward County on January 5, 1995. Petitioner did not establish that the billing of $32.50 for driving time on January 5, 1995, was inappropriate since that was for time spent driving within Dade County, Florida. Ms. Alfaro frequently spoke with Mr. Seitz about the investigation, requesting details. She came to believe that Mr. Seitz was not performing his investigation and sent her nephew to check on him. On different occasions, the nephew went to the locations where Mr. Seitz had told Ms. Alfaro he would be conducting a surveillance of the sister-in-law. The nephew reported to Ms. Alfaro that Mr. Seitz was not at those locations. On or about January 9, 1995, Ms. Alfaro instructed Mr. Seitz to terminate the investigation because her nephew caught his stepmother with another man. There was a dispute as to whether Ms. Alfaro requested a written report of the investigation and copies of video tapes taken during the investigation. Ms. Alfaro testified that she wanted a written report and copies of videotapes because she did not believe that Mr. Seitz had conducted an investigation. Mr. Seitz testified that she did not ask for a written report because she did not want her brother to know that she had been investigating his wife. This conflict is resolved by finding that Ms. Alfaro did ask for a written report of the investigation and that she wanted copies of any video tapes. This finding is reached, in part, because Ms. Alfaro clearly did not believe that Mr. Seitz had performed an investigation as he had verbally reported to her. A request for a written report would be consistent with that belief. The finding is also based on an evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses offering the conflicting testimony. On or about January 12, 1995, Mr. Seitz left Ms. Alfaro a handwritten note and $170.00 cash under the door of her business. The note reflected that the total of time and mileage for the investigation was $830.00. The $170.00 purported to represent the difference between the amounts incurred by Ms. Alfaro pursuant to the contract and the amount of the retainer. Ms. Alfaro requested an itemized statement to substantiate this billing. She never received a written report, any videotape, or an itemized billing. Mr. Seitz and ISI failed to maintain investigative notes of the surveillance activities on behalf of Ms. Alfaro. Mr. Seitz produced to Petitioner's investigator what purports to be a computer record of the charges incurred by Ms. Alfaro. The hourly rate specified by the contract was $65.00. The charges reflected by the computer record are as follows: A. 1-4-95 Computer Research $100.00 B. 1-5-95 Surveillance 130.00 C. 1-5-95 Travel Time 32.50 D. 1-5-95 Mileage (75 @ 45 ) 33.75 E. 1-6-95 Surveillance 325.00 F. 1-6-95 Travel Time 65.00 G. 1-7-95 Standby Time 65.00 $751.25 The computer records also reflected that the agency agreed to absorb taxes in the amount of $48.83. Mr. Seitz rounded these figures and determined that Ms. Alfaro was entitled to a refund of $250.00. Mr. Seitz testified that he actually returned to Ms. Alfaro the sum of $250.00 in the note he left for her on January 12, 1995. He testified that his note reflecting that the sum of $170.00 was being returned to her was an error on his part. Ms. Alfaro's testimony was that she was returned only $170.00. Since Ms. Alfaro's testimony is consistent with Mr. Seitz's handwritten note, the conflicting evidence is resolved by finding that Mr. Seitz returned to Ms. Alfaro the sum of $170.00. His testimony that he simply made a mistake as to the amounts due to be refunded is found to be credible and is, consequently, accepted. CASE 95-4775 At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Robin Bloodworth held a Class "CC" Private Investigator Intern license issued by Petitioner. Prior to January 17, 1995, Ms. Bloodworth was told by a friend of hers that he knew someone who might be interested in employing her. This friend asked her to fax to him a copy of her resume. On January 17, 1995, Ms. Bloodworth was contacted by telephone twice by Mr. Seitz. She faxed to him her resume in response to the request he made during the first conversation. He thereafter called a second time, at approximately 10:15 p.m. and asked whether she could be available for a surveillance the following Sunday (January 22, 1995). In response, Ms. Bloodworth told him that she could be available for that assignment on Sunday. On January 18, 1995, Ms. Bloodworth received another telephone call from Mr. Seitz. He asked if she could be on a surveillance by 11:00 a.m. that day in Hollywood, Florida. Ms. Bloodworth accepted that assignment after Mr. Seitz told her what he wanted her to do, thereby beginning her employment with ISI. Ms. Bloodworth did not meet Mr. Seitz in person until 6:30 p.m. on January 18, 1995. During that first meeting, Ms. Bloodworth gave to Mr. Seitz a copy of her Class "CC" Private Investigator Intern license and was told by him that he was going to fill out her sponsor forms and send them to the Petitioner. Mr. Seitz knew that Ms. Bloodworth was a novice investigator with little field experience, other than process serving. Ms. Bloodworth never actually saw any documentation from Mr. Seitz or ISI regarding forms pertaining to her employment that were required to be submitted to the Petitioner. She never received a copy of a letter notifying Petitioner that either Mr. Seitz or ISI intended to sponsor her. Prior to being employed by ISI, Ms. Bloodworth had held her Class "CC" Private Investigator Intern license for approximately six months and had conducted only two or three surveillances. Ms. Bloodworth received no formal training from ISI. During the course of her employment with ISI, which lasted approximately three months, she conducted approximately 35 investigations. Ms. Bloodworth was not directly supervised by Mr. Seitz or by anyone else while she was in the field conducting her investigations. Prior to undertaking an assignment, Mr. Seitz would explain to her the assignment and generally instruct her as to what she would need to do. He frequently told her to use her "judgment" as she was a "big girl". He told her that he did not have time to "baby-sit" her. Ms. Bloodworth had a cellular telephone at her disposal and she knew Mr. Seitz' pertinent telephone numbers at all times. She was instructed to only call him in the event of an emergency. The only time Mr. Seitz visited Ms. Bloodworth in the field was on one assignment for approximately an hour. That visit was prompted by her needing batteries for a camcorder. During the latter part of her employment with ISI, Ms. Bloodworth was told to contact Michael Graff, the lead investigator for ISI, and not Mr. Seitz. During her employment with ISI, Ms. Bloodworth was assigned to conduct an investigation in Haiti. Prior to being sent to Haiti, Ms. Bloodworth was briefed as to the assignment, which included instructions as to where to go, who to meet, and what to do. Ms. Bloodworth was able to contact ISI personnel by telephone. Petitioner does not regulate investigations outside of the United States. Ms. Bloodworth's official Class "CC" Private Investigator Intern application file as maintained by the Department of State, Division of Licensing, does not contain a notification that ISI or Mr. Seitz intended to sponsor her. This file does not contain any documentation relating to Ms. Bloodworth's hiring by ISI, her termination, or an intern biannual report. Mr. Seitz testified that he submitted to Petitioner a form notifying it that ISI intended to sponsor Ms. Bloodworth. He displayed to Petitioner's investigator a form that he represented was a file copy of the notification form. That form was dated January 13, 1995, which was four days before he first talked to Ms. Bloodworth and five days before he met her in person and received a copy of her license. He was unable to produce any other documentation as to this notification. Mr. Seitz's testimony as to this issue is rejected as lacking credibility. Mr. Seitz admits that ISI did not submit any documentation relating to the termination of Ms. Bloodworth's employment and it did not submit an intern biannual report that would have been due as a result of her employment having been terminated. Mr. Seitz testified that he did not file these reports when Ms. Bloodworth's employment was terminated because she threatened him and he was awaiting the results of a police investigation before filing the reports. 3/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order containing the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that Respondents, Investigative Services International, Inc., and Robert C. Seitz, be fined in the total amount of $1,600.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1996.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of fraud or deceit in the practice of activities regulated under Chapter 493 and knowingly violating a statutory prohibition against carrying a concealed firearm in the course of business regulated by Chapter 493.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has held a Class "A" Private Investigative Agency License, a Class "C" Private Investigator License, and a Class "PD" Proprietary Security Officer License. By final order entered December 8, 1992, Petitioner suspended Respondent's Class "A" and "C" licenses for one year for unlawfully intercepting oral communications. The final order also imposes an administrative fine of $1000 for this violation. In August, 1991, Respondent was retained by a client to perform an asset check of another person. Respondent did not perform the work to the client's satisfaction, so the client filed a complaint with Petitioner. On September 17, 1991, Petitioner's investigator visited Respondent at his office to conduct an interview. When the investigator asked to see Respondent's file on the case, he went to his filing cabinet, pulled out a drawer, and exclaimed that the file was missing. The investigator asked what happened, and Respondent said that someone must have stolen the file. The investigator advised Respondent that, if so, he should report the theft to the police. Respondent did report the theft to the police. In so doing, he made a false report to the police. The file was not missing or stolen; Respondent was trying to obstruct the investigation into the complaint that the client had made against him. When requested to visit the police station for an interview in November, 1991, Respondent wore his handgun in a shoulder holster under his jacket. The evidence is unclear as to the status of Respondent's Class "C" license at the time of the interview at the police department. There is some evidence that it had expired due to nonrenewal, but Respondent also testified that he had already mailed a check and the paperwork necessary for the renewal. However, Respondent may be presumed to be aware that even a current Class "C" license does not authorize the licensee to carry a concealed firearm into a police station.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a final order dismissing Count II, finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 493.6118(1)(f), issuing a reprimand, and imposing an administrative fine of $1000. ENTERED on September 24, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on September 24, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Attorney Henri C. Cawthon Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Frank J. Lanzillo 520 - 12 Street West, #203 Bradenton, Florida 32405
Findings Of Fact The only issue raised as to whether the Petitioner's application for a private investigative agency license should be granted, is whether or not he has the experience required by law. The Petitioner has received an Associate of Arts degree from Palm Beach Community College. His primary area of study was law enforcement, including courses in search and seizure and investigations. In 1974 the Petitioner received a Bachelor's degree in Criminology from the Florida State University. At Florida State he took courses in criminal investigations, constitutional law, government, psychology, and sociology. While the Petitioner's course work does not constitute experience in the area of private investigations, it is relevant to his qualifications to serve in that capacity. Prior to his attending college, and during the time that he attended college, the Petitioner worked as a security officer for several department stores. He worked approximately four months for Fountain's Department Store in Palm Beach County, and approximately twelve months at Gayfer's Department Store in Tallahassee, Florida, At Gayfer's his employment was part-time, however, he worked thirty to forty hours per week. After graduation from college the Petitioner worked approximately five months at a Sears Department Store in Palm Beach County on a full-time basis. Four months of that experience was as a security officer. As a security officer at the department stores, the Petitioner was present at the stores and observed customers. He apprehended shoplifters, took statements from them, and testified against them in court. He also investigated cash register shortages and other indications of employee dishonesty. An investigator for the Division of Licensing testified that in his opinion the department store experience would not constitute experience in the area of investigations, but rather should be considered security work. The agent did testify, however, that a policeman who worked on a "beat" would be considered to have investigative experience. The work that the Petitioner performed at the department stores is directly analogous to the work that a policeman would perform, and his experience is directly related to the field of private investigations, and should be included in his experience. From March, 1976 through February, 1977 the Petitioner was employed by the Wackenhut Corporation. Since March, 1977 the Petitioner has been employed by Damron Investigative Agency. The work that the Petitioner has performed with these two employers is directly related to the field of investigations. At the time of the hearing the Petitioner had a total of 26 months of experience working for these two employers.
The Issue The issue for consideration was whether the Respondent, Frank R. Kuiken, Jr., should be disciplined because of the misconduct alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At approximately 3:00 PM on August 30, 1989, Manatee County Sheriff's Deputy Michael Kenyon saw Respondent's wife, Michelle, driving their automobile in the city of Bradenton with a blue flasher posted on the dash board inside the windshield. Because the unauthorized use of such a light is prohibited by law, Deputy Kenyon stopped Ms. Kuiken and when he approached the car, noticed she had moved the light from the dashboard to the floor. When he asked her why she had such a light in the car, she replied that her husband, a private investigator, used it in the course of his business in emergency situations. Deputy Kenyon requested Respondent be contacted and come to the scene. When he arrived, Kuiken advised Kenyon that he was a private investigator and used the light only in cases of extreme emergency in the performance of those duties. He further related he had not yet had the opportunity to use it. Mr. Kuiken also indicated that in addition to being a private investigator, he was a process server appointed by two local judges, and a court officer. Deputy Kenyon attempted to verify Respondent's claim to being a court officer but was unable to do so. Upon request, Respondent refused to show a private investigator's license, but indicated he had a permit to carry a concealed weapon. Several days later, Mr. Eugene Blitch, an investigator with the Department of State's Division of Licensing, was contacted by the Bradenton Police Department regarding Mr. Kuiken's claim to being a private investigator, and requested to confirm the licensing status. Blitch's inquiry and search of official state records revealed that Kuiken was the holder of a concealed weapon permit but did not hold, does not now hold, and never has held a license as either a private investigator or a private investigative agency. There was no evidence presented with reference to the occupational license. Respondent's business card, which he gave to the Deputy Sheriff indicates he holds himself out, without qualification, as an "investigator" offering surety recovery, missing persons searches, and service of process services. He claims this card was not given out to the general public but only to attorneys and finance companies for whom he worked on a contract basis. On September 7, 1989, Mr. Blitch, in the company of a Manatee County detective, went to the Respondent's home in Bradenton where upon inquiry from Blitch, Respondent admitted he did not hold a license to do private investigative work. He also indicated he carried no liability insurance but claimed, however, that he did not work for the public and did not advertise or hold himself out to the general public as a private investigator. He indicated he worked for attorneys, as a process server, and as an employee of ITT Financial Services. Inquiry of the manager of this concern revealed Respondent was not an employee of the company but did security and investigative work for it on a contract basis from time to time. During his interview with Blitch, Respondent denied having admitted to the deputy that he was a private investigator, but the other evidence contradicts this and is found to be more credible. The evidence of record clearly indicates that Respondent held himself out as an investigator, and the hearsay statement of the ITT manager confirms this. Respondent asserted to Mr. Blitch that since he did no work for the general public and limited his activity solely to process serving, work for attorneys, and for ITT, he was not required to be licensed. When advised that his understanding was incorrect, he quickly agreed to do whatever was necessary to "get legal".
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Frank Robert Kuiken, Jr., be assessed an administrative fine of $250.00. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Frank Robert Kuiken, Jr. 5655 Tousley Drive Eau Claire, Michigan 49111 Hon. Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ken Rouse General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner's rule challenge petition should be dismissed for failure to present issues that meet the requirements of Sections 120.56(1), 120.56(3), and 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, and if so, whether Respondent is entitled to an award of costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Sections 120.569(2)(e), 120.595(3), and 120.595(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed an application for a Class "C" private investigator license on or about May 15, 2000. By letter dated September 5, 2000, Respondent advised Petitioner that his application for a Class "C" license as a private investigator was denied. The letter stated as follows in relevant part: Failure to qualify under Section 493.6203, Florida Statutes. You have not demonstrated the necessary lawfully gained, verifiable, full-time experience or appropriate training. Your application is therefore being denied. Petitioner filed a request for an administrative hearing with Respondent on or about September 13, 2000. He filed an amended request for hearing with Respondent on or about September 15, 2000. On September 27, 2000, Respondent issued an Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend. This order referenced Rule 28-106.201(2), Florida Administrative Code, and found that Petitioner's hearing request was substantially deficient because it did not contain the following: An explanation of how the petitioner's substantial interest will be affected by the agency determination; A statement of disputed issues of material fact. The Petitioner has not disputed the material facts at issue in this case; which is whether the Petitioner provided the Division with information which the Division could then verify. Verification is achieved by actually speaking with the persons provided by an applicant to obtain information as to what duties were performed and to obtain a percentage of the time worked which involved investigative work. Petitioner provided information concerning former employers in the Affidavit of Experience section of the application. After submitting the application, Petitioner submitted an affidavit from an investigator, however that investigator was not Petitioner's employer and therefore not in the position to verify Petitioner's experience. For the first time, in Petitioner's requests for a hearing, Petitioner submits information concerning a former career in executive recruiting consisting of an affidavit, notarized in Maryland, of a former co- worker. This information was never provided to the Division and is not listed anywhere on the application submitted by Petitioner nor is there any way to verify any of the information in that affidavit as the affiant's address and telephone number are not provided. In his petitions for hearing Petitioner has raised only legal issues which are not legally the forum of a formal administrative hearing. Section 120.569(1), Florida Statutes . . . . A concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, including the specific facts the petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action; A statement of the specific rules or statutes the petitioner contends require reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action . . . . (Emphasis added) Respondent's Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend also determined that: (a) Petitioner's hearing requests improperly mixed rule validity challenge arguments for Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, proceedings with disputed material fact arguments for proceedings under Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes; (b) Petitioner's argument that his Juris Doctorate training and related legal work experience met the statutory requirements of Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes, was a statutory construction/legal argument presented in the guise of factual issues; (c) The Division of Administrative Hearings does not have jurisdiction to decide constitutional validity arguments in a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, proceeding; and (d) Petitioner's argument that he is entitled to licensure by default due to the failure of the agency to meet the 90-day time requirement of Section 120.60, Florida Statutes, is a legal issue in light of the tolling provision of Section 493.6108, Florida Statutes. In a footnote to the Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend, Respondent referred to two documents that Respondent attached as a courtesy to Petitioner. The first document was Respondent's Opinion Letter No. 92-50. This letter responded to a specific inquiry, determining that an attorney, who was not a member of the Florida Bar and who wanted to perform sub-contract investigative work for a licensed private investigation agency, was not exempt under Section 493.6102(6), Florida Statutes, from having to separately qualify for "C" licensure requirements. The second document was Respondent's internal memorandum, identified herein as Opinion No. 92-4. This memorandum determined that legal training and work experience of attorneys do not automatically qualify them for a Class "C" license. Instead, each application should be considered on a case-by-case basis. On October 10, 2000, Petitioner filed his Request for Formal Administrative Hearing, citing Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, as authority to challenge certain of Respondent's rules and statements defined as rules. Petitioner claims that Respondent routinely applies heightened scrutiny to applications submitted by attorneys, persons who are qualified to be attorneys, or others who have research and investigative skills but no actual police or criminal justice experience. Petitioner's hearing request first argues that Respondent's Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend, together with its attachments, all of which are referenced above, set forth policies having the effect of rules. In Petitioner's "First Rule Challenge," he argues that Respondent's interpretation of the time limitations for processing license applications in Section 120.60, Florida Statutes, together with Respondent's interpretation of the tolling provisions of Section 493.6108(1), Florida Statutes, constitute a rule. Petitioner concludes that Respondent is without delegated legislative authority to extend the 90-day application processing time of Section 120.60, Florida Statutes, unless Respondent does not receive the fingerprint investigation report required by Section 493.6108(1), Florida Statutes, prior to the expiration of the 90-day processing period. Petitioner's "Second Rule Challenge" argues that Respondent's Opinion No. 92-4, a memorandum dated January 23, 1992, constitutes a rule because: (a) Respondent uses the opinion to define the "practice of law"; and (b) Respondent relies on the opinion in refusing to recognize experience gained by lawyers in the practice of their profession unless the lawyer was engaged in "full-time investigative work." However, Respondent concludes by acknowledging that the opinion recommends a case-by-case analysis of each attorney's application to determine whether the attorney has the experience and training required by Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's "Third Rule Challenge" also argues that Respondent's Opinion No. 92-4 constitutes a rule. According to Petitioner, Respondent relies on the opinion to find that an attorney, even if a member of the Florida Bar, lacks creditable "college coursework related to criminal justice, criminology, or law enforcement administration." See Section 493.6203(4)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioner concludes that Respondent does not have authority to interpret the meaning of the statutory term, "related to," so narrowly. Petitioner's hearing request did not include a "Fourth Rule Challenge." Petitioner's "Fifth Rule Challenge" states that Respondent's Opinion Letter No. 92-50, dated October 20, 1992, is an unpromulgated rule. Petitioner claims that Respondent relies on this opinion to set broad policy concerning the agency's treatment of the experience and educational qualification of unlicensed attorneys. Petitioner states that the opinion infringes on the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Bar. Petitioner asserts that he is substantially affected because he is an unlicensed attorney. Petitioner's "Sixth Rule Challenge" states that Respondent's Order Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend is an unpromulgated rule. Specifically, Petitioner claims Respondent created a rule by refusing to credit applicants with work experience that is not "verifiable by actually speaking with the persons provided by an applicant to obtain information as to what duties were performed and to obtain a percentage of the time worked which involved investigative work." According to Petitioner, Respondent has no authority to establish such an agency specific meaning of the common term, "verifiable experience." Petitioner's "Seventh Rule Challenge" argues that Respondent has adopted a special meaning for the term "private investigation" which contravenes the statute. Petitioner takes issue with Respondent's interpretation of "private investigation" as defined in Section 493.6101(17), Florida Statutes. Petitioner also challenges Respondent's interpretation of the experience requirement of Section 493.6203(4), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has withdrawn his "Eighth Rule challenge" regarding the validity of Rule 1C-3.100(3)(a), Florida Administrative.
