The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, a surviving beneficiary, is entitled to change the Florida Retirement System retirement benefits 1 All references to chapter 120 are to the 2019 version. payment option selected by her now-deceased spouse, a member of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes (2002),2 with administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner is the spouse of James L. Williams, now deceased, who was employed by the School District of Palm Beach ("District) for 38 years, and was a member of the FRS. Williams retired from his employment with the District on August 23, 2002. At that time, he executed the Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement Form, Form FR-11. On Form FR-11, he designated Petitioner as his primary beneficiary and Jones as his contingent beneficiary. Williams signed this form, and his signature was notarized. Also on August 23, 2002, Williams executed the Florida Retirement System Option Selection for FRS Members Form, Form FRS-11o. On that form, he selected FRS retirement benefits payment Option 2, and designated that choice by writing an "X" on the line next to Option 2. Option 2 was described on Form FRS-11o as: A reduced monthly payment for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. 2 All references to chapter 121 are to the 2002 version of the Florida Statutes, which was in effect at the time that the retirement benefits application and option selection forms that have given rise to this proceeding were executed. Form FRS-11o contained a section, immediately below the description of Option 2, that was required to be completed by the spouse of a married FRS member who had selected Option 1 or Option 2. On August 23, 2002, Petitioner completed, signed, and dated that section, confirming that she was the legal spouse of Williams and acknowledging that she was informed that Williams had selected either Option 1 or Option 2. The purpose of that section on Form FRS-11o is to inform the spouse of the FRS member that, by the member's selection of either Option 1 or Option 2, the surviving spouse is not entitled to receive a continuing benefit for the rest of his or her life. The last sentence on Form FRS-11o, immediately above the space for the FRS member's signature, states in pertinent part: "[m]y retirement becomes final when any payment is cashed . . . [or] deposited." DeVonnia Jones was present with Williams at the time he was given Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o to execute. Jones testified that when Williams arrived at the District office on August 23, 2002, Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o already had been filled out by District staff, and were presented to him by his supervisor, who informed him that he needed to retire or he would be terminated. According to Jones, Williams did not wish to retire at that time. Jones asked District staff how much more Williams' monthly benefits would be if he did not retire for another year or two, and was told that Williams' benefits would be between $25 and $30 more per month. According to Jones, "my dad basically shed a couple tears. He was not comfortable, but he went ahead and signed it because I told him to, because they made it seem like he wasn't going to be eligible to get what he was supposed to get." Williams signed and dated Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002, and his signature was notarized. On August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application." This document stated, among other things, that Williams had selected FRS Option 2, and that his retirement was effective September 2002. At the bottom of this document was a standalone paragraph, in bold face type, that read: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED!" Also on August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Florida Division of Retirement Estimate of Retirement Benefit (Estimate only, subject to final verification of all factors)." This document provided information regarding the amount of the monthly benefits Williams would receive for the four options offered under the FRS. A statement in bold face type at the bottom of the document read: "Comments: You have chosen Option 2. Your option selection cannot be changed after you cash or deposit any benefit payment." Had Williams wished to change his retirement benefits payment option, he could have done so up to the time he cashed or deposited a retirement benefits payment. Williams began receiving his monthly FRS retirement benefits payments from Respondent on October 4, 2002. He cashed or deposited the first FRS benefits warrant (Warrant #0618275) that he received. Thereafter, Williams received monthly FRS retirement benefits payments until his death on April 26, 2010. Williams received a total of 92 monthly benefits payments before his death. All of the FRS retirement benefits payment warrants issued to Williams were deposited or cashed. On May 17, 2010, Respondent contacted Petitioner to inform her that she needed to complete a Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Beneficiary of Monthly Retirement Benefits Form, Form FST- 11b, in order for her to receive monthly FRS retirement benefits payments as Williams' beneficiary. In the contact letter, Respondent informed Petitioner that "you will receive the same gross monthly benefits to which the member was entitled through August 31, 2012." Petitioner completed Form FST-11b on June 25, 2010, and began receiving FRS monthly benefits payments on June 30, 2010. Petitioner received a total of 28 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments. The last warrant issued to Petitioner (Warrant #0375196) was issued on August 31, 2012. All of the warrants issued to Petitioner were cashed or deposited. In sum, Williams and Petitioner collectively received a total of 120 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments, pursuant to Option 2. All of the warrants issued to Williams, and then to Petitioner, as his beneficiary, were deposited or cashed. Petitioner testified that beginning in 2003, she made numerous attempts, over a period of years, to contact the District and Respondent regarding changing the FRS retirement benefits payment option that Williams had selected on August 23, 2002. During this time, Williams and Petitioner continued to cash or deposit the benefits payment warrants they received from Respondent. In this proceeding, Petitioner does not claim that Williams accidentally selected Option 2, or that he intended to select another option, when he signed Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002. Rather, she asserts that at the time Williams retired, he suffered from confusion and memory loss such that he did not understand the option he chose—effectively, that he lacked the mental capacity to have chosen Option 2 as his retirement benefits payment option. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that because Williams was forced to retire under threat of termination from his employment, he was under duress when he chose Option 2 on Form FRS-11o. On these grounds, Petitioner asserts that she should be permitted to change Williams' choice of retirement benefits payment option.3 3 Here, Petitioner, has requested that she be allowed to "change" Williams' choice of Option 2 on the FRS retirement option selection forms. She did not identify, or present evidence, Petitioner's impassioned testimony at the final hearing shows that she fervently believes her husband was wrongly treated by the District when it required him to retire in 2002, against his desire to continue to work.4 However, as was explained to Petitioner at the final hearing, the purpose of this proceeding was not to determine whether the District wrongly forced Williams out of his employment; rather, it is to determine whether there is any factual or legal basis for changing the retirement benefits option that Williams selected when he executed Form FRS-11o nearly 18 years ago. The evidence does not support Petitioner's argument that Williams lacked the mental capacity to adequately understand the option that he chose on Form FRS-11o. Although Petitioner testified that Williams had been treated by a neurologist, no direct medical evidence was presented establishing that Williams was mentally incapacitated at the time he executed Form FRS-11o. Additionally, at the time Williams signed the form, he was accompanied by his daughter, who, after speaking to District staff regarding his options, advised him to sign the form. Petitioner herself also was present at the District office and signed Form FRS-11o, expressly acknowledging that she understood Williams had chosen Option 2. Thus, to the extent that Williams may not, on his own, have fully appreciated his choice of options on Form FRS-11o—and there is no competent direct evidence showing that to be the case—both his daughter and wife were present with him when he executed Form FRS-11o, his daughter told him to sign the form, and his wife expressly acknowledged that she understood his choice of Option 2. These circumstances do not support a finding that Williams lacked the mental capacity to understand, or did not adequately regarding which specific option she would choose, if permitted to change Williams' selected FRS benefits option. 4 The evidence indicates that the District required Williams to retire because he began having difficulty with his job as a mail carrier. According to Petitioner, Williams had an accident in a District vehicle and did not report the accident to the District, and that when he was transferred to the mail room, he had difficulty remembering to do certain required tasks. understand, the consequence of choosing Option 2 when he executed Form FRS-11o. The evidence also does not support a finding that Williams' choice of Option 2 should be changed, due to duress. There is no direct evidence establishing that Williams was under duress when he chose Option 2. Although Jones testified, credibly, that her father was upset about being forced to retire when he wanted to continue working, her testimony that he was under duress was based on her subjective conclusion. Furthermore, even if Williams was emotionally distressed when he signed the FRS benefits options forms, there is no evidence showing that as result of such distress, he chose Option 2 instead of a different option. It also is noted that Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o both expressly informed Williams that once his retirement became final—which would occur when any benefit payment was cashed or deposited—his retirement benefits option selection would become final and could not be changed. Further, Williams received two more pieces of correspondence from Respondent—both containing statements in bold face type—expressly informing him that once any FRS retirement benefits payments were cashed or deposited, his retirement benefits option choice could not be changed. As noted above, Williams could have changed his FRS benefits option at any time before he cashed or deposited a benefits payment; however, he did not do so. Thus, pursuant to the express terms of Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o, when Williams cashed or deposited the first benefits payment, his selection of Option 2 became final and could not be changed. In sum, the evidence does not establish any factual basis for permitting Petitioner to change Williams' selection of Option 2 as his FRS retirement benefits payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to change the FRS retirement benefits payment option selected by her husband, an FRS member, when he retired. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ladasiah Jackson Ford, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Deloris Williams 1219 West Ninth Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Mangement Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Mangement Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. (“Holiday Endowment”) is eligible for a consumer certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, the Holiday Endowment, is an organization incorporated in the State of Florida as a not-for-profit corporation under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes. It was formed in October 1996 by the Holiday Rotary Club of Holiday, Florida, as a vehicle for accruing funds to contribute to the various charities supported by the Holiday Rotary Club. The Holiday Endowment is exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3), having obtained an exemption letter from the Internal Revenue Service on May 30, 1997. Larry Schalles, Treasurer of the Holiday Endowment, testified that annual fundraising achieves variable results, and that the membership of the Holiday Rotary Club seeks to attain stability in its philanthropic endeavors by placing a portion of its funds into the Holiday Endowment each year. Once the endowment is built up, the interest can be used to pay for scholarships each year, leaving the principal intact. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the sole active function of the Holiday Endowment has been to raise moneys to establish the endowment fund. All moneys raised by the Holiday Endowment are invested in the fund to provide scholarships in the future. All of the Holiday Endowment’s fund raising activities are conducted by unpaid volunteers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Holiday Endowment has made no expenditures of any kind. The Department denied the Holiday Endowment’s application for a certificate of exemption on the ground that the Holiday Endowment did not qualify as a charitable institution under the seven criteria set forth in Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes. In particular, the Department found that the Holiday Endowment does not expend in excess of 50% of its operational expenditures toward qualified charitable services, meaning that the provision of a charitable service is not the organization’s sole or primary function. As set forth above, the Holiday Endowment has in fact made no expenditures of any kind. The Department also found that the Holiday Endowment does not provide a reasonable percentage of services free of charge or at a substantially reduced cost to persons unable to pay for such service. The Holiday Endowment’s response is that the exemption should nonetheless be granted, because any expenditures it makes in the future will be for charitable purposes.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying the certificate of exemption sought by the Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry C. Schalles, C.P.A. Treasurer, Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. 5728 Main Street New Port Richey, Florida 34652 William B. Nickell Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street, Suite 304 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Heike Stoll (f/k/a Heike Bybee), has standing to assert a claim or right to any portion of her former husband’s Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) benefits as an “innocent spouse” pursuant to Article II, Section 8(d) of the Florida Constitution, and section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2017).1/
Findings Of Fact Mr. Bybee is a member of the FRS Investment Plan by virtue of his former employment as a deputy with the Sarasota County Sheriff, an FRS participating employer. On October 6, 2017, in Sarasota County Circuit Court Case Number 2017CF001018, Mr. Bybee was found guilty by jury verdict of the following felonies under Florida law: Kidnap- Commit or Facilitate Commission of Felony; Crimes Against Person-Exploitation Elderly or Disabled Adult $20,000 to $100,000 dollars; Fraudulent Use of Personal Identifying Information (8 counts); and Computer Crime to Defraud or Obtain Property (3 Counts) (referred to collectively as the “felony convictions”). On October 6, 2017, judgment was entered against Mr. Bybee adjudicating him guilty of the felony convictions. The SBA notified Mr. Bybee that his felony convictions required forfeiture of his FRS benefits under section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Mr. Bybee did not file a petition for hearing to challenge the Notice of Forfeiture or otherwise assert that his felony convictions did not warrant forfeiture of his FRS benefits under the forfeiture statute. Mr. Bybee’s interest in his FRS benefits is subject to forfeiture due to his commission of the crimes, and his felony convictions. Ms. Stoll was married to Mr. Bybee on August 27, 1994. On or about May 9, 2017, Ms. Stoll filed her Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in Manatee County (Circuit Court Case Number 2017-DR-2067) asserting her interest in, inter alia, Mr. Bybee’s FRS benefits. On December 8, 2017, Ms. Stoll filed an “FRS Investment Plan Petition for Hearing” asserting her claim of entitlement to her spousal share of Mr. Bybee’s FRS benefits as an “innocent spouse.” On February 26, 2018, Mr. Bybee and Ms. Stoll executed a Marital Settlement Agreement. As to retirement accounts, Mr. Bybee and Ms. Stoll agreed to the following: Retirement Accounts/Pension. Wife shall receive as her sole property, and all equity and value therein, all retirement accounts and/or pensions in the Husband’s sole name, in the joint name of the parties, and/or in the Wife’s sole name, free and clear of any claims or interest which Husband may have thereto. Specifically, Husband has a pension and/or retirement account through the County of Sarasota Sheriff’s Department, State of Florida. Wife shall receive as her sole property, and all equity and value therein, in said pension and/or retirement account, free and clear of any claims or interest which Husband may have thereto. Further, Husband assigns, transfers, and relinquishes any legal or equitable claims, causes of action, or remedies of any nature against the pension and/or retirement account through the County of Sarasota Sheriff’s Department, State of Florida; and Husband shall fully cooperate with Wife in any and all respects as necessary for Wife to pursue any such legal or equitable claims, causes of action, or remedies related any manner said pension and/or retirement account. Ms. Stoll was not charged with or convicted of any crimes related to Mr. Bybee’s felony convictions. Ms. Stoll’s testimony was credible that she was unaware of Mr. Bybee’s crimes, and had not benefited from them in any fashion. On April 16, 2018, a Final Judgement of Dissolution of Marriage was entered in Manatee County Circuit Court Case Number 2017-DR-2067 that “approved, ratified and incorporated” the marital settlement agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to her former husband’s retirement benefits, because he was a public employee convicted of specified offenses; and pursuant to section 112.3173, he forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account upon committing the crimes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Department administers the CDCSAP Act (the "act"). The Florida legislature makes annual appropriations to fund the CDCSAP. These funds are used to finance activities of qualified CDCs. CDCs are community-based organizations which, in concert with state and local governments and private enterprise, facilitate or financially support revenue-generating business for the purpose of community economic development, redevelopment, preservation, restoration and revitalization. To this end, the Department's line staff person for the CDC program, James Fox, who is a planner employed by the Department, reviews applications, gives technical assistance workshops on rules and gives statewide speeches to CDC programs and at their annual meetings. Fox is familiar with the community development corporations statewide and the activities of each CDC program. He has been instrumental in assisting local entities prepare applications to become CDCs to include filing their non-profit corporate status with the Secretary of State. He has authored a pamphlet for the Department which has been distributed to entities desirous of achieving CDC status entitled "How to become a CDC". (Respondent's Exhibit 1). This pamphlet is widely utilized by entities seeking CDC status and provides all of the basic information needed to become a CDC. The act empowers the Department to administer the CDCSAP and authorizes issuance of one and three year administrative grants, planning grants and loans to fund the activities of eligible CDCs. The act requires the Department to monitor expenditures of CDC funds and to provide technical assistance to CDCs. In addition to CDCSAP grants and loans, CDC has also received funding from private foundations and local governments. The Department has adopted Chapter 9B-14, Florida Administrative Code. That chapter implements the act and establishes regulations and procedures governing the CDCSAP. CDCs fiercely compete annually for administrative grants when filing their applications with the Department. These grant applications are reviewed by Fox. There are approximately fifty CDCs statewide and they annually submit applications for grants. Once these applications are received, Fox reviews and scores them pursuant to Rule 9B-14, Florida Administrative Code. In so doing, the Department uses three reviewers and the reviews are individually conducted. In reviewing the grant applications, a funding matrix is used. Using the matrix, a score and rank is made for each application. Next, the division director goes over each application and the matter is discussed with the Department's Secretary. Later a letter of intent is given (to either grant or deny the application). The score lists the rank and order and is not an entitlement to funding. After the applications are reviewed, the Department's senior management lists a "pre-appeal" score and ranking for each applicant. Once the CDCs are notified in writing of the score and ranking in the pre-appeal scoring matrix, they are also advised that the number and amount of administrative grants awarded will be contingent upon passage of a state budget and appropriation for the fiscal year. Applicants are also advised of rights to pursue an appeal regarding the correctness of the scores pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. (Respondent's Exhibit 3). If an appeal is initiated, an administrative proceeding is conducted usually under the informal provisions of Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. A hearing officer assigned by the Department conducts a hearing and issues a recommended order. A final order is then entered by the Department's Secretary. Thereafter, each applicant is assigned a final score and ranking in the matrix which determines funding order priority. The final scores are usually determined prior to adoption of an appropriations act by the legislature. As noted, the final score does not establish whether a particular CDC will be funded. Section 290.036(3), Florida Statutes and Rule 9B-14.007(3) and 9B- 14.009(11)(a)-(c) provide the parameters within which the Department determines the number, type and amount of administrative grants it will award. When grant applications are submitted and evaluated, the Department is, at the time, unaware of the amount of money available for upcoming grants because the legislature has not passed an appropriations bill for the fiscal year. Final decision with respect to the number and amount of administrative grants is made after the final appropriation bills and summary statement of intent is transmitted to the Department. "Proviso language" is passed by the legislature as part of the appropriations bill. It is signed by the governor, has the force of law and is binding on the Department. Legislative statement of intent language is transmitted to the governor at a date after passage of the appropriations act by chairpersons of the House and Senate committees on appropriations. The intent language is the statement of how the legislature, in its considered opinion, thinks the appropriated funds should be spent. It guides the Department regarding use of appropriated funds. The Department considers and relies on applicable legislative proviso or intent language in deciding its final determination as to number and amount of administrative grants. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Department follows the statement of intent language in reaching its final funding decision. Over the years, a pattern has emerged which evidences that the Department carefully considers applicable proviso or statement of intent language. Specifically, from a historical perspective, for the 1983-84 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,175,000 for the CDCSAP but did not include either proviso or legislative statement of intent language. The governor vetoed $200,000.00 of that sum leaving $975,000 to fund the program. The Department awarded administrative grants in varying amounts to 23 CDCs. Subsequently, the legislature amended the statute to allow the Department to fund no more than 18 CDCs. (Respondent's Exhibit 7 and Chapter 84-240, Laws of Florida). For the 1984-85 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,600,000 for the CDCSAP and included proviso language directing that no more than 16 CDCs be funded. In accordance with that proviso language, the Department awarded administrative grants of $100,000 each to 16 CDCs. For the 1985-86 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,600,000 for the CDCSAP but included neither proviso nor statement of intent language. The Department awarded grants of $100,000 to 16 CDCs. For the 1986-87 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,600,000 for the CDCSAP and included proviso language directing that no more than 16 CDCs be awarded administrative grants and that a specific CDC be awarded a training grant. Pursuant to that proviso language, the Department awarded administrative grants of $85,000 each to 16 CDCs, and a $40,000 training grant to the specified CDC. For the 1987-88 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,337,156 for the CDCSAP and included proviso language directing that no more than 16 CDCs be funded. Pursuant to that proviso language, the Department awarded grants of $83,338 each to 15 CDCs. Another $83,338 was divided to provide grants of $41,669 each to two eligible CDCs which received identical scores for the last funding slot. For the 1988-89 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,337,156 for the CDCSAP and included proviso language directing that no more than 16 CDCs be funded. Pursuant to that proviso language, the Department awarded grants of $72,380 each to 16 CDCs. For the 1989-90 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,337,156 for the CDCSAP and included statement of intent language directing that no more than 16 CDCs be funded. The Department awarded grants of $83,572 each to 16 CDCs. For the 1990-91 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,699,600 for the CDCSAP and included statement of intent language directing that no more than 18 CDCs be funded. The Department followed the statement of intent and awarded grants of $90,564 each to 17 CDCs which scored above the minimum point threshold as set forth in the matrix. For the 1991-92 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,600,000 for the CDCSAP but included neither proviso nor statement of intent language. The Department awarded grants of $88,888 each to 18 CDCs. Final scores and ranking does not establish entitlement to funding under the program. The final score establishes whether a CDC is eligible to receive either a one or three year administrative grant depending on the total number of points received. The score also results in ranking of each CDC so that depending upon legislative appropriations and expressions of intent regarding funding, a funding priority is established. Prior to 1991, the act provided only for the award of one year administrative grants. In 1991, the Florida legislature amended the act to permit the award of multi-year administrative grants and planning grants. (Chapter 91-263, Laws of Florida). The provisions of the act relative to funding provides: The amount of any administrative grant to a community development corporation in one year shall be any amount up to $100,000. The Department may fund up to 18 Community Development Corporations this year as provided for in the general appropriations act. The Department shall develop a diminishing scale of funding each year based on the annual appropriation to ensure compliance with this section and Section 290.0365. See Section 290.036(3), Florida Statutes (1991). To incorporate the 1991 statutory changes into Rule 9B-14, Florida Administrative Code, the Department initiated rulemaking pursuant to Section 120.54 in September 1991. Several workshops were held to gain input from CDCs regarding proposed changes to the rule. In addition, a public hearing was held in January 1992 at which the Department received oral and written comments from CDCs regarding the proposed rule challenges. Amendments were adopted and took effect on March 22, 1992. During the rulemaking process, no comment was submitted regarding the proposed changes to Rule 9B-14.009(11). No party initiated a rule challenge to the proposed amendments pursuant to Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes. Rule 9B-14.007(3), which was not affected by the 1992 amendments, states in relevant part that "[n]o grant will be awarded for funds exceeding $100.000." Respondent's Exhibit 2 at Rule 9B-14.007(3). Rule 9B-14.009(11), as amended in 1992, now authorizes the award of two types of administrative grants of one and three years duration in addition to planning grants. The pertinent portion of this rule provides: A maximum of 18 administrative grants may be awarded in any fiscal year pursuant to Section 290.036(3), Florida Statutes. Applicants which receive a score of 150 or more points will be awarded a three year administrative grant. Applicants which receive a score of at least 100 points but less than 150 points will be awarded a one year administrative grant. For the 1992-93 funding cycle, prior to the application deadline and after the amendments to Rule 9B-14 were adopted, public application workshops were held in Tallahassee and Miami. At the workshops, representatives of the Department discussed the recent statutory and rule changes to the CDCSAP as well as the proper way to complete applications. The application deadline for administrative grants for the 1992-93 grant cycle was April 1, 1992. The Department received 29 timely applications. When the 1992-93 grant applications were received, evaluated and given tentative scores and rankings, the Department was unaware of the amount of legislative appropriations for the CDCSAP and whether any proviso or statement of intent language would accompany the appropriation. After the applications were evaluated, the preappeal scores and rankings derived and the applicants were notified of the results, several CDCs including Petitioners appealed their scores. Informal hearings were held during late May 1992. The hearing officer's recommended orders were issued June 25, 1992 followed by the Department's final orders on July 8, 1992. Thereafter, each applicant was assigned a final score and ranking. For the 1992-93 funding cycle, 21 CDCs scored above the 100 point minimum threshold. Of these 21, 12 CDCs scored above 150 points and 9 CDCs scored above 100 points but less than 150 points. Each of the Petitioners scored above 100 points but less than 150 points. In late June 1992, the legislature passed an appropriations act which was signed into law on July 2, 1992. On July 14, the Department received a copy of the appropriations act and the accompanying statement of intent regarding the disbursements of appropriated funds of the CDCSAP. The Department requested funding of $1,800,000 for the CDCSAP grant and loan program for fiscal year 1992-93. However, the legislature reduced that funding request to $800,000 for the CDCSAP grants and included a statement of intent language directing that those CDCs which received sufficient point scores under Rule 9B-14 to qualify for a three year administrative grant be funded. The intent language states: It is the intent of the legislature that funds provided in specific appropriation 293A shall be used to award administrative grants in accordance with the provisions of Section 290.036, Florida Statutes, of equal amounts, to those Community Development Corporations that receive a sufficient point score under the Department of Community Affairs evaluation of FY 1992-93 grant applicants to qualify for a three year administrative grant pursuant to criteria established in Chapter 9B-14.009(11) (b), F.A.C. In reaching its decision respecting funding, the Department considered whether to follow the statement of intent language and award 12 grants of $66,666 each, or instead to award 18 grants at $44,444 each. The Department's Secretary ultimately decided to follow the statement of intent language and award grants of $66,666 each to the 12 CDCs which qualified for three year grants under Rule 9B-14. The action of the Secretary was within the discretion accorded by Section 290.036(3), Florida Statutes and Rule 9B-14.009(11)(a) to award "up to" 18 grants. The Department has not issued any type of statement which indicates that, in future funding cycles, it will award only three year administrative grants. The Secretary's decision relates only to the 1992-93 fiscal year. Section 290.036(3), Florida Statutes and Rules 9B-14.007(3) and 9B- 14.009(11)(a), Florida Administrative Code commands the Department to award between 0 and 18 administrative grants each year, provided no single award exceeds $100,000. Flexibility is given to the Department based on the uncertainties each year surrounding the legislative appropriations process. Due to the vagaries of the appropriations process, it is not practical or feasible for the Department to adopt a rule which requires it to award a specific number of administrative grants annually. Nor is it feasible or practicable for the Department to wait for the appropriations bill to be passed before initiating an order on the number of grants it will award. The Department strives to get the administrative funds to the CDCs expeditiously. At a minimum, rulemaking takes several months and would accordingly substantially delay transferring grant monies to the CDCs.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to receive Florida Retirement System (FRS) benefits from her deceased spouse’s retirement account, pursuant to FRS Option 3 (lifetime monthly benefit to joint annuitant).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lettie Jones, is the wife of FRS member, James Jones, and a designated beneficiary of his FRS account. Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency with the responsibility to administer the FRS. Background Findings Mr. Jones applied to the State of Florida for disability retirement on July 13, 1994. On his application, Mr. Jones noted that the “[m]uscles in [his] feet and legs [were] deteriorating.” In response to a question regarding any other physical impairments, Mr. Jones answered, “Losing strength in right hand.” The record does not reflect the effective date of Mr. Jones’ retirement. Mr. Jones suffered a stroke in April 1996. On January 27, 1997, Mr. Jones obtained from the state an “Estimate of Disability Retirement Benefits” listing the approximate monthly benefit payment amounts for all four FRS payment options. On that date, Mr. Jones also obtained Form 11o, the FRS retirement benefit election option form, and Form FST 12, the FRS beneficiary designation form. On March 18, 1997, Mr. Jones executed Form 11o, choosing Option 2 for payment of his monthly retirement benefits, and Form FST 12, designating Petitioner as primary beneficiary, and his daughter as contingent beneficiary, of his retirement account. Form 11o provides the following explanation of Option 2: A reduced monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 payments. No further benefits are then payable. Form 11o requires the spouse’s signature acknowledging the member’s election of Option 2. The spousal acknowledgment section appears in a box on Form 11o following the description of Options 1 and 2. The first line inside the box reads, in all capital letters, “THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED IF YOU SELECT OPTION 1 OR 2.” On March 18, 1997, Petitioner signed the box on Form 11o acknowledging her husband’s election of Option 2. Mr. Jones received more than 120 monthly retirement benefit payments prior to his death in 2013. Petitioner’s Challenge Petitioner alleges that Mr. Jones lacked the capacity to make an informed election of benefit payments on March 18, 1997, because he had reduced cognitive function. Both Petitioner and her daughter testified that they accompanied Mr. Jones to the FRS office on March 18, 1997, but were not allowed to “go back” with him when he met with an FRS employee to select his retirement option and execute Form 11o.2/ Petitioner admitted that she did sign the box on Form 11o, which acknowledges spousal election of Option 2, but testified that the form was blank at the time her husband presented it to her for signature. Petitioner signed the spousal acknowledgment on Form 11o the same day her husband executed the form. Petitioner introduced no evidence, other than the testimony of her daughter, that Mr. Jones suffered from reduced cognitive function on March 18, 1997. The fact that Mr. Jones suffered a stroke in 1996 is insufficient evidence to prove that he lacked the mental capacity to make an informed retirement option selection on the date in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying the relief requested in the Petition for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2016.
The Issue Whether at the time of his father's death, Armando Martinez, Jr., was a "dependent beneficiary" of his father, a vested member of the Florida Retirement System, so as to be entitled to his father's retirement benefits?
Findings Of Fact Armando Martinez, Jr., was born on February 22, 1974, to Natalie M. Martinez and the late Armando Martinez, Sr. In 1992, when Armando, Jr., was eighteen years old, Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were divorced. The following year, 1993, less than two weeks after Armando, Jr.'s, nineteenth birthday, Armando Martinez, Sr., died. The cause of death was liver cancer, a disease from which Ms. Martinez presently suffers. At the time of his death on March 7, 1993, Mr. Martinez was a vested member of the Florida Retirement System. A municipal employee, he had been a bus operator. At some point close to commencement of his employment, slightly more than ten years prior to his death, Armando Martinez, Sr., had executed a Form M-10. The form named his wife, Natalie, as his primary beneficiary. Armando, Jr., the only child of Armando, Sr., and Natalie Martinez, was named as the sole contingency beneficiary. Following Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s death, Ms. Martinez disclaimed Florida Retirement System benefits. She did so in order for Armando, Jr., as the contingent beneficiary, to be able to receive the benefits. On February 17, 1997, the Division of Retirement denied Armando, Jr., survivor benefits. Had Mr. Martinez, Sr., died one-year and several weeks earlier, that is, prior to Armando, Jr.'s eighteenth birthday, the Division would have approved distribution of survivor benefits to him. But, although he was still a high school student, since he was older than nineteen by a few days at the time of his father's death, the Division required proof that Armando, Jr., had received half of his support from his father at the time of his father's death. No such proof was provided to the Division prior to or at the time of its preliminary denial. In fact, in his 1992 tax return, Mr. Martinez did not claim his son Armando, Jr., as a dependent. In this formal administrative proceeding, however, Armando Martinez, Jr., provided such proof, proof which was lacking until hearing. The year 1992 was very difficult for Armando Martinez, Jr., and his family. His parents separated, Armando, Jr., lived with his mother. Armando, Sr., lived elsewhere. Prior to his death, divorce proceedings were finalized. In the meantime, Ms. Martinez had lost her job. She remained unemployed for the entire year and in early 1993 as well. Armando, Jr., was still in high school at the time of his father's death. During the 1992-93 school year, to support himself and his mother, he obtained work part-time while he remained in school. Ms. Martinez paid the rent for their apartment at a rate of between $370 and $500 per month. The monthly phone bill of Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr., was approximately $50; utility payments $70; groceries $300; gasoline $10, automobile insurance $100; and school supplies $40. There were other expenses, clothes, for example, that occurred from time-to-time. In addition to minimal government support to Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr.'s, part-time employment income, Armando, Jr., was supported by cash payments provided by his father. Two or three times a month, Armando's father and a girl friend, Karen Jones, would drive to the front of the house. Because of his illness, Mr. Martinez remained in the car while Ms. Jones brought cash, usually between two and five hundred dollars in an envelope to the front door. On more than one of these occasions, Ms. Jones, the envelope, and the cash were observed by friends of the family at the moment of delivery. Ms. Martinez log of the estimates of these payments totals approximately $8,500, an amount in excess of Mr. Martinez's income reported in his 1992 tax return filed before his death in 1993 to be $6,389.00. But, Mr. Martinez, Sr. had access to other means of support and other monies including proceeds from insurance policies. The $8,500 provided to Armando, Jr., by Armando Martinez, Sr. constituted more than half of Armando, Jr.'s, support for the year 1992 and up until Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death in early 1993.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the Division of Retirement recognize Armando Martinez, Jr., to have been the dependent beneficiary of Armando Martinez, Sr., at the time of Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death, and therefore entitled to retirement benefits. DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Natalie Martinez Suite 3811 3801 Northgreen Avenue Tampa, Florida 33624 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner timely filed his request for claim form requesting reimbursement for certain covered expenses under the Florida Flexible Benefits Program--Reimbursement Plan.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a member of the faculty of the University of South Florida. He participates in the Florida Flexible Benefits Program--Reimbursement Program (Program). The Plan allows participants to pay certain eligible medical or dependent day care expenses with pretax earnings. Each year, during an open enrollment period, an employee may elect to participate in the Program and select an amount of salary to be deducted from his or her pay. The amount of salary so deducted is not subject to federal income tax, but is available to reimburse the employee for covered expenses. In order for the Program to continue to enjoy preferential treatment under the federal income tax law, Respondent, which administers the Program, must adhere to certain rules. Most relevant to this case is that that the deducted salary must be at risk. Specifically, an employee is not entitled to a refund of all or part of the deduction if he or she does not timely submit sufficient reimbursable expenses to exhaust his or her account. The Program brochure clearly warns participants of this "use it or lose it" rule. The plan year for the Program is the calendar year. In 1997, Petitioner was a participant in the Program. He and his wife chose not to submit claims for covered expenses, as they paid them during the year. Instead, they accumulated the receipts with the intent of submitting a single claim for their account balance at the end of the plan year. The Program sets a claims filing deadline of April 15 for filing claims arising out of the expenses paid in the preceding calendar year. The Program brochure warns that this deadline means all claims for expenses incurred during a plan year must be postmarked by midnight, April 15 of the following year to be considered for processing. Any claims received after this date will be returned to the participant unprocessed, regardless of the account balances. Participants should file claims as soon as the required documentation is obtained. This case involves only one issue: whether Petitioner timely submitted his claims for reimbursement under the Program. There is no issue concerning Petitioner's payment of these expenses or his account balance. There is no issue whether these expenses are eligible for reimbursement. In early March 1998, Petitioner and his wife collected their receipts for covered expenses from 1997. Petitioner completed a reimbursement form and addressed the envelope to Respondent at the correct address. Wanting to make copies of the materials, Petitioner did not immediately mail the package to Respondent. A few days later, prior to copying the materials or mailing the package, Petitioner's father became ill in the Mideast, where he lives. Petitioner and his wife agreed that she would copy the materials and mail the package to Respondent. On March 21, which marks the birthday of Petitioner's wife and a cultural holiday for Petitioner and his wife, Petitioner's wife telephoned her husband, who was still visiting his sick father. In the ensuing discussion, Petitioner learned that she had not yet mailed the package. They discussed the matter and again agreed that she would copy the materials and mail the package without further delay. Without further delay, Petitioner's wife copied the materials and mailed the package to Respondent at the correct address. She placed the package with sufficient postage in a mailbox across from her home. The package consisted of a claims reimbursement form and receipts for eligible expenses. It appears that she may have written an old return address on the envelope. Respondent never received the package. Respondent's procedures are carefully designed and executed to ensure that it will not lose a claim form. Repeated searches for the missing form never uncovered it. The package was lost after its mailing by Petitioner's wife and prior to its delivery to Respondent. Possibly, the incorrect address precluded notification to Petitioner of problems with delivery. Possibly, the package was just lost. Unfortunately, Petitioner learned only after the April 15 deadline that Respondent had never received the package.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, enter a final order determining that Petitioner timely submitted the claim and eligible expenses that were the subject of this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Thomas D. McGurk, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Mohsen M. Milani 15927 Ellsworth Drive Tampa, Florida 33647 Julia Forrester Assistant General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Petitioner made a timely election to participate in the Florida Flexible Benefits Plan (Plan) in accordance with Rule 60P-8.0041(2), Florida Administrative Code and if not, should his participation in the Florida Flexible Benefits Plan (the Plan) for the Plan Year of December 1, 1991, through December 31, 1992, be denied. Whether Petitioner would be entitled to reimbursement from the Plan for medical expenses incurred prior to November 12, 1992, provided it is determined that Petitioner made a timely election to participate in the Plan in accordance with Rule 60P-8.0041(2), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Petitioner was a full- time employee of the University of Florida, Institute of Food and Agriculture Science (IFAS) in Hardee County, Florida and as such, was eligible to participate in the Plan Medical Reimbursement Account provided he timely elected to participate and was otherwise qualified. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering all state insurance plans for state employees in the State of Florida. As part of its insurance program, the State of Florida offers the Florida Flexible Benefits Plan. The Plan is a benefit program for state employees under which specified, incurred medical expense may be reimbursed. The period of coverage for the Plan material to this proceeding was December 1, 1991 through December 31, 1992. Petitioner did not enroll in the Plan during the open enrollment period for all state employees conducted by the Division during the month of October 1991. During the summer of 1992, and again in October 1992, (sometime after the child was born on October 5, 1992) the Petitioner's wife, Karen S. Weaver, contacted the Division by telephone to inquire about, and to get clarification on, enrolling in the Plan based on a "Change In Family Status" (the child' birth) after the effective date of the Plan, December 1, 1991. On both occasions, Karen Weaver talked with an enrollment agent of the Division and, other than the child's date of birth, no effective date was discussed. The enrollment agent advised Karen Weaver that the Petitioner could not apply until after the birth of the child due to the documentation needed concerning the child's birth. Neither Karen Weaver nor Petitioner were ever advised that with proper certification of pregnancy from the wife's doctor that Petitioner could apply before the birth of the child. After the wife's last conversation with the Division, the Petitioner completed and signed a Reimbursement Account Enrollment/Qualifying Status Change Form, Form FB-2 (the Form) which was dated October 23, 1992. Whether the Petitioner returned the Form to IFAS's personnel office by mail or hand delivery is not clear from the record. However, a notation on the bottom of the Form indicates the Form was received by the personnel office of IFAS on November 9, 1993. The Form was received by the Division on November 12, 1992. The instructions in the Revised September 1991 Florida Flexible Benefits Plan booklet on when Form FB-2 must be submitted provides in pertinent part as follows: Requests must be made by submitting a completed Enrollment/Qualifying Status Change Form, FB-2 (available from your personnel office), to DSEI within 31 days of the event's occurrence. . . . The instructions on the reverse side of Form FB-2 as to the submission of the form provides: Return this completed from to your personnel office. It must be received at DSEI within 31 days of your employment or change in family/employment status. The personnel office is responsible for sending the form immediately upon its receipt to DSEI. THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF PLAN PARTICIPATION OR CHANGE IN FAMILY/EMPLOYMENT STATUS WILL BE THE DATE THE SIGNED AND PROPERLY COMPLETED FORM AND DOCUMENTATION ARE RECEIVED BY DSEI. Petitioner was accepted in the Plan with an effective date of enrollment being November 12, 1992, the date the Division received the Form from Petitioner. The Petitioner elected to contribute $900.00 to the Plan Medical Reimbursement Account to fund reimbursement payment for incurred medical expenses. The Petitioner's acceptance in the Plan was based on the Division having: (a) considered the child's birth as a qualifying status change and; (b) determined that the Petitioner had timely elected to participate in Plan in accordance with Rule 60P-8.0041(2), Florida Administrative Code, in that the Form has been completed and dated (not received by the Division) within 31 calendar days of the occurrence of the qualifying status change. There was insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that within 31 calendar days of occurrence (child's birth) of Qualifying Status Change the Petitioner had: (a) placed the Form with the U.S. mail or similar carrier for delivery to the personnel office of IFAS for submission to the Division; (b) placed the Form with the U.S. mail or similar carrier for submission with the Division; (c) hand delivered the Form to the personnel office of IFAS for submission to the Division or; (d) hand delivered the Form to the Division. Notwithstanding that the notation on the bottom of the Form indicates that the personnel office of IFAS had the Form in its possession as early as November 9, 1992, there is competent substantial evidence to show that the Division did not receive the Form until November 12, 1992. Likewise, there is competent substantial evidence to show that the Respondent did not make a timely election to participate in the Plan by submitting the Form to the Division within 31 calendar days of occurrence (child's birth) of qualifying status change as required by Rule 60P-8.0041(2), Florida Administrative Code, notwithstanding that the Form was dated October 23, 1992, well within the first 31 calendar days of occurrence (child's birth) of the qualifying status change. On December 14, 1992, the Petitioner submitted a claim for medical expense reimbursement for his wife and infant daughter for medical expenses incurred in the month of March, April, June, October and December, 1992. By letter dated December 24, 1992, the Division advised the Petitioner that expenses incurred prior to his enrollment date of November 12, 1992, (the date the Form was received by the Division) were not eligible for reimbursement and to resubmit claims for services incurred after November 12, 1992. There was no evidence presented as to whether the Petitioner resubmitted the medical expenses incurred during the month of December 1992, for reimbursement. The Petitioner contends that the Division should grant Petitioner an exception to the requirement that the effective date must be the date Form FB-2 is received by the Division and allow the effective date in this instance to be the date of occurrence, October 5, 1992, (date of child's birth) of qualifying status change. The Petitioner's contention is based primarily on the fact that the verbal instructions from the Division was misleading, and that the Division had made an exception by allowing the Petitioner to participate in the Plan even though the Petitioner had not timely elected to participate in the Plan in accordance with Rule 60P-8.0042, Florida Administrative Code. The Division denied the Petitioner's request for an exception contending that there is no provision for granting an exception in either case. The Division also contends that date Form FB-2 is completed and signed is the date to be used to in calculating the 31-calendar day requirement to determine if an employee has timely elected to participate in the Plan in accordance with Rule 60P-8.0041(2), Florida Administrative Code. The Division's position is expressly stated in Petitioner's exhibit 8 wherein William H. Lindner, Secretary, Department of Management Services, is responding to a letter from Petitioner and states: In your letter you indicated that an exception had been made in the enrollment process. It had not. Subsection 60P- 8.0041(2), F. A. C. (copy enclosed) indicates that an election to participate in the reimbursement accounts must be made within the first 31 calendar days of the occurrence of the Qualifying Status Change. Our records indicate that you made your election on October 23, 1992 which is within 31 days of the birth of your child on October 5, 1992. The records indicate that the Form was signed on October 23, 1992, well within the 31-day requirement but was not received by the Division until November 12, 1992, some seven days after the 31-day requirement had expired.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of State Employees' Insurance enter a final order finding that the Petitioner failed to timely elect to participate in the in Plan in accordance with Rule 60P-8.0041(2), Florida Administrative Code, was not qualified to participate in the Plan, and any participation in the Plan allowed by the Division was void ab initio. It is further recommended that the Division refund all contributions made by the Petitioner to the Plan after adjustment for any reimbursement for medical expenses that may have been made to the Petitioner by the Division. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER NO. 93-5571 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner, Gregory E. Weaver's Proposed Findings of Fact. The following proposed finding(s) of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact:1(1); 3-4(5); 5-6(9); 7(6,11); 9(11); 10(6,11); 11(9,16); 12(9); 13(8); 14-15(13); 16(15); 17(16); 18(5) and 19(6). Proposed Finding of Fact 2 is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed Finding of Fact 8 is more properly covered in the Conclusions of Law. Proposed Finding of Fact 20 is more an argument than a finding of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. The following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1(1,2); 2(3); 3(4,6,9); 4(9); 7(13); and 8(14). Proposed finding of fact 5 is not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. See Findings of Fact 10 and 11. Proposed finding of fact 6 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 6 and 11, except for the first sentence which is rejected as I find no evidence as to the Form being mailed. Proposed findings of fact 9 and 11 ( there is no proposed finding of fact 10) are adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 7 and 8. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory Weaver Route 1, Box 423 Wauchula, Florida 33873 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire Division of State Employment Insurance 2002 Old St. Augustine Road, B-12 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-4876 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Alecia Runyon, Director Division of State Employees Insurance 2002 Old St. Augustine Road, B-12 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-4876 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioners " . . . provide[d] direct services in a local fiscal agent's area (so that they may) . . . receive the same percentage of undesignated funds as a percentage of designated funds they receive . . . ", Section 110.181 (2)(e), Florida Statutes (2006), in relation to the 2006 Florida State Employees' Charitable Campaign (the 2006 Campaign).
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts The Florida Legislature created the Florida State Employees' Charitable Campaign in 1993 ("Campaign"). § 110.181(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). The Act requires the Department to "establish and maintain" an annual Campaign, which "is the only authorized charitable fundraising drive directed toward state employees within work areas during work hours, and for which the state will provide payroll deduction." § 110.181(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). State employees are provided annually with a pledge card that allows them to direct their donations to particular charities. Each employee is given a booklet containing a list of those charities that have qualified to participate in the Campaign. Each employee can either pick from the pre-qualified list, or the employee can give "undesignated funds" that go to no particular charity. The Act requires the creation of a Statewide Steering Committee ("Committee") of seven members appointed by the Administration Commission, and two members appointed by the Department Secretary, all serving staggered terms. § 110.181(4), Fla. Stat. In addition to the Committee, the Act calls for the creation of several other steering committees, one "in each fiscal agent area," whose purpose is to "assist in conducting the campaign and to direct the distribution of undesignated funds" ("local steering committees"). § 110.181(2)(d), Fla. Stat. The Department is required to select through the competitive procurement process a "fiscal agent" or agent whose duties are limited to "receiv[ing], account[ing] for, and distribut[ing] charitable contributions among the participating charitable organizations." § 110.181(2)(a), Fla. Stat. United Way of Florida, Inc., served as the state wide fiscal agent during the 2006 Campaign. Petitioners are 21 charities that were approved by the Committee and participated in the 2006 Campaign. Petitioner Community Health Charities is a "federation" or "umbrella" agency within the meaning of Rule 60L-39.0015(j), Florida Administrative Code, representing each of the other Petitioners in the 2006 Florida State Employees' Charitable Campaign ("2006 Campaign" or "FSECC"). Each Petitioner is either a charity or a federation within the meaning of the Act that participates in the annual statewide campaign and has a direct interest in the proper administration of the Act, including the distribution of designated and undesignated charitable funds generated thereby. Additional Facts Section 110.181(3), Florida Statutes, grants rulemaking authority to the Respondent in association with the time and manner for charitable organizations to participate in the Campaign. This process is undertaken upon the recommendations of the Committee. In accordance with those opportunities Respondent had adopted administrative rules to implement Section 110.181, Florida Statutes. Among the rules in the Florida Administrative Code were the following: 60L-39.001 (scope and purpose); 60L- 39.002 (general requirements); 60L-39.003 (Statewide Steering Committee); 60L-39.004 (Eligibility Criteria for Participation by Charitable Organizations); 60L-39.005 (Application Procedures); and 60L-39.006 (Duties and Responsibilities of the Fiscal Agent). None of these rules defined the term "direct services" in a "local fiscal agent's area", referred to in Section 110.181(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2006), as that statute controls the opportunity for a charitable organization to receive undesignated funds from the 2006 Campaign. This has been explained as the "first tier distribution" of undesignated charitable contributions made by state employees. After the 2006 Campaign commenced, Respondent adopted a rule that defined the term "direct services." Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-39.0015(1)(i) provided that definition. The rule was effective January 23, 2007. It defined the term "direct services" as: Direct services. Identifiable and specific services available in the local fiscal agent's area without any intervention between the services offered and persons served. The 2006 Campaign began in the summer of 2006. December 22, 2006, was the deadline for applying for first tier undesignated funds. Application was made upon a form created for use in the 2006 Campaign. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2. On October 17, 2006, by e-mail, Petitioners were made aware of the direct local services certification form and its guidelines, contained in one document, Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 2. Explanations were provided. The e-mail came from John Kuczwanski, Committee Chairman. This document referenced distribution of the first tier undesignated funds for the 2006 Campaign. It said in pertinent part: As a result of recent changes to the FSECC Law (s. 110.181(2)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes), the Statewide FSECC Steering Committee is in the process of implementing rules and a process by which federations and unaffiliated/independent organizations will submit information, regarding provision of direct local services in each fiscal agent United Way area, in order to receive a pro- rata share of undesignated funds. The final process and rules will take effect in 2007, and will become a part of the 2007 FSECC application cycle and are a result of input during our rules promulgation process. Because these formal rules will not be implemented until 2007, an interim process will be in place for the 2006 FSECC. As such, the following process will be utilized by federations and unaffiliated/independent organizations to determine where direct local services are being provided, and thereby eligibility for a pro-rata share of 2006 undesignated funds. Attached is a spreadsheet, which you must complete and submit to the Statewide FSECC Steering Committee no later than close of business on Friday, December 22, 2006. Instructions for Federations: On the attached spreadsheet, please enter the requested information for your federation and each of your member agencies (that have been approved to participate in the 2006 FSECC) that provide direct local services in the appropriate Fiscal Agent United Way sections. Each section identifies which county(ies) are included in that fiscal agent area. Only enter agencies in the fiscal agent section(s) in which that agency provides direct local services, as defined on the spreadsheet. The attached spreadsheet (form), in relevant part contained the following: 2006 Florida State Employees' Charitable Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Form GuidelinesDEADLINE: December 22, 2006 [Forms received after the deadline will result in ineligibility for a pro-rata share of undesignated funds.] Federation Name: OR Unaffiliated/Independent Organization Name: Contact Person: Email Address: Telephone Number: INSTRUCTIONS: Please enter the requested information below for each of your federation's member agencies (that have been approved to participate in the 2006 FSECC) that provide direct local services in the appropriate United Way Fiscal Agency sections below. Unaffiliated/independent organizations should provide the requested information in the appropriate sections for the areas in which your organization provides direct local services. Name of Organization Organization Address Address(es) where the direct service(s) were delivered in the previous calendar year (2005) Description of the type of direct service(s) delivered ["Direct services" is defined as identifiable and specific services available in the local fiscal agent's area without any intervention between the services offered and persons served.] # of people served/Population served * * * The form goes on to describe the areas served by the United Way fiscal agents, as examples United Way of the Big Bend, with its respective counties and the United Way of Brevard County, with its respective counties. It was contemplated that the charities seeking participation in distribution of first tier undesignated funds identify the organization by name, its address, addresses where direct services were delivered in the previous calendar year, etc., in relation to all of the United Way fiscal agent areas. Petitioners and other charities seeking participation in the first tier distribution of undesignated funds were expected to proceed without further direction from the Committee or Respondent when completing the 2006 Direct Local Services' Certification Form. Concerning the rule adoption process referred to in the e-mail, on October 16, 2007, the Committee had met to review proposed rules under consideration that supported the process of charitable campaigns recognized in Section 110.181, Florida Statutes. Prior to that date, the Respondent had held meetings and conducted workshops related to rule development. As a result, Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-39.015, and an amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-39.005, were adopted and became effective January 23, 2007. The amendment within Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-39.005(5), incorporated by reference Form DMS-ADM-102, effective January 23, 2007, the same date the overall Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-39.005 was amended. The incorporated form differed in appearance when compared to the 2006 Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines that had been provided in relation to the 2006 Campaign. The difference was that the Form incorporated by reference was titled "Agency Direct Local Services Certification Form". It spoke of a March 1 deadline with no specific year. It spoke of a need to provide the federation name, contact person and telephone number. It carried the same headings in the five columns related to the provision of the information about direct services in the 27 United Way fiscal agent areas. In its instructions it stated: Each federation is required to submit this form for all member agencies that provide direct local services, as defined in Rule 60L-39.0015(i), Florida Administrative Code, in the appropriate local fiscal agent sections below and provide with their annual application package. Independent or unaffiliated agencies must provide this form with their annual application. Gwen Cooper, president and CEO of Community health Charities of Florida (CCH), helped the members of the federation, the other Petitioners in this cause, complete the 2006 Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines. This included contacts by telephone and e-mails to address the proper response to the form on the part of the member charities. In addition, Ms. Cooper prepared a different form, designed to assist the member charities in presenting needed information. That form called for a deadline of December 5, 2006, for submission to her of information provided by the member charities on the form prepared by Ms. Cooper. The return information was then edited and utilized in her preparation of the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines that had been made available by the Committee on October 17, 2006. An example of the instructions for a member charity as filled out by the charity on the form created by Ms. Cooper is Respondent's Exhibit numbered 6 pertaining to the Leukemia & Lymphoma Society, Palm Beach Chapter. The completed Direct Local Services Certification Forms with guidelines for the 2006 Campaign for all CHS member charities is Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12A. Importantly, the instructions provided in the Cooper form directed to the CHC member charities, stated: INSTRUCTIONS: Please enter the requested information below for each fiscal agent regional area where your agency provides direct local services. Simply recording the office in that region is not enough. Please keep your descriptions concise and general. There is no need to give lengthy details for each region. If you know the number of people served in that region, please record it. If not, please provide an estimate or put NA. If you do not provide services in a particular regions (sic), please put NA in the Description column. If you have more than one office in a particular region, please list all the offices. We will review all submissions and call with questions. Feel free to add lines as needed. This record is for services rendered in Calendar Year 2005. As can be seen, this was a departure from the instructions provided by the Committee in the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines previously described, Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12A representing the completed form for all CHC member charities. The Committee met on February 14, 22, and 28, 2007, to consider the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Forms with guidelines completed by Petitioners and other charitable groups. Dr. Kenneth Armstrong, Jr., Executive Director of the United Way of the Big Bend, attended the February 14, 2007, Committee meeting. At the meeting he presented the Committee members with a document intended to express his opinion concerning the basis for deciding whether Petitioners and other charitable organizations were entitled to receive first tier undesignated funds. Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 4. In this document, Dr. Armstrong critically comments on the entitlement of Petitioners, unaffiliated and independent charitable agencies to receive first tier undesignated funds. In his written remarks, he opposes the right for some Petitioners to receive the first tier undesignated funds, while explaining his reasons. These suggestions were favorably received by Respondent's counsel who advised the Committee during the meeting. In particular, counsel stated that he found Dr. Armstrong's approach created an " . . . incisive analysis of the kind of activities that could not reasonably be considered direct services . . . ". While the Committee was left to arrive at its own decision concerning Petitioners' entitlement to receive first tier undesignated funds, Dr. Armstrong's ideas given credence by Respondent's counsel were accepted as part of that process. The work was not completed on February 14, 2007, and the Committee reconvened on February 22, 2007, to continue consideration of the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Forms. The Committee met again on February 28, 2007, to consider the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Forms. By then the forms had been divided among the Committee members, with each Committee member being responsible for review and recommendation in relation to his or her part of the assignment. The discussion in the session was at best abbreviated concerning the decision to include or reject a charity in a locale in relation to receiving first tier undesignated funds. One Committee member left the meeting and his portion of the assignment was dealt with by the remaining Committee members reviewing the annotations of the missing member indicating denial or approval of a given charity. There were other notes as well on these materials assigned to the Committee member who left the meeting. The remaining Committee members approved the recommendations by the missing Committee member. On March 8, 2007, the Committee made its decision and e-mailed Petitioners concerning its position on the "2006 FSECC Direct Local Services Certification" spreadsheets (forms). The e-mail is Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 10. The reference line in the e-mail is "Distribution of 2006 FSECC undesignated funds -- Direct Local Services Certification". The reason for this preliminary decision was: After three meetings, the FSECC Statewide Steering Committee has completed its review and voted on all 2006 FSECC Direct and Local Service Certification spreadsheets previously submitted for its consideration. Attached is the final spreadsheet that lists all charitable organizations that were approved by the Committee and deemed, based on the information submitted, to be providing direct local services in at least one United Way fiscal agent area. Charitable organizations not included on the attached list were not deemed to be providing direct local services, based on the information submitted. Direct local services, as defined on the certification form and in Rule, are "identifiable and specific services available in the local fiscal agent's area without any intervention between the services offered and persons served." The 59 charitable organizations included on the attached list will receive a pro-rata share (based on their local designation percentages in 2006) of the 2006 undesignated funds, in the Fiscal Agent United Way areas within which they were deemed to be providing direct local services, as indicated on the attached by an "X" in specific United Way fiscal agent columns. Thank you, The FSECC Statewide Steering Committee The above-quoted language in the e-mail notification that refers to the certification form is understood to mean the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines. The comment in the e-mail concerning the "rule" where it says "identifiable and specific services available in the local fiscal agent's area without any intervention between the services offered and persons served" is taken directly from Florida Administrative Code Rule 60-39.0015(1)(i), effective January 23, 2007, with its definition of "direct services." As the March 8, 2007, e-mail summarizes, CHC had 16 member originations approved. At the time the preliminary decision was communicated, the Committee had approved approximately 18.64 percent of Petitioners' individual submissions. The basis of the denial of the remaining submissions seeking receipt of first tier undesignated funds was not explained. This led to the original petition challenging the decision to deny rights to receive first tier undesignated funds filed on March 30, 2007. The history of the case beyond that point has been explained in the Preliminary Statement, to include the basis for proceeding before DOAH. On August 24, 2007, after the case had been referred to DOAH for hearing, Respondent published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 33 No. 34, to this effect: The Florida Department of Management Services announces a public meeting to which all persons are invited. DATE AND TIME: September 10, 2007, 9:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon PLACE: 4050 Esplanade Way, Room 101, Tallahassee, Florida GENERAL SUBJECT MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED: Review and Approval of Local Steering Committee Members. Community Health Charities lawsuit and re-visit on direct services determinations. A copy of the agenda may be obtained by contacting: Erin Thoresen, Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 235, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950, (850)922-1274. If any person decides to appeal any decision made by the Board with respect to any matter considered at this meeting or hearing, he/she will need to ensure that a verbatim record of the proceeding is made, which record includes the testimony and evidence from which the appeal is to be issued. * * * Respondent's Exhibit numbered 24. The notice by its terms did not explain in any detail what might be achieved during the course of the meeting to consider the pending "lawsuit" and revisit issues in relation to direct services determinations. The "lawsuit" related to the pending administrative proceeding in DOAH Case No. 07-3547. Barton Cooper, CHC Director of Corporate Development, attended the meeting with Petitioners' counsel. No presentation was made by Petitioners, as they were uncertain of Respondent's intentions when the meeting was advertised in the Florida Administrative Weekly, and understood that litigation was ongoing before DOAH. Nonetheless, Mr. Cooper expressed his appreciation for the Committee's willingness to revisit the issue of the remaining Petitioners' entitlement to receive first tier undesignated funds. On this occasion the Committee conducted an additional review of material provided by Petitioners. Those materials were constituted of Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12A, the original December 22, 2006, Direct Local Services Certification Forms for the rejected applicants for first tier undesignated funds and Exhibit 2 to the Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing filed March 30, 2007, with the Respondent. (Exhibit 2 became Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12B, admitted at the final hearing.) This exhibit provides additional information concerning member charities within CHC and supporting argument for their inclusion in the distribution of first tier undesignated funds. As a consequence of the Committee's efforts, approximately 77 percent of Petitioners' applications made originally were approved, leaving 21 Petitioners denied the ability to receive first tier designated funds in one or more of the United Way fiscal agent areas. On September 12, 2007, the Committee made known its "Amended and Revised FSECC Direct Services Determinations for the 2006 Campaign" in correspondence directed to Petitioners. Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 13. In explanation, the written communication stated: On September 10, 2007 the Statewide Steering committee decided to re-visit issues on direct services determinations. In accordance with Exhibit 2 of the Second Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing, the participating Community Health Charities, within the fiscal area listed, were revisited. The Direct Local Services Certification Forms submitted on behalf of your organization and/or your member agencies were reexamined for compliance with the eligibility criteria for a receipt of undesignated funds based upon the provision of direct services. Direct services are defined as "[i]dentifiable and specific services available in the local fiscal agent's area without any intervention between the services offered and persons served." Rule 60L-39.0015(1)(i), Florida Administrative Code. Applicant organizations named above that did not meet the criteria for direct services were denied by the FSECC Statewide Steering Committee. This explanation referred to the definition of direct services found within Florida Administrative Code Rule 60-39.0015(1)(i), effective January 23, 2007. It also mentioned reliance upon Exhibit numbered 2 to the Second Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing (Exhibit 2 accompanied the Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing as well). The memorandum decision pointed out a spreadsheet attached describing those charities whose application forms had been reexamined on September 10, 2007, noting approvals and disapprovals. The attachment to the September 12, 2007, amended revised FSECC Direct Local Services determination for the 2006 Campaign breaks out the agencies approved as to locations within United Way fiscal agents areas, those approved earlier and those approved by actions taken on September 10, 2007. Those approvals are noted by marking the letter "X" in the column for each agency earlier approved or approved on September 10, 2007, as to each charity and every United Way fiscal agent area. Concerning the remaining requests to receive first tier undesignated funds by those 21 Petitioners, information necessary to decide entitlement is found within the 2006 Campaign Direct Local Services Certification Form with guidelines (Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12A); the explanations found within Exhibit 2 to the Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing, which became Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 12B and a series of exhibits admitted at hearing, Petitioners' Exhibit numbered 21 through 38. Those latter exhibits provide explanations pertaining to the 21 disappointed Petitioners, expanding what is known about the charities, their services, the manner that the services are provided, who receives the services and where the services are received, together with the address(es) of the respective organizations. In addition, the depositions of Paul Andrew Ledford of Florida Hospice and Palliative Care (Joint Exhibit numbered 2); Susanne Homant, National Association of Mentally Ill in Florida (Joint Exhibit numbered 3); Deborah Linton, Association for Retarded Citizens of Florida, Inc. (Joint Exhibit numbered 4); Suzanne Earle, Children's Tumor Foundation (Joint Exhibit numbered 5); Pamela Byrne, Leukemia & Lymphoma Society (Joint Exhibit numbered 6) and Tracy Tucker, Cystic Fibrosis Foundation (Joint Exhibit numbered 7) afford additional insight on the subject of who is served, where they are served etc., pertaining to the subject. Without recounting the details from the various sources previously described, all that information is accepted for purposes of this Recommended Order, as to the facts represented in the exhibits. Based upon information provided in the aforementioned exhibits, the Association for Retarded Citizens/Florida, CHC, Florida Hospices and Palliative Care and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Florida do not provide direct services in fiscal agent areas without intervention between the services offered and persons served in any location. Based upon information provided in the aforementioned exhibits, ALS Association provides direct services in the Heart of Florida United Way fiscal agent area, contrary to the impression held by the Committee before the final hearing. Based upon information provided in the aforementioned exhibits, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation provides direct services in the United Way fiscal agent areas in Lake and Sumter, Okaloosa-Walton, Santa Rosa, and Volusia-Flagler, for reasons comparable to the practice of the Committee when making its earlier determinations. Based upon information provided in the aforementioned exhibits, the Lupus Foundation of America, Southeast Florida Chapter, provides direct services in the United Way fiscal agent areas in Broward and Palm Beach counties. Of the unapproved requests for first tier undesignated funds made by remaining Petitioners in other specific United Way fiscal agent areas, the facts do not support those requests.
Recommendation Upon consideration, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered that allows Petitioners to receive first tier undesignated funds in relation to the 2006 Campaign to the extent identified and denies any additional relief requested in the Third Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of February, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: David C. Hawkins, Esquire David C. Hawkins, PLLC 3141 Brockton Way Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Matthew F. Minno, Esquire Gerard York, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 David Andrew Byrne, Esquire Phillips Nizer LLP 666 5th Avenue New York, New York 10103-0001 James A. Peters, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda South, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
