The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, a surviving beneficiary, is entitled to change the Florida Retirement System retirement benefits 1 All references to chapter 120 are to the 2019 version. payment option selected by her now-deceased spouse, a member of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes (2002),2 with administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner is the spouse of James L. Williams, now deceased, who was employed by the School District of Palm Beach ("District) for 38 years, and was a member of the FRS. Williams retired from his employment with the District on August 23, 2002. At that time, he executed the Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement Form, Form FR-11. On Form FR-11, he designated Petitioner as his primary beneficiary and Jones as his contingent beneficiary. Williams signed this form, and his signature was notarized. Also on August 23, 2002, Williams executed the Florida Retirement System Option Selection for FRS Members Form, Form FRS-11o. On that form, he selected FRS retirement benefits payment Option 2, and designated that choice by writing an "X" on the line next to Option 2. Option 2 was described on Form FRS-11o as: A reduced monthly payment for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. 2 All references to chapter 121 are to the 2002 version of the Florida Statutes, which was in effect at the time that the retirement benefits application and option selection forms that have given rise to this proceeding were executed. Form FRS-11o contained a section, immediately below the description of Option 2, that was required to be completed by the spouse of a married FRS member who had selected Option 1 or Option 2. On August 23, 2002, Petitioner completed, signed, and dated that section, confirming that she was the legal spouse of Williams and acknowledging that she was informed that Williams had selected either Option 1 or Option 2. The purpose of that section on Form FRS-11o is to inform the spouse of the FRS member that, by the member's selection of either Option 1 or Option 2, the surviving spouse is not entitled to receive a continuing benefit for the rest of his or her life. The last sentence on Form FRS-11o, immediately above the space for the FRS member's signature, states in pertinent part: "[m]y retirement becomes final when any payment is cashed . . . [or] deposited." DeVonnia Jones was present with Williams at the time he was given Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o to execute. Jones testified that when Williams arrived at the District office on August 23, 2002, Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o already had been filled out by District staff, and were presented to him by his supervisor, who informed him that he needed to retire or he would be terminated. According to Jones, Williams did not wish to retire at that time. Jones asked District staff how much more Williams' monthly benefits would be if he did not retire for another year or two, and was told that Williams' benefits would be between $25 and $30 more per month. According to Jones, "my dad basically shed a couple tears. He was not comfortable, but he went ahead and signed it because I told him to, because they made it seem like he wasn't going to be eligible to get what he was supposed to get." Williams signed and dated Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002, and his signature was notarized. On August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application." This document stated, among other things, that Williams had selected FRS Option 2, and that his retirement was effective September 2002. At the bottom of this document was a standalone paragraph, in bold face type, that read: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED!" Also on August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Florida Division of Retirement Estimate of Retirement Benefit (Estimate only, subject to final verification of all factors)." This document provided information regarding the amount of the monthly benefits Williams would receive for the four options offered under the FRS. A statement in bold face type at the bottom of the document read: "Comments: You have chosen Option 2. Your option selection cannot be changed after you cash or deposit any benefit payment." Had Williams wished to change his retirement benefits payment option, he could have done so up to the time he cashed or deposited a retirement benefits payment. Williams began receiving his monthly FRS retirement benefits payments from Respondent on October 4, 2002. He cashed or deposited the first FRS benefits warrant (Warrant #0618275) that he received. Thereafter, Williams received monthly FRS retirement benefits payments until his death on April 26, 2010. Williams received a total of 92 monthly benefits payments before his death. All of the FRS retirement benefits payment warrants issued to Williams were deposited or cashed. On May 17, 2010, Respondent contacted Petitioner to inform her that she needed to complete a Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Beneficiary of Monthly Retirement Benefits Form, Form FST- 11b, in order for her to receive monthly FRS retirement benefits payments as Williams' beneficiary. In the contact letter, Respondent informed Petitioner that "you will receive the same gross monthly benefits to which the member was entitled through August 31, 2012." Petitioner completed Form FST-11b on June 25, 2010, and began receiving FRS monthly benefits payments on June 30, 2010. Petitioner received a total of 28 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments. The last warrant issued to Petitioner (Warrant #0375196) was issued on August 31, 2012. All of the warrants issued to Petitioner were cashed or deposited. In sum, Williams and Petitioner collectively received a total of 120 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments, pursuant to Option 2. All of the warrants issued to Williams, and then to Petitioner, as his beneficiary, were deposited or cashed. Petitioner testified that beginning in 2003, she made numerous attempts, over a period of years, to contact the District and Respondent regarding changing the FRS retirement benefits payment option that Williams had selected on August 23, 2002. During this time, Williams and Petitioner continued to cash or deposit the benefits payment warrants they received from Respondent. In this proceeding, Petitioner does not claim that Williams accidentally selected Option 2, or that he intended to select another option, when he signed Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002. Rather, she asserts that at the time Williams retired, he suffered from confusion and memory loss such that he did not understand the option he chose—effectively, that he lacked the mental capacity to have chosen Option 2 as his retirement benefits payment option. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that because Williams was forced to retire under threat of termination from his employment, he was under duress when he chose Option 2 on Form FRS-11o. On these grounds, Petitioner asserts that she should be permitted to change Williams' choice of retirement benefits payment option.3 3 Here, Petitioner, has requested that she be allowed to "change" Williams' choice of Option 2 on the FRS retirement option selection forms. She did not identify, or present evidence, Petitioner's impassioned testimony at the final hearing shows that she fervently believes her husband was wrongly treated by the District when it required him to retire in 2002, against his desire to continue to work.4 However, as was explained to Petitioner at the final hearing, the purpose of this proceeding was not to determine whether the District wrongly forced Williams out of his employment; rather, it is to determine whether there is any factual or legal basis for changing the retirement benefits option that Williams selected when he executed Form FRS-11o nearly 18 years ago. The evidence does not support Petitioner's argument that Williams lacked the mental capacity to adequately understand the option that he chose on Form FRS-11o. Although Petitioner testified that Williams had been treated by a neurologist, no direct medical evidence was presented establishing that Williams was mentally incapacitated at the time he executed Form FRS-11o. Additionally, at the time Williams signed the form, he was accompanied by his daughter, who, after speaking to District staff regarding his options, advised him to sign the form. Petitioner herself also was present at the District office and signed Form FRS-11o, expressly acknowledging that she understood Williams had chosen Option 2. Thus, to the extent that Williams may not, on his own, have fully appreciated his choice of options on Form FRS-11o—and there is no competent direct evidence showing that to be the case—both his daughter and wife were present with him when he executed Form FRS-11o, his daughter told him to sign the form, and his wife expressly acknowledged that she understood his choice of Option 2. These circumstances do not support a finding that Williams lacked the mental capacity to understand, or did not adequately regarding which specific option she would choose, if permitted to change Williams' selected FRS benefits option. 4 The evidence indicates that the District required Williams to retire because he began having difficulty with his job as a mail carrier. According to Petitioner, Williams had an accident in a District vehicle and did not report the accident to the District, and that when he was transferred to the mail room, he had difficulty remembering to do certain required tasks. understand, the consequence of choosing Option 2 when he executed Form FRS-11o. The evidence also does not support a finding that Williams' choice of Option 2 should be changed, due to duress. There is no direct evidence establishing that Williams was under duress when he chose Option 2. Although Jones testified, credibly, that her father was upset about being forced to retire when he wanted to continue working, her testimony that he was under duress was based on her subjective conclusion. Furthermore, even if Williams was emotionally distressed when he signed the FRS benefits options forms, there is no evidence showing that as result of such distress, he chose Option 2 instead of a different option. It also is noted that Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o both expressly informed Williams that once his retirement became final—which would occur when any benefit payment was cashed or deposited—his retirement benefits option selection would become final and could not be changed. Further, Williams received two more pieces of correspondence from Respondent—both containing statements in bold face type—expressly informing him that once any FRS retirement benefits payments were cashed or deposited, his retirement benefits option choice could not be changed. As noted above, Williams could have changed his FRS benefits option at any time before he cashed or deposited a benefits payment; however, he did not do so. Thus, pursuant to the express terms of Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o, when Williams cashed or deposited the first benefits payment, his selection of Option 2 became final and could not be changed. In sum, the evidence does not establish any factual basis for permitting Petitioner to change Williams' selection of Option 2 as his FRS retirement benefits payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to change the FRS retirement benefits payment option selected by her husband, an FRS member, when he retired. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ladasiah Jackson Ford, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Deloris Williams 1219 West Ninth Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Mangement Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Mangement Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to rescind a "second election" to invest in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) Investment Plan on the ground that, when filed, the second election failed to comply with the requirements of sections 121.4501(4)(g) and 121.021(17)(b), Florida Statutes (2012).
Findings Of Fact On August 9, 2004, Petitioner first became eligible to participate in the FRS. At the time, she was employed by Monroe County in its building department. On February 21, 2005, Petitioner timely elected to participate in the FRS Pension Plan, which is a defined benefit plan, rather than the FRS Investment Plan, which is a defined contribution plan. Petitioner participated in the FRS Pension Plan until the events described in this paragraph. Her last day of work was in June 2012, although she did not formally terminate her employment until December 6, 2012. At the time, Petitioner was experiencing health problems that Petitioner worried would prevent her from continuing to perform the duties of her job with Monroe County. In July 2012, Petitioner called the FRS financial guidance line and discussed transferring to the FRS Investment Plan, so she could withdraw funds to live on during a period of extended unemployment for health reasons. Even though Petitioner did not work after June, from November 1 through 6, she received pay for 13.25 hours of unused sick leave and 5 hours of unused annual leave. For the remainder of the month, Petitioner was on leave without pay. On November 29, Petitioner called the FRS financial guidance line to discuss again transferring to the FRS Investment Plan. An FRS representative warned her that, to make an election, she would have to be "employed with the FRS service credit" to make a second election. On the same day, Petitioner filed a second election with Respondent to transfer from the FRS Pension Plan to the FRS Investment Plan. In a form mailed on December 3, 2012, Respondent acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's second election, effective December 1, 2012. There is some dispute as to whether Respondent adequately advised Petitioner of any grace period to rescind her second election, but she did not attempt to do so until over three years had elapsed, as noted below. On April 5, 2013, Petitioner called the FRS financial guidance line and asked about withdrawing some of the funds in her FRS Investment Plan. She was informed that, if she did so, she could not defer compensation to this account on regaining FRS-covered employment. In September or October 2015, Petitioner obtained FRS-covered employment at the library of the City of Islamorada. On November 1, 2015, Petitioner called the FRS financial guidance line and asked about rescinding her second election. An FRS representative told her that she would have to submit a request for "intervention." On February 10, 2016, Petitioner filed a request for intervention, stating that no one had warned her that, if she withdrew any funds from the defined contribution account, she could not again defer compensation to this account. By letter dated March 4, 2016, Respondent denied the request solely on the ground that Petitioner had earned service credit for the month of November 2012 when she filed her second election, so, since she had not yet terminated employment, her second election was lawful.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's request for hearing on Respondent's denial of her request for intervention to allow her to transfer from the FRS Investment Plan to the FRS Pension Plan. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Robert E. Meale Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: T. A. Delegal, III, Esquire James C. Poindexter, Esquire Delegal Law Offices, P.A. 424 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (eServed) Brian A. Newman, Esquire Pennington, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Second Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Ash Williams, Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Post Office Box 13300 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3300
The Issue The issue is whether payment of Petitioner's retirement benefits should have commenced after the filing of an application to retire with the Division of Retirement, with an effective date of April 1, 2004, or be retroactively changed to the date of his termination of employment, July 1, 2003.
Findings Of Fact On July 19, 1995, Petitioner applied for membership in the Special Risk Division of the Elected Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). On August 14, 1995, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter admitting him into FRS. On September 6, 1995, Sarabeth Snuggs, Chief of the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions for Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter revoking his membership in FRS. On December 17, 1996, Petitioner wrote to Sarabeth Snuggs responding to Respondent's decision to revoke his membership in FRS. Petitioner cited Section 121.052(2)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that membership in FRS includes "any constitutional county elected officer assuming office after July 1, 1981, including any sheriff." The Consolidated City of Jacksonville was created by the Florida Legislature with the enactment of Chapter 67-1320, Laws of Florida. Section 1.01 of the Jacksonville Charter provides that the county government of Duval County and the municipal government of the City of Jacksonville are consolidated into a single body politic. The Charter further provides that the consolidated government succeeds to and possesses all of the properties of the former government. After being denied membership in FRS, Petitioner and other members of the consolidated government and its instrumentalities worked diligently to convince Respondent to admit Petitioner into FRS. During Petitioner's attempts to be included in FRS, Respondent repeatedly took the position that Duval County did not exist as a county agency. In a letter to Petitioner dated January 15, 1997, Ms. Snuggs wrote that the consolidated Duval County government "chose to consolidate as a 'city' government." Mr. Keane worked with the Duval County Legislative Delegation to amend Chapter 121 to specifically clarify the fact that the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court are constitutional officers entitled to participate in FRS. In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted language to clarify the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court's status with respect to FRS. In a letter dated June 24, 2002, Petitioner thanked Ms. Snuggs for recognizing his right to elect membership in FRS. Petitioner observed that, since he was in the last year of his second term as Sheriff (Duval County allows only two consecutive terms), he wanted confirmation of his "right to connect the previous seven (7) years of service as Sheriff." The June 24, 2002, letter also asked for "guidance" from Respondent. The purpose of the June 24, 2002, letter was for Petitioner to learn how Respondent intended to treat his first six years of service. Petitioner sought to avoid any problems since his retirement date was rapidly approaching. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner and Mr. George Dandelake, the Chief of the Budget and Management Division of the Sheriff's Office, wrote to Ms. Snuggs requesting a calculation of the amount of employer contributions required on Petitioner's behalf. The October 10 letter also requested that Respondent "identify what documents are required, in addition to the contribution amount which will be paid by the City, that must be supplied to the Florida Retirement System." Petitioner re-applied for membership in FRS, which was granted on June 1, 2002, after the effective date of the legislation designed to specifically admit the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court into FRS. On June 18, 2003, twelve days before the expiration of his term of office, still not having received confirmation of the status of his prior service, Petitioner sent a letter to Ms. Snuggs advising that FRS had not recognized his service from 1995 through 2002. Petitioner again stated in the letter that he was terminating his position as Sheriff on June 30, 2003. Less than a week prior to the termination of his term, Petitioner received two "Statement[s] of Account" dated June 24, 2003, indicating that "you have until retirement to pay the amount due on your account." The statements further indicated that "when you become vested for monthly benefits, we will provide you an estimate of benefits with and without this service." According to the first Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 1.6 percent multiplier rate for the FRS regular class. According to the second Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 2.0 percent multiplier rate for the FRS special risk class. Neither Statement of Account was correct, as both failed to permit Petitioner to purchase service at the 3.0 percent rate for special risk, despite the fact that Petitioner had served a continuous and uninterrupted term as Sheriff. The Statement of Account did not advise Petitioner that he must submit a separate retirement application, Form FR-11, in order to preserve his retirement date. The statement did advise Petitioner that interest would be assessed at a rate of 6.5 percent. This warning appeared in bold face on the Statement of Account. The June 24, 2003, statements were the first time that Petitioner was supplied with the amount due to purchase service credit. Since neither statement applied the correct multiplier rate (3.0 percent) for all eight years of Petitioner's service as Sheriff, neither statement was correct. Recognizing that only six days remained prior to the expiration of Petitioner's term as Sheriff, Mr. Keane advised Petitioner to submit payment to Respondent on an expedited basis. After receiving the June 24, 2003, Statements of Account, Petitioner prepared a letter dated June 26, 2003, to Cal Ray, the Director of the Department of Administration and Finance for the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. In this letter, Petitioner requested an employer contribution in the amount of $163,554.32 to purchase his prior service. Petitioner further requested an expedited preparation of the check to ensure delivery to Respondent by July 1, 2003. The letter to Mr. Ray requested payment of the amounts that would have been periodically contributed by the City of Jacksonville if Respondent had been acknowledged as a participant in FRS in 1995. On June 27, 2003, three days prior to the expiration of his term of office, Petitioner drove from Jacksonville to Tallahassee to meet with Respondent's representatives, including Ms. Snuggs, regarding Petitioner's retirement. Mr. Dandelake accompanied Petitioner on this trip. At the June 27, 2003, meeting, Petitioner personally delivered a check to Respondent in the amount of $163,554.32. Respondent accepted the check and issued a written receipt signed by Sarabeth Snuggs. Petitioner was never told during the June 27, 2003, meeting with Respondent that he would forfeit benefits if he failed to complete an application. Respondent knew that Petitioner was leaving office on June 30, 2003. Respondent never discussed the filing of an application for retirement benefits at any time during the course of its conversations and correspondence with Petitioner. Petitioner was never told by Respondent to complete any forms to protect his rights to the 2.0 percent multiplier during the pendency of his dispute with Respondent. Petitioner was never provided any handbook, notice, statutes, or rules indicating he would forfeit benefits under any circumstances. When Petitioner left the June 27, 2003, meeting, both he and Mr. Dandelake understood that he was still engaged in a dispute with Respondent over his entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Petitioner knew that he was required to file an application in order to receive retirement benefits. Petitioner testified that if he had left the June 27 meeting with any indication that he would forfeit benefits by not filing an application, he would have filed something, with advice of counsel, to preserve his rights. Petitioner received an Estimate of Benefits via fax from Respondent on June 27, 2003, reflecting an annual benefit of $23,105.90. This statement valued 6.92 years of Petitioner's uninterrupted special risk service as Sheriff using the 2.0 percent multiplier, and 1.08 years of service as Sheriff using the 3.0 percent multiplier. The June 27, 2003, statement lists Petitioner's retirement date as July 1, 2003. The estimate does not warn Petitioner that he must do anything in order to preserve his July 2003 retirement date. The estimate states only that it is subject to "final verification of all factors." Petitioner's term of office as elected Sheriff ended on June 30, 2003. Petitioner's employment terminated when his term expired on that date. Respondent was aware of the dates of the expiration of Petitioner's term of office as well as his employment termination date. When Petitioner's employment terminated on June 30, 2003, it was unclear whether he would be credited with the 3.0 percent multiplier for his eight years of special risk service. Petitioner was not notified by Respondent prior to the expiration of his term as Sheriff on June 30, 2003, that he needed to submit a retirement application. The first time Petitioner was advised by Respondent of the need to file an application for retirement benefits was in the comment section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefits provided to him by letter dated March 4, 2004. The warning was printed in bold face type. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated June 27, 2003, did not include the bold face warning to file an application. Respondent was not provided with a Division of Retirement publication entitled "Preparing to Retire" prior to his leaving service on June 30, 2003. In fact, the copy of the publication offered into evidence by Respondent is dated "July 2003," subsequent to Petitioner's retirement. As the only member of FRS in his office in Jacksonville, Petitioner had no staff or employees trained in FRS or Florida retirement benefits. Petitioner was provided with a "Preparing to Retire" booklet in March 2004. On November 3, 2003, Florida Attorney General Opinion 2003-46 confirmed that Petitioner, as the elected Sheriff, was eligible for membership in the Elected Officer's Class of the Florida Retirement System. On December 31, 2003, and on January 16, 2004, Petitioner's counsel attempted to obtain clarification from Respondent regarding Petitioner's retirement benefits. The December 31, 2003, letter noted that the "extraordinary delay" in resolving the issue of Petitioner's benefits was at no time due to fault on the part of Petitioner. Respondent never refuted or disputed this statement. By letter dated March 4, 2004, Petitioner was finally advised by Respondent that he was entitled to be credited with the higher 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight years of his service as Sheriff. Petitioner noted that the March 4, 2004, Statement of Account, while properly applying the 3.0 percent multiplier, now had changed Petitioner's retirement date to April 2004 from the previous estimates showing a retirement date of July 2003. The March 4, 2004, statement included the bold face notice to Petitioner that he must file an application for retirement benefits. No prior notices or correspondence from Respondent had informed Petitioner that he must file Form FR-11 in order to retain his retirement date of July 1, 2003. After formally being notified that he would receive the 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight of his years of service as Sheriff, and after having received the notice that he must file Form FR-11, Petitioner submitted the form in April 2004. Respondent is a fiduciary charged with acting in the best interest of participants in FRS. Andy Snuggs, who travels around the state educating employers and employees in FRS, acknowledged that Petitioner was not responsible for the delay by Respondent in recognizing Petitioner's entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Mr. Snuggs acknowledged that he does not tell employees that they will forfeit benefits if they delay the filing of their applications. Petitioner received his first retirement check in May 2004 which was based upon the benefit established in March 2004 of $32,624.58 annually, not the $23,105.90 previously established by Respondent in June 2003. Petitioner has received no retroactive benefits for the period of July 1, 2003, through April 30, 2004. In a letter dated May 6, 2004, Petitioner stated that his acceptance of the first retirement check was not to be construed by Respondent of a waiver of his rights to retroactive benefits from July 1, 2003, forward.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be awarded retirement benefits at the rate of 3.0 percent per year for his eight years of Elected Officer's Class of service, retroactive to July 1, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 10059 Northwest 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000
The Issue Does Petitioner qualify for a consumer's certificate of exemption as a "church" as defined in Rule 12A-1.001(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code, or as a "religious institution" as defined in Section 212.08(7)(o) 2.a., Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Friends Housing and Care, Inc. (Petitioner), is a non-profit corporation exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner has filed under the fictitious name statute and is doing business under the name Woodmere at Jacarande. Petitioner's Amended Articles of Incorporation dated October 25, 1996, state Petitioner's purposes as follows: To provide elderly families, elderly persons, and handicapped persons housing and related facilities and services specially designed to meet the physical, social, psychological, economic and spiritual needs of the aged and contribute to their health, financial security, happiness and usefulness in longer living. To plan, construct, operate, maintain, and improve housing and related facilities and services for elderly families and elderly persons. To acquire by gift or purchase, hold, sell, convey, assign, mortgage, or lease any property, real or personal, necessary or incident to the provisions of housing and related facilities and services for elderly families and elderly persons. To borrow money and issue evidence of indebtedness in furtherance of any or all of the objects of its business; and to secure loans by mortgage, pledge, deed or trust, or other lien. To engage in any kind of activity, and enter into, perform and carry out contracts of any kind, necessary or in connection with, or incidental to the accomplishment of any one or more of the nonprofit purposes of the corporation. To conduct educational or scientific research on a non-profit basis and to cooperate with foundations, educational institutions, and research centers in promoting same, with the aim of increasing knowledge and enhancing life in our society. To foster and encourage spiritual life and bring the human spirit into intimate relation with the Divine Spirit, to provide definite, organized opportunity for the development of spiritual values and for the renewal of our strength in accordance with generally accepted faith and practice of the Religious Society of Friends. Note 1 of Petitioner's audited financial statements containing the independent auditor's report dated January 8, 1997, states that Petitioner ". . .was created by Friends (Quakers) to plan and develop a Not-for-Profit Condominium Retirement Community in Florida to meet the needs of Friends and others who wish to retire or live in a Quaker-sponsored retirement community in Florida. " Note 3 to the same financial statements indicates that Petitioner's operations have been devoted to raising capital, obtaining financing, purchasing land and beginning construction on the planned retirement community. As reflected in the unaudited financial statement dated April 30, 1997, of the total reflected year-to-date expenses of $820,681: $299,548 went to architectural fees; $71,985 was spent for engineering fees; $84,265 was spent for pre-construction management fees; and $40,331 went to advertising. Only $200 was directed to worship expenses. Neither the audited financial statements nor any of the notes thereto indicate that Petitioner is engaged in any religious activities or worship services. Petitioner's retirement community will comprise 32.7 acres, with a 3.7 acre easement. There will be about 700 condominiums constructed on this acreage. Currently, it is anticipated that the first condominiums will be available for occupancy sometime in 1999. Thus, currently there are no residents residing at the Petitioner's retirement community. Petitioner will be constructing an 80,000 square foot commons building which will contain an "auditorium chapel" consisting of approximately 5,500 square feet. This building has not been constructed. The "auditorium chapel" will be used for "religious purposes and multiple-purposes." It is anticipated that both silent and program services of the Friends (Quaker) faith will be held in the chapel. Other religious faiths would also be included. There will also be located within the commons building a 6,000 square foot dining facility, 4,000 square foot library, a gift shop, beauty and barber shops, post office, banking facility, game rooms, and lounge area. Petitioner sells its condominiums to members of the general public of retirement age, regardless of their religious affiliation or even if they have no religious affiliation. Purchasers do not have to be members of the Friends (Quaker) faith. In fact, the retirement community will be a "non- denominational community." The price of the condominiums ranges from about $82,000 for a one-bedroom (676 square foot) unit, to well over $200,000 for a large (2100 square foot) unit. In addition to the sales price, Petitioner will charge its residents a monthly condominium fee to cover maintenance. An activity or club fee will also be charged by Petitioner to cover residents' social activities and transportation costs. If a resident needs medical attention, Petitioner will provide the care and bill the resident's insurance company for the cost of the care. Several witnesses testified that the meetings held at Petitioner's location were held under the name "Woodmere Friends Fellowship," while other witnesses testified that the meetings held at Petitioner's location were held under the name "Woodmere Fellowship." The newspaper advertisements or other published advertisements advertising meetings at Petitioner's location did not refer to "Woodmere Friends Fellowship" or "Woodmere Fellowship." An advertisement appearing in "Quaker Life" in June 1997, indicated that "All Friends Fellowship" was located at Woodmere at Jacaranda. A newsletter from Petitioner dated January 1997, stated that "Friends Inter-Faith Fellowship" was begun at Woodmere Information Center and that several prospective residents from the Venice/Englewood area had "voiced interest in having a meeting in this area. Presently, these meetings are being held every Sunday evening at 6:30 p.m." Additionally, this newsletter stated that these meetings were consistent with Petitioner's federally-recognized religious affiliation. However, Petitioner is never identified as a church or religious institution in this newsletter. By letter dated February 17, 1997, William R. Martin, Petitioner's Chairman, advised the Department that "[o]ur Worship group is being identified as the Woodmere All Friends Fellowship." In an advertisement dated February 1, 1997, Woodmere at Jacaranda, a Quaker-sponsored, resident-owned retirement community, invites interested people to attend a fellowship hour at 6:00 p.m. the first and third Sunday of each month. This advertisement does not refer to Petitioner as a church or religious institution. The bulletins, advertisements, newsletters, and other evidence submitted by the Petitioner do not refer to Petitioner as a church or religious institution. The hours of operation posted on the doors to Petitioner's premises indicate that Petitioner is open Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., and Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. There were no hours listed for Sunday. Additionally, there was nothing to indicate that worship service or religious activities were being conducted by Petitioner on its premises. Although there are meetings being held at Petitioner's location where religious services or activities are being conducted on a somewhat regular basis, there is insufficient evidence to show that Petitioner is responsible for, and conducting, those religious services or activities. Petitioner's sole purpose is not to provide free transportation services to church members, their families, and other church attendees. Petitioner is not a state, district, or other governing or administrative offices the function of which is to assist or regulate the customary activities of religious organizations or members. Petitioner does not own or operate a Florida television station whose programs are of a religious nature. Petitioner does not provide regular religious services to Florida state prisoners. Friends Housing and Care, Inc., d/b/a Woodmere at Jacaranda is a Quaker-sponsored, resident-owned, retirement community whose primary function is the development and marketing of a retirement community to members of the general public, regardless of religious affiliation. Petitioner intends to use its sales tax exemption primarily to purchase building materials, including those building materials for the condominiums which it produces for sale to the general public, regardless of their religious affiliation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for sales tax exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lattera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Nick Roknich, Esquire Dunlap, Moran, Roknich, and Gibson, P.A. 1819 Main Street, Suite 700 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Ruth Ann Smith, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(17)(a), Florida Statutes (2009),1 as a substitute teacher for the Lee County School Board.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been an employee of the Lee County School Board (the School Board) from February 28, 2001, through the date of the final hearing. The School Board is a participating member in the FRS. Petitioner has never been a full-time employee of the School Board and has never been eligible for service credits for purposes of the FRS. From February 28, 2001, until some time in May 2004, the School Board employed Petitioner in a temporary, part-time position. From some time in May 2004 through the date of the final hearing, the School Board has employed Petitioner as a substitute teacher. From February 28, 2001, through some time in May 2004, the School Board required part-time employees such as Petitioner to participate in a plan identified in the record as the Bencor FICA Alternative Plan (the Bencor Plan). The Bencor Plan provided retirement benefits for temporary teachers, who were not eligible for FRS retirement benefits. On May 25, 2004, Petitioner submitted a Distribution Request Form to withdraw her accumulated savings from the Bencor Plan. Petitioner was eligible to withdraw her retirement benefits from the Bencor Plan, because she changed her employment status from a temporary teacher to a substitute teacher. Some time in May 2004, Petitioner began teaching as a substitute teacher for the School Board. Petitioner has continued as a substitute teacher for the School Board through the date of the final hearing. As a substitute teacher, Petitioner is not a full-time employee, who is eligible for service credits for purposes of the FRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for FRS benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2010.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, as a surviving spouse, is entitled to a continuing benefit from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) based on the retirement account of her deceased husband, George S. Bohler. More specifically, it must be determined whether the forgery of the spousal acknowledgement form renders the member's election of the "Option 1" retirement benefit payment, which precludes a survivor's benefit for his spouse, invalid and void.
Findings Of Fact George Bohler, the FRS member at issue, was employed, at times pertinent, as a Professor of Economics at Florida Community College in Jacksonville. The College is an FRS employer and Mr. Bohler was a member of the FRS retirement system. The Division of Retirement is an administrative agency charged with regulation and operation of the Florida retirement system, including calculation of and determination of entitlement to retirement benefits, under various options and member circumstances. On March 22, 1999, Mr. Bohler filed a completed Florida Retirement System Application for service retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). This was accomplished through his filing of "Form DP-11." The Form provides a retiree with information pertaining to four options by which his retirement benefits may be paid. One full page of that form provides an explanation of each option. Mr. Bohler selected Option 1, a retirement benefit pay-out plan which provides the highest monthly benefit. The Option 1 selection provides that this highest monthly benefit is payable for the lifetime of the retiree only. Upon his death, the benefit would stop and his beneficiary, here his spouse, the Petitioner, would receive only a refund of any contributions the member might have paid into the FRS which exceeds the amount he had received in benefits. Option 1 provides no continuing or survivor benefit to a beneficiary or surviving spouse. The DP-11 Form filed with the retirement application contained an apparent spousal acknowledgement purportedly signed by Deborah T. Bohler, the spouse of member George Bohler. It appears to acknowledge that the member had elected either Option 1 or Option 2, which provide no survivor/spouse benefit. The DP-11 Form indicated to the Division that the member was married. The parties have stipulated, however, that the Petitioner's signature on the FRS application for service retirement and the DROP program was actually forged. George Bohler, the member, was an FRS member from August 19, 1968, to March 31, 2005. He received FRS retirement benefits based upon the above-referenced application from the Division from April 1, 2000, to October 31, 2007. The Form DP-11 contained a statement to the effect that the retiree member understood that he could not add additional service, change options, or change his type of retirement once his retirement became final. Mr. Bohler began participation in the DROP program on April 1, 2000. Thereafter, his last date of employment was March 31, 2005, and he passed away on October 18, 2007. He received FRS benefits from April 1, 2000, until October 31, 2007. For 28 years, until his death on that date, Mr. Bohler was legally married to the Petitioner, Deborah Bohler, during which time they were never separated or divorced. On March 10, 1999, Mr. Bohler executed the FRS Application for Service Retirement and the DROP program. He had his signature notarized as required for that form. Joint Exhibit 1, in evidence. Mr. Bohler designated the Petitioner as his primary beneficiary on the DROP Application. He elected to begin participation in the DROP program as of April 1, 2000, and to retire from state employment effective March 31, 2005, which he did. There are four options which an FRS member may select for his or her retirement benefits to be paid to the member or to the survivors/beneficiaries. Mr. Bohler selected "Option 1" on his DROP Application form. This results in a significantly higher retirement monthly benefit than does Options 3 or 4, which have survivorship rights. The acknowledgement section on the DROP Application form requires that a member's spouse be notified and must acknowledge a member's selection of Option 1 or Option 2 by signing that DROP Application form, so that the FRS is thus informed that the spouse made a knowing, intelligent waiver of survivorship rights to benefits. The spousal acknowledgement provision or section does not require that the member's spouse's signature be notarized. The form also does not require a member to swear under oath that the spouse was notified. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner's apparent signature shown on Mr. Bohler's retirement application form was forged. The Petitioner had no knowledge that her name had been placed on the form by some other person, nor did she have any knowledge that Mr. Bohler had selected Option 1 prior to his death. The Petitioner first learned that her husband had selected Option 1 when she contacted the Respondent, after his death, to request that his retirement benefits now be paid to her. She believed that she was entitled to survivorship benefits. Her husband never informed her that he had selected a retirement option which would not pay her survivorship benefits, nor had they discussed the matter before or since his retirement. In their marital and family relationship, the Bohlers had divided certain duties in such a way that Mr. Bohler, the FRS member at issue, handled all financial matters himself. The Petitioner, Mrs. Bohler, dealt with any tax issues or filings the couple was required to make during the years of their marriage. The Petitioner is a certified public accountant. The Petitioner was simply aware that her husband received retirement benefits, and knew the amount of them, but did not know that they represented benefits for Option 1 rather than Option 3 or 4. The Petitioner's signature on the spousal acknowledgment section of the DROP Application form is stipulated to have been forged. The fact of the forgery, and the Petitioner's un-refuted testimony, establishes that she was never notified, nor did she ever acknowledge that her husband had selected Option 1. She was not aware that an attempt to waive or extinguish her survivor's benefits had been made. She believed, during his lifetime, that she was to be accorded survivor benefits. Testimony presented by the Respondent shows that the Respondent Division will not accept a retirement application form, or process it, if a member fails to complete the spousal acknowledgement section or, alternatively, to submit a signed statement explaining why that section is left blank, or the signature of the spouse has not been obtained. The fact that the Division will not accept a retirement or DROP Application form or process the related benefits if the acknowledgement section is unsigned or blank establishes the mandatory nature of the requirement that a spouse acknowledge a member's election to receive benefits under an option which would preclude a spouse's survivorship benefits. The acknowledgement is thus not an optional requirement. In fact, the legislature clearly placed that requirement in the statute, Section 121.091(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as a mandatory requirement so a spouse would know of any such attempt to waive the spouse's survivorship rights and benefits. It is an acknowledgement that the spouse has a vested or property right in such benefits, which must be knowingly and intelligently waived. The Statute says, in fact, that the spouse of any member "shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." Therefore, obtaining a spouse's signature is not the only desired result set forth by the legislature (and under the rule adopted pursuant thereto) because it requires actual notification of the spouse, not merely the obtaining of a spouse's signature, whether genuine or forged. Actual notification is what must be accomplished. The required notification and indeed the obtaining of the Petitioner's signature was not accomplished in the facts of this case. In light of these facts, the act of declaring and accomplishing retired status, and selection of the related benefit option, was never completed. The Option selection was obviously a nullity and void ab initio because the mandatory condition precedent never was accomplished by the member.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, awarding the Petitioner retirement benefits based upon her status as a surviving spouse and joint annuitant, in the manner described above, adjusted to reflect re-calculation and recoupment of overpayment based upon the amount of benefits already paid from the subject retirement account pursuant to Option 1. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Regina Stevens, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32327 T. A. Delegal, Esquire Delegal Law Offices, P.A. 424 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, as a surviving spouse, is entitled to the monthly benefits of his deceased wife pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes (1995). (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1995) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Mrs. Betty Thomas began participation in the Florida Retirement System ("FRS") on December 19, 1970, when the public school system that employed her as a teacher converted its retirement program from the Florida Teachers Retirement Program to the FRS. At the time, Mrs. Thomas had approximately six years of previous service for which she received credit in the FRS. The designated beneficiaries of Mrs. Thomas in 1970 were Mr. Johnny Brown, her husband at the time, and the couple's dependent children, Shauna Jackson, Peguena Brown, and Romina Brown. The three daughters were born, respectively, in 1961, 1962, and 1969. The FRS did not become noncontributory until 1975. By 1972, Mrs. Thomas had received $2,322.75 in three separate refunds representing part of the personal contributions and accrued interest that she made prior to 1975. Mrs. Thomas and Mr. Brown divorced in 1972. Mrs. Thomas met Petitioner sometime in 1975, and the two married in 1990. They remained together until Mrs. Thomas died on September 21, 1996. At the time of her death, Mrs. Thomas was actively employed as an assistant principal with 28.2 years of creditable service in the FRS. If her creditable service had not been reduced by previous refunds of personal contributions, Mrs. Thomas would have held 31.8 years of creditable service. On May 31, 1992, Mrs. Thomas changed her designated beneficiary. She deleted Mr. Johnny Brown, her former husband, and designated her three adult daughters as her beneficiaries using the From M-10 (the "M-10") required by Respondent for such purposes. Mrs. Thomas did not designate Petitioner as a beneficiary. From the time Mrs. Thomas executed the M-10 on May 31, 1992, and thereafter, none of the daughters of Mrs. Thomas qualified as a "joint annuitant" or a "dependent beneficiary" within the meaning of Section 121.021(28). None of the daughters was under age 25, physically or mentally disabled or incapable of self-support, or otherwise financially dependent on Mrs. Thomas for at least one-half of their support. From the time Petitioner married Mrs. Thomas in 1990, Petitioner qualified as a "joint annuitant" within the meaning of Section 121.021(28)(a). He was the spouse of a member of the FRS and is now the surviving spouse. Shortly after the death of Mrs. Thomas on September 21, 1996, Petitioner requested the monthly benefits of his deceased wife. By letter dated November 1, 1996, Respondent advised Petitioner that the "only benefit" available was a refund of personal contributions. In relevant part, the letter stated: Unless one of the beneficiaries qualified as a joint annuitant of the member at the time of death . . ., a refund of retirement contributions is the only benefit payable from this account. (emphasis supplied) Each beneficiary is entitled to an equal portion of the $2,354.05 on deposit and should complete Form FST-11g, APPLICATION OF BENEFICIARY FOR REFUND. (emphasis not supplied) If all the designated beneficiaries wish to disclaim interest in this account, you, as the surviving spouse would qualify as a joint annuitant. You would be eligible to receive the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. The monthly benefit would be payable for your lifetime and is estimated to be $1,617.95 effective October 1, 1996. (emphasis supplied) For you to receive this benefit, we need the following (emphasis supplied): Forms DIS-1 completed by Shauna B. Jackson, Peguena Brown, and Romina Brown. Disclaimer forms must be filed and recorded in Circuit Court within two years of the member's date of death. . . . The daughters of Mrs. Thomas did not disclaim their interest in the personal contributions that remained in the FRS account of their deceased mother. Rather, they applied for a refund. On December 9, 1997, Respondent refunded the remaining personal contributions of Mrs. Thomas to her three daughters. Petitioner continued his attempts to obtain the monthly benefits of his deceased wife. By letters dated January 30 and May 2, 1997, Respondent provided Petitioner with responses substantially the same as the response contained in the letter dated November 1, 1996. On July 17, 1998, Petitioner filed an Application of Beneficiary for Retirement Benefits. Respondent advised Petitioner that the "benefits" had already been paid to the three daughters of Mrs. Thomas, and Respondent requested an administrative hearing. The purpose of the M-10 signed by Mrs. Thomas was to designate beneficiaries of the retirement benefits earned by Mrs. Thomas during her years of service. The M-10 executed by Mrs. Thomas on May 31, 1992, stated, in relevant part: . . . I CHOOSE TO HAVE BENEFITS PAID . . . AS FOLLOWS . . . 3. . . . JOINTLY . . . BENEFITS SHALL BE DIVIDED AND PAYABLE AS INDICATED BELOW. . . . Shauna Brown Jackson Daughter 11/15/61 F Peguena Brown Daughter 12/10/61 F Romina Brown Daughter 3/9/69 F The term "benefits" is not defined in Section 121.021. However, Respondent's own rule, in relevant part, defines the term to mean a "monthly payment." Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(10). (Unless otherwise stated, all references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.) After Mrs. Thomas died on September 21, 1996, Respondent did not pay "benefits" to anyone, as Respondent defines the term "benefit" in Rule 60S-6.001(10). On December 9, 1997, Respondent distributed three lump sum payments totaling $2,354.05, to the designated beneficiaries who were entitled to the personal contributions of Mrs. Thomas pursuant to Section 121.091(7)(b)2. Respondent distributed one lump sum payment of $784.69 to Ms. Romina Brown and two equal lump sum payments of $784.68 to Ms. Peguena Brown and Ms. Shauna Brown. Section 121.091(7)(b)2 authorizes Respondent to pay only the personal contributions of Mrs. Thomas to her designated beneficiaries who do not qualify as joint annuitants within the meaning of Section 121.021(28). However, nothing in Chapter 121 or the evidence of record requires Respondent to withhold monthly benefits from a surviving spouse who is entitled in Section 121.091(8) to receive retirement benefits. The attempt by Mrs. Thomas to designate beneficiaries on the M-10 was, in part, effective and, in part, ineffective. It was an effective attempt to designate the beneficiaries entitled to a refund of her personal contributions. However, it was an ineffective attempt to name a beneficiary entitled to the monthly benefits that accrued independently of any personal contributions. An ineffective attempt to designate a beneficiary who is entitled to monthly benefits fails to name a beneficiary entitled to those benefits. When no beneficiary is named, Petitioner, as the surviving spouse, is the beneficiary designated in Section 121.091(8) who is entitled to the monthly benefits. When Respondent refunded $2,322.75 in personal contributions to Mrs. Thomas in 1972, the refund reduced the monthly benefit from $1,617.95 to $1,279.54. The refund resulted in a reduction in monthly benefit of approximately $338.41. There is no evidence that a $2,354.05 refund of the remaining contributions in 1997 should have any different effect on the monthly benefit. In the absence of some legal reason not to do so, a refund of $2,354.05 in 1997 should reduce the monthly benefit in the same proportion that the previous refunds in 1972 reduced the monthly benefit. The $2,354.05 refund in 1997 should reduce the monthly benefit of $1,279.54, by $341.79, to $937.75. Sections 121.091(7)(e) and (f) authorize a surviving spouse to modify monthly benefits by repaying contributions refunded to the member. Petitioner can restore the monthly benefit either to $1,279.54 or to $1,617.95 by electing to pay either $2,354.05 or $4,676.05 in personal contributions previously refunded plus accrued interest at the statutorily prescribed rate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order awarding to Petitioner, for the remainder of his life, the monthly benefits earned by Mrs. Thomas during 31.8 years of service in an amount that may range from $937.75 to $1,617.95, depending on the amount of personal contributions repaid by Petitioner, and shall include a lump sum payment of all monthly benefits plus accrued interest from October 1, 1996, to the date of the first payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Button, Senior Attorney Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Granville E. Petrie, Esquire 1105 North Duval Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. (“Holiday Endowment”) is eligible for a consumer certificate of exemption as a charitable institution pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, the Holiday Endowment, is an organization incorporated in the State of Florida as a not-for-profit corporation under Chapter 617, Florida Statutes. It was formed in October 1996 by the Holiday Rotary Club of Holiday, Florida, as a vehicle for accruing funds to contribute to the various charities supported by the Holiday Rotary Club. The Holiday Endowment is exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3), having obtained an exemption letter from the Internal Revenue Service on May 30, 1997. Larry Schalles, Treasurer of the Holiday Endowment, testified that annual fundraising achieves variable results, and that the membership of the Holiday Rotary Club seeks to attain stability in its philanthropic endeavors by placing a portion of its funds into the Holiday Endowment each year. Once the endowment is built up, the interest can be used to pay for scholarships each year, leaving the principal intact. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the sole active function of the Holiday Endowment has been to raise moneys to establish the endowment fund. All moneys raised by the Holiday Endowment are invested in the fund to provide scholarships in the future. All of the Holiday Endowment’s fund raising activities are conducted by unpaid volunteers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Holiday Endowment has made no expenditures of any kind. The Department denied the Holiday Endowment’s application for a certificate of exemption on the ground that the Holiday Endowment did not qualify as a charitable institution under the seven criteria set forth in Section 212.08(7)(o)2.b., Florida Statutes. In particular, the Department found that the Holiday Endowment does not expend in excess of 50% of its operational expenditures toward qualified charitable services, meaning that the provision of a charitable service is not the organization’s sole or primary function. As set forth above, the Holiday Endowment has in fact made no expenditures of any kind. The Department also found that the Holiday Endowment does not provide a reasonable percentage of services free of charge or at a substantially reduced cost to persons unable to pay for such service. The Holiday Endowment’s response is that the exemption should nonetheless be granted, because any expenditures it makes in the future will be for charitable purposes.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying the certificate of exemption sought by the Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry C. Schalles, C.P.A. Treasurer, Holiday Rotary Endowment Fund, Inc. 5728 Main Street New Port Richey, Florida 34652 William B. Nickell Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street, Suite 304 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Heike Stoll (f/k/a Heike Bybee), has standing to assert a claim or right to any portion of her former husband’s Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) benefits as an “innocent spouse” pursuant to Article II, Section 8(d) of the Florida Constitution, and section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2017).1/
Findings Of Fact Mr. Bybee is a member of the FRS Investment Plan by virtue of his former employment as a deputy with the Sarasota County Sheriff, an FRS participating employer. On October 6, 2017, in Sarasota County Circuit Court Case Number 2017CF001018, Mr. Bybee was found guilty by jury verdict of the following felonies under Florida law: Kidnap- Commit or Facilitate Commission of Felony; Crimes Against Person-Exploitation Elderly or Disabled Adult $20,000 to $100,000 dollars; Fraudulent Use of Personal Identifying Information (8 counts); and Computer Crime to Defraud or Obtain Property (3 Counts) (referred to collectively as the “felony convictions”). On October 6, 2017, judgment was entered against Mr. Bybee adjudicating him guilty of the felony convictions. The SBA notified Mr. Bybee that his felony convictions required forfeiture of his FRS benefits under section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Mr. Bybee did not file a petition for hearing to challenge the Notice of Forfeiture or otherwise assert that his felony convictions did not warrant forfeiture of his FRS benefits under the forfeiture statute. Mr. Bybee’s interest in his FRS benefits is subject to forfeiture due to his commission of the crimes, and his felony convictions. Ms. Stoll was married to Mr. Bybee on August 27, 1994. On or about May 9, 2017, Ms. Stoll filed her Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in Manatee County (Circuit Court Case Number 2017-DR-2067) asserting her interest in, inter alia, Mr. Bybee’s FRS benefits. On December 8, 2017, Ms. Stoll filed an “FRS Investment Plan Petition for Hearing” asserting her claim of entitlement to her spousal share of Mr. Bybee’s FRS benefits as an “innocent spouse.” On February 26, 2018, Mr. Bybee and Ms. Stoll executed a Marital Settlement Agreement. As to retirement accounts, Mr. Bybee and Ms. Stoll agreed to the following: Retirement Accounts/Pension. Wife shall receive as her sole property, and all equity and value therein, all retirement accounts and/or pensions in the Husband’s sole name, in the joint name of the parties, and/or in the Wife’s sole name, free and clear of any claims or interest which Husband may have thereto. Specifically, Husband has a pension and/or retirement account through the County of Sarasota Sheriff’s Department, State of Florida. Wife shall receive as her sole property, and all equity and value therein, in said pension and/or retirement account, free and clear of any claims or interest which Husband may have thereto. Further, Husband assigns, transfers, and relinquishes any legal or equitable claims, causes of action, or remedies of any nature against the pension and/or retirement account through the County of Sarasota Sheriff’s Department, State of Florida; and Husband shall fully cooperate with Wife in any and all respects as necessary for Wife to pursue any such legal or equitable claims, causes of action, or remedies related any manner said pension and/or retirement account. Ms. Stoll was not charged with or convicted of any crimes related to Mr. Bybee’s felony convictions. Ms. Stoll’s testimony was credible that she was unaware of Mr. Bybee’s crimes, and had not benefited from them in any fashion. On April 16, 2018, a Final Judgement of Dissolution of Marriage was entered in Manatee County Circuit Court Case Number 2017-DR-2067 that “approved, ratified and incorporated” the marital settlement agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to her former husband’s retirement benefits, because he was a public employee convicted of specified offenses; and pursuant to section 112.3173, he forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account upon committing the crimes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2018.
