Findings Of Fact On 30 April 1976 Salter Advertising Company's application to locate a sign facing north on Salter-owned property off the I-110 near the intersection of Scott and Alcaniz Streets, Pensacola, Florida, was approved (Exhibit 1). By application dated 12 November 1976 Salter requested authorization to erect a sign at the same location facing south (Exhibit 8). This application was disapproved by the District sign inspector on December 20, 1976. What happened to the original of Exhibit 8 was not disclosed at the hearing. On a duplicate original of this application, which was introduced as Exhibit 9, the disapproval on the duplicate original application was erased or whited-out and under date 5-2-77, this application was approved by the District Sign Coordinator, the supervisor of the inspector who had disapproved Exhibit 8. The copy introduced as Exhibit 8 differs from Exhibit 9 in several respects. In the first place it is a carbon copy of what appears to have been the original of Exhibit 8. The "received" stamps dated November 24, 1976, December 13, 1976, and December 21, 1976, appear at different places on Exhibits 8 and 9; Exhibit 8 contains a "returned" stamp with date of 11/15/76 which does not appear on Exhibit 9; Exhibit 9 contains a "received" stamp dated April 29, 1977 which does not appear on Exhibit 8; and Exhibit 9 shows sign to be facing both S and W, while Exhibit 8 shows sign facing S only. The reason given for disapproving Exhibit 8 contained in letter dated January 31, 1977, (Exhibit 5), was that there was inadequate space to place a sign at the location proposed because of the City of Pensacola's setback line 50 feet from the center line of Alcaniz Street. This same condition exists respecting the application approved in Exhibit 1. Accordingly, no sign has been erected at the location despite the approval of the South and West facing sign approved in Exhibit 9. In November of 1976 Respondent contacted Petitioner's sign inspector for Pensacola and arranged to meet at the site of the sign proposed in Exhibits 2 and 4. The property at this location was for sale and Respondent wanted to know if it was suitable for a sign. At this time it was customary for the official who approved the application to go to the site before the application was submitted and advise whether or not an application for a sign at the location would be approved. At the on-site meeting the inspector advised Respondent that approval for the intended sign would be forthcoming. Respondent then purchased the property, submitted the application for sign approval and erected the sign at a cost of some $12,000. The testimony, that it was customary for an applicant after receiving on-site approval, to erect the sign before receiving formal approval of its application for sign permit, was not rebutted. The sign erected by Respondent is located approximately 300 feet from the site for which Salter received approval of its application in Exhibits 1 and The I-110 is part of the interstate system.
Findings Of Fact V.J. Patel, general manager of the Best Western North Florida Inn, caused a sign to be erected a tenth of a mile south of State Road 143, advertising the motel. At all pertinent times, Shree Realty, Inc., Mr. Patel's employer, owned both the motel and the sign. At no time was the owner's name anywhere on the sign. Glenel Bowden, an outdoor advertising sign inspector employed by the Department of Transportation (DOT), told Mr. Patel he thought the unpermitted sign, visible to southbound traffic on Interstate 75, was unlawful. Mr. Pate1 and Mr. Bowden discussed the question of the sign's legality on several occasions. On August 28, 1989, Mr. Bowden posted a fluorescent orange violation notice on one of the poles supporting the sign, visible to anyone viewing either of the sign's faces from the highway. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. With this development, conversations between the two men ceased. When Mr. Bowden returned to the sign a few days after posting the violation notice, the notice had been removed. Although he stopped by the motel in search of Mr. Patel, and telephoned several times, leaving requests that Mr. Patel return his telephone calls, Mr. Bowden did not succeed in speaking to Mr. Patel again until October 17, 1989, the day the sign was taken down. On August 29, 1989, DOT's administrator for District Two, Tom Brown, signed a notice to show cause addressed to "Vijay" Patel at Route 1, Box 222, Jennings, Florida. DOT sent the notice by certified mail that day, and it arrived at the motel the following day. Tina Williams, a desk clerk, signed for it. The notice DOT mailed to Mr. Patel advised of the necessity to ask for a formal administrative hearing, if desired, within 30 days. The notice stated: You must comply with the applicable provisions of the said Statute(s) and Code(s) within thirty (30) days from the date of the posted notice . . . or, in the alternative, an administrative hearing must be requested by you within thirty (30) days of the date of this notice. . . . In either case, if you fail to comply within the thirty (30) day period above, then the . . . violation(s) shall be considered true . . . [one possible result being] removal of the sign without further notice. The notice, itself dated August 29, 1989, advised that the sign "was posted with a notice pursuant to Section 479.105(l)(a) on August 28, 1989." On October 2, 1989, 32 days after the notice DOT mailed reached the motel, Mr. Patel went to a lawyer's office. That day the lawyer signed and mailed a request for hearing on behalf of V. J. Patel. The hearing request reached DOT on October 5, 1989, 38 days after Mr. Bowden posted the notice of violation on the sign pole, and 37 days after DOT mailed notice to Mr. Patel. Until the final hearing, when counsel first disclosed the true owner of the sign to DOT, Shree Realty, Inc. never requested a hearing.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DOT enter an order dismissing the request for formal hearing with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 William J. Haley, Esquire Nancy Staff Slayden, Esquire Brannon, Brown, Haley, Robinson & Cole, P.A. Post Office Box 1029 Lake City, FL 32056-1029 Robert Scanlon, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Electrical Contractors Licensing Board, appropriately denied Petitioner's, Kevin Harrington, application to take the examination for licensure as an electrical contractor.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is the state agency vested with the authority to test applicants seeking certification as electrical contractors. Petitioner is seeking certification (licensure) as an electrical contractor. On December 12, 2001, Respondent received Petitioner's application to take the Electrical Contractors Unlimited examination. On December 24, 2001, Respondent mailed Petitioner a letter requesting additional information. The letter requested that the additional information be received by Respondent no later than January 4, 2002. This date was later extended to January 8, 2002. On January 4 and January 7, 2002, Petitioner, through his attorney, forwarded the requested additional information to Respondent. Petitioner's application was complete on January 10, 2002. Respondent, Electrical Contractors Licensing Board("Board"), met on January 16 and 17, 2002. The Board delegates initial consideration of applications to take certification examinations to an Applications Committee consisting of members of the Board who make recommendations to the full Board on each application. Each application is examined by at least two Applications Committee members; if both recommend "denial of the application," or, if one recommends "approval of the application" and one recommends "denial of the application," the application is reviewed by a third Applications Committee member. Each member of the Applications Committee is provided a worksheet as a part of the application package which lists reasons for denial drawn from Subsection 489.511(2)(a)(3), Florida Statutes. After each application is considered by members of the Applications Committee, the application with the Applications Committee's recommendations, reasons for denial (if applicable), and other comments are given to a staff employee who prepares an approved/denial list which is presented to the full Board for consideration. The foregoing procedure was followed in the instant case. On January 16, 2002, Board members, Roger Lange and Kim DeBerry, who were members of the Applications Committee, considered Petitioner's application; both recommended denial of the application. Because there were two recommendations of denial, the application was considered by a third Applications Committee member, Dawn Johnson; she, too, recommended denial. Petitioner's application and the recommendations, reasons for denial, and comments of the Applications Committee were then given to a staff employee who prepared a summary list of all applicants with the recommendations for approval or denial by the Applications Committee with reasons given for denial for submission to the full Board. The full Electrical Contractors Licensing Board considered Petitioner's application on January 17, 2002, and unanimously denied the application. Petitioner was advised of the denial by letter dated February 8, 2002. Petitioner's Applicant's Affidavit dated November 16, 2001, indicates that he was seeking a license under Subsection 489 .511(2)(a)(3)(a), Florida Statutes. The Applicant's Affidavit specifically states: 489.511(2)(a)(3)(a), F.S. Has, within the six (6) years immediately preceding the filing of the application, at least three (3) years proven "management experience" in the trade or education equivalent thereto, or a combination thereof, but not more than one- half of such experience may be educational. (Please submit at least three (3) years of W- 2 Forms) The occupational skills and responsibilities of an electrical contractor are unique and require experience and understanding which are typically acquired by extensive, direct "on-the-job" training in the electrical contracting trade. Petitioner is an experienced General Contractor's project manager. His credentials as a General Contractor's project manager are impressive and the projects he has supervised are extensive. Petitioner has little or no direct supervisory experience in the electrical contracting trade. Petitioner's construction management experience is as a General Contractor project manager, not an Electrical Contractor project manager or similar position, and, as a consequence, he does not meet the "'management experience' in the trade" statutory requirement. Petitioner has an enviable academic record: an Associate of Science Degree With Honors from Miami-Dade Community College (1990), a Bachelor of Science in Building Construction from University of Florida (1993), 21 hours of graduate studies at Florida International University leading towards a Master of Building Construction degree. Petitioner's academic credentials have little direct application to the electrical contracting trade and, as a consequence, do not meet the "educational equivalent" to management experience statutory requirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application to take the Certified Electrical Contractor's Licensure Examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Rosemary Hanna Hayes, Esquire Hayes & Associates 3117 Edgewater Drive Orlando, Florida 32804 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Anthony B. Spivey, Executive Director Electrical Contractors Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The outdoor advertising sign which is the subject of these proceedings is located on U.S. 1 (State Road 5) approximately 1,029 feet north of Summerland Road in North Key Largo. The outdoor advertising sign is owned and maintained by the Respondent and is visible from the main traveled way of the adjacent roadway. The Respondent purchased the sign from the Daly Outdoor Advertising Company in 1984. The sign consist percents of a ten feet by forty feet plywood sign face supported ]by five four inch by six inch poles which serve as uprights. In addition, the sign has 5 stringers (wooden planks placed in a cross-type fashion on the upright poles to hold the sign face in place). The parties stipulated that the sign, in place prior to 1971, was a "nonconforming sign" as defined by Rule 14- 10.07, Florida Administrative Code. The sign permit number is AK-332-10. In November of 1985, Hurricane Kate traveled through the Keys and damaged the sign. On December 4, 1985, Mr. William Kenney, District VI Outdoor Advertising Administrator, passed the site of the sign and noticed that the face of the structure was blown over In the water. Because the sign was surrounded by water and mud, Mr. Kenney observed the sign from approximately 30 feet away. Although the sign was blown over into the water, the face was intact. The poles which were used to hold the sign face snapped. On December 10, 1985, the Respondent purchased 5 used telephone poles at a cost of $50.00 each and repaired the damaged sign. The poles were used as uprights to support the sign face. On January 8, 1986, Mr. Kenney walked over to the sign and inspected it. In Mr. Kenney's opinion, the replaced upright poles appeared to be longer than the old ones, the stringers appeared to be made out of new wood and the plywood used on the face of the structure appeared to be new. The overall size of the repaired structure appeared to be the same size that it was before being damaged by the hurricane. The sign is located at exactly the same location as it was prior to being blown down. It is standard practice in the outdoor advertising industry for a company to exchange, refinish and replace faces of outdoor advertising signs on a routine basis. By letter dated January 14, 1986, the Petitioner advised Respondent that its sign permit number AK-332-10 was no longer valid and by notice to show cause dated February 14, 1986, the Petitioner advised Respondent that the repaired sign had no valid permit and was illegal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be issued declaring that sign permit AK-332-10 remains valid and dismissing the notice of violation and notice to show cause. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1986. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-0575T & 86-0966T (consolidated) The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to these cases. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1 and 5. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument and/or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6 and 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 11. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire -Department of Transportation -Haydon Burns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Charles C. Papy, III, Esquire 201 Alhambra Circle, Suite 502 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Thomas Drawdy, Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in these causes is whether denial of Petitioners' outdoor advertising sign site permit applications by Respondent were correctly determined under Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), on the basis that the sign sites were unzoned commercial/industrial areas; and on the basis that within attending factual circumstances, the sign site did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial areas as defined in Subsection 479.01(23), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Tropical Landholdings, a Florida Corporation, was created in 1998 and purchased approximately 700 to 800 acres of land comprised of residential multi-family and commercial properties along Interstate 75 (I-75) in Punta Gorda, Florida. On September 8, 2003, Petitioner, Crown Advertising, Inc., of Belleview, Florida, submitted three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications to the Department for review. On September 23, 2003, the Department denied the three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign sites were not permitted under the local land use designation of site (§ 479.111(2), Fla. Stat. (2003)); and (2) the sign sites did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area. § 479.01, Fla. Stat. (2003). The sign site permit application forms used by Petitioners in these causes were composed and authorized by the Department. The form required the applicant to obtain and provide information regarding the proposed sign site, what is proposed to be constructed on the site, and where the proposed construction is to occur. The sign site permit applications also required the applicant to secure information from the appropriate local zoning official of the future land use designation and the current zoning of the proposed sites enacted by the local government's Comprehensive Plan and land use development regulations. This form required information from the local government as to whether the applicant is or is not in compliance with all adopted local ordinances. Permission to erect an outdoor sign structure on the identified sign site is subject to approval by the City. Petitioners complied with the requested information. The local government, the City of North Port, approved the three sign site permit applications in question and granted Petitioners permission to erect three outdoor billboard signs. This local grant of approval was then subjected to concurring approval by the Department. After receiving the sign site permits that were approved by the City, the Department engaged the services of a consultant to conduct on-site review and identification of: (1) the local government's designation for each proposed sign site; (2) the permitted uses of each proposed sign site (local drainage facilities, pipeline corridors, underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs); and (3) a review of adjacent and surrounding parcels. The consultant reported to the Department the factual circumstances attendant the three locally approved sign sites. It should be noted that the consultant did not render an opinion regarding the Department's approval or denial of the sign site permit applications. The sign sites in question were zoned under the local "land use designation" of the City of North Port's Ordinance 02-46, Section 53.146 (Ordinance 02-46), as a "utility industrial corridor." The zoned land was composed of strips of land measuring 25 to 70 feet in width on the west side and 160 to 170 feet in width on the east side. The "permitted governmental uses" of a parcel zoned as a "utility industrial corridor," included such uses as underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs. Ordinance 02-46, under the title "Prohibited Uses and Structures," specifically prohibits "all commercial and industrial uses." Based upon a review of all information provided by Petitioners, the local government, and its consultant, the Department first determined the three sign sites on which the subject signs were to be erected and located, prohibited commercial or industrial uses. The Department then determined, based upon an analysis of the materials provided by its consultant and the City of North Port, the three sign sites in question had not been zoned for commercial or industrial uses as a part of the local government's comprehensive zoning plan. Based upon (1) the prohibition of commercial or industrial uses and (2) no commercial or industrial zoning of the sign sites, the Department concluded these three sign sites were zoned "primarily to permit outdoor advertising," a prohibited function. The denials were required. Under the local land use designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included local drainage facilities and a pipeline corridor. Under governmental uses designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising. However, Ordinance 02-46 specifically prohibits all commercial and industrial uses under the governmental uses designation. When questioned by Petitioners, Ms. Holschuh testified "that the Department's intent was to allow [sign] permits whenever possible and never prohibit the installation of billboards." From this specific statement of testimony, Petitioners argued that "implementing the intent the Department must look beyond the labels of the zoning and look at the actual primary uses allowed under those designations." (Emphasis added.) Ms. Holschuh disagreed with Petitioners' characterization of the Department's procedures and convincingly maintained that the Department based its denials on "sign site zoning" and factors considered for determining an "unzoned commercial/industrial area" as defined by statute. Continuing with its argument, Petitioners conclude "[T]he department . . . appears to be in conflict with Judge Barbara Staros' decision of February 16, 2004, in a rule challenge proceeding, where she analyzed the Sign Permit procedure under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes." In her Final Order, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros made a Finding of Fact in paragraph 30, stating: Once the local government zoning official certifies that the proposed sign identified in the application is in compliance with the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, the Department does not go behind that certification to look factually at whether the zoning action was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Page 13. The procedures followed by the Department in this proceeding complied with Judge Staros Finding of Fact in paragraph 31, where she wrote: The Department uses the application and the information contained therein to determine whether a proposed sign location falls within the definition of a "commercial or industrial zone." If it does, [fall within] then the Department determines whether those designations were adopted as part of the local government's comprehensive planning efforts or were "primarily" adopted to permit outdoor advertising signs on that location. Page 30. Based upon it's receipt, review, and analysis of the specific facts provided by all parties of interest, the Department determined the sites where the signs were to be erected prohibited commercial or industrial use. The Department factually determined that no local zoning identified the sites as commercial or industrial. The Department concluded correctly and in accord with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052 that these three sign sites were zoned by the City of North Port, the local governmental entity, "primarily to permit outdoor advertising" contrary to sign site permit procedures under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes (2003). Based upon the evidence of record and considering the size of the sign site, the local government's zoning of the site, designated uses of the site, and prohibited uses on the site, denial of the sign applications was correctly determined pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052. Based on the testimonies of Ms. Holschuh and James Duff, who testified regarding his ownership, property taxes paid, and the investors' inability to use the property in question to their economic advantage, Petitioners failed to carry the burden of producing a preponderance of credible evidence to establish that the Department incorrectly and/or wrongfully denied Petitioners' applications for three sign site permits pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, for having no identification on the sign, no valid lease for the sign and no current permit tag.
Findings Of Fact A violation notice was issued to the Respondent, Peterson Outdoor Advertising Company, on June 18, 1976, citing a sign located at .23 miles south of John's Road on U.S. 1, with copy "TOBYS". The violation not ice stated that the Respendent was to violation of Section 479.07(4), Florida Statutes, with no current tag, with the lust tag being 1971; Section 479.07(7), Florida Statutes, with no identifier; Section 479.13, Florida Statutes, with no valid lease. The latest permit tag affixed to the sign is dated 1971. A photograph of the sign taken on the 20th of April, 1977, showed that there was no identifier on the sign. An identifier is the imprint showing the owner of the sign. Subsequent to the taking of the photograph, an identifier was added to the sign showing the Respondent as owner. The Respondent entered into evidence an application for outdoor advertising permit dated March 2, 1977. A sign lease agreement was entered into evidence by the Respondent dated the 15th day of February, 1977, alleged to be a lease agreement from the Florida Conference Association of Seventh Day Adventists for a lease for a term of five years beginning January 1, 1973 and expiring December 31, 1977, for the subject billboard sign. There was confusion as to the ownership of the sign and the sign stood without permit tags subsequent to 1971. No application for permitting of the sign was made until the Respondent made an application for a permit as indicated in the foregoing findings of fact in 1977. The proposed Recommended Order of the Respondent has been considered in the preparation of this order.
Recommendation Remove the subject sign inasmuch as the sign is illegal and in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William D. Rowland, Esquire 115 East Morse Boulevard Post Office Box 539 Winter Park, Florida 32789
The Issue Whether the subject sign of Respondent is a lawful sign for which Respondent should be compensated upon its removal.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, David Grover, owns a V-shaped billboard with a north face and a south face located outside any incorporated city or town 0.14 mile south of State Road 518 on Highway A1A, a federal-aid primary highway, advertising "Sun Harbor Nursery" on both faces of the sign. The nursery advertised on the billboard is a business owned by Respondent located approximately one half mile from the subject sign. (Transcript, page 53.) A violation notice dated July 15, 1981 was Served on Respondent alleging that the subject sign is in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.04(1), Florida Administrative Code, because it was erected without a permit; and that it is also in violation of Section 479.02, Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-10.06(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code, because it is located within 500 feet of a permitted sign. Respondent's father, David Grover, Sr., erected the V-shaped billboard in 1961 without a permit and maintained it until he sold the land on which it is located to his son in 1974. (Transcript, pages 31-35.) No application for a permit from the Petitioner Department was made during the time David Grover, Sr. owned the land and sign or since Respondent owned the property until 1981, when an application was denied because permits had previously been issued for other nearby signs. (Transcript, pages 43 and 46.) There is a distance of approximately 118 feet between the south face of the subject sign and a billboard which bears a permit issued by the Petitioner Department in 1974. There is also a distance of approximately 118 feet between the north face of the subject sign and a billboard which bears a permit issued by the Petitioner Department in 1974. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1; Transcript, pages 14, 15 and 41.) Subsequent to the hearing Respondent admitted that his sign is in violation of the statutes and rules requiring a space of 500 feet from a permitted sign but contends the sign is a lawful sign having been grandfathered by the passage of time since its erection in 1961 and therefore he is entitled to compensation upon its removal. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact, memoranda of law and proposed recommended orders, which were considered in the writing of this order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been adopted in or are inconsistent with factual findings in this order, they have been specifically rejected as being irrelevant or not having been supported by the evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the testimony adduced, the evidence admitted and after consideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation enter its final order directing the removal of the subject sign within thirty (30) days from the date hereof and without compensation to the sign owner. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Peirce Wood, Esquire 542 Hammock Road Melbourne, Florida 32901 Paul N. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the permit for sign installation previously issued by the Department of Transportation is still valid to authorize Petitioner’s sign located on State Road 60 in Pinellas County.
Findings Of Fact The parties entered into two stipulations of fact which are accepted and incorporated herein. Stipulation of Fact #1 reads: The off-premise outdoor advertising billboard structure located at 2815-2817 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida, owned by Allan J. Stowell was lawfully erected under the applicable provisions of the City’s ordinances in the fall of 1981. The City issued building permit number 6361D, dated September 3, 1981, to Stowell to erect the billboard in issue. On August 25, 1985, the City of Clearwater adopted sign regulations which required, among other things, uniformity among signs. City Code Section 44.55(3)(b), required that all billboards on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, east of Highland Avenue, be brought into conformance with the Code provisions by January 19, 1996. On January 19, 1989, the City adopted Ordinance No. 4753-88, regulating signs on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard. Pursuant to that ordinance, the billboard in issue became non-conforming due to its size. Mr. Stowell was allowed a seven-year amortization period which expired on January 19, 1996. By letter dated August 30, 1994, the City advised Mr. Stowell that the billboard in issue would have to be brought into compliance with the provisions of the City’s sign ordinance by January 19, 1996. As a result of the sign regulations adopted by the City in 1985, the billboard in issue was classified thereafter as a legal non-conforming sign, and it was such on November 25, 1995. Stipulation of Fact #2 reads: State Road 60 means that segment of roadway, also known as Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, which is located within the City of Clearwater and is east of Highway 19. The effective date of the national highway system was November 28, 1995, and all references in stipulated exhibits, stipulations, transcripts of depositions, correspondence or other documents which erroneously refer to November 25, 1995, shall be amended to read November 28, 1995, for the purposes of this administrative proceeding. Any reference in this administrative proceeding to the “subject sign,” “billboard,” “off-premise outdoor advertising structure,” “sign,” or other similar designations shall mean the off-premise outdoor advertising billboard structure owned by the Petitioner and located at 2815-2817 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard (State Road 60). On May 22, 1974, State Road 60 was designated a Federal- Aid Primary. On July 1, 1976, State Road 60 was re-designated from a Federal-Aid Primary to a Federal-Aid Urban. Allan J. Stowell was licensed by the Florida Department of Transportation as an outdoor advertiser pursuant to license number 19848, dated October 2, 1981. On or about October 1, 1981, Allan J. Stowell was issued state sign permit numbers AF307-10 and AF308-10, by the Florida Department of Transportation, for the construction, maintenance and operation of the two sign facings on the subject billboard structure. At this point, State Road 60 was not part of the Federal-Aid Primary Highway System within Florida. After 1988, the Department discontinued billing Mr. Stowell because State Road 60 was not a Federal-Aid Primary, Interstate, or a part of the State Highway System outside a municipality. State Road 60 became a part of the national highway system on November 25, 1995. Petitioner, Allan J. Stowell, purchased the property on which the sign in issue is located in 1972. At that time, a sign owned by Foster and Kleiser (F&K), an outdoor advertising firm, was situated on the property. After Petitioner purchased the property, he entered an amended lease agreement with F&K for the use of his property. At that time, the existing sign was permitted by the state. Subsequent to the execution of the amended lease, because he wanted to develop the land and put up his own sign, Mr. Stowell requested that F&K remove their sign from his property, and an agreement to do that was received on August 3, 1981. During his research in preparation for the request for removal, Mr. Stowell spoke with Mr. Andre DeVetter of the Brandon office of the Department of Transportation (DOT). Mr. DeVetter advised him the sign was located adjacent to a Federal Aid Primary Highway, that the property on which the sign was to be located was properly zoned for that purpose, that after removal of the existing sign, Stowell could apply for and receive a permit for a new sign, and that under the terms of the Federal Highway Beautification Act (the Act), Mr. Stowell could not be required to take the sign down without compensation therefor. Based on these assurances, Petitioner borrowed $35,000, placing his home as collateral for the loan, which he used for the construction of the new sign. Before starting construction, however, Mr. Stowell went to the City of Clearwater for both a permit for the construction and a variance to exceed the normal size limitations because his proposed sign was to be bigger than the code calls for by more than 100 square feet. He requested and obtained a permit to construct a 10 by 40-foot sign. The variance was initially denied by the city’s sign approval board, but a subsequent action by the Board of Adjustment granted the variance. Though the minutes of the pertinent meeting of the Board of Adjustment cannot now be found, Mr. Stowell has a letter dated August 21, 1997, from DOT in which the Department agrees that a variance was granted. He also obtained an occupational license to conduct the outdoor sign business. Mr. Stowell constructed the new sign which was permitted by the Department as promised in 1982. He thereafter obtained renewals of the permits for the sign from DOT for calendar years 1983 and 1984 - one for each face. Over the succeeding years, Mr. Stowell did not receive annual renewal notices for the years 1985, 1986, or 1987, and the fees for those years were not initially paid. However, he received a letter in 1988 indicating he was delinquent in certain costs and fees for the permits. When he received that letter, Mr. Stowell sent in a check for the delinquent costs and fees in the amount of $308.00, which covered all delinquent permit fees and a 10 percent delinquency penalty, and believed his delinquencies had been brought current. The Department issued permits to Mr. Stowell for the sign in 1981 and 1982. After the delinquencies were brought current in 1988, Mr. Stowell did not hear anything further from the Department, other than the previously mentioned letter, which noted the sign was now on the Federal Highway System and he needed to obtain permits for it. Since he had previously been issued permits for the sign in 1981 and 1982, and since he had never received any notice that those permits had been revoked, he mistakenly believed his status was acceptable. When Mr. Stowell received the variance from the city for the 14 by 48-foot sign prior to its installation, he advised Mr. DeVetter at the Department’s Brandon office of its granting and was told his status was acceptable. After the City later sent him a letter indicating that the sign had to come down due to a change in the City ordinance, instead of planning to amortize the cost of the sign over the succeeding seven years, he started research into what he needed to do to obtain compensation for the taking as is required by the FHBA. In response, he received a copy of a certificate of sign removal from Reginald N. Millian, the Department’s Outdoor and Property Advertising Inspector, indicating that the sign had been removed by the owner, and that this determination was made based on a personal visit to the site. This was patently in error. The sign had not been removed and, in fact, had been operated and maintained, structurally unchanged, continuously since its construction in 1981. After the Department advised Mr. Stowell of his delinquency in permit fees in September 1988, even after the fees were paid up, due to the change in jurisdiction status, the Department inactivated his permits for this sign, dropped his permit numbers from its permit billing inventory, and did not issue and further billings to him for the previously issued permits. However, the Department did not issue a notice of intent to revoke the two permits, AF307-10 and AF308-10, nor did it in any way advise Mr. Stowell that his permits were no longer valid. Mr. Stowell mistakenly assumed that his sign was validly permitted, even after the City notified him of its status in 1994. After the Department reassumed jurisdiction, by letter dated June 21, 1996, the Department’s District Administrator, Property Management/ODA, Susan L. Rosetti, advised Mr. Stowell that his sign was not permitted and that the sign’s two faces required permits. At this point Mr. Stowell was provided with application forms for the permits and a set of instructions. After receipt of the June 21, 1996, letter, Mr. Stowell contacted Kenneth M. Towcimak, the Director of the Department’s Office of Right-of-Way, to request assistance in obtaining the required permits. In response, Mr. Towcimak advised Mr. Stowell that the permits had been inactivated by the Department, and that because State Road 60, on which the sign was located, was now under the Department’s jurisdiction, he had to obtain a new state permit by January 1, 1997. Towcimak contacted the City to determine the appropriate status of the sign, and as a result of this inquiry, advised Stowell in writing on November 6, 1996, that the Department was precluded by Florida Statute from approving any application for a permit which was not accompanied by a statement from the appropriate local government that the sign complies with all local government requirements, and that the local government will issue a permit upon approval of the application by the Department. Thereafter, On December 31, 1996, Mr. Stowell filed an application with the Department by certified mail. The document reflects it was date stamped in the Department on January 1, 1997, at 4:31 p.m., and again on January 3, 1997, at 1:07 p.m. Since the application Mr. Stowell filed was to reinstate the previously issued permits and not for new permits, he failed to complete a number of the information blocks on the form. On January 21, 1997, the Department issued a Notice of Denied Application for the permits to Mr. Stowell. The denial form reflected the reason for denial was that Mr. Stowell had failed to provide proof of ownership of the billboard, and had provided incorrect information on the application form. The evidence of record indicates that Mr. Stowell did provide the requested proof of ownership of both the billboard and the property on which it is located in his application. One of the City’s previously existing sign ordinances was declared unconstitutional by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on March 23, 1993. Since that time, the City has not enacted a comprehensive sign ordinance, but in 1989 it enacted an ordinance, No. 4753-88, which relates to signs located on SR 60 and which requires those signs on that road which are non- conforming to be brought into conformance or removed within seven years. This provides affected sign owners an opportunity to either bring the sign into conformity with the requirements or amortize the cost of the sign over seven years. Mr. Towcimak, Director of the Department’s Office of Right-of-Way, indicated that when the national highway system under ISTEA came into effect in November 1995, the Department had no inventory of existing signs. As a result, it did not provide notice to the owners of effected signs, and instructed its district offices to accept applications for sign permits through January 1, 1997. The operations of the Department of Transportation are decentralized with policy being set at the headquarters, but the day-to-day operations being determined at each of the eight districts. As to outdoor advertising enforcement, however, while each district handles enforcement, accounting is handled in the central office. In doing so, the Department follows the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which specifies that all permits expire on January 15 of each year. In practice, the advertiser is billed by October 1 of each year and is furnished a list of all permits shown by the Department records to be held by that permittee, along with a bill for all fees owed. If the Department records do not reflect an active permit for a particular sign, no billing will go out for that sign. Petitioner’s instant application for permit reflects it was timely received in the pertinent Department office. It is general practice within the Department for the District Outdoor Advertising Administrator to review the application and decide whether to grant or deny the permit. Thereafter, the application is forwarded to the central office for final check prior to issuance of the metal tag. It is Department practice to issue or deny the permit within 30 days of receipt of the application, as mandated by statute. When an application for a permit for an outdoor sign is received by the Department it is agency practice to review it for completeness. If the application is complete, a decision is made whether to approve or disapprove the application. If the application is incomplete, it is returned to the applicant without decision. However, if an application is incomplete, but it is apparent that, even if complete, the application would not be approved, that application will be returned “denied” rather than “incomplete.” There are several requirements which must be satisfied before an application may be approved. One of these is that the applicant submit a statement from the local government that the proposed sign would comply with local sign regulations, as required by Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes. If an application is received by the Department without this element being present, the Department may either return the application as incomplete or, if it appears the sign does not comply with local sign regulations, deny the application. The “Harmony of Regulations” provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, prohibits the state from issuing a permit where local government does not approve the sign, and prohibits local governments from issuing a sign permit where the Department does not approve. Consistent with that direction, when Petitioner contacted Mr. Towcimak to request guidance in the permitting process, and outlined his problem regarding the City’s position, Mr. Towcimak contacted the City to find out where that entity stood. On two separate occasions, the City advised the Department in writing that Petitioner’s existing sign was illegal and it would not grant permission for the Department to issue a sign permit. When that information was received by the Department, Petitioner was advised of the City’s position and that the permit would not be issued as a result.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying Petitioner permits for the maintenance of the signs in issue, and denying compensation for their removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Livingston & Associates, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Diedre Grubbs 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue There are two separate issues in this case: (1) Whether Petitioner breached its contract with Respondent by not making payments for a sign lease, thereby resulting in the sign permit becoming invalid; and (2) Whether Petitioner constructed a roadside sign illegally, i.e., without a permit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, SG Outdoor, is a company engaged in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida. Respondent is the State of Florida ("State") agency responsible for monitoring compliance with State and Federal laws relating to outdoor advertising. According to those laws, signs within 660 feet of primary or interstate roadways visible from those roadways are subject to advertising regulations. There is currently a 1,500-foot spacing requirement (up from 1,000 feet in 1984) between signs. Further, signs must be located on land zoned for commercial and industrial use. Petitioner owns two signs which are at issue in this proceeding. One of the signs is a single facing sign of wood construction with a seven-foot height above ground level. The sign is assigned Tag No. AU557. The sign is situated just off Interstate 4, .871 miles east of State Road 33 in Polk County, Florida. This sign will be referred to herein as the "Original Sign." The Original Sign was built in 1971 and was located, at all times relevant hereto, on land owned by Mrs. Ona Grimes until that land was purchased by the State in October 2002. Petitioner also constructed another sign at approximately the same location. This sign, referred to herein as the "New Sign," has a double-faced, single-metal pole and is considerably higher in height than the Original Sign. Both the Original Sign and the New Sign are located on property which DOT contends is zoned as "Pasture, with residence." However, Polk County did away with its zoning ordinance in March 2000 and replaced it with Land Use Districts. The current Land Use District designation for the site is Business Park Center (within the Green Swamp Area of Critical State Concern). There was no competent testimony at final hearing as to whether that designation constitutes commercial or industrial zoning for purposes of roadside signs. The Original Sign was purchased by Petitioner in 1991 and was located on the Grimes property. Petitioner entered into a Ground Lease with Grimes that had a term of 30 years at a payment of $1,500 per year. In 2002, DOT entered into negotiations with Grimes to purchase the property. When DOT purchases property on which a roadside sign already exists, DOT may take the sign by way of condemnation through eminent domain (sometimes referred to by DOT as a "Take"). In such cases, the State must reasonably compensate the sign owner for the taking of its sign. In the alternative, the State may assume the sign lease and become a lessor to the sign owner. In that case, the sign owner must make its lease payments directly to the State. On May 22, 2002, DOT sent a letter to Petitioner explaining that DOT was in the process of acquiring the right of way on which the Original Sign was located. DOT offered to purchase (or Take) the sign from Petitioner for $17,300. While that offer to Petitioner was pending, DOT went forward with the purchase of the Grimes property. The purchase agreement for the property was signed by Grimes on July 11, 2002. Four days later, a letter from DOT to Petitioner was issued which said: Subsequent to receiving agreement and signed ODA [out door advertising] disclaimer from the property owner, an offer has been made to SG Outdoor, Inc. for the purchase of the ODA structure. Negotiations are ongoing. However, the purchase of Grimes property did not occur immediately. Meanwhile, in August 2002, Grimes entered into an illegal lease with Lamar Advertising, giving Lamar the same rights it had already contracted away to Petitioner. Petitioner was unaware of the lease with Lamar at that time. Such a lease would have been in violation of the already-existing lease between Grimes and Petitioner. At almost the same time, a DOT memorandum indicated that DOT was still "involved in ongoing negotiations" with Petitioner concerning the sign. The Grimes property purchase (by DOT) finally closed on October 1, 2002, at which time DOT became the owner of the Grimes property. Because of this fact, Petitioner was supposed to make its annual lease payments to the State of Florida ("State") as the new owner. Stated differently, the State became Petitioner's new lessor. On October 14, 2002, Lamar Advertising filed a Sign Permit Application with the Polk County Building Division. The application was for approval of its sign on the Grimes property. The application included a copy of Lamar's lease with Grimes; the lease had a 10-year period and a payment of $4,000 per year.1 On July 8, 2003 (ten months after DOT purchased the property), Petitioner filed a permit application with Polk County for the New Sign. Petitioner did not, at that time, have permission from DOT to erect a new sign, but believed it could obtain that permission after the fact. Petitioner then went forward with the construction of the New Sign. Meanwhile, Petitioner sent Grimes a check in October 2003, for its lease payment for the period June 1, 2003, through May 30, 2004. By that time, the State already owned the Grimes property. A member of the Grimes family sent Petitioner's check back to Petitioner in January 2004, explaining that all payments should be made directly to the State. There is no evidence in the record as to whether Petitioner attempted to make a lease payment to the Department at that time or at any other time. In November 2003, DOT issued a certified letter to Petitioner addressing Sign Permit No. AU557 that said: On October 2, 2002, the above referenced parcel was purchased by the Florida Department of Transportation. Although the Department will honor an existing lease, it will not engage in any new lease agreements nor grant permission for the referenced sign to remain. Since any potential oral agreement with the previous owner has expired, the Department requests that the [Original] sign be removed. Clearly DOT was mistaken. Petitioner had a written, not oral, lease with the prior owner. In response, Petitioner sent DOT a copy of its Ground Lease with Grimes. At that time, Petitioner also asked for a meeting with DOT's acquisition director to continue negotiating a fair price for the Original Sign. Several months later (on July 9, 2004), DOT issued its Notice of Violation regarding the Original Sign. The notice said "that the outdoor advertising sign referenced above has been acquired by the Department" (rather than saying the Department had purchased the land). The notice directed Petitioner to immediately remove the sign from the premises. The notice was partially in error; DOT had actually acquired the land, not the sign. Petitioner was in breach of its lease with the State by failing to make lease payments as required by the lease which DOT had assumed. However, it is unclear as to whether, upon notice of receipt of the written lease, DOT had ever advised Petitioner to send its lease payments directly to the Department. The Notice of Administrative Hearing Rights attached to the DOT Notice of Violation indicates a deadline of 30 days from receipt of the Notice for filing such a request, i.e., on or about August 10, 2005. Petitioner responded to the Notice with another letter (dated July 14, 2009) explaining again that it had a valid lease with Grimes for the sign location. Petitioner's letter asked DOT to abate its violation notice and reinstate Petitioner's permit. It also stated that "[i]f the State decides not to acknowledge the Judicial process [the ongoing probate dispute with the Grimes family concerning the lease with Lamar] and still proceeds with the Notice of Violation, then upon receiving your next correspondence, we will exercise our privilege to request an administrative hearing." Petitioner contends that the quoted statement constituted its request for an administrative hearing. However, the plain reading of the statement indicates that it is a statement of future intent based upon future actions by DOT. DOT then issued a letter dated August 10, 2004, to Petitioner explaining that the permit for the Original Sign had been revoked. The letter directed Petitioner to remove the sign. The letter stated that if Petitioner does not do so, then DOT would have the right to remove the sign. (As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, the sign was still in place.) The August 10 letter, in response to Petitioner's July 14 letter, appears to be the "next correspondence" Petitioner had requested. The exercise of its right to an administrative hearing would, therefore, be due on or about September 11, 2004. On September 8, 2004, Petitioner sent a letter to Holschuh declining DOT's offer to purchase the Original Sign for $17,000. That offer had been made in May 2002.2 This letter suggests a counter-offer of $82,500 as the purchase price. The letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to an administrative hearing. Holschuh responded that she was not involved in acquisitions, and Petitioner should contact the district office (with whom Petitioner had previously negotiated). Instead of heeding Holschuh's directions, Petitioner then sent her another letter asking her to send the correspondence on to someone in the acquisition division. The new letter also repeats the counter-offer of $82,500. This letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to a formal hearing, either. About one year later, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued another Notice of Violation, this one addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a (which Holschuh at final hearing said referred to the Original Sign, although there was no "a" nomenclature on the July 9, 2004, Notice of Violation). Also, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued a Notice of Violation addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, which Holschuh said referred to Petitioner's New Sign, even though no permit for the New Sign had ever been issued by DOT. The New Sign by this time had been completed and was being used for outdoor advertising. Petitioner understands the need for a permit to construct a new outdoor sign on the State road right-of-ways, but opined that it believed it could do so after the fact. Petitioner has only obtained approval from Polk County for erecting the sign, an event necessary for construction purposes, but irrelevant to DOT requirements. In the letter to DOT from Petitioner dated October 26, 2005 (and presumably accepted by DOT as Petitioner's request for a formal hearing), reference is made to Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, i.e., the New Sign. However, the letter addresses the Original Sign and its perceived value by Petitioner. It is patently unclear as to which sign is actually being addressed, but facts surrounding both signs were presented at final hearing and both have been addressed herein. Nonetheless, Petitioner's October 26, 2005, letter was submitted within 30 days of the latest Notice of Violation and was presumably intended to invoke Petitioner's right to a formal administrative hearing. This letter was then forwarded to DOAH by DOT in March 2009, for the purpose of conducting the hearing. (No evidence was presented as to why the DOT's cover letter and Petitioner's request for hearing were not submitted to DOAH until three-and-a-half years after the letter was written.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Transportation, reversing the revocation of Sign Permit No. AU557 and providing Petitioner, SG Outdoor, just compensation for that sign. Further, the final order should deem the newly constructed sign on the same site to be unauthorized and order its removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2009.
