The Issue Whether Petitioner's outdoor advertising sign permit applications should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the parties' Prehearing Stipulation (which contains a "Statement of Admitted Facts"),1 and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner's Signs On or after July 21, 1998, Petitioner filed outdoor advertising sign permit applications for two signs2 (Petitioner's Signs) located on property it owns on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of I-95, one-half mile south of Northlake Boulevard, and north of Blue Heron Boulevard, in Palm Beach County, Florida. This area of I-95 has been a part of the interstate highway system since at least August of 1967. Palm Beach County is the local governmental entity with authority to adopt a comprehensive land use designation for the property on which Petitioner's Signs are located (Property). From the time the Signs were erected in 1987, through the present, the Property (on which Petitioner conducts no business activities) has been zoned or designated for residential, not predominantly commercial or industrial, use. Petitioner's Signs, each of which exceeds eight square feet in area, contain advertising messages for Petitioner. The messages can be read without visual aid by motorists of normal acuity traveling on I-95. Previously, the Signs indicated the Property was for sale, but they have not been used for such purpose since December 14, 1994. The Department denied Petitioner's permit applications because the Signs are located in an "unpermittable land use designation" inasmuch as the Property is designated for residential, not predominately commercial or industrial, use. Other Signs Subsequent to December 8, 1971, the effective date of Chapter 71-971, Laws of Florida,3 the Department has issued and/or renewed outdoor advertising sign permits for other signs located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, notwithstanding these signs' location in areas not designated primarily for commercial or industrial use. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AZ346-35, AZ347-35, AY935-35, AY936-35, AY937-35, and AY938-35. Among these signs are six signs (three sign structures with two facings each) that, like Petitioner's Signs, are located on the west side of I-95, south of Northlake Boulevard and north of Blue Heron Boulevard, in an area designated for residential, not predominantly commercial or industrial, use. The Department has annually renewed the sign permits for these signs since at least 1973. The 1974 annual permit renewals are the earliest records the Department has for these signs. (The Department has neither an original, nor a copy of, the initial applications or the initial permits, for these signs.) The signs currently have the following permit numbers: AZ346-35, AZ347-35, AY935-35, AY936-35, AY937-35, and AY938-35. According to Palm Beach County Building records, these signs were all constructed before January 27, 1972, and four of the signs were constructed in the late 1960's (in or sometime after July of 1968). These signs are in the same location as when originally permitted, and that location has been zoned or designated for residential use since before the time the signs were constructed and permitted. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AN661-35 and BG910-35 Two signs (one sign structure with two facings) located within 660 feet of the westerly right-of-way of I-95, south of Forest Hill Boulevard and north or Seventeenth Avenue North, in Palm Beach County, Florida, were permitted by the Department in August of 1984. This area of I-95 has been a part of the interstate highway system since at least April of 1976. The two signs were erected after August of 1984. They currently are assigned permit numbers AN661-35 and BG910-35. The initial outdoor advertising sign permit applications that were filed with the Department for these signs (in August of 1984), unlike the applications submitted by Petitioner in the instant case, indicated that the signs were to be located in an area that was "commercial or industrial zoned." On each application, the applicant "certif[ied] that the statements made and the information given in this application [were] true and correct." In accordance with the Department's standard operating procedure, a review of these applications was conducted by Department staff and the information contained therein, including that relating to the zoning of the area in which the signs were to be located, was determined to be accurate. Accordingly, the permits were issued. Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing in this case, it appears that, contrary to the determination made by the Department, the zoning information provided by the applicant was inaccurate inasmuch as the area in which the signs were to be located was actually (and still is) an unzoned residential area. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AX549 and AX550 State Road 80 in Section 35, Township 43 South, Range 40 East, in Palm Beach County, Florida, has been part of the federal-aid primary system since at least January of 1973. There are two signs (one sign structure with two facings) that are located within 660 feet of the right-of-way of State Road 80 in Section 35, Township 43 South, Range 40 East, in Palm Beach County, Florida, in an area not designated for predominately commercial or industrial use (State Road 80 Signs). These signs currently are assigned permit numbers AX549 and AX550. The Department issued sign permits for the predecessors of the State Road 80 Signs (Predecessor Signs) on April 15, 1979. An examination of the initial outdoor advertising sign permit applications filed with the Department (in April of 1979) for the Predecessor Signs reveals that each application has the entry "8/67" in the space for showing the "date [the sign is] to be erected,"4 and has the handwritten notation, "grandfathered," on that portion of the application to be filled out by the Department. The Department uses the term "grandfathered" to refer to signs which existed legally prior to a change in the law rendering them nonconforming, but which, notwithstanding such change, are still treated as lawful (albeit nonconforming) signs. The Department has a policy of permitting or "grandfathering" signs that existed (in compliance with the then- existing law) prior to the effective date of the aforementioned January 27, 1972, agreement between the State of Florida and the United States Department of Transportation (which is referenced in Section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes), provided no changes are made to the signs. The State Road 80 Signs are in the same general location (but not the identical location) where the Predecessor Signs were located, and all of the property in that general location is now, and has been since before the Predecessor Signs were permitted, zoned or designated for some use other than commercial or industrial. In 1986, the property on which the Predecessor Signs were located was acquired (for $42,000.00, excluding attorney's fees and costs) by the Department as a result of a settlement reached by the Department and the property owner in an eminent domain proceeding. In recommending (in writing) that the Department settle the matter, the Department's trial attorney stated the following with respect to the Predecessor Signs: The settlement figure of $42,000.00 dollars is a reasonable Award in light of the real estate and severance damages. Due to the specific difficulties involved in this matter, for instance the importance of a particular type of advertising sign combined with the fact that this advertising sign was grandfathered in and since the sign has been put up, restrictions had occurred in Palm Beach County which would have prevented a similar sign from being put up. Accordingly all parties had to work within the constraints of the original sign location with slight adjustment and renovation in order to make effectively a new sign into a renovated sign for purposes of seeking whatever variance. As the trial attorney had suggested in his written recommendation, the Predecessor Signs, with the Department's approval, had been removed from their original location and reconstructed (in or about June of 1986) on a part of the property that was not subject to the eminent domain proceeding. Signs Along the Florida Turnpike State Road 91 (the Florida Turnpike) in Palm Beach County, Florida, was designated as a part of the National Highway System by the United States Congress on November 28, 1995. It thereupon was deemed by the Department to be a part of the federal-aid primary highway system in the state. Before November 28, 1995, starting at least as early as 1973, the Department had issued at least 95 sign permits for signs located in Palm Beach County, which were within 660 feet of the Florida Turnpike right-of-way and not located in areas zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use at the time the permits were issued. Many, or all, of these signs are still in areas not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use. With the concurrence of the Federal Highway Administration, the Department did not require signs along the Florida Turnpike to meet the requirements applicable to signs located along federal-aid primary highway system roadways, provided a permit application for these signs was received by the Department prior to July 1, 1996. A sign located within 660 feet of the edge of the westerly right-of-way of the Florida Turnpike, south of Forest Hill Boulevard and north of Lake Worth Road (State Road 802), in Palm Beach County, Florida, was issued outdoor advertising sign permit number BM818 by the Department on May 28, 1996. The application for this permit had been received by the Department on May 8, 1996. At the time of the issuance of the permit, the sign was located in an area not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use. The sign is presently in the same location, which continues to be not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying Petitioner's applications for outdoor advertising sign permits for his Signs. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1999.
The Issue The issue in these causes is whether denial of Petitioners' outdoor advertising sign site permit applications by Respondent were correctly determined under Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), on the basis that the sign sites were unzoned commercial/industrial areas; and on the basis that within attending factual circumstances, the sign site did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial areas as defined in Subsection 479.01(23), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Tropical Landholdings, a Florida Corporation, was created in 1998 and purchased approximately 700 to 800 acres of land comprised of residential multi-family and commercial properties along Interstate 75 (I-75) in Punta Gorda, Florida. On September 8, 2003, Petitioner, Crown Advertising, Inc., of Belleview, Florida, submitted three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications to the Department for review. On September 23, 2003, the Department denied the three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign sites were not permitted under the local land use designation of site (§ 479.111(2), Fla. Stat. (2003)); and (2) the sign sites did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area. § 479.01, Fla. Stat. (2003). The sign site permit application forms used by Petitioners in these causes were composed and authorized by the Department. The form required the applicant to obtain and provide information regarding the proposed sign site, what is proposed to be constructed on the site, and where the proposed construction is to occur. The sign site permit applications also required the applicant to secure information from the appropriate local zoning official of the future land use designation and the current zoning of the proposed sites enacted by the local government's Comprehensive Plan and land use development regulations. This form required information from the local government as to whether the applicant is or is not in compliance with all adopted local ordinances. Permission to erect an outdoor sign structure on the identified sign site is subject to approval by the City. Petitioners complied with the requested information. The local government, the City of North Port, approved the three sign site permit applications in question and granted Petitioners permission to erect three outdoor billboard signs. This local grant of approval was then subjected to concurring approval by the Department. After receiving the sign site permits that were approved by the City, the Department engaged the services of a consultant to conduct on-site review and identification of: (1) the local government's designation for each proposed sign site; (2) the permitted uses of each proposed sign site (local drainage facilities, pipeline corridors, underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs); and (3) a review of adjacent and surrounding parcels. The consultant reported to the Department the factual circumstances attendant the three locally approved sign sites. It should be noted that the consultant did not render an opinion regarding the Department's approval or denial of the sign site permit applications. The sign sites in question were zoned under the local "land use designation" of the City of North Port's Ordinance 02-46, Section 53.146 (Ordinance 02-46), as a "utility industrial corridor." The zoned land was composed of strips of land measuring 25 to 70 feet in width on the west side and 160 to 170 feet in width on the east side. The "permitted governmental uses" of a parcel zoned as a "utility industrial corridor," included such uses as underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs. Ordinance 02-46, under the title "Prohibited Uses and Structures," specifically prohibits "all commercial and industrial uses." Based upon a review of all information provided by Petitioners, the local government, and its consultant, the Department first determined the three sign sites on which the subject signs were to be erected and located, prohibited commercial or industrial uses. The Department then determined, based upon an analysis of the materials provided by its consultant and the City of North Port, the three sign sites in question had not been zoned for commercial or industrial uses as a part of the local government's comprehensive zoning plan. Based upon (1) the prohibition of commercial or industrial uses and (2) no commercial or industrial zoning of the sign sites, the Department concluded these three sign sites were zoned "primarily to permit outdoor advertising," a prohibited function. The denials were required. Under the local land use designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included local drainage facilities and a pipeline corridor. Under governmental uses designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising. However, Ordinance 02-46 specifically prohibits all commercial and industrial uses under the governmental uses designation. When questioned by Petitioners, Ms. Holschuh testified "that the Department's intent was to allow [sign] permits whenever possible and never prohibit the installation of billboards." From this specific statement of testimony, Petitioners argued that "implementing the intent the Department must look beyond the labels of the zoning and look at the actual primary uses allowed under those designations." (Emphasis added.) Ms. Holschuh disagreed with Petitioners' characterization of the Department's procedures and convincingly maintained that the Department based its denials on "sign site zoning" and factors considered for determining an "unzoned commercial/industrial area" as defined by statute. Continuing with its argument, Petitioners conclude "[T]he department . . . appears to be in conflict with Judge Barbara Staros' decision of February 16, 2004, in a rule challenge proceeding, where she analyzed the Sign Permit procedure under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes." In her Final Order, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros made a Finding of Fact in paragraph 30, stating: Once the local government zoning official certifies that the proposed sign identified in the application is in compliance with the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, the Department does not go behind that certification to look factually at whether the zoning action was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Page 13. The procedures followed by the Department in this proceeding complied with Judge Staros Finding of Fact in paragraph 31, where she wrote: The Department uses the application and the information contained therein to determine whether a proposed sign location falls within the definition of a "commercial or industrial zone." If it does, [fall within] then the Department determines whether those designations were adopted as part of the local government's comprehensive planning efforts or were "primarily" adopted to permit outdoor advertising signs on that location. Page 30. Based upon it's receipt, review, and analysis of the specific facts provided by all parties of interest, the Department determined the sites where the signs were to be erected prohibited commercial or industrial use. The Department factually determined that no local zoning identified the sites as commercial or industrial. The Department concluded correctly and in accord with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052 that these three sign sites were zoned by the City of North Port, the local governmental entity, "primarily to permit outdoor advertising" contrary to sign site permit procedures under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes (2003). Based upon the evidence of record and considering the size of the sign site, the local government's zoning of the site, designated uses of the site, and prohibited uses on the site, denial of the sign applications was correctly determined pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052. Based on the testimonies of Ms. Holschuh and James Duff, who testified regarding his ownership, property taxes paid, and the investors' inability to use the property in question to their economic advantage, Petitioners failed to carry the burden of producing a preponderance of credible evidence to establish that the Department incorrectly and/or wrongfully denied Petitioners' applications for three sign site permits pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052.
The Issue Whether Respondent's sign displays lights in violation of Section 479.11(5), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The sign that is the subject of the notice of violation issued by the Department is a "sign" as defined by 479.01(14), Florida Statutes. The sign is located within 100 feet of the right-of-way of U.S. Highway 17. The sign is visible from U.S. Highway 17. U.S. Highway 17 is part of the State Highway System. U.S. Highway 17 is part of the federal-aid primary highway system. The lights in question are contained in a panel at the top of the sign. The lights in question are visible through openings in a panel at the top of the sign. The lights in question are visible from U.S. Highway 17. Prior to September 25, 1992, the lights in question were being automatically turned on and off on a regular cycle. The lights in question were flashing at regular two-second intervals. After September 25, 1992, Central Florida changed the lights in question to remain lighted in a steady manner. Subsequently, Central Florida returned the lights to their earlier state and they are now flashing as they were before. The lights in question are not part of, nor do they illuminate, a written message on the sign. The lights in question have never been part of, nor have they illuminated, a written message on the sign. The photograph of the sign attached to the joint motion is an accurate photograph of the sign in question.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent's sign to be in violation of Section 479.011(5), Florida Statutes, and directing Respondent to remove those intermittent lights forthwith from his sign or change the lights to fixed instead of flashing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of April 1993. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Robert L. Valentine, Esquire Post Office Box 2538 Lakeland, Florida 33806-2538 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the permit for sign installation previously issued by the Department of Transportation is still valid to authorize Petitioner’s sign located on State Road 60 in Pinellas County.
Findings Of Fact The parties entered into two stipulations of fact which are accepted and incorporated herein. Stipulation of Fact #1 reads: The off-premise outdoor advertising billboard structure located at 2815-2817 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida, owned by Allan J. Stowell was lawfully erected under the applicable provisions of the City’s ordinances in the fall of 1981. The City issued building permit number 6361D, dated September 3, 1981, to Stowell to erect the billboard in issue. On August 25, 1985, the City of Clearwater adopted sign regulations which required, among other things, uniformity among signs. City Code Section 44.55(3)(b), required that all billboards on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, east of Highland Avenue, be brought into conformance with the Code provisions by January 19, 1996. On January 19, 1989, the City adopted Ordinance No. 4753-88, regulating signs on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard. Pursuant to that ordinance, the billboard in issue became non-conforming due to its size. Mr. Stowell was allowed a seven-year amortization period which expired on January 19, 1996. By letter dated August 30, 1994, the City advised Mr. Stowell that the billboard in issue would have to be brought into compliance with the provisions of the City’s sign ordinance by January 19, 1996. As a result of the sign regulations adopted by the City in 1985, the billboard in issue was classified thereafter as a legal non-conforming sign, and it was such on November 25, 1995. Stipulation of Fact #2 reads: State Road 60 means that segment of roadway, also known as Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, which is located within the City of Clearwater and is east of Highway 19. The effective date of the national highway system was November 28, 1995, and all references in stipulated exhibits, stipulations, transcripts of depositions, correspondence or other documents which erroneously refer to November 25, 1995, shall be amended to read November 28, 1995, for the purposes of this administrative proceeding. Any reference in this administrative proceeding to the “subject sign,” “billboard,” “off-premise outdoor advertising structure,” “sign,” or other similar designations shall mean the off-premise outdoor advertising billboard structure owned by the Petitioner and located at 2815-2817 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard (State Road 60). On May 22, 1974, State Road 60 was designated a Federal- Aid Primary. On July 1, 1976, State Road 60 was re-designated from a Federal-Aid Primary to a Federal-Aid Urban. Allan J. Stowell was licensed by the Florida Department of Transportation as an outdoor advertiser pursuant to license number 19848, dated October 2, 1981. On or about October 1, 1981, Allan J. Stowell was issued state sign permit numbers AF307-10 and AF308-10, by the Florida Department of Transportation, for the construction, maintenance and operation of the two sign facings on the subject billboard structure. At this point, State Road 60 was not part of the Federal-Aid Primary Highway System within Florida. After 1988, the Department discontinued billing Mr. Stowell because State Road 60 was not a Federal-Aid Primary, Interstate, or a part of the State Highway System outside a municipality. State Road 60 became a part of the national highway system on November 25, 1995. Petitioner, Allan J. Stowell, purchased the property on which the sign in issue is located in 1972. At that time, a sign owned by Foster and Kleiser (F&K), an outdoor advertising firm, was situated on the property. After Petitioner purchased the property, he entered an amended lease agreement with F&K for the use of his property. At that time, the existing sign was permitted by the state. Subsequent to the execution of the amended lease, because he wanted to develop the land and put up his own sign, Mr. Stowell requested that F&K remove their sign from his property, and an agreement to do that was received on August 3, 1981. During his research in preparation for the request for removal, Mr. Stowell spoke with Mr. Andre DeVetter of the Brandon office of the Department of Transportation (DOT). Mr. DeVetter advised him the sign was located adjacent to a Federal Aid Primary Highway, that the property on which the sign was to be located was properly zoned for that purpose, that after removal of the existing sign, Stowell could apply for and receive a permit for a new sign, and that under the terms of the Federal Highway Beautification Act (the Act), Mr. Stowell could not be required to take the sign down without compensation therefor. Based on these assurances, Petitioner borrowed $35,000, placing his home as collateral for the loan, which he used for the construction of the new sign. Before starting construction, however, Mr. Stowell went to the City of Clearwater for both a permit for the construction and a variance to exceed the normal size limitations because his proposed sign was to be bigger than the code calls for by more than 100 square feet. He requested and obtained a permit to construct a 10 by 40-foot sign. The variance was initially denied by the city’s sign approval board, but a subsequent action by the Board of Adjustment granted the variance. Though the minutes of the pertinent meeting of the Board of Adjustment cannot now be found, Mr. Stowell has a letter dated August 21, 1997, from DOT in which the Department agrees that a variance was granted. He also obtained an occupational license to conduct the outdoor sign business. Mr. Stowell constructed the new sign which was permitted by the Department as promised in 1982. He thereafter obtained renewals of the permits for the sign from DOT for calendar years 1983 and 1984 - one for each face. Over the succeeding years, Mr. Stowell did not receive annual renewal notices for the years 1985, 1986, or 1987, and the fees for those years were not initially paid. However, he received a letter in 1988 indicating he was delinquent in certain costs and fees for the permits. When he received that letter, Mr. Stowell sent in a check for the delinquent costs and fees in the amount of $308.00, which covered all delinquent permit fees and a 10 percent delinquency penalty, and believed his delinquencies had been brought current. The Department issued permits to Mr. Stowell for the sign in 1981 and 1982. After the delinquencies were brought current in 1988, Mr. Stowell did not hear anything further from the Department, other than the previously mentioned letter, which noted the sign was now on the Federal Highway System and he needed to obtain permits for it. Since he had previously been issued permits for the sign in 1981 and 1982, and since he had never received any notice that those permits had been revoked, he mistakenly believed his status was acceptable. When Mr. Stowell received the variance from the city for the 14 by 48-foot sign prior to its installation, he advised Mr. DeVetter at the Department’s Brandon office of its granting and was told his status was acceptable. After the City later sent him a letter indicating that the sign had to come down due to a change in the City ordinance, instead of planning to amortize the cost of the sign over the succeeding seven years, he started research into what he needed to do to obtain compensation for the taking as is required by the FHBA. In response, he received a copy of a certificate of sign removal from Reginald N. Millian, the Department’s Outdoor and Property Advertising Inspector, indicating that the sign had been removed by the owner, and that this determination was made based on a personal visit to the site. This was patently in error. The sign had not been removed and, in fact, had been operated and maintained, structurally unchanged, continuously since its construction in 1981. After the Department advised Mr. Stowell of his delinquency in permit fees in September 1988, even after the fees were paid up, due to the change in jurisdiction status, the Department inactivated his permits for this sign, dropped his permit numbers from its permit billing inventory, and did not issue and further billings to him for the previously issued permits. However, the Department did not issue a notice of intent to revoke the two permits, AF307-10 and AF308-10, nor did it in any way advise Mr. Stowell that his permits were no longer valid. Mr. Stowell mistakenly assumed that his sign was validly permitted, even after the City notified him of its status in 1994. After the Department reassumed jurisdiction, by letter dated June 21, 1996, the Department’s District Administrator, Property Management/ODA, Susan L. Rosetti, advised Mr. Stowell that his sign was not permitted and that the sign’s two faces required permits. At this point Mr. Stowell was provided with application forms for the permits and a set of instructions. After receipt of the June 21, 1996, letter, Mr. Stowell contacted Kenneth M. Towcimak, the Director of the Department’s Office of Right-of-Way, to request assistance in obtaining the required permits. In response, Mr. Towcimak advised Mr. Stowell that the permits had been inactivated by the Department, and that because State Road 60, on which the sign was located, was now under the Department’s jurisdiction, he had to obtain a new state permit by January 1, 1997. Towcimak contacted the City to determine the appropriate status of the sign, and as a result of this inquiry, advised Stowell in writing on November 6, 1996, that the Department was precluded by Florida Statute from approving any application for a permit which was not accompanied by a statement from the appropriate local government that the sign complies with all local government requirements, and that the local government will issue a permit upon approval of the application by the Department. Thereafter, On December 31, 1996, Mr. Stowell filed an application with the Department by certified mail. The document reflects it was date stamped in the Department on January 1, 1997, at 4:31 p.m., and again on January 3, 1997, at 1:07 p.m. Since the application Mr. Stowell filed was to reinstate the previously issued permits and not for new permits, he failed to complete a number of the information blocks on the form. On January 21, 1997, the Department issued a Notice of Denied Application for the permits to Mr. Stowell. The denial form reflected the reason for denial was that Mr. Stowell had failed to provide proof of ownership of the billboard, and had provided incorrect information on the application form. The evidence of record indicates that Mr. Stowell did provide the requested proof of ownership of both the billboard and the property on which it is located in his application. One of the City’s previously existing sign ordinances was declared unconstitutional by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on March 23, 1993. Since that time, the City has not enacted a comprehensive sign ordinance, but in 1989 it enacted an ordinance, No. 4753-88, which relates to signs located on SR 60 and which requires those signs on that road which are non- conforming to be brought into conformance or removed within seven years. This provides affected sign owners an opportunity to either bring the sign into conformity with the requirements or amortize the cost of the sign over seven years. Mr. Towcimak, Director of the Department’s Office of Right-of-Way, indicated that when the national highway system under ISTEA came into effect in November 1995, the Department had no inventory of existing signs. As a result, it did not provide notice to the owners of effected signs, and instructed its district offices to accept applications for sign permits through January 1, 1997. The operations of the Department of Transportation are decentralized with policy being set at the headquarters, but the day-to-day operations being determined at each of the eight districts. As to outdoor advertising enforcement, however, while each district handles enforcement, accounting is handled in the central office. In doing so, the Department follows the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which specifies that all permits expire on January 15 of each year. In practice, the advertiser is billed by October 1 of each year and is furnished a list of all permits shown by the Department records to be held by that permittee, along with a bill for all fees owed. If the Department records do not reflect an active permit for a particular sign, no billing will go out for that sign. Petitioner’s instant application for permit reflects it was timely received in the pertinent Department office. It is general practice within the Department for the District Outdoor Advertising Administrator to review the application and decide whether to grant or deny the permit. Thereafter, the application is forwarded to the central office for final check prior to issuance of the metal tag. It is Department practice to issue or deny the permit within 30 days of receipt of the application, as mandated by statute. When an application for a permit for an outdoor sign is received by the Department it is agency practice to review it for completeness. If the application is complete, a decision is made whether to approve or disapprove the application. If the application is incomplete, it is returned to the applicant without decision. However, if an application is incomplete, but it is apparent that, even if complete, the application would not be approved, that application will be returned “denied” rather than “incomplete.” There are several requirements which must be satisfied before an application may be approved. One of these is that the applicant submit a statement from the local government that the proposed sign would comply with local sign regulations, as required by Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes. If an application is received by the Department without this element being present, the Department may either return the application as incomplete or, if it appears the sign does not comply with local sign regulations, deny the application. The “Harmony of Regulations” provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, prohibits the state from issuing a permit where local government does not approve the sign, and prohibits local governments from issuing a sign permit where the Department does not approve. Consistent with that direction, when Petitioner contacted Mr. Towcimak to request guidance in the permitting process, and outlined his problem regarding the City’s position, Mr. Towcimak contacted the City to find out where that entity stood. On two separate occasions, the City advised the Department in writing that Petitioner’s existing sign was illegal and it would not grant permission for the Department to issue a sign permit. When that information was received by the Department, Petitioner was advised of the City’s position and that the permit would not be issued as a result.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying Petitioner permits for the maintenance of the signs in issue, and denying compensation for their removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Livingston & Associates, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Diedre Grubbs 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue There are two separate issues in this case: (1) Whether Petitioner breached its contract with Respondent by not making payments for a sign lease, thereby resulting in the sign permit becoming invalid; and (2) Whether Petitioner constructed a roadside sign illegally, i.e., without a permit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, SG Outdoor, is a company engaged in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida. Respondent is the State of Florida ("State") agency responsible for monitoring compliance with State and Federal laws relating to outdoor advertising. According to those laws, signs within 660 feet of primary or interstate roadways visible from those roadways are subject to advertising regulations. There is currently a 1,500-foot spacing requirement (up from 1,000 feet in 1984) between signs. Further, signs must be located on land zoned for commercial and industrial use. Petitioner owns two signs which are at issue in this proceeding. One of the signs is a single facing sign of wood construction with a seven-foot height above ground level. The sign is assigned Tag No. AU557. The sign is situated just off Interstate 4, .871 miles east of State Road 33 in Polk County, Florida. This sign will be referred to herein as the "Original Sign." The Original Sign was built in 1971 and was located, at all times relevant hereto, on land owned by Mrs. Ona Grimes until that land was purchased by the State in October 2002. Petitioner also constructed another sign at approximately the same location. This sign, referred to herein as the "New Sign," has a double-faced, single-metal pole and is considerably higher in height than the Original Sign. Both the Original Sign and the New Sign are located on property which DOT contends is zoned as "Pasture, with residence." However, Polk County did away with its zoning ordinance in March 2000 and replaced it with Land Use Districts. The current Land Use District designation for the site is Business Park Center (within the Green Swamp Area of Critical State Concern). There was no competent testimony at final hearing as to whether that designation constitutes commercial or industrial zoning for purposes of roadside signs. The Original Sign was purchased by Petitioner in 1991 and was located on the Grimes property. Petitioner entered into a Ground Lease with Grimes that had a term of 30 years at a payment of $1,500 per year. In 2002, DOT entered into negotiations with Grimes to purchase the property. When DOT purchases property on which a roadside sign already exists, DOT may take the sign by way of condemnation through eminent domain (sometimes referred to by DOT as a "Take"). In such cases, the State must reasonably compensate the sign owner for the taking of its sign. In the alternative, the State may assume the sign lease and become a lessor to the sign owner. In that case, the sign owner must make its lease payments directly to the State. On May 22, 2002, DOT sent a letter to Petitioner explaining that DOT was in the process of acquiring the right of way on which the Original Sign was located. DOT offered to purchase (or Take) the sign from Petitioner for $17,300. While that offer to Petitioner was pending, DOT went forward with the purchase of the Grimes property. The purchase agreement for the property was signed by Grimes on July 11, 2002. Four days later, a letter from DOT to Petitioner was issued which said: Subsequent to receiving agreement and signed ODA [out door advertising] disclaimer from the property owner, an offer has been made to SG Outdoor, Inc. for the purchase of the ODA structure. Negotiations are ongoing. However, the purchase of Grimes property did not occur immediately. Meanwhile, in August 2002, Grimes entered into an illegal lease with Lamar Advertising, giving Lamar the same rights it had already contracted away to Petitioner. Petitioner was unaware of the lease with Lamar at that time. Such a lease would have been in violation of the already-existing lease between Grimes and Petitioner. At almost the same time, a DOT memorandum indicated that DOT was still "involved in ongoing negotiations" with Petitioner concerning the sign. The Grimes property purchase (by DOT) finally closed on October 1, 2002, at which time DOT became the owner of the Grimes property. Because of this fact, Petitioner was supposed to make its annual lease payments to the State of Florida ("State") as the new owner. Stated differently, the State became Petitioner's new lessor. On October 14, 2002, Lamar Advertising filed a Sign Permit Application with the Polk County Building Division. The application was for approval of its sign on the Grimes property. The application included a copy of Lamar's lease with Grimes; the lease had a 10-year period and a payment of $4,000 per year.1 On July 8, 2003 (ten months after DOT purchased the property), Petitioner filed a permit application with Polk County for the New Sign. Petitioner did not, at that time, have permission from DOT to erect a new sign, but believed it could obtain that permission after the fact. Petitioner then went forward with the construction of the New Sign. Meanwhile, Petitioner sent Grimes a check in October 2003, for its lease payment for the period June 1, 2003, through May 30, 2004. By that time, the State already owned the Grimes property. A member of the Grimes family sent Petitioner's check back to Petitioner in January 2004, explaining that all payments should be made directly to the State. There is no evidence in the record as to whether Petitioner attempted to make a lease payment to the Department at that time or at any other time. In November 2003, DOT issued a certified letter to Petitioner addressing Sign Permit No. AU557 that said: On October 2, 2002, the above referenced parcel was purchased by the Florida Department of Transportation. Although the Department will honor an existing lease, it will not engage in any new lease agreements nor grant permission for the referenced sign to remain. Since any potential oral agreement with the previous owner has expired, the Department requests that the [Original] sign be removed. Clearly DOT was mistaken. Petitioner had a written, not oral, lease with the prior owner. In response, Petitioner sent DOT a copy of its Ground Lease with Grimes. At that time, Petitioner also asked for a meeting with DOT's acquisition director to continue negotiating a fair price for the Original Sign. Several months later (on July 9, 2004), DOT issued its Notice of Violation regarding the Original Sign. The notice said "that the outdoor advertising sign referenced above has been acquired by the Department" (rather than saying the Department had purchased the land). The notice directed Petitioner to immediately remove the sign from the premises. The notice was partially in error; DOT had actually acquired the land, not the sign. Petitioner was in breach of its lease with the State by failing to make lease payments as required by the lease which DOT had assumed. However, it is unclear as to whether, upon notice of receipt of the written lease, DOT had ever advised Petitioner to send its lease payments directly to the Department. The Notice of Administrative Hearing Rights attached to the DOT Notice of Violation indicates a deadline of 30 days from receipt of the Notice for filing such a request, i.e., on or about August 10, 2005. Petitioner responded to the Notice with another letter (dated July 14, 2009) explaining again that it had a valid lease with Grimes for the sign location. Petitioner's letter asked DOT to abate its violation notice and reinstate Petitioner's permit. It also stated that "[i]f the State decides not to acknowledge the Judicial process [the ongoing probate dispute with the Grimes family concerning the lease with Lamar] and still proceeds with the Notice of Violation, then upon receiving your next correspondence, we will exercise our privilege to request an administrative hearing." Petitioner contends that the quoted statement constituted its request for an administrative hearing. However, the plain reading of the statement indicates that it is a statement of future intent based upon future actions by DOT. DOT then issued a letter dated August 10, 2004, to Petitioner explaining that the permit for the Original Sign had been revoked. The letter directed Petitioner to remove the sign. The letter stated that if Petitioner does not do so, then DOT would have the right to remove the sign. (As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, the sign was still in place.) The August 10 letter, in response to Petitioner's July 14 letter, appears to be the "next correspondence" Petitioner had requested. The exercise of its right to an administrative hearing would, therefore, be due on or about September 11, 2004. On September 8, 2004, Petitioner sent a letter to Holschuh declining DOT's offer to purchase the Original Sign for $17,000. That offer had been made in May 2002.2 This letter suggests a counter-offer of $82,500 as the purchase price. The letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to an administrative hearing. Holschuh responded that she was not involved in acquisitions, and Petitioner should contact the district office (with whom Petitioner had previously negotiated). Instead of heeding Holschuh's directions, Petitioner then sent her another letter asking her to send the correspondence on to someone in the acquisition division. The new letter also repeats the counter-offer of $82,500. This letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to a formal hearing, either. About one year later, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued another Notice of Violation, this one addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a (which Holschuh at final hearing said referred to the Original Sign, although there was no "a" nomenclature on the July 9, 2004, Notice of Violation). Also, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued a Notice of Violation addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, which Holschuh said referred to Petitioner's New Sign, even though no permit for the New Sign had ever been issued by DOT. The New Sign by this time had been completed and was being used for outdoor advertising. Petitioner understands the need for a permit to construct a new outdoor sign on the State road right-of-ways, but opined that it believed it could do so after the fact. Petitioner has only obtained approval from Polk County for erecting the sign, an event necessary for construction purposes, but irrelevant to DOT requirements. In the letter to DOT from Petitioner dated October 26, 2005 (and presumably accepted by DOT as Petitioner's request for a formal hearing), reference is made to Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, i.e., the New Sign. However, the letter addresses the Original Sign and its perceived value by Petitioner. It is patently unclear as to which sign is actually being addressed, but facts surrounding both signs were presented at final hearing and both have been addressed herein. Nonetheless, Petitioner's October 26, 2005, letter was submitted within 30 days of the latest Notice of Violation and was presumably intended to invoke Petitioner's right to a formal administrative hearing. This letter was then forwarded to DOAH by DOT in March 2009, for the purpose of conducting the hearing. (No evidence was presented as to why the DOT's cover letter and Petitioner's request for hearing were not submitted to DOAH until three-and-a-half years after the letter was written.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Transportation, reversing the revocation of Sign Permit No. AU557 and providing Petitioner, SG Outdoor, just compensation for that sign. Further, the final order should deem the newly constructed sign on the same site to be unauthorized and order its removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2009.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent?s Outdoor Advertising Permits should be revoked pursuant to section 479.08, Florida Statutes, because the associated sign has not remained substantially the same, has been disassembled and re-erected, or has been destroyed, as set forth in the Amended Notice of Intent to Revoke.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation regulates outdoor advertising signs located in proximity to the State Highway System, the Interstate, and portions of the Federal-aid Primary System. Green?s Wrecker Service, begun in 1947, was one of the first wrecker services in Alachua County. Mr. Allen Green was the owner and operator. There was no precise testimony as to when Mr. Green first erected the advertising sign at issue here, but Mr. Green?s daughter, Pamela, vaguely remembered that happening: Well, I was seven or eight years old. I remember Daddy and Grandpa going down there after they opened up the road. It was woods there and we used to play on our bikes and I remember my Grandmother coming out and sitting beside the road because she was scared we was gonna get onto 301 because it was always woods back there before, and we could ride and we didn?t have her bothering us, you know. So when the woods got cleared out to 301, then, you know, Granny was sitting out there and daddy and grandpa went down there and done something, put that sign up, I guess. Based upon Pamela?s current age and her recollection, it can be roughly calculated that the sign was put up over 40 years ago. It is a small sign, about three feet by six feet, and has the words “Green?s Garage” in red letters and a smaller “Pennzoil” logo in yellow, along with a large arrow pointing toward the business. The sign sits at the intersection of US Highway 301 and 165th Avenue, the business being located about a hundred yards down 165th Avenue. The sign is important to the business because, due to the trees, one cannot see the actual building or cars at the business location from US Highway 301 until one is already at the 165th Avenue intersection, where one can finally see them through the area that has been cleared out for the road. Mr. Green turned the business over to Pamela before he died, and she has operated the business ever since. She subsequently married Mr. Gary Keen. Mrs. Pamela Green Keen incorporated the business as “Green?s Garage and Wrecking Service, Inc.” There was no evidence as to when the subsequent provision of state law or local ordinance with which the sign fails to comply was passed, but the parties stipulated that the sign is nonconforming, so it is clear that the sign was lawful when erected but could not be put up today. The sign was permitted as a wooden sign with a back-to- back configuration and two supports. That configuration has never changed. The sign was assigned tag numbers BE893 and BE894 by the Department. These tags look like small license plates that are posted on the sign and must be visible from the main travel-way. Mr. Tom Simmons is a senior outdoor advertising inspector for Cardno TBE Consultants (Cardno TBE), a contractor for the Department. Cardno TBE manages the outdoor advertising program for the State of Florida. Mr. Simmons has been employed with them for 12 years, and, before that, performed a similar job for four years with the Department. Mr. Simmons oversees 16 counties in northeast Florida, including Alachua County. Mr. Simmons was very credible in his testimony. Mr. Simmons testified that he was aware of the sign: In the due process of traveling from point A to point B on 301, I had seen it before. Like I stated earlier, after you have been out here a long time like I have, when structures disappear and go away, you pick up on it because it?s something that you are looking for constantly. On September 7, 2011, Mr. Simmons took a picture of the sign. It was down on the ground and was not erect. Mr. Keen testified that shortly before this, he had been having problems with vandals. The windshield of his tow truck had been shattered by a man whose car had been towed to Green?s Garage. That man was caught and ultimately paid restitution. A vehicle had also been stolen from Green?s Garage in June, and Mr. Keen or his wife had requested increased sheriff?s patrols at the business address in August, as evidenced by records from the Alachua County Sheriff?s Department. Mr. Keen testified that people often became upset when their cars were towed and that some were vindictive and would resort to vandalism. He said it was an unavoidable consequence of the business, since he towed cars for the Sheriff?s Department and the Florida Highway Patrol. Mr. Keen testified that he goes down 165th Avenue to US Highway 301, right past where the sign is located, almost every day. His testimony that the sign was not down for more than a day is accepted. Mr. Keen?s first action was to look for signs as to who had knocked it down, but he could not find any evidence such as cigarette butts, or cans, or footprints, so he decided it would do no good to call the police. Mr. Keen re-erected the sign. He did not have to reassemble or add to the materials on the sign in any way, since it was still intact. He just put it back up. The Department issued its original Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit for Violation, dated October 26, 2011, alleging that the sign had been abandoned. Respondent denied this in its response to the Department and requested an administrative hearing. The Department did not request an administrative law judge within 15 days of Respondent?s request. Green?s Garage and Wrecker Service is substantially affected by the Department?s intended action to revoke the permits for the sign. If the permit is lost, the sign must be taken down and no new sign can be erected. Almost a year later, on October 18, 2012, Mr. Simmons took a picture of the sign which showed that it was back up in its original location. He testified that it appeared to be the same sign, constructed of the same materials as before. On March 28, 2013, the Department issued Green?s Garage an Amended Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit for Violation, alleging violations of three different provisions of the rules. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the sign remained substantially the same as it was on the date it became nonconforming. Even if it was determined that the sign did not remain substantially the same simply because it was down for a day or two, simply re-erecting the sign when no assembly or construction was required constituted reasonable repair and maintenance of the sign. The sign was never disassembled throughout the time relevant to this proceeding. Less than 60 percent of the upright supports of the sign were physically damaged at any time relevant to this proceeding. One pole was not damaged at all; the other had only very minor damage. The minor damage to one pole was not such that the normal repair practices of the industry would call for that pole?s replacement. Respondent never had an intention to abandon or discontinue the sign at any time relevant to this proceeding. The facts did not show that the sign structure ceased to exist. All the interrelated parts and material -- including the beams, poles, and stringers -- which were constructed for the purpose of supporting or displaying the message remained completely intact and never ceased to exist as an integrated structure.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the Amended Notice of Intent to Revoke Sign Permit for Violation and allow the outdoor advertising permits to continue. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2013.
The Issue Whether the application contains knowingly false or misleading information; or Whether the Department is estopped to revoke the permits.
Findings Of Fact By application for outdoor advertising sign permits dated December 19, 1989 (Exhibit 1), Dolphin Outdoor Advertising requested permits for a sign to be located along I-4 in Polk County, Florida 100 feet west of Kraft Road. The application stated that the proposed sign was 1600 feet from the nearest permitted sign. The District DOT sign inspector to whom this application was referred for processing checked the records for signs located within 1000 feet of the proposed location under the mistaken understanding that the minimum spacing requirement for signs along interstate highways was 1000 feet. After determining there were no valid conflicting signs, the inspector, who had been employed by the department approximately six months, approved the application and tags numbered AY 108-35 and AY 109-35 were issued on February 24, 1989. In the interim, the applicant, upon learning that his application would be approved, contacted the landowner and entered into a lease for the property and on February 17, 1989, paid Florida Log and Timber $5000 for the first year's lease (Exhibit 11) on this property. The applicant also paid the finder of the site some $4300 for services and expenses in November, 1988. (Exhibits 7 and 8) In mid-March 1989, while discussing these permits with her supervisor, the inspector who had issued the permit to Respondent learned that the required spacing between signs along interstate highways is 1500 feet instead of 1000 feet which is the minimum spacing along federal-aid primary highways. By letter dated March 17, 1989 (Exhibit 3) the Department advised Respondent that permits AY 108-35 and AY 109-35 were issued in error because of a valid existing permit for a sign located 1056 feet west of Respondent's proposed sign. The permits were therefore stated to be no longer valid, and these proceedings followed. Petitioner's letter of March 17, 1989 was received by Respondent before construction on the sign started but after Respondent received a building permit from Polk County dated February 27, 1989 at a cost to Respondent of $101.20.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued revoking permits AY 108-35 and AY 109-35 issued to Dolphin Outdoor Advertising for a sign along I-4 100 feet west of Kraft Road in Polk County. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Scott Hill, Pro Se 1718 Golfside Drive Winter Park, Florida 32972 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Electrical Contractors Licensing Board, appropriately denied Petitioner's, Kevin Harrington, application to take the examination for licensure as an electrical contractor.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is the state agency vested with the authority to test applicants seeking certification as electrical contractors. Petitioner is seeking certification (licensure) as an electrical contractor. On December 12, 2001, Respondent received Petitioner's application to take the Electrical Contractors Unlimited examination. On December 24, 2001, Respondent mailed Petitioner a letter requesting additional information. The letter requested that the additional information be received by Respondent no later than January 4, 2002. This date was later extended to January 8, 2002. On January 4 and January 7, 2002, Petitioner, through his attorney, forwarded the requested additional information to Respondent. Petitioner's application was complete on January 10, 2002. Respondent, Electrical Contractors Licensing Board("Board"), met on January 16 and 17, 2002. The Board delegates initial consideration of applications to take certification examinations to an Applications Committee consisting of members of the Board who make recommendations to the full Board on each application. Each application is examined by at least two Applications Committee members; if both recommend "denial of the application," or, if one recommends "approval of the application" and one recommends "denial of the application," the application is reviewed by a third Applications Committee member. Each member of the Applications Committee is provided a worksheet as a part of the application package which lists reasons for denial drawn from Subsection 489.511(2)(a)(3), Florida Statutes. After each application is considered by members of the Applications Committee, the application with the Applications Committee's recommendations, reasons for denial (if applicable), and other comments are given to a staff employee who prepares an approved/denial list which is presented to the full Board for consideration. The foregoing procedure was followed in the instant case. On January 16, 2002, Board members, Roger Lange and Kim DeBerry, who were members of the Applications Committee, considered Petitioner's application; both recommended denial of the application. Because there were two recommendations of denial, the application was considered by a third Applications Committee member, Dawn Johnson; she, too, recommended denial. Petitioner's application and the recommendations, reasons for denial, and comments of the Applications Committee were then given to a staff employee who prepared a summary list of all applicants with the recommendations for approval or denial by the Applications Committee with reasons given for denial for submission to the full Board. The full Electrical Contractors Licensing Board considered Petitioner's application on January 17, 2002, and unanimously denied the application. Petitioner was advised of the denial by letter dated February 8, 2002. Petitioner's Applicant's Affidavit dated November 16, 2001, indicates that he was seeking a license under Subsection 489 .511(2)(a)(3)(a), Florida Statutes. The Applicant's Affidavit specifically states: 489.511(2)(a)(3)(a), F.S. Has, within the six (6) years immediately preceding the filing of the application, at least three (3) years proven "management experience" in the trade or education equivalent thereto, or a combination thereof, but not more than one- half of such experience may be educational. (Please submit at least three (3) years of W- 2 Forms) The occupational skills and responsibilities of an electrical contractor are unique and require experience and understanding which are typically acquired by extensive, direct "on-the-job" training in the electrical contracting trade. Petitioner is an experienced General Contractor's project manager. His credentials as a General Contractor's project manager are impressive and the projects he has supervised are extensive. Petitioner has little or no direct supervisory experience in the electrical contracting trade. Petitioner's construction management experience is as a General Contractor project manager, not an Electrical Contractor project manager or similar position, and, as a consequence, he does not meet the "'management experience' in the trade" statutory requirement. Petitioner has an enviable academic record: an Associate of Science Degree With Honors from Miami-Dade Community College (1990), a Bachelor of Science in Building Construction from University of Florida (1993), 21 hours of graduate studies at Florida International University leading towards a Master of Building Construction degree. Petitioner's academic credentials have little direct application to the electrical contracting trade and, as a consequence, do not meet the "educational equivalent" to management experience statutory requirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application to take the Certified Electrical Contractor's Licensure Examination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Rosemary Hanna Hayes, Esquire Hayes & Associates 3117 Edgewater Drive Orlando, Florida 32804 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Anthony B. Spivey, Executive Director Electrical Contractors Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The outdoor advertising sign which is the subject of these proceedings is located on U.S. 1 (State Road 5) approximately 1,029 feet north of Summerland Road in North Key Largo. The outdoor advertising sign is owned and maintained by the Respondent and is visible from the main traveled way of the adjacent roadway. The Respondent purchased the sign from the Daly Outdoor Advertising Company in 1984. The sign consist percents of a ten feet by forty feet plywood sign face supported ]by five four inch by six inch poles which serve as uprights. In addition, the sign has 5 stringers (wooden planks placed in a cross-type fashion on the upright poles to hold the sign face in place). The parties stipulated that the sign, in place prior to 1971, was a "nonconforming sign" as defined by Rule 14- 10.07, Florida Administrative Code. The sign permit number is AK-332-10. In November of 1985, Hurricane Kate traveled through the Keys and damaged the sign. On December 4, 1985, Mr. William Kenney, District VI Outdoor Advertising Administrator, passed the site of the sign and noticed that the face of the structure was blown over In the water. Because the sign was surrounded by water and mud, Mr. Kenney observed the sign from approximately 30 feet away. Although the sign was blown over into the water, the face was intact. The poles which were used to hold the sign face snapped. On December 10, 1985, the Respondent purchased 5 used telephone poles at a cost of $50.00 each and repaired the damaged sign. The poles were used as uprights to support the sign face. On January 8, 1986, Mr. Kenney walked over to the sign and inspected it. In Mr. Kenney's opinion, the replaced upright poles appeared to be longer than the old ones, the stringers appeared to be made out of new wood and the plywood used on the face of the structure appeared to be new. The overall size of the repaired structure appeared to be the same size that it was before being damaged by the hurricane. The sign is located at exactly the same location as it was prior to being blown down. It is standard practice in the outdoor advertising industry for a company to exchange, refinish and replace faces of outdoor advertising signs on a routine basis. By letter dated January 14, 1986, the Petitioner advised Respondent that its sign permit number AK-332-10 was no longer valid and by notice to show cause dated February 14, 1986, the Petitioner advised Respondent that the repaired sign had no valid permit and was illegal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be issued declaring that sign permit AK-332-10 remains valid and dismissing the notice of violation and notice to show cause. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1986. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-0575T & 86-0966T (consolidated) The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to these cases. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1 and 5. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Addressed in Conclusions of Law section. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument and/or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 6 and 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 11. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire -Department of Transportation -Haydon Burns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Charles C. Papy, III, Esquire 201 Alhambra Circle, Suite 502 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Thomas Drawdy, Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
