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AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 81-001601 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001601 Latest Update: Aug. 09, 1982

Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated to all facts in this proceeding. Those facts found relevant to a determination of the issue are as follows: Petitioner, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, is a New York corporation and is functionally divided into two divisions: the Long Lines Department and the General Department. Through its Long Lines Department, petitioner is a federally regulated public utility and common carrier which furnishes interstate and international telecommunications services. Long Lines is responsible generally for the construction, operation and maintenance of a nationwide system of interstate telecommunications facilities and related equipment which serve to interconnect the facilities of over 1700 operating telecommunications companies in the United States as well as telecommunications systems abroad. Some of these facilities extend into and through the State of Florida. In performing this interstate business, Long Lines operates, and thus has property or employees or both in 49 states, including Florida. Through its General Department, petitioner is the parent corporation of 21 operating telecommunications companies (known as "Associated Companies"), Western Electric Company, Inc. ("Western") and Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. ("Bell Labs"). The General Department holds and manages the stock owned in these subsidiaries and two minority owned companies, and provides capital. advice and assistance to them. It conducts these activities principally in New York and New Jersey and conducts no business and has no property or employees in Florida. The only business activities in the State of Florida during 1972, 1973 and 1974 were conducted through petitioner's Long Lines Department in connection with the operation of the interstate and international long distance telecommunications network. None of the Associated Companies is organized under the laws of Florida or has its headquarters in Florida. The Only Associated Company which conducts business or has property or employees within Florida is the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company (hereinafter "Southern Bell"), a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner. Southern Bell files its own separate Florida income tax returns and during the period 1972-1974 paid approximately $10 million in income tax to Florida. The respondent concurs that petitioner is entitled to deduct 100 percent of the dividends paid by Southern Bell to petitioner. Western, also a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner, is a manufacturing corporation with its own Board of Directors and officers, doing business in all 50 states. During the period 1972-1974 Western paid approximately $1.7 million in income tax to Florida. The respondent concurs that petitioner is entitled to deduct 100 percent of the dividends paid by Western to petitioner. For each of the 1972, 1973 and 1974 tax years, petitioner has filed a federal consolidated income tax return, and has made a valid election under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code for each of those years. That provision of the federal tax law permits a domestic corporation to deduct 100 percent of the dividends received from its wholly-owned domestic subsidiaries. Petitioner's federal income tax returns were audited by the Internal Revenue Service and the respective tax liabilities were determined and paid for each of the years in question. The Internal Revenue Service did not tax dividends received by petitioner from its affiliates. Petitioner timely filed its Florida corporate income tax returns for the years ending December 31, 1972, December 31, 1973 and December 31, 1974. Petitioner did not elect and was not required to file a Florida consolidated income tax return under Section 220.131, Florida Statutes. For each of the years in question, petitioner reported on line 1--"federal taxable income (line 30, Form 1120 or corresponding line on related form 1120 series, 990C or 990T)"- -of its Florida corporation income tax return (Form F-1120) its taxable income for federal income tax purposes computed as if petitioner had filed a separate federal income tax return for each of the years in question and for each preceding taxable year for which it was a member of an affiliated group. These amounts were: 1972 $ 94,020,281 1973 $213,364,165 1974 $110,770,402 On its Florida corporation income tax return for each of the years in question, petitioner made the additions and subtractions required by the form of the return in computing "adjusted federal income" and apportioned this amount by the prescribed three-factor formula to obtain "Florida net income." The Department of Revenue adjusted the amount of "federal taxable income" and hence "Florida net income" of petitioner for each of the years in question by adding thereto 15 percent of the dividends received from subsidiaries which were deductible for federal income tax purposes under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code. On April 10, 1978, the Department issued a notice of proposed deficiency for petitioner's tax years ended December 31, 1972, December 31, 1973 and December 31, 1974. The total amount of the proposed deficiency was $1,131,158, computed as follows: YEAR AUDITED TAX TAX AS FILED DEFICIENCY 1972 $426,468 $122,365 $304,103 1973 668,597 281,168 387,429 1974 594,300 154,674 439,626 Total $1,689,365 $558,207 $1,131,158 After a timely protest to the proposed deficiencies was filed by the petitioner, correspondence and an informal conference between the parties was had. Finally, on April 16, 1981, the Department issued a letter denying the protest and petitioner petitioned for an administrative hearing. Through correspondence and discussions with the petitioner, the Department of Revenue has taken the position that it would allow only an 85 percent dividend deduction for the dividends received by petitioner from those affiliates which were not subject to the Florida corporate income tax code. Petitioner is seeking to take a 100 percent deduction of all dividends which it received from its subsidiaries, as it did on its federal income tax returns. The dividends received by petitioner which the Department is attempting to subject to Florida tax by its proposed deficiency assessment are derived from its equity investment in its subsidiaries and they represent to petitioner a return on such investment. Since the actual capital, however, for that investment is furnished primarily by public investors, the principal use of the dividends received by petitioner is to meet its obligation to its shareholders and bondholders for the payment of dividends and interest. For example, in 1974 petitioner received dividends from the Associated Companies, Western and other affiliates in the amount of $2,538,443,000 and paid dividends to shareholders in the amount of $2,039,800,000 and interest on its long and intermediate term debt of $475,670,000. Petitioner, therefore, serves as the investor interface between the investing public and its subsidiary companies, whereby the purchase of petitioner's stock or debt issues actually represents an investment in the earnings of the Bell System. Petitioner, acting through its General Department, thus provides the avenue by which the subsidiaries pass their net earnings to the investing public. The income which the Department seeks to tax is derived from dividends received by petitioner primarily from earnings generated by the property and employees of the Associated Companies which are devoted to furnishing intrastate and interstate telecommunications services in their operating territories in states other than the State of Florida. These earnings are subject to income taxes in all states in which the Associated Companies provide telecommunications services that impose income taxes on corporations. The dividends received by petitioner do not contribute to the funding of Long Lines since (1) the pervasive regulation under which petitioner's subsidiaries operate limits their earnings to that amount sufficient for the needs of their own operations and effectively prevents those earnings from being available for use in other businesses and (2) earnings paid out as dividends by petitioner's subsidiaries are principally required to be passed to the public investors in the Bell System, through petitioner's General Department, in order to meet dividend and interest obligations to these outside shareholders and bondholders. During the tax years in question, the Department of Revenue had not promulgated any rule with respect to the disallowance of a deduction for 100 percent of dividends received as provided for under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code, and the Florida corporate income tax return forms did not require any such add-back or adjustment. During the 1980 legislative session, an amendment to Chapter 220, Florida Statutes, was proposed which would have changed the definition of "affiliated group of corporations." Such proposed legislation was not passed and did not become law.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that that portion of the Department's proposed assessment of deficiencies for the 1972, 1973 and 1974 tax years as is based upon dividends received by the petitioner from its affiliates be withdrawn as being contrary to law and invalid. Respectfully submitted and entered this 28th day of April, 1982. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1982.

Florida Laws (7) 120.56220.02220.11220.12220.13220.131220.43
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SUNSHINE TOWING AT BROWARD, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 10-000134BID (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jan. 12, 2010 Number: 10-000134BID Latest Update: May 07, 2010

The Issue The issues in this bid protest are, first, whether, as Petitioner alleges, Intervenor's failure to attach copies of "occupational licenses" to its proposal was a deviation from the requirements of the Request for Proposal; second, whether any such deviation was material; and third, whether Respondent's preliminary decision to award Intervenor the contract at issue was clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.

Findings Of Fact On September 18, 2009, Respondent Department of Transportation ("Department") issued Request for Proposal No. RFP-DOT-09/10-4007FS (the "RFP"). Through the RFP, which is entitled, "Treasure Coast Road Ranger Service Patrol," the Department solicited written proposals from qualified providers who would be willing and able to perform towing and emergency roadside services on Interstate 95 in Martin County, St. Lucie County, and Indian River County. The Department intended to award a three-year contract to the "responsive and responsible Proposer whose proposal is determined to be the most advantageous to the Department." The Department anticipated that the contract would have a term beginning on December 1, 2009, and ending on November 31, 2012. The annual contract price was not to exceed $1.59 million. Proposals were due on October 13, 2009. Four firms timely submitted proposals in response to the RFP, including Petitioner Sunshine Towing @ Broward, Inc. ("Sunshine") and Intervenor Anchor Towing and Marine of Broward, Inc. ("Anchor"). An evaluation ensued, pursuant to a process described in the RFP, during which the Department rejected two of the four proposals for failing to meet minimum requirements relating to technical aspects of the project. As a result, Sunshine and Anchor emerged as the only competitors eligible for the award. Sunshine offered to perform the contractual services for an annual price of $1,531,548. This sum was less than the price that Anchor proposed by $46,980 per year. Despite Sunshine's lower cost, Anchor nevertheless edged Sunshine in the final score, receiving 92.86 points (out of 100) from the Department's evaluators, to Sunshine's 87.75. On November 30, 2009, the Department duly notified the public of its intent to award the contract to Anchor. Sunshine promptly initiated the instant protest, whereby Sunshine seeks to have Anchor's proposal disqualified as nonresponsive, in hopes that the Department will then award the contract to Sunshine as the highest-ranked (indeed the sole) responsive proposer. Sunshine alleges that Anchor's proposal failed to conform strictly to the specifications of the RFP, principally because Anchor did not attach copies of its "occupational licenses" to the proposal. Anchor insists that its proposal was responsive but argues, alternatively, that if its proposal deviated from the specifications, the deviation was merely a minor irregularity which the Department could waive. Anchor further contends that Sunshine's proposal contains material deviations for which it should be deemed nonresponsive. The Department takes the position that Anchor's failure to attach "occupational licenses" was a minor irregularity that could be (and was) waived.1 The RFP includes a "Special Conditions" section wherein the specifications at the heart of this dispute are located. Of particular interest is Special Condition No. 8, which specifies the qualifications a provider must have to be considered qualified to perform the services called for under the contract to be awarded. Special Condition No. 8 provides as follows: QUALIFICATIONS General The Department will determine whether the Proposer is qualified to perform the services being contracted based upon their proposal demonstrating satisfactory experience and capability in the work area. The Proposer shall identify necessary experienced personnel and facilities to support the activities associated with this proposal. Qualifications of Key Personnel Those individuals who will be directly involved in the project should have demonstrated experience in the areas delineated in the scope of work. Individuals whose qualifications are presented will be committed to the project for its duration unless otherwise excepted by the Department's Project Manager. Where State of Florida registration or certification is deemed appropriate, a copy of the registration or certificate should be included in the proposal package. Authorized To Do Business in the State of Florida In accordance with sections 607.1501, 608.501, and 620.169, Florida Statutes, foreign corporations, foreign limited liability companies, and foreign limited partnerships must be authorized to do business in the State of Florida. Such authorization should be obtained by the proposal due date and time, but in any case, must be obtained prior to the posting of the intended award of the contact. For authorization, [contact the Florida Department of State].[2] Licensed to Conduct Business in the State of Florida If the business being provided requires that individuals be licensed by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, such licenses should be obtained by the proposal due date and time, but in any case, must be obtained prior to the posting of the intended award of the contract. For licensing, [contact the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation]. References and experience must entail a minimum of three (3) years of experience in the towing industry in Florida. NOTE: Copies of occupational licenses must also be attached to the back of Form 'F'. (Boldface in original.) Special Condition No. 19, which defines the term "responsive proposal," provides as follows: RESPONSIVENESS OF PROPOSALS Responsiveness of Proposals Proposals will not be considered if not received by the Department on or before the date and time specified as the due date for submission. All proposals must be typed or printed in ink. A responsive proposal is an offer to perform the scope of services called for in this Request for Proposal in accordance with all the requirements of this Request for Proposal and receiving fifty (50) points or more on the Technical Proposal.[3] Proposals found to be non-responsive shall not be considered. Proposals may be rejected if found to be irregular or not in conformance with the requirements and instructions herein contained. A proposal may be found to be irregular or non-responsive by reasons that include, but are not limited to, failure to utilize or complete prescribed forms, conditional proposals, incomplete proposals, indefinite or ambiguous proposals, and improper and/or undated signatures. (Emphasis and boldface in original.) In the "General Instructions to Respondents" section of the RFP there appears the following reservation of rights: 16. Minor Irregularities/Right to Reject. The Buyer reserves the right to accept or reject any and all bids, or separable portions thereof, and to waive any minor irregularity, technicality, or omission if the Buyer determines that doing so will serve the State's best interests. The Buyer may reject any response not submitted in the manner specified by the solicitation documents. Anchor did not attach copies of any "occupational licenses" to the back of Form 'F' in its proposal. Anchor contends that it did not need to attach such licenses because none exists. This position is based on two undisputed facts: (1) The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("DBPR") does not regulate the business of providing towing and emergency roadside assistance; therefore, neither Anchor nor Sunshine held (or could hold) a state-issued license to operate, and neither company fell under DBPR's regulatory jurisdiction. (2) The instrument formerly known as an "occupational license," which local governments had issued for decades, not for regulatory purposes but as a means of raising revenue, is presently called (at least formally) a "business tax receipt," after the Florida Legislature, in 2006, amended Chapter 205 of the Florida Statutes, changing the name of that law from the "Local Occupational License Tax Act" to the "Local Business Tax Act." See 2006 Fla. Laws ch. 152. Sunshine asserts that the terms "occupational license" and "business tax receipt" are synonymous and interchangeable, and that the RFP required each offeror to attach copies of its occupational licenses/business tax receipts to the proposal. Sunshine insists that Anchor's failure to do so constituted a material deviation from the specifications because, without such documentation, the Department could not be sure whether an offeror was authorized to do business in any given locality. Sunshine presses this argument a step further based on some additional undisputed facts. As it happened, at the time the proposals were opened, Anchor held a local business tax receipt from the City of Pembroke Pines, which is the municipality in which Anchor maintains its principal place of business. Anchor had not, however, paid local business taxes to Broward County when they became due, respectively, on July 1, 2008, and July 1, 2009. Anchor corrected this problem on December 14, 2009, which was about two weeks after the Department had posted notice of its intent to award Anchor the contract, paying Broward County a grand total of $248.45 in back taxes, collection costs, and late penalties. As of this writing, all of Anchor's local business tax obligations are paid in full. Sunshine contends, however, that during the period of time that Anchor's Broward County business taxes were delinquent, Anchor was not authorized to do business in Broward County and hence was not a "responsible" proposer eligible for award of the contract. In support of this proposition, Sunshine relies upon Section 20-15 of the Broward County, Florida, Code of Ordinances ("Broward Code"), which states: Pursuant to the authority granted by Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, no person shall engage in or manage any business, profession or occupation, as the same are contemplated by Chapter 205, Florida Statutes, unless such person first obtains a business tax receipt as required by this article, unless other exempt from this requirement . . . . On this latter point regarding Anchor's authority to operate in Broward County, Sunshine appears to be correct, at least in a narrow legal sense. It is abundantly clear, however, and the undersigned finds, that, as a matter of fact, Anchor was never in any danger of being shut down by the county. Indeed, even under the strict letter of the local law, Anchor was entitled to continue operating in Broward County unless and until the county took steps to compel the payment of the delinquent taxes. Broward Code Section 20-22, which deals with the enforcement of the business tax provisions, provides: Whenever any person who is subject to the payment of a business tax or privilege tax provided by this article shall fail to pay the same when due, the tax collector, within three (3) years from the due date of the tax, may issue a warrant directed to the Broward County Sheriff, commanding him/her to levy upon and sell any real or personal property of such person liable for said tax for the amount thereof and the cost of executing the warrant and to return such warrant to the tax collector and to pay him/her the money collected by virtue thereof within sixty (60) days from the date of the warrant. . . . The tax collector may file a copy of the warrant with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Broward County[, which shall be recorded in the public records and thereby] become a lien for seven (7) years from the due date of the tax. . . . Any person subject to, and who fails to pay, a business tax or privilege tax required by this article, shall, on petition of the tax collector, be enjoined by the Circuit Court from engaging in the business for which he/she has failed to pay said business tax, until such time as he/she shall pay the same with costs of such action. There is no evidence suggesting that the county ever sought to enjoin, or that a court ever issued an injunction prohibiting, Anchor from engaging in business, nor does it appear, based on the evidence, that a tax warrant ever was issued, filed, or executed to force Anchor to pay its back taxes. Given the relatively small amount of tax due, the likelihood of such enforcement actions being taken must reasonably be reckoned as slim to none. While paying taxes when due is certainly the obligation of a good corporate citizen, it would not be reasonable, based on the facts established in this case, to infer that Anchor is a scofflaw for failing to timely pay a local tax amounting to about $80 per year. Anchor, in short, was a responsible proposer. Sunshine's other argument has more going for it. The RFP clearly and unambiguously mandated that "occupational licenses" be attached to a proposal. If, as Sunshine maintains, the terms "occupational license" and "business tax receipt" are clearly synonymous, then Anchor's proposal was noncompliant. For reasons that will be explained below, however, the undersigned has concluded, as a matter of law, that the term "occupational license" does not unambiguously denote a "business tax receipt"——at least not in the context of Special Condition No. 8. The specification, in other words, is ambiguous. No one protested the specification or otherwise sought clarification of the Department's intent. The evidence shows, and the undersigned finds, that the Department understood and intended the term "occupational license" to mean the instrument now known as a "business tax receipt." The Department simply used the outdated name, as many others probably still do, owing to that facet of human nature captured by the expression, "old habits die hard." The Department's interpretation of the ambiguous specification is not clearly erroneous and therefore should not be disturbed in this proceeding. Based on the Department's interpretation of Special Condition No. 8, the undersigned finds that Anchor's failure to attach copies of its occupational licenses was a deviation from the requirements of the RFP. That is not the end of the matter, however, for a deviation is not necessarily disqualifying unless it is found to be material. The letting authority may, in the exercise of discretion, choose to waive a minor irregularity if doing so will not compromise the integrity and fairness of the competition. There is no persuasive direct evidence in the record that the Department made a conscious decision to waive the irregularity in Anchor's proposal. Documents in the Department's procurement file show, however, that the Department knew that Anchor's proposal lacked copies of occupational licenses, and in any event this was a patent defect, inasmuch as nothing was attached to the back of Anchor's Form 'F'. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the Department elected to waive the irregularity, and the undersigned so finds. Necessarily implicit in the Department's action (waiving the deficiency) is an agency determination that that the irregularity was a minor one. The question of whether or not Anchor's noncompliance with Special Condition No. 8 was material is fairly debatable. Ultimately, however, the undersigned is unable to find, for reasons more fully developed below, that the Department's determination in this regard was clearly erroneous. Because the Department's determination was not clearly erroneous, the undersigned accepts that Anchor's failure to submit occupational licenses was a minor irregularity, which the Department could waive. The Department's decision to waive the minor irregularity is entitled to great deference and should be upheld unless it was arbitrary or capricious. The undersigned cannot say that waiving the deficiency in question was illogical, despotic, thoughtless, or otherwise an abuse of discretion; to the contrary, once it has been concluded that the irregularity is minor and immaterial, as the Department not incorrectly did here, waiver seems the reasonable and logical course of action. The upshot is that the proposed award to Anchor should be allowed to stand. The foregoing determination renders moot the disputed issues of fact arising from Anchor's allegation that Sunshine's proposal was nonresponsive. It is unnecessary, therefore, for the undersigned to make additional findings on that subject.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order consistent with its preliminary decision to award Anchor the contract at issue. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2010.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57205.194205.196607.1501
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HEFTLER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 75-001566 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001566 Latest Update: Mar. 25, 1977

Findings Of Fact Having considered the pleadings, evidence and legal arguments presented in this cause, the following facts are found: Petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey and qualified to do business is one State of Florida. Two of the subsidiaries of Petitioner are Island Properties, Inc., formerly known as Heftler International, Inc., and Island Land Corporation, formerly known as Heftler Construction Company of Puerto Rico, Inc. These corporations are organized under the laws of the State of Florida and the State of New Jersey respectively and maintain principal places of business in Puerto Rico. For the fiscal years ending July 31, 1972 and July 31, 1973, petitioners properly included losses from the operations of the Puerto Rico corporations in their consolidated income tax returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service. For the fiscal years ending July 31, 1972, and July 31, 1973, petitioners timely filed with the respondent consolidated income tax returns including therein the operations of the Puerto Rico corporations. After a timely audit, the respondent excluded, for the purposes of computing adjusted federal income as defined by 220.13, the losses sustained by the Puerto Rico corporations. The respondent also excluded from the computation of the apportionment factors defined in F.S. s. 214.71 and 220.15 the value of the property, payroll and sales utilized in the operations of the Puerto Rico corporations. The respondent cited F.S. ss. 220.13(1)(b)2.b, 220.15(3) and 214.71 as its authority. The adjustments made by the respondent results in a net proposed deficiency of $75,076.46 for the two fiscal years in question. After attempts by the parties to resolve the issues by informal means failed, the petitioner requested a formal hearing and the respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.

Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that there is no basis for affording petitioners any relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiency in the amount of $75,076.46 be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Lewis M. Kanner, Esquire WILLIAMS, SALOMON, KANNER DAMIAN 1003 du Pont Building Miami, Florida 33131 E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Mr. J. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Revenue Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (6) 220.11220.12220.13220.131220.14220.15
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130 NE 40TH STREET, LLC, D/B/A MICHAEL'S GENUINE FOOD AND DRINK vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 16-006333 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Oct. 28, 2016 Number: 16-006333 Latest Update: Jun. 16, 2017

The Issue The issues to be determined in this proceeding are 1) whether Respondent, the Department of Revenue (Respondent or the Department), demonstrated that it made an assessment against the taxpayer, as well as the factual and legal basis for the assessment; 2) whether Petitioner, 130 NE 40th Street, LLC, d/b/a Michael’s Genuine Food and Drink (Petitioner or Michael’s), is entitled to enterprise zone job credits (EZ credits) claimed on its sales and use tax returns for the audited period; and whether the penalty and interest assessed in the August 18, 2016, Notice of Decision is justified.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation with its home office and principal place of business in Miami, Florida. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida, charged with administering the state’s sales tax laws under chapter 212, Florida Statutes (2012-2014). Michael’s is a limited liability company located at 130 NE 40th Street, Miami, Florida 33137. It operates a restaurant and bar at that address. Business Structure of Michael’s Michael’s opened in 2007 and is located in an enterprise zone in Miami. Michael’s enterprise zone identification number is 1301. Michael’s is owned by Michael Schwartz. In 2012, Mr. Schwartz opened a second restaurant known as Harry’s Pizzeria, which is also located in Miami. A third restaurant, the Cypress Room, was also opened during the audit period, although the timing of its opening is not clear from the record. Neither Harry’s Pizzeria nor the Cypress Room is the subject of this audit. All of the restaurants are separate legal entities. Mr. Schwartz is also the owner of a shared service company named Genuine Hospitality Group (GHG). The direct employees of GHG are the comptroller for the restaurants, the director of beverage, the director of operations, a marketing person, and the people overseeing the various restaurants. GHG does not have ownership in any of the restaurants, but provides services to each of them, including at different times, payroll, marketing, operations, and menu development. For example, during the years 2012 and 2013, GHG provided payroll functions for the various restaurants. According to Omar Azze, GHG’s comptroller, the idea was to create a “common paymaster” for the restaurants, because it would allow them to have a larger pool of employees for health insurance, in order to get a more favorable rate. When Michael’s decided to use this payroll method, Mr. Azze called the Department and canceled the reemployment tax registration of Michael’s because the taxes would be paid through GHG. Contrary to notations in the Department’s records, Michael’s never closed during the audit period: it still had the same employees and management team. The idea for using a common paymaster approach for the restaurants came from the restaurants’ accounting consultant. Paying employees through GHG was never intended to reduce the tax liability of Michael’s, or to transfer control of the employees to GHG, and taxes related to payroll were all paid through GHG for 2012 and 2013. Each restaurant maintained control over its own employees (general manager, two or three assistant managers, the head chef, bussers, waiters, cooks, support staff, and bartenders) and employee records, and employees did not “float” from restaurant to restaurant. GHG would pay the employees for Michael’s and the other restaurants, and all of the restaurants would reimburse GHG for the payroll payments for their respective employees. Mr. Azze’s testimony regarding this arrangement is consistent with the deductions on the restaurants’ respective federal tax returns for the payrolls in 2012 and 2013, and is credited. It is found that, during the calendar years 2012 and 2013, the employees remained under the direction and control of Michael’s and that payroll services alone were handled by GHG. In 2014, the third year of the audit period, the Petitioner decided to stop having GHG performing payroll functions, and to handle payroll in-house using a QuickBooks program, in order to reduce costs. In terms of the audit, this change in payroll method meant that for the first two years of the audit, all of the employees for Michael’s were paid through GHG, as were all of Michael’s’ reemployment taxes. The third year of the audit, employees and reemployment taxes were paid through Michael’s directly. Applications for EZ Credits for Michael’s Section 212.096 allows certain eligible businesses within identified “enterprise zones” to take a credit against sales and use taxes when there are employees hired who live within the identified enterprise zones and when there has been an increase in jobs over the 12 months prior to the date of the application. Section 212.096(1)(a) defines an “eligible business” as “any sole proprietorship, firm, partnership, corporation, bank, savings association, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, or other group or combination, or successor business, located in an enterprise zone.” In order to obtain the credit, an eligible business must file an application, including a statement made under oath that includes, for each new employee, the employee’s name and place of residence; the enterprise zone number for the zone in which the new employee lives; the name and address of the eligible business; the starting salary or hourly wages paid to the new employee; and a demonstration to the Department that, on the date of the application, the total number of full-time jobs is greater than it was 12 months prior to the application. The application is initially filed with the governing body or enterprise zone development agency, which reviews the application and determines whether it contains all of the required information and meets the requirements of section 212.096. If it does, then the enterprise zone coordinator certifies the application and transmits it to the Department. In addition, the business also forwards a certified application to the Department. Once the Department receives a certified application for enterprise zone credits, it has ten days to notify the business that the credit has been approved. If the application is incomplete or insufficient to support the credit, the Department is required to deny the credit and notify the business, which is free to reapply. Section 212.096(2)(a) provides that “[u]pon an affirmative showing . . . that the requirements of this section have been met, the business shall be allowed a credit against the tax remitted under this chapter.” The credit “shall be allowed for up to 24 consecutive months, beginning with the first tax return due pursuant to s. 212.11 after approval by the department.” § 212.096(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Petitioner regularly submitted applications for EZ credits, and during the audit period, submitted applications on the following dates: February 1, 2012; August 1, 2012; February 4, 2013; April 2, 2013; July 19, 2013; August 15, 2013; August 30, 2013; January 6, 2014; January 30, 2014; March 3, 2014; March 27, 2014; and June 17, 2014. Each of these applications was made listing Michael’s as the taxpayer. Petitioner used a company named Economic Development Consultants (EDC) to help it calculate the credits Michael’s would be entitled to claim. Each month, Petitioner provided to EDC the names of employees terminated or resigned and those newly hired, along with the new hires’ addresses. Petitioner would also provide to EDC the number of full-time employees for each month. In determining residency for its employees, Petitioner relied on the addresses received from employees when they were hired. EDC would then provide a report saying which employees qualified for a credit, and do the necessary paperwork in order to obtain approvals for the credits. Each of Petitioner’s applications for EZ credits submitted during the audit period was approved, and Petitioner took the EZ credits associated with those applications with the understanding that they were properly approved. At the time the Department approved each of the applications for EZ credits, it had access to the information in and attached to the applications, including the identities of employees eligible for the credits. What the Department did not have when it reviewed the applications would be the actual wages paid to the eligible employees, because most of those wages would not have been paid at that point. Actions Taken By the Auditor On February 27, 2015, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records to Michael’s, indicating that it would be subject to audit for the period February 1, 2012, through January 31, 2015. Robert Ward was the auditor assigned to conduct the audit. Mr. Ward was relatively new to the Department, and had not previously conducted an audit that involved EZ credits. As part of his audit preparation, Mr. Ward pulled a copy of the Department’s standard audit plan, as well as the Department’s audit plan specifications for the industry in question (here, the restaurant industry). He noted that Michael’s had been audited previously and that the current audit resulted from a “lead,” but could not recall the basis or substance of the lead. He also noted that EZ credits had been an issue in the previous audit, which spanned the period from March 1, 2007, through June 30, 2009. Mr. Ward conducted a pre-audit interview with Omar Azze, Petitioner’s comptroller, on May 1, 2015.1/ While there was an agenda prepared for this pre-audit meeting, it does not appear to be in the record. At this pre-audit meeting, Mr. Ward was focused on the routine aspects of the audit as opposed to EZ credits. The issue of EZ credits was first raised in a meeting with Mr. Azze and Mr. Schwartz on May 27, 2015. At that time, Mr. Ward advised that EZ credits would be disallowed because the employees for whom credits were taken were on the payroll of GHG as opposed to Michael’s. Mr. Ward stated at hearing that this decision was made not based upon additional information, but based upon the sharing of employees by different entities. Mr. Ward acknowledged that Michael’s had received approval to take EZ credits, and that Michael’s provided all of the documentation requested of it. He had sought guidance from his trainer, Michelle Samuels, and a senior revenue consultant, Miguel Suarez. Mr. Ward was advised to verify the validity of the EZ credits claimed, with the focus on the growth of full-time employment. If a company subject to an audit had not received an approval letter for the credits, then the credits would be disallowed automatically. If there was an approval letter (as there was here), Mr. Ward understood that he was to look at the application itself and review the information provided with the application, including the schedules filed with the application, in order to validate the use of the EZ credits. Mr. Ward acknowledged that the person who reviewed the application for the Department when it was approved had all of this information. He was advised that the turn-around period for the initial applications was short, and that the initial reviewer is not required to validate the information, because the reviewer would trust the accuracy of the affirmation required of the taxpayer. The initial approval did not mean that the Department would not later go back and reexamine the information originally submitted. In addition to the documents submitted with the applications, Mr. Ward considered other Department records, such as reemployment tax records. He also verified addresses for named employees in the applications using the DAVID database of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. The DAVID database maintains information related to drivers’ licenses and car registrations. The information in the DAVID database is not available to the general public, and was not available to Petitioner. Mr. Ward also acknowledged that people can have a different mailing address from their residential address for a variety of reasons, and they were not always consistent, even in the DAVID database.2/ For example, one of the employees listed by Petitioner on an application dated August 1, 2012, was Aleksandar Gjurovski. The DAVID records indicate that on July 20, 2013, Mr. Gjurovski changed his mailing address. However, his residential address was not changed in the DAVID system until a date after the filing of the enterprise zone application. Mr. Ward relied on the change in the mailing address alone to determine that Mr. Gjurovski did not live within the enterprise zone at the time of the application. It is found that, at the time of the application, Mr. Gjurovski lived in the enterprise zone. After consultation with his supervisors, Mr. Ward disallowed all of the EZ credits for 2012 and 2013, as well as some of the credits for 2014. Respondent issued Michael’s a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated November 10, 2015, for audit number 200180508. The reasons given in the Explanation of Items included in the Work Papers are initially listed by employee, as opposed to by date. For all of the employees for which credits were claimed for 2012 and 2013, the primary reason stated by Mr. Ward is that the employees for which EZ credits were claimed were not employees of Michael’s, but instead were employees of another company. If the application for EZ credits was filed during 2012 or 2013, but the credits were claimed past December 2013, all of the credits related to that employee were disallowed. Other reasons listed for disallowing the tax credits were that there was no demonstrated job growth (for employees Kates, Gibson, Lopez, Jackson-Thompson, Daniels, Bradbury, Allante, Alicea, Wallace, and Herget); that the employee for which the credit was claimed did not live in the enterprise zone (for employees Coleman, Albert, Gjurovski, and Lopez); and discrepancies in terms of when employment ended compared to dates credits were claimed, or whether appropriate amount of credit was claimed for wages paid (for employees Kates, Poinsetti, Gomez, Daniels, Bradbury, Williams, Allante, and Herget). The first two of these reasons were based upon Mr. Ward’s verification of the information provided in the EZ credit applications. With respect to those employees for whom credits were disallowed because they had left the employ of Michael’s, Petitioner introduced a letter from the Department’s tax specialist, Suzanne Paul. The letter stated that a company could claim credits up to three months after employment ended in order to recapture the three months of employment required prior to submitting an application for that employee. Mr. Ward was not aware of this letter at the time he performed the audit, and had he known, it would have changed his note, at least as to Mr. Gjurovski, concerning that basis for disallowing the credit. Respondent assessed Michael’s sales and use tax for disallowed EZ credits, for untaxed purchases of fixed assets, and for untaxed consumable purchases. Only the assessment related to disallowed EZ credits is challenged in this proceeding. The Notice of Intent to Make Audit changes included a penalty of $62,609.01. In the letter accompanying the notice, Mr. Ward informed Petitioner that the penalty for items assessed in Exhibit B01 had been adjusted based on the reasonable cause guidelines outlined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 12- 13.007. It appears that there was no adjustment or compromise of penalties associated with the disallowance of EZ credits. Mr. Ward testified that penalties were assessed in this case because EZ credits were also an issue in the prior audit for Michael’s. The payroll arrangement at issue in this case was not at issue in the prior audit, however, as it did not begin until 2012. The financial dealings of Michael’s, including the payment of taxes to the Department, were also under a new comptroller, who was not involved in the first audit. Lastly, while the Department found fault with EZ credits in the first audit, it compromised the taxes assessed for the same amount as those associated with the EZ credits. Mr. Ward acknowledged that, under the circumstances related to this audit, the penalty seemed harsh. The Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) on December 15, 2015, in which it assessed taxes in the amount of $127,243.77, penalties of $62,609.01, and interest as of December 15, 2015, of $19,605.03. Michael’s filed an informal protest of the proposed assessment with the Department by means of a letter dated February 5, 2016. On August 18, 2016, the Department issued a Notice of Decision that sustained the proposed assessment against Michael’s in full. The Notice of Decision, which is, by its terms, the Department’s final position in this matter, only addresses the issue of whether Michael’s is an eligible employer for the purpose of receiving EZ credits.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order assessing additional taxes based upon discrepancies in wages paid for eligible employees, and rejecting those parts of the assessment attributable to disallowance of enterprise zone credits based on information related to Petitioner’s initial applications. It is further recommended that no penalties be imposed on the reduced assessment. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2017.

Florida Laws (18) 120.569120.57120.68120.80212.08212.096212.11212.17213.34215.26220.181243.77288.703290.004290.0065609.0172.01195.091
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ISEASEAL, LLC vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 04-002373 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 08, 2004 Number: 04-002373 Latest Update: Jul. 01, 2005

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the taxpayer owes use tax, penalty and interest on the purchase of tangible personal property under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Iseaseal, LLC, a Delaware corporation, has its principal place of business at 695 East Main Street, Suite 103, Stamford, Connecticut. Its federal employer identification number is 06-1600000. On November 22, 2000, the taxpayer purchased a 1982, 72-foot, Hatteras CPMY yacht, named “Windcrest,” with hull number HATBN3270182 and 60 net tons of admeasurement. The purchase was made through a registered yacht broker. The yacht’s sales price was $725,000. On November 21, 2000, at the closing for the yacht, the taxpayer’s managing member, Paul Bakker, signed an Affidavit for Exemption of Boat Sold for Removal from the State of Florida by a Nonresident Purchaser. The yacht was also registered with the Coast Guard. However, to date, the yacht has not been registered or titled in Florida or any other U.S. state or territory. The taxpayer took possession of the yacht at Pier 66, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on November 22, 2000. Also, on November 22, 2000, the taxpayer was issued a 90-day decal known as a “cruising decal.” A cruising decal, with certain restrictions, exempts the purchase of a yacht from sales tax if the purchaser agrees to remove the yacht from Florida within 90 days after the date of purchase and does remove the purchased yacht. On December 28, 2000, the taxpayer removed the yacht from Florida to the Bahamas. The removal occurred within 90 days after the purchase date. As a result, the sale became exempt from Florida sales tax and the Petitioner did not pay Florida sales tax on the purchase of the yacht. On January 15, 2001, the taxpayer returned the yacht to Florida for repairs. A repair bill shows that the yacht remained at the repair facility for four and a half hours on January 16, 2001. The repair visit was within six months after the departure date of December 28, 2000. There was no evidence that the repair facility was registered with the Department of Revenue or how long the boat remained in Florida waters. The yacht also returned to Florida for repairs on May 21, 2001. Again there was no evidence that the repair facility was registered or how long the boat remained in Florida waters. The evidence did not establish that the tax exemption related to use of Florida waters for 20 days or repairing a boat in Florida apply. Since the purchase date, the Petitioner has leased mooring space in Florida. The Petitioner’s insurance policy also indicates that the yacht was moored in Florida and includes a Florida endorsement for such mooring. Additionally, the Petitioner reported to Connecticut’s Department of Revenue that the yacht was exempt from Connecticut sales tax because the yacht was purchased and berthed in the State of Florida. Based on copies of the bill of sale, closing statement, banking statements, credit card statements, mortgage documents, insurance agreements, mooring agreements, repair and parts receipts and a chronological listing of the yacht’s whereabouts since the date of purchase, the yacht has operated, and continues to operate, in Florida waters. Indeed, the yacht remained in Florida for more than 183 days from July 1, 2002 through December 31, 2002. Moreover, since September 11, 2002, the yacht has been moored or stored in Florida the majority of the time because the main users of the yacht lost interest in sailing the yacht and travel after the terrorist attack on the twin towers in New York City. The Department found that the Petitioner was liable for use tax on its use and storage of the yacht here in Florida. On May 5, 2004, the Department issued an enforcement billing to the Petitioner for use tax, penalty and interest, pursuant to Sections 212.05(1)(a)2 and 212.06(8), Florida Statutes. The Department assessed the Petitioner use tax and interest based on the sales price of the yacht. The Department also assessed the Petitioner a mandatory penalty equal to the tax because it returned the yacht to Florida within six months of the departure date. The Petitioner admitted that, through ignorance of Florida’s tax exemption law, he violated Chapter 212, but argues that the assessment of tax, interest and mandatory penalty is excessive. On May 24, 2004, the Department issued the Petitioner a Notice of Final Assessment for Sales and Use Tax, Penalty and Interest Due. The Notice set forth the basis for the assessment of tax, in the sum of $43,500, penalty, in the sum of $43,500, and interest, in the sum of $14,759.84, plus additional interest that accrues at the rate of $10.73 per day. The Department issued the Petitioner the Final Assessment because it returned the yacht to Florida within six months of the departure date and the yacht remained in Florida for more than 183 days in a calendar year. Since the Petitioner returned the yacht to Florida within 6 months of the purchase date and allowed the yacht to remain in Florida for more than 183 days in a calendar year, the Petitioner is liable for use tax, penalty and interest in the use and storage of the yacht in Florida.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a final order upholding the assessment of use tax, penalty and interest against the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Bakker Iseaseal, LLC 695 East Main Street Stamford, Connecticut 06901 Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Section Plaza Level 01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffman, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (8) 120.57212.02212.05212.06212.08212.12213.35328.48
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FLORIDA MINING AND MATERIALS CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, 76-001599 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001599 Latest Update: May 16, 1991

Findings Of Fact The facets herein are undisputed. On May 31, 1973 Petitioner purchased Thomas Concrete Company, and on February 28, 1973 Petitioner purchased Kelly Builders, Inc. Both companies were forthwith liquidated and federal income tax returns were filed in which depreciation in excess of fair value of the properties was recaptured for federal tax purposes. In his state corporate income tax returns Petitioner claimed deduction for that portion of the recaptured depreciation which occured prior to November 2, 1971, the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Statute. These deductions were disallowed by the Department of Revenue, that portion of the tax relating to Thomas Concrete Company was paid under protest, the portion relating to Kelly Builders, Inc. was not paid, and this petition was filed. In 1974 Petitioner sold real property on which it made a substantial capital gain. In computing its federal income tax the full capital gain was reported. However, that portion of its capital gain accruing prior to November 2, 1971 was excluded from its Florida corporate income tax and the assessment of $50,494.75 was levied against Petitioner by Respondent, Department of Revenue for the full amount of the capital gain as income received in 1974. The two issues here involved are whether Petitioner is taxable under Chapter 220 F.S. on depreciation taken prior to the effective date of Chapter 220, and subsequently recaptured, and whether Petitioner is taxable under Chapter 220, F.S. for the full amount of capital gain realized on property held prior to the effective date of Chapter 220 where part of appreciation occurred prior to the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax law.

Florida Laws (4) 220.02220.11220.12220.43
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STAN MUSIAL AND BIGGIE`S, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 75-001112 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001112 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 1977

The Issue Broadly stated, the issue in this proceeding the validity of the proposed deficiency in petitioner's corporate income in the amount of $25,712.80 for the 1972 fiscal year. More specifically, the issue is whether Florida may lawfully tax for the gain it realized on the sale of securities in the of $941,418.00. Included within this issue is the question of whether the apportionment formula set forth in Florida Statutes is applicable to petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the pleadings, the stipulations the parties and the record in this proceeding, the following relevant During the calendar year 1972, petitioner was a foreign " Corporation subject to the Florida Corporate Income Tax, imposed Chapter 220, Florida Statutes. Petitioner also operated a business in St. Louis, Missouri. January 1, 1972, petitioner held a 95 percent interest in Bal Harbour Joint Venture, which owned and operated the Ivanhoe Hotel and Restaurant in Bal Harbour, Florida. On December 15, 1972, petitioner was the sole owner of the Ivanhoe Hotel and Restaurant. November 16, 1972, the petitioner acquired by merger 100 percent interest in the Clearwater Beach Hilton, a motel and restaurant business located in Clearwater, Florida, and continued to own this interest on December 31, 1972. The Clearwater and Ivanhoe hotel and restaurant businesses in Florida and the petitioner's business in Missouri have separate, individual general managers. There is no central purchasing by the hotels and no centralized operating records are maintained by petitioner. There are no central reservation services available between the hotels and the hotels advertise separately and unilaterally in local publications in the cities in which they are located. No standardized product lines exist. On November 2, 1972, petitioner sold certain securities which resulted in a realized gain to petitioner for federal income tax purposes of $941,418.00. Said securities were purchased, located and sold in the State of Missouri, and had no relationship to petitioner's Florida transactions. Petitioner timely filed its 1972 Florida corporate income tax return on which it subtracted from its federal taxable income the gain realized from the sale of the securities. Its "Florida net income" and its "total tax due" were thus reported as "none." On or about May 8, 1974, respondent advised petitioner of a proposed deficiency in petitioner's 1972 tax in the amount of $29,392.00. In accordance with the provisions of Florida Statutes Sec. 214.11, petitioner timely filed with respondent its protest of the proposed deficiency assessment. After a hearing, respondent issued to petitioner its Notice of Decision in which the proposed, deficiency was reduced to $25,712.80, and the reasons therefor were set forth. Petitioner requested reconsideration by respondent. On March 11, 1975, the parties stipulated that further proceedings in this cause would be, processed under the Florida Administrative Procedures Act. The petition for hearing was forwarded by respondent to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the undersigned was duly assigned as the Hearing Officer.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that: the proposed deficiency assessment in the amount of $25,712.80 be vacated and set aside; and The respondent permit petitioner to file an amended 1972 return utilizing, within the discretion of the respondent, the employment of either separate accounting, a monthly averaging formula or another method which would effectuate an equitable apportionment of petitioner's income to the State of Florida. Respectfully submitted and entered this 8th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Pleasants Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings and Evans Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601 Louis de la Parte, Jr. 725 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Patricia S. Turner Assistant General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================

Florida Laws (4) 220.11220.12220.14220.15
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BINGHAMTON TOO, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 88-001989 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001989 Latest Update: Aug. 11, 1989

Findings Of Fact On January 31, 1984, the subject vessel, a 1969 sixty-five foot Hargrave Halmatic motor yacht, was purchased by Nelson Gross as President and principal of the corporation, Binghamton Too, Inc., for $457,500 in Houston Texas. It was financed through a Connecticut bank. The closing was held in Mr. Gross' New Jersey office. No sales or use tax has been paid on the yacht in Florida or in any other state. Mr. Gross' initial intent was to operate his new purchase as a commercial charter boat in conjunction with the "Binghamton," a ferryboat permanently moored and operating in Edgewater, New Jersey, as a floating restaurant. To get the new motor yacht there, Mr. Gross directed that it be brought to New Jersey around the Florida coast under its own power. The motor yacht reached Florida on February 17, 1984, but en route from Texas an unexpected vibration had arisen which required emergency repairs. These repairs were commissioned at Bradford Marine, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, where the motor yacht remained, except for sea trials in connection with the vibration problem, until the first week in April, 1984. A cracked strut was diagnosed as the cause of the vibration problem. Repair costs of this emergency problem totalled $5,975. The balance of charges incurred at Bradford Marine, Ft. Lauderdale, was $21,729, including dockage. Many more of the repairs catalogued by Respondent's Exhibit 5, the Bradford Marine records for this period, were clearly voluntary, discretionary, and cosmetic in nature. The majority were of a non-emergency nature. The vessel, by then relettered "Binghamton Too," left Florida waters approximately April 20, 1984. "Binghamton Too" next spent approximately three weeks at Thunderbolt Marine Industries in Georgia at an approximate cost of $12,000. There, a strap was fabricated to hold the strut and the yacht proceeded on to New Jersey. The "Binghamton Too" began its charter business as part of the "Binghamton" operation in Edgewater, New Jersey on May 5, 1984. Seventy-five to eighty charters were accomplished between May, 1984 and October, 1984 under New Jersey state and local chartering, transit liquor, and environmental licenses and under U.S. Corps of Engineers permits. "Binghamton Too" returned to Florida waters sometime on or before October 25, 1984, when it was sighted at the Indian River Causeway Bridge. On October 26, 1984, it was sighted at Flagler Bridge in West Palm Beach. Thereafter, it went on to the Lantana Boat Works Marina, Lantana, Florida, for repairs. Lantana is the location of the yacht's original builder, whose equipment and expertise were preferable to that of other boatyards for certain strut repairs due to the peculiar nature of this type of yacht. After those repairs, the yacht was anchored in Palm Beach from January 1985 to April 1985. Although Mr. Gross testified that the strut repairs of necessity had to be done in the Lantana boatyard, his view is not necessarily conclusive of this issue because he admitted "Binghamton Too" was the first yacht he had ever purchased, because he was vague about equating desirability and necessity without any supporting direct expert testimony, and because of the facts found infra. The Lantana repair records from October 29 to December 31, 1984 show $42,521.82 in repairs, of which only $2,500 pertain to fabrication of a strut. Again, the majority of repairs was to refurbish and paint the vessel. Mr. Gross spent approximately October 1984 to April 1985, October 1985 to April 1986, and October 1986 to April 1987 in his father's home in West Palm Beach, Florida. By his own testimony, he confirmed that he established the "technical" office for his "Binghamton Too" business there. He applied, in early December 1984, for a Florida sales tax registration to operate a charter business, representing Palm Beach as his place of business. The account was established January 1, 1985 with the account number of 60-22-080051-61. The captain and mate of the "Binghamton Too" also wintered in Florida each of these years. On December 6, 1984, Mr. Gross wrote the State of New Jersey's Division of Taxation that the yacht's "principal location and headquarters are in West Palm Beach, Florida where it maintains an office and full-time employees," thus successfully arguing that the "Binghamton Too" should be exempt from New Jersey's registration requirements for any vessel residing in that state in excess of 180 days. This correspondence was in connection with a tax problem of the mother ship "Binghamton," still moored in New Jersey. Mr. Gross further represented that Florida was "Binghamton Too's" primary location with trips to the Bahamas." For most of the period from late December, 1984 to early April, 1985, the yacht was in Palm Harbor Marina, West Palm Beach, Florida, the first time not in repairs, and clearly could have returned to New Jersey under its own power had Mr. Gross chosen to do so. From January 24 to March 26, 1985, the boat was in operation, as sighted at the Pompano Beach and Fort Lauderdale bridges. From April 1985 until October of 1985, the yacht was operated as part of Petitioner's commercial charter operation in New Jersey, which included over 100 charters during this time period. Nonetheless, on June 10, 1985, Mr. Gross purchased a boat slip at Ocean Reef Club in Key Largo, Florida. This slip was later sold. Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact 6-12, which clearly establish a pattern of wintering the yacht in Florida waters, it is inferred that, despite Mr. Gross' testimony that it was "necessary" to have "Binghamton Too's" strut repaired in late 1984 by the original Florida manufacturer of the yacht, its presence in Florida from October 1984 until April, 1985 was primarily and substantially due to the preference of Mr. Gross, Petitioner's President, and not due to necessity or emergency. In October of 1985, the yacht returned to Florida where it remained until April of 1986. During this time, the boat underwent further repairs, including the complete repainting of the hull, the need for which Mr. Gross attributed to the old paint being cracked and shaken off by the vibration of the yacht. From April 1986 until October of 1986, the yacht was operated as part of Petitioner's commercial charter operation in New Jersey, which included over 100 charters during this time period. The yacht returned to Florida in October, 1986, and again remained in Florida until early April, 1987, when it left for New Jersey. In late October 1987, the yacht returned to Florida where it was traded in as part of the consideration for a larger yacht in November of 1987. The closing date was December 30, 1987. The cash equivalent received by Petitioner as credit on the trade-in was $100,000. In all, Petitioner asserts that over $200,000 was spent by the corporation on the "Binghamton Too" before it was traded. Shortly after buying the "Binghamton Too", Petitioner had begun trying to sell it for the highest price obtainable. These sales efforts included large ads in national yachting publications and listings with active yacht brokers. The highest outright offer received by Petitioner was $75,000. However, this was Mr. Gross' first sales effort of this kind, and his opinion testimony that the "Binghamton Too" was not bought from the Petitioner outright and at a good price because of latent defects and cost of repair is neither credible nor persuasive since his opinion does not possess the reliability of an expert in assessing whether it was the condition of the yacht, its unusual "Halmatic" type, or some other factor which made the "Binghamton Too" undesirable to potential purchasers. The Florida Department of Revenue issued a Notice of Delinquent Tax January 30, 1987, of five-percent use tax upon the purchase price plus 25 percent penalty. Interest was figured at 12 percent per annum. Petitioner timely protested. The agency conceded that the purchase price on the original notice was mistakenly listed at $475,000, that the assessment appropriately should have been on $457,500 (see Finding of Fact No. 1) and that the State presently claims only the tax amount of 5% of Petitioner's initial $457,500 purchase price at $22,875, the 25 percent penalty at $5,719, and interest on the tax from February 18, 1984, to June 18, 1989 at $14,650. (Interest accrues at $7.52 daily.) The total assessment through June 18, 1989 is $43,234.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order affirming the assessment of $22,875, with 25% penalty and interest at $7.52 per day from February 18, 1984 until paid. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon consideration of Section 120.59(2) Florida Statutes the following rulings are made upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 2,3, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22: Accepted except to the degree not proven. 4: Rejected as stated because not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as a whole. 6, 12: Rejected in part as not proven, in part as subordinate and unnecessary, and in part as to the conclusion-if law as "latent." 7, 8, 9: Accepted except as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. 16: Accepted that Mr. Gross testified to this amount, however, the evidence does not support the amount precisely nor that it all went to "repairs." 20: Accepted as modified to better express the record as a whole. Respondent's PFOF: 1: Accepted, but as a Conclusion of Law. 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23: Accepted. 5: Accepted in substance; what is not adopted is either mere recitation/characterization of testimony, is cumulative, or is subordinate to the facts as found. 6: Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. 7: Sentence 1 is accepted. The remainder is rejected as mere legal argument or subordinate to the facts as found. 8, 11: Accepted as modified to conform to the record as a whole. Mr. Gross testified to a May 5, 1984 date for No. 8. 18: Except for mere legal argument, accepted. 24: Accepted upon the terms set forth in the Recommended Order. 25: Except as subordinate and unnecessary, accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Gene D. Brown, Esquire 3836 Killearn Court Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Linda G. Miklowitz, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William D. Moore, General Counsel Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Katie D. Tucker Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (3) 212.02212.06212.08
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DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE vs SPIN AND MARTY, INC., D/B/A CRABBIT`S PUB, 06-004192 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Brooksville, Florida Oct. 30, 2006 Number: 06-004192 Latest Update: Mar. 12, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's Certificate of Registration may lawfully be revoked.

Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida pursuant to Section 20.21. The Department has the responsibility of administering the revenue laws of the state, including the laws relating to the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use tax, pursuant to Chapter 212. Spin and Marty is a Florida corporation doing business as Crabbit's Pub whose principal address is 10513 Spring Hill Drive, Spring Hill, Florida. Spin and Marty is a "dealer" as that term is defined in Chapter 212. It holds a certificate of registration issued by the Department that is numbered 37-8012056472-7. Spin and Marty initially registered with the Department on January 30, 1992. The sales and use tax collected by a registrant, such as Spin and Marty, become the property of the state at the moment they are collected. A registrant is an agent of the state when collecting the sales and use tax. Spin and Marty was required to remit the sales and use tax collected to the state on or before the 20th of each month. From November 1999 until December 2003, Spin and Marty filed no returns and paid no sales and use taxes to the Department. Also, Spin and Marty, in November 2005, did not file a return or pay sales and use taxes. In a letter dated November 20, 2001, Spin and Marty was notified that the Department was going to audit its records. The Department received no response. In a letter dated April 3, 2002, Spin and Marty was again asked to contact the Department's auditor so a mutually agreed date could be set to conduct the audit. The Department received no response to this letter. The Department thereafter conducted an audit. The result of the audit was a notice of proposed assessment which stated that Spin and Marty owed $146,044.74 in back taxes, penalties, and interest through September 4, 2002. Neither Spin and Marty, nor its principal, Mr. McNiff, contested the audit findings. A letter from the Department addressed to "Dear Taxpayer," dated August 5, 2002, was received by Spin and Marty. This letter stated that the Department wished to arrange a meeting in its office for the purpose of reviewing the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated June 18, 2002. Spin and Marty did not avail itself of this opportunity. Six tax warrants were filed with the Clerk of Court in Hernando County against Spin and Marty. These warrants indicate that as of the day of the hearing Spin and Marty owed $175,299.93 to the Department. This amount includes the actual tax due, or in the case of warrant 1000000029678, the estimated tax due, penalties, interest, and filing fees. Interest continues to accrue. Pursuant to notice from the Department, on July 31, 2006, Theodore Faugno, who works for Mr. McNiff's CPA, and Mr. McNiff met with Debra B. Smith, a Revenue Specialist III with the Department. Neither Mr. McNiff nor Mr. Faugno contacted Ms. Smith following the meeting. This resulted in the Administrative Complaint seeking to revoke Respondent's Certificate of Registration. Mr. McNiff related that during the period he failed to submit returns and remit the taxes then due, he experienced adverse health issues and the unplanned birth of a baby. However, he was able to operate Spin and Marty and make a profit. It is indubitably concluded that he could have also reported and remitted the tax due, had he been so inclined.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue revoke Certificate of Registration No. 37-8012056472-7, held by Spin and Marty, Inc., d/b/a Crabbit's Pub. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Warren J. Bird, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 J. Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 James McNiff Spin and Marty, Inc., d/b/a Crabbit's Pub 10050 Sleepy Willow Court Spring Hill, Florida 34608 James McNiff Crabbit's Pub 10513 Spring Hill Drive Spring Hill, Florida 34608-5047 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.6020.21212.05212.18
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