The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondents' application for re-licensure of their therapeutic foster home should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The Respondents have operated a licensed foster home since 1994 and have operated a therapeutic foster home since 2011. The Respondents' foster home was originally licensed under the supervision of Lee County Mental Health Center, which was the local agency responsible for placing children in the home. In 2009, responsibility for supervision of the home was transferred to "Florida MENTOR" (MENTOR), which also assumed the responsibility for placement of children in the home. The children placed in the Respondents' foster home have been between eight and 11 years of age. Children placed in therapeutic foster homes have significant special needs and can be emotionally unstable. A safe and supportive therapeutic environment is required for their protection. The Respondents' license was valid through September 30, 2011. On August 3, 2011, the Respondents applied for renewal of the license. Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13.027 requires that changes in a licensee's household composition or employment be reported within 48 hours of the event. When the application was filed, the Respondents disclosed that their adult daughter and her three children had been residing with them for approximately three weeks. Prior to the application, the Respondents had not advised MENTOR that there had been any change in household composition. Mr. Williams became unemployed in December 2010, but the Respondents failed to report the change in the employment prior to filing the application. MENTOR was concerned about the financial stability of the household due to additional residents in the home and the reduction in income related to the loss of Mr. Williams' employment. An applicant for re-licensure of a foster home is required to submit financial information sufficient to establish that the applicant has the resources required to provide a stable household and meet basic expenses. The financial information initially submitted by the Respondents with the application for re-licensure was incomplete and did not appear to be an accurate reflection of household expenses. Attempts by MENTOR to obtain additional information were resisted by Ms. Williams. MENTOR eventually determined that, although the household had sufficient income to support their own expenses, placement of a foster child into the Respondents' home would cause a financial hardship for the family. Foster parents are permitted, with approval of the supervising agency, to add payments received to board a foster child to their income calculation, but the Respondents have not obtained such approval. By the time of the hearing, the Williams' adult daughter and her children no longer resided in the home, but Mr. Williams remained unemployed and was selling scrap metal to obtain income. At the hearing, he testified that his scrap metal income had been declining as more unemployed people began to collect and resell scrap. In September 2011, MENTOR completed the re-licensing study, a 24-page document that outlines the history of the foster home, including abuse reports and licensing deficiencies, and the efforts of the licensee to correct such issues. Rule 65C-13.028(3)(i)2. requires that the re-licensing study include documentation related to the level of cooperation by the licensee with the case plans developed for the child placed in the foster home. The re-licensing study documented MENTOR's concerns about the physical safety of children residing in the home and the Respondents' willingness and ability to provide appropriate support to therapeutic foster children placed in the home. During a significant period in 2011, the Respondents maintained a collection of junk metal and other debris in the yard of the foster home. The junk was apparently being collected by Mr. Williams for sale to scrap dealers. Jodi Koch, a MENTOR therapist who was assigned to work with the children in the Respondents' home, testified at the hearing about her observations of conditions in the home and about her interactions with the Respondents. In November 2010, Ms. Koch observed a child begin to play with a rusty machete that the child discovered in the Respondents' yard, and she so advised Ms. Williams, who expressed her displeasure that Ms. Koch had exceeded her authority as a therapist. Ms. Koch reported her observation to MENTOR personnel. MENTOR officials, including the program director and re-licensing coordinator, discussed the unsafe conditions of the property with the Respondents. Suggestions that the Respondents relocate the debris or otherwise prevent access by children to the debris were initially ignored by the Respondents. On May 2, 2011, MENTOR issued a Written Notice of Violation (Notice) to the Respondents, documenting the hazardous conditions of the property. The Notice was hand-delivered on May 5, 2011, at which time the Respondents refused to read or sign the paper. On May 6, 2011, the Lee County Code Enforcement Authority issued a nuisance citation against the Respondents for the accumulation of junk and debris on their property. The violation was cured on May 13, 2011, but, on June 1, 2011, the Lee County Code Enforcement Authority issued a second nuisance citation for the same violation. That violation was not resolved until November 2011, after the Lee County Code Enforcement Authority had prosecuted the violation through a hearing, and more than a year after Ms. Koch observed the child with the machete. At the hearing, Ms. Williams asserted that Ms. Koch was a therapist and that she had exceeded her authority by reporting the observations of the property to the MENTOR officials, essentially the same position Ms. Williams asserted in 2011 when Ms. Koch reported the situation to MENTOR. The MENTOR re-licensing study also documented the failure of the Respondents to cooperate in therapeutic plans developed for the children placed in the home and to supervise the children properly. Ms. Williams often refused to cooperate with the therapeutic plans and goals Ms. Koch developed for the children in the Respondents' foster home. Ms. Williams apparently concluded that she was better able to address the needs of a therapeutic foster child than was Ms. Koch, but the evidence failed to support such a conclusion. Ms. Williams refused to implement standard behavioral therapies suggested by Ms. Koch and opined that they were a "waste of her time." Ms. Williams refused to allow one foster child to have toys purchased for the child by Ms. Koch. Ms. Williams claimed that the child would have destroyed the toys, but Ms. Koch testified they had been purchased to allow the child to have her own possessions for the first time in the child's life and to develop a sense of responsibility. The Respondents routinely put children to bed at an early hour as a means of discipline and refused to comply with Ms. Koch's direction to develop other disciplinary practices. In one discussion with Ms. Koch at the home, Ms. Williams discussed the circumstances of one foster child in the presence of another foster child, violating the confidentiality of the children. The Respondents failed to contact MENTOR staff to address behavioral issues exhibited by children placed in the home and instead called upon law enforcement authorities to respond when a child refused to comply with their directions. The Respondents failed to supervise one child placed in their home sufficiently to prevent the child from accessing pay- per-view pornography on cable television, resulting in a charge in excess of $700 on one bill. It was clear, based on Ms. Williams' testimony and demeanor at the hearing, that Ms. Williams disliked Ms. Koch. Much of Ms. Williams' presentation of evidence during the February 17 portion of the hearing was directed towards discrediting MENTOR and Ms. Koch. After completing the re-licensing study, MENTOR forwarded the application and study to the Department, which received the materials on October 5, 2011. Notwithstanding the continuing problems between MENTOR and the Respondents, MENTOR recommended in the study that the Respondents' home be conditionally re-licensed. The conditions, essentially intended to increase the possibility that the Department would approve the application for re-licensure, were as follows: Reduction in the licensed capacity from two therapeutic individuals to one therapeutic individual. Unannounced visits to monitor the home in terms of food content, refrigerator temperature, client supervision and safety concerns. Continuing monitoring of the foster parents ability to work in conjunction with service providers regarding the best interests of the child. Monitoring to ensure that the living situation of the additional four residents was resolved within six months. Ms. Williams was dissatisfied with the results of the study, disagreed with the proposed conditions, and refused to accept them. While MENTOR (as the supervising agency) was responsible for the evaluation of the application, the Department has the responsibility for the making the final determination regarding licensure or re-licensure of a foster home. The Department considered the MENTOR recommendation when making the licensing decision. The primary focus of the Department's decision was whether the Respondents could provide an appropriate and safe environment for a therapeutic foster placement. The Department has no financial interest in the decision and had no direct contact with the Respondents. As the regional licensing manager for the Department, Kristine Emden was tasked with the responsibility of reviewing the application and materials. Based on her review, Ms. Emden determined that the application should be denied. Ms. Emden based her decision on the Respondents' lack of cooperation with therapeutic programs developed for the children in their care, their failure to supervise children adequately or to maintain confidentiality regarding the children, and their lack of cooperation with the MENTOR personnel who attempted to resolve the identified deficiencies. Additionally, Ms. Emden considered the Respondents' response to issues related to the hazardous conditions of the premises, the lack of financial resources to support a therapeutic foster placement in the home, and the rejection of conditions proposed by MENTOR in the study. Ms. Emden was unable to identify any remedial measures that would alter the denial of the application for re-licensure. The Respondents failed to offer credible evidence to establish that the Department's denial of the application was incorrect or that the application should otherwise be approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order denying the license application filed by the Respondents at issue in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2012.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent’s license to operate a foster home in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued herein on October 11, 1996.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Children and Families was the state agency responsible for the inspection and licensing of foster homes in this state. Respondent, Blanche Hadley, was issued an initial foster home license, No. 1095-13, for one child, for her residence at 1107 East Humphrey Street in Tampa, on October 21, 1995. The license was to continue in effect for one year, and several months before the license is due to expire, the Department does a study of the licensed home to see if re- licensing is appropriate. Ms. Hadley filed an application for renewal of her foster home license on July 5, 1996, several months before the license expired. Because the Department did not act in a timely manner to deny the application, it became a license by default. In the interim, however, on both August 15 and August 20, 1996, Francine McGee, a Department relicensing counselor, called Respondent on the telephone to discuss her relicensing and to schedule the Department’s visit to the home, because the license was due to expire on October 20, 1996. Ms. McGee also wanted to discuss certain items which, in her opinion, had to be corrected. During the August 15 call, Ms. McGee and Respondent discussed the need for a mandatory check of and re-tagging of the fire extinguishers in the home to insure they were working. This could be done only by one of several companies licensed to do so, or the fire department. Ms. Hadley did not want to do this, however. She got angry with Ms. McGee and hung up on her. Ms. McGee called back several days later in a second effort to resolve the fire extinguisher issue and, in addition, to discuss the fact that the home appeared to be overcrowded due to the presence of Ms. Hadley’s two grandchildren who were, purportedly, living there as well. Ms. Hadley again got angry and hung up on Ms. McGee. That same day, August 20, 1996, Ms. Altman, Ms. McGee’s supervisor, also called Ms. Hadley by phone, but Ms. Hadley hung up on her as well. The following day, Ms. McGee wrote to Ms. Hadley about the fire extinguishers and the two extra children in the home and also asked about the location of the nearest disaster shelters. It appears that in discussions about shelters with Ms. McGee in April, 1996, Ms. Hadley had indicated she did not believe in preparing for disasters, adopting instead the philosophy that, “when it’s your time to go, it’s your time to go.” She also hung up on Ms. McGee during that conversation, though she ultimately complied with the Department’s request and identified the closest shelters of which she knew. Ms. McGee, however, was not satisfied and wanted shelters closer to the house. Respondent also hung up on Ms. McGee during a telephone conversation held on May 22, 1996 about 5:30 in the evening. When reached by Ms. McGee, Respondent immediately said she didn’t have time to talk and hung up. This was a routine check call which would have taken no more than five minutes or so. Ms. Hadley responded to Ms. McGee’s August 20, 1996 letter by her own letter in which she did not address the Department’s concerns. Instead, she indicated that if it had been necessary for her to change any of the conditions existing at her home, she would have been told of the defects in the safety inspections done on it. She claimed she would not be used by the system. Ms. McGee tried to explain to Ms. Hadley that these matters were not an attempt by the Department to use her but merely an attempt to enforce the Department rules which had to be followed. Ms. Hadley, as early as February 27, 1996, was asked by Ms. McGee to purchase an additional smoke detector to supplement those already there. One existing detector was located between the bedrooms occupied by Respondent and her brother, who lives with her, and the second is located in the family room near the foster child’s bedroom, which was not occupied at the time. Ms. McGee claims she merely suggested the placement of a third detector near the kitchen to give quicker notice of kitchen fires. This was not a requirement by the Department rules, but Respondent still resisted compliance. Though Respondent now denies any of her grandchildren live with her, Ms. McGee recalls a conversation she had with Respondent on August 15, 1996, when Respondent indicated she had two grandchildren living in the home with her. This, if true, constituted overcrowding since with the two adults, (Ms. Hadley and her brother) and the two grandchildren, and only four beds in the house, there would have been no room for any foster child. Ms. Hadley had initially indicated the children only came for dinner from time to time, and this was acceptable, but, allegedly, she later changed her story to indicate they did live there. Ms. Hadley denies having said this. When Ms. McGee raised the issue with Respondent, Respondent allegedly claimed the grandchildren slept with her, and when Ms. McGee indicated that was too crowded, Respondent hung up on her and on Ms. Altman who called later in the day. In light of the obvious mutual animosity between Ms. Hadley and Ms. McGee, it is clear there was a miscommunication on this issue, and in the absence of some independent evidence of the fact that the grandchildren resided at the house, it is found they did not. Department records indicate no foster children have ever been placed in Respondent’s facility. Whenever she was called to take children, she would not accept them. A foster home has to be prepared to receive foster children, and the deficiencies identified by Ms. McGee, if accurate, would disqualify this home. Based on the above, and due to a continuing lack of ability to communicate with the Respondent, Ms. McGee recommends that Respondent’s license to operate a foster home be disciplined. Ms. Hadley tells a somewhat different version of Ms. McGee’s story. She contends that when Ms. McGee came to her home for the first time, somewhat after a letter had been sent to her, she received McGee warmly. From the very first, however, Ms. Hadley was put off by what she described as Ms. McGee’s “snotty” attitude. Respondent claims that she went to classes to learn what she had to do as the operator of a foster home and did it. In addition, Ms. Hadley claims she followed to the letter the dictates imposed as a result of the safety inspections her facility underwent, though she admits she was resistant to re-tagging the fire extinguisher because it had never been used. She didn’t want to pay $16.00 to have it re-tagged if it was not a bona-fide requirement. Unfortunately for her, fire requirements mandate a yearly check and re-certification whether the unit is used in the interim or not. As for the allegations that she hung up on Ms. McGee and Ms. Altman, Ms. Hadley claims she asked Ms. McGee not to call her at work but to call at home. When McGee called her at home and got “hostile”, Hadley admits to hanging up on her. With regard to the call from Ms. Altman, when that call was made, Ms Hadley was still at work and Hadley merely indicated that she could not talk with Altman at the time. She denies hanging up on a Department representative more than one time, and claims she did it that time only from work when the party calling her continued to talk after she advised she could not take calls at her work place. Ms. Hadley works from 8 to 5 each day and goes home for lunch from 12:05 to 12:45. She requested that Ms. McGee call her at home during that period. McGee admits to this, but claims her schedule did not always allow her to make calls at that time. When she called and Respondent was not at home, she would leave a message on the answering machine and called at work when those messages went unanswered. Ms. McGee stays at her office until 6:30 PM most days, and could see no reason why Respondent could not return her calls after she got home from work at 5:30. McGee tries to convenience foster parents in the matter of phone calls and visits, and she admits that often Respondent did return calls left on the answering machine during the lunch hour, but by that time, McGee was again out of the office. Hanging up on a Department representative is unacceptable without justification. It is clear Ms. Hadley did so, but the question of how often she did so is not resolved by the evidence. Most likely, from the obvious hostility indicated, it was more than once. Ms. Hadley candidly admits to resisting making additional changes to her home which were not called for either in the training classes she took or the pre-licensure inspection made of the home. She agrees to have the fire extinguisher check and recharged if that is a requirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order suspending the license for the foster home operated by Blanche Hadley at 1107 East Humphrey Street, in Tampa, pending compliance with all legitimate safety and operating requirements and a demonstration by the Respondent of a more cooperative attitude toward the Department staff. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond R. Deckert, Esquire Department of Children and Families 4000 West Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33614 Blanche Hadley 1107 East Humphrey Street Tampa, Florida 33604 Richard A. Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Families 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Two, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building Two, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners should be licensed to operate a foster home in Marianna, Jackson County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Respondent licensed Petitioners to operate a foster home in Respondent's District No. 9, West Palm Beach, Florida, beginning in 1995 through April 1, 2000. The Department of Health, under its Children's Medical Services Program, licensed Petitioners as medical foster parents for almost two years of that time. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioners had five children living with them in West Palm Beach, Florida. Two boys, aged six and three, were Petitioners' adopted sons. A two-year-old boy, A.B., and his one-year-old sister, T.B. were medical foster children. C.S. was a two-year-old female foster child. In August 1999, Petitioners bought a home in Respondent's District No. 2, which includes Marianna, Jackson County, Florida. Mr. Mayes is a carpenter and intended to make repairs to the home before moving his family to North Florida. Petitioners knew their foster home license in District No. 9 was not transferable to District No. 2. Therefore, they applied for a foster home license in District No. 2. Petitioners wanted their three foster children to move with them to Mariana, Florida. Petitioners hoped to adopt C.S. and to keep A.B. and T.B. in the same placement until another family adopted them. All of the foster children had been in Petitioners' home since they were a few days old. A.B. was a very active two-year-old child. He regularly climbed out of his crib. On one occasion he climbed up on the stove and turned on the burners. He seemed to "have no fear." In the fall of 1999, Mrs. Mayes requested Respondent to provide her with behavior management assistance for A.B. Because Petitioners were planning to move out of District No. 9, Respondent decided to wait until A.B. was settled after Petitioners' move to perform the behavior management evaluation. In the meantime, Petitioners could not keep A.B. in his highchair during mealtime. They had difficulty keeping him in his crib. They bought a safety harness and attempted to use it to keep A.B. in his crib on one occasion and in his highchair on another occasion. A.B. was able to wiggle out of the harness on both occasions. Petitioners subsequently discarded the harness. They resorted to tightening the highchair's feeding tray in order to keep A.B. still long enough to feed him. Petitioners never used and never intended to use the harness to punish A.B. Petitioners usually disciplined the children by placing them in timeout for one minute per year of age. Timeout for Petitioners' foster children usually meant being held in Mrs. Mayes' lap. Mrs. Mayes admitted using the safety harness on A.B. during a telephone conversation with Respondent's medical foster care counselor in January 2000. The counselor informed Ms. Mayes that foster parents are not allowed to use a harness to restrain foster children. Prospective foster parents must participate in and complete training classes designed by Respondent. Persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent teaches prospective foster parents during this training that children should never be restrained by a harness. Petitioners have taken these training classes. If A.B. and the other children were free to go into a bedroom, they would pull everything out of the chest of drawers. They would flush objects down the toilet in the bathroom. Mr. Mayes put a hook-type latch on the door to the Petitioners' bedroom, A.B.'s bedroom, and the bathroom in the hall. The primary purpose of the door latches was to keep the children out of unsupervised areas of the home. Petitioners never used the door latches as a means of discipline. On two occasions Mrs. Mayes latched the door to A.B.'s room while he was in the room asleep. The first time she latched the door while she went to the mail box in front of her home. The other time, she latched the door while she bathed another child who had a doctor's appointment later that afternoon. On both occasions, A.B. was locked in his room for only a few minutes. Petitioners knew that they needed permission from Respondent in order to take A.B., T.B., and C.S. out of the state on vacations. On several occasions, Respondent's staff gave Petitioners permission to take the foster children to North Florida for short visits during the time that Mr. Mayes was remodeling the home. Respondent's staff approved these short visits as if they were vacations. Petitioners knew that they needed to be licensed in Respondent's District No. 2 before Respondent's staff in District No. 9 could approve the permanent transfer of the foster children. At the same time, the Respondent's staff in District No. 2 could not license Petitioners until they actually made the move with all of their furniture. Petitioners discussed their dilemma with several members of Respondent's staff in District No. 9. During these conversations, Petitioners asked Respondent if they could take the children with them and treat the time that they would be temporarily unlicensed as if it were a vacation. At least one member of Respondent's staff responded that treating the move initially as if it were a vacation was "an option that could be explored." Respondent's staff subsequently advised Petitioners that under no circumstances could the foster children move to Jackson County, temporarily or permanently, until Petitioners were properly licensed. Petitioner's never attempted to deceive Respondent; to the contrary, they were openly looking for an acceptable way to take the foster children with then when they moved. They never intended to circumvent the proper licensing process. Based on Petitioners' former experience with Respondent, they believed that treating the move as a vacation would be an appropriate way to solve what was otherwise a "catch twenty-two" situation. By letter dated March 14, 2000, Respondent's staff in District No. 2 advised Petitioners that they would receive a provisional foster home license as soon as information furnished by Petitioners and copies of Petitioners' file from the licensing unit in District No. 9 could be sent to Respondent's office in Panama City, Florida. Respondent removed the three foster children from Petitioners' home just before Petitioners moved to Jackson County on April 1, 2000. In a memorandum dated April 19, 2000, Respondent listed Petitioners' home as one of two medical foster homes in Jackson County, Florida. Despite the representation in this memorandum, Respondent issued the letter of denial on June 5, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners a foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James Mayes Gail Mayes 4561 Magnolia Road Marianna, Florida 32448 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe, Suite 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a family foster home should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Sometime around 2004, Petitioner held a license as a foster home in Florida. During the licensure period, Petitioner fostered X. B. and T. T. in her home where she resided with her three biological children. X. B. stayed in Petitioner's home for approximately three weeks to a month. Throughout X. B.'s stay, Petitioner failed to provide breakfast to X. B. prior to school. Petitioner's failure necessitated the case manager providing such breakfast to X. B. when she drove X. B. to school. Additionally, on several occasions the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in the home. In particular, upon X. B.'s return to Petitioner's home from visiting X. B.'s siblings, the case manager found him in a roach-infested environment, with no running water in the home since the service had been turned off by the service provider for non-payment of the bill. The toilet bowl was filled with feces and urine and had feces on the lid. It was unsanitary and unusable. X. B. asked the case manager to take him to the local gas station so that X. B. could use the bathroom. Soon after, X. B. was removed from Petitioner's care due to unsanitary conditions and/or unsafe conditions in Petitioner's home. T. T. was a one-year-old child who was also placed in Petitioner's foster home during her earlier licensure period. Again, the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in Petitioner's home. At first, the case manager only saw a couple of roaches in the home. However, the roach problem progressively grew to the point that during one of the case manager's visits the wall behind the baby's crib looked like it was moving because there were so many roaches on it. Soon after, the case manager removed T. T. to another foster home. When they arrived at the new home, a roach crawled out of T. T.'s diaper bag. Upon inspection of the bag, the case manager discovered many dead roaches in the bag. More importantly, half of a dead roach was discovered in the baby bottle of milk that T. T. was drinking while being moved to T. T.'s new foster home. Clearly, the condition of Petitioner's foster home was neither sanitary nor safe. Petitioner's care of both these children resulted in verified abuse reports in Florida's abuse registry for conditions hazardous to the health of children. Petitioner's initial foster home license either lapsed or was not renewed. Since 2004, Petitioner has not been financially stable. In fact, she often asked her neighbors for money to pay her utility bills or buy gas for her car. Additionally, Petitioner lost different homes to foreclosure in 2006 and 2007. Since 2009, she and her children have moved to a different home an average of once a year. To her credit, Petitioner attended college and obtained her doctorate in Theology and Philosophy. However, her history has not demonstrated either household stability or financial ability in her life. In 2011, Petitioner applied for licensure as a family foster home. She successfully completed the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) training program on September 20, 2011. In June 2012, Trauma Therapist for Children’s Homes Society, Katie Klutz, began the required home study of Petitioner. During the home study, Petitioner and her three biological children were living in a three bedroom home. Petitioner moved her bedroom furniture into the living room in order to make room for potential foster children. The bedroom space was separated from the living room by "curtains" that afforded no significant privacy for those living in the home. Clearly, Petitioner's home did not provide sufficient space to foster an additional child in the home. Petitioner has since moved to a larger home that was not the subject of the home study for this license. However, given Petitioner's past household instability, the very limited evidence regarding this new home does not support a finding that Petitioner's current home offers sufficient space to provide for the privacy and well-being of a foster child. More importantly, Petitioner has not worked since having an accident on the job in May 2010. A neighbor also provided a written reference in which she praised Petitioner’s spirit but stated that it is “a real struggle” for Petitioner to maintain her home and that “she will definitely need additional support in this area.” Notably, it was unclear how Petitioner was currently supporting her household. She has no employment. Petitioner claimed that she received money from a church or charitable organization that she founded. However, there was no evidence that such limited income, if any, was sufficient to support her family and/or provide financially stable conditions to Petitioner and her family. Moreover, Petitioner's bank records reflect that in June 2012, she made deposits of $167.53 and debited the account $266.07. Her ending balance in June was $18.81. At hearing, other than child support and food stamps, Petitioner offered no evidence of additional finances or income that is attributable to her. Given these facts, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate home safety, household stability or financial ability sufficient to entitle her to be licensed as a foster home. Therefore, Petitioner's application for such licensure should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure as a foster home should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Rowell, Esquire Department of Children and Families 2383 Phillips Road Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Shakinah Glory 4768 Woodville Highway Apartment 428 Tallahassee, Florida 32305 M. Burnette Coats, Esquire Department of Children and Families 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David Wilkins, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination at final hearing is whether Respondent's foster care license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact On July 1, 1995, Mildred Sands (Respondent) was issued a provisional foster home license by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Petitioner), with an effective period of July 1, 1995 - June 30, 1996. Her license number is 0795-06-3. A provisional license is issued when all requirements for a license are not met and the licensee is given a specific time period to comply with the remaining requirements. Due to a court action involving a minor child, J. F., who was born on May 7, 1983, the court placed J. F. with Respondent. In order for the minor child to live with Respondent, Petitioner issued Respondent a provisional license. Prior to the placement, Respondent knew J. F.'s mother for several years on a personal basis. The mother and her children were at one time living with Respondent. Respondent is J. F.'s godmother and has interacted with her since J. F.'s birth. Prior to licensing, on June 12, 1995, Respondent signed a "Bilateral Service Agreement" (Bilateral Agreement) with Petitioner, agreeing to abide by or with several conditions. The Bilateral Agreement provides in pertinent part: 2. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. * * * 8. We will accept dependent children into our home for care only from the Department and will make no plans for boarding other children or adults. We will notify the Department if any adult relative or family members returns to live in the home. * * * 10. We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, employment, living arrangements, arrest record, health status or family composition, as well as any special needs for the child (i.e. health, school problems, emotional problems). * * * 16. We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster home as prescribed by the Department. * * * 18. We understand that any breach of the Agreement may result in the immediate removal of the child(ren) and revocation of the license. Respondent signed a "Discipline Policy Agreement" (Discipline Agreement) on July 19, 1993, when she was initially licensed as a foster care provider and on June 12, 1995, during her re-licensure process. The Discipline Agreement signed on July 19, 1993, provides in pertinent part: The following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN in caring for your foster child. Failure to comply may result in an investigation and possible closure of your home. * * * Hitting a child with an object. Slapping or spanking a child, or ANY OTHER physical discipline. The Discipline Agreement signed on June 12, 1995, provides in pertinent part: [T]he following disciplinary practices are FORBIDDEN on our children. FAILURE OF THE FOSTER PARENT(S)... TO COMPLY MAY RESULT IN THE REMOVAL OF THE CHILD(REN) FOR AN INVESTIGATION AND RESULT IN THE CLOSURE OF YOUR HOME. * * * Hitting a child with ANY object. Slapping, smacking, whipping, washing mouth out with soap, or ANY other form of physical discipline. On February 14, 1995, Petitioner waived placement requirements in order for J. F.'s siblings to be placed with Respondent to keep the family unit together. J. F.'s siblings had been living with her grandmother who had become ill and was unable to care for the children. On September 1, 1995, Petitioner received a report of alleged child abuse allegedly committed by Respondent against J. F., who was 12 years old, at Respondent's foster home. Respondent was allegedly disciplining J. F. Within a short span of time that same day, Petitioner began an investigation. The minor child, J. F., had raised bruises, swelling, abrasions, and redness on the lower part of her legs. Also, J. F. had a small scratch on one of her legs and a scratch on her left arm. The injuries were purportedly inflicted by a ruler. No expert opinion was presented to confirm that the injuries were consistent with such an instrument, and no attempt was made to obtain the instrument used to commit the alleged abuse. Petitioner removed all the children from Respondent's home. Petitioner notified Respondent that it was revoking her foster home license due to the alleged excessive corporal punishment. The minor child, J. F., did not testify at the hearing. 1/ Respondent did not inflict the injuries to the minor child, J. F. 2/ Respondent did not use corporal punishment of any kind on the minor child, J. F. Respondent did not violate the Discipline Agreement. Respondent was responsible for the supervision and care of the minor child, J. F. Respondent was not aware of J. F.'s injuries and was, therefore, unable to notify Petitioner of the injuries or to obtain medical attention for J. F.'s injuries. Respondent had allowed the children's adult sibling, who was 19 years old, to live with her and the children. Respondent failed to notify Petitioner that the adult sister would be and was living in her home. In failing to notify Petitioner, Respondent violated the Bilateral Agreement, paragraph numbered 8.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the foster home license of Mildred Sands not be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1996.
The Issue Did Respondent violate Section 409.175(8)(b)1, Florida Statutes, or Rule 65C-13.011(d) and (f)1, Florida Administrative Code, and, if so, should Respondent's license as a foster home be revoked?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a foster home, having been issued such license on October 23, 1997. The Department is the agency of the state charged with the responsibility and duty to carry out and enforce the provisions of Chapter 409, Florida Statutes. Respondent received the Department's Model Approach to Partnership Parenting (MAPP) training to become a foster parent between September 1995 and December 1995. The Department provides MAPP training to teach persons how to become foster parents. The MAPP training that Respondent received included instructions concerning appropriate sleeping arrangements, namely that an adult should not sleep in the same bed with a foster child. Respondent agreed that the MAPP training was very useful and that he gained insight from that training on how to be a foster parent. Respondent received his foster care license on October 23, 1997, and the Department placed its first foster child with Respondent in January 1998. Foster child D.D., born October 23, 1985, was placed with Respondent by the Department January 20, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 12, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. Foster child E.T., born December 12, 1984, was placed with Respondent on January 12, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until January 21, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. E.T. was again placed by the Department with Respondent on January 23, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 12, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. Foster child R.M., born October 10, 1984, was placed with Respondent by the Department on March 2, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 9, 1998, when he was removed by the Department due to an alleged incident between R.M. and E.T. which occurred on March 9, 1998. The incident resulted in the Department's conducting an investigation concerning an alleged abuse on the foster child, E.T. by the foster child, R.M.. It appears from the record that the allegations were unfounded. In any event, R.M. was removed from Respondent's foster home on March 9, 1998, because his record indicated that in an earlier incident R.M. had sexually victimized another child (not E.T.). Also, because E.T. had been sexually victimized by another child (not R.M.) previous to being placed in Respondent's care the Department decided to remove E.T. from Respondent's home. It should be noted that the Department was aware of these prior incidents concerning R.M. and E.T. and the sleeping arrangements at Respondent's foster home at the time these foster children were placed with Respondent by the Department. Foster children, B.B. and C.L., dates of birth not in evidence, were placed with the Respondent by the Department on February 24, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until February 25, 1998, when they were removed by the Department. During the investigation concerning the alleged abuse incident involving R.M. and E.T. and at the hearing, Respondent admitted to sleeping in the same bed as E.T. and D.D. Respondent testified that on at least five occasions E.T. had slept in the same bed as Respondent. The facts surrounding this sleeping arrangement was that E.T. was suffering from an upper respiratory problem and would go to sleep on Respondent's bed before Respondent, who stayed up late reading, was ready for bed. As a result Respondent would sleep with E.T. to keep from waking him. There was no allegation, and certainly no evidence, that Respondent sexually or otherwise molested E.T. at any time. Respondent also admitted to sleeping in the same bed as D.D. on one occasion. Again, there was no allegation, and certainly no evidence, that Respondent sexually or otherwise molested D.D. At the time the Respondent applied for and was granted a foster home license and during the intervening time, the Department's personnel who worked with Respondent were well aware of the lack of sleeping spaces in Respondent's home. In fact, one of the Department's employees upon being advised of Respondent's sleeping arrangements commented that "it was better than sleeping on the floor at HRS." Upon being advised of the restriction on adults sleeping with foster children, the Respondent did not at first fully understand the risk of harm to the children. However, after being reminded of his MAPP training and the risk of harm to children in such a sleeping arrangement, Respondent realized his mistake in allowing such sleeping arrangements. Under Respondent's tutelage, E.T. and D.D. thrived academically and have continued to thrive since they left Respondent's home. The Department had some concern that Respondent's son was living in the home and that it had not been made aware of that circumstance. However, the Department knew, when Respondent's license was issued, that his son was living in the home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the mitigating circumstances, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order suspending Respondent's foster home license for a period of one year, staying the suspension and imposing such reasonable conditions as the Department deems necessary to further educate Respondent as to his responsibilities as a foster parent. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 Thomas D. Wilson, Esquire Law Office of Gregory Ruster 1525 South Florida Avenue Suite 3 Lakeland, Florida 33803 Gregory D. Venz. Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license should be denied on the grounds set forth in the June 20, 1995, letter from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), Respondent's predecessor, to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is (as was its predecessor, HRS) a state government licensing and regulatory agency. From September of 1989 to June 30, 1995, Petitioner was licensed by HRS (on a yearly basis) to operate a family foster home at her residence in Palm Beach County. In May of 1994, as part of the licensure renewal process, Petitioner signed an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children" (Agreement). In so doing, she agreed that she would, as a licensed foster parent, among other things, "comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the department," "immediately report any injuries or illness of a child in [her] care," and "abide by the department's discipline policy." The previous day (May 23, 1994), Petitioner had received and signed a copy of HRS's "discipline policy," which provided as follows: FOSTER PARENT(S): You are aware that for some time, Health and Rehabilitative Services has discouraged the use of Physical punishment, including spanking, for children in foster care. Now, however, we have an Administrative Rule statewide which prohibits foster parents from using corporal punishment on foster children. This section of administrative Rule 10M- 6, which deals with discipline is reproduced in the following paragraph. "Licensing and relicensing procedure developed by the Department shall include the presentation of written foster care disciplinary policies to applicants and licensed foster parents to ensure that appropriate nonabusive disciplinary practices are used in dealing with foster children's behavior. Discipline is a training process through which the child develops the self- control, self-reliance and orderly conduct necessary for them to assume responsibilities, make daily living decisions and live according to accepted levels of social behaviors. The purpose of discipline is education and rational. It focuses on deterring unacceptable behavior by encouraging the child to develop internal controls. Foster parents are expected to define rules which establish limits and types of acceptable behavior. These rules must be clearly explained to each child and applied equally to all children. Prohibited disciplinary practices include group punishments for misbehavior of individuals; withholding of meals, mail or family visits; hitting a child with an object; spanking a child; physical, sexual, emotional and verbal abuse; humiliating or degrading punishment which subjects the child to ridicule; being placed in a locked room; and delegation of authority for punishment to other children or persons not known to the child. The use of isolation shall be used only for short periods of time as a therapeutic measure when a child's behavior is temporarily out of control. Such periods of isolation shall be observed and supervised by the foster parent to ensure the safety of the child." If you have problems with this new rule, please discuss this with your licensing counselors who will be able to help you work out alternative disciplinary techniques for each child, according to his/her needs. My signature acknowledges that I have read this statement, that I understand the content and agree to abide by it. A. G. is a 12 year-old foster child who currently resides in Boys Town in Tallahassee. Before entering the foster care system, he had been the victim of abuse. In 1994, A. G. lived in Petitioner's family foster home along with three other male foster children, J. W., M. M., and B. P., all of whom were teenagers with troubled pasts and juvenile records. On or about December 15, 1994, the day before A. G. was scheduled to leave Petitioner's home for another foster home, the other boys angrily reported to Petitioner that A. G. had misappropriated a gift certificate that belonged to M. M. and a watch that belonged to B. P. M. M. was particularly upset and angry about what A. G. had done. Upon receiving this report, Petitioner instructed the boys to "take care of" the matter. The boys then went to A. G.'s room and proceeded to hit A. G. with their hands and a belt. A. G. sustained a number of bruises on his buttocks and the back of his legs as a result of the attack. A. G. yelled and screamed as he was being hit. Petitioner was in her bedroom, which was adjacent to the room where the beating took place. At no time during the attack did she leave her bedroom to tell the boys to stop beating A. G., nor did she take any other action to stop the beating. Petitioner exercised extremely poor judgment in instructing the older boys to "take care of" the matter. She should have realized that the carte blanche she gave J. W., M. M., and B. P., who were upset and angry with A. G., placed A. G.'s physical safety at risk. She compounded her error by not carefully monitoring the older boys subsequent activities to make sure that they resolved the matter appropriately without harming A. G. The following morning, A. G. left Petitioner's home for another foster home, that of Janet Kerimoglu and her husband. A. G. arrived at the Kerimoglu home with very few belongings. Moreover, his physical appearance concerned Ms. Kerimoglu. A. G. appeared to be very thin. Furthermore, he had head lice and fresh bruises on his body. When asked about the bruises, A. G. explained that he had been beaten up by some teenagers the day before at Petitioner's home. A report that A. G. had been the victim of abuse while at Petitioner's home was made to HRS's abuse registry. The report was investigated by HRS's protective services investigative unit. On January 10, 1995, following the completion of the investigation, FPSS Report No. 94-117809 issued. The report classified as "proposed confirmed" the allegation that Respondent was guilty of neglect in connection with the beating that A. G. received at her home on or about December 15, 1994. According to the report, the beating occurred "because of [Petitioner's] lack of supervision and [her] failure to protect [A. G.]," a finding which is supported by the preponderance of the record evidence in the instant case. A request to expunge or amend the report was denied on June 6, 1995. By letter dated June 20, 1995, Petitioner was advised that her foster family home license would not renewed because of the finding of neglect made in FPSS Report No. 94-117809.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1998.
The Issue Should Respondents' application for annual renewal of their foster care license be denied?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the Agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of licensing family foster homes. Respondents were first licensed as a foster home by the Department in February 1999. At the time of the initial licensure in February 1999, the Department was aware that Respondents owned a large Rottweiler dog. However, the issue of the dog was resolved, and the Department issued Respondents their initial license and renewed their license in February 2000. At the time of the initial licensure in February 1999, and the renewal in February 2000, Respondents had an in-ground swimming pool located in their backyard. Apparently, the lack of a proper barrier around the pool, as required by the Department rule, was not an issue since the Department issued the initial license in February 1999, and renewed that license in February 2000. On November 6, 2000, Respondents filed an application with the Department for renewal of their foster home license. On November 6, 2000, Cheryl Dishong, the Department's foster care licensing worker, visited Respondents' home and determined that Respondents were caring for nine children in their home which included: (a) four foster children placed in Respondents' home by the Department; (b) Respondents' two natural children; (c) Respondents' two adopted children; and (d) one child, no relation to Respondents, which they were caring for due to the child's mother having been incarcerated. However, this child is no longer in the home except for visiting. Respondents never attempted to a seek waiver to exceed the "rule of five" set out in Rule 65C-13.001(a), Florida Administrative Code, for good cause as provided for in Rule 65C-13.011(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code. On December 8, 2000, Mazen Omari, sanitation inspector with the Polk County Heath Department, inspected Respondents' home and found the following: (a) the carpet in the living room and the bedrooms needed cleaning and the kitchen needed cleaning (there were dirty dishes in kitchen sink); (b) the children's bedrooms needed cleaning and their clothes needed to be put in a proper place; and (c) the fire extinguisher needed an up-to-date inspection tag. Respondents did not advise the Polk County Heath Department that the violations noted by Omari on December 8, 2000, had been corrected. Therefore, the Polk County Health Department did not provide the Department with an approved Sanitation Report. On January 3, 2001, Cheryl Dishong visited Respondents' home. During this visit, Dishong determined that Respondents had not corrected the sanitary violations cited by Omari on December 8, 2000. Dishong found that Respondents' fire extinguisher had been used but had not been recharged. Dishong observed: (a) dirt, dirty handprints, and crayon markings on the walls throughout the house; (b) dirty carpet throughout the house; and (c) general clutter, with piles of clothes on the floor in the laundry room. Cheryl Dishong visited Respondents' home again on January 12, 2001, and observed that not all of the sanitary violations cited by Omari on December 8, 2000, had been corrected. Dishong also observed: (a) the house being in "general disarray;" (b) a bed frame in one of the rooms which needed to be stored where it would not constitute a danger to the children's safety; (c) zippy cups and clothing strewn about; and (d) debris, including chair cushions and "other things" scattered all over the yard, which could be considered as constituting a danger to the children's safety. Dishong visited Respondents' home again on January 22, 2001, and observed that not all of the sanitary violations cited by Omari on December 8, 2000, had been corrected. Dishong also observed some hazardous household cleaning chemicals that were not locked up to prevent access by the children. However, Respondents had purchased a lock, and it appeared that they were in the process of installing the lock on the cabinet door to prevent access to the chemicals by the children. In the front yard, Dishong observed: (a) a garden hose lying across the walkway in two places; (b) a metal rectangular bar lying across the walkway which two of the boys were throwing back and forth; (c) a toy lawnmower under the family van; and (d) garbage items such as open bean cans and pieces of cement scattered "all about.” In the backyard, Dishong observed: (a) a trampoline beside the swimming pool; (b) items scattered throughout the backyard, including chair cushions; (c) that there was no barrier around the swimming pool as required by Department rule; (d) and that the pool was covered by green algae. All of the things observed by Dishong at Respondents' home on January 22, 2001, could be considered as constituting a danger to the children's safety. Respondent Troy Allen testified that there was a fence installed on three sides of the swimming pool and that the house served as a barrier on the fourth side. However, there were no safety features, such as those listed in Rule 65C-13.01(12)(c), Florida Administrative Code, installed on the exits from the house to the swimming pool to prevent the children from having access to the swimming pool only when supervised. Therefore the swimming pool was readily accessible to the children from the house when unsupervised. Respondents own a Rottweiler dog, and had owned such a dog from the beginning of their licensure in February 1999. The dog was present at Respondents home on each occasion that Dishong visited Respondents' home. An earlier safety plan, agreed to by Respondents, required that the dog be kept outside, or restricted from the children, unless supervised while in the presence of the children. There was no evidence that this agreement had been violated by Respondents. This dog might be what Dishong considers to be a "large pet." However, other than Dishong's description of the dog as being a "large dog" and estimating its weight to be 125 pounds, there was no evidence that the dog met the definition of "large" as anticipated by the Department's rule. Likewise, there was no evidence to show that this particular dog was potentially dangerous. Shortly before the hearing, Respondents had new carpet installed through out the house where appropriate, the walls stripped and painted, tile installed in areas where carpet was not appropriate, and some new furniture installed, which included a replacement for the bed frame that was noted as a violation. By letter dated February 20, 2001, the Department notified Respondents that their application for renewal of their foster home licensure had been denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order denying Respondents application for the annual renewal of their foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Troy Allen Rebecca Allen 4514 Scottswood Drive Lakeland, Florida 33813 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioners are entitled to the renewal of their foster care license.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Petitioners operated a shelter foster home in Dade County, Florida, pursuant to a license that was issued by the Department. Mr. Ezewike investigated allegations of neglect at the Petitioners' home. According to Mr. Ezewike, children residing at the home were left without adult supervision. Such children ranged in ages from a few months to teenager. Mr. Welch investigated allegations of verbal abuse against Petitioners. The report of these allegations was closed without classification. Thus the Petitioners were not identified as the perpetrators of verbal abuse. According to Mr. Blum, who also visited the home, children residing with the Petitioners were left without adult supervision. Mr. Blum observed that the interior of the house was dirty and messy. His report concluded that there were some indications of conditions hazardous to health as a result of the unkept home. Mr. Blum further observed that a refrigerator at the Grice home was encircled by a chain with a lock which prevented it from being opened. Mr. Blum also observed and overheard an interaction between Mr. Grice and some of the foster children. According to Mr. Blum, Mr. Grice used harsh and inappropriate language with the children. Jackie Hodge, supervisor of the licensing unit, received a report from another worker responsible for supervising the Grice foster home. Such report cited Mr. Grice for inappropriate and harsh language. According to Ms. Hodge, licensing standards, including the quality of care and supervision provided by foster parents, must be a part of the evaluation to determine the suitability of a home during a relicensing review. According to Ms. Hodge, the Department does not permit foster parents to be verbally abusive, including harsh or inappropriate language, with the children in their care. Ms. Hodge further explained that the condition of, and cleanliness of, the home are also part of a relicensing evaluation. Based upon the Department's practice, the failure to meet any of the licensing standards is grounds for denying a renewal of license. Ms. Hodge recommended that the Petitioners' home not be relicensed. Petitioners were timely notified of the Department's denial and timely requested an administrative review.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying Petitioners' request for licensure renewal. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4951 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioners: 1. None submitted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 14 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Hilda Fluriach District 11 Legal Office Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Willie and Geraldine Grice 18830 N.W. 43rd Avenue Carol City, Florida 33055 Kim Tucker General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Bonita Jones-Peabody The Executive Building 3000 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 300 Miami, Florida 33137
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should deny Petitioners' application to be licensed as foster parents.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster parents in the state. Respondent first licensed Petitioners as foster parents on June 29, 2003, and renewed the license on June 29, 2004. The last license expired on June 28, 2005. Petitioners allowed their license to expire on June 28, 2005. They wanted to make improvements to a new home they had moved into before bringing foster children into the home. Petitioners submitted a completed application for a new license on March 20, 2006. By letter dated April 27, 2006, Respondent denied the application for licensure. Petitioners did not receive the notice of denial until May 3, 2006, because Respondent sent the notice to the address of record in the old license application files instead of the correct address in the application for a new license that is at issue in this proceeding. The letter denying the application for licensure incorrectly stated that Respondent intended to revoke Petitioners' license. The misstated literal terms of the letter nevertheless provided Petitioners with adequate notice of the actual proposed agency action to deny the license application. Contrary to the literal terms of the letter, Petitioners understood that the letter constituted notice of Respondent's proposed denial of their license application. Petitioners timely requested an administrative hearing by letter dated May 7, 2006. The request for hearing stated, in relevant part: [W]e received notice advising us that [Respondent] has initiated proceedings to revoke our foster home license. . . . Please note that we are not a licensed foster home at this time. Our license expired in June, 2005. So, we are somewhat confused about proceedings to revoke something that does not exist. Please be advised that we did [sic] however, complete an application for a 'new' foster care license. . . . We were also told that, [sic] our application would be denied and that we would have the right to request an administrative hearing to contest the 'denial'. If the letter that we received is in regard to our application for licensure, and if that application has been denied, then we are requesting an administrative hearing to contest that decision. Respondent's Exhibit 1C. Respondent gave the request for hearing to the agency clerk to forward to DOAH to conduct the hearing. However, the agency clerk was confused by the literal terms of the denial letter. When the agency clerk could not ascertain an existing foster home license to revoke, the agency clerk merely "sat" on the request for hearing and did not forward it to DOAH. By letter dated November 13, 2006, Respondent corrected the literal terms of the previous letter. The letter dated November 13, 2006, correctly notified Petitioners of Respondent's proposed denial of the license application. By letter dated November 23, 2006, Petitioners again requested an administrative hearing to contest the proposed denial of the license application. In addition, the request for hearing notified Respondent of Petitioners' intent to rely on the so-called default license provisions in Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2006).1 Respondent gave the request for hearing to the agency clerk. This time, the agency clerk referred the matter to DOAH. However, the agency clerk did not refer the request for hearing to DOAH within the 15 days mandated in Subsection 120.569(2)(a). Rather, DOAH received the referral from the agency clerk on March 6, 2007; approximately 103 days after the date of the second request for hearing and approximately 303 days after the date of the first request for hearing. The delays in referring the requests for hearing to DOAH did not impair either the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the agency action. It is undisputed that when Petitioners were previously licensed as foster parents they repeatedly administered corporal punishment to a foster child who was approximately four years old at the time. It is also undisputed that Petitioners punished the child by requiring the child to stand for one hour to one hour and a-half almost daily. Both types of discipline violate applicable standards for foster care and evidence Petitioners disqualification to be foster parents. The parties spent most of the evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the four-year-old female suffered from a condition identified in the record as reactive attachment disorder (RAD). However, the trier of fact finds evidence concerning RAD to be irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether Petitioners are qualified to be foster parents. The evidence that Petitioners administered unauthorized discipline to a four-year-old foster child in their care clearly evidences their lack of qualification. No medical evidence established a nexus between the alleged disorder and illicit discipline of a young child.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order denying Petitioners' application to be licensed as foster parents. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2007.
