The Issue Whether Petitioner Antoinette Scanziani's license as a family foster home should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating family foster homes. Children's Home Society (CHS) is the contract agency in the Central Licensing Zone that directly supervises licenses in that area. Petitioner filed an application to renew her family foster home license on May 26, 2006, which was originally issued for one year in August 2005. Prior to the issuance of her family foster care license on August 19, 2005, Petitioner had completed, inter allia, 30 hours of Models Approach Partnership and Parenting (MAPP) training and signed a Foster Parent Agreement, prepared by CHS, which spells out the duties and obligations of a foster parent. Paragraph 12 of the Agreement specifically states that a foster parent will notify CHS immediately of any change of address. Under Respondent's rules, a family foster care license is not transferable, and a new sanitation inspection and recommendation must be completed before Respondent can issue a new license for the new address. The family foster care license was issued to Petitioner for 5831 Bent Pine Drive, Apartment 300, Orlando, Florida 32822. The first foster child was placed in Petitioner's care on September 1, 2005. In August 2005, Petitioner began a dispute with the rental management company who managed the apartment complex where she lived. This resulted in Petitioner giving the company 60 days' notice that she would not renew her lease after October 31, 2005. The rental company, mean while, would not accept her tender of rental payments for August and September 2005, and initiated eviction proceedings in County Court. Prior to the final hearing, a stipulation was signed by the parties and approved by the County Court. Petitioner moved out of her apartment on October 31, 2005. On November 1, 2005, Petitioner, along with one foster child, moved into a house located at 7741 Fort Sumter Drive, Orlando, Florida 32822. CHS was not notified of this change of address until November 11, 2005. The CHS Dependency Specialist worked diligently with Petitioner to obtain a license for her new residence. DCF issued a new family foster care license for 7741 Fort Sumter Drive, Orlando, Florida 32822 on December 20, 2005. Petitioner maintained an unlicensed foster home from the period of November 1, 2005, through December 20, 2005. Although the foster child residing with Petitioner was not removed from the home, Petitioner was reminded of the need to notify CHS prior to any moves in the future. On April 6, 2006, Petitioner notified CHS that she had moved from her Fort Sumter Drive, Orlando, residence to a residence in Poinciana, Florida (Osceola County) at the end of March 2006. It was subsequently determined that a Writ of Possession for the Orlando residence was issued by the Orange County Court on March 2, 2006. Petitioner testified at the hearing that she moved at the end of March 2006, because of poor maintenance and discriminatory and retaliatory conduct by the landlord. The foster child was not removed from the home and the CHS Dependency Specialist again worked diligently and patiently with Petitioner to obtain a license for her family foster care residence at 127 Conch Drive, Kissimmee, Florida 34759 (Poinciana). Due primarily to Petitioner's lack of cooperation, a completed health inspection of the home was not completed until August 4, 2006. During this time, Petitioner submitted her application for relicensure on May 26, 2006. On July 13, 2006, the CHS Dependency Specialist hand delivered a letter, dated July 11, 2006, to Petitioner reminding her that a face-to-face visit and a walk through of the home was required before recommendation could be given. Petitioner was given a check-list of 16 items which were due to be completed prior to July 16, 2006, or CHS could not recommend renewal of her foster care license. On July 18, 2006, CHS sent Petitioner a follow-up letter. Although another home inspection had taken place on July 17, 2006, it was not a satisfactory home health inspection. In addition, proof of completion of 12 hours of training had not been demonstrated and six other items on the check-list were, also, not completed. The deadline for compliance was extended to August 3, 2006, with a reminder that the existing license expired on August 19, 2006. CHS followed with reminder telephone calls on July 19 and 20, followed by another letter on July 25, 2006, that all remaining items must be completed by August 3, 2006. Petitioner demonstrated compliance with four of the items, but did not provide Radon Test results or proof that her 2A10BC fire extinguisher was tagged and inspected. On August 18, 2006, the foster child, living in Petitioner's home, was removed. On August 19, 2006, Petitioner's family foster care license expired by operation of law, without Petitioner having submitted a completed application package to CHS. On August 28, 2006, Respondent sent Petitioner a notice of intent to deny her application for relicensure. The reasons for the denial were outlined on the four-page letter. Petitioner objected to the notice and requested a formal hearing, and this proceeding followed. From the evidence, it is apparent that CHS worked diligently in helping Petitioner transfer her existing license two times, when Petitioner moved without notifying CHS before the move; and encouraged and worked with Petitioner to complete the application for renewal a month before the expiration of her license. However, due to Petitioner's procrastination and/or resistance, the completed documentation was not sent in to Respondent prior to the expiration of her prior license.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner, Antoinette Scanziani's, application for a renewal of her family foster home license be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2007.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's foster parent application for adoption of the minor child, S. J., should be granted.
Findings Of Fact S.J. was abandoned at birth. Moses and Juanita Pitchford served as foster parents of the child from the age of two days until March 30, 1998, when the child was over two years old. S.J. was observed by several of Respondent's employees as not behaving like other children her age. She had a flat effect, not laughing, playing or verbalizing as other children who visited Respondent's offices did. Subsequent evaluations of the child established that S.J. was developmentally delayed in speech, physical, and cognitive skills. S.J. was then referred to Easter Seals for services to assist her in the speech, physical, and cognitive skills areas. The Pitchfords' care had never been criticized in any of the Respondent's home evaluation forms completed by Gwen Tennant, the home care counselor employed by Respondent. Only when Juanita Pitchford applied to adopt S.J. did Tennant assert that Juanita Pitchford was not providing adequate care for the child. Tennant's concern was based on the fact that S.J. was not receiving the maximum exposure to an Easter Seals program for which she had qualified. The Pitchfords were never formally informed of this or any other deficiency. The evidence establishes that the Pitchfords presented S.J. at the program four days per week out of the total five days for which she was eligible. Following Respondent's denial by letter dated April 13, 1998, of Petitioner's foster parent application for adoption, Respondent has continued to place foster children, including infants, in the Pitchford home. The rights of the child's biological parents were terminated by court order dated June 17, 1997, due to their abandonment of the child. The court noted in its order that: Testimony adduced revealed that the child can and has formed a significant relationship with the parental substitute as has been established in her current foster care placement. The foster parents are the only parents she has ever known. The court's order also stated: [T]he child is currently being given excellent care by foster parents who love and care for [S.J.], and consider [S.J.] to be their child. On March 30, 1998, S.J. was removed to the home of Betty Allen, another foster parent. Allen is not married, cares for six other foster children under the age of six years, and works at a full-time job outside the home. Consequently, S.J. is delivered to day care on a regular basis for five days each week. During four of those days, she is later taken to the Easter Seals program by day care personnel for four and one-half hours. Allen cares for the foster children in her home from approximately 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. in the evening. She drops the children at day care before 8:00 a.m. each day. In contrast, Petitioner is not employed outside the home, remains there throughout the day, and is able to provide intense daily interaction with S.J.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered approving the application of Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger L. D. Williams, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 James C. Cumbie, Esquire One Independent Drive, Suite 3204 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Respondents have cared for foster children for some twenty years. In November or December of 1975, they began with Christian Youth Care, Inc. (CYC), a foster home in Zephyrhills founded under the auspices of the First Baptist Church of Zephyrhills. Since then small groups of adolescent girls have lived with respondents and their teenage daughter, Dawn. In all, some 80 children have lived at CYC since respondents have had charge of the home. In July of 1977, petitioner placed June Holmes, who is deaf and dumb, with respondents. After June had been with the Houghs for two weeks or so, Lillian Parsons, a social worker in petitioner's employ, told Mrs. Hough that June should be wearing a hearing aid. June did not want to wear a hearing aid. She was also disappointed that Mrs. Hough would not take her to Daytona Beach; she became very upset, wielded a straightened safety pen and started knocking things off bureaus. When Mr. Hough served as a medical technician in the armed forces, unruly patients were sometimes wrapped in blankets. Perhaps remembering this experience, he enlisted Mrs. Hough in wrestling June to the floor, wrapping her in a blanket and securing the blanket with three belts. In the process, Mr. Hough said to June, "See how mad you can get." These events caused concern among the other children living in the home, who gathered to watch and, at respondents' suggestion, to say prayers. Mrs. Hough told June that she loved her. After June had lain bound in this fashion for 45 minutes, respondents released her. The following day Mrs. Hough called Mrs. Parsons to report the incident and to ask that June be placed in another home. Mrs. Parsons expressed no disapproval of respondents' method of restraining June nor did she tell them not to do it again. June remained with respondents until she left for boarding school in St. Augustine. When June returned to the Houghs from school on Easter vacation 1978, she wanted a new pair of shoes that cost $24.95. Respondents bought her a different pair instead. Easter morning June wanted to wear her old shoes, not her new shoes. This caused an argument. Mrs. Hough stayed home with June while Mr. Hough took the others to church. When Mrs. Hough began packing June's clothes into a suitcase, June was "worried that [respondents] would move [her] out." Deposition of June Holmes, p. 5. She walked outside and sat under a tree near the road. Mrs. Hough telephoned her husband and summoned him home from church. With the help of a deputy sheriff brandishing handcuffs, respondents coaxed June into their van and drove her up the driveway to their home. At first she refused to leave the van, so respondents went inside without her. When June eventually went inside, there was another confrontation. Mr. Hough wrestled June to the floor and sent Mrs. Hough for a blanket. After respondents wrapped June in the blanket and secured it with belts, Mr. Hough set off to retrieve the children he had left at church. After Mr. Hough returned with the other children, respondents unwrapped June and there was an Easter egg hunt. The next day Mrs. Hough called petitioner's offices in New Port Richey, then drove June to New Port Richey and left her there, because she wanted no more to do with her. When Mrs. Parsons learned that respondents had wrapped June in a blanket a second time, she asked to be relieved of responsibility for June. Eventually David J. Schultz, at the time a child welfare social worker in petitioner's employ, assumed responsibility for June; and June was again placed with respondents. Mr. and Mrs. Hough frequently communicated with guidance counselors and teachers at the schools children in their care attended. They made six visits to talk about Evelyn Ciacelli's progress with Ricky Rowell, guidance counselor at Woodland Elementary School in Zephryhills, and spoke to him on the telephone about Evelyn on several other occasions. Disappointed in Evelyn's progress with her homework one night, Mr. Hough picked her up and shook her. On another occasion, Evelyn and her roommate were wrestling in their room after they had been sent to bed. Mr. Hough heard them from the kitchen, walked into their bedroom with a spatula in his hand, and gave Evelyn, who was wearing a bathrobe over her nightgown, a swat on the rear with the spatula. On November 20, 1978, David J. Schultz left Petitioner's employ. He subsequently went to work for a corporation controlled by respondents and began living in their home. He lived there on December 13, 1978. On December 13, 1978, Bonnie Blair McKenzie, then employed by petitioner as a community youth leader, picked up Cindy Spickelmier at a shelter home in Dade City and drove her to respondents' home. Cindy, a 14 year old, was at the shelter home after having run away from another foster home, the Newmans'. She had lived with respondents previously and David Schultz also knew her. Shortly after Cindy's arrival, David Schultz was talking to her in the Houghs' living room, where she was sitting on a couch, crying. Also present were Mr. Hough, Ms. McKenzie, Nancy Newman, the foster mother who had previously had custody of Cindy, and Ed Springer, then the social worker in petitioner's employ responsible for Cindy's placement. Angry because Cindy was ignoring him, David Schultz grabbed the hair of her head, jerked her up into a standing position, had her bend over and lean against a desk for support, and struck her buttocks with a wooden paddle an inch thick. He administered the first blow with such force that Ms. Newman was frightened and Ms. McKenzie was "horrified and devastated." (T.52). Cindy fell to her knees, hysterical. Less forcefully, David Schultz struck her buttocks a second time. At the hearing Mr. Hough testified that: after Dave gave her the swats she sat back down and she was a new child. We were able to communicate with her and we thought we were really making good progress and being able to work with the child. That was the purpose of the new program and of course we were trying to set up parameters that would be beneficial to the child. (T.233). Notwithstanding this perceived improvement in Cindy's deportment, Ed Springer gave Cindy another spanking 30 or 45 minutes after David Schultz had finished. In the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Hough, and Mr. Schultz, Ed Springer struck Cindy five times on the buttocks with the same wooden paddle David Schultz had used, as punishment for running away from the Newmans' house. Later, on the evening of December 13, 1978, Cindy ran away from the Houghs'. She ended up at her mother's house where she spent the night. The next day her mother took her to the Pasco County Sheriff's Department. There Fay Wilbur an investigator for the Sheriff's Department, took photographs of Cindy's badly bruised buttocks. Petitioner's exhibits 3, 4 and 5. On the following day, December 15, 1978, Dr. Lena Ayala, a pediatrician, examined Cindy. She found large "[v]ery tender, painful" (T.55) hematomas covering the whole area of Cindy's buttocks. If she had seen a child in the custody of its natural parents in that condition, Dr. Ayala testified, she would have reported the matter to the child abuse registry. Petitioner discharged Ed Springer because of the beating he had administered to Cindy Spickelmier. Petitioner publishes a manual with a chapter entitled "Foster Family Group Homes for Dependent youth," Petitioner's exhibit No. 8. In part, the manual provides: 8.4.4 Unacceptable disciplinary approaches include: a. Corporal punishment--slapping, kicking, hitting, etc. * * * Humiliation, ridicule, sarcasm, shaming in front of the group or alone. Deprivation of essential needs such as food, sleep, or parental visits. Petitioner's exhibit No. 8, p.9. Although petitioner sometimes furnished foster group home licensees copies of its manuals, petitioner's files do not indicate that either Mr. or Mrs. Hough ever received a copy. Respondents wore unaware of the manual's contents on December 13, 1978; and David Schultz was also unaware of any policy against corporal punishment of foster group home children. Lorraine Cash, a foster mother in Pasco County, never spanked any foster child in her care over the age of eleven years. On the other hand, Henry Arnett, another foster parent in Pasco County, used corporal punishment in disciplining teen aged foster boys. He and his wife, Doris, were named foster parents of the year in 1978. On December 14, 1978, Joanne Wall telephoned respondents on behalf of petitioner and told Mr. Hough that David Schultz should be barred from their premises. When Mr. Hough protested that David Schultz lived on the premises, Ms. Wall asked Mr. Hough to keep David Schultz from working with the girls, which Mr. Hough agreed to do. On December 18, 1978, respondents submitted an application to petitioner for a child care center license, an application on which they had begun work considerably before December 13, 1978. Discouraged by the pace at which this application was being considered and by what respondents perceived as unfairness on the part of some of petitioner's personnel, Mr. Hough on February 15, 1979, told William Laing, a manager for petitioner, that he wanted all the foster children but two removed by five o'clock the following day, a Friday. Even though the agreement between petitioner and respondents called for two weeks' notice by the foster parents, petitioner's exhibit No. 6, Mr. Hough was unwilling to wait so long. Petitioner arranged to pick up all the foster children in respondents' care on the following day. Some of the children had not been told they would be leaving the Houghs' home. Respondents own improved real estate from which they derive rental income. In addition, CYC, funded by the First Baptist Church of Zephyrhills, paid respondents a salary. Occasionally, Mr. Hough worked outside the home. Pasco County contributed to the costs of caring for foster children. Respondents did not need moneys petitioner paid them on behalf of the children for their own personal purposes.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That, on the next anniversary of the date of respondents' original foster group home license, petitioner discontinue respondents' license for a period of one year. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara McPherson, Esquire Post Office Box 5046 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Robert L. Williams, Esquire Post Office Box 443 Dade City, Florida 33525
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of acts and omissions to justify the revocation of his license to operate a family foster home, pursuant to Section 409.175(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner licensed Respondent to operate a family foster home from June 22, 2000, until May 15, 2001, at which time Petitioner revoked Respondent's license. The only foster children placed with Petitioner were Ju. K. (Ju.) and J. K. (J.), who are brothers. During the majority of the period in question, Ju. was 16 years old and J. was 17 years old. The boys were adopted at infancy. However, their adoptive mother died when they were young. The adoptive father remarried, but died a few years later, in January 1999. The stepmother never adopted the children, and, shortly after the death of their adoptive father, she turned over the two children to foster care. Respondent had been a friend of the stepmother since the mid-1980s and, through her, had met the adoptive father. Respondent became close with the couple and their children, whom he often visited on holidays. Learning that at least one of the boys had had problems in foster care, Respondent decided to qualify to become their foster father. At the time, Respondent was 40 years old and single and had not raised any other children. However, Respondent took the training courses required for licensing as a foster parent. After Respondent obtained his foster parent license, Project Teamwork for Kids, which is the private entity in Brevard County that recruits, trains, and licenses foster parents and places foster children with these parents, placed Ju. and J. with Respondent. J. began to live with Respondent in January 2000, and Ju. joined him in June 2000. During the summer of 2000, relations among Respondent, J., and Ju. were good. They took vacations and settled into their new lives during a period relatively free of stressful demands. Respondent asked Project Teamwork 4 Kids representatives not to start any family therapy during the summer and, once school started, asked that they again defer the initiation of such services. Respondent was aware that Ju. had been diagnosed with dissociative personality disorder, but believed that a normal home life would ameliorate this condition. During the summer, Respondent was concerned with the high school to which Ju. had been assigned for ninth grade. Respondent convinced school officials to reassign Ju. to a different high school, but school officials warned Respondent that, due to the reassignment, they would not tolerate disruptive behavior from Ju. Respondent was satisfied with J.'s assignment for tenth grade because it was the same school from which he had earlier dropped out. At the start of the school year, Respondent required weekly progress reports from J.'s teachers. However, as J.'s grades improved, Respondent dropped this requirement. During the period covered by this case, Respondent's relationship with J. was better than Respondent's relationship with Ju. Respondent and J. had a major disagreement arise at the end of October when J. returned home drunk from a homecoming celebration. A day or two later, after giving the matter considerable thought, Respondent discussed the matter with J. and imposed the punishment that Respondent would not provide his written consent for J. to obtain his driving learner's permit for six months, although Respondent would reconsider at three months. When J. learned of his punishment, he became irate and telephoned his case manager with Project Teamwork 4 Kids, Karen McCalla. He demanded that she remove him from Respondent's home. Ms. McCalla visited the home and spoke with J. alone for several hours, then Respondent, and then J. again alone. This home visit provides an early, but typical, example of the difference in perspectives of Respondent and Petitioner's witnesses. According to Respondent, Ms. McCalla arrived at the home, spoke with J. alone for several hours, spoke with Respondent, and then spoke with J. alone again. She then announced that Respondent should sign for J.'s learner's permit, but not allow him to drive for three months. Although he disagreed with the recommendation and felt that Ms. McCalla's recommendation had undercut his authority, Respondent complied with the request. Ms. McCalla's version is considerably different. Agreeing that J. was demanding that she remove him from Respondent's home, Ms. McCalla noted that J. complained generally that Respondent was "overbearing, overpowering and does not give [J.] any privacy." Focusing on the larger issues than merely the proper punishment for J.'s recent misbehavior, Ms. McCalla recommended that the family undergo family therapy. Ms. McCalla's version is credited. By Respondent's own account, Ms. McCalla spent "several hours" speaking with J. initially. Although underage drinking is a serious matter that may necessitate serious discussions, it is unlikely that Ms. McCalla and J. could have spent "several hours" on this single transgression. It is more likely that J. broadened his complaints in the manner described by Ms. McCalla. Respondent's contrary version either undermines his credibility as a witness or, if sincere, his competence as a foster parent. During the fall, Respondent's relationship with Ju. deteriorated. In general, Respondent's nascent parental skills were insufficient to meet the needs of Ju. When a conventional menu of incentives and disincentives failed to produce the desired results, Respondent grew increasingly frustrated, but declined to take advantage of the support resources available to him through Project Teamwork 4 Kids and its contractors. Instead, Respondent, alone, proceeded with his own disciplinary scheme, intensifying his disciplinary measures each time that less intense measures failed. Eventually, conflict between Respondent and Ju. escalated, and the domestic situation became unbearable for both of them. For instance, at school, Respondent was legitimately concerned that Ju. not jeopardize his placement at the high school to which he had been assigned due to Respondent's efforts. Worried about Ju.'s associations at school, especially due to Ju.'s poor school associations in the past, Respondent required Ju. to sign into the library immediately after eating lunch, so he would not have the chance to socialize with his peers. If Ju. failed to sign in, a teacher was to telephone Respondent, who would go to school to find Ju. By Respondent's admission, he enforced this arrangement for four to six weeks. Respondent was adamant that Ju. not date until he was 16 years old. This was a legitimate concern due to sexual behaviors that Ju. had displayed prior to his arrival in Respondent's home. Early in the school year, while Ju. was still 15 years old, Respondent overheard him speaking on the telephone with a girl from school. Respondent interrupted the conversation and asked Ju. to ask the girl if her mother were home. Finding that she was, Respondent asked to speak to the mother. Explaining to the mother that Ju. was not allowed to go on one-on-one dates until he reached 16 years of age, Respondent, by his own testimony, managed to agitate and offend the mother. Respondent admitted that Ju. became upset because he had considered the girl his girlfriend. On another occasion, Respondent required that Ju. end a relationship with a girl at school. Without detailing any concerns about sexual activity, Respondent explained his intervention by noting that Ju. had taken another boy's girlfriend, who seems to have not been suitable for Ju.--in Respondent's opinion. At home, numerous times Respondent employed more intense strategies when conventional disciplinary interventions failed to produce the desired results. For instance, when Ju. persisted in viewing sexually unsuitable material on the television in his room, Respondent removed the bedroom door, thus depriving Ju. of all privacy. Also, when Ju. persisted in abusing and overusing the telephone, even after being placed on telephone restriction, Respondent removed the handsets when he left the home, leaving the boy without telephone service in the home, although he could walk outside the apartment to a neighbor or a pay phone. Gradually, frustration erupted into physical confrontations. Twice, Respondent ripped T-shirts off the back of the boy during angry exchanges. Once, Respondent lightly slapped the boy on the mouth when he swore at Respondent. Twice, Respondent intentionally damaged audio equipment used by Ju. For each of these actions, Respondent devised transparent stories to cover up his failure to handle Ju.'s transgressions in a positive, effective manner. As the above incidents suggest, Respondent sought to impose a level of control over Ju. that was unsuitable for Ju.'s age and the circumstances of the relationship that existed between Respondent and Ju. Lacking both experience and maturity, Respondent obstinately dug in deeper each time his discipline failed to produce the desired result. Never lacking in good motives, Respondent lacked the resources needed for the difficult parenting task that Ju. presented, and Respondent exacerbated the situation by refusing to accept the assistance of professionals who might have been able to help him with Ju. Over time, even Respondent's innocuous behavior- modification techniques became counterproductive. For instance, Respondent routinely insisted that he and a child not go to sleep without first resolving any conflicts that may have arisen. Although a salutary policy, if applied with discretion, Respondent's overbearing implementation of this policy intensified hostilities, rather than defused them. An example of the injudicious use of this policy took place in early February 2001 when Respondent and Ju. got into an argument over an uncompleted homework assignment. Respondent warned Ju. that Petitioner lacked sufficient beds to accommodate Ju. at the time and that, if Ju. did not compose himself, Respondent would call the police to have Ju. removed from Respondent's home. This was especially hurtful to a child who had already known the pain of abandonment and abuse. Trying to defuse the confrontation, Ju. demanded time to step outside and cool off, but Respondent, insistent on a resolution on his terms, ordered Ju. to remain inside until Respondent had finished talking to him. By March 2001, Project Teamwork 4 Kids representatives had tried to intervene on at least two occasions in recent weeks, but Respondent had become increasingly resistant to what he viewed as interference from caseworkers with Ju. and J. By this time, Ju. wanted out of the home, and Respondent wanted him out of the home. On March 28, 2001, Project Teamwork 4 Kids removed Ju. from Respondent's home. About six weeks later, Project Teamwork 4 Kids also removed J. from Respondent's home. Petitioner proved some of its specific allegations and failed to prove others, but, as the Administrative Law Judge noted at the final hearing, the basic issue in this case is whether Petitioner can prove that Respondent has committed an intentional or negligent act materially affected the health or safety of children in his home. Petitioner has met its burden with respect to Ju. Ju. would have been a considerable challenge to a person with considerable parenting experience and skills. Respondent lacked both, but, knowing Ju.'s special needs, nonetheless sought the responsibility of serving as Ju.'s foster father. As the situation worsened, Respondent lacked the insight to avail himself of the resources offered to him and Ju. Instead, Respondent resorted to ineffective disciplinary strategies that eventually deteriorated into angry outbursts, culminating in Respondent's angry and desperate threat to end the placement itself--a most injurious act, given Ju.'s circumstances and dissociative personality disorder. Although it is clear that Respondent assumed a very difficult undertaking, his incompetent discharge of these responsibilities, coupled with his obstinate refusal to accept readily available help from others with greater training and experience, justifies the revocation of his family foster home license.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order revoking Respondent's family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathleen A. Kearney, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Deborah Guller Department of Children and Family Services 201 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Samuel D. Lopez Samuel D. Lopez, P.A. 629 Southeast Fifth Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Alan Siegel 500 Northwest 34th Street, Apartment #105 Pompano Beach, Florida 33064
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a Residential Foster Care Home should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Patricia Rovai, was first licensed by Respondent as a Developmental Services Residential Foster Care Home in 1989. Additionally, since 1975, Petitioner was and continues to be a Licensed Practical Nurse. Ms. Rovai specialized in providing foster care to children participating in the Medically Complex Children Foster Care Program. On January 18, 1996, a meeting was held between Donna Mims, head of foster care licensing for Developmental Services, and Petitioner and her husband. The meeting was held in regards to the conditional license which had been issued to Petitioner and was due to expire on January 31, 1996. During the meeting, Ms. Mims informed Petitioner that she was qualified to receive an ordinary foster care license and could receive such a license. However, Children’s Medical Services was not willing to designate, certify, or endorse Petitioner for participation in the medical foster care program. She therefore, would not be able to provide foster care to a medically complex child. At the conclusion of the meeting and in part due to the fact that Petitioner was exhausted after living through two successive hurricanes, Petitioner chose to allow her license to expire. Respondent admits that, other than the allegations set forth in its 1996 licensure denial letter, Petitioner is qualified to be licensed as a developmental services foster home. Around July 1996, Petitioner submitted an application for licensure as a developmental services foster home under Chapter 393, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10F-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. On August 21, 1996, Respondent notified Petitioner by letter that her application had been denied. The letter denying a new license to Petitioner addresses several concerns of the Department based on Petitioner's past performance as a medical foster parent. The letter specifically referred to Petitioner's alleged problems with her foster child's school attendance, cooperation with Departmental staff or therapists assigned to her foster child, failure to utilize or inappropriate use of community resources and skilled nursing care, failure to encourage parental involvement or reunification, failure to encourage the child to achieve, and failure to share information regarding parental involvement with the Department. The letter cited Rule 10F-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, dealing with foster parent responsibility and training of the foster child. In general, foster care providers are subject to the promulgated rules applicable to foster care facilities and caregivers contained in Chapter 10F-6.009, Florida Administrative Code. These are the only rules applicable to foster care licenses for developmental services foster care or medically complex foster care. Whether a licensee provides medically complex foster care seems to depend on whether the licensee is designated, endorsed, or certified by Children's Medical Services. Children's Medical Services was part of Respondent, but is now part of a different agency. The evidence was unclear on the exact legal process for becoming a medical foster care parent. Even the various agencies involved seemed confused regarding the licensure status of a medical foster care parent. The licensure requirements set forth in Chapter 10F-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, are separate from the Statewide Operation Plan, which is not a rule. In fact, the Statewide Operation Plan specifically states at Chapter 7, page 4 that "failure to meet the requirements for Medical Foster Care does not necessarily affect their license as a 'traditional' foster parent." No administrative rules have been promulgated for the medical foster care designation. However, the effect of the medical designation upon a foster home license is to allow the foster home to become a Medicaid provider and be paid for their service from Florida's Medicaid program. The payment from Medicaid for the medical foster care designation is approximately $2,000.00 per month per child. The foster home also receives $440.00 per month per child from developmental services. The vast majority of children in the medically complex program live with their biological families. When a child needs to be placed in a medical foster home, the skills of the medical foster parent are matched to the child’s needs. The program looks at whether the medical foster parent is trained, licensed, and credentialed to meet the needs of a given child. If a medical foster care parent lacks a skill a potential placement might require, then the foster parent is given training to develop that skill. All the foster care parents assigned medically complex children have some background in the medical field. In February of 1989, at about two-years old, Adam Ingram was placed into Petitioner's care as a participant/patient in the Medical Complex Children Foster Care Program within the Developmental Services Program of Respondent. Dr. Rex Northup, the Medical Director for the Medical Foster Care Program, considered Adam Ingram to be one of the higher level of care children in the Medical Foster Care Program. Specifically, Adam Ingram was born with and continues to suffer from myotonic dystrophy. Myotonic dystrophy is a congenital disorder that affects neuromuscular formation and has an extensive impact on other bodily systems. Adam Ingram's mother, Karen Moncrief, permanently suffers from the related condition of muscular dystrophy. Adam Ingram's congenital disorder adversely affects his central nervous system functions, muscle functions, gastro- intestinal functions, cardiac functions, and respiratory functions. In short, Adam’s muscles, lungs, heart, stomach, legs, throat, bowels, and bladder, etc., do not work well. As a result of his medical condition, Adam Ingram has a respiratory insufficiency that required a tracheostomy. He is periodically ventilator-dependent when he is asleep or ill. When not ventilated, Adam’s respiratory system must be cleared of mucous through suctioning, coughing, or throat clearing. Because of his complex and often fragile medical condition, Adam Ingram receives treatment from a neurologist, ophthalmologist, otolaryngologist, pulmonologist, cardiologist, gastroenterologist, and orthopedist. He has been hospitalized on at least seven occasions between 1984 and 1995. Otherwise, Adam has frequently been below normal health. Adam Ingram has also needed and received surgical intervention relating to his trachea tube. Because of his tracheostomy, he is at a higher risk for contracting respiratory illnesses, such as colds. He has also had problems with controlling his bowels and with voiding his bladder, causing bladder distension. Adam is not potty trained and must wear diapers. Additionally, due to his medical problems, Adam Ingram has been delayed in development of speech, vocalization, and communication skills. However, he is of normal intelligence and emotion. He can to some degree operate a computer. In sum, Adam, as a medically complex patient, is one of the higher level of care children in that he requires a great deal of direct care to manage his medical problems. He is not as unstable as some of the other children in the program that require more technological assistance and medical care. These more unstable children tend to also lack mobility, activity, and awareness. Adam, on the other hand, is quite mobile, active, and aware. He requires and demands a great deal of attention, as any young child does. Adam is simply a handful to care for. As part of undertaking Adam’s care, Petitioner was specially trained to operate various ventilators required by Adam. Petitioner also served as a demonstrator for other foster parents who required training. Judith Benford was the medical foster care nurse who had substantial contact with Petitioner and who was primarily knowledgeable in the Department as to the conditions in Petitioner's home. She rated Petitioner as satisfactory in some areas and unsatisfactory in the areas noted in Respondent's letter of denial. However, Petitioner was recommended for re- licensing by Benford around October 6, 1995, after a complete evaluation of Petitioner's performance with Adam Ingram. In November of 1995, Petitioner's license was conditionally renewed. The only specific written conditions were that she recharge her fire extinguisher and renew her CPR certification. The capacity of the home was reduced to one bed. Although not listed specifically on the conditional license, other conditions on Petitioner's license, issued in November 1995, were to develop a list of people who were interested in licensure and would be willing to care for Adam, improve Adam’s school attendance, and other “concerns” expressed at Petitioner’s and Adam’s medically handicap assessment team (MHAT) staffings. It should be noted that these unspecified “conditions” or “concerns” probably were ineffective as limitations on Petitioner’s conditional license. What is relevant for this hearing is that these conditions had been ongoing issues throughout Petitioner’s time as a medical foster parent. One major concern was Petitioner's continual request for additional help or respite care from Respondent when the resources available are limited by budgetary concerns of the Department. Because funding for extra help is limited, medical foster parents are encouraged to try to provide cross-coverage for each other, in that one medical foster parent would take care of another's children to allow the other foster parent a break or respite for an evening, weekend, or whatever. This is a reciprocal arrangement between medical foster homes. However, in the absence of an available swap between foster parents for respite care, the Department has the ability and does occasionally provide extra help to the foster parent. The problem from the Department's point of view is whether Medicaid or other Departmental funds can be and are available to pay for the assignment of extra help to a foster parent. Medicaid pays for extra help only when the medical needs of the child require the extra service. Other Departmental funds, which are often not available, pay when the extra help is needed by the foster parents because they are exhausted or ill. Nursing care requested by Petitioner on some occasions was not provided. Additionally, the medical foster parent is the primary eyes and ears for the Department regarding the medical services required by any medical foster child. For that reason the communication and feedback between the licensee and the Department has to be good, trusted, and comfortable. In May 1993, Petitioner was urged to swap respite services with other medical foster parents. Petitioner was hesitant because not all medical foster parents were trained in ventilator usage and she had a low opinion of some of the care rendered by some of the medical foster parents. At the time, at least one other medical foster parent had ventilator training. However, the evidence did not show that the ventilator-trained foster parent was able to provide respite care to Petitioner when she needed it. The Department recognized the problem with the lack of ventilator training and on July 7, 1994, all medical foster parents were given training on ventilator usage. In the winter of 1994, the department was attempting to work out respite help for Petitioner. The Department provided some respite help for 12 hours per month at $7.50 per hour. For unknown reasons, the respite was not used. Petitioner was also encouraged to obtain services through developmental services. The evidence did not show what services were available, if any. In December, 1994, the Department offered to temporarily place Adam in another medical foster home so Petitioner could get some rest. Petitioner declined because of her opinion of the poor care rendered by that foster home and the fact that the preparation for moving Adam was just as taxing as his staying. On January 10, 1995, a private duty nurse was provided by the Department. Petitioner directed the nurse to take Adam outside to swing. The evidence did not show whether any medical care was rendered during this visit. In February 1995 a private duty nurse assigned to Adam found Adam in the living room watching TV with Petitioner. At the time, no medical symptoms of significance were noted by the nurse. On March 20, 1995, Petitioner reported that Adam was coughing incessantly and needed frequent suctioning every 15 minutes. Petitioner requested additional nursing help. That same day the Department’s supervising nurse visited the home for one and one-half hours. During that time, Adam’s condition was stable; he did not cough and did not need suctioning. The Department did not provide additional nursing help. Also, sometime in March 1995, a private duty nurse was utilized to cleanup Adam’s room, linens, and bed. She also emptied the suction machine and installed a new catheter. The evidence did not show whether private duty nursing care was needed. Around May, 1995, the department lost confidence in Petitioner’s ability to determine when Adam was sick. The loss in confidence was due in part to the high number of school absences, in part to the Petitioner’s frequent requests for respite help, and in part due to the department’s suspicion that Petitioner was overstating Adam’s illnesses in order to obtain more help. In May of 1995, the Respondent instituted close supervision, monitoring, and support in an effort to prevent disruption in the placement of Adam in the Petitioner's home. During this time, the Petitioner's daughter, Dana, was providing some of the extra nursing care to Adam. School attendance was basically non-existent. Petitioner increased her request for nursing services in July 1995 after becoming aware that another child who was medically more complex than Adam was receiving additional nursing services. Petitioner, correctly, felt it was her duty to seek the best care for Adam. Between July and the end of October 1995, Petitioner was averaging around 16 hours per week of private duty nursing. During that time period, Adam was experiencing chronic bronchitis and other illnesses, in part due to the fact that his trachea tube needed to be re-seated. Sixteen hours of private duty nursing care per week for a child such as Adam is unusual but not unreasonable. In August 1995, an extra private-duty nurse was provided to Petitioner. During that time, Adam put himself in his wheelchair and went outside to swing for 30 minutes. Adam then watched TV and played pretend games in the front room. The evidence did not show whether any medical care was rendered during the nurse's visit. To resolve some of the Petitioner’s problems with inadequate help, the Department in 1995 requested that Petitioner develop a “corrective action program” to maintain the placement of the child in her home. Petitioner continuously attempted to develop a respite system by involving and or recruiting other potential foster care providers into the program. However, Adam Ingram's complex medical condition and activity level limited the availability of such respite providers. Either the recruits lost interest in pursuing licensure or qualified caretakers would observe Adam and decide he was to much to deal with. As the foster care parent to Adam Ingram, Petitioner was considered to be the primary person to evaluate Adam's health to decide whether Adam was healthy enough to attend school. However, Adam's mother, Karen Moncrief, was expected to provide six to eight hours of care per week as well as provide some respite care. At some point during Adam’s placement at Petitioner’s home, Ms. Moncrief met Petitioner’s nephew. Ms. Moncrief and Petitioner’s nephew were eventually married. Karen Moncrief has always been involved in Adam’s care. However, her involvement was often sporadic due to complications from her medical condition and complications of her pregnancy. She often would not follow through on promises of caring for Adam or promises of helping Petitioner with Adam’s care. Her involvement was inconsistent. Therefore, the reports of Karen’s involvement with Adam reflected that inconsistency. The Department concluded that the problem of inconsistent reporting or refusal to share such parental information was because Petitioner was being inconsistent in her reports on parental involvement or not including such information in her reports. The Department’s conclusion was wrong and not based on the facts regarding Ms. Moncrief’s behavior. On September 29, 1995, Adam was scheduled to go on a weekend visit to the biological parent’s home. However, Petitioner refused to permit the visit because the home was in poor condition and not suitable or safe for Adam to visit. The evidence showed other parental visits were encouraged. Also, on September 29, 1995, after Adam’s mother had once again failed to keep her promise that she would help Ms. Rovai with Adam’s care, Ms. Rovai became very upset and called Respondent to come and get Adam. She was leaving. After some conversation, Petitioner calmed down and Adam was not picked up by the Department. On October 20, 1995, Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation as the foster parent of Adam. The resignation was to be effective in 30 days. Towards the end of Petitioner's licensure, on November 15, 1995, at 9:30 p.m., Petitioner called the Department’s supervising nurse and reported that Adam had labored respiration and retraction and was generally sicker than usual. The nurse advised Petitioner to take Adam to the emergency room. Petitioner reported she was too ill and exhausted to take Adam to the emergency room. Adam’s mother was called and she took Adam to the emergency room. The emergency room exam did not reveal anything unusual in Adam’s condition and Adam was well, for Adam. On November 16, 1995, Petitioner requested that the supervising nurse come to Petitioner's home to see Adam. Petitioner also indicated she was still ill and exhausted. The supervising nurse obtained Medicaid approval for 8 hours per day of extra private duty nursing care for four days based on Petitioner's exhaustion and for support of the continued placement of Adam in Petitioner’s home until he was moved to Hattie Grant’s home. Throughout 1995, the supervising nurse visited Adam on at least 8 occasions to double check his condition against any illness Petitioner had reported. Except for one visit when Adam was febrile, Adam appeared healthy enough to attend school. However, these visits were often several hours after Petitioner’s report and usually in the afternoon, enough time for fever, nausea, or congestion to reduce with medication. The Medical Director of the Medical Foster Care Program testified that Petitioner's request for nurses and or respite care were not unreasonable given that Adam was a high-level of care and medically needy person. Petitioner was simply expected by the Department to live with the lack of assistance, keep quiet about it, and not make requests for help, except when she needed help. The double-bind demands the Department was placing on Petitioner were simply unreasonable and cannot serve as a basis for denying her application for licensure. Around the end of November 1995, Hattie Grant, a medical foster care parent, agreed to take Adam Ingram into her home. The change in foster care parents was agreed to by Adam’s mother, Karen Moncrief. Ms. Moncrief agreed for reasons she described as manipulation of her by Petitioner. However, Adam along with his mother and Petitioner’s nephew continued to see Petitioner at church and visit her at her home. The medical condition of Adam improved once in Ms. Grant’s home. He did not need as much acute care. Additionally, his school attendance increased dramatically. His manners at office visits with the doctor improved. However, this improvement could not be attributed to the change in placement or to anything Petitioner did or did not do in caring for Adam. It is very likely that the improvement was due primarily to his physical maturation. It is also very likely that re-seating his tracheal tube caused Adam’s propensity to become ill to dissipate. Ms. Grant did not require the amount of additional skilled nursing help that Petitioner had. The lessening of the need for skilled nursing help may have been due, in part, to Adam’s improved health and better attendance at school, giving Ms. Grant a break from caring for Adam. Additionally, Ms. Grant expressed serious concerns about harassment and constant scrutiny by the parents of Adam. One such complaint arose when Adam’s mother, accompanied by Ms. Rovai, took Adam to the emergency room from school. The emergency room physician could not find anything wrong with Adam. Another complaint was that Adam was losing weight. Weight loss was not borne out by any medical examination. Ms. Grant felt that she could not do anything right in the opinion of Adam’s parents. Eventually, an abuse complaint was filed against Ms. Grant. The complaint was determined to be unfounded. She was concerned about her reputation, the constant scrutiny and second guessing of her care. The parents of Adam did not testify at the hearing. The testimony from Ms. Rovai and Ms. Grant was in conflict as to the legitimacy of various complaints regarding Ms. Grant’s care of Adam and who was behind those complaints. The evidence did show that some of the complaints came from Ms. Rovai. However, the evidence did not bear out the Department’s conclusion that Ms. Rovai was illegitimately interfering with Adam’s placement at Ms. Grant’s home. At the end of the school year, around June 1996, Adam was removed from Ms. Grant’s home at her request. He was taken back to Ms. Rovai’s house. The evidence that Adam’s health or behavior deteriorated during this second stay at Ms. Rovai’s home consists of doctor’s notes from one medical examination on July 15, 1996. The doctor did not testify at the hearing. Unexplained doctor’s notes related to one visit simply do not form a basis to conclude that Ms. Rovai’s care of Adam was inadequate. Adam was not a participant in the medical foster care program while at Ms. Rovai’s house. After a short period of time Adam was reunited with his mother and remains in her care to date. Since being in his mother’s care Adam has become a stronger individual. He has shown increased joint flexibility, more ability for independent movement with braces and crutches. He continues to have less need for acute care. Additionally, his school attendance has remained fairly good. Adam continues to demonstrate good manners. Again, the improvements in Adam’s condition are likely due to his continued maturation. The evidence clearly showed that Petitioner actively assisted and cooperated with Adam's physical therapist assistant and physical therapist. Apparently the Department failed to acquaint itself with the facts of Adam's case and based its allegation of failure to cooperate on very limited and uninformative notes contained in Adam's records. In July 1995 a behavior assessment by Lakeview Hospital Special Population was arranged for Adam. The first meeting with the assessor was postponed due to Adam’s ill health. Shortly after the postponement, the assessor met with Adam and viewed him at Petitioner's home. After one visit, the assessor determined that Adam did not need the help of a behavioral specialist. The assessor suggested some behavior modification techniques which Petitioner was already utilizing. Clearly, the evidence showed that Petitioner cooperated with the behavioral specialist assigned to review Adam Ingram's behavior. The evidence also showed that the Department again did not acquaint itself with the facts of Adam's case and based its conclusions about Adam's behavior on the Department's limited contacts with Adam and very limited and uninformative notes in Adam's record. Adam’s attendance at school while in the care of Petitioner was less than 50 percent. In the semester of school beginning January 1994, Adam was seen only 10 times by the occupational therapist at school. The other major complaint regarding Adam’s care by Petitioner centered on Adam’s poor school attendance. According to competent substantial evidence provided by Adam Ingram's teacher, Vernell R. Martin, Petitioner actively sought to encourage Adam in educational activities at the Oriole Beach Elementary School. There were no staff nurses working at Oriole Beach Elementary School. The school Adam attended while living at Ms. Grant's home provided more for children with special needs. It had staff nurses and could render better medical care to Adam. He therefore could attend more often when he was not feeling well. While at school, Adam would need some suctioning through the day. He also receives gastronomy feedings and various medicines through the day. Since Adam is not potty trained he requires his diapers to be changed when needed. He would receive general physical stimulation to develop his muscles and help with wearing ankle foot orthopedic supports. Physical therapy, occupational therapy and speech therapy were provided at school. However, the evidence also demonstrated that these various therapies were also provided at Petitioner’s home either by Petitioner or through other professionals. Home physical therapy would not continue once Adam reached a plateau or refused to participate. On the other hand, therapies received at school would continue daily or weekly as established in Adam’s Independent Educational Plan. Adam was seldom sent home for medical problems at school. However, given his poor attendance, it is speculation how much he would have been sent home had he been at school. On many occasions, Adam's complex medical condition prevented him from safely attending school. At the beginning of the 1994 school year, Petitioner, at the Department’s suggestion, was going to arrange for Adam to ride the school bus to school and be picked up from school by Petitioner. Petitioner scrapped the school bus ride when she discovered that no air-conditioned bus was available to transport Adam. Adam had apparently become overheated and ill when he rode the first time on a non-air conditioned bus. On the other hand, while at Ms. Grant’s home, Adam was able to ride in a non-air conditioned bus over about a six month period, some of which was in hot weather. Still, Petitioner was capable of transporting Adam to school in her air-conditioned car. The evidence did not demonstrate that Adam was harmed by his poor school attendance. From year to year, while in Petitioner's care, Adam achieved the educational, therapeutic, occupational, and social goals established in his Individual Educational Plan. On whole, Adam is a well-adjusted child. Ms. Rovai had legitimate reasons for his absences. Given this evidence, Adam's school attendance cannot form a basis for denying Petitioner's license application. Finally, another issue raised for the first time at the hearing was whether Petitioner was suctioning too deep or too often. One bronchoscope indicated that the catheter used for suctioning had touched the trachea by being inserted too far into the tracheostomy. The evidence did not show that Respondent had given corrective instructions to Petitioner on either of these two points. Moreover, suctioning too deep is a common problem and does not reflect poor care or a failure to follow Departmental instructions. Finally, the type of catheter used by Petitioner to suction Adam had a stop on it to prevent too deep insertion of the catheter into the trachea. In short, neither of these late raised issues were established by the evidence and neither of these issues can form a basis for disqualifying Petitioner from receiving a foster home license.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Petitioner be GRANTED. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Matthew D. Bordelon, Esquire Bordelon and Bordelon, P.A. 2717 Gulf Breeze Parkway Gulf Breeze, Florida 32561 Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Department of Health 1295 West Fairfield Drive Pensacola, Florida 32501 Katie George, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 601 160 Governmental Services Pensacola, Florida 32501 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners' foster home license should be denied on the basis that the abuse registry examined during the re-licensure process disclosed a verified finding of abandonment of a child, recorded against the Petitioners as perpetrators, under authority of Section 409.175(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners were licensed as a foster home and sometime in the latter part of 1999, their licensure came due for renewal. They were advised by a denial letter dated October 8, 1999, from the Department of Children and Family Services (Department), that their home would not be re-licensed as a foster home. The initial agency decision to this effect was because the Petitioners, or at least Mr. Barnes, had an entry on the Department's abuse registry indicating a verified finding of abandonment against the Petitioners. The finding of abandonment involved the Petitioners' adopted son, D.B., being left at the office of the Department's foster care staff. Apparently the Barnes had had a great deal of trouble with D.B.'s behavior and had been unable to constructively discipline him and improve his behavior. This apparently made them very frustrated such that on March 26, 1999, Mr. Barnes called the Department regarding D.B., to inform the Department that they were simply unable to handle the child. Mr. Barnes talked to James Grant, supervisor of the foster care unit in the Department's Ocala office, and a witness for the Department in this case. Mr. Grant offered to provide assistance to the family to help resolve the issues between the Petitioners and their child. That offer of assistance was refused, however. Later that day, Mr. Barnes took D.B. to the Ocala offices of the Department's foster care unit and apparently left him sitting in the lobby of the building which houses the foster care staff. Mr. Barnes did not speak to Mr. Grant or anyone else in a responsible position before leaving the building and permanently abandoning the child. He only informed the receptionist that he was leaving the child. Because of the Petitioners' actions in leaving the child sitting in the lobby, a call was placed to the abuse hotline that same day. Joanne Hunter was assigned as the investigator of the abuse report. According to the final report of the investigation that was admitted into evidence, the case was closed with a verified indication of abandonment and neglect, the result of D.B. being abandoned in the Department's lobby. On March 27, 1999, a shelter hearing was held before a circuit judge and D.B. was placed in the custody of the Department due to the Petitioner's act of abandonment at the Department's office. Subsequently, the child was adjudicated dependent and placed in a long-term foster care placement. The child remained in that foster care placement at the time of the instant hearing. Certified copies of the judge's shelter order and the order of adjudication and disposition have been entered into evidence in this case. Prior to their adoption by the Petitioners, D.B. and his two siblings had been abused and neglected by their natural parents. They had, therefore, been placed in foster care by the Department. D.B.'s natural parents' parental rights had been terminated because of the uncorrected and continuing abuse and neglect of D.B. and his two siblings. The Petitioners had adopted D.B. and his two siblings. Children who have been abused and neglected or abandoned by their parents are especially vulnerable and require the greatest degree of stability in their home life that is possible.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services denying the re-licensure of the Petitioners as a licensed family foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Billie and Willie Mae Barnes 15606 Southwest 27th Avenue Road Ocala, Florida 34473 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 43785 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Did Respondent violate Section 409.175(8)(b)1, Florida Statutes, or Rule 65C-13.011(d) and (f)1, Florida Administrative Code, and, if so, should Respondent's license as a foster home be revoked?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a foster home, having been issued such license on October 23, 1997. The Department is the agency of the state charged with the responsibility and duty to carry out and enforce the provisions of Chapter 409, Florida Statutes. Respondent received the Department's Model Approach to Partnership Parenting (MAPP) training to become a foster parent between September 1995 and December 1995. The Department provides MAPP training to teach persons how to become foster parents. The MAPP training that Respondent received included instructions concerning appropriate sleeping arrangements, namely that an adult should not sleep in the same bed with a foster child. Respondent agreed that the MAPP training was very useful and that he gained insight from that training on how to be a foster parent. Respondent received his foster care license on October 23, 1997, and the Department placed its first foster child with Respondent in January 1998. Foster child D.D., born October 23, 1985, was placed with Respondent by the Department January 20, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 12, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. Foster child E.T., born December 12, 1984, was placed with Respondent on January 12, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until January 21, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. E.T. was again placed by the Department with Respondent on January 23, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 12, 1998, when he was removed by the Department. Foster child R.M., born October 10, 1984, was placed with Respondent by the Department on March 2, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until March 9, 1998, when he was removed by the Department due to an alleged incident between R.M. and E.T. which occurred on March 9, 1998. The incident resulted in the Department's conducting an investigation concerning an alleged abuse on the foster child, E.T. by the foster child, R.M.. It appears from the record that the allegations were unfounded. In any event, R.M. was removed from Respondent's foster home on March 9, 1998, because his record indicated that in an earlier incident R.M. had sexually victimized another child (not E.T.). Also, because E.T. had been sexually victimized by another child (not R.M.) previous to being placed in Respondent's care the Department decided to remove E.T. from Respondent's home. It should be noted that the Department was aware of these prior incidents concerning R.M. and E.T. and the sleeping arrangements at Respondent's foster home at the time these foster children were placed with Respondent by the Department. Foster children, B.B. and C.L., dates of birth not in evidence, were placed with the Respondent by the Department on February 24, 1998, and stayed with Respondent until February 25, 1998, when they were removed by the Department. During the investigation concerning the alleged abuse incident involving R.M. and E.T. and at the hearing, Respondent admitted to sleeping in the same bed as E.T. and D.D. Respondent testified that on at least five occasions E.T. had slept in the same bed as Respondent. The facts surrounding this sleeping arrangement was that E.T. was suffering from an upper respiratory problem and would go to sleep on Respondent's bed before Respondent, who stayed up late reading, was ready for bed. As a result Respondent would sleep with E.T. to keep from waking him. There was no allegation, and certainly no evidence, that Respondent sexually or otherwise molested E.T. at any time. Respondent also admitted to sleeping in the same bed as D.D. on one occasion. Again, there was no allegation, and certainly no evidence, that Respondent sexually or otherwise molested D.D. At the time the Respondent applied for and was granted a foster home license and during the intervening time, the Department's personnel who worked with Respondent were well aware of the lack of sleeping spaces in Respondent's home. In fact, one of the Department's employees upon being advised of Respondent's sleeping arrangements commented that "it was better than sleeping on the floor at HRS." Upon being advised of the restriction on adults sleeping with foster children, the Respondent did not at first fully understand the risk of harm to the children. However, after being reminded of his MAPP training and the risk of harm to children in such a sleeping arrangement, Respondent realized his mistake in allowing such sleeping arrangements. Under Respondent's tutelage, E.T. and D.D. thrived academically and have continued to thrive since they left Respondent's home. The Department had some concern that Respondent's son was living in the home and that it had not been made aware of that circumstance. However, the Department knew, when Respondent's license was issued, that his son was living in the home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the mitigating circumstances, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order suspending Respondent's foster home license for a period of one year, staying the suspension and imposing such reasonable conditions as the Department deems necessary to further educate Respondent as to his responsibilities as a foster parent. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th of July, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37 Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 Thomas D. Wilson, Esquire Law Office of Gregory Ruster 1525 South Florida Avenue Suite 3 Lakeland, Florida 33803 Gregory D. Venz. Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' foster home license for use of corporal punishment of a foster child in violation of Section 409.175(8), Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13.010. (Citations to statutes are to Florida Statutes (2001), and citations to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes in Florida. Respondents are licensed foster parents. On November 1, 2001, Petitioner's Child Protection Team received an abuse report alleging that Respondent, Yvonne Lindsay, had administered corporal punishment to a foster child under Mrs. Lindsay's care and identified in the record as D.J. D.J. was born on May 6, 1997. D.J. urinated in the van owned by Respondents. D.J. urinated in the van regularly. Mrs. Lindsay became angry and grabbed D.J. forcefully by the arm. Mrs. Lindsay testified that she did not spank D.J. Mrs. Lindsay's denial concerning corporal punishment is neither credible nor persuasive. On November 2, 2001, members of the Child Protection Team examined D.J. at one of their offices. One team member who observed D.J. is an Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner (ARNP). The ARNP has specialized in family practice since 1980 and was the supervising nurse practitioner in the examining room when other members of the Child Protection Team examined D.J. The ARNP observed fresh red contusions on D.J.'s back as well as numerous healed lesions on D.J.'s buttocks from old injuries. The ARNP observed D.J. herself and supervised the examination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a Final Order finding that Mrs. Lindsay used corporal punishment against one of her foster children in violation of Section 409.175 and Rule 65C-13.010 and revoking Respondents' foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Cato, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 J. William Masters, Esquire 2901 Curry Ford Road, Suite 207 Orlando, Florida 32806 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes. Mrs. Sampson operated a Childrens' Medical Services ("CMS") medical foster home for children with special medical, emotional and physical needs, and was licensed by the Department as either a CMS medical foster home or as a regular foster home from 1990 until November 1997. At some point in 1996 or 1997, Mrs. Sampson voluntarily ceased operating as a CMS medical foster home, but continued to operate as a regular foster home. There was conflicting evidence as to the precise date of this change, but the date is not relevant to this phase of the bifurcated proceeding. On March 2, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint that sought to revoke Mrs. Sampson's foster care license. On October 6, 1999, the Department filed an Amended Administrative Complaint. The Department also denied Mrs. Sampson's application to adopt one of the foster children in her care. Mrs. Sampson requested a formal administrative hearing on both the revocation of her foster care license and the denial of her adoption application. The cases were consolidated, and a formal administrative hearing was held over several dates in April, May, and June 2000. Mrs. Sampson prevailed on all issues in the consolidated cases. A Recommended Order in her favor was entered on August 11, 2000. A Final Order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Recommended Order was entered on October 2, 2000. Mrs. Sampson contends that she is a "small business party" as defined in Subsection 57.111(3)(d)1.a, Florida Statutes, which provides that the term "small business party" includes: A sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time that action is initiated by a state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments. . . . At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was domiciled in the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was licensed as a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN"). The determinative issue is whether Mrs. Sampson's operation of a foster home establishes her as the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business or professional practice. Mrs. Sampson initially operated her medical foster home for the benefit of one child, who was admitted to Tampa General Hospital while Mrs. Sampson worked there as a contract nurse. The child was born prematurely and was not expected to live longer than six weeks. Mrs. Sampson became a licensed foster parent to take this child home and care for him. Under her care, the child thrived. Though he survived the initial crisis, the child continued to require full-time nursing care. Mrs. Sampson was not able to return to full-time employment as a contract nurse outside the home. Mrs. Sampson testified that she advised the Department's case workers that she would need to take in additional medical foster children to supplement her income while she worked at home caring for the children. Over a period of eight years, the Department placed at least 14 medically needy foster children in Mrs. Sampson's home. The Department establishes foster home care board rates, which are standard reimbursements to foster parents for the expenses incurred for the foster children, such as food, clothing, medical care, and transportation. The board rates are minimums that can be increased by the Department if the needs of the foster child cannot otherwise be met. Mrs. Sampson received an enhanced board rate for at least some of the children in her care. The Department conducts orientation meetings for and training of prospective foster parents. The Department emphasizes that the purpose of foster parenting is to provide temporary surrogate parenting for the foster children. The prospective parents are informed that they are considered volunteers and will not be paid for their services. The parents are told that the board payments are for the childrens' expenses. Foster parents sign an agreement acknowledging that the board payments are "on behalf of the child." Rule 65C-13.011(4), Florida Administrative Code, expressly provides that substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure the stability and security of their own families without reliance on the board payments, and that the substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care before receiving a board payment. If the Department removes a child from a foster home, the board payment to the foster payment ceases. If the child is placed with a new foster parent, then the board payment goes to the new foster parent. In addition to the regular and enhanced board payments, a CMS medical foster parent may receive payments from Medicaid as reimbursement for medically necessary services rendered to the foster children. Mrs. Sampson was a designated Medicaid provider from April 1992 through March 1997. Mrs. Sampson contended that these Medicaid payments were for the nursing services she provided to the children, just as physicians receive Medicaid payments for treatment of eligible patients. However, medical foster parents are not required to be licensed medical professionals. Mrs. Sampson offered no evidence that the Medicaid payments were for her services as an LPN, or that private, residential LPN services even qualify for Medicaid reimbursement absent prior authorization. CMS-administered medical foster care services are authorized for Medicaid reimbursement, and the best evidence is that Mrs. Sampson was reimbursed as a medical foster care provider, not as an LPN. The Department established that Mrs. Sampson did not hold herself out as running a business, nor did she report as income on her federal tax return the payments received in connection with providing foster care. Mrs. Sampson testified that she hired part-time employees to assist her in caring for the children, but she did not withhold federal income tax or Social Security taxes from their pay and did not file W-2 wage statements for them. Mrs. Sampson explained her failure to report her board payments as income by reference to 26 U.S.C. s. 131, which excludes foster care payments from reportable gross income. This citation justifies her failure to report, but also supports the Department's contention that foster care payments should not be considered business income. Mrs. Sampson implicitly conceded that her foster home did not possess any of the common indicia of a business. Her chief contention was that from 1970 to 1990, she worked as an LPN through nursing agencies, caring for sick children in hospitals or in their homes, and that from 1990 to 1997, she worked as an LPN caring for medical foster children in her own home. In other words, Mrs. Sampson contended that by operating the foster home, she was continuing to practice her profession in a different setting. She gave up the income from her practice as an LPN through nursing agencies in favor of the income she received as an LPN acting as a medical foster parent.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners should be licensed to operate a foster home in Marianna, Jackson County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Respondent licensed Petitioners to operate a foster home in Respondent's District No. 9, West Palm Beach, Florida, beginning in 1995 through April 1, 2000. The Department of Health, under its Children's Medical Services Program, licensed Petitioners as medical foster parents for almost two years of that time. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioners had five children living with them in West Palm Beach, Florida. Two boys, aged six and three, were Petitioners' adopted sons. A two-year-old boy, A.B., and his one-year-old sister, T.B. were medical foster children. C.S. was a two-year-old female foster child. In August 1999, Petitioners bought a home in Respondent's District No. 2, which includes Marianna, Jackson County, Florida. Mr. Mayes is a carpenter and intended to make repairs to the home before moving his family to North Florida. Petitioners knew their foster home license in District No. 9 was not transferable to District No. 2. Therefore, they applied for a foster home license in District No. 2. Petitioners wanted their three foster children to move with them to Mariana, Florida. Petitioners hoped to adopt C.S. and to keep A.B. and T.B. in the same placement until another family adopted them. All of the foster children had been in Petitioners' home since they were a few days old. A.B. was a very active two-year-old child. He regularly climbed out of his crib. On one occasion he climbed up on the stove and turned on the burners. He seemed to "have no fear." In the fall of 1999, Mrs. Mayes requested Respondent to provide her with behavior management assistance for A.B. Because Petitioners were planning to move out of District No. 9, Respondent decided to wait until A.B. was settled after Petitioners' move to perform the behavior management evaluation. In the meantime, Petitioners could not keep A.B. in his highchair during mealtime. They had difficulty keeping him in his crib. They bought a safety harness and attempted to use it to keep A.B. in his crib on one occasion and in his highchair on another occasion. A.B. was able to wiggle out of the harness on both occasions. Petitioners subsequently discarded the harness. They resorted to tightening the highchair's feeding tray in order to keep A.B. still long enough to feed him. Petitioners never used and never intended to use the harness to punish A.B. Petitioners usually disciplined the children by placing them in timeout for one minute per year of age. Timeout for Petitioners' foster children usually meant being held in Mrs. Mayes' lap. Mrs. Mayes admitted using the safety harness on A.B. during a telephone conversation with Respondent's medical foster care counselor in January 2000. The counselor informed Ms. Mayes that foster parents are not allowed to use a harness to restrain foster children. Prospective foster parents must participate in and complete training classes designed by Respondent. Persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent teaches prospective foster parents during this training that children should never be restrained by a harness. Petitioners have taken these training classes. If A.B. and the other children were free to go into a bedroom, they would pull everything out of the chest of drawers. They would flush objects down the toilet in the bathroom. Mr. Mayes put a hook-type latch on the door to the Petitioners' bedroom, A.B.'s bedroom, and the bathroom in the hall. The primary purpose of the door latches was to keep the children out of unsupervised areas of the home. Petitioners never used the door latches as a means of discipline. On two occasions Mrs. Mayes latched the door to A.B.'s room while he was in the room asleep. The first time she latched the door while she went to the mail box in front of her home. The other time, she latched the door while she bathed another child who had a doctor's appointment later that afternoon. On both occasions, A.B. was locked in his room for only a few minutes. Petitioners knew that they needed permission from Respondent in order to take A.B., T.B., and C.S. out of the state on vacations. On several occasions, Respondent's staff gave Petitioners permission to take the foster children to North Florida for short visits during the time that Mr. Mayes was remodeling the home. Respondent's staff approved these short visits as if they were vacations. Petitioners knew that they needed to be licensed in Respondent's District No. 2 before Respondent's staff in District No. 9 could approve the permanent transfer of the foster children. At the same time, the Respondent's staff in District No. 2 could not license Petitioners until they actually made the move with all of their furniture. Petitioners discussed their dilemma with several members of Respondent's staff in District No. 9. During these conversations, Petitioners asked Respondent if they could take the children with them and treat the time that they would be temporarily unlicensed as if it were a vacation. At least one member of Respondent's staff responded that treating the move initially as if it were a vacation was "an option that could be explored." Respondent's staff subsequently advised Petitioners that under no circumstances could the foster children move to Jackson County, temporarily or permanently, until Petitioners were properly licensed. Petitioner's never attempted to deceive Respondent; to the contrary, they were openly looking for an acceptable way to take the foster children with then when they moved. They never intended to circumvent the proper licensing process. Based on Petitioners' former experience with Respondent, they believed that treating the move as a vacation would be an appropriate way to solve what was otherwise a "catch twenty-two" situation. By letter dated March 14, 2000, Respondent's staff in District No. 2 advised Petitioners that they would receive a provisional foster home license as soon as information furnished by Petitioners and copies of Petitioners' file from the licensing unit in District No. 9 could be sent to Respondent's office in Panama City, Florida. Respondent removed the three foster children from Petitioners' home just before Petitioners moved to Jackson County on April 1, 2000. In a memorandum dated April 19, 2000, Respondent listed Petitioners' home as one of two medical foster homes in Jackson County, Florida. Despite the representation in this memorandum, Respondent issued the letter of denial on June 5, 2000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners a foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: James Mayes Gail Mayes 4561 Magnolia Road Marianna, Florida 32448 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe, Suite 252-A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
