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NUGGET OIL COMPANY, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 81-000284 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000284 Latest Update: Oct. 21, 1981

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has erected two signs advertising a service station business, one of which lies 1.4 miles east of State Road 81 on the north side of Interstate Highway 10, and one of which is located nine-tenths of a mile west of State Road 81 on the south side of Interstate 10. The Petitioner seeks a permit authorizing the erection and maintenance of those two signs. Both signs lie within the corporate limits of the City. of Ponce de Leon. A previous application by the Petitioner was rejected apparently because the subject sign locations were not properly zoned to comply with the exception contained in Section 479.111, Florida Statutes. That is, they were not commercially or industrially zoned and were not in on zoned areas of commercial and industrial character. In denying the instant application, the Respondent has taken the position that the signs, which are within 660 feet of Interstate Highway 10, occupy areas which are located in areas which are "strip zoned" and are therefore improperly zoned. Interstate Highway 10 is part of the interstate system defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The interstate highway was opened at the time that the signs wore erected, and they can be seen from the main traveled way of Interstate 10. The Respondent contends that strip zoning is prohibited by Title 23, Code of Federal Regulations, Subchapter H, Part 750, "Highway Beautification." The testimony of the Petitioner, as well as the zoning map of the City of Ponce de Leon, Florida, embodied in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, establishes that both of the subject signs are in an area zoned commercial, which official zoning map or plan was adopted by the Commission of the City of Ponce de Leon on January 29, 1976. The Petitioner's testimony also, as corroborated by Petitioner's Exhibit 4, establishes that the Ponce de Leon zoning pattern is not unique or unusual, and that strip zoning is analogous to the term "spot zoning" which is used to imply zoning which is improper or aberrational in its relation to the overall character, use and zoning of the property which surrounds or adjoins a "strip" or "spot zoned" tract. There was no showing that the commercially zoned area in which the signs are located is out of context with the proper use of property adjoining it along Interstate 10 and around the subject intersection, nor was it shown to be detrimental to the adjoining properties or the proper enjoyment and use of the adjoining properties. No evidence was adduced by the Respondent which would establish that the zoning map and the zoning plan it represents by the City of Ponce de Leon, insofar as it relates to the subject commercially zoned area, is unique, unusual or improper. The subject zoning ordinances and the map were demonstrated to be duly and properly adopted by the City Commission. Finally, The Respondent's own witness conceded that the area in which the signs are located is not strip zoned in a deleterious sense.

Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence in the record, pleadings and arguments of counsel, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation granting the petition of Nugget Oil Company, Inc., and permitting the erection and location of the signs described hereinabove located respectively 1.4 miles east of State Road 81 on the north side of Interstate Highway 10, and nine-tenths of a mile west of State Road 81 on the south side of Interstate Highway 10. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Paul H. J. Mosier Post Office Box 1297 Crestview, Florida 32536 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Jacob D. Varn, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 479.02479.07479.11479.111
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs THE ADALITE GROUP, 90-001220 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Feb. 28, 1990 Number: 90-001220 Latest Update: Mar. 25, 1991

Findings Of Fact Respondent owns a series of light poles that were erected at Respondent's expense at various locations within the city limits of the City of West Miami (the "City") pursuant to a written contract between Respondent and the City (the "contract"). Signs were affixed to eight light poles with the permission of the City pursuant to the contract. Respondent paid for the cost of construction and installation of the light poles. Respondent also pays operating costs for the light poles, including utility and insurance costs. The sign on each light pole is self illuminating. Respondent pays the City a percentage of advertising revenues derived from signs placed on the light poles. Revenue from advertising is derived from signs attached to eight of the light poles erected by Respondent. 1/ Advertising revenues from signs to be affixed on all of the light poles erected by Respondent were projected by Respondent and the City in an amount sufficient to pay for the capital and operating costs of the light poles and provide both the City and Respondent with additional revenue. The five signs at issue in this proceeding are not permanent. Each sign consists of a metal frame approximately three feet high and two feet wide. Each metal frame is attached to the light pole by bolts and clamps. Advertising is provided on heavy duty paper covered with a clear, mylar plastic panel. Advertising can be easily changed by sliding out an old advertising panel and inserting a new advertising panel. The metal frame can be detached from the light pole in a matter of minutes by removing the bolts and clamps. The five signs at issue in this proceeding are attached to light poles erected on State Road 90 which is also U.S. 41, the Tamiami Trail, and Calle Ocho (the "Tamiami Trail"). 2/ The signs are located within 660 feet of the Tamiami Trail where it intersects Southwest 67th Avenue and Ludlam Road and where it intersects Southwest 57th Avenue and Red Road. The portion of the Tamiami Trail on which the five signs are located is designated by Petitioner as part of the federal-aid primary highway system. Some of the eight signs erected by Respondent are within a thousand feet of other permitted signs. The five signs at issue in this proceeding were erected without first obtaining permits from Petitioner. Each sign and sign message is visible from Tamiami Trail. Each sign advertises business activities conducted at locations other than those where the signs are located. None of the five signs at issue in this proceeding are official road signs or traffic control devices. The signs do not: indicate points of historical interest; advertise the sale or lease of the property upon which they are located; advertise only the name or nature of the business being conducted, or products, goods, or services that are sold, supplied, or distributed upon or in the premises upon which the signs are located. The signs were not in place prior to July 3, 1986. The signs are not otherwise within an area where signs are permitted by law. Approximately three or four years ago, Eric Nadel, Respondent's president and founder, conferred on a number of occasions with Mr. William Kenney who is the Outdoor Advertising Coordinator for Petitioner's District 6. Mr. Nadel advised Mr. Kenney of the plan to put signs on light poles. Mr. Kenney told Mr. Nadel " . . . over and over again . . . " which locations on state roads in Dade County would require sign permits and which locations would not require sign permits. Mr. Kenney provided Mr. Nadel with Petitioner's log of the state highway system in District 6, including Dade and Monroe counties. The log identified those roads designated by Petitioner as interstate highways ("FAI"), federal-aid urban highways ("FAU"), and federal-aid primary highways ("FAP"). Mr. Kenney also provided Mr. Nadel with copies of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. 3/ The light poles and five signs at issue in this proceeding were erected and installed by Respondent subsequent to the time Mr. Nadel conferred with Mr. Kenney. Mr. Nadel was personally responsible for the erection of the light poles and signs. The signs do not carry sign permits and were erected without first obtaining sign permits. After the lights and signs were installed, Mr. Nadel received a Notice to Show Cause for each of the five signs at issue in this proceeding. After a formal hearing was requested in this proceeding, Mr. Nadel met with representatives of the Petitioner including, George Fisher, Enforcement Supervisor, Stanley M. Cann, Director of Operations, and Barbara Hobbs, attorney. Mr. Nadel was accompanied by Mr. Alex Chavez, a commissioner for the City during the period when the contract was negotiated and executed between the City and Respondent. Discussions at the meeting between the parties included the potential violation of Chapter 86-308, Laws of Florida, which designates Calle Ocho as an historic roadway (the "Calle Ocho Statute"). 4/ An agreement of the parties was reached as a result of the meeting between Mr. Nadel and representatives of the Respondent. The agreement was memorialized in a letter dated March 13, 1990, from Mr. Fisher to Mr. Nadel. Petitioner agreed to stay further removal action against existing unpermitted signs for 90 days from March 13, 1990. Respondent agreed not to install any additional signs until proper permits are issued for the existing unpermitted signs. Petitioner agreed to "process" Respondent's applications for sign permits if Respondent secured approval from the Division of Archives for all signs in the area covered by the Calle Ocho Statute. Approval of any applications for sign permits was expressly conditioned upon Respondent's compliance with the current provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. In the event Respondent was unable to secure approval from the Division of Archives for all signs in the area covered by the Calle Ocho Statute "and" comply with Petitioner's requirements for obtaining valid permits, Petitioner would remove the signs and bill Respondent for the costs incurred. The agreement of the parties expressly provided that the terms of the agreement did not waive any legal rights of the parties. The Division of Archives determined that it had no jurisdiction over any of the signs at issue in this proceeding. After several preliminary letters, the Division of Archives notified Mr. Nadel of its determination by letter dated April 25, 1990.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's notices of violation be upheld, and the five signs at issue in this proceeding be removed in accordance with applicable Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of March, 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1991.

Florida Laws (9) 120.57337.406337.407479.01479.02479.07479.11479.111479.16
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. BILL SALTER OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 85-000327 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000327 Latest Update: Oct. 31, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Bill Salter Outdoor Advertising, Inc., was issued permits numbered AI-962-10 and AI-963-10 on or about April 28, 1983. These permits were for the erection of a sign located on the north side of I-10, approximately 1.6 miles east of SR 297, in Escambia County, Florida. They were issued because of the proximity of an automotive business noted on a sketch attached to the applications submitted by the Respondent as "Bill's Paint and Body Shop." In February of 1984, replacement tags numbered AL844-12 and AL845-12 were issued. The Respondent submitted the applications and the attached sketch for these permits, and designated on the applications that the sign location would be in an unzoned area within 800 feet of a business. The sketch shows what is designated as "Bill's Paint and Body Shop" to be in close proximity to the proposed sign location. On each of these applications the Respondent certified that the sign would meet all requirements of Chapter 479 of the Florida Statutes. Prior to the issuance of these permits, the subject site was inspected by the Department's outdoor advertising inspector, who approved the applications because of the existence of a "Pritchett's Paint and Body Shop" nearby the proposed sign location. This inspector was able to see several autos on the Pritchett property and some activity around these autos. Apparently because the inspector expected to find an automotive business near the proposed sign site as represented on the Respondent's applications, it was concluded that such a business existed there, and the applications were approved. Subsequently, a sign was erected on the Pritchett property with the copy "Willie's Paint and Body Shop," but this sign was not in place when the site inspection was made. From the main traveled way of I-10, the inspector was not able to testify specifically that any paint and body work was observed, or that any commercial activity could be seen from the interstate. The inspector merely testified "I observed activity around those automobiles going on." The Pritchett property is residential. Mr. Pritchett lives there. He does operate a paint and body business from his back yard. He has had an occupational license since 1977, renewing these businesses each year through 1984. Although he could not produce a license for the year when the permits were approved, this does not mean that he didn't actually renew the license for this year. Nevertheless, as viewed from I-10, only the sign which was erected subsequent to the approval of the permits and the rear portion of some autos, can be seen. The Department's inspector made a mistake in approving the Respondent's applications because no commercial activity is visible from the interstate. The testimony of the Respondent and his witnesses, including Mr. Pritchett, is rejected as being inconsistent with what can be seen by viewing the photographs in evidence. Moreover, whoever erected the sign had to feel that the view from I-10 was inadequate to qualify the site as commercial without it. During the summer of 1984, the subject site was inspected by a Department Right-of-Way Administrator, who determined that the permits had been issued in error because of the absence of visible commercial activity within 800 feet of the sign. In December of 1984, the Department issued its notices of violation advising the Respondent that the subject sign permits were being revoked.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that permits numbered AL844-12 and AL845- 12 held by the Respondent, Bill Salter Outdoor Advertising, Inc., authorizing signs on the North side of I-10, approximately 1.6 miles east of SR 297 in Escambia County, Florida, be revoked, and any signs erected pursuant to these permits be removed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 31st day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1985. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 85-0327T The Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties are ruled upon as follows: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Rejected, as irrelevant. Rejected, as irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected, as irrelevant. Accepted relative to use of sketch. Rejected relative to remainder, as irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted relative to the photos. Rejected relative to remainder, as irrelevant. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, as irrelevant. Rejected. Accepted relative to the application. Rejected relative to remainder, as irrelevant. Rejected, as irrelevant. Accepted relative to visibility of the commercial activity. Rejected relative to remainder. Accepted relative to everything except the visibility from I-10. Rejected, relative to the visibility from I-10. Accepted. Rejected relative to visibility from I-10. Accepted relative to the remainder. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Mark J. Proctor, Esquire Post Office Box 12308 Pensacola, Florida 32581 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (6) 120.57479.01479.02479.08479.11479.111
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs MARCENT FLORIDA, INC., 91-004956 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 05, 1991 Number: 91-004956 Latest Update: Mar. 09, 1992

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility under law of regulating and controlling outdoor advertising signs such as the one at issue in these proceedings. The Respondent, Marcent Florida, Inc., maintains or controls an outdoor advertising sign located at the intersection of Sandlake Road (State Road 482) and Interstate 4. The sign is located on property belonging to Grenada N.V. but Respondent has permission to maintain the sign at the location. The sign is approximately 14 feet by 48 feet, is 30 feet above ground, and, according to Respondent, "looks similar to a standard roadside billboard." At all times material to this case, the above-described sign did not have a valid DOT sign permit. At all times material to this case, the above-described sign contained language advertising lakefront, lakeview, homesites at North Bay. Additionally, the sign advertised a development known as Park Terrace. Both of the referenced developments are off-site and not immediately adjacent to the subject property. At all times material to this case, the above-referenced sign was located two hundred feet west of the center line of Sand Lake Road. Further, the sign was fifteen feet back from the right-of-way. The subject sign was erected in approximately 1985 or 1986 and is within 1500 feet of a DOT permitted sign. After Respondent received the notice of alleged violations, it made efforts to alter the language of the sign so that it would only advertise the availability of the property on which it is placed. To the date of the hearing, such changes had not been completed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding the subject sign to be in violation of Chapter 479 as set forth above. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are accepted. Paragraph 5 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are accepted. Paragraph 8 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraphs 9 and 10 are accepted. Paragraph 11 is accepted. Paragraph 12 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 9 are rejected as irrelevant, argument or fact not supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Jay O. Barber Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas M. Ramsberger Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson Firstate Tower 255 Orange Avenue Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32802-0231 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Florida Laws (3) 479.02479.07479.16
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NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 77-001832 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001832 Latest Update: May 04, 1978

The Issue Whether the outdoor advertising structures of the Petitioner, National Advertising Company, are in violation of F.S.A. 479.13 and 479.05.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, National Advertising Company, is the owner of two signs located on U.S. Highway 41, east of SR 840A which is known as the Turner River Road. The face on one side bears the copy of "Holiday Inn;" the face on the other side bears the copy of "African Safari." The Petitioner was cited on September 22, 1977, by the Department of Transportation for violation of Chapter 479.13 of the F.S.A. The real property upon which these structures are located was formerly owned by the Collier Company of Naples, Florida, who by letter dated November 17, 1976, notified the Petitioner that it expected to conclude negotiations for sale of its property leased by Petitioner sign company on November 1976 and therefore would not renew any sign space leases beyond their expiration date of December 31, 1976. The leases were not renewed and the structures stand upon the property without authorization from the present owner of the property, the State of Florida, which has leased it to the National Park Service. By letter dated April 14, 1977, the National Park Service, requested the Respondent DOT which has the responsibility to administer and enforce the outdoor advertising law, Chapter 479, F.S., to remove subject signs. As a reason for the request, it cited: Title 23 CRF - Highways, Part 131(h) states that "All public lands or reservations of the United States which are adjacent to any portion of . . . the primary system shall be controlled in accordance with the provisions of this section and the national standards promulgated by the Secretary," and Part 138 Preservation of parklands states: "It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands."

Recommendation Remove the Petitioner's signs. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William D. Rowland, Esquire Post Office Box 539 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Mr. O. E. Black, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Section Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (1) 479.05
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JAMES HARVEL SMITH vs CITY OF LAUREL HILL, 01-001310GM (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Crestview, Florida Apr. 05, 2001 Number: 01-001310GM Latest Update: Jan. 23, 2002

The Issue The issue is whether the small scale development amendment adopted by Respondent by Ordinance No. 231 on March 1, 2001, is in compliance.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this land use dispute, Petitioner, James Harvel Smith, has challenged a small scale development amendment adopted by Respondent, City of Laurel Hill (City). The City is located in northern Okaloosa County, Florida, just south of the Florida-Alabama State Line. By the amendment, the City proposes to amend its Future Land Use Map (FLUM) by changing the land use classification on a small parcel of land from Residential to Commercial. Despite opposition from residents who live near the affected area, the City adopted Ordinance No. 231 (Ordinance) on March 1, 2001, which changed the land use on a 2.58-acre parcel of property from Residential to Commercial. The amendment is a small scale development amendment subject to the requirements of Section 163.3187, Florida Statutes (2000). As such, it was not reviewed for consistency by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA). It is undisputed that the City followed all pertinent statutory requirements in noticing the matter and conducting a public meeting before the adoption of the Ordinance. In his Petition, Petitioner contends that the amendment violates (or is inconsistent with) various provisions within the City's Comprehensive Plan (Plan) and Land Development Code (Code). More specifically, he contends that the Ordinance violates Section 7.A.2.3 of the Plan, which provides that new development shall be located in conformity with the land use categories shown on the FLUM. He also asserts that the Ordinance is inconsistent with Page 4-14 of the Code, which restricts commercial development to intersections of two-lane arterial roads. He further contends that the change in land use is inconsistent with Sections 13 and 17 of Ordinance No. 222, which contain the regulations applicable to single-family residential and commercial land use districts. Finally, by amendment to his Petition filed on April 14, 2001, Petitioner contends that until the City identifies in its future land use element the land use categories in which public schools are an allowable use, as required by Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), it is statutorily barred from adopting any plan amendments, including the one in issue. The City's current FLUM depicts a large residential area which makes up the greater part of the central section of the City. State Road 85 (a two-lane arterial road) and an old Louisville & Nashville railroad track run through the middle of the City, including the residential district. The subject property is an odd-shaped parcel fronting on Clary Road (owned by the Department of Transportation) in the residential district approximately "1,000 feet as the crow flies" east of State Road 85. The property is now vacant, but single-family residences are located on three sides of the property. The closest commercial property on the FLUM is several blocks away. Section 7.A.2.3 of the Plan requires that "[n]ew development will be located in conformance with the land use categories shown on the Future Land Use Map, while Section 7.A.3.3. provides that "[e]xpansion or replacement of land uses which are inconsistent or incompatible with the Future Land Use Map shall be prohibited." Page 14-4 of the Plan, which was adopted by Ordinance No. 202 in December 1990, reflects that "[f]uture Commerical development will occur only at intersections of two-lane Arterial Roads in order to protect neighborhoods from Commercial intrusion." Although State Road 85 is an arterial road, the subject property is not located at an intersection of that roadway. Indeed, at the present time, access to the property from State Road 85 can only be obtained by entering the residential district at least two or three blocks north or south of the subject parcel, and then meandering for several blocks through a residential neighborhood. Therefore, the amendment is inconsistent with the requirements that commercial development occur only at intersections of a two- lane arterial road, and that development be in conformity with the land use categories shown on the FLUM. The amendment is also inconsistent with Sections 13 and 17 of the Code, which set forth the regulations applicable to single-family and commercial land use districts, respectively. More specifically, Section 13 provides that the "express purpose" of the Single Family Residential District is "to exclude from this district all building[s] or other structures and uses having commercial characteristics, whether operated for profit or otherwise." Section 17 provides that the Commercial District "is intended to be situated along selected segments of City thoroughfares and in the vicinity of intersections." The amendment is contrary to both provisions since it inserts a commercial enclave into an existing residential district. Finally, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. G includes a letter dated March 12, 2001, from the DCA to the City regarding the City's transmittal of Ordinance No. 231 to the DCA. The letter stated in pertinent part as follows: The Department has received the City of Laurel Hill's small scale amendments adopted by Ordinance No. 231 on March 1, 2001. The adopted amendment package received by the Department is incomplete because the City has not been demonstrated to meet the requirements of Paragraph 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes (F.S.), with regards to the public school siting criteria. The Department's records indicate that these [school siting] requirements have not been incorporated into your plan and therefore this amendment appears to be invalid. There is no evidence of record that the City has complied with the requirements of Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), since the date of the letter. Under the terms of the statute, the City is barred from adopting any plan amendments, including Ordinance No. 231, until the requirement is satisfied.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that the small scale development amendment adopted by the City of Laurel Hill by Ordinance No. 231 on March 1, 2001, is not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Leighty, Clerk Growth Management and Strategic Planning The Capitol, Suite 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Charles Canaday, General Counsel Office of the Governor The Capitol, Suite 209 Tallahassee, Florida 323999-0001 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 James Harvel Smith Post Office Box 206 Laurel Hill, Florida 32567 T. Martin Knopes, Esquire Post Office Box 727 Crestview, Florida 32536

Florida Laws (2) 163.3177163.3187
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LAMAR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING (AE994-10) vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 86-003608 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003608 Latest Update: Jan. 27, 1987

Findings Of Fact In 1974 Tag No. 8670-10 was issued to Peterson Outdoor Advertising for a sign located on US 98 one-half mile north of SR 60 in Bartow, Florida. At the time the permit was issued, Peterson had a sublease to erect the sign from the operator of a garage located on this site who leased the property from the owner. In 1980 Lamar bought out Peterson and acquired its assets including the permit for a sign on the garage property. At this time Peterson held a lease from Garfield Jones to occupy the site with one advertising structure. This lease was for a five year period ending December 31, 1984 (Exhibit 6). The lease contained the usual provisions for cancellation by the parties and for extensions beyond the expiration date. In 1985, the garage tenant surrendered his lease, and the building was modified to operate as a feed store. Lamar's sign was removed to make way for the building modification as provided for by the lease. On July 22, 1986, Quality executed a lease with Milton W. Bryan, Jr. (Exhibit 3) for a site for an advertising sign at premises located at 1710 N. Broadway in Bartow, Florida. This is the site for which both of these Petitioners seek permits. As compensation therefor the lessee agrees to pay $1200 a year upon erection of the sign. Subsequent thereto on August 6, 1986, Lamar obtained a lease from Bryan to erect a sign on this same property. As compensation therefor, Lamar provided Bryan with a sign along U.S. 17 south of Bartow at no cost. Lamar also presented Exhibit 4 which was admitted without objection. This is an affidavit of Bryan that upon removal of Lamar's sign during construction of the Feed Depot building Lamar had right of first refusal to rebuild an outdoor advertising structure. No evidence was submitted that Bryan offered or failed to offer Lamar right of first refusal before he executed the lease to Quality.

Florida Laws (1) 479.07
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KATHLEEN BURSON vs CITY TITUSVILLE, 08-000208GM (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Titusville, Florida Jan. 10, 2008 Number: 08-000208GM Latest Update: Feb. 02, 2009

Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Kathleen Burson owns property and resides at 2950 Knox McRae Drive in Titusville. Her residence is located near the land affected by the FLUM amendment. Petitioner submitted comments and objections regarding the amendment to the Titusville City Commission. The City of Titusville is a municipality of the State of Florida and has adopted a comprehensive plan that it amends from time to time pursuant to Section 163.3167(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Intervenor Ravi Shah was the applicant for the comprehensive plan amendment and a companion zoning change. He signed a contract to purchase the property affected by the amendment. At the time of the hearing, the contract's expiration date had passed. However, Intervenor is pursuing mediation under the terms of the contract to contest and prevent the termination of his right to purchase the property. The Amendment The amendment changes the FLUM designations for a portion of a 18.17-acre parcel of land ("the property") located at the intersection of State Road 405 (South Street) and Fox Lake Road. The amendment was formally approved by Ordinance 72- 2007, issued by the City on December 11, 2007, and was designated Small Scale Amendment 15-2007. The property had two FLUM designations before the amendment, Residential High Density and Conservation. The amendment changes a portion of the Residential High Density area to Conservation. It changes an area formerly designated Residential High Density and Conservation to Commercial Low Intensity. It changes an area formerly designated Conservation to Residential Low Density. Respondent's Exhibit 10 and Petitioner's Exhibit 50, respectively, depict the "before" and "after" land use designations. Concurrent with the comprehensive plan amendment, the City approved a rezoning of the property. Petitioner and the City presented evidence related to the rezoning and to Intervenor's proposed development of a drug store and other retail shops on that portion of the property now designated Commercial Low Intensity. However, most of this evidence was irrelevant to the issue of whether the comprehensive plan amendment is "in compliance." The Property and Surrounding Land Uses The property is currently vacant. A wetland covers 3.71 acres in the southern portion of the property. The boundaries of the wetland were used to define the area designated Conservation by the amendment. It was the City's intent for the amendment to place in the Conservation designation on any part of the wetland that was not previously designated Conservation and to remove from the Conservation designation any land that was not part of the wetland. The upland portion of the property is used by wildlife, but it is not known to be used by any threatened or endangered wildlife species other than the gopher tortoise, which is a threatened species. Several gopher tortoise burrows were found and at least one burrow was "active." Petitioner claims that the amendment would destroy the rural character of the area. The City disputed that the area has much rural character. The property is bounded on the west by South Street, which is an arterial road. The land across South Street to the west includes commercial and industrial uses. The land on the northwest corner of the intersection of South Street and Fox Lake Road is designated Commercial Low Intensity and the City has approved a gas station/convenience store for the site. The property is bounded on the north partly by Fox Lake Road, a collector road, and partly by a small parcel which is designated Residential High Density. This small parcel has existing dwellings and has non-conforming density. Across Fox Lake Road to the north is land which is designated Residential High Density. To the east of the property, between the property and the neighborhood where Petitioner resides, is land which is designated Residential Low Density and is zoned for single- family homes on lots of at least one acre. Petitioner's neighborhood comprises 14 homes on lots that generally range in size from one acre to 4.5 acres, with one 10-acre lot. No other homeowners in Petitioner's neighborhood challenged the amendment, even those persons who live closer to the property than Petitioner. The southern border of the property is bounded by Commercial High Intensity, Conservation, and Educational land uses. The Education designation covers the site of Apollo Elementary School. The property has access to urban services, including public utilities. The land uses designations created by the amendment are compatible with the surrounding land uses. More specifically, the Commercial Low Intensity designation is compatible with Petitioner's neighborhood because the neighborhood is separated from the commercial use by almost 300 feet, with other residential land uses between. The Conservation Designation Petitioner's challenge to the amendment focuses primarily on the change in the area previously designated Conservation. She contends that the area should remain Conservation because she relied on the designation, and the former Conservation designation protects upland wildlife. When it adopted its first comprehensive plan in 1988, the City designated Conservation areas on the FLUM to correspond with wetlands as depicted on a 1988 National Wetland Inventory map prepared for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. From time to time since 1988, the City has modified the boundaries of Conservation areas depicted on the FLUM when, in the process of reviewing land development proposals, the City has received more current and detailed information about the boundaries of particular wetlands. Petitioner claims that it is wrong for the City to use wetlands, alone, as a basis for designating Conservation areas. She cites statements made by the City in 1988 as evidence that the City intended for the Conservation designation to cover some upland areas as well as wetlands. Goal 1, Objective 6, Policy 3 in the Conservation Element states that "at a minimum," the 1988 Wetland Inventory Map will be used to define Conservation areas. Policy 3 allows the City to designate Conservation areas to correspond only with wetlands, and that has been the City's consistent practice. It is reasonable for the City to continue that practice in the adoption of the amendment at issue in this case. The amendment is consistent with this policy. Protection of the Wetland's Functional Values Petitioner contends that the amendment is inconsistent with comprehensive plan policies and with Florida Administrative Code 9J-5.013(3), related to protecting the functional values of wetlands. Petitioner did not present competent evidence that any functional values of the wetland on the property would be adversely affected by the amendment, but she does not think an adequate functional value assessment was done for the wetland. Goal 1, Objective 6 of the Conservation Element is to "encourage preservation/protection of wetlands according to their function." Policy 1, Strategy 1 states that "The protection of wetlands shall be determined by the functional value of the wetland." Other related policies and strategies in the Conservation Element indicate that this objective is to be accomplished in part through land development regulations. For example, Policy 3, Strategy 6 states that "Mitigation for unavoidable impacts to wetlands which possess significant functional value, as determined by a functional value assessment, will be addressed in the land development regulations." Florida Administrative Code 9J-5.013(3)(a) states: Wetlands and the natural functions of wetlands shall be protected and conserved. The adequate and appropriate protection and conservation of wetlands shall be accomplished through a comprehensive planning process which includes consideration of the types, values, functions, sizes, conditions and locations of wetlands, and which is based on supporting data and analysis. The City interprets its comprehensive plan policies as satisfied if wetland impacts are avoided. The wetland analysis conducted for the amendment at issue in this case was adequate because the entire wetland is included in the Conservation designation and, therefore, appropriate planning level protection is provided for the wetland. The adjacent Commercial Low Intensity designation, standing alone, does not mean that adverse impacts to the wetland will occur. Intervenor's proposed development, for example, provides a buffer from the wetland and does not propose to have an impact to the wetland. The City's interpretation and application of the comprehensive plan objectives and policies related to protecting wetland functional values was not shown to be unreasonable. The amendment was not shown to be inconsistent with the comprehensive plan nor with Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J- 5.013(3)(a). Compatibility Petitioner contends that the amendment also violates Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.013(3)(b) because it directs incompatible land uses into wetlands. The amendment places all of the wetlands on the property under the Conservation land use designation. Neither the Residential Low Density designation nor the Commercial Low Intensity designation is placed in the wetlands. The amendment eliminates an incompatible Residential High Density designation that was formerly in the wetlands. Petitioner failed to show that the amendment directs incompatible uses into the wetlands. Petitioner contends the amendment is inconsistent with Objective 1.13 and Policy 1.13.1 of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE), which require compatibility with "environmentally sensitive areas;" and Policy 1.6.1 which requires elimination or minimization of negative impacts to environmentally sensitive areas caused by commercial land uses. "Environmentally sensitive areas" are not defined in the comprehensive plan, but discussed in the Conservation Element are (1) habitat for threatened and endangered species, (2) important natural resources, (3) critical habitat, and (4) streams, lakes, rivers, estuaries, and wetlands. The types of "environmentally sensitive areas" on the property are wetlands and habitat for a threatened species, the gopher tortoise. As found above, the amendment does not direct commercial uses into the wetlands. Petitioner did not show where the gopher tortoise habitat is located on the property but claims that Intervenor’s proposed commercial project fails to protect that habitat. The property has not been designated as critical habitat for the gopher tortoise. In fact, no critical habitat has been designated in Florida for the gopher tortoise because there are many areas in the state that provide suitable habitat for this species. In Florida, it is common for land developers to seek and obtain approval from state and federal regulatory agencies to remove and relocate gopher tortoises to other areas which have suitable gopher tortoise habitat. Developers also have the option to build near the burrows as long as they are not disturbed. Goal 1, Objectives 1 and 2, Policy 3 of the Conservation Element states that "any public or private use of land greater than three (3) acres in area shall require a management plan designed to minimize harm to the species and its habitat.” Such a management plan, however, would be submitted as part of a re-zoning or development proposal and, therefore, the adequacy of any management plan submitted by the Intervenor in this case is not a relevant inquiry. Petitioner argues that the relocation of the gopher tortoises to other suitable habitat would not be consistent with the comprehensive plan's policy to protect habitat. For threatened and endangered species ("listed species") other than the gopher tortoise, relocation might be impracticable or inappropriate, and, therefore, inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. However, for gopher tortoises, their relocation is often determined to be practicable and appropriate, and it has been the practice of the City and of the state and federal regulatory agencies to allow their relocation. There is no policy in the comprehensive plan that clearly requires gopher tortoises and their habitat to be managed differently in Titusville than in other areas of the state. A local government's future land use designation has no effect on the regulation and protection of listed species, including gopher tortoises, afforded under state and federal law. Any land use, including a single-family residence, has the potential to disturb the habitat of gopher tortoises. Although Petitioner is correct in her view that the Conservation designation is more likely to avoid habitat disturbances and the need to re-locate gopher tortoises on the property than the Commercial Low Intensity designation, that factor, standing alone, does not require a finding that the amendment is not in compliance. Restricting Development Petitioner contends that the amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.6.1 E because the City did not impose conditions regarding hours of operation, visual impacts, and privacy factors on the Intervenor's proposed development in the Commercial Low Intensity area. This policy only requires that such matters be considered. The City approved the concurrent rezoning of property with a condition that a six-foot wooden fence be placed along the boundary between the commercial project and the adjacent residential area. The City also required Intervenor to place the wetland under a conservation easement, to provide a buffer zone around the wetland, and to prepare and submit a gopher tortoise management plan prior to development of the property. Petitioner failed to show that controls were not considered by the City or that the amendment is incompatible due to the lack of adequate controls. Road Access Petitioner contends the amendment is inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.6.1 A, which states that sites for commercial development at collector/arterial intersections are appropriate "provided minimal access is necessary on the collector street." The site plan for the proposed commercial development shows a primary entrance on South Street, an arterial road. A secondary, side entrance is on the collector street, Fox Lake Road. Petitioner failed to show how the amendment was inconsistent with Policy 1.6.1 A. Open Space and Recreation Zoning Petitioner contends the amendment violates the City's land development regulations (LDRs) because the LDRs place an Open Space and Recreation (OR) zoning classification on all Conservation lands on the FLUM, and describe OR as a "permanent" classification. This argument is not persuasive, because the characterization of the OR zoning classification as "permanent" in the LDRs is merely to distinguish OR from certain other classifications which are used as "holding" or temporary classifications. The word "permanent" in this context merely means that the OR classification is treated the same way as normal zoning classifications, which are "permanent" unless there is a re- zoning by the City. The City has modified or eliminated OR districts many times in conjunction with updated wetland delineations. Market Analysis Petitioner contends the amendment in inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.6.1 I because a market analysis was not conducted. The policy states: Commercial land use shall be limited to those areas designated as commercial or mixed use on the Future Land Use Map except as may be permitted by the Planned Development Regulations. Requests to increase and/or convey commercial land rights to an alternate site must be accompanied by adequate analysis to prove necessity for such request. The applicability of this policy was not shown. The first sentence of the policy appears to be self-evident; limiting commercial uses to land designated for commercial uses. The meaning of “Planned Development Regulations” was not explained. Perhaps it is a typographical error and was intended to refer to “Land Development Regulations.” The meaning intended for the term “commercial land rights” was not explained, nor was it explained how this amendment involves a request to increase or convey commercial land rights to an “alternate” site. A market analysis is more typically associated with a specific development proposal, because that allows the analysis to be focused on a particular service or product. Petitioner argues that the policy requires a market analysis for any FLUM amendment that creates a new commercial land use designation. If she is correct, the market analysis would necessarily be a more general one. The City conducted a general market analysis and determined that the residential development in the surrounding area provided a market for a commercial use on the property. That is a reasonable conclusion. If FLUE Policy 1.6.1 I is applicable to this amendment, the amendment is consistent with the policy. Archaeological Resources Petitioner amended her petition to allege that the amendment was improper because it was incompatible with the protection of an Indian mound on the property. However, no admissible evidence was presented to show that an Indian mound exists on the property, where it is located, or how the amendment would cause it to be disturbed. As with listed species, a local government's land use designations have no effect on the state regulation and protection of archaeological resources.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the amendment is "in compliance" as defined in Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2008.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569163.3167163.3177163.3178163.3184163.3187163.3191163.3245 Florida Administrative Code (3) 9J-5.0039J-5.0059J-5.013
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BONIFAY ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 88-006317 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-006317 Latest Update: Jul. 18, 1989

The Issue The issue at the hearing was whether proposed sign locations located in Holmes County 5,000 feet West of State Road 79 on the South side of Interstate 10 and 7500 feet East of State Road 79 on the North side of Iterstate 10 should be permitted. 1/

Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied to Respondent for permits on two proposed sign locations in Holmes County, Florida. The locations were 5,000 feet West of State Road 79 on the South side of Interstate 10 and 7500 feet East of State Road 79 on the North side of Interstate 10. Both locations are in areas which are zoned commercial and otherwise meet the Department's requirements for spacing, etc. The area in question was zoned commercial in 1988 when the County adopted Ordinance Number 88-02 as a comprehensive zoning plan. The relevant commercial area parallels Interstate 10, Highway 90 and State Road 79 in which many commercial activities are presently located. The portions paralleling Interstate 10 West of State Road 79 are located on the North side of I-10 and run west, terminating at County Road 173. The portions paralleling I-10 East of State Road 79 are located on the North and South sides of I-10 and run east for over two miles. While some may disagree that the areas designated for commercial or industrial use will develop those uses in the future, it is clear that commercial or industrial development is a reasonable use of this land for comprehensive zoning purposes and neither the physical dimensions nor configurations of the area prevent or prohibit such use. Prior to the enactment of Ordinance 88-02, Holmes County held several public hearings and worked with a company which is an expert in land use planning in developing this ordinance. The ordinance considers all reasonable land uses and encompasses all unincorporated areas of the County. The ordinance is consistent with the County's comprehensive plan and with the purposes of the ordinance stated therein. The Ordinance does not permit lesser uses of the commercial or industrial areas. Commercial or industrial use is the only use allowed in the commercial and industrial areas. Neither variance or special exceptions are required for a commercial or industrial use of those areas. The ordinance is clearly comprehensive zoning and was not adopted by the County for the primary purpose to permit signs. Numerous other signs within this same area have been permitted by DOT since the adoption of Ordinance 88-02.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order permitting signs located in Holmes County 5,000 feet West of State Road 79 on the South side of Interstate 10 and 7500 feet East of State Road 79 on the North side of Interstate 10. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 1989.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57479.07
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GLENTEX, INC., D/B/A WOODY`S vs DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS AND ISLAMORADA, VILLAGE OF ISLANDS, 01-002865GM (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Islamorada, Florida Jul. 20, 2001 Number: 01-002865GM Latest Update: Apr. 05, 2002

The Issue The issue is whether Village Ordinance No. 01-08, which regulates sexually oriented businesses, is inconsistent with the Principles for Guiding Development in the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern, pursuant to Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact On June 14, 2001, Respondent Islamorada, Village of Islands (Village), adopted Ordinance No. 01-08 (Ordinance). The Ordinance generally regulates the "location and separation" of "sexually oriented businesses." On June 19, 2001, Respondent Department of Community Affairs (DCA) entered a final order determining that the Ordinance is consistent with Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes (Principles for Guiding Development). In particular, the Ordinance applies to "regulated business[es]." These are defined as "[s]exually oriented bookstore[s]," "[s]exually oriented domination/submission parlor[s]," "[s]exually oriented mini motion picture theater[s]," "[s]exually oriented motel[s]," "[s]exually oriented motion picture theater[s,]" [e]ncounter studio/modeling studio[s]," and "[n]ude entertainment establishment[s]." The Ordinance defines a "[n]ude entertainment establishment" as: any establishment which does or does not offer alcoholic beverages for sale or consumption but does feature male or female entertainers, performing partially clothed, or completely nude, displayed in a setting, stage, or cubicle within a business, which has as its principal and incidental purpose the offering for viewing to adults of performances which have as their dominant or primary theme matters depicting, describing or relating to "specified sexual activities" or "specified anatomical areas," as defined below. The Ordinance defines "specified sexual activities" as: Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation, arousal, or tumescence; or Acts of human anilingus, bestiality, buggery, cunnilingus, coprophagy, coprophilia, fellatio, flagellation, masochism, masturbation, recrophilia, pederasty, pedophilia, sadism, sadomasochism, sexual intercourse or sodomy; or Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock, anus, or female breast; or Excretory functions as part of or in connection with the activities set forth in subsections (1) through (3). The Ordinance defines "specified anatomical areas" as: Less than complete and opaquely covered: Human genitals and pubic region; or Cleavage of the human buttocks; or That portion of the human female breast encompassed within an area falling below the horizontal line one would have to draw to intersect a point immediately above the top of the areola, including the areola; this definition shall include the entire lower portion of the human female breast, but shall not include a portion of the cleavage of the human female breast exhibited by a dress, blouse, shirt, leotard, bathing suit or other wearing apparel, provided the areola is not so exposed; and Human male genitals in a discernible turgid state, even if completely and opaquely covered. The Ordinance provides that "regulated businesses" are permitted within the Industrial "I" Future Land Use category, subject to several restrictions. These restrictions include a 400-foot setback from the property line of any property designated on the future land use map, zoned, or used for residential purposes; or a 100-foot setback from the property line of any property used for a place of worship, park, or school. The Ordinance requires that, within 90 days of the effective date, all legal nonconforming "regulated businesses" shall conform to the provisions of the Ordinance, or the use shall be terminated. The Ordinance explains the legislative intent underlying its passage as follows: It is the intent and purpose of this [Ordinance] to regulate the location and separation of sexually oriented businesses, referred to herein as "regulated businesses," which, because of their very nature, are recognized as having serious objectionable operational characteristics, particularly when they are located near properties designated, zoned or used for residential purposes or used for places of worship, parks or schools, thereby having a deleterious effect upon the adjacent areas. Further, it is recognized that the location of even one regulated business near such an area causes such deleterious effects on that area. Special regulation of these businesses is necessary to ensure that these adverse effects will not contribute to the blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neighborhood, as provided herein. . . . Petitioner operates a restaurant and nightclub known as Woody's in Islamorada. Originally a roadhouse, Woody's has been in business since 1987. During the time that it has been in business, Woody's has offered adult entertainment featuring the band known as "Big Dick and the Extenders." Jack Snipes, the large man who is the "Big Dick" of "Big Dick and the Extenders," is a part owner of Woody's. The double entendre implicit in the name of the band exemplifies the sexual content that laces the band's show, which relies heavily on sexually explicit language, sexual props, and occasional baring of female breasts and male and possibly female buttocks. Historically, most of the nudity was occasional, largely spontaneous, and displayed by the crowd, rather than the band or employees of Woody's (Mardi Gras-Style Nudity). In May 2001, Woody's abandoned Mardi Gras-Style Nudity in favor of live nude dancing performed by dancers hired by Woody's. The dancers performed for the entire crowd or, for a tip, performed for a specific customer. However, Woody's allowed only dancing on the stage or table and prohibited physical contact between any dancer and any customer. Woody's is unobtrusive, although it abuts U.S. Route A1A. Surrounding Woody's are restaurants, boat yards, marinas, and stores. Woody's is not a notorious focal point of drug activity or prostitution. To the contrary, Mr. Snipes and his band have given freely of their time for charitable fundraising, according to the pastor of a local Methodist church. Some island residents view Woody's as an essential ingredient of their community and would not require Woody's to relocate. Other residents, such as those serving on the Village Council, probably do not view Woody's as an essential ingredient of their community and certainly would require Woody's to relocate. Woody's is not presently in an Industrial future land use category. The two areas designated Industrial on Islamorada's future land use map are on Plantation Key and comprise 24 acres, of which ten acres would be unavailable to a regulated business such as Woody's due to buffering requirements. DCA overcame all of Petitioner's objections to the Ordinance. Petitioner claimed that the Ordinance lacked specificity, such as floor-area ratios. However, the Ordinance applies an overlay of a new permitted use--regulated businesses--in areas designated Industrial. Other provisions of the comprehensive plan and land development regulations governing land uses in Islamorada will provide more specific guidelines concerning permitted land uses, including regulated businesses. Petitioner claimed that Woody's would be forced by economic necessity to relocate, if it had to revert to Mardi Gras-Style Nudity and that Woody's could not find an economically viable site within the Industrial areas in Islamorada. DCA proved that these claims were ungrounded. Petitioner claimed that the relocation of Woody's to an Industrial area would take it out of the commercial area in which it is presently located and place it in closer proximity to a church, park, and school. However, DCA proved that this relocation represented no more than a potential for incompatibility of land uses. More importantly, DCA proved that this relocation produced no meaningful inconsistency between the Ordinance and the comprehensive plan and land development regulations governing land uses in Islamorada such that would jeopardize Islamorada's planning capabilities. The Ordinance is not inconsistent with the principle of strengthening Islamorada's capabilities for managing land use and development, so that the local government may achieve these objectives without the ongoing designation of a critical area of state concern. An inconsistency with this criterion of the Principles for Guiding Development must be sufficiently significant to jeopardize the ability of the local government to engage in effective land use planning so as to protect the natural environment of the Florida Keys. DCA has proved that possible inconsistencies, if any, between the Ordinance and any provision of the comprehensive plan or land development regulations governing land uses in Islamorada would be insubstantial. The Ordinance is not inconsistent with the principle of ensuring the maximum well-being of the Florida Keys and its citizens through sound economic development. Neither the Ordinance nor the disappearance or relocation of Woody's and "Big Dick and the Extenders" will have any measurable impact on the economy of the Florida Keys. The Ordinance is not inconsistent with the principle of protecting the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Florida Keys and maintain the Florida Keys as a unique Florida resource. Neither the Ordinance nor the disappearance or relocation of Woody's and "Big Dick and the Extenders" will have any measurable impact on the public health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Florida Keys or the maintenance of the Florida Keys as a unique Florida resource. The Ordinance and the disappearance or relocation of Woody's and "Big Dick and the Extenders" will have no impact whatsoever on the natural resources and public facilities typically within the scope of the Principles for Guiding Development.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that Islamorada Ordinance No. 01-08 is consistent with the Principles for Guiding Development, as set forth in Section 380.0552(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven M. Seibert, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Steven G. Mason Steven G. Mason, P.A. 1643 Hillcrest Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Karen A. Brodeen, Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 315 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Daniel A. Weiss Weiss Serota 2665 South Bayshore Drive, Suite 420 Miami, Florida 33133

Florida Laws (3) 120.57380.05380.0552
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