The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification to work in a position of trust or responsibility in a direct care position pursuant to Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a single mother of five children, including two sets of twins. She is twenty-nine years old and has a tenth-grade high school education. On July 26, 1995, Petitioner drove a car into a Walmart parking lot in Leon County, Florida, and parked illegally directly in front of the store. Petitioner was operating the car while her driving privileges were suspended. After parking the car, Petitioner left her five children unsupervised in the car while she went into Walmart to exchange a shirt. At that time, the older twins were six years old, one child was four years old, and the younger twins were three years old. When Petitioner went into the store, she removed the key from the ignition and left the windows down. The temperature was 93 degrees. Petitioner was in the store for approximately ten minutes. Upon Petitioner's return to the car, a policeman arrested her for the second-degree misdemeanor offense of "negligent treatment of children" under Section 827.05, Florida Statutes (1993). 1/ The children were not harmed as a result of being left unattended in the car. They were never removed from Petitioner's custody. After her arrest, Petitioner and her children were picked up and taken home by a relative. In September 1995, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the charge of "negligent treatment of children." The County Judge of Leon County accepted Petitioner's plea, withheld adjudication of guilt, and ordered that Petitioner be placed on probation for six months. One of the conditions of Petitioner's probation was that she attend parenting class. On February 28, 1996, Petitioner was charged with violating her probation related to the charge of "negligent treatment of children." Specifically, she had not provided proof that she had attended the parenting class. Additionally, she had not paid a $100 probation supervision fee or a $150 court fine. Petitioner violated her probation because she did not have funds to pay for the parenting class or the required fee and fine. At the violation of probation hearing on May 10, 1996, Petitioner presented proof that she had attended the parenting class. The County Judge of Leon County terminated Petitioner's probation in open court. On March 5, 1998, Petitioner was charged in Leon County, Florida, with the traffic offense of driving with suspended driving privileges. The County Judge of Leon County convicted and adjudicated Petitioner guilty of this offense on March 25, 1998. On September 7, 1998, Petitioner was charged in Leon County, Florida, with the traffic offense of driving with suspended driving privileges. The County Judge of Leon County withheld adjudication of guilt for this offense on October 7, 1998. Petitioner has worked as a dietary aide at Tallahassee Convalescent Home (TCH) for four years. In 1998, she applied for a position with TCH as a certified nurse assistant, a direct care position. The application included Petitioner's request for a Florida Abuse Hotline Information System Background Check. A member of Respondent's staff completed the background check on September 23, 1998, finding no confirmed report of abuse or neglect. On April 16, 1999, Petitioner signed a sworn Affidavit of Good Moral Character as part of the application process to secure a direct care position with Tallahassee Developmental Center. By signing the affidavit, Petitioner swore that she had not been found guilty or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, regardless of the adjudication, to a number of offenses, including "negligent treatment of children." This affirmation was false. Petitioner's testimony that she forgot her plea of nolo contendere and subsequent conviction for "negligent treatment of children" or that she never knew the exact nature of her crime is not persuasive. In April 1999, Petitioner was charged with violating her probation related to one of her offenses for "driving while privileges suspended" in Leon County, Florida. Petitioner violated her probation because she did not have funds to pay her traffic fines. Petitioner subsequently entered the Florida Traffic Assistance Program. She completed a corrective driving class on August 14, 1999. The Department of Motor Vehicles issued Petitioner her first driver's license on August 31, 1999. Since October 1999, Petitioner has paid $50 per month on her outstanding traffic fines. She now owes $453 in traffic fines.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
Findings Of Fact Respondent, John E. Mitchell (Mitchell), was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0184919. Mitchell was the owner and qualifying broker for Respondent, Florida East Coast Management, Inc. (Florida East Coast), which was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida under license number 0211550. Respondents are, inter alia, engaged in the business of managing rental apartments for landlords. On April 17, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Chestnut executed an application to rent an apartment through Florida East Coast, and delivered to Florida East Coast a deposit of $460.00. Pertinent to this case, the agreement provided: Applicant has deposited the sum of $460.00 in partial payment of the first month's rent with the understanding that this application is subject to approval and acceptance by the Landlord. Upon approval and acceptance, the applicant agrees to execute the Landlord's standard agreement before possession of residence is given and to pay any balance due on the first month's rent and security deposit within five (5) days after the approval of application or the deposit will be forfeited to the Landlord. If this application is not approved, or if applicant cancels within five (5) days, the deposit will be refunded, the applicant hereby waiving any claim for damages by reason of non- acceptance. This application is for information only and does not obligate Landlord to execute a lease or deliver possession of the proposed residence. (Emphasis added) Within five days of the date of application, Mr. Chestnut spoke telephonically with Ms. Debra M. Best, the rental agent for Florida East Coast with whom he had dealt, and advised her that his anticipated job transfer to the area had not materialized and requested a refund of his deposit. 1/ Ms. Best promised to return his deposit. On April 29 or May 1, 1985, Mr. Chestnut telephoned Ms. Best to inquire of his deposit. At that time, Ms. Best advised Mr. Chestnut that it was company policy not to refund deposits. By letter of May 13, 1985, Florida East Coast responded to Mr. Chestnut's written inquiry of Hay 1, 1985, by stating: "... it is our policy NOT TO RETURN ANY DEPOSIT FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER." Following receipt of Florida East Coast's letter of May 13, 1985, Mr. Chestnut filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department). Approximately seven months later, December 10, 1985, Florida East Coast refunded Mr. Chestnut's deposit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That an administrative fine be imposed against Respondents, John E. Mitchell and Florida East Coast Management, Inc., jointly and severally, in the sun of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). DONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1987.
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to hear a petition, brought pursuant to section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes (2010),1/ claiming that a state university's documents concerning the process and criteria for faculty performance evaluation; documents from the university's College of Business setting out a Framework and Standards for Contract Renewal and Promotion for faculty; and documents showing the university's organization structure and delegations of authority are "agency statements" that require rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a former associate professor with Florida Gulf Coast University. Florida Gulf Coast University is a member of the Florida state university system. Since November 2002, with the voter's adoption of article IX, section 7, Florida Constitution, the state university system has been overseen by a Board of Governors. Further, article IX, section 7, Florida Constitution, designated that each university, including Florida Gulf Coast University, would be managed by a local board of trustees. Thus, the Board of Governors and boards of trustees for universities derive power from the Florida Constitution, not legislative enactment. The Board of Governors enacted Regulation 1.001 that established power and duties for university boards of trustees. Among the Board of Governors' powers and duties delegated to the universities' board of trustees is the authority to manage university personnel and faculty. Dr. Hudson Rogers (Dr. Rogers), an associate provost with the University, testified that the University faculty are organized and represented by the United Faculty of Florida (UFF). The University and UFF are parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement.2/ The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Florida Gulf Coast University Board of Trustees and UFF addresses the evaluation of faculty members. Under Article 10 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, each college within the University is empowered to develop its faculty evaluation procedures and forms consistent with the criteria agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The colleges' promulgation and implementation of their respective evaluation frameworks are not subject to any special process other than that outlined in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The University's College of Business developed its own evaluation framework for faculty evaluation, which was consistent with the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Further, Dr. Rogers credibly explained that the University faculty voted on and approved the Faculty Performance and Evaluation Document in 2003 that is used to evaluate faculty. In September 2008, the Petitioner signed a Professional Development Plan that included a performance improvement plan. The performance improvement plan identified objectives that the University expected the Petitioner to meet regarding her job duties. In August 2009, after completing a probationary period of the 2008-2009 academic year, the Petitioner was evaluated by her department chair. The department chair rated the Petitioner as not meeting expectations by failing to publish at least one journal article by the end of the 2008-2009 academic year to meet the College of Business scholarship standards. Based on the Petitioner's failure to publish, the department chair recommended that the Petitioner not be reappointed after the 2009-2010 academic year. A peer review committee for the University's College of Business also determined the Petitioner had failed to meet the minimum requirements. The peer review committee informed the Petitioner of its decision on September 12, 2009. On October 21, 2009, the Petitioner filed a grievance pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. A review of the Petitioner's grievance shows that it alleged numerous violations of the Collective Bargaining Agreement concerning her faculty evaluation and decision not to re-appoint her as an associate professor. On October 22, 2009, the dean for the College of Business informed the Petitioner that "[a]fter reviewing your request and all documents provided me by you and the Peer Review Committee, my decision is that your contract will not be renewed." On November 20, 2009, the University representative, who reviewed the grievance, found that a majority of the claims were time barred or did not constitute a violation. The University representative found "a partial violation of [Collective Bargaining Agreement] Article 10.3A(1)" for failing to timely finalize the Petitioner's annual evaluation for the 2008-2009 academic year. The University representative noted that the Collective Bargaining Agreement did not "indicate any action to be taken in response to this violation." On December 10, 2009, the Petitioner filed a Request for Arbitration under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. On February 23, 2010, the University received the Petitioner's Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. On April 12, 2010, an arbitration hearing was held on the Petitioner's grievance. The arbitrator held that the Petitioner's Notice of Intent to Arbitrate was not timely under the Collective Bargaining Agreement; thus, it was considered withdrawn. On September 22, 2010, the Petitioner's supervisor, Dr. Robert O'Neill (Dr. O'Neill), wrote the Petitioner, confirming that her last date of employment at the University was December 17, 2010. The Petitioner's last day of employment with the University was December 17, 2010. On February 14, 2011, the Petitioner filed the Petition. The Petitioner alleged that the University is an "agency" within the definition of chapter 120 and is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Further, the Petitioner alleged that the University has made the following agency statements that are unadopted rules: (1) the Faculty Performance Evaluation Document for 2003 and 2008; (2) College of Business Framework and Standards for Contract Renewal and Promotion adopted on April 14, 2006, and revised on February 5, 2010 ("Framework"); (3) Delegation of Authority Memorandum accessed on October 7, 2010, from the University's web-site; and (4) Florida Gulf Coast University's organizational chart. The Petitioner also alleged that her substantial interests are affected "because her employment has been terminated based on several unadopted rules involving published documents from the [Florida Gulf Coast University] President, to the Provost, to the College." Further, a reading of the Petitioner's challenge here shows that she alleged that the University failed to the follow the "unadopted rules" when it evaluated her and decided not to re-appoint her to a teaching position. For example, the Petitioner claimed that the Florida Gulf Coast University Faculty Performance and Evaluation document is an agency statement that was not adopted as a rule under chapter 120. Next, the Petitioner alleged that Dr. O'Neill, who was her supervisor, failed to follow this Faculty Performance and Evaluation document when he evaluated her.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is entitled to creditable service in the Florida Retirement System for service in the Florida Virtual School from September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a regular class member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). On October 23, 2003, Petitioner entered the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and left her employment on June 30, 2004. Petitioner worked most of her career as a teacher and an administrator for the Pasco County School Board (School Board). The School Board is a local education association (LEA) and a local agency employer within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(42)(a), Florida Statutes (2001). Beginning with the 2001-2002 school year, Petitioner undertook additional employment by working in the Florida Virtual School (FVS) in accordance with former Section 228.082, Florida Statutes (2000).1 Petitioner undertook additional employment to increase the average final compensation (AFC) that Respondent uses to calculate her retirement benefits. From September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2004, Petitioner worked for the LEA and served in the FVS. During the 2001-2002 school year, Petitioner was a full-time employee for the LEA and also served part-time in the FVS. Beginning with the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner served full-time in the FVS and also worked for the LEA during the summer. The LEA paid Petitioner annual salaries as a full-time employee for all relevant school years and made the necessary contributions to the FRS. The AFC includes compensation Petitioner received from the LEA, and that compensation is not at issue in this proceeding. With one exception, the AFC includes the compensation Petitioner received for service in the FVS. The AFC does not include $6,150 (the contested amount) that Petitioner earned during her first year of service in the FVS from September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2002 (the contested period).2 Sometime prior to April 2004, Petitioner requested that Respondent include the contested amount in her AFC. In a one- page letter dated April 6, 2004 (the preliminary denial letter), Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent proposed to deny the request. The grounds for denial stated that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position and that FVS did not join the FRS until December 1, 2001. In relevant part, the preliminary denial letter states: . . . you filled a temporary instructional position as an adjunct instructor whose employment was contingent on enrollment and funding pursuant to Section 60S- 1.004(5)(d)3, F.A.C., copy enclosed. As such, you are ineligible for . . . FRS . . . participation for the time period in question. The School joined the FRS on December 1, 2001 and past service was not purchased for you since you filled a temporary position. Effective July 1, 2002, you began filling a regularly established position with the Florida Virtual High School and were correctly enrolled in FRS. The School has reported your earnings from July 1, 2002, to the present to the FRS. Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R-2). A two-page letter dated June 23, 2004 (the denial letter), notified Petitioner of proposed final agency action excluding the contested amount from her AFC. The only ground for denial stated that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position. The denial omits any statement that FVS did not join the FRS until December 1, 2001. However, the denial letter includes a copy of the preliminary denial letter and is deemed to include, by reference, the stated grounds in the preliminary denial letter. In relevant part, the denial letter states: By letter dated April 6, 2004 (copy enclosed). . . [Respondent] advised you filled a temporary instructional position as an adjunct instructor from September 15, 2001 through June 30, 2002. We have reviewed the information submitted in your recent letter and maintain our position that you were an adjunct instructor from September 2001 through June 2002, pursuant to Section 60S-1.004(5)(d)3, F.A.C. (copy enclosed). Your employment with the Florida Virtual School during the time period in question was contingent on enrollment and funding. Since you filled a temporary position, the School was correct in excluding you from the [FRS]. This notification constitutes final agency action. . . . R-3 at 1. The legal definition of a temporary position varies depending on whether the employer is a state agency or a local agency. If the employer is a state agency, a position is temporary if the employer compensates the position from an account defined as "an other personal services (OPS) account" in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001) (OPS account). If the employer is a local agency, a position is temporary if the position will exist for less than six consecutive months; or as otherwise provided by rule. § 121.021(53), Fla. Stat. (2001). The distinction is based, in relevant part, on the practical reality that local agencies do not maintain OPS accounts for "the fiscal affairs of the state." § 216.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). The employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount was not an LEA. Three different employers may have been responsible for payment of the contested amount. Some evidence supports a finding that the employer was the Board of Trustees of FVS (the Board). Contracts of employment for service in FVS identify the employer as the Board.3 The Board has statutory authority over personnel serving FVS and has statutory authority to govern FVS. Other evidence supports a finding that the employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount was FVS. The record evidence identifies the employer that enrolled in FRS and made contributions on behalf of Petitioner as FVS. Finally, there is evidence that the Orange County School Board, acting as the statutorily designated fiscal agent for FVS (the fiscal agent), was the employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount. The contested amount was paid from funds administered by the fiscal agent in the name of FVS. The Board, FVS, and the fiscal agent each exemplify distinct characteristics of a state agency defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(qq), Florida Statutes (2001). The Board consists of seven members appointed by the Governor for four-year staggered terms. The Board is a public agency entitled to sovereign immunity and has authority to promulgate rules concerning FVS. Board members are public officers and bear fiduciary responsibility for FVS. The Board has statutory authority to approve FVS franchises in each local school district. §§ 228.082, Fla. Stat. (2000) and 1002.37, Fla. Stat. (2001). FVS is administratively housed within an office4 of the Commissioner of Education, as the Head of the Department of Education (Commissioner). The fiscal year of FVS is the state fiscal year. Local school districts cannot limit student access to courses offered statewide through FVS.5 The fiscal agent of FVS is a state agency. The fiscal agent receives state funds for FVS and administers those funds to operate FVS for students throughout the state. The Board, FVS, and the fiscal agent each satisfy judicial definitions of a state agency pursuant to "territorial" and "functional" tests discussed in the Conclusions of Law. Each agency operates statewide in accordance with a statutory mandate to serve any student in the state. Each serves students in public and private schools; in charter schools; in home school programs; and in juvenile detention programs. Unlike an LEA, the scope of authority and function of the employer that paid the contested amount to Petitioner was not circumscribed by county or other local boundaries; regardless of whether the employer was the Board, FVS, or the fiscal agent (collectively referred to hereinafter as the employer). The employer did not pay the contested amount from an OPS account. The fiscal agent for FVS is the presumptive repository of funds appropriated for FVS. The fiscal agent is organically structured as a local agency even though it functions as a state agency in its capacity as fiscal agent. Unlike a state agency, an organic local agency does not maintain an OPS account, defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001), for the "fiscal affairs of the state." The legislature funded FVS during the contested period in lump sum as a state grant-in-aid provided in a line item appropriation pursuant to Subsection 228.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2000). The legislature subsequently began funding of FVS through the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP). Each FVS student with six-credit hours required for high school graduation is included as a full-time equivalent student for state funding. Each student with less than six-credit hours counts as a fraction of a full-time equivalent student. A local LEA cannot report full-time equivalent student membership for courses that students take through FVS unless the LEA is an approved franchise of FVS and operates a virtual school. As student enrollment in FVS increased, the legislature changed the funding formula to avoid paying twice for students in FVS; once to fund FVS and again to fund local LEAs that were authorized to earn FTE funding for students enrolled in FVS. The employer that paid the contested amount to Petitioner was a state agency that did not compensate Petitioner from an OPS account defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001). Petitioner did not earn the contested amount in a temporary position within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(53)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(62). Respondent argues that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position in a local agency defined in Subsection 221.021(42), Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(36). A temporary position in a local agency is generally defined to mean a position that will last less than six months, except as otherwise provided by rule. By rule, Respondent defines a temporary position to include temporary instructional positions that are established with no expectation of continuation beyond one semester. Fla. Admin. Code R. 60S-1.004(5)(d)3. Respondent supports its argument with limited documentary evidence (the documents). The documents consist of several items. An undated FVS Information Sheet indicates the employer started Petitioner as an adjunct instructor on September 15, 2001. An FVS memorandum dated several years later on March 16, 2004, indicates Petitioner started an adjunct position on September 6, 2001, and includes a parenthetical statement that it was seasonal employment.6 The employer paid Petitioner $3,150 during 2002 as miscellaneous income and reported it to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on a "Form 1099-Misc." An undated letter of intent for the 2002-2003 school year, which requests submission before March 8, 2002, indicates that Petitioner intended to continue her adjunct employment status and requested a full-time position if one became available.7 Use of labels such as "adjunct" to describe employment status during the contested period would be more probative if the duties Petitioner performed were limited to the duties of a part-time, on-line instructor. As discussed hereinafter, Petitioner earned the contested amount while occupying a dual- purpose position in which she performed both the duties of an instructor and significant other duties unrelated to those of an instructor. The trier of fact would be required to disregard a substantial body of evidence to find that Petitioner's position was limited to that of a part-time, on-line instructor. The IRS requires taxpayers to report miscellaneous income paid to independent contractors on Form 1099-Misc. Neither the denial letter nor the preliminary denial letter includes a statement that Petitioner occupied a non-employee position as an independent contractor. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law give little weight to the use of IRS Form 1099-Misc in cases such as this one where there is little other evidence of independent contractor status or where the evidence establishes an employer-employee relationship. The record evidence discussed hereinafter shows that Petitioner and her employer enjoyed a continuing employment relationship within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(32)(f). Respondent was not a party to the employment contract and did not witness the employment relationship between Petitioner and her employer. Nor did Respondent call a witness from FVS who was competent to testify about events that occurred during the contested period. The testimony of Petitioner is supported by the totality of evidence. In relevant part, Petitioner disclosed to her supervisors at FVS at the time of her employment that she sought employment to enhance her retirement benefits. The proposed exclusion of the contested amount from the AFC is inconsistent with a material condition of employment. Respondent asserts that the documents satisfy requirements for notice and documentation of a temporary position in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6.1004(5). The rule requires an employer to notify an employee at the time of employment that the employee is filling a temporary position and cannot participate in the FRS; and to document the intended length of the temporary position. However, the terms of the documents from Respondent are ambiguous and insufficient to provide the required notice and documentation. The documents did not expressly notify Petitioner she was filling a temporary position that did not qualify as a regularly established position in the FRS. None of the documents use the term "temporary" or "temporary position." The notice and documentation requirements of the rule must be satisfied, if at all, by implication from terms on the face of the documents such as "adjunct," "adjunct position," and "adjunct employment status." Unlike the term "temporary position," neither the legislature nor Respondent defines the term "adjunct." One of the several common and ordinary uses of the term "adjunct" can mean, "Attached to a faculty or staff in a temporary . . . capacity." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, at 21-22 (4th ed. Houghton Mifflin Company 2000). The employer used an undefined term such as "adjunct" as an ambiguous euphemism for a temporary position. The ambiguity of the term "adjunct" is underscored when each document from Respondent is considered in its entirety. The letter of intent form requested Petitioner to indicate whether she intended to continue her "adjunct employment status" and whether she would be interested in "a full-time position." The form did not refer to either a "temporary position," or a "part-time position." Petitioner reasonably inferred that "adjunct employment status" was the part-time alternative to "a full-time position." The inference was consistent with the announced purpose for serving in FVS and the evidence as a whole. Respondent also does not define part- time employment to exclude a regularly established position. The FVS utilized different contracts for adjunct and part-time instructors. The contracts of record pertaining to Petitioner are not contracts for adjunct instructors (adjunct contracts). The contracts are annual contracts. Even if Petitioner were to have signed a contract for adjunct instructors, the contract used for adjunct instructors was ambiguous. In relevant part, the adjunct contract included a caption in the upper right corner labeled, "Terms of Agreement for Part-Time Instructional Employment." (emphasis supplied) As previously found, a part-time position may be a regularly established position. Use of the term "part-time employment" on a contract for an adjunct instructor supported a reasonable inference that the employer was using the terms "adjunct" and "part-time" synonymously to differentiate part-time employment from full-time employment. The employer required Petitioner, unlike adjunct instructors, to sign in on an instructor log sheet and to attend training sessions and staff meetings. Petitioner attended training sessions on September 8 and 22, and October 24, 2001. Petitioner attended other training sessions on February 26 and 27, 2002, and on March 27 and April 10, 2002. The employer also issued office equipment to Petitioner that the employer did not issue to adjunct instructors. Petitioner performed significant duties in addition to those required of a part-time instructor. Petitioner wrote grant applications and assisted in writing a procedures manual for FVS. By November 30, 2001, Petitioner had completed and submitted a federal "Smaller Learning Communities Grant" for $230,000. On December 27, 2001, Petitioner began working on the procedures manual, finalized the work on January 3, 2002, and was listed in the credits in the manual. The additional duties assigned to Petitioner continued through the second semester of the contested period. On February 26 and 27, 2002, FVS asked Petitioner to develop their "FCAT" course for the eighth grade. Petitioner wrote and developed the course. By May 30, 2002, Petitioner had written and submitted three more grant applications and was a member of a team that developed strategies for additional fundraising. For the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner entered into an annual contract for a full-time non-instructional position, as Grants Manager, and a separate contract for employment in a part-time instructor position. Each contract was terminable only for "good cause" within the meaning of Subsection 1002.33(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). The expectation of continued employment is further evidenced by the general business experience of FVS leading up to the contested period. In the 1997-1998 school year, approximately 25 students were enrolled statewide in FVS. In the next three years, enrollment grew to 5,564. Professional staff grew from 27 teachers to 54 full-time teachers. Legislative funding was adequate for the growth FVS experienced, and the legal contingency of enrollment and funding was not a realistic condition of continued employment. There was nothing temporary in the expectations of the employer and Petitioner during the contested period. FVS staff had legitimate business reasons to expect continued student enrollment and legislative funding during the contested period. The employer also had legitimate reasons to expect continued employment of Petitioner based on the individual experience the employer enjoyed with Petitioner, the ongoing and continuous nature of Petitioner's work, and the significant additional duties assigned to Petitioner. The employer, in fact, employed Petitioner continuously after the contested period. When FVS enrolled in the FRS on December 1, 2001, some employees purchased past credit. Petitioner was not on the list of employees for whom past credit was purchased. That omission is consistent with Petitioner's understanding that she was already receiving FRS credit. By rule, Respondent required the employer to make an affirmative disclosure that Petitioner did not occupy a position qualifying for FRS credit. After FVS enrolled in the FRS on December 1, 2001, FVS was required to make contributions to the FRS on behalf of Petitioner for approximately 208 days during the remainder of the contested period. FVS did not make the required contributions to the FRS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order including in the AFC that portion of the contested amount earned on and after December 1, 2001, and excluding the remainder of the contested amount from the AFC. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2005.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner has been discriminated against by being denied adequate training and being dismissed from her employment for reasons of her race (African-American).
Findings Of Fact The Florida Gulf Coast University (Gulf Coast) operated in Tallahassee, Florida at times pertinent hereto, for the purpose of improving teaching and learning in the area of environmental education in the public schools as well as community colleges and universities. Dr. Kathleen Shea Abrams served as the Director of the Office of Environmental Education (OEE) from October 1990 until the office closed in July of 2000. She was responsible for making OEE employment decisions in conformance with Gulf Coast's hiring approval procedures. Dr. Abrams, as Director, was responsible for organizing a hiring committee and interviewing candidates for the vacant office assistant position. With approval from Gulf Coast and the hiring committee Dr. Abrams selected Synthia Dianne Mallard, the Petitioner, for the position on August 14, 1996. Pursuant to the position description for the office assistant position, Ms. Mallard would be required to prepare routine correspondence, reports, requisitions, invoices, travel documents, etcetera, as well as answer the telephone and provide information for routine questions and make referrals as appropriate. She was required to screen calls and perform other assigned duties and was required to possess the knowledge, skills and ability to produce grammatically correct, oral and written work products. Following her employment, Ms. Mallard was provided with information regarding OEE telephone procedures. The written procedural guidelines expressly set forth the information to be obtained when taking a message. Dr. Abrams requested Tara Johnson, an African-American student clerical assistant who was working for the OEE, to provide training to Ms. Mallard. Training was based upon the office procedural manual which outlined requirements for completing university forms, described the mail pick-up and delivery process, discussed operation of the office telephone systems and other relevant matters. Dr. Abrams also met with Ms. Mallard several times a week for five to ten minutes or more to communicate work requests and provide brief written instructions and information to her. During these meetings Dr. Abrams recommended several times that Ms. Mallard review portions of the procedural manual and refer to it as she carried out her work. At the time that Ms. Mallard joined the OEE, a set of computer-generated address labels were available to be affixed to envelopes for daily courier pick-up and delivery to Gulf Coast. As the supply ran low, Dr. Abrams requested that Ms. Mallard print new ones. Since Ms. Mallard explained that she did not know how to print labels, Dr. Abrams allowed her to write labels by hand. The handwritten labels printed by Ms. Mallard, however, did not follow the same format as the computer-printed ones and improperly included the office's return address. As a result an envelope was returned to the office by courier who misread the return address as the primary address. Dr. Abrams instructed Ms. Mallard to omit the return address thereafter and wrote a sample label for Ms. Mallard to follow. Despite these efforts, Dr. Abrams was forced to speak to Ms. Mallard on several additional occasions about this subject as she continued to improperly address the mail. In preparing correspondence, Dr. Abrams would write out letters long-hand and deliver these to Ms. Mallard for typing. Through this process, Dr. Abrams discovered that Ms. Mallard was unfamiliar with the proper format for business letters or memoranda. After returning several drafts of letters because of errors in spacing, margins, and capitalization, Dr. Abrams advised Ms. Mallard to refer to examples of business letters from existing files and use them as models. Ms. Mallard required additional instruction on how to use the office typewriter. Dr. Abrams stated to Ms. Mallard at one point that she appeared to have over-estimated her clerical skills and computer training. She asked Ms. Mallard to establish a weekly goal of mastering one new skill a week. In order to achieve this goal, Ms. Mallard received computer instructions from Tara Johnson and other staff members including Dr. Robert Raze. Ms. Mallard cautioned Dr. Abrams, however, that the expectation "to master" the skills might be too high. As part of her duties, Ms. Mallard was asked to inventory and organize an office supply cabinet consisting of four shelves of supplies. Although Dr. Abrams estimated that the task should take a maximum of three to four hours to complete, Ms. Mallard did not finish the job until several weeks later. After several weeks, Dr. Abrams arrived at the conclusion that Ms. Mallard lacked important secretarial skills and would be unable to consistently produce a quality work product. Determining that Ms. Mallard would be unable to elevate her skills to an acceptable level, Dr. Abrams requested Ms. Mallard's termination as an employee by correspondence dated December 2, 1996. In addition to the performance deficiencies that Dr. Abrams observed personally, she also received complaints concerning the Petitioner's performance from other employees. Dr. Raze was hired by Dr. Abrams in 1991, and served as a "Coordinator," a senior professional position at the OEE. Dr. Raze experienced difficulty in receiving complete and accurate telephone messages from the Petitioner. Dr. Raze advised Dr. Abrams that Ms. Mallard had failed to obtain basic information such as the complete correct name of the individual calling, the entity which the individual represented, the purpose of the call and the return phone number on certain messages. Shannon Guillemette, another employee, reported an incident where she missed an important return telephone call because of Ms. Mallard's failure to answer incoming office telephone calls in accordance with her job description. Ms. Guillemette advised that similar incidents occurred in the past as well. These complaints were received by Dr. Abrams in the ordinary course of business as the Director of the office. The Petitioner prepared correspondence dated December 11, 1996, to Steven Belcher, Director of Human Resources at Gulf Coast in response to the letter from Dr. Abrams requesting her termination. The Petitioner's, correspondence in response to the termination letter itself contained numerous errors in grammar, spelling and punctuation, which were consistent with the deficiencies earlier identified by Dr. Abrams in the Petitioner's job performance. In December of 1996, the Petitioner was terminated from her employment position. The Respondent, through its witnesses and exhibits, has established that legitimate business reasons existed for that termination. The proven reason for Ms. Mallard's termination from employment was "poor job performance." When Ms. Mallard was terminated from the OEE, the office employed a total of nine individuals. Five of those individuals were African-American and four were non-minority. The Petitioner, Ms. Mallard, is an African-American and so is Dr. Raze. Dr. Abrams is a non-minority and is responsible for the decision to both offer employment and to hire Ms. Mallard as well as the decision to terminate her. Dr. Raze observed no instances of racial discrimination in the operation of the OEE from the time he was first hired in September 1991 through the closing of the office in July of 2000. The Petitioner failed to introduce any testimony or evidence corroborating her charge of racial discrimination.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations determining that the Petition for Relief filed by Synthia Dianne Mallard be denied and that this cause be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Synthia Dianne Mallard 1205 West 6th Street, Apartment 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Robert C. Shearman, Esquire Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt Post office Box 280 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Azizi Coleman, Acting Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by Rules 9.110 and 9.190, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Attn: Ronda L. Bryan, Agency Clerk, 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 92, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 and a second copy, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Florida Appellate District where the party resides. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via Certified U.S. Mail to Oasis Cafe at Key Biscayne, c/o Carlos Flores, 19 Harbor Drive, Miami, Florida 33149; by regular U.S. Mail to the Honorable Darren A. Schwartz, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 3060; and by hand delivery to Marc Drexler, Chief Attorney, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business and Professional Regulations, 1940 North Monroe Styeet, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202, this |@¥day of Yezember , 2013. msn For the Division of Hotels and Restaurants 7196 4008 G11) 4516 1240 | SENDERS, RECORD
Findings Of Fact At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner held a career service position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS). His job title was Public Assistance Specialist II. On September 10, 1990, Petitioner requested authorization to use 120 hours of accumulated annual leave beginning September 17, 1990, through October 5, 1990. Because of the office work load, Petitioner's supervisor, Doreen Moskowitz, authorized him to take 80 hours of leave beginning September 17, 1990, through September 28, 1990. Petitioner accepted this authorization and agreed to return to work on the morning of Monday, October 1, 1990. While on leave, Petitioner traveled to his native country of Nigeria to visit his mother who was ill. While in Nigeria, Petitioner became ill and was under the care of a doctor in Nigeria between September 27, 1990, and October 5, 1990. On October 5, 1990, Petitioner was determined by his doctor to be fit to travel. Because his travel plans had been disrupted by his illness, Petitioner had difficulty making arrangements to return to Miami. On Monday, October 8, 1990, Petitioner flew from London to New York and from New York to Miami. On Tuesday, October 9, 1990, Petitioner reported to work. Petitioner's wife did not accompany him to Nigeria, but remained in the Miami area. Petitioner contacted his wife from Nigeria by telephone and caused her to call his supervisor on several occasions to advise that Petitioner would not be returning to work on October 1, 1990, as scheduled and the reasons for his absences. On October 1, 1990, Petitioner's wife called Ms. Moskowitz and informed her that Petitioner had fallen ill in Nigeria and would not be able to return to work as scheduled. Petitioner's wife was informed that Petitioner's leave was unauthorized. Petitioner's wife called Ms. Moskowitz again on October 4 and on October 5, 1990, and informed her that Petitioner was still ill in Nigeria. Petitioner's wife also called Ms. Moskowitz on October 8, 1990, and told her that Petitioner was in London en route to Miami. On October 1, 1990, Petitioner left a telephone message with a coworker, Shirley Franklin, advising that he was ill in Nigeria and hoped to return to work on October 5, 1990. Ms. Franklin, at Petitioner's request, gave this message to Ms. Moskowitz. Petitioner also called another coworker, Sylvester Onyemeziem, to advise him of his illness in Nigeria and asked that he contact Ms. Moskowitz and to make sure that Petitioner's wife had spoken to Ms. Moskowitz. Mr. Onyemeziem gave this information to Ms. Moskowitz and confirmed with Petitioner's wife that she had also contacted Ms. Moskowitz. The DHRS Employee Handbook, dated October 1, 1988, advises employees at page 13 under the heading of Absences: If you expect to be absent from work for any reason, you must request leave from your supervisor as much in advance as possible, so that suitable disposition of your work may be made to avoid undue hardship on fellow employees and clients. As soon as you know you will be late or absent from work you must notify your supervisor. Absence without approved leave is cause for disciplinary action. If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned. The standard procedure followed by this DHRS office is to require employees to make personal contact with his or her supervisor to advise the supervisor of any absences and to explain the reasons therefor. This standard procedure has not been adopted as a rule. In this instance, it was very difficult for Petitioner to call Ms. Moskowitz during her business hours because of his limited access to international telephone lines. (The telephone calls Petitioner made to his wife and to his coworkers were placed either before or after normal business hours.) Petitioner was absent from his employment without authorized leave on October 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8, 1990. On October 8, 1990, DHRS terminated Petitioner's employment as a career service employee. The letter of termination provided, in pertinent part, as follows: In accordance with Chapter 22A-7 of the State of Florida Career Service Rules and Regulations, since you did not report to work as scheduled October 4, 5, 8, 1990 and you have not reported to work since that time; you have abandoned your position of Public Assistance Specialist II. Your resignation was effective at the close of business October 4, 1990.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Petitioner did not abandon his career service position and which orders that Petitioner be reinstated with back-pay to his career service position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of April, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: William C. Robinson, Esquire 220 Courthouse Plaza 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Jacqueline S. Banke, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 201 West Broward Boulevard, Room 513 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Linda K. Harris Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Linda Stalvey Acting General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Kay McGinn, willfully violated Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes (2001), when she certified the correctness of a campaign treasurer's report that was incorrect, false, or incomplete because it failed to disclose an in-kind contribution by Frank Furman for the use of telephones used by Petitioner and her campaign volunteers in offices that Mr. Furman owned.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is the Mayor of Pompano Beach, Florida. She ran unsuccessfully for Pompano Beach City Commission in 1996. Her campaigns for the same office in 1998, 2000, and 2002 were successful. The alleged offense took place during the 2002 election campaign. Petitioner is an intelligent, conscientious public servant. She is familiar with the Florida election law and is sensitive to her obligation to follow the law and diligent in her attempt to do so. During the 2002 campaign, Frank Furman, a long-time Pompano Beach business man who enjoys an excellent reputation, offered the use of his business offices to Petitioner for campaign activities. Petitioner chose to use Furman's office on six to eight occasions to make campaign-related local telephone calls. Typically, Petitioner and five or six volunteers would spend about one hour in the early evening calling Pompano Beach voters encouraging them to vote for Petitioner. Mindful of the election law requiring the reporting of "in-kind" contributions, Petitioner asked Mr. Furman the value of the use of his telephones for reporting purposes. Furman advised Petitioner that the use of his telephones had "no value." In reporting "in-kind" contributions, Petitioner's practice was to ask the contributor to provide an invoice reflecting the "fair market value" of the "in-kind" contribution. Armed with the invoice, she would then report the "in-kind" contribution. "Fair market value" is an economic concept used most frequently in reported Florida cases when referring to the value of real property taken in condemnation actions or in determining restitution in criminal cases. Numerous definitions are found. Typically, the definitions involve "a willing buyer and a willing seller, fully informed as to the value of the object of the transaction, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell." Respondent's Statement of Findings, which was analyzed by Petitioner's expert witness, offers an amortized cost to Mr. Furman for use by Petitioner and her volunteers of the telephones. This amortized cost is apparently advanced as evidence of "fair market value" or "attributable monetary value." Mr. Furman pays a fixed-rate of slightly less than $1,500.00 per month for the use of 32 to 33 telephone lines. This means that each line costs approximately $46.87 per month. Assuming 30 days per month, the daily cost per line is $1.56. Assuming 24-hour days, the hourly cost per line is $0.065. Further assuming that six volunteers used one telephone for one hour on eight different days, the result is 48 hours of line use. The resulting amortized use cost, given the known use by Petitioner and her campaign volunteers, is $3.12. Amortized use cost is not fair market value. Neither an "attributable monetary value" nor a "fair market value" of Petitioner's use of Mr. Furman's telephones was established. To the contrary, it was established that there was no "market" for access to six to eight telephones for one hour, one night per week. While it is assumed that Petitioner would benefit from telephone calls made by her supporters, whether made from their individual homes or from some group setting, the evidence failed to established that Petitioner's use of Mr. Furman's telephones had any "attributable monetary value" or "fair market value." Given that the use of the telephones by Petitioner was during non-working hours when the telephones would normally be idle, it is not surprising that Mr. Furman advised Petitioner that there was no cost associated with the use of his telephones. His monthly telephone bill would be the same whether Petitioner used his telephones or not. Nor is Petitioner to be faulted for relying on the contributor's assessment of the value of the "in-kind" contribution of the use of the telephones. The real value to Petitioner's campaign was the use of Mr. Furman's office as a meeting place. As a practical matter, each volunteer could have taken a list of the telephone numbers of Pompano Beach voters to their respective homes and made the telephone calls from their homes. This was not a professional "phone bank," sometimes used in political campaigns where trained callers use scripted messages designed to elicit voter preferences and where the candidates receives "feed-back" on salient issues. A "fair market value" can be easily established for such services as they are common in the market place. The evidence suggests that campaign volunteers making telephone calls to registered voters from their homes or from someone's office is a common practice in political campaigns in Florida. It is also suggested that this common practice is not reported as a campaign contribution.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Elections Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner, Kay McGinn, did not violate Subsection 106.07(5), Florida Statutes, as alleged, and dismissing the Order of Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission Collins Building, Suite 224 107 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Stuart R. Michelson, Esquire Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson 200 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Rushing, Clerk Florida Elections Commission The Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
