The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners have been guilty of violation of pertinent statutes and rules governing qualification and capability to hold a foster home license and to operate a foster home, in this case a "therapeutic foster home" and, if so, whether their application for renewal of licensure should be denied.
Findings Of Fact The above-named Petitioners were licensed as operators of a therapeutic foster home and as therapeutic foster parents. Due to an alleged abuse report, they became involved in a revocation proceeding with the Department concerning their previously-held license. Upon advice by personnel with Camelot, Inc. (Camelot), a private provider which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care, by contract, they voluntarily relinquished their previous license on February 6, 2006, in the belief that they would still be entitled to a formal proceeding to contest that the alleged abuse occurred, and their licensure entitlement. The Department declined to afford them a hearing on the issue, and they appealed to the District Court of Appeal for the First District. The Department was upheld. They then applied for a renewal of their therapeutic foster care license on August 10, 2006, for Lake County, Florida. An evaluation of the application was launched by the Department and ultimately the Department issued a denial of the license application. A timely request for an administrative proceeding to contest denial of that license was filed by the Giegers. The license denial was based initially upon the Department's determination that the Giegers had allegedly inappropriately punished children in their home and that they had some sort of business interest or income interest in being licensed foster parents, purportedly a violation of foster parenting rules. Sometime thereafter a supplemental basis for denial was served upon them by the Department wherein the Department alleged that the Petitioners had also violated Section 409.175(4) and (12)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), because they had a child placed in their home through a guardianship agreement that had not been approved by a court and were therefore acting as an unlicensed foster home. A response to that supplemental denial notice was made by the Petitioners. Therapeutic foster parents are trained to provide for children with difficult behavioral problems. The Giegers received this training and remained in compliance with the training updates and continued education necessary in order to continue their licensure in good standing. In addition to this, Mrs. Geiger is a trained mental health specialist, with a master's degree, who works for Lifestreams, a mental health provider, providing services to disturbed children. The Giegers were previously affiliated, as therapeutic foster parents, with the private provider, Camelot, which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care. They were licensed as therapeutic foster parents at that time, and accepted a number of severely disturbed children into their home over the years while they were affiliated with Camelot. When a foster parent has a child placed in their home, Camelot has a therapeutic system whereby a therapist is assigned to that child and is available for consultation at any time of day. If the primary therapist is unavailable, the supervisor of that therapist is available for consultation. Camelot's therapeutic personnel and various mental health professionals have been frequently in the Giegers' home to consult, monitor, and assist with the care and therapy of foster children placed there. A number of those therapeutic personnel testified. They established that the Giegers are excellent parents who have provided exemplary care to the foster children placed in their home. These people have training in mental health and related fields. Some hold master's degrees and have been trained to recognize abuse or evidence of it. Some are psychologists, specifically assigned as the mental health professional working with particular children placed in the Giegers' home. In 2005, a child, J.D., was placed in the Giegers' home by the Department. In addition to J.D., there were other children in the home, including Tyler, a non-foster care child placed privately by Camelot with the Giegers, as well as the Giegers' own adopted son. All of the children in the home had been abused prior to their placement with the Giegers. J.D.'s previous situation before coming to the Giegers' home was particularly egregious. He had been starved, locked in a closet, had his fingernails removed by his parents and otherwise was the victim of severe parental abuse before coming into foster care. His was a case of high public notoriety and appears to have been thus treated with a heightened level of attention by the Department, as compared to the case of other children. When J.D. arrived at the Giegers' home after his initial rescue from his earlier situation, he purportedly weighed 58 pounds and was only 4 feet 8 inches tall, at the age of 17 years. During the time he resided with the Giegers, he grew several inches and gained almost 80 pounds due to the care given him by the Giegers. He was placed on special vitamins and formula, in addition to his regular meals, in order to restore him to appropriate physical condition. Because of his physical condition, extra efforts were made by the Petitioners to assure his safety. They even placed him in a private school because they felt he would be at risk attending a large public high school, which he would otherwise have been required to attend. J.D. did well at the Giegers' home initially and it was planned for him to remain in their home after he reached 18 years of age, if he continued to adjust favorably to being a member of their family. He began "acting out" more severely, however, with problematic behaviors. Ultimately it was determined by both the Giegers and Camelot that he should not remain in their home after he turned 18 because of the adverse impact he was having on other children residing in the home. Before the determination was made that J.D. would not remain in the Giegers' home after he reached 18 years of age, the Department had praised the Petitioners' care of J.D. After that decision was made, an attorney for the Department suggested to Mrs. Gieger that she be hired by the Department to provide special services to J.D. Apparently there was a funding problem with regard to continuing J.D. in private school, and this was suggested as a means of funding the private school. Mrs. Gieger, however, did not feel this funding was appropriate because she was already being paid by Camelot for these services, and expressed this to the attorney, she therefore declined that offer. In December 2005 the Department decided to have J.D. re-evaluated by his original evaluator, a psychologist, Dr. Dykel. During his meeting with Dr. Dykel, J.D. apparently told Dr. Dykel that the Giegers had cursed in his presence and in the presence of other children, used racially derogatory language concerning Black children in the foster childrens' presence and that Mrs. Gieger had sat on him as a means of restraint or punishment. He also stated that he was being deprived of food. This meeting occurred on a Friday afternoon. After the meeting J.D. returned to the Giegers' home and made statements about what he had said to Dr. Dykel. Initially the Petitioners thought nothing about the statements, but on the following Tuesday an abuse report was called in indicating that the Giegers had inappropriately punished J.D. in the manner he had related to Dr. Dykel. The child Tyler, who had been placed in the Giegers' home was a child who suffered from severe mental health issues. He had been placed privately with Camelot by his father. He had set his father's and step-mother's bed on fire the previous Christmas because he did not receive a toy, a "PS2," that he asked to be given him for Christmas. There was testimony that he was told by J.D. that if he would make a statement against the Giegers to the Department that he would get the PS2 toy that he wanted. He was taken by Erica Summerfield, an investigator assigned by the Department to the case concerning the abuse report, to the "Child Advocacy Center," for a statement. He apparently made such a statement, of the above import, but then recanted it. Nonetheless, based only on the statement made by J.D. and by Tyler, Erica Summerfield made a determination that the abuse report should be determined to be "founded." As a result of her report (and apparently a past history of abuse reports concerning the Giegers' foster care facility, none of which had been proven to be "founded"), Camelot apparently suggested to the Giegers that they voluntarily relinquish their license, purportedly telling them that they would still have the ability to challenge the abuse report through a Chapter 120 hearing. They sought to obtain a Chapter 120 hearing and the Department denied their request. An appeal ensued and the denial by the Department was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. During the pendency of that appeal, the Giegers filed an application to renew their license, which was denied. This proceeding ensued after that denial, when the Giegers requested a formal proceeding. The Department offered the testimony of Erica Summerfield who was a child protective investigator assigned to the investigation. She was the supervisor of the person who interviewed J.D. and Tyler, apparently the only sources of investigative information leading to her finding that abuse had occurred. Ms. Summerfield testified that her concerns about the Giegers led her to make a report finding that abuse had occurred because alarms had been placed on the bedroom doors of childrens' bedrooms in the Giegers home; that the Giegers had used excessive restraint against J.D. (allegedly held him on the floor and lay on him or sat on him); and that J.D. had been mentally injured by the Giegers and not provided with sufficient food. She also opined that Mrs. Gieger had made inappropriate statements to J.D. None of these purported findings are supported by credible evidence. Initially it is found that J.D.'s and Tyler statements to the interviewer, who then apparently related them to Ms. Summerfield, constitute, at best, "second-hand" hearsay. Neither the interviewer nor J.D., nor Tyler testified at the hearing, and Tyler later recanted his statements made to the interviewer. The Respondent's exhibits two, three, and four, the interview reports, were offered into evidence and were only admitted regarding a basis for the Department's course of conduct in the matter, but not for the truth of any facts depicted on the face of those exhibits. Concerning the alleged complaint, related to the interviewer, regarding lack of food, the credible persuasive evidence shows that J.D. actually grew several inches after being placed with the Giegers, even though doctors had opined that he would not grow much, if at all, because of the starvation that had occurred early in his life. He also gained substantial weight while being cared for by the Giegers, so that he essentially looked like a normal child by the time he left their care. He had been emaciated when he came to the Giegers' care and had been described as looking like a "concentration camp victim." He was described as being far smaller than a child of his age when he came to the Giegers' care, but seven months later appeared to be essentially a normal child in physical appearance. The evidence, in fact, clearly supports the determination that the Giegers did provide J.D. with appropriate nutrition during their care of him. The basis for the alleged abuse regarding his not being properly fed is simply not credible. The Giegers had also been accused by J.D. or Tyler, or both, with using inappropriate language, racial slurs and cursing in J.D.'s presence, purportedly causing him mental harm. However, mental health experts present in the Giegers' home on a weekly and almost daily basis had never heard any inappropriate language, including any inappropriate racial language or inappropriate cursing in the childrens' presence during their visits to the Giegers' home. Many of these visits were unannounced. Two of the counselors or mental health professionals often present in the home were African-American. They found no evidence of racial tension or racially derogatory language being used by the Giegers or in the Giegers' home. It was their belief that the Giegers did not exhibit any behavior which suggested racism. Further, there were no Black children placed in the Giegers' home during the time that J.D. was there. There is simply no credible evidence to support any finding that inappropriate language was used by Mr. or Mrs. Gieger in J.D.'s or other childrens' presence, of a racially derogatory nature or otherwise. Part of the basis for the abuse finding (and the reason for license denial) was excess restraint or "sitting on" J.D. as punishment. This position was based on the statements of the two children, J.D. and Tyler. One of them, Tyler, tearfully recanted his story shortly after he made the statement. Erica Summerfield testifying for the Department, admitted in her testimony that she was aware of his recantation. She also admitted that Tyler's parents had asked her more than once to allow him to be placed back in the Giegers' home. They also had disclosed to her that he had a habit of making inappropriate statements and lying. There is evidence that J.D. had told him that he would receive a toy he wanted very much if he would make a statement to the Department that J.D. had been abused by the Giegers. Most importantly, J.D. had identified the point in time when Ms. Gieger was supposed to have sat on him as during an occasion when he broke a window at the house. Other mental health providers who were in the home around that time reported never seeing any bruise marks or other evidence of injury to J.D. or at any other time. They also reported that Mrs. Gieger was especially careful of his safety because of the seriously debilitated condition of his body. Most importantly, however, during the time that the window was broken by J.D. and he was severely acting out, Mrs. Gieger was on the phone with a professional from Camelot who was helping her to calm or "de-escalate" J.D. and who remained on the phone with Mrs. Gieger during the entire incident. That expert heard nothing which indicated that Mrs. Gieger had sat on the child or in anyway inappropriately restrained him. Mrs. Gieger denied using physical restraints on the foster children at the hearing. The Department maintains, however, that in two prior reports discussed in Camelot's letter, report 1999-127436 and 2002-007021, the Giegers had admitted restraining foster children. In the 1999 incident the child purportedly sustained rug burns on the face while being restrained on the floor by Mr. Gieger. These reports are at best second-hand hearsay. Moreover, they are not reasons of which the Petitioners were provided notice, as part of the basis for the denial of their licensure application which triggered this proceeding. Moreover, both of those incidents were immediately reported by the Giegers themselves to the Department and, ironically, the Department did not see fit to make any determination at the time, or since, that those incidents amounted to abuse. No finding was made that those alleged incidents were "founded" abuse episodes. Moreover, the Department relies upon an incident where Mrs. Gieger purportedly stated that she used force against J.D. when he tried to grab her neck. She purportedly told Ms. Summerfield in an interview that she gave J.D. a "therapeutic bear hug" by grabbing his arm and turning him around. He fell to the floor as a result. Parenthetically, not even the Department claims that she forced him to the floor. Mrs. Gieger's testimony at hearing concerning this event was to the effect that she grabbed J.D.'s wrist in order to prevent him from striking her or grabbing her neck and that he just collapsed to the floor. The Department then maintains that foster parents are not permitted to use such "force" on foster children, such as grabbing J.D.'s wrist, because it equates this to the use of corporal punishment and that grabbing a child's arm or wrist could "traumatize" an already vulnerable foster child. Mrs. Gieger's testimony, however, indicates that the use of "therapeutic bear hug," even if it occurred, is part of an approved method of training which she had, which is designed to safely manage children who are acting out in a potentially dangerous way, until they can calm down. She testified that Camelot, the Department's contracting agent, had approved this training for her. Moreover, when a foster parent is in danger of attack by a 17-year-old, even a somewhat debilitated child, who threatened striking or grabbing the foster parent by neck or throat, to grab his arm or wrist to prevent such conduct is reasonable and does not constitute unreasonable restraint. Assuming this event occurred, to characterize the grabbing of a child's wrist, to prevent injury or potential injury to a foster parent or another, as excessive force or "corporal punishment" is nonsensical. There is no credible, persuasive evidence that either Mr. or Mrs. Gieger engaged in any excessive force or restraint amounting to abuse. A concern was raised by Dr. Dykle, the psychologist, who was fearful of the fact that alarms had been placed on childrens' rooms in the foster home. Ms. Summerfield based her finding that abuse had occurred, in part, on the report that the alarms had been placed on the doors of some of the childrens' rooms. Ms. Summerfield, however, admitted in her testimony that alarms are often and routinely placed on childrens' rooms in therapeutic foster care homes. The mental health experts who testified clearly established that in every therapeutic foster home such alarms must be placed on bedroom doors because of a safety concern for other children. Children who are placed in this type of home are often serious safety risks for themselves or for other children. They have often been found themselves to be perpetrators of inappropriate or violent conduct. Many times they are children who have been sexually abused and have themselves become sexual perpetrators. In fact, there was a child in the Giegers' home at the time J.D. was there who had set his parents' bed on fire because he did not get a desired toy for Christmas. Dr. Dykle's apparent grave concern about alarms being placed on the childrens' bedroom doors is surprising since it appears to be completely contrary to generally accepted, safe practice for therapeutic foster homes, something that he should have been aware of if he is indeed an expert in child abuse issues. Ms. Summerfield admitted that she was aware that this was a virtually universal safety practice in therapeutic foster homes and yet, paradoxically, used it as a factor in support of her finding that abuse had occurred, as a basis of denial of re-licensure. Ms. Summerfield also admitted that she had spoken with Camelot professionals who assured her that the Giegers had been exemplary foster care parents. She acknowledged that J.D. had made untrue statements in the past about other foster placements. She admitted that the only evidence of improper restraint, or any kind of abuse or neglect in the home, was essentially predicated on the statements of the two children who did not testify in this proceeding. She conceded that one of them had recanted and she knew of this well before the hearing. Mental health experts from Camelot who testified, established that it is a very frequent event for foster children placed in therapeutic foster homes to act out and to make false statements and accusations concerning their care-givers. They also indicated that J.D. had made such false allegations in the past against other caregivers. This was all information that a thorough investigation would have made known to the Department, at the time it was making the determination that there was a basis for a finding of abuse. The only witness other than Ms. Summerfield, presented by the Department, was Amy Hammett, the licensing official who actually signed the letter denying the license application. She testified that she did not review all of the documents that made up the Giegers' license application. Some other department employee had been assigned to the case and it had been later transferred to Ms. Hammett before the final decision was made. She had reviewed five relevant forms, but nothing else. She had no evidence to support the Department's position that the Giegers had relied upon the foster care services they provided for income to support their own family, other than the fact that they had taken a legal position in the appeal from the previous attempt at a Chapter 120 proceeding, to the effect that they had something in the nature of a property interest in their foster care license. This may have been a necessary position to take in an attempt to establish jurisdiction or standing in that proceeding, but other than that, and one statement attributable to Mr. Gieger that there was an adverse financial effect on the Giegers related to that proceeding, it was not established that the Giegers were relying on the income from foster care services to support their family. Rather, in the context of that statement and the Giegers legal position during the course of their appeal, the reference was most likely made in the context that the hiring of an attorney, with related expense, in prosecuting the first case, including an appellate proceeding, caused an adverse financial effect, which is understandable. That does not constitute credible, persuasive evidence that the Giegers were relying upon foster care services as income to support their own family and themselves in violation of any Department rule. Mrs. Gieger, indeed, testified under oath that they did not rely upon foster care income to support their family. Her testimony and that of others showing that they have successfully operated a well- managed, licensed home for a substantial period of time, shows that the Petitioners are financially capable of operating safely and successfully under a new license. There is no persuasive evidence to the contrary. The greater weight of the credible evidence is persuasive in establishing that the Giegers provide quality therapeutic foster care and have not engaged in the abuse with which they are charged. Even J.D. expressed the desire to come back and live with the Giegers and, after he reached 18 years of age, he did so. This certainly does not support the existence of abuse. Moreover, Earnest Thomas, J.D.'s guardian ad litem established that the Giegers provided J.D. with excellent care. He was a frequent visitor in their home and paid close attention to J.D.'s well-being during times pertinent to this case. Further, the caseworker, Sheila Donato, was the person who took J.D. from the Giegers' home when he was removed by the Department. On this occasion she stated that he was tearful and crying when he left the Giegers' home and asked if he would be able to come back to their home for Christmas. There were no bruises or other evidence that he had been harmed in any way. She established that the fact that he returned to the Giegers home after he turned 18 years of age is evidence that he had never been abused while there. After the Giegers' foster care license had been relinquished voluntarily by them under the above-referenced circumstances, Tyler's parents executed "guardianship papers" placing Tyler in the custody or guardianship of the Giegers and they continue to allow Tyler to reside in their home. The Department maintains that this was an illegal placement because the Giegers were not a licensed foster care facility at that time and had not secured a court order allowing Tyler to be in their guardianship. The circumstances were, however, that Ms. Giegers' mother was the attorney who prepared the guardianship papers for the Giegers and for Tyler's parents to execute. She rendered an opinion to them that that was sufficient to justify allowing Tyler to remain in the Giegers' home. Ms. Gieger testified that she knew of other teachers and other individuals who had used similar documents to establish a basis to take custody of a child in their home. She believed that what she was doing was legal. There was no intent by her, or Mr. Gieger, to engage in any kind illegal custody, guardianship or circumvention of the foster care licensure requirements, or any other illegal act. There is no evidence that Tyler had been adjudicated dependent and subject to the custody of the Department.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services granting a foster home license to the Petitioners, authorizing their operation as a therapeutic foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerri A. Blair, Esquire Lockett & Blair Post Office Box 130 Tavares, Florida 32778 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert A. Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact The Respondents operated a "therapeutic foster home" in Lee County, North Fort Myers, Florida. A therapeutic foster care home such as this is licensed to accept and care for emotionally disturbed children such as the 9- year-old girl, T.P., involved in this case and, as such, has a mental health technician from the Department available for consultation should such assistance be needed. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged, as pertinent hereto, with administration of the foster care program mandated by Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, and the above-cited chapter of the Florida Administrative Code. The child involved in this dispute, "T.P.", is a 9-year-old girl who has been diagnosed as emotionally disturbed. The Respondents were aware that she was an emotionally disturbed child when she was placed in their home with one other foster child and were also aware that theirs was a licensed therapeutic foster home with a mental health technician available for consultation. They failed to make use of the services of that technician in dealing with the child's problem involving enuresis and ecopresis. This child's medical problem, involving incontinence of bowel and bladder, is related to the child's emotional disturbance. Because of the nature of this problem and its psychological ramifications, it is even more critical than with ordinary children that slapping or hitting as a punishment for bed- wetting or soiling of clothes or bedding should be avoided. If the child is so punished for incontinence, then the child's guilt feelings or feelings of inadequacy for having "accidentally" soiled bedding or clothes is greatly aggravated. On February 10, 1982, the Respondent, Russell Ostrander, administered corporal punishment to the child T.P. on two occasions, leaving multiple black and blue marks or bruises on the buttocks and thighs of this child "because she was messing in her britches." The child, either later that day or one or two days thereafter, visited with her natural mother who observed the bruises and reported the matter to Mrs. Parker, the Petitioner's first witness, who is a "district intake counselor." Mrs. Parker, and/or the other HRS personnel testifying for the Petitioner, felt that an instance of child abuse had occurred and removed the child from the foster home. The despondent admitted spanking the child on several occasions, but did not believe he could have caused the bruises shown in Exhibits 1 and 2. The Respondents admitted however that the child was spanked as punishment for "messing in her britches."
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, the evidence in the record, it is therefore RECOMMENDED: That the license of Janet and Russell Ostrander to operate a foster home be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony N. DeLuccia, Esquire District Legal Counsel Post Office Box 06085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906 Russell and Janet Ostrander Rt. 2, Box 382 Ruden Road North Fort Myers, Florida 33903 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes. Mrs. Sampson operated a Childrens' Medical Services ("CMS") medical foster home for children with special medical, emotional and physical needs, and was licensed by the Department as either a CMS medical foster home or as a regular foster home from 1990 until November 1997. At some point in 1996 or 1997, Mrs. Sampson voluntarily ceased operating as a CMS medical foster home, but continued to operate as a regular foster home. There was conflicting evidence as to the precise date of this change, but the date is not relevant to this phase of the bifurcated proceeding. On March 2, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint that sought to revoke Mrs. Sampson's foster care license. On October 6, 1999, the Department filed an Amended Administrative Complaint. The Department also denied Mrs. Sampson's application to adopt one of the foster children in her care. Mrs. Sampson requested a formal administrative hearing on both the revocation of her foster care license and the denial of her adoption application. The cases were consolidated, and a formal administrative hearing was held over several dates in April, May, and June 2000. Mrs. Sampson prevailed on all issues in the consolidated cases. A Recommended Order in her favor was entered on August 11, 2000. A Final Order adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Recommended Order was entered on October 2, 2000. Mrs. Sampson contends that she is a "small business party" as defined in Subsection 57.111(3)(d)1.a, Florida Statutes, which provides that the term "small business party" includes: A sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time that action is initiated by a state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million, including both personal and business investments. . . . At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was domiciled in the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this case, Mrs. Sampson was licensed as a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN"). The determinative issue is whether Mrs. Sampson's operation of a foster home establishes her as the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business or professional practice. Mrs. Sampson initially operated her medical foster home for the benefit of one child, who was admitted to Tampa General Hospital while Mrs. Sampson worked there as a contract nurse. The child was born prematurely and was not expected to live longer than six weeks. Mrs. Sampson became a licensed foster parent to take this child home and care for him. Under her care, the child thrived. Though he survived the initial crisis, the child continued to require full-time nursing care. Mrs. Sampson was not able to return to full-time employment as a contract nurse outside the home. Mrs. Sampson testified that she advised the Department's case workers that she would need to take in additional medical foster children to supplement her income while she worked at home caring for the children. Over a period of eight years, the Department placed at least 14 medically needy foster children in Mrs. Sampson's home. The Department establishes foster home care board rates, which are standard reimbursements to foster parents for the expenses incurred for the foster children, such as food, clothing, medical care, and transportation. The board rates are minimums that can be increased by the Department if the needs of the foster child cannot otherwise be met. Mrs. Sampson received an enhanced board rate for at least some of the children in her care. The Department conducts orientation meetings for and training of prospective foster parents. The Department emphasizes that the purpose of foster parenting is to provide temporary surrogate parenting for the foster children. The prospective parents are informed that they are considered volunteers and will not be paid for their services. The parents are told that the board payments are for the childrens' expenses. Foster parents sign an agreement acknowledging that the board payments are "on behalf of the child." Rule 65C-13.011(4), Florida Administrative Code, expressly provides that substitute care parents must have sufficient income to assure the stability and security of their own families without reliance on the board payments, and that the substitute family must have sufficient income to absorb four to six weeks of a foster child's care before receiving a board payment. If the Department removes a child from a foster home, the board payment to the foster payment ceases. If the child is placed with a new foster parent, then the board payment goes to the new foster parent. In addition to the regular and enhanced board payments, a CMS medical foster parent may receive payments from Medicaid as reimbursement for medically necessary services rendered to the foster children. Mrs. Sampson was a designated Medicaid provider from April 1992 through March 1997. Mrs. Sampson contended that these Medicaid payments were for the nursing services she provided to the children, just as physicians receive Medicaid payments for treatment of eligible patients. However, medical foster parents are not required to be licensed medical professionals. Mrs. Sampson offered no evidence that the Medicaid payments were for her services as an LPN, or that private, residential LPN services even qualify for Medicaid reimbursement absent prior authorization. CMS-administered medical foster care services are authorized for Medicaid reimbursement, and the best evidence is that Mrs. Sampson was reimbursed as a medical foster care provider, not as an LPN. The Department established that Mrs. Sampson did not hold herself out as running a business, nor did she report as income on her federal tax return the payments received in connection with providing foster care. Mrs. Sampson testified that she hired part-time employees to assist her in caring for the children, but she did not withhold federal income tax or Social Security taxes from their pay and did not file W-2 wage statements for them. Mrs. Sampson explained her failure to report her board payments as income by reference to 26 U.S.C. s. 131, which excludes foster care payments from reportable gross income. This citation justifies her failure to report, but also supports the Department's contention that foster care payments should not be considered business income. Mrs. Sampson implicitly conceded that her foster home did not possess any of the common indicia of a business. Her chief contention was that from 1970 to 1990, she worked as an LPN through nursing agencies, caring for sick children in hospitals or in their homes, and that from 1990 to 1997, she worked as an LPN caring for medical foster children in her own home. In other words, Mrs. Sampson contended that by operating the foster home, she was continuing to practice her profession in a different setting. She gave up the income from her practice as an LPN through nursing agencies in favor of the income she received as an LPN acting as a medical foster parent.
The Issue The issue presented is whether the Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed in this case and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Kathy Bergerson, held a family foster home license for her residence issued by the Children, Youth and Family Program Office of Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. As it relates to the license at issue, Respondent was first licensed by Petitioner in April 1987. In her home, Respondent was responsible for several developmentally disabled children and a developmentally disabled adult. Respondent's mother lives in an apartment adjoining the home and has access to the residence. Respondent's mother is a registered nurse. During the period since the licensure, the several incidents described in the following paragraphs occurred. Because the incidents involved Respondent or her home and the incidents were unexplained, Petitioner became concerned for the safety of the children in Respondent's care. The incidents at issue are as follows: Sometime during 1987 while one of the children was hospitalized, the child was discovered in what appeared to be a drug-induced sleep during a visit by Respondent. No harm to the child was demonstrated from the incident, and Respondent relayed the incident to Petitioner during her relicensure interview in 1988. Also, sometime in 1987, a housekeeper, provided by Metro-Dade County, allegedly assaulted Respondent's mother while attempting to steal toys and bed sheets from the home. No harm to the children was shown from the incident, and Respondent reported the incident to Petitioner during her relicensure interview in 1988. Then, early in 1988, Respondent received a delivery of medication which did not contain full amounts of the prescribed contents. The medication was delivered by a representative sent by Petitioner. No harm to the children was proven from the incident, and Respondent reported the incident to Petitioner. In July 1988, a report of the sexual abuse of the developmentally disabled adult living with Respondent was filed with Petitioner. The final disposition of the incident was not shown; however, neither Respondent nor Respondent's mother were classified as perpetrators of the alleged abuse. In September 1988, a child under Respondent's care, and custody was hospitalized after she became, untypically, lethargic and unresponsive when Respondent gave the child a dose of Panadol for her fever. Fearing that the child was allergic to the medicine, Respondent brought the bottle from which she had administered the medicine with them to the hospital, and reported her fear to the medical personnel at the hospital and to Petitioner. Although Petitioner asserted that the bottle of medicine was tested for its contents, the proof failed to demonstrate that a test was performed or the results of any such test. Respondent kept the medication for the children in a locked cabinet in her kitchen. Included in the drugs in the cabinet were Panadol, Valium and Benedryl. In addition to Respondent, Respondent's mother and nurses provided by Petitioner, on occasion, had access to the cabinet. While Petitioner contended that the Panadol given to the child was adulterated with Valium and Benedryl, the proof failed to indicate that the Panadol was altered, or that the child suffered from the ingestion of the medication. Petitioner asserted that it was unusual for a foster parent, such as Respondent, to have as many unexplained events reported within an almost two- year period. Therefore, based on the above incidents and what Petitioner perceived to be a pattern of unexplained incidents involving Respondent and her home, and after ordering a psychological evaluation of Respondent and her mother, Petitioner issued its notice of intent to revoke Respondent's family foster home license on February 14, 1989. Petitioner alleged that Respondent was not capable of handling the stresses associated with maintaining a family foster home. At the hearing Respondent demonstrated a tendency to become overly excited; however, the proof failed to demonstrate that she is unable to handle the stresses of her life. Respondent is a caring person who has an obvious interest and concern for the children in her charge. She expressed deep concern over each of the incidents recited above and, in fact, reported the majority of the incidents to Petitioner. Although the incidents described above generate concern, was not shown that the safety of the clients was endangered by the incidents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: Recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order withdrawing its intent to revoke Respondent's family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of December 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Park way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December 1989.
Findings Of Fact Respondents have cared for foster children for some twenty years. In November or December of 1975, they began with Christian Youth Care, Inc. (CYC), a foster home in Zephyrhills founded under the auspices of the First Baptist Church of Zephyrhills. Since then small groups of adolescent girls have lived with respondents and their teenage daughter, Dawn. In all, some 80 children have lived at CYC since respondents have had charge of the home. In July of 1977, petitioner placed June Holmes, who is deaf and dumb, with respondents. After June had been with the Houghs for two weeks or so, Lillian Parsons, a social worker in petitioner's employ, told Mrs. Hough that June should be wearing a hearing aid. June did not want to wear a hearing aid. She was also disappointed that Mrs. Hough would not take her to Daytona Beach; she became very upset, wielded a straightened safety pen and started knocking things off bureaus. When Mr. Hough served as a medical technician in the armed forces, unruly patients were sometimes wrapped in blankets. Perhaps remembering this experience, he enlisted Mrs. Hough in wrestling June to the floor, wrapping her in a blanket and securing the blanket with three belts. In the process, Mr. Hough said to June, "See how mad you can get." These events caused concern among the other children living in the home, who gathered to watch and, at respondents' suggestion, to say prayers. Mrs. Hough told June that she loved her. After June had lain bound in this fashion for 45 minutes, respondents released her. The following day Mrs. Hough called Mrs. Parsons to report the incident and to ask that June be placed in another home. Mrs. Parsons expressed no disapproval of respondents' method of restraining June nor did she tell them not to do it again. June remained with respondents until she left for boarding school in St. Augustine. When June returned to the Houghs from school on Easter vacation 1978, she wanted a new pair of shoes that cost $24.95. Respondents bought her a different pair instead. Easter morning June wanted to wear her old shoes, not her new shoes. This caused an argument. Mrs. Hough stayed home with June while Mr. Hough took the others to church. When Mrs. Hough began packing June's clothes into a suitcase, June was "worried that [respondents] would move [her] out." Deposition of June Holmes, p. 5. She walked outside and sat under a tree near the road. Mrs. Hough telephoned her husband and summoned him home from church. With the help of a deputy sheriff brandishing handcuffs, respondents coaxed June into their van and drove her up the driveway to their home. At first she refused to leave the van, so respondents went inside without her. When June eventually went inside, there was another confrontation. Mr. Hough wrestled June to the floor and sent Mrs. Hough for a blanket. After respondents wrapped June in the blanket and secured it with belts, Mr. Hough set off to retrieve the children he had left at church. After Mr. Hough returned with the other children, respondents unwrapped June and there was an Easter egg hunt. The next day Mrs. Hough called petitioner's offices in New Port Richey, then drove June to New Port Richey and left her there, because she wanted no more to do with her. When Mrs. Parsons learned that respondents had wrapped June in a blanket a second time, she asked to be relieved of responsibility for June. Eventually David J. Schultz, at the time a child welfare social worker in petitioner's employ, assumed responsibility for June; and June was again placed with respondents. Mr. and Mrs. Hough frequently communicated with guidance counselors and teachers at the schools children in their care attended. They made six visits to talk about Evelyn Ciacelli's progress with Ricky Rowell, guidance counselor at Woodland Elementary School in Zephryhills, and spoke to him on the telephone about Evelyn on several other occasions. Disappointed in Evelyn's progress with her homework one night, Mr. Hough picked her up and shook her. On another occasion, Evelyn and her roommate were wrestling in their room after they had been sent to bed. Mr. Hough heard them from the kitchen, walked into their bedroom with a spatula in his hand, and gave Evelyn, who was wearing a bathrobe over her nightgown, a swat on the rear with the spatula. On November 20, 1978, David J. Schultz left Petitioner's employ. He subsequently went to work for a corporation controlled by respondents and began living in their home. He lived there on December 13, 1978. On December 13, 1978, Bonnie Blair McKenzie, then employed by petitioner as a community youth leader, picked up Cindy Spickelmier at a shelter home in Dade City and drove her to respondents' home. Cindy, a 14 year old, was at the shelter home after having run away from another foster home, the Newmans'. She had lived with respondents previously and David Schultz also knew her. Shortly after Cindy's arrival, David Schultz was talking to her in the Houghs' living room, where she was sitting on a couch, crying. Also present were Mr. Hough, Ms. McKenzie, Nancy Newman, the foster mother who had previously had custody of Cindy, and Ed Springer, then the social worker in petitioner's employ responsible for Cindy's placement. Angry because Cindy was ignoring him, David Schultz grabbed the hair of her head, jerked her up into a standing position, had her bend over and lean against a desk for support, and struck her buttocks with a wooden paddle an inch thick. He administered the first blow with such force that Ms. Newman was frightened and Ms. McKenzie was "horrified and devastated." (T.52). Cindy fell to her knees, hysterical. Less forcefully, David Schultz struck her buttocks a second time. At the hearing Mr. Hough testified that: after Dave gave her the swats she sat back down and she was a new child. We were able to communicate with her and we thought we were really making good progress and being able to work with the child. That was the purpose of the new program and of course we were trying to set up parameters that would be beneficial to the child. (T.233). Notwithstanding this perceived improvement in Cindy's deportment, Ed Springer gave Cindy another spanking 30 or 45 minutes after David Schultz had finished. In the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Hough, and Mr. Schultz, Ed Springer struck Cindy five times on the buttocks with the same wooden paddle David Schultz had used, as punishment for running away from the Newmans' house. Later, on the evening of December 13, 1978, Cindy ran away from the Houghs'. She ended up at her mother's house where she spent the night. The next day her mother took her to the Pasco County Sheriff's Department. There Fay Wilbur an investigator for the Sheriff's Department, took photographs of Cindy's badly bruised buttocks. Petitioner's exhibits 3, 4 and 5. On the following day, December 15, 1978, Dr. Lena Ayala, a pediatrician, examined Cindy. She found large "[v]ery tender, painful" (T.55) hematomas covering the whole area of Cindy's buttocks. If she had seen a child in the custody of its natural parents in that condition, Dr. Ayala testified, she would have reported the matter to the child abuse registry. Petitioner discharged Ed Springer because of the beating he had administered to Cindy Spickelmier. Petitioner publishes a manual with a chapter entitled "Foster Family Group Homes for Dependent youth," Petitioner's exhibit No. 8. In part, the manual provides: 8.4.4 Unacceptable disciplinary approaches include: a. Corporal punishment--slapping, kicking, hitting, etc. * * * Humiliation, ridicule, sarcasm, shaming in front of the group or alone. Deprivation of essential needs such as food, sleep, or parental visits. Petitioner's exhibit No. 8, p.9. Although petitioner sometimes furnished foster group home licensees copies of its manuals, petitioner's files do not indicate that either Mr. or Mrs. Hough ever received a copy. Respondents wore unaware of the manual's contents on December 13, 1978; and David Schultz was also unaware of any policy against corporal punishment of foster group home children. Lorraine Cash, a foster mother in Pasco County, never spanked any foster child in her care over the age of eleven years. On the other hand, Henry Arnett, another foster parent in Pasco County, used corporal punishment in disciplining teen aged foster boys. He and his wife, Doris, were named foster parents of the year in 1978. On December 14, 1978, Joanne Wall telephoned respondents on behalf of petitioner and told Mr. Hough that David Schultz should be barred from their premises. When Mr. Hough protested that David Schultz lived on the premises, Ms. Wall asked Mr. Hough to keep David Schultz from working with the girls, which Mr. Hough agreed to do. On December 18, 1978, respondents submitted an application to petitioner for a child care center license, an application on which they had begun work considerably before December 13, 1978. Discouraged by the pace at which this application was being considered and by what respondents perceived as unfairness on the part of some of petitioner's personnel, Mr. Hough on February 15, 1979, told William Laing, a manager for petitioner, that he wanted all the foster children but two removed by five o'clock the following day, a Friday. Even though the agreement between petitioner and respondents called for two weeks' notice by the foster parents, petitioner's exhibit No. 6, Mr. Hough was unwilling to wait so long. Petitioner arranged to pick up all the foster children in respondents' care on the following day. Some of the children had not been told they would be leaving the Houghs' home. Respondents own improved real estate from which they derive rental income. In addition, CYC, funded by the First Baptist Church of Zephyrhills, paid respondents a salary. Occasionally, Mr. Hough worked outside the home. Pasco County contributed to the costs of caring for foster children. Respondents did not need moneys petitioner paid them on behalf of the children for their own personal purposes.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That, on the next anniversary of the date of respondents' original foster group home license, petitioner discontinue respondents' license for a period of one year. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara McPherson, Esquire Post Office Box 5046 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Robert L. Williams, Esquire Post Office Box 443 Dade City, Florida 33525
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondents' application for re-licensure of their therapeutic foster home should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The Respondents have operated a licensed foster home since 1994 and have operated a therapeutic foster home since 2011. The Respondents' foster home was originally licensed under the supervision of Lee County Mental Health Center, which was the local agency responsible for placing children in the home. In 2009, responsibility for supervision of the home was transferred to "Florida MENTOR" (MENTOR), which also assumed the responsibility for placement of children in the home. The children placed in the Respondents' foster home have been between eight and 11 years of age. Children placed in therapeutic foster homes have significant special needs and can be emotionally unstable. A safe and supportive therapeutic environment is required for their protection. The Respondents' license was valid through September 30, 2011. On August 3, 2011, the Respondents applied for renewal of the license. Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13.027 requires that changes in a licensee's household composition or employment be reported within 48 hours of the event. When the application was filed, the Respondents disclosed that their adult daughter and her three children had been residing with them for approximately three weeks. Prior to the application, the Respondents had not advised MENTOR that there had been any change in household composition. Mr. Williams became unemployed in December 2010, but the Respondents failed to report the change in the employment prior to filing the application. MENTOR was concerned about the financial stability of the household due to additional residents in the home and the reduction in income related to the loss of Mr. Williams' employment. An applicant for re-licensure of a foster home is required to submit financial information sufficient to establish that the applicant has the resources required to provide a stable household and meet basic expenses. The financial information initially submitted by the Respondents with the application for re-licensure was incomplete and did not appear to be an accurate reflection of household expenses. Attempts by MENTOR to obtain additional information were resisted by Ms. Williams. MENTOR eventually determined that, although the household had sufficient income to support their own expenses, placement of a foster child into the Respondents' home would cause a financial hardship for the family. Foster parents are permitted, with approval of the supervising agency, to add payments received to board a foster child to their income calculation, but the Respondents have not obtained such approval. By the time of the hearing, the Williams' adult daughter and her children no longer resided in the home, but Mr. Williams remained unemployed and was selling scrap metal to obtain income. At the hearing, he testified that his scrap metal income had been declining as more unemployed people began to collect and resell scrap. In September 2011, MENTOR completed the re-licensing study, a 24-page document that outlines the history of the foster home, including abuse reports and licensing deficiencies, and the efforts of the licensee to correct such issues. Rule 65C-13.028(3)(i)2. requires that the re-licensing study include documentation related to the level of cooperation by the licensee with the case plans developed for the child placed in the foster home. The re-licensing study documented MENTOR's concerns about the physical safety of children residing in the home and the Respondents' willingness and ability to provide appropriate support to therapeutic foster children placed in the home. During a significant period in 2011, the Respondents maintained a collection of junk metal and other debris in the yard of the foster home. The junk was apparently being collected by Mr. Williams for sale to scrap dealers. Jodi Koch, a MENTOR therapist who was assigned to work with the children in the Respondents' home, testified at the hearing about her observations of conditions in the home and about her interactions with the Respondents. In November 2010, Ms. Koch observed a child begin to play with a rusty machete that the child discovered in the Respondents' yard, and she so advised Ms. Williams, who expressed her displeasure that Ms. Koch had exceeded her authority as a therapist. Ms. Koch reported her observation to MENTOR personnel. MENTOR officials, including the program director and re-licensing coordinator, discussed the unsafe conditions of the property with the Respondents. Suggestions that the Respondents relocate the debris or otherwise prevent access by children to the debris were initially ignored by the Respondents. On May 2, 2011, MENTOR issued a Written Notice of Violation (Notice) to the Respondents, documenting the hazardous conditions of the property. The Notice was hand-delivered on May 5, 2011, at which time the Respondents refused to read or sign the paper. On May 6, 2011, the Lee County Code Enforcement Authority issued a nuisance citation against the Respondents for the accumulation of junk and debris on their property. The violation was cured on May 13, 2011, but, on June 1, 2011, the Lee County Code Enforcement Authority issued a second nuisance citation for the same violation. That violation was not resolved until November 2011, after the Lee County Code Enforcement Authority had prosecuted the violation through a hearing, and more than a year after Ms. Koch observed the child with the machete. At the hearing, Ms. Williams asserted that Ms. Koch was a therapist and that she had exceeded her authority by reporting the observations of the property to the MENTOR officials, essentially the same position Ms. Williams asserted in 2011 when Ms. Koch reported the situation to MENTOR. The MENTOR re-licensing study also documented the failure of the Respondents to cooperate in therapeutic plans developed for the children placed in the home and to supervise the children properly. Ms. Williams often refused to cooperate with the therapeutic plans and goals Ms. Koch developed for the children in the Respondents' foster home. Ms. Williams apparently concluded that she was better able to address the needs of a therapeutic foster child than was Ms. Koch, but the evidence failed to support such a conclusion. Ms. Williams refused to implement standard behavioral therapies suggested by Ms. Koch and opined that they were a "waste of her time." Ms. Williams refused to allow one foster child to have toys purchased for the child by Ms. Koch. Ms. Williams claimed that the child would have destroyed the toys, but Ms. Koch testified they had been purchased to allow the child to have her own possessions for the first time in the child's life and to develop a sense of responsibility. The Respondents routinely put children to bed at an early hour as a means of discipline and refused to comply with Ms. Koch's direction to develop other disciplinary practices. In one discussion with Ms. Koch at the home, Ms. Williams discussed the circumstances of one foster child in the presence of another foster child, violating the confidentiality of the children. The Respondents failed to contact MENTOR staff to address behavioral issues exhibited by children placed in the home and instead called upon law enforcement authorities to respond when a child refused to comply with their directions. The Respondents failed to supervise one child placed in their home sufficiently to prevent the child from accessing pay- per-view pornography on cable television, resulting in a charge in excess of $700 on one bill. It was clear, based on Ms. Williams' testimony and demeanor at the hearing, that Ms. Williams disliked Ms. Koch. Much of Ms. Williams' presentation of evidence during the February 17 portion of the hearing was directed towards discrediting MENTOR and Ms. Koch. After completing the re-licensing study, MENTOR forwarded the application and study to the Department, which received the materials on October 5, 2011. Notwithstanding the continuing problems between MENTOR and the Respondents, MENTOR recommended in the study that the Respondents' home be conditionally re-licensed. The conditions, essentially intended to increase the possibility that the Department would approve the application for re-licensure, were as follows: Reduction in the licensed capacity from two therapeutic individuals to one therapeutic individual. Unannounced visits to monitor the home in terms of food content, refrigerator temperature, client supervision and safety concerns. Continuing monitoring of the foster parents ability to work in conjunction with service providers regarding the best interests of the child. Monitoring to ensure that the living situation of the additional four residents was resolved within six months. Ms. Williams was dissatisfied with the results of the study, disagreed with the proposed conditions, and refused to accept them. While MENTOR (as the supervising agency) was responsible for the evaluation of the application, the Department has the responsibility for the making the final determination regarding licensure or re-licensure of a foster home. The Department considered the MENTOR recommendation when making the licensing decision. The primary focus of the Department's decision was whether the Respondents could provide an appropriate and safe environment for a therapeutic foster placement. The Department has no financial interest in the decision and had no direct contact with the Respondents. As the regional licensing manager for the Department, Kristine Emden was tasked with the responsibility of reviewing the application and materials. Based on her review, Ms. Emden determined that the application should be denied. Ms. Emden based her decision on the Respondents' lack of cooperation with therapeutic programs developed for the children in their care, their failure to supervise children adequately or to maintain confidentiality regarding the children, and their lack of cooperation with the MENTOR personnel who attempted to resolve the identified deficiencies. Additionally, Ms. Emden considered the Respondents' response to issues related to the hazardous conditions of the premises, the lack of financial resources to support a therapeutic foster placement in the home, and the rejection of conditions proposed by MENTOR in the study. Ms. Emden was unable to identify any remedial measures that would alter the denial of the application for re-licensure. The Respondents failed to offer credible evidence to establish that the Department's denial of the application was incorrect or that the application should otherwise be approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order denying the license application filed by the Respondents at issue in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2012.
The Issue The determinative issue in this cause is whether Petitioners "abused" and "neglected" foster children in their care, as those terms are defined in Sections 39.01(2) and 39.01(45), Florida Statutes (2000). As a result of the alleged abusive neglect, two subsequent issues are raised: (1) whether Petitioners' foster home license should be revoked for the reasons as stated in the Administrative Complaint dated July 20, 2001; and (2) whether Respondent's denial of Petitioners' requests to adopt the "M" sibling and to adopt the "T/S" sibling foster children, based primarily upon the allegations in the Administrative Compliant dated July 20, 2001, as explained in a denial letter dated January 18, 2002, was appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and by taped interviews, the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings during the final hearing, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found. At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, was the state agency responsible for receiving and approving applications for foster care licenses and for monitoring, regulating, and if necessary, suspending or revoking foster parent licenses pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, was the state agency responsible for receiving, evaluating, approving or denying applications for adoption of foster children pursuant to Section 63.062, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 65C-16, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners' Foster Care Licensure History Petitioners are married and are the parents of two biological children. Mrs. Sawyer was reared with foster children and has always desired to become a foster parent. Petitioners were initially licensed by the Agency as foster parents in October of 1986, and six months later on April 20, 1987, Petitioners voluntarily closed their foster home due to Mrs. Sawyer's complications with the pregnancy of their second child. During the above six-month licensed period, Petitioners successfully fostered ten children, the last child was removed by the Agency from the foster home in March 1987. In December 1986, two months after initial licensing, Petitioners were the subject of an abuse report alleging spanking a child. The Agency's investigation concluded that the abuse report was "unfounded,"4 and closure was recommended by the Agency's investigator. On September 7, 1987, the Agency again licensed Petitioners as foster parents. Eight months thereafter, on May 23, 1988, the Agency again closed Petitioners' foster home. On August 10, 1988, three months later, the Agency, for the third time, licensed Petitioners as foster parents. Mrs. Sawyer acknowledged using corporal discipline on a foster child during the 1988 licensure period. As a result of the corporal punishment incident in 1988, the Agency required Petitioners to attended its Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) classes, which Petitioners attended and completed. The 1988 licensure of Petitioners as foster parents was specifically granted for the "T/S" sibling group who, with voluntary permission of their biological parents, had been living with Petitioners for approximately two months before their official placement with Petitioners by the Agency. Since 1988, the Agency has annually renewed Petitioners' foster care license.5 Responding to the requests of the Agency, Petitioners on occasions fostered as many as 16 to 20 foster children. Petitioners' foster home was frequently used by the Agency for unannounced "overnight" foster care, many of which extended into protracted foster care periods. During periods when the Agency's need for foster home beds was pressing, the Agency's rule-of-five was waived by the Agency's District Administrator so that Petitioners could and did house more children.6 The record reflects no evidence of complaints of abuse or any other complaints during the periods the Agency needed and made use of Petitioners' home to foster children. The evidence of record, viewed chronologically, reflects a protracted period of intense investigation of allegations which, if true, were apparently ongoing over a period of months prior to the filing of Abuse Report 2000-198255, the basis of the Agency's intended revocation of Petitioners' foster care license. Petitioners' latest license was issued on August 24, 2000, and was effective until August 24, 2001. This August 24, 2000, foster home license is the subject of the Agency's revocation notice, which states: The revocation is based on the following reasons: Between December 21, 2000 and March 1, 2001, the Department of Children and Families investigated eleven reports of abuse and neglect involving your home. In Florida Abuse Hotline Report 2000-198255[7] it was concluded that there were verified findings of excessive corporal punishment and confinement, bizarre punishment and excessive restraint committed by Cynthia Sawyer towards several foster children in her care. The report also noted several instances of inappropriate physical punishment, which is a violation of the foster parent disciplinary policy. These incidents are considered "an intentional or negligent act materially affecting the health and safety of children in the home or agency" and a violation of the licensing rules promulgated pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes. Section 409.175(8)(b) 1 and 2 Florida Statutes; 65C- 13.010(1)(b)5 Florida Administrative Code. (emphasis added) The Agency's allegations of neglect and abuse revolved around four specific types of disciplinary activities that are alleged to have occurred on or after August 24, 2000, the date the current foster care license was issued, and to have terminated on or before March 1, 2001, the date the Agency removed children from Petitioners' home. The four specific types of disciplinary activities are: (1) excessive corporal punishment and confinement, (2) inappropriate physical punishment, (3) bizarre punishment, and (4) excessive restraints.8 In support of those allegations, the Agency presented the testimonies of several foster children, video- taped interviews of three foster children made in March 2001, approximately one month after removal from Petitioners' home; the testimony of another foster care parent; the testimony of a Guardian Ad Litem; and the testimonies of several of the Agency's employees. Mike Katz, agency employee, prepared the Administrative Complaint but had no personal knowledge of the abuse allegations contained in Abuse Report 2000-198255, which formed the basis for the Administrative Complaint he prepared. Mr. Katz acknowledged that his understanding of the Agency's practice and policy was that "one incident of corporal punishment" did not equate to foster care license revocation. According to Mr. Katz, evaluating corporal punishment allegations requires all factors be taken into consideration and the totality of circumstances be reviewed; the intended result is a fact specific determination for each case of alleged corporal punishment. Kate Kimball's, the Sawyers' family service counselor, testimony was primarily concerned with agency reports dating from December 3, 1996, through the year 2000. Her testimony regarding and relating to matters that occurred prior to December 21, 2000, are not relevant nor material to issues of foster home license denial as stated in the Administrative Complaint that is challenged by Petitioners. However, Ms. Kimball's testimony regarding the Sawyers' life-style during the period she was their case worker is relevant and material to the issue of denial of the Sawyers' application to adopt the "M" children. The record reflects that in 1999, while fostering the "T/S" and the "M" siblings under the Agency's District Administrator's waiver of the rule-of-five policy, Petitioners were given an "Above Satisfactory" evaluation by the assigned foster care case worker, Kim Bryant. Ms. Bryant reported that the Sawyers are "very involved, supportative of the children's extra curricular activities and educational needs; show children much needed attention and affection; children and foster parents seem very fond of each other and there is much improvement with the children educationally and emotionally and they appear to have adjusted well in the home." Ms. Bryant's report is undisputed and credible. One year later, Hotline Report 2000-078274 was filed containing an allegation of medical negligence against Mrs. Sawyer as a result of her attempt to refill a prescribed medication for a foster child in her care after the child had taken all the medication. In this particular instance, the Agency had failed to provided Mrs. Sawyer with the child's medical record when the child was placed in her foster home. This medical negligence allegation was resolved when the case worker assigned to the Sawyers secured from the child's file the physician's prescription refill order. The Hotline Report was closed by the Agency with "No indicators of alleged maltreatment-or abuse/neglect." On June 26, 2000, and after the Sawyers added separate bedrooms and bathrooms for the girls and separate bedrooms and bathrooms for the boys to their home to accommodate 16 children, their case worker, Ms. Kimball, wrote, "It appeared that the Department has continued to utilize their home, as we have had no alternatives." The home study case worker's comments are revealing and reliable. It is reasonable to infer that the Agency was satisfied with the Sawyers' methods of disciplining foster children in their home, when they met the Agency's need for foster beds. However, when the Agency's need for foster beds were apparently met by other resources their prior position of satisfaction with the Sawyers, for reasons not entirely clear from the record, took a sudden 180-degree turn-about from satisfaction to dissatisfaction, within a six-month time period from June 26, 2000, to December 21, 2000. The case worker assigned to the "M" children, Anjanet Stilwell, reported that the Sawyers' foster home was "a wonderful foster home--they were very cooperative and caring." Case worker, Karen Braden, who was in the home twice weekly regarding kids assigned to her, wrote, "Cindy is great! I have no concerns regarding placement of my kids. I truly don't know how she does it!" I find Ms. Stilwell's and Ms. Braden's opinions acceptable and reflective of the Agency's approved satisfactory view of the Sawyers as foster parents for many children who were housed solely by the Agency's waiver of its rule-of-five policy and for its benefit. One foster care referral report regarding the "T/S" children written by case worker Heather Blair was considered at the Adoption Applicant Review Committee (AARC) staffing. In her report, Ms. Blair summarized Psychologist Lisa Gaise's conclusions that: "3 T/S children reported being paddle [sic] and 'the context in which these clear disclosures were made was so natural as to dispel any questions of the veracity of their statements.'" Apparently the AARC staffing considered Ms. Gaise's comments credible in their decision to deny the adoption application. The fact of the matter is that Ms. Blair's statement regarding the "truth" and acceptance of Lisa Gaise's opinion that the child's statement were true, is not accepted for the truth asserted and, therefore, is not credible.9 Bobby Cooper, another agency witness, commenced his investigation of Abuse Report 2000-198255, on December 21, 2000, at 4:00 p.m. Mr. Cooper's investigation consisted entirely of reviewing reports of other agency investigators. Mr. Cooper had no personal knowledge nor had he personally sought independent collaboration of statements contained in the reports he reviewed. His testimony is not credible. Kate Kimball, the case worker assigned to Petitioners' foster home, often made announced and unannounced visits to Petitioners' foster home, as required by Agency policy. Ms. Kimball was in close and constant contact with the foster children and the foster parents during her visits to the home. Ms. Kimball was required to (1) observe the foster children, speak in confidence with each child individually, immediately report any "signs" of abuse or "suspected abuse," and to (4) cause "removal" of a child or children from abusive foster home situations. Ms. Kimball never requested nor caused removal of a child from Petitioners' foster home during the period of December 21, 2000, through March 2001, the period the abuse reports were allegedly "verified." Detective Christi Esquinaldo was assigned to investigate this case by Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department. Her investigation consisted of interviewing foster child L.S., reviewing the abuse reports, and creating a matrix from those reports. The matrix consisted of Detective Esquinaldo's listing the names of children who were alleged to have been subjected to a specific abusive discipline crossed referenced by the names of the children who made the allegations. According to Detective Esquinaldo, L.S. told her that the Sawyers "made children stand in a corner for three to four hours" as punishment, and Lil David was restrained to a chair for "three to four hours." However, during her testimony at the hearing, L.S. denied having made those statements to Detective Esquinaldo. L.S.'s testimony at the final hearing is credible. In closing her investigation, Detective Esquinaldo recommended to the State Attorney's Office the direct filing of a felony charge of Aggravated Child Abuse against the Sawyers. The Hillsborough County State Attorney's Office, citing "numerous inconsistencies in the statements of the children," declined to file any charges against the Sawyers and closed their files on the matter. After reviewing the children's testimonies of record, I am compelled to agree with the Hillsborough County State Attorney Office that the "inconsistencies of the statements of the children" render their collective testimonies unreliable and insufficient to provide a preponderance of evidence necessary to establish a fact. None of the adult witnesses, presented by the Agency, possessed knowledge acquired through collaboration of the children's stories from independent sources and/or their investigations regarding the abuse allegations alleged in the Complaint. The Agency's employees' initial and total acceptance of the children's recollection of time, i.e. as "all day" and "all night," should have, but did not raise reasonable concern regarding each child's ability to differentiate between fantasy and reality and the child's accuracy of recall as well. The children's story-line, that Petitioners forced each of them to walk, to stand in time-outs, to dig holes, to sleep in their beds or do any other activities "all day" or "all night," was testified to as a form of punishment and not discipline for acting up. Accepting as true, accurate, and realistic, their identical versions of four specific experiences from the several children without more does not equate to credible nor collaborative evidence. The testimonies presented by several foster children at this hearing were, at best, confusing, conflicting and contradictory. When asked specific questions about the several forms and methods of discipline, the unanimity of their responses were: stand in the corner "all night," dig holes "all day," walk in circles "all day," and sleep in the bed "all day." The fact that the children's testimonies clustered in a certain position (sibling groups wanting to stay together as a group and those sibling groups wanting to be moved to another foster home as a group gave almost identical answers to questions relating to specific disciplines) does not mean nor imply that their testimonies were necessarily accurate, realistic, or true. In fact, the record reflects that several of the testimonies initially given by the children to the Agency were in conflict with their testimonies subsequently given to the Agency representatives and testimony given at the final hearing. Considering the children's testimonies in the context of the children's ages; the children's physical sizes; the physical improbability of a small child actually squatting, with knees bent, against a wall with both arms held out in front of the body or held out to the sides of their bodies all day; and their description of time as "all day" and "all-night," rendered their collective testimonies unrealistic, unreliable and, therefore, not credible. Steve Barber, Petitioners' pastor and the one who has interfaced with the foster children, based upon his experience as a former high school football coach, gave undisputed testimony that the physical size and stature of the young children made it physically impossible for any of them to "stand, squat, dig or walk in circles, all day." Based upon the testimony of Mr. Barber and the unrealistic testimonies of the several children, Respondent has failed to prove that Petitioners committed "excesses" in administering policy discipline, by imposing time-outs, separation from other children, grounding, loss of privileges, and by assigning other chores. I find that the cumulative testimonies of the foster children found in the Agency reports in evidence and of those children who testified at the final hearing unreliable, inconsistent, devoid of details, physically impossible in most instances and, therefore, insufficient to establish by a preponderance that the Sawyers subjected them to: (1) excessive corporal punishment and confinement, (2) inappropriate physical punishment, (3) bizarre punishment, and (4) use of excessive restraints as punishment as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed in this cause. Of the three video-taped interviews reviewed by the undersigned, the interview of D.I. revealed a reliable and detailed account of the daily life and activities of the foster children in the Sawyers' home from an articulate child with personal knowledge and accurate recall of events. First, D.I. was in the Sawyers' foster care for a period of seven months. Second, D.I. appeared to be bright, intelligent, articulate, straight-forward, and he was definite and clear in his responses to questions asked by the Agency's spokesperson. Third, D.I.'s memory of details was complete, uncompromising, realistic, and reasonable. Fourth, D.I. acknowledged that his possibility of being reunited with his biological mother was nonexistent, and he would probably be in foster care until his majority, if not adopted, preferably by the Sawyers. Fifth, he is familiar with and aware of foster children, individually and as sibling groups "working the foster care system for their desired ends by telling stories." During his seven months' stay in foster care with the Sawyers, D.I. testified that he never saw nor was he made aware by other children of any child punished by the Sawyers in the form of being forced to stand in time-out "all day," forced to dig holes "all night," or forced to walk in circles "all day." D.I. knew that Lil L.S. pooped in her pants and smeared the poop over the walls of the foster care residence. He knows this because he was one of the older children who volunteered to clean the poop off the walls; he remembers these incidents because the walls had "white spots" where the cleaning solutions were used. He also remembered because Mrs. Sawyer would put white powder on the bedroom floor leading from Lil L.S.'s room to other parts of the house. In the morning when Lil L.S. was awaken and asked about poop on the walls, she would blame other children, but her foot prints would prove contradiction of the story of not having gotten out of bed during the night. According to D.I., Lil L.S. was never "hosed down outside" the house after pooping on herself. Each time Lil L.S. pooped on herself, Mrs. Cindy would require her to go into her bathroom10 and bathe herself. When asked about household chores and work around the house as a form of punishment, D.I. answered that older children would be offered the opportunity to "work outside" with Mr. Sawyer on "things around the house," only if that child wanted to work outside. If not, the child was given the option to stay outside and play or to go inside and watch T.V., play games, or do other things. D.I. was emphatic that the opportunity to do other things was made available to each child only after that child completed his or her homework. Homework was always first, and some children got in trouble because of not doing or completing their homework. According to D.I., the younger children who played outside would customarily play in the round-about driveway, the yard, and on the Jungle Jim play set. The older children would customarily do other things. D.I.'s examples of "doing things around the house" were: helping Mr. Sawyer work on his truck; putting together and/or repairing the Jungle Jim swing-slide play set; helping to dig a trench line to lay pipe for the new water heater connection; tending to and caring for the animals; planting trees and stuff; and painting and building additional bathrooms and bedrooms onto the house. According to D.I., all outside activities were made available to any children who wished to participate in them instead of playing among themselves. When asked, D.I. was empathic in his answer that no child, "as a form of punishment," was forced to assist Mr. Sawyer in "doing things around the house," if they wanted to help they could, if not, then other activities were available and that no child was handcuffed nor had he seen any (metal) handcuffs at the Sawyers' house, save his pair of red plastic toy handcuffs that came with a toy set the Sawyers gave him. D.I., from observation, knew Lil David to be self-mutilating.11 D.I. recalls that "Lil David would sometimes just pick himself to make himself bleed." During his seven-month stay and on more than one occasion, in passing, D.I. would see Lil David in bed at night with velcro restraints on his wrists and the bed to stop him from picking himself and making himself bleed. "Mrs. Cindy did this to keep Lil David from picking himself when he was asleep."12 Regarding meal times and meals at Mrs. Cindy's, D.I. stated that all the children ate the same meal at the same time "cause there was so many of us and Mrs. Cindy had no time for separate meals and we [older children] helped to feed the young children, we did help." When asked about peanut butter sandwiches as a form of punishment, D.I. responded, "Those children who had been bad or were in time-out at mealtime were separated from the other children and given peanut butter sandwiches to eat while in their time-outs. But Mrs. Cindy would say to them 'say you are sorry and you can join us.'" He never saw nor knew of a child in time-out (against the wall) for "hours." The longest time-out he could recall was about "20 minutes," and that was because the child was "acting up" in the time-out and had additional time added to the time-out. D.I. was familiar with the "T/S" and (other) siblings. He knew from personal experience in foster care that older siblings would instruct their younger siblings on all matters: what to say, when to say it, how to act, and how to act up. D.I. was personally familiar with "foster homes" and the means and methods of "getting out of one" and "staying together" as a sibling group and getting into another as a group. When asked about "corporal punishment" i.e. spanking with a wooden paddle and/or slapping with hands, D.I. testified that during his seven-month stay, he knew of no child to have gotten spanked with a wood paddle. "I never saw a wood paddle." Regarding "getting slapped by Mrs. Cindy" as punishment, D.I. answered that Ms. Cindy would "tap" you on the back of the head, butt, or shoulder "to get your attention, like if she was talking to you and you were watching T.V. and not answering her but she never slapped any of us for punishment." This method of getting one child's attention by touching is reasonable when considered in the context of the Agency's waiver of its rule-of- five policy so as to place as many as 16 to 20 children in the Sawyers' foster care home. 13 The video testimony of D.I. is accurate, detailed, reasonable, realistic, based upon his personal knowledge, undisputed and, therefore, credible. Based in part upon the video testimony of D.I., Respondent has failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the Sawyers subjected a foster child in their care to: (1) excessive corporal punishment and confinement, (2) inappropriate physical punishment, (3) bizarre punishment, and (4) use of excessive restraints for the time period alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The Sawyers' admitted use of velcro restraints on Lil David was neither excessive, punitive nor disciplinary, but rather was for Lil David's protection from harming himself. The Sawyers' used velcro restraints on Lil David during the day only when he was in time-out and sitting in a small rocking chair and during the night when he was put to bed. The evidence of record by testimonies of virtually every witnesses who knew Lil David knew him to be a self-mutilator. The use of restraints is an acceptable, preventative method for protection in this situation. The record contains no evidence that the Agency provided the Sawyers with an evaluation report of Lil David upon his placement nor during his stay within their foster home. Lil David's medical report would have advised the Sawyers of Lil David's self-mutilation problem. It is a reasonable assumption that had the Agency provided Lil David's medical records, the Sawyers would have been alerted to Lil David's self-mutilation problem and would have had the benefit of the Agency's instructions regarding care and protection for Lil David's problem of self-mutilation. The Sawyers' admitted use of velcro restraints reflects a caring and sincere effort of the foster parents to protect the child from hurting himself. In the absence of information from the Agency regarding Lil David's condition, the Sawyers' use of an acceptable, safe and preventative method of care for this particular problem reflects their efforts to comply with the "spirit" of the rules regarding foster parent responsibilities. The record contains no evidence that the Sawyers' use of velcro restraints to prevent Lil David's self- mutilation was "willfully harmful" or "neglect" or an "abusive" act of intentional punishment. Bobby Cooper's, child protection investigator, reported findings and conclusions were based entirely upon statements provided by individuals he interviewed. The record contains no evidence of collaboration to substantiate testimonies of the children. Therefore, Mr. Cooper's testimony is hearsay without support and therefore, not credible. Finally, consideration is given to what is not in evidence. First, the record in this case contains no evidence of a child alleged to have suffered ongoing neglect and abuse in the form of excessive, bizarre,14 and inappropriate punishment, or to have borne body marks or bruises resulting from the alleged treatment by the Sawyers. Second, the record in this case contains no evidence of a Sawyer-housed foster child to have suffered "physical, mental or emotional injury" as the result of the alleged negligent and abusive treatment. Third, the record contains no evidence from which it could be inferred that a foster child removed from Petitioners' home suffered a "discernible and substantial impairment in the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior" as a direct result of the alleged abusive discipline.15 The evidence of record supports a reasonable conclusion that Mrs. Sawyer was proactive in seeking the assistance of local politicians and state officials to accomplish her apparent goal of responsive and exceptional services from the Department for her foster children. It is undisputed that the Sawyers, with the advice and consent of the Department, had more foster children than was reasonable to expect only two adults to provide a minimal of custodial care. Permitting the Sawyers to house as many as 16 to 20 foster children, plus their two biological children, at any point in time, was permissive and self serving by the Department and was overreaching acceptance by the Sawyers. It is a reasonable inference that in this case both the Department and the Sawyers engaged in a mutual course of conduct to satisfy their respective needs and desires. When the mutually beneficial relationship came to a close, a reversal of opinions and recommendations from the Department regarding the Sawyers occurred. The Sawyers, who had been described by the Department as "unbelievable foster parents," became merely unbelievable when confronted with and evaluated by conflicting stories of 14 foster children removed from their home. Denial of Adoption Application for the M sibling group Turning to evidence in the record regarding the denial of Petitioners' application to adopt the four "M" siblings, the fact that some animosity existed between Ms. Gains16 and Mrs. Sawyer, became readily apparent during Ms. Gains' testimony. The existence of animosity was further confirmed by Ms. Gains' detailed chronology of alleged abusive acts and omissions by Mrs. Sawyer over a period in excess of one year. When answering questions asked by the Agency's representative regarding Ms. Gains' statements and opinion of Mrs. Sawyer, D.I. answered: "She [sic] said handcuffs and other things about Mrs. Cindy so as to get kids moved out of Mrs. Cindy's house to her house." Based upon D.I. testimony above, Ms. Gains' testimony given at the hearing and her written report in evidence is biased and unreliable. In the evaluation and review of Petitioners' adoption request, Respondent appropriately engaged in a holistic evaluation of all abuse reports filed, investigative reports, personal opinions, and comments from Department employees, community members and other foster parents, dating from as early as 1986 to the date of the adoption denial. Respondent, in reevaluation of Petitioners' adoption request for the "M" children, should hereinafter be guided by the Findings of Fact herein that allegations of excessive discipline as contained in the Administrative Compliant herein were not proven by the testimonies of the Agency's witnesses and documentary evidence. Therefore, allegations found in Abuse Report 2000-198255 reported or alleged to have occurred within the time period of December 21, 2000, through March 1, 2001, shall not be considered by the Agency in its reevaluation of the Sawyers' application to adopt the "M" siblings; being mindful that the "M" siblings' desire to be adopted by the Sawyers is in the "M" child(ren)'s best interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order granting renewal of Petitioners' Foster Care License. It is further RECOMMENDED, that in accord with the expressed desires of the "M" siblings to be adopted by Petitioners, that the Department enter a final order granting Petitioners' application to adopt the "M" siblings. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 2002.
The Issue Are Respondents entitled to have Petitioner renew their license to provide foster home care?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner licenses and re-licenses persons who provide residential care to children. This process is in accordance with Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 65C-13, Florida Administrative Code. Respondents have held a foster home license pursuant to those laws. On March 16, 1998, Petitioner advised Respondents that Respondents would not be re-licensed for the upcoming year for reason that: "A recent investigation of neglect resulted in a confirmed report against you." As was revealed at the hearing, the more specific basis for the denial was in accordance with Section 409.175(8)(b)1, Florida Statutes, in which Petitioner accused Respondents, in the person of Sherrie Rund, of a negligent act which materially affected the health and safety of a child in her home. That child is J.V., date of birth July 15, 1995. Moreover, the basis for non-renewal of the foster home license was premised upon the further allegation that Sherrie Rund was found by Petitioner's counselor to be unable to secure the "Abuse Registry" prior to issuance of a new foster home license, as provided in Rule 65C- 13.006(3), Florida Administrative Code. On January 6, 1998, Respondents were caring for three foster children in their home in Inverness, Florida. In addition to J.V. there was M.V., who was 3½ years old, and J.S., who was 12 months old. J.V. and M.V. are brothers. The day before Petitioner had asked Respondent, Sherrie Rund, to take two additional children into her home to receive foster care. On the day before, Mrs. Rund had also suffered a miscarriage. Mrs. Rund left her home on the morning of January 6, 1998, to run some errands and to eventually drive to Brooksville, Florida, to pick up the newest foster children. At some point in time in her travels on January 6, 1998, with J.V. and J.S. in her car, Mrs. Rund noticed a loud knocking sound in her car and decided to have an automobile mechanic with whom she was familiar check the status of her car, in anticipation of her trip to Brooksville. Upon arriving at the mechanic's shop, the mechanic told Mrs. Rund that she was not going anywhere in the car, and that something was not right with the car. The mechanic got into the car with Mrs. Rund and they made a test drive. When they returned to the mechanic's shop, the mechanic pointed out a block that was part of the suspension system, referred to as a lift kit in the area of the rear axle. That block had shifted over and the mechanic told Mrs. Rund that all that would be necessary to correct the problem was to adjust two bolts. When Mrs. Rund, the mechanic, and her children had returned to the shop, the children were asleep. As a consequence, Mrs. Rund asked the mechanic if it would be acceptable to leave the children in the car while the mechanic made repairs to the automobile. Apparently, the mechanic was not opposed to that arrangement. The mechanic told Mrs. Rund that it would only take a couple of minutes to tighten the parts that were causing the problem. With that assurance, Mrs. Rund allowed the mechanic to lift the car off the concrete floor in the shop by the use of a hydraulic lift. Once the car had been lifted, the distance from the car to the shop floor was approximately 3 to 4 feet. The mechanic began his work and noticed that threads in the bolts that were being tightened had become stripped. At that time Mrs. Rund was sitting on a stool by the car door. The mechanic summoned her and asked to show her what was wrong. As Mrs. Rund walked around the car she heard a slight noise. It was J.V. J.V. had been strapped in his car seat attached to the back seat of the automobile, but he had awakened from his nap in the back seat of the car, gone between the seats in the front of the car, opened the door and stepped out onto the platform that supported the car on the lift. Before anyone could intervene, J.V. fell from the platform to the floor of the shop fracturing his skull. The skull fracture was of the temporal bone. In addition, J.V. also suffered an abrasion of one ear and split his lip in the fall. The automobile in question was a Jeep vehicle with tinted windows, that created a condition in which Mrs. Rund could not see into the automobile while it was on the lift. After the accident Mrs. Rund immediately picked the child up and noted that he appeared "a little incoherent." She could not drive her car. But she knew that her father was about two miles away. Mrs. Rund's father immediately responded to her request for assistance. They drove J.V. to the emergency room at the Citrus Memorial Hospital in Inverness, Florida, for treatment. Later that day, J.V. was taken to Shands Hospital at the University of Florida, in Gainesville, Florida, for additional treatment. Mrs. Rund and her father managed to transport J.V. to the emergency room at Citrus Memorial Hospital within 10 minutes of the accident. Upon arrival Mrs. Rund attempted to advise Petitioner about the accident by contacting the case worker responsible for her foster children. Four of the people who were on the list of possible contacts were unavailable. Mrs. Rund also wanted to inquire about the status of the two new children who were going to be left in her care that day. Eventually, Mrs. Rund explained to a case worker the circumstances of J.V.'s accident. In answer to her question, the case worker told Mrs. Rund that the two additional children were going to be brought to Mrs. Rund's home in any event. The children were brought to Mrs. Rund's home on January 6, 1998, and were kept for the moment by Mrs. Rund's mother. The two additional children were siblings 2½ and 5 years old. Mrs. Rund spent about 6 to 7 hours at the Citrus Memorial Hospital attending J.V. and making certain of his care. Beyond that time, Mrs. Rund felt the need to return home and take a shower because of her miscarriage the day before and because she had blood on her shirt resulting from J.V.'s injuries. Mrs. Rund also had concern about the welfare of the two additional children that were being brought to her home. There had been some discussion between Mrs. Rund and a nurse at the Citrus Memorial Hospital, who insisted that Mrs. Rund should accompany J.V. to Shands Hospital. Mrs. Rund replied that she needed to check the situation at home and then she would go to Shands. Eventually, the nurse contacted someone from the Child Protective Service. Mrs. Rund spoke to that person and having decided that it would be acceptable for J.V. to ride to Shands unaccompanied by her, Mrs. Rund allowed J.V. to be transported to Shands Hospital without her. A short time later, Mrs. Rund's parents picked her up at the Citrus Memorial Hospital and took her home. By that time Christopher Rund, Mrs. Rund's husband, had arrived at their home and was available to take care of the other four children. After spending a little time with the children in her home and taking a shower, Mrs. Rund called Shands Hospital to check on the well-being of J.V. Mrs. Rund went to Shands Hospital the following day to see J.V. The two newest children were removed from Respondents' home. J.S., one of the original three children cared for by Respondents, was also removed from their home. The brothers J.V. and M.V. were returned to the Respondents on January 9, 1998, where they have remained. M.V. and J.V. were eventually adopted by the Respondents on May 22, 1998. As Mrs. Rund acknowledges, she momentarily neglected the needs of J.V. when he fell from her automobile to the floor of the mechanic's shop. Her response to his needs beyond that point was not neglectful given the circumstances that have been described. She immediately arranged for his care and treatment. The failure to accompany J.V. to Shands Hospital was not neglectful. Petitioner instituted an investigation identified as Abuse Report 98-001853, involving the incident on January 6, 1998, in which J.V. was injured when falling from the automobile to the floor of the repair shop. That report is referred to as institutional abuse-neglect, involving the conduct of Sherrie Rund and her foster home. Through the investigation, the report was verified for inadequate supervision or care pertaining to the accident, as well as the verification of other physical injuries associated with neglect. Richard V. Perrone, Adoptions and Related Services Counselor for Petitioner, worked with the Respondents from March of 1997 through May of 1998 as an adoption counselor. In correspondence for the record, he indicates that he has seen the family, and the children in their care on a monthly basis and that the home was always appropriate and the children well cared for. In particular, Mrs. Rund was observed by Mr. Perrone to be active with children's care and appropriate services. Mr. Perrone notes the adoption of the children that he visited.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That the foster home license held by Christopher Rund and Sherrie Rund be renewed. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Sowell, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 220 Sumterville, Florida 33585 Christopher Rund Sherrie Rund 13059 East Shawnee Trail Inverness, Florida 34450 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should revoke Respondent's license to operate a foster home for dependent children.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for issuing licenses to operate foster homes for dependent children. Petitioner also prosecutes license discipline proceedings. Respondent is the maternal aunt of three female children, Deanna, Angelique, and Antoinette. Respondent is a retired teacher. She worked for the state of New York before she moved to Florida. She also receives Social Security payments. Prior to 1990, Respondent's three nieces lived with their biological parents in the state of New York. New York adjudicated the children dependent and assigned the children to the foster care of Respondent. The three nieces were approximately 5, 7, an 8 years old. New York paid Respondent $2,100 a month to provide foster care for the three children. New York pays a monthly board rate of $700 per child. Petitioner agreed to supervise Respondent's foster care on behalf of New York. On March 12, 1992, Petitioner and Respondent entered into an Agreement To Provide Foster Care For Dependent Children ("Foster Care Agreement"). Each Foster Care Agreement provided, in relevant part: We will not give the child into the care or physical custody of any other person(s) . . . without the consent of a representative of the Department. * * * We will notify the Department immediately of any change in our address, . . . living arrangements, family composition, or law enforcement involvement. * * * We will comply with all requirements for a licensed foster care home as prescribed by the Department. * * * This child is placed in our home on a temporary basis and is at all times under the supervision and control of the Department. We are fully and directly responsible to the Department for the care of the child. We will take no action to acquire legal custody or guardianship of the child. * * * The Department may remove the child from our home at any time but will, whenever possible, give us at least two weeks notice. Until May 2, 1995, Respondent provided foster care for her three nieces without incident. Respondent was a loving and caring foster parent while the children were young. The children regarded Respondent as their mother. On April 25, 1995, Petitioner increased Respondent's licensed capacity for the period May 2, 1995, through May 1, 1996, to five children. Petitioner assigned two Florida foster children to Respondent. Petitioner paid Respondent $592 a month to provide foster care for the two Florida children. Florida pays a monthly board rate of $296 for each child. Problems developed in the foster home due to overcrowding. Tiffany, one of the two Florida foster children, had an infant child. Tiffany did not maintain good hygiene for herself or her child. Tiffany neglected her child. The additional parenting responsibilities fell on Respondent. Petitioner reduced the overcrowding by removing the two Florida foster children. Petitioner removed Tiffany and her child on December 8, 1995, and removed the second foster care child as soon as the school year ended. Other problems persisted in the foster home separate and apart from the problem of overcrowding. The three nieces were growing up and were beginning to manifest problems from unresolved childhood issues. Each niece had unresolved issues that presented very difficult parenting problems. As the nieces grew older, Respondent did not have the parenting skills necessary to parent her three nieces. Deanna's unresolved issues are illustrative. Deanna weighed under four pounds at birth. The mother was a cocaine addict throughout the gestational period. There was some fetal distress related to withdrawal. Deanna was always irritable. She had a very low frustration tolerance. She had frequent tantrums in which she would throw, spit, and hit her siblings and Respondent. Deanna had been treated with various medications. They included Ritalin, Depakote, Dexedrine, and Clonidine. The other two nieces presented Respondent with similar parenting problems. They hit Respondent when they did not get their way, frequently lied, and stole items from home and school. The problems presented by the three nieces would have been difficult enough to deal with for the best of parents. However, Respondent practiced inappropriate parenting techniques. Respondent used excessive corporal punishment to discipline all of her foster children. She practiced humiliation tactics on her oldest niece. Respondent gave preferential treatment to the youngest niece. Respondent arbitrarily allowed the youngest niece to have privileges denied to the other nieces. Respondent routinely gave the youngest niece excessive amounts of money for nominal tasks. For example, Respondent paid the youngest niece $100 for two hours work around the house. Respondent manages her own money poorly. Her income is insufficient to cover her expenditures. She is evasive and vague about her finances. Respondent became depressed and withdrawn. She remained non-verbal with lengthy periods of silence. She stared at the wall. When counselors and case workers confronted Respondent regarding her depression, she became very angry and agitated. She retreated into denial and relied on adolescent responses to distance herself from those trying to help her and her nieces. Petitioner conducted a critical case review on June 28, 1996. Petitioner provided numerous intervention services for Respondent and her nieces from July through November, 1996. Petitioner provided counseling through The Harbor Mental Health Services ("Harbor"). Respondent and her three nieces attended group therapy at Harbor. In addition, each niece participated in individual counseling at Harbor. Petitioner provided an Intensive Crisis Counseling Program ("ICCP") for Respondent. ICCP is an intense in-home counseling program over six weeks. It is designed to prevent removal of foster children from the home. Petitioner extended the ICCP in Respondent's home for an additional six weeks. Petitioner provided psychological evaluations to determine if Respondent was suicidal or suffered from alcoholism. The evaluations found no evidence of either problem. Therapists attempted to assist the individual family members toward effective communication, establishing boundaries, reasonable consequences, and consistent discipline. The intervention services provided by Petitioner were unsuccessful. Respondent and her nieces persisted in their inappropriate behavior. Petitioner issued a provisional license to Respondent for the period August 2, 1996, through November 2, 1996. The license required weekly visits by a foster care counselor. Petitioner conducted a routine home visit on September 26, 1996. The situation had not improved. On October 4, 1996, Petitioner conducted another critical case review. At the critical case review, the foster care counselor learned from members of the ICCP team that Respondent planned to leave Florida to visit New York. On October 10, 1996, the foster care counselor telephoned Respondent. Respondent confirmed that she was leaving for New York on October 11, 1996. When the foster care counselor asked Respondent to provide the location of her three nieces and the identity of the respite caregiver during Respondent's absence, Respondent stated only that she was leaving the nieces with her mother. Respondent told the foster care counselor that if Petitioner wanted to see her nieces while Respondent was in New York, the foster care counselor should telephone Respondent's home and leave a message on Respondent's voice mail. Respondent's mother would check the messages each day and return the case worker's telephone call. Respondent's manner and tone were abrupt, cryptic, abrasive, and angry. The foster care counselor was unable to obtain any further information. Respondent terminated the telephone call. Respondent violated several requirements of each Foster Care Agreement. Respondent allowed the removal of each niece from her home by someone other than Petitioner's representatives. Respondent gave each foster child into the care or physical custody of another without the consent of Petitioner. Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with adequate notice of any change in the living arrangements or family composition of the foster children. Respondent's mother was not, and never has been, an authorized foster care parent or respite caregiver. Respondent did not consent to Respondent giving her nieces to the physical care and custody of Respondent's mother. Respondent did not give Petitioner the information needed for Petitioner to adequately supervise the foster children during Respondent's absence. Petitioner determined that it could no longer supervise Respondent's foster care on behalf of New York. Petitioner ascertained the location of the foster children. On October 17, 1996, Petitioner removed the nieces from the home of Respondent's mother. Petitioner returned the nieces to the appropriate authorities in New York. By letter dated, October 17, 1996, Petitioner notified Respondent of the action taken. The letter also notified Respondent that the foster care home was closed and that Respondent's license was being revoked.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating material provisions of the Foster Care Agreement for each of her three nieces, failing to effectively supervise and safeguard her foster home, and revoking Respondent's license to operate a foster care home for dependent children. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire District 13 Legal Office Department of Children and Families 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Patricia Genovese Qualified Representative 13140 Jessica Drive Spring Hill, Florida 34609 Yvonne B. Butler, Esquire 6341 Gainsboro Avenue Spring Hill, Florida 34609
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a family foster home should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Sometime around 2004, Petitioner held a license as a foster home in Florida. During the licensure period, Petitioner fostered X. B. and T. T. in her home where she resided with her three biological children. X. B. stayed in Petitioner's home for approximately three weeks to a month. Throughout X. B.'s stay, Petitioner failed to provide breakfast to X. B. prior to school. Petitioner's failure necessitated the case manager providing such breakfast to X. B. when she drove X. B. to school. Additionally, on several occasions the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in the home. In particular, upon X. B.'s return to Petitioner's home from visiting X. B.'s siblings, the case manager found him in a roach-infested environment, with no running water in the home since the service had been turned off by the service provider for non-payment of the bill. The toilet bowl was filled with feces and urine and had feces on the lid. It was unsanitary and unusable. X. B. asked the case manager to take him to the local gas station so that X. B. could use the bathroom. Soon after, X. B. was removed from Petitioner's care due to unsanitary conditions and/or unsafe conditions in Petitioner's home. T. T. was a one-year-old child who was also placed in Petitioner's foster home during her earlier licensure period. Again, the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in Petitioner's home. At first, the case manager only saw a couple of roaches in the home. However, the roach problem progressively grew to the point that during one of the case manager's visits the wall behind the baby's crib looked like it was moving because there were so many roaches on it. Soon after, the case manager removed T. T. to another foster home. When they arrived at the new home, a roach crawled out of T. T.'s diaper bag. Upon inspection of the bag, the case manager discovered many dead roaches in the bag. More importantly, half of a dead roach was discovered in the baby bottle of milk that T. T. was drinking while being moved to T. T.'s new foster home. Clearly, the condition of Petitioner's foster home was neither sanitary nor safe. Petitioner's care of both these children resulted in verified abuse reports in Florida's abuse registry for conditions hazardous to the health of children. Petitioner's initial foster home license either lapsed or was not renewed. Since 2004, Petitioner has not been financially stable. In fact, she often asked her neighbors for money to pay her utility bills or buy gas for her car. Additionally, Petitioner lost different homes to foreclosure in 2006 and 2007. Since 2009, she and her children have moved to a different home an average of once a year. To her credit, Petitioner attended college and obtained her doctorate in Theology and Philosophy. However, her history has not demonstrated either household stability or financial ability in her life. In 2011, Petitioner applied for licensure as a family foster home. She successfully completed the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) training program on September 20, 2011. In June 2012, Trauma Therapist for Children’s Homes Society, Katie Klutz, began the required home study of Petitioner. During the home study, Petitioner and her three biological children were living in a three bedroom home. Petitioner moved her bedroom furniture into the living room in order to make room for potential foster children. The bedroom space was separated from the living room by "curtains" that afforded no significant privacy for those living in the home. Clearly, Petitioner's home did not provide sufficient space to foster an additional child in the home. Petitioner has since moved to a larger home that was not the subject of the home study for this license. However, given Petitioner's past household instability, the very limited evidence regarding this new home does not support a finding that Petitioner's current home offers sufficient space to provide for the privacy and well-being of a foster child. More importantly, Petitioner has not worked since having an accident on the job in May 2010. A neighbor also provided a written reference in which she praised Petitioner’s spirit but stated that it is “a real struggle” for Petitioner to maintain her home and that “she will definitely need additional support in this area.” Notably, it was unclear how Petitioner was currently supporting her household. She has no employment. Petitioner claimed that she received money from a church or charitable organization that she founded. However, there was no evidence that such limited income, if any, was sufficient to support her family and/or provide financially stable conditions to Petitioner and her family. Moreover, Petitioner's bank records reflect that in June 2012, she made deposits of $167.53 and debited the account $266.07. Her ending balance in June was $18.81. At hearing, other than child support and food stamps, Petitioner offered no evidence of additional finances or income that is attributable to her. Given these facts, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate home safety, household stability or financial ability sufficient to entitle her to be licensed as a foster home. Therefore, Petitioner's application for such licensure should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure as a foster home should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Rowell, Esquire Department of Children and Families 2383 Phillips Road Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Shakinah Glory 4768 Woodville Highway Apartment 428 Tallahassee, Florida 32305 M. Burnette Coats, Esquire Department of Children and Families 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David Wilkins, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
