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SHAKINAH GLORY vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 12-003270 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 04, 2012 Number: 12-003270 Latest Update: Jul. 19, 2013

The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a family foster home should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Sometime around 2004, Petitioner held a license as a foster home in Florida. During the licensure period, Petitioner fostered X. B. and T. T. in her home where she resided with her three biological children. X. B. stayed in Petitioner's home for approximately three weeks to a month. Throughout X. B.'s stay, Petitioner failed to provide breakfast to X. B. prior to school. Petitioner's failure necessitated the case manager providing such breakfast to X. B. when she drove X. B. to school. Additionally, on several occasions the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in the home. In particular, upon X. B.'s return to Petitioner's home from visiting X. B.'s siblings, the case manager found him in a roach-infested environment, with no running water in the home since the service had been turned off by the service provider for non-payment of the bill. The toilet bowl was filled with feces and urine and had feces on the lid. It was unsanitary and unusable. X. B. asked the case manager to take him to the local gas station so that X. B. could use the bathroom. Soon after, X. B. was removed from Petitioner's care due to unsanitary conditions and/or unsafe conditions in Petitioner's home. T. T. was a one-year-old child who was also placed in Petitioner's foster home during her earlier licensure period. Again, the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in Petitioner's home. At first, the case manager only saw a couple of roaches in the home. However, the roach problem progressively grew to the point that during one of the case manager's visits the wall behind the baby's crib looked like it was moving because there were so many roaches on it. Soon after, the case manager removed T. T. to another foster home. When they arrived at the new home, a roach crawled out of T. T.'s diaper bag. Upon inspection of the bag, the case manager discovered many dead roaches in the bag. More importantly, half of a dead roach was discovered in the baby bottle of milk that T. T. was drinking while being moved to T. T.'s new foster home. Clearly, the condition of Petitioner's foster home was neither sanitary nor safe. Petitioner's care of both these children resulted in verified abuse reports in Florida's abuse registry for conditions hazardous to the health of children. Petitioner's initial foster home license either lapsed or was not renewed. Since 2004, Petitioner has not been financially stable. In fact, she often asked her neighbors for money to pay her utility bills or buy gas for her car. Additionally, Petitioner lost different homes to foreclosure in 2006 and 2007. Since 2009, she and her children have moved to a different home an average of once a year. To her credit, Petitioner attended college and obtained her doctorate in Theology and Philosophy. However, her history has not demonstrated either household stability or financial ability in her life. In 2011, Petitioner applied for licensure as a family foster home. She successfully completed the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) training program on September 20, 2011. In June 2012, Trauma Therapist for Children’s Homes Society, Katie Klutz, began the required home study of Petitioner. During the home study, Petitioner and her three biological children were living in a three bedroom home. Petitioner moved her bedroom furniture into the living room in order to make room for potential foster children. The bedroom space was separated from the living room by "curtains" that afforded no significant privacy for those living in the home. Clearly, Petitioner's home did not provide sufficient space to foster an additional child in the home. Petitioner has since moved to a larger home that was not the subject of the home study for this license. However, given Petitioner's past household instability, the very limited evidence regarding this new home does not support a finding that Petitioner's current home offers sufficient space to provide for the privacy and well-being of a foster child. More importantly, Petitioner has not worked since having an accident on the job in May 2010. A neighbor also provided a written reference in which she praised Petitioner’s spirit but stated that it is “a real struggle” for Petitioner to maintain her home and that “she will definitely need additional support in this area.” Notably, it was unclear how Petitioner was currently supporting her household. She has no employment. Petitioner claimed that she received money from a church or charitable organization that she founded. However, there was no evidence that such limited income, if any, was sufficient to support her family and/or provide financially stable conditions to Petitioner and her family. Moreover, Petitioner's bank records reflect that in June 2012, she made deposits of $167.53 and debited the account $266.07. Her ending balance in June was $18.81. At hearing, other than child support and food stamps, Petitioner offered no evidence of additional finances or income that is attributable to her. Given these facts, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate home safety, household stability or financial ability sufficient to entitle her to be licensed as a foster home. Therefore, Petitioner's application for such licensure should be denied.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure as a foster home should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Rowell, Esquire Department of Children and Families 2383 Phillips Road Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Shakinah Glory 4768 Woodville Highway Apartment 428 Tallahassee, Florida 32305 M. Burnette Coats, Esquire Department of Children and Families 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David Wilkins, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.175
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CHARLES GOLDEN AND CAROL GOLDEN vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 01-004052 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Oct. 22, 2001 Number: 01-004052 Latest Update: Jan. 09, 2002

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Petitioners committed violations of Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code sufficient to justify revocation of Petitioners’ license to operate a foster care facility.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners’ foster home is a private agency foster home licensed by Respondent to provide substitute care for children in foster care. On or about August 24, 2000, a report was made to the Florida Abuse Registry indicating that a child, A.C., who suffers from Downs Syndrome and who resided in Petitioners’ care at the time, had suffered a burn mark that was three to four inches long. The burn reportedly appeared to be from an iron. Pursuant to this report, Respondent’s Child Protective Investigator commenced an investigation of the matter on August 24, 2000. During the course of the August 24, 2000, investigation, Respondent’s investigator observed the burn on A.C.’s arm. Testimony of the investigator establishes the presence of such a burn on A.C.’s arm at the time. That testimony is corroborated by photographs in Respondent’s Composite Exhibit No. 3 and fairly and accurately depicts A.C.’s burned arm as it appeared on August 24, 2001. Petitioner Carol Golden, when asked about the situation, stated that she was unaware of the burn on A.C.’s right arm until the matter was brought to her attention by the investigation which commenced on August 24, 2000, following the discovery of the child's injury by school personnel. Interviews with other children in the home revealed that another child was ironing clothes on the evening of August 23, 2000, and left the iron unattended momentarily, during which time A.C. burned his arm on the iron. Respondent’s investigator referred A.C. to the Child Protection Team for an examination of his injury. Subsequently, A.C. was removed from Petitioners’ foster home after the findings of the Child Protection Team revealed that the child’s injury was indicative of inadequate supervision. Respondent’s investigator concluded her investigation and closed the case, Abuse Report 2000-133049, with verified findings for lack of supervision and failure to seek medical attention for A.C. Subsequently, Petitioners’ foster care license was revoked because of the verified findings of neglect and inadequate supervision found in Abuse Report 2000-133049. Medical examination of A.C.’s injury, as it appeared on August 24, 2000, reveals that the injury was on the child’s right arm; was five by eight centimeters in size; and was a charred burn in the shape of an iron with the circles for the steam holes clearly visible. The burn was in such a place, and of such a size, that any caretaker responsible for the bathing and clothing of A.C. should have seen the injury. Attempts by Respondent’s employees to conduct an assessment of A.C. were not successful. He was friendly and interacted well; however, he only pointed to his injury and could not communicate how it happened.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, and the testimony of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered confirming the revocation of Petitioner’s foster license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Golden Carol Golden 7939 Denham Road Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.175
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LORRAINE ARNOLD vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 01-001536 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Apr. 25, 2001 Number: 01-001536 Latest Update: Aug. 23, 2002

The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for re-licensure as a family foster home should be approved or denied.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lorraine Arnold, has operated a foster home since 1995 at her current place of residence. Petitioner applied for and was granted a family foster home license in January 1995. Petitioner was approved for placement of up to two children between the ages of 5 and 10 years. Foster home licenses are valid for one year and must be renewed annually. Petitioner's license was renewed annually thereafter. On December 15, 2000, Petitioner applied to renew her foster home license. Respondent denied Petitioner's application for renewal on March 9, 2001. During the relevant time-period in 2000, Petitioner was entrusted with responsibility for several children, including two teenage foster children, L. C. and J. B. In late August 2000, Respondent's case worker approached Petitioner with the request to accept into her home L. C., a 17-year-old female. Petitioner was told that L. C. was severely emotionally disturbed (SED), had violent behavior problems and was taking psychotropic medication. Because of L. C.'s history of behavioral problems, including incidents of violence, Respondent offered to contract with a private company to provide Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) services to supplement the care given to L. C. Contract CNAs were to be present with L. C. around the clock, in order to provide Petitioner and her family some semblance of protection in the event of a violent outburst by L. C. This case worker assured her that under the watchful eye of the CNAs, L. C. would do fine. Petitioner was provided with additional monetary inducements by Respondent in order to persuade Petitioner to take in L. C. Upon placement, L. C.'s "Blue Book" was not provided to Petitioner. The "Blue Book" contained critical medical and social information about L. C. In addition, L. C. was not under the care of any local healthcare professional at the time of placement. Although Petitioner is a licensed pharmacist in Florida, she has received no special training in dealing with SED children. No specialized training of any kind was provided by Respondent during the two months that L. C. lived in Petitioner's home. Respondent was aware that L. C.'s needs required that she be placed in a living situation where she could receive proper therapy for her special needs, but none was provided. Respondent's conduct in the placement of L. C. in Petitioner's home violated its own guidelines and demonstrated very poor judgment on its part. The presence of contract CNAs was not intended to, nor did it in fact, relieve Petitioner of her responsibility to supervise foster children in her care. However, Petitioner was not instructed by Respondent that the teenage children in her care were not permitted to be alone or leave with the CNA, if the CNA offered to take them out for a supervised activity. In August of 2000, Petitioner gave L. C. and J. B., both minor girls, permission to go with the CNA, then on duty, to the home of L. C.'s aunt. While at the home of L. C.'s aunt, J. B., then fourteen years old, slipped out of the house and smoked marijuana. When J. B.'s case worker learned of the incident, she had J. B. tested for drug usage; J. B. tested positive for marijuana. Petitioner had L. C. tested and her test results were negative. Carla Washington, case worker for both L. C. and J. B., had previously informed Petitioner that L. C. was not to have contact with family members that was not supervised by Respondent. Petitioner misunderstood the instructions, and believed that L. C. was only restricted from having contact with her mother. Petitioner was not negligent in this incident, and J. B.'s misconduct could not have reasonably been foreseen. Less than a month before the incident in which J. B. smoked marijuana at L. C.'s aunt's house, there were two other incidents involving J. B. and L. C., with results detrimental to the foster children. On one occasion, Petitioner gave permission for the CNA on duty to take L. C. and another foster child out to the movies. Because of a family emergency, Petitioner left Orlando and drove to Tallahassee, leaving her adult daughter in charge of the household. The CNA took the two foster children to her residence, changed into "hoochie" clothes, went to a bar during which L. C. visited with her mother and witnessed a shooting. After the incident, the case worker spoke to Petitioner and reminded her that L. C. was not to have unsupervised contact with her mother. Petitioner complied with these instructions. No evidence was presented concerning the disposition of the CNA that perpetrated this outrageous conduct. Petitioner was not negligent in giving permission for the girls to go to the movies, and the CNA's conduct could not have been foreseen. On September 14, 2000, Petitioner was placed in a position of duress in regard to L. C. She had not received L. C.'s Blue Book, which contained all of her medical records and her Medicaid number, and L. C. was out of all of her psychotropic medications. Petitioner tried several times to find a psychiatrist who would treat L. C. She spent 2 days looking through the telephone book and calling every psychiatrist until she found one who would accept Medicaid. She also went to the Nemours Children's Clinic and spent most of the day waiting at the Sanford Health Department, where Petitioner finally discovered that L. C. could only be seen by a doctor in the Oviedo area. When the doctor in Oviedo was contacted an appointment was made for the following day at 2:00 p.m. Petitioner contacted the caseworker for assistance in getting L. C. to the doctor's appointment because Petitioner was unable to remain out of work for a third day. The case worker informed Petitioner that she was unable to assist, and if Petitioner did not see that the child got to the doctor any repercussions would be Petitioner's responsibility. Petitioner was given no choice but to rely on a family member to assist in making sure that L. C. received the required medical attention. Petitioner asked a family member to take L. C. and J. B. to the doctor's appointment. He left them in the reception area for 20 minutes to run an errand while L. C. waited to see the doctor. Before he returned, L. C. and J. B. misbehaved at the doctor's office. The adult family member did not have reason to believe that these two teenagers could not be left alone at a doctor's office for 20 minutes. He expected that the teenagers would behave themselves for such a short period of time. During the course of her testimony in this matter, J. B. testified that she had sexual relations in the house while living with Petitioner. This testimony is neither credible nor relevant to this proceeding. Petitioner has not committed an intentional or negligent act which materially affected the health or safety of L. C. or J. B. while in her care. Several years in the past, Petitioner used corporal punishment on a much younger, uncontrollable foster child on more than one occasion. Upon receiving counseling from her case worker, Petitioner agreed to corrective action to address her improper use of corporal punishment of foster children entrusted to her care. Over time, Petitioner has displayed extreme care and concern for the children placed in her care. She has taken the issues of supervision seriously. Petitioner has demonstrated that as a foster mother she has given the children placed in her care an abundance of love. She has taught them how to care for and love themselves. She has been there to listen to their needs and their desires, and she cares about them. She has taught them that self- control, self-discipline and hard work will lead to success in life.

Recommendation Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary grant Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Lorraine Arnold 3997 Biscayne Drive Winter Springs, Florida 32708 Craig A. McCarthy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.569120.57120.60409.175
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JANNIFER THOMPSON vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 07-002643 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Pierce, Florida Jun. 12, 2007 Number: 07-002643 Latest Update: Jun. 18, 2010

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's foster home license should be renewed.

Findings Of Fact From August 24, 2004, and throughout the period material to this proceeding, Petitioner Jannifer Thompson ("Thompson") and her husband, Dalkeith, held a license that authorized them to operate a family foster home under the supervision——and within the regulatory jurisdiction——of Respondent Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF"). Like all licensed foster parents, Thompson and her husband had entered into a written contract with DCF known as the "Bilateral Service Agreement" ("Agreement"), most recently as of April 30, 2006. This Agreement, by its terms, "reflect[ed] standards of care that are current requirements in Florida [law]." On September 14, 2006, a counselor named Elboney Ojobor, who was employed by a private agency to whom DCF had delegated various responsibilities pursuant to contract, made a routine quarterly visit to Thompson's home. Ms. Ojobor was covering for a colleague (Rondalyn Woulard) who was on maternity leave; she had not met Thompson previously. While interviewing Thompson, Ms. Ojobor learned that Thompson was the only adult living in the home at the time, and that Thompson was getting divorced from Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor understood this to mean that Mr. Thompson had moved out of the home permanently. In fact, Mr. Thompson was away from the home then not because he had moved to another residence ahead of a divorce, but because his job with a shipping company had required him to be out of town for an extended period. Nevertheless, the couple was estranged; Mr. Thompson would leave the marital home for good in the middle of October 2006. Ms. Ojobor's visit was not the first occasion on which Thompson had notified DCF (through its private-sector agent) that her marriage to Dalkeith was in trouble. During an earlier home visit (probably around June 2006, during the quarter immediately preceding Ms. Ojobor's visit in September), Thompson had told her regular counselor, Ms. Woulard, that she might divorce Dalkeith. Ms. Ojobor was not aware of this previous communication, however, and thus she reported the apparent change in circumstances (Mr. Thompson's absence) to her supervisor. The upshot was that on September 15, 2006, Ms. Ojobor called Thompson to inform her that, if she were to continue operating the foster home as a single parent, she would need to obtain a new license. As it happened, whatever steps Thompson took thereafter to become re-licensed came quickly to naught because, in early October 2006, DCF received an allegation that children in Ms. Thompson's home were being physically abused. Having brought up the abuse report, the undersigned believes it necessary here to interrupt the narrative flow of the findings, to call attention to some important points. The most serious charge against Thompson in this case is that she used "excessive" corporal punishment on foster children in her care. The accusation is not that Thompson was found by some other agency or investigator to have abused a foster child or children. The distinction is critical. Because DCF has alleged that Thompson used corporal punishment excessively, it is not sufficient (or even necessary) for DCF to prove that someone else, after investigating allegations of abuse, concluded that Thompson had inflicted some sort of physical injury on a foster child. Rather, DCF must prove that Thompson, in fact, actually used corporal punishment, which is a different fact. Indeed, that someone else found Thompson guilty of physical abuse is not especially probative, in this de novo proceeding, of the salient factual dispute, namely whether Thompson used corporal punishment on foster children.2 Against this backdrop, the undersigned finds that, on October 9, 2006, DCF referred a report of abuse concerning Thompson to the local Child Protective Team ("CPT"). DCF requested that the CPT examine the allegedly abused foster child and make an assessment of the situation. One member of the CPT who took part in this particular assessment was Karl Dorelien. Though not a medical provider, Mr. Dorelien was present for the medical examination of the child in question, whose name is T. P. The examination was performed by an advanced registered nurse practitioner ("ARNP"). Mr. Dorelien testified at hearing. The ARNP did not. At the time of the examination, Mr. Dorelien saw some bruising on T. P.'s forearm. T. P. told Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP that she had been struck by a belt. The CPT did not independently investigate T. P.'s statement. Mr. Dorelien and the ARNP accepted at face value T. P.'s statement about the cause of her injury. The ARNP found that T. P.'s wound was "not accidental." (Mr. Dorelien specifically denied having the expertise to ascertain whether a bruise was caused accidentally or intentionally. There is, it should be added, no persuasive evidence that the ARNP possesses such expertise, either.) Based on the medical examination, the CPT concluded that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (It is not clear how the CPT determined that Thompson——as opposed to someone else——caused T. P.'s injury.3) The evidence shows, in short, that the CPT found Thompson had caused bodily injury to T. P., a foster child then in her care, whom (the CPT determined) Thompson had hit with a belt. There is, however, no persuasive evidence upon which the undersigned independently can find that Thompson actually hit T. P. with a belt (or otherwise). How can this be? First, no one claiming to have personal knowledge of the matter testified at hearing that Thompson had struck T. P. with a belt. (T. P. was not called as a witness.) Thompson denied having perpetrated the alleged misdeed. Second, although there is competent and credible evidence (Mr. Dorelien's testimony) that T. P.'s forearm was bruised, the only evidence as to the cause of this injury was hearsay: (1) T. P.'s statements to the CPT revealing that she had been struck with a belt and (2) the ARNP's opinion (which Mr. Dorelien repeated at hearing) that the wound was not accidental. This uncorroborated hearsay is not a legally sufficient basis for any finding of fact, and even if it were, the undersigned, as the trier of fact, would give it too little weight to support a finding.4 Finally, even if there were sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that T. P. had been struck with a belt (and there isn't), there yet would be nothing but Mr. Dorelien's ambiguous testimony concerning the substance of T. P.'s out-of-court statement, coupled with inference or speculation (based on uncorroborated hearsay), tending to establish that Thompson did the striking. Again, such "proof" is neither legally sufficient nor, in any event, logically persuasive enough to support a finding that Thompson was at fault for the child's injury. DCF alleges that, in addition to striking T. P. with a belt (which allegation was not proved, as just found), Thompson also spanked J. D. F. and his brother, O. F. Both of these boys, respectively aged 8 and 7 years at the time of hearing, testified against their former foster mother. Each claimed that Thompson had spanked him with a belt. As witnesses, however, the boys did not inspire confidence in the truth of their accounts. Each gave testimony that was confusing, sometimes inconsistent, and lacking in precision. Neither one seemed distinctly to remember the important events at issue, much less any of the details surrounding them, causing the undersigned to wonder, at times, whether the boys were independently recalling the underlying events or, rather, testifying from the memory of what someone might have told them was alleged to have occurred. Doubtless many of these boys' shortcomings as witnesses stemmed from their youth and immaturity. Even so, all witnesses, regardless of age and experience, must be measured according to the same standards of credibility; the bar can be neither lowered nor raised to conform to a particular witness's capacity for giving testimony, for doing so would put a thumb on the scales of justice. At bottom, the accounts of J. D. F. and O. F., though not inherently incredible, nevertheless lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to produce in the undersigned's mind a firm belief or conviction that Thompson had spanked them with a belt. The undersigned hesitates to say more than that such is a possibility. Against the shaky testimonies of the boys was offered the decidedly stronger testimony of their sister, Sancia Jeantil, who swore that while she was living in Thompson's home (which admittedly was not at all times her brothers were there), she never saw Thompson spank either J. D. F. or O. F. She further testified that neither of her siblings had ever complained to her about being beaten. The undersigned has accorded considerable weight to Ms. Jeantil's testimony, because it seems unlikely that she would prevaricate to protect Thompson at her brothers' expense. Although Ms. Jeantil was not always present in the home, her testimony, which the undersigned accepts, is persuasive proof of the pertinent negative proposition, i.e. that Thompson did not use corporal punishment on the boys. Thompson herself testified at hearing and denied having used corporal punishment on J. D. F., O. F., or any other foster child. Mr. Thompson, too, testified that corporal punishment had not been used on any of the foster children in their home. Thompson's own child, J. T., said the same. None of these witnesses conclusively proved the negative of DCF's allegation regarding corporal punishment, but then again it was not Thompson's burden to disprove the charge. What these witnesses did do, effectively, was establish a credible, if simple, theory of innocence: Thompson never beat the foster children in her care. The undersigned has determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence as a whole fails to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, that Thompson used corporal punishment on any of the foster children under her care. Aside from the allegations regarding corporal punishment, DCF has charged Thompson with the lesser offense of failing immediately to notify DCF that her husband had moved out of the home. The evidence shows, however, that Thompson satisfied her duty to notify DCF concerning changes that might affect the life and circumstances of the foster children residing in her home. To recap, briefly, the material facts, Thompson informed DCF's agent, Ms. Woulard, of the possibility that she and Dalkeith might divorce; thus, DCF was on actual notice of a potential change in Thompson's marital status. Thompson likely gave DCF this advance warning in June 2006; in any case, she spoke up long before Dalkeith established a new residence and before the divorce proceeding commenced. There is no clear proof that the couple's situation had changed materially as of September 14, 2006, when Mr. Ojobor visited the home. Without question, Mr. Thompson was away at that time——but he worked for a shipping company and thus extended absences were part of his routine. Having all the evidence of record in view, the undersigned is not convinced that Mr. Thompson had "moved out" of the home as of mid-September 2006 in the sense of having permanently relocated from that residence, which is what DCF maintains. While there is some evidence that such was the case, there is also persuasive evidence that Mr. Thompson did not leave the home for good until October 2006——evidence sufficient to preclude the undersigned from finding, without hesitancy, that DCF's allegation is accurate.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DCF enter a final order approving the renewal of Thompson's foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2007.

Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.569120.57409.17590.803
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ROBERT DEROO vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 01-004881 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Largo, Florida Dec. 21, 2001 Number: 01-004881 Latest Update: Sep. 04, 2002

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license because “skinny dipping” with a foster child at the foster home violates Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13. (All section references are to Florida Statutes (2001). All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.)

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes in Florida. A foster home license is valid for a period of one year and must be renewed annually. Various privatized entities supervise licensed foster homes, review applications for foster home licenses, and make recommendations to Petitioner regarding the applications. However, the recommendations are not binding on Petitioner. Petitioner, rather than the private entity, is the licensing agency. For example, Petitioner rejected the recommendation from the private entity with responsibility for reviewing the application at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner first issued a foster home license to Respondent on January 28, 2000. Petitioner licensed Respondent to operate a therapeutic foster home. A therapeutic license authorized Respondent to operate a foster home for children with psychological or emotional disorders and for children without such disorders. Therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Personal Enrichment through Mental Health, Inc. (PEMHS). PEMHS recommended that Petitioner issue the original foster home license on January 28, 2000, and a renewal license that Petitioner issued on January 28, 2001, for the second year. The second therapeutic foster home license expired on January 27, 2002. Petitioner never took action to discipline or revoke Respondent’s therapeutic foster home license. In July 2001, Respondent applied for a non- therapeutic foster home license. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorizes a licensee to operate a foster home only for children without psychological or emotional disorders. Non-therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Family Continuity Programs (Family Continuity). Family Continuity recommended that Petitioner approve the application for a non-therapeutic foster home license. However, Petitioner did not follow the recommendation of Family Continuity and denied the application. Petitioner's denial of Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is the proposed agency action that is at issue in this proceeding. Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is not an application for a new license. Rather, it is an application for renewal of an existing license. Both the therapeutic license that Respondent held at the time of the application and the non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorize the licensee to operate a foster home for children without psychological or emotional disorders. By applying for a non-therapeutic foster home license before the expiration of his therapeutic foster home license, Respondent sought to renew his license to operate a foster home for children without psychological and emotional disorders. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks does not impose any requirements in addition to those that Respondent had already satisfied when Petitioner granted the therapeutic license to Respondent. The requirements for the therapeutic license are more stringent than those that must be met to qualify for a non-therapeutic license. The requirements for a therapeutic license are more comprehensive, and Petitioner requires an applicant for a therapeutic license to have more training than an applicant for a non-therapeutic license. A non-therapeutic license does not impose requirements in addition to those imposed for a therapeutic license. Petitioner proposes to deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license on the sole ground that Respondent went "skinny dipping" with two minor males. One of those males was a foster child assigned to Respondent. The foster child is a victim of past sexual abuse and has psychological and emotional disorders. The child suffers from oppositional defiance disorder and mood disorder. The symptoms of the disorders include self-injury, such as head banging, aggression, anger, and low self-esteem. However, many of the behavioral problems diminished during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. The "skinny-dipping" events occurred between six and nine times during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. During that time, the foster child was between 12 and 14 years old. The foster child swam nude in the swimming pool at Respondent's residence and bathed nude in the hot tub adjacent to the pool. On some of those occasions, Respondent was nude in the hot tub and swimming pool with the foster child and at other times the two were in the swimming pool and hot tub independently of each other while both were nude. The local sheriff's office investigated the foster home and found no indicators of abuse. Once PEMHS learned of the "skinny dipping" events, neither PEMHS nor Petitioner sought to revoke Respondent's therapeutic foster home license or to provide Respondent with remedial training. Rather, PEMHS removed the foster child from the foster home and refused to assign any more foster children to Respondent's foster home. At the administrative hearing, Petitioner sought the post-hearing deposition testimony of Dr. Cotter for several purposes. One of those purposes was to show the impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events. Another purpose was to show that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. The ALJ sustained Respondent's objection to the admissibility of the expert deposition testimony for the purpose of showing the impact on the foster child and for the purpose of showing that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter could not render an opinion concerning the actual impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events or whether those events were actually intended by Respondent as "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter did not intend to evaluate either the foster child or Respondent before rendering his opinions and, in fact, never evaluated either individual. Any expert opinion by Dr. Cotter concerning "grooming behavior" for pedophilia was not relevant to the grounds stated in the Notice of Denial. That expert opinion was relevant only to grounds not stated in the Notice of Denial. Nudity in a swimming pool and hot tub are not synonymous with "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Nudity and "grooming behavior" for pedophilia are separate grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license to operate a foster home. Petitioner failed to provide adequate notice prior to the administrative hearing that Petitioner sought to deny the renewal of Respondent's license on the separate ground that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Fundamental principles of due process prohibit a state agency from notifying a regulated party of the allegations against the party and then, at the hearing, proving-up other allegations. One of the primary functions of an ALJ is to assure that an administrative hearing is a fair hearing. Respondent was not prepared at the administrative hearing to submit evidence, including expert testimony, to refute any allegation not stated in the Notice of Denial. The admission of evidence relevant to allegations not stated in the Notice of Denial would have required a continuance of the administrative hearing to provide Respondent with an opportunity to refute the allegation. A continuance would have denied Respondent a remedy during the period of continuance, increased the economic burden on Respondent, and frustrated judicial economy. Nothing prevents Petitioner from bringing a separate proceeding against the licensee based on the allegation that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. The ALJ limited the testimony of Dr. Cotter to those grounds for denial that Petitioner stated in the Notice of Denial. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial states: After careful review and consideration, your application has been denied. Our decision is based on the following: Your admission that you and two minor boys, one of which was a foster child under your supervision, participated in several "skinny dipping" incidents during your recent licensure as a foster parent for Pinellas Enrichment Through Mental Health Services (PEMHS). As you are aware, the nature of a boy's early experiences may affect the development of his sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Therefore, foster parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities appropriate to the child's age. "Skinny dipping" in a hot tub with two minor boys violates the intent of this rule. These incidents reflect poor judgment for a person who is a licensed foster parent. Respondent's Exhibit 1. The Notice of Denial essentially states four grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license. One ground is the impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Another ground is nudity between a foster parent and a foster child. A third ground is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. The remaining ground is that Respondent provided recreational activities that were not appropriate to the foster child's age. No evidence shows that the "skinny dipping" events had any adverse impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Dr. Cotter did not evaluate the foster child to determine the actual impact of the events on the foster child. Contrary to the statements in the Notice of Denial, Petitioner's representative testified at the hearing that Petitioner did not consider the impact on the child that resulted from skinny dipping with Respondent. The preponderance of evidence shows that the actual impact of the foster care provided by Respondent during the 15 months in which the "skinny dipping" events occurred was positive. Many of the foster child's behavioral problems greatly diminished. The foster child made remarkable progress in his behavior both at home and at school. The foster child bonded with Respondent, and Respondent was an exemplary foster parent. The placement of the child with Respondent was so successful that Family Continuity published an article in their magazine about the successful match between the foster child and Respondent. Family Continuity considers Respondent to be an exemplary foster parent and wishes to have Respondent in its foster care program. If Petitioner grants the application for renewal, Family Continuity intends to return the foster child to Respondent for adoption. The second ground stated in the Notice of Denial is nudity between the foster parent and foster child. Without considering the impact on the foster child, Petitioner determined that being naked in the presence of a foster child, without more, was sufficient to close a foster home, remove a child, and revoke a foster home license. Petitioner cited no written statute or rule that prohibits nudity between a foster parent and foster child; or that establishes intelligible standards for regulating such nudity. Petitioner failed to submit competent and substantial evidence to explicate an unwritten policy that prohibits or regulates nudity. Rather, some evidence shows that nudity between foster parents and foster children is generally unavoidable and common. The third ground stated in the Notice of Denial is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. Several witnesses at the hearing and Dr. Cotter opined that Respondent exercised poor judgment. It is unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner exercised poor judgment because Petitioner cited no written rule or policy that defines or prohibits "poor judgment." For reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner must base a denial of a license application on a finding that the applicant violated a specific statute or rule. Petitioner cannot use the Notice of Denial to invent requirements that are not authorized by statute or rule. Petitioner cited no statute or rule that defines "poor judgment" or that establishes intelligible standards to guide the discretionary determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment. In the absence of intelligible standards, the determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment is necessarily an exercise of unbridled agency discretion. The use of unbridled agency discretion to make findings of fact violates fundamental principles of due process. Unbridled agency discretion creates the potential that agency decision-makers may define poor judgment by relying on their personal predilections rather than on those standards authorized by the legislature. Even if it were determined that poor judgment is a standard authorized by the legislature and that Respondent violated that standard, the determination is not dispositive of whether Petitioner should renew Respondent's license to operate a foster home. For example, representatives for Family Continuity and PEMHS agreed in their testimony that Respondent exercised poor judgment. However, Family Continuity recommends that Petitioner issue the non- therapeutic foster home license while PEMHS recommends against renewal of the license. The remaining allegation in the Notice of Denial is that "skinny dipping" is not an age-appropriate recreational activity. Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8a. states: 8. Recreation and community. a. The substitute parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities for children. The activities must be appropriate to the child's age and abilities. Swimming in a swimming pool and bathing in a hot tub are recreational activities within the meaning of Rule 65C- 13.010(1)(a)8a. Swimming nude and bathing nude in a hot tub with a nude adult are not appropriate for a child who is between 12 and 14 years old and whose psychological and emotional abilities are diminished by past sexual abuse.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8 and granting Respondent’s application for a therapeutic foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 314 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Gary A. Urso, Esquire 7702 Massachusetts Avenue New Port Richey, Florida 34653 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.175
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WILLIAM AND ANN DAVIS vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 07-001081 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Mar. 06, 2007 Number: 07-001081 Latest Update: Aug. 14, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should deny Petitioners' application to be licensed as foster parents.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster parents in the state. Respondent first licensed Petitioners as foster parents on June 29, 2003, and renewed the license on June 29, 2004. The last license expired on June 28, 2005. Petitioners allowed their license to expire on June 28, 2005. They wanted to make improvements to a new home they had moved into before bringing foster children into the home. Petitioners submitted a completed application for a new license on March 20, 2006. By letter dated April 27, 2006, Respondent denied the application for licensure. Petitioners did not receive the notice of denial until May 3, 2006, because Respondent sent the notice to the address of record in the old license application files instead of the correct address in the application for a new license that is at issue in this proceeding. The letter denying the application for licensure incorrectly stated that Respondent intended to revoke Petitioners' license. The misstated literal terms of the letter nevertheless provided Petitioners with adequate notice of the actual proposed agency action to deny the license application. Contrary to the literal terms of the letter, Petitioners understood that the letter constituted notice of Respondent's proposed denial of their license application. Petitioners timely requested an administrative hearing by letter dated May 7, 2006. The request for hearing stated, in relevant part: [W]e received notice advising us that [Respondent] has initiated proceedings to revoke our foster home license. . . . Please note that we are not a licensed foster home at this time. Our license expired in June, 2005. So, we are somewhat confused about proceedings to revoke something that does not exist. Please be advised that we did [sic] however, complete an application for a 'new' foster care license. . . . We were also told that, [sic] our application would be denied and that we would have the right to request an administrative hearing to contest the 'denial'. If the letter that we received is in regard to our application for licensure, and if that application has been denied, then we are requesting an administrative hearing to contest that decision. Respondent's Exhibit 1C. Respondent gave the request for hearing to the agency clerk to forward to DOAH to conduct the hearing. However, the agency clerk was confused by the literal terms of the denial letter. When the agency clerk could not ascertain an existing foster home license to revoke, the agency clerk merely "sat" on the request for hearing and did not forward it to DOAH. By letter dated November 13, 2006, Respondent corrected the literal terms of the previous letter. The letter dated November 13, 2006, correctly notified Petitioners of Respondent's proposed denial of the license application. By letter dated November 23, 2006, Petitioners again requested an administrative hearing to contest the proposed denial of the license application. In addition, the request for hearing notified Respondent of Petitioners' intent to rely on the so-called default license provisions in Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2006).1 Respondent gave the request for hearing to the agency clerk. This time, the agency clerk referred the matter to DOAH. However, the agency clerk did not refer the request for hearing to DOAH within the 15 days mandated in Subsection 120.569(2)(a). Rather, DOAH received the referral from the agency clerk on March 6, 2007; approximately 103 days after the date of the second request for hearing and approximately 303 days after the date of the first request for hearing. The delays in referring the requests for hearing to DOAH did not impair either the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the agency action. It is undisputed that when Petitioners were previously licensed as foster parents they repeatedly administered corporal punishment to a foster child who was approximately four years old at the time. It is also undisputed that Petitioners punished the child by requiring the child to stand for one hour to one hour and a-half almost daily. Both types of discipline violate applicable standards for foster care and evidence Petitioners disqualification to be foster parents. The parties spent most of the evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the four-year-old female suffered from a condition identified in the record as reactive attachment disorder (RAD). However, the trier of fact finds evidence concerning RAD to be irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether Petitioners are qualified to be foster parents. The evidence that Petitioners administered unauthorized discipline to a four-year-old foster child in their care clearly evidences their lack of qualification. No medical evidence established a nexus between the alleged disorder and illicit discipline of a young child.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order denying Petitioners' application to be licensed as foster parents. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2007.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57120.60
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs JOSEPH ITURRIAGA AND CHERIE ITURRIAGA, 15-004169 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Micanopy, Florida Jul. 22, 2015 Number: 15-004169 Latest Update: Jun. 13, 2016

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' foster home license based on violations of section 409.175(9), Florida Statutes (2014), and provisions of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-13 alleged in the Notice of Intent to Revoke Foster Home License dated April 16, 2015.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes pursuant to section 409.175.2/ Respondents are foster care parents in a foster care home licensed as Provider FSFN ID #100032652, the therapeutic foster home at issue in this proceeding.3/ A.A., an eight-year-old child, was placed into Respondent's foster home in April 2014.4/ On the afternoon of September 4, 2014, Respondent Cherie Iturriaga took A.A. and her two grandchildren to a shopping center. When they were ready to leave, A.A. refused to get into the family van. Mrs. Iturriaga testified that she tried, for approximately ten to 15 minutes, to persuade A.A. to get into the vehicle, but he refused. She became very frustrated, yelled at A.A. to get into the van, and began to back the van out of the parking space while A.A. was standing next to the van's open door.5/ A passerby called 911 to report that Mrs. Iturriaga—— who the passerby characterized as A.A.'s "grandmother"——was attempting to make A.A. get into the vehicle against his will. The passerby told A.A. "you don't have to get in the van if you don't want to." Mrs. Iturriaga also called 911 to report that A.A. would not get into her vehicle. She told the 911 dispatcher that she was not staying for him, and that she was "going home." The dispatcher told her that because the child was supposed to be in her care, she had to stay with him, and that officers already were on the way to that location. Nonetheless, Mrs. Iturriaga drove away and left A.A. in the parking lot with the passerby, who Mrs. Iturriaga characterized, in testimony at the hearing, as a "random person." The evidence does not clearly establish whether Mrs. Iturriaga left A.A. in the parking lot for "five to ten minutes," as she claimed, or for as much as 20 to 30 minutes, as indicated by other evidence in the record. Regardless, it is undisputed that she drove away from the parking lot and left A.A. in the company of a stranger. At some point, Mrs. Iturriaga returned to the parking lot to pick up A.A., but he was not there. She called 911, and the dispatcher confirmed that A.A. had been taken to the Pembroke Pines Police Department. Mrs. Iturriaga went to the police department to pick up A.A. There, she was arrested and charged with child neglect without great bodily harm, a third-degree felony; this charge ultimately was dropped. A.A. was not physically harmed as a result of being left in the parking lot. The evidence establishes that approximately 45 days before the September 4, 2014, incident, Mrs. Iturriaga requested that Citrus remove A.A. from Respondents' foster home within 30 days; however, he was not timely removed. When the incident giving rise to this proceeding occurred, A.A. was immediately removed from Respondents' foster home. Another child, J.O., who was approximately 14 years old at the time of the incident, was placed in Respondents' foster home approximately two and one-half years before the incident. Since then, J.O. has formed very close bonds with both Respondents, particularly Mr. Iturriaga. At the time of the hearing, J.O. had not been removed from Respondents' home and continued to reside with them. J.O. does not wish to be removed from Respondents' home. Eric Sami serves as the guardian ad litem for J.O., and has done so for the past three and one-half years. Mr. Sami testified, persuasively, that when he was assigned to J.O.'s case, J.O. was a very withdrawn, depressed, socially unstable child who had been moved through several different foster homes, and who was academically struggling. Since being placed in Respondents' home, J.O. has flourished. He has made friends, his academic performance has dramatically improved, and he is no longer depressed and socially unstable. According to Mr. Sami, Respondents have treated J.O. as if he were their own child, including taking him on family vacations and involving him in all holiday celebrations. Mr. Iturriaga participates in parent- teacher conferences for J.O. and has taken an interest in J.O.'s school work and in helping him improve his academic performance. Sami also testified, credibly, that in the short amount of time in which A.A. lived in Respondents' home, he was an extremely disruptive force, bullying J.O. and Respondents' grandchildren and killing ducks in front of Respondents' granddaughter——an event that was extremely traumatic for her to witness. Sami observed, and the undersigned agrees, that it is fundamentally unfair for J.O. to suffer the consequences of Respondents' license revocation due to an event that was precipitated by A.A.'s extreme, ongoing misbehavior before he was removed from the home. Because Sami and J.O.'s therapist, Fred Leon, believed so strongly that removing J.O. from Respondents' home would have very substantial negative consequences for J.O., they advocated to Petitioner and Citrus to allow Respondents to keep their foster home license and to keep J.O. in their home. However, that did not dissuade Citrus from recommending that Petitioner revoke Respondents' license. In October 2014, J.O.'s placement was changed from foster care in Respondents' home to non-relative placement in Respondents' home. Because revocation of Respondents' license would require J.O. to be removed from Respondents' foster home, this placement change was necessary in order for J.O. to remain in the home. However, this placement change is not without negative consequences. J.O. remains in Respondents' home but they do not receive any monetary allowance for his care,6/ so they are placed in the position of supporting him without receiving any financial assistance through the foster care system. Thus, the consequence of revoking Respondents' license is that if J.O. remained in the foster care system, he would have to be moved to a licensed foster home. If he were to stay in Respondents' home in a non-relative placement, Respondents would not receive any monetary assistance through the foster care system to help with his support. Respondents' fervently wish to keep J.O. in their home, even without financial assistance through the foster care system, due to the strong emotional bond they have with him and because of the remarkable social and academic strides he has made while in their care. However, Mr. Iturriaga testified, persuasively, that this situation imposes a financial hardship on them, which, in turn, penalizes J.O. That Respondents wish to continue to provide a nurturing home for J.O., despite the financial hardship, is strong evidence that they have J.O.'s best interests at heart and that they would continue to provide the same stable, nurturing environment for him that they have provided for more than two and one-half years. As noted above, the criminal charges against Mrs. Iturriaga were dropped. Nonetheless, employees of Citrus testified that because there was an open child abuse investigation with verified findings, they could not recommend that Respondents' foster home continue to be licensed. Petitioner presented the testimony of Sonia De Escobar, licensing manager of Petitioner's Circuit II foster care program. Ms. De Escobar testified that Petitioner is seeking to revoke Respondents' license in part due to concern for the safety of children who may be placed in Respondents' foster home in the future. De Escobar noted that it is not uncommon for children in the dependency system to "misbehave,"7/ and Petitioner is concerned about Respondents' ability to deal with child misbehavior in the future. However, the evidence establishes that Respondents successfully cared for eight foster children over a six-year period and never had any problems dealing with child misbehavior until the incident involving A.A. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that A.A. was extremely aggressive and engaged in behavior that seriously disrupted Respondents' home environment. Because of A.A.'s extreme behavior, Respondents previously had given Citrus the required 30-day notice. However, Citrus did not timely remove A.A. from Respondents' home and the incident giving rise to this proceeding thereafter ensued. As noted above, there is no dispute that Mrs. Iturriaga intentionally left A.A. with a complete stranger for some period of time. In doing so, she endangered his health and safety, in violation of section 409.175(9)(a)1. However, the undersigned finds that mitigating circumstances in this case militate against revoking Respondents' foster home license. Specifically, Respondents enjoyed a spotless record as foster parents before the incident involving A.A. Further——and very importantly——they have fostered a very successful, nurturing, long-term parental relationship with J.O. that will be jeopardized if their foster home license is revoked. Finally, it is undisputed that A.A.'s behavior was extremely aggressive, disrespectful, and disruptive throughout the time he was placed in Respondents' home. On September 4, 2014, his behavior finally caused Mrs. Iturriaga to "snap."8/ Although her actions unquestionably were inappropriate and affected A.A.'s health and safety, the evidence indisputably shows that this was a one-time incident that occurred while Mrs. Iturriaga was under significant duress, and that, under any circumstances, A.A. was not injured. The undersigned further notes Citrus' role in this incident. As the child placing agency, Citrus is charged with placing foster children in foster homes, and with removing them when circumstances warrant. As discussed above, in July 2014, Respondents gave Citrus the required 30-day notice for transitioning A.A. out of their home. However, Citrus failed to timely meet its obligation to remove A.A. from Respondents' home and this incident subsequently occurred. Had Citrus met its obligation to timely remove A.A. from Respondents' home, this incident would not have occurred. Thus, Citrus is not without blame in this matter. The undersigned further notes that if Respondents were allowed to keep their license, Citrus, as the child placing agency, is obligated under the Bilateral Agreement to consult with Respondent before placing children in their home. This consultation process presumably would help ensure that children having extreme behavioral problems are not placed in Respondents' home in the future. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that allowing Respondents to keep their foster home license would enable them to continue their close, nurturing relationship with J.O., and, further, likely would not result in any danger or other adverse effect on the health and safety of foster children who may be placed in their home in the future.9/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Notice of Intent to Revoke Foster Home License issued on April 16, 2015, and imposing a corrective action plan on Respondents' foster home license to the extent deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2016.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.5739.5085409.175435.04 Florida Administrative Code (3) 65C-15.02265C-28.00865C-30.001
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BILLIE AND WILLIE MAE BARNES vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 00-000730 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Feb. 15, 2000 Number: 00-000730 Latest Update: Dec. 21, 2000

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners' foster home license should be denied on the basis that the abuse registry examined during the re-licensure process disclosed a verified finding of abandonment of a child, recorded against the Petitioners as perpetrators, under authority of Section 409.175(8), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners were licensed as a foster home and sometime in the latter part of 1999, their licensure came due for renewal. They were advised by a denial letter dated October 8, 1999, from the Department of Children and Family Services (Department), that their home would not be re-licensed as a foster home. The initial agency decision to this effect was because the Petitioners, or at least Mr. Barnes, had an entry on the Department's abuse registry indicating a verified finding of abandonment against the Petitioners. The finding of abandonment involved the Petitioners' adopted son, D.B., being left at the office of the Department's foster care staff. Apparently the Barnes had had a great deal of trouble with D.B.'s behavior and had been unable to constructively discipline him and improve his behavior. This apparently made them very frustrated such that on March 26, 1999, Mr. Barnes called the Department regarding D.B., to inform the Department that they were simply unable to handle the child. Mr. Barnes talked to James Grant, supervisor of the foster care unit in the Department's Ocala office, and a witness for the Department in this case. Mr. Grant offered to provide assistance to the family to help resolve the issues between the Petitioners and their child. That offer of assistance was refused, however. Later that day, Mr. Barnes took D.B. to the Ocala offices of the Department's foster care unit and apparently left him sitting in the lobby of the building which houses the foster care staff. Mr. Barnes did not speak to Mr. Grant or anyone else in a responsible position before leaving the building and permanently abandoning the child. He only informed the receptionist that he was leaving the child. Because of the Petitioners' actions in leaving the child sitting in the lobby, a call was placed to the abuse hotline that same day. Joanne Hunter was assigned as the investigator of the abuse report. According to the final report of the investigation that was admitted into evidence, the case was closed with a verified indication of abandonment and neglect, the result of D.B. being abandoned in the Department's lobby. On March 27, 1999, a shelter hearing was held before a circuit judge and D.B. was placed in the custody of the Department due to the Petitioner's act of abandonment at the Department's office. Subsequently, the child was adjudicated dependent and placed in a long-term foster care placement. The child remained in that foster care placement at the time of the instant hearing. Certified copies of the judge's shelter order and the order of adjudication and disposition have been entered into evidence in this case. Prior to their adoption by the Petitioners, D.B. and his two siblings had been abused and neglected by their natural parents. They had, therefore, been placed in foster care by the Department. D.B.'s natural parents' parental rights had been terminated because of the uncorrected and continuing abuse and neglect of D.B. and his two siblings. The Petitioners had adopted D.B. and his two siblings. Children who have been abused and neglected or abandoned by their parents are especially vulnerable and require the greatest degree of stability in their home life that is possible.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services denying the re-licensure of the Petitioners as a licensed family foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Billie and Willie Mae Barnes 15606 Southwest 27th Avenue Road Ocala, Florida 34473 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 43785 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57409.17563.172 Florida Administrative Code (1) 65C-13.010
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES vs CHERYL SMITH, 01-002837 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lake City, Florida Jul. 18, 2001 Number: 01-002837 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2001

The Issue May the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) revoke Respondent's foster home license for violating Section 409.175 (8)(b) 1., Florida Statutes, in that Respondent intentionally or negligently committed acts that materially affected the health and safety of children, to-wit: inadequate supervision of a minor child entrusted to her care?

Findings Of Fact R.G. is the biological mother of the infant female, A.G., born out of wedlock. R.G. gave birth to a male child before A.G. That son was taken away from R.G. by DCF. Both A.G. and R.G., while R.G. was yet a minor under the age of 18 years, were adjudicated dependent children, subject to placement by DCF, pending DNA testing of A.G. and two putative fathers. R.G. had been placed with a licensed foster home other than Respondent's licensed foster home. That home requested R.G.'s removal because R.G. would not follow its rules. R.G. with A.G., was then placed in the licensed foster care home of Respondent. Although the placement of A.G. with Respondent raised Respondent's home population to one more live foster child than Respondent's licensed capacity, a situation to which Respondent objected, DCF personnel informed Respondent that the infant A.G. would be counted as part of R.G.'s placement. Therefore, despite A.G. and R.G. being two separate persons, DCF would not consider Respondent to have exceeded her license's capacity. It was not explained on the record how DCF intended to pay board to Respondent for care of A.G., if A.G. were not considered a whole person, but it is clear that DCF personnel resented Respondent's asking how she would be compensated for A.G.'s care. At all times material, R.G. and A.G. were subject to a Circuit Court Order which permitted only "unsupervised day visitation" by R.G. with A.G. (Emphasis in the original). By implication of the Circuit Court Order, and by her own understanding from instructions by DCF personnel, Respondent knew that R.G., the minor mother, was not permitted to have unsupervised night visitation with the dependent infant, A.G. DCF's and Respondent's understanding of the Circuit Court Order was that Respondent, R.G., and A.G. were required to be in Respondent's home after dark, but Respondent was not required to "eyeball" R.G. and A.G. all night, every night, while they were present in Respondent's foster home. Gracie Rager, DCF foster care worker, authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out of Respondent's foster home during the day for unsupervised visitation. Ms. Rager also authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. to R.G.'s older natural sister's home to spend some nights, including weekends. R.G.'s older natural sister was married and licensed for foster care. Accordingly, DCF personnel, including Ms. Rager, presumed that the older sister was sufficiently responsible and qualified to provide supervision of R.G. and A.G. at night. DCF reasonably concluded that R.G.'s presence with A.G. in her sister's home at night would constitute supervised night visitation and comply with the Court's Order. Ms. Rager never authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out at night by herself, but Ms. Rager reasonably saw no impediment, including the Circuit Court Order, to R.G. taking A.G. with her anywhere she wanted to take the baby during the day. R.G. openly resented being placed with Respondent because Respondent is Black. R.G. wanted to return, with A.G., to a white foster home placement. As a result, R.G. was never cooperative with Respondent. When R.G. turned 18 years of age, she became openly defiant of Respondent. R.G. insisted that she alone, would do everything for A.G., who was still under two years old. R.G. refused all assistance from Respondent concerning A.G. Respondent asked DCF to remove R.G. and A.G. or at least A.G., from her foster home. DCF had no other placement for them and asked Respondent to keep them until another placement was found. R.G. had a part-time day job. To get there, she would "catch a ride" with others. She would not accept a ride from Respondent. Sometimes, R.G. would take A.G. with her to work and go directly from work, with A.G., to her older, licensed sister's home. On these occasions, R.G. and A.G. might be gone for a night or a weekend. When R.G. did not return to Respondent's foster home, Respondent sometimes called R.G.'s older, licensed sister's home to be sure that R.G. and A.G. had arrived there safely. Sometimes, Respondent asked this sister to call her when R.G. and A.G. arrived. However, Respondent did not always contact R.G.'s older, licensed sister or otherwise check-up on R.G.'s and A.G.'s whereabouts overnight or over a weekend. When R.G. and A.G. returned after a night or weekend away, Respondent did not always check up on where they had been. Respondent was under the impression that a different, adult sister of R.G.'s was also a suitable adult supervisor for after dark, even though that sister was not licensed for foster care. Indeed, there is nothing in the Circuit Court Order requiring that supervised night-time visitation of R.G. with A.G. could not be undertaken by any other adult, regardless of whether that person were licensed for foster care. Respondent never checked to see if R.G. and A.G. were with R.G.'s unlicensed sister. At no time did Respondent report to law enforcement or DCF that R.G. had gone off and failed to return or that R.G. was taking A.G. away on weekends. At some point, R.G.'s authorized and licensed older sister called Ms. Rager and said R.G. had taken A.G. out all night with R.G.'s boyfriend and had not returned. It is unclear from Ms. Rager's testimony whether R.G.'s and A.G.'s departure point for their night or weekend of unsupervised visitation was Respondent's home or R.G.'s licensed sister's home. On February 9, 2001, Ms. Page, a DCF protective investigator, responded to an abuse hotline call and met with Respondent in the lobby of a DCF facility. During her interview of Respondent, Ms. Page knew nothing of where either R.G. or A.G. had been picked up, or how long they had been unsupervised at night, but Ms. Page "understood" from Ms. Rager that R.G. and A.G. had been removed from Respondent's home and that Respondent had come to the DCF facility voluntarily. Ms. Page was particularly concerned because of a comment Respondent made in the course of this interview, to the effect that Respondent guessed she had "handled it all wrong" because she had only asked to have the baby, A.G., removed from her care instead of reporting R.G.'s rebelliousness. DCF Investigator Page testified that she "verified" in an abuse report that Respondent was guilty of neglect by failure to notify authorities of R.G.'s unsupervised night visitation with A.G. There is insufficient evidence to determine of Respondent ever had a chance to challenge the abuse report or if the report was ever "confirmed." There is no evidence R.G. or A.G. suffered harm as a result of this incident.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing charges against Respondent and restoring her foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: David West, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 390, Mail Stop 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Dr. James Brant, Qualified Representative 1140 Durkee Drive, North Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Cheryl Smith Post Office Box 1053 Lake City, Florida 32056 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.57409.175475.175
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CONNIE LEWIS vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 11-003235 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jun. 24, 2011 Number: 11-003235 Latest Update: Dec. 09, 2011

The Issue Whether Petitioner’s request for a foster home license should be denied due to her alleged failure to comply with foster care licensing requirements.

Findings Of Fact Since 2006, Petitioner has held a foster care license, issued by the Department through Citrus, which is a child placing agency ("CPA"). Since becoming a foster parent, there have never been any concerns raised as to the care Petitioner provided to the foster children. Every year, Petitioner entered into a Bilateral Service Agreement with Citrus. The Agreement identifies the responsibilities of both the foster parents and Citrus on behalf of the children served in the foster care program. Under the heading “Foster Parent Responsibilities to the CPA” the Bilateral Service Agreement provides that the foster parent is required: To notify the CPA immediately of a potential change in address, living arrangements, marital status, family composition (who is in the home), employment, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child’s well-being. To notify the CPA promptly of all contacts the family or any member of the home has with police or any law enforcement agencies. In the summer of 2010, Citrus sent a letter to all foster parents reminding them that all family members or visitors who frequent the home on a daily basis, or sleep overnight, or have constant contact with the foster children, must have background checks completed. In the fall of 2010, for the annual review for the upcoming year of 2011, Citrus conducted a home study, which included an announced visit and inspection of the home. The Citrus consultant who conducted the home study recorded that Warren Clark (Clark), Petitioner’s son, was living in the home. Petitioner’s daughter was listed as a family member that did not live in the home and was not a frequent visitor. She conducted a background screening on Clark, and discovered that Clark had been arrested twice for battery/aggravated assault charges in May, 2010. If Petitioner’s daughter had been listed as a household member or frequent visitor, the consultant would have conducted background screening on the daughter as well. During her announced visit, the consultant saw Clark’s room, and only noticed male belongings. She did not see any kind of female items, such as jewelry, makeup, or female clothing. Petitioner never reported Clark’s arrests to Citrus. At the hearing, she testified that she was unaware of her son’s arrests, and was only made aware of the arrests when the Citrus consultant told her about them. Her son testified that he had never told his mother about the arrests because he was embarrassed. The undersigned does not find this testimony credible, as it is self-serving in nature and is not plausible, given that Petitioner’s son lived with Petitioner and was arrested twice in one month. It was ultimately Petitioner’s duty to be informed of any involvement between a household member and law enforcement, and to promptly notify the Department. On January 27, 2011, a foster care licensing staffing was held. Petitioner agreed to have her son move out of her home, due to the nature of the arrests. To memorialize the agreement reached during the meeting, Petitioner signed a statement indicating that she would have her son move out of the foster home, and that she understood that if her daughter was going to be a frequent visitor, her daughter needed to be fingerprinted. The statement also indicated that any violation of this agreement might result in revocation of her foster home license. This statement was dated February 22, 2011. During the exit interviews of two of Petitioner’s foster care children, the children reported that Petitioner’s daughter lived at the foster home. Citrus and the Department conducted an unannounced home visit on March 10, 2011. Dulce Pupo, a Citrus Foster Care Licensing Supervisor, and Ada Gonzalez, a Department Licensing Specialist, conducted the visit. Present at the home were two foster children, Petitioner, Petitioner’s daughter, and a tutor for one of the foster children. One foster child, who was approximately 12 years old, told Ms. Gonzalez that Petitioner’s daughter lived in the home, and pointed out her bedroom. When Ms. Gonzalez approached the room that had been indicated, Petitioner asked her not to enter that room, because it was messy. Ms. Gonzalez entered the bedroom, and found items that belonged to a woman; she photographed women’s jewelry, skin products, perfumes, women’s clothing, women’s shoes, and a curling iron that she saw in the room. Petitioner told Ms. Gonzalez that the items were her daughter’s items, but that her daughter did not live at the foster home. On March 11, 2011, a staffing was held. Petitioner attended and admitted that her daughter was living at her home. At the hearing, Petitioner explained that during this staffing, she was very upset, and misspoke when she stated that her daughter lived in her foster home. She, did, however, admit that her daughter was a frequent visitor, and that she should have reported that fact to Citrus. On May 9, 2011, the renewal of Petitioner’s foster care license was denied by the Department.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order finding that Petitioner violated section 409.175(9), Florida Statutes, and deny Petitioner’s request to renew her foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2011.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57409.175
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