The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, certified by Petitioner as a law enforcement officer. Until his retirement in January 2008, Respondent served in excess of 20 years as a sworn police officer in the Tampa Police Department (TPD). At the time of his retirement, he was a corporal. At all times material to the instant case, including January 4, 2007, in addition to working full-time as a TPD police officer, Respondent owned an automotive parts and service business (Adkins Enterprises) and the seven-acre property at 4709 East Hillsborough Avenue in Tampa (including the improvements thereon) where the business was located. Until April 2005, when its Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (HSMV)-issued motor vehicle dealer's license expired, Adkins Enterprises also sold used vehicles at this location. The business had approximately 25 employees. Respondent left the day-to-day operations of the business to his managerial employees. He would stop by when he was off-duty to check on how things were going and to help out, particularly with the paperwork. At a meeting held in 2004 (2004 Meeting), TPD Captain Robert Lovering introduced Respondent to three brothers-- Roynauth "Sham" Sahdeo (Sham), Seewchand "Blacks" Sahdeo (Blacks), and Deonauth "Prim" Sahdeo (Prim)--all of whom worked at a business on 15th Street in Tampa (S & S Auto) which did automotive repairs and paint and body work, as well as provided towing services.2 Respondent understood Sham to be the "main brother," under whom the other two brothers worked. Sham, in fact, at that time, did own the business (which, unlike Adkins Enterprises, was not a Florida-licensed motor vehicle dealer). Blacks and Prim did not then have any ownership interest in S & S Auto. It was verbally agreed, at the 2004 Meeting, that Adkins Enterprises and S & S Auto would go into the auto parts and scrap metal business together, with the auto parts and scrap metal to be sold by the joint venture coming from vehicles purchased at motor vehicle auctions using Adkins Enterprises' dealer license.3 (Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, provided then, as it still does, that only licensed dealers could purchase vehicles at these auctions.) Respondent also agreed to rent out space to S & S Auto at Adkins Enterprises' 4709 East Hillsborough Avenue location (Adkins' Location). Sometime in or around 2005, Sham sold his interest in S & S Auto to his two brothers, Blacks and Prim. As far as Respondent understood, however, Sham continued to act on behalf of S & S Auto.4 Also in or around 2005, S & S Auto applied for and obtained a motor vehicle dealer license from HSMV. Because Adkins Enterprises no longer had its dealer license (it having expired in April 2005), S & S Auto's dealer license was used to purchase (at auction), not only the vehicles it sold as a licensed motor vehicle dealer, but also the vehicles from which the parts and scrap metal for the joint venture between Adkins Enterprises and S & S Auto were obtained. After they were purchased at auction, the vehicles were transported to Adkins' Location on a tow truck operated by Blacks. Space was set aside at Adkins' Location for S & S Auto to conduct motor vehicle sales operations. Insofar as Respondent knew, Dale Marler was in charge of these operations. Sham helped Mr. Marler out, but most of Sham's time at Adkins' Location (where he had a regular presence) was devoted to the auto parts/scrap metal joint venture in which Adkins Enterprises and S & S Auto were participants. (It was at Adkins' Location where the vehicles purchased for the joint venture were stripped and crushed, and the salvaged auto parts were sold.) When he had the time, as a favor, Respondent would take tag and title paperwork to the HSMV local office for Mr. Marler and/or Sham. As of January 4, 2007, Sham and Mr. Marler were still working out of Adkins' Location and engaging in the business activities described above. On that day, Respondent agreed, at Sham's request, to go to the local HSMV office and purchase temporary tags for S & S Auto's motor vehicle sales operations at Adkins' Location. In addition to the money to make the purchase, Sham provided Respondent with S & S Auto's HSMV- assigned Personal Identification Number (PIN), which Respondent had to give to the HSMV clerk in order to initiate the transaction. Respondent went to the local HSMV office, as Sham had requested, later that same day (January 4, 2007). He told the clerk that he was there to purchase 25 temporary tags for S & S Auto, and he gave her S & S Auto's PIN. The clerk inputted the information Respondent had provided her into the HSMV computer system and produced a completed HSMV Form 83090, which represented S & S Auto's application for 25 temporary tags (S & S Auto's Application). The clerk printed out copies of S & S Auto's Application, and Respondent signed the "agency copy" on the "Authorized Representative for Dealership" signature line. At the clerk's request, he showed her his driver's license, and she wrote down his driver's license number next to his signature on the application. Respondent left the office with 25 temporary tags (numbered Q415821 through Q415845), for which he paid $53.00. Respondent did not knowingly provide any false or misleading information in obtaining these tags. He honestly believed that he was acting as the "Authorized Representative" of S & S Auto in this transaction, as he represented by placing his signature on the "agency copy" of S & S Auto's Application. When he returned to Adkins' Location, Respondent put the 25 temporary tags that had been purchased at the local HSMV office in a file for Mr. Marler and Sham to use. He had nothing further to do with the tags.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2011.
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a motor vehicle dealer license should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Global Express, LLC. (Global Express), is a limited liability company which has submitted to Respondent an application for a license as a motor vehicle dealer under the fictitious name of Auto Zone Auto Sales (the subject application). Johnny Romero and Rosangela Romero, who are husband and wife, are the members and managers of Global Express. Mr. Romero is also known as Johnny Guillermo Romero Peguero.1 Both Mr. and Mrs. Romero signed the subject application on behalf of Global Express before a notary public on May 4, 2009. The following language is contained above the signature lines: Under penalty of perjury, I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this application is true and correct . . . Part 5 of the application form requires that the “applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director” answer yes or no to certain questions (the Certifications). Each dealership officer is required to answer these questions under penalties of perjury. Relevant to this proceeding, both Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the negative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever had a surety bond cancelled? Relevant to this proceeding, both Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the negative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever been denied or had a dealer license suspended or revoked in Florida or any other jurisdiction? In addition to the foregoing, Mr. and Mrs. Romero answered the following question in the affirmative: Has this applicant, partner, or corporate officer or director ever been a licensed dealer in Florida or any other jurisdiction? Under their affirmative response Mr. and Mrs. Romero inserted information reflecting that they had previously been licensed dealers under the license numbered VI/1018283. Pursuant to application executed by Mr. and Mrs. Romero on January 11, 2007, Respondent issued motor vehicle dealer license numbered VI/1018283 to Pronto Cars Corp. (Pronto). Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license bond was cancelled by its surety, Nova Casualty Company, by notice dated December 18, 2007. Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license was suspended by Respondent by Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint dated March 20, 2008. That case was assigned the following case number by Respondent: DMV-08-479. The Order suspended Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license because Pronto’s surety had cancelled its bond. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Romero ever received a copy of the Emergency Final Order and Administrative Complaint in case DMV-08-479. That conflict is resolved by finding that Ms. Pierre-Lys, acting in her capacity as a compliance officer for Respondent, served a copy of the Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint on Mr. Romero on April 16, 2008. Mr. Romero, on behalf of Pronto, signed and submitted an election of rights form dated May 5, 2008, which provided, in relevant part, as follows: “I have read the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter [DMV-08-479] and understand my options.” Immediately before Mr. Romero’s signature is a check in a box indicating that Mr. Romero was exercising the following option: “I have not obtained a surety bond and wish to voluntarily relinquish my motor vehicle license. I have completed and am returning the Voluntary Relinquishment of License form within 21 days from the date of my receipt of this administrative complaint.” On May 23, 2008,2 Respondent issued its Final Order in its case number DMV-08-479, thereby canceling Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer’s license. The Final Order directed Pronto to surrender its license and all dealer and temporary tags in its possession. The Final Order also contained the following: It is further ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Order of Emergency Suspension and Administrative Complaint filed herein is DISMISSED and this case is hereby CLOSED. Mr. Romero called Respondent’s compliance officer, Luz Irizarry, on March 6, 2009, told her that he wanted to obtain a motor vehicle dealer license, and asked whether he would have to go to a school for new dealers. Ms. Irizarry referred the inquiry to Ms. Buck, who determined that Mr. Romero would have to attend the school because Pronto had received consumer complaints, Pronto’s surety had cancelled its bond, and Pronto’s license had been suspended and subsequently revoked. On March 9, 2009, Ms. Irizarry informed Mr. Romero of the reasons he would have to go to dealer school, and specifically discussed with him the fact that Pronto’s operations had been suspended. When he signed the Certifications on May 4, 2009, Mr. Romero had actual knowledge that Pronto’s surety bond had been revoked and that Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license had been suspended. Mr. Romero’s contends that he was confused about his answers because he thought he had bought the surety bond for its full term and because he thought the Final Order entered by Respondent dismissed the suspension of his license. Those contentions are rejected. It is clear from his answer pertaining to the license that had been issued to Pronto that Mr. Romero understood as a principal of Pronto he would have to disclose the revocation of Pronto’s surety bond and the suspension of Pronto’s motor vehicle dealer license on the subject application. Mr. and Mr. Romero’s Certifications under section 5 of the subject application pertaining to the revocation of a surety bond and the suspension of a motor vehicle dealer license are willful, material misrepresentations of fact. On February 26, 2008, Respondent discovered that Pronto had moved its business location and was doing business at a location that had not been approved by Respondent. On April 1, 2009, Mrs. Romero drove a motor vehicle displaying a “For Sale” sign. The vehicle had a temporary tag on it that had been issued to Pronto. The possession of that temporary tag violated the Final Order entered in Respondent’s case number DMV-08-479, which ordered Pronto to immediately surrender all temporary tags to Respondent. On April 27, 2009, Mrs. Romero displayed, or acquiesced in the display of, another car with a “For Sale” sign on it parked in front of Global Express’s proposed, but unlicensed, location. That car had a temporary tag on it that had been issued to Pronto. The temporary tag was filled out to show the name of another dealer. The possession of that temporary tag violated the Final Order entered in Respondent’s case number DMV-08-479, which ordered Pronto to immediately surrender all temporary tags to Respondent. On April 2, 2009, Mr. Romero had 13 motor vehicles titled in his name. Although he asserts that some of the motor vehicles were bought in conjunction with a taxi service he operated, he admitted that some of these vehicles had been purchased for resale. Mr. Romero acquired a 1966 Ford motor vehicle on May 9, 209, and sold the vehicle on May 21, 2009. Mr. Romero acquired a 1999 Chevrolet motor vehicle on May 18, 2009, and sold the vehicle on May 25, 2009. Mr. Romero acquired another Chevrolet motor vehicle on May 20, 2008, and sold the vehicle on May 31, 2009. Respondent established that during April and May 2009, Mr. Romero engaged in the business of dealing in motor vehicles without a license. On March 30, 2009, Mr. Romero paid Respondent for the registrations of ten motor vehicles with worthless checks.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order deny the subject application. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2009.
The Issue The issue for disposition in this proceeding is whether Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license should be revoked for his prior conviction of a felony, as proposed in an administrative complaint dated October 26, 1993.
Findings Of Fact It is uncontroverted that Respondent Lorenzo Reddick, Jr. (Reddick) holds an independent motor vehicle dealer license, issued by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). The complaint fails to allege, and there is no evidence of, when the license was issued. The licensed place of business is 3214 Orange Center Boulevard, #C, Orlando, Florida. On April 27, 1993, Reddick pleaded, and was adjudged guilty of a single count offense in a multi-count superseding indictment, in U.S.A. v. Lorenzo Reddick, Case #92-104 Cr-Orl-19, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The offense, as described in the Judgment, was "Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity", on 12/30/91, pursuant to title 18 U.S. Code, section 1957(a), and title 18 U.S. Code, Section 2. (Petitioner's exhibit #1) Reddick was sentenced to twenty-four months imprisonment, commencing May 21, 1993, with two years supervision after release. According to the court documents comprising Petitioner's exhibit #1, the sentence was less than provided in sentencing guidelines "upon motion of the government, as a result of defendant's substantial assistance." Reddick is currently serving his prison term. At the time of the offense Reddick was not operating nor was he licensed as a motor vehicle dealer. There is no evidence of whether his license was obtained before or after his conviction. There is no evidence whatsoever of the offense other than what is found on the face of the judgment, as reflected above. DHSMV learned of Reddick's conviction in the process of investigating a filed complaint related to failure to transfer title and registration of a vehicle purchased from Reddick's dealership. Neil Chamelin was the manager of DHSMV's dealer license and consumer complaint programs and was responsible for evaluating requests for administrative action and preparing administrative pleadings for the division director. Chamelin received a copy of Reddick's Judgment of Conviction and Sentence and based the administrative complaint on those documents only. Chamelin has no independent knowledge of the offense. DHSMV has a longstanding policy that a single felony conviction may be sufficient for the agency to take action against a dealer's license. That is, the agency has interpreted the language of the relevant statute to mean that a licensee does not automatically get one free felony before his dealer's license is jeopardized, even after the language was amended seven or eight years ago to include a requirement of sufficient frequency of violations as to establish a pattern of wrongdoing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter its Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint that is the subject of this proceeding. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 James R. Cunningham, Esquire 200 East Robinson, Suite 1220 Orlando, Florida 32801 Charles J. Brantley, Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Room B439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's establishment of North Tampa Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc. (North Tampa), as a successor motor vehicle dealer for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge line-makes (vehicles) in Tampa, Florida, is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3), Florida Statutes (2009),1 pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner manufactures and sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles to authorized Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealers. Ulm is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ulm sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 2966 North Dale Mabry Highway, Tampa, Florida 33607. Ferman is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ferman sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 24314 State Road 54, Lutz, Florida 33559. It is undisputed that Petitioner has had four dealers in the Tampa metro market for a significant number of years. Petitioner's primary competitors also have had four or more dealers in the Tampa metro market. By appointing North Tampa as a successor dealer to Bob Wilson Dodge Chrysler Jeep (Wilson), Petitioner seeks to maintain the status quo of four Chrysler dealers in the Tampa metro market. In April 2008, Petitioner had four dealers in the Tampa metro market that each sold and serviced Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The four dealers were: Ulm, Ferman, Courtesy Chrysler Jeep Dodge, and Wilson. On April 25, 2008, Wilson filed a Chapter 11 petition in United States Bankruptcy Court in the Middle District of Florida (the Bankruptcy Court). At or about the same time, Wilson closed its doors and ceased selling and servicing Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The filing of Wilson’s bankruptcy petition precipitated an automatic stay under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. The automatic stay prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson’s franchise and dealer agreements (dealer agreements). But for Wilson’s bankruptcy filing, Petitioner would have sent Wilson a notice of termination when Wilson closed its doors and ceased dealership operations. Wilson’s cessation of business adversely impacted Petitioner. In relevant part, Petitioner lost sales and lacked a necessary fourth dealer to provide service to Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge customers in the Tampa metro market. Petitioner desired to reopen a dealership at or close to the former Wilson location as soon as possible to mitigate or eliminate the economic loss. During the automatic stay, Petitioner was legally precluded from unilaterally appointing a successor dealer to Wilson. Wilson still had valid dealer agreements for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles and, therefore, was still a dealer. During the automatic stay, Wilson attempted to sell its existing dealership assets, including the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealer agreements. Any attempt by Petitioner to appoint a successor dealer or even negotiate with a successor dealer, would have undermined Wilson’s efforts to sell the dealerships and maximize the estate for the benefit of the creditors. A sale of the dealership required the consent of Wilson and Wilson’s largest creditor, Chrysler Financial. Petitioner did everything it could to accelerate a sale. However, Petitioner was not a party to the sale negotiations and had no ability to require or force Wilson to sell the dealership or its assets to any particular party or to do so within any particular time period. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner did anything to intentionally, or inadvertently, delay or manipulate the timing of a sale. On July 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay. The motion also sought the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner filed the motion in the Bankruptcy Court in an attempt to hasten the sale negotiations. Petitioner also wanted to be able to terminate the dealer agreements as quickly as possible in the event that a sale was not consummated. The Bankruptcy Court did not initially grant Petitioner's motion. The court wanted to allow time for a sale of the dealership to proceed. During 2008 and early 2009, Wilson continued to negotiate with potential buyers for the dealership. On January 8, 2009, Wilson's motor vehicle dealer license expired. It became apparent to Petitioner that a sale of Wilson’s assets would be unlikely. Petitioner again asked the Bankruptcy Court to grant Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. On February 9, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. However, the order did not terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. On February 16, 2009, within a week of the entry of the order lifting the stay, Petitioner sent Wilson a notice of intent to terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. Wilson received the notice of termination on February 23, 2009, and the termination became effective on March 10, 2009. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner attempted to manipulate or delay the timing of the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner began working on establishing a replacement dealership as soon as Wilson’s dealer agreements were terminated. Establishing a replacement dealership is a lengthy process that primarily involves finding a suitable dealer candidate, finding a suitable location and facility, and making sure that the candidate has the necessary capital to start and maintain the dealership. Petitioner talked to several potential candidates to replace the Wilson dealership, including Jerry Ulm, the principal of one of the complaining dealers in these cases. By letter dated June 24, 2009, Mr. Ulm advised Petitioner that he opposed the opening of a successor dealership for anyone else but wanted the successor dealership for himself should Petitioner decide to proceed. Petitioner determined that Petitioner would not be able to locate the successor dealership at the former Wilson facility. Petitioner considered several potential alternative locations for the successor dealership, including property offered by Ferman. Ferman had a vacant site on Fletcher Avenue in Tampa, Florida, which Ferman leased from a third party unrelated to this proceeding. Ferman offered to sublease the property to Petitioner. In a letter to Petitioner's real estate agent dated July 17, 2009, Ferman stated Ferman's understanding that Petitioner intended to use the property to establish a Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealership. Petitioner ultimately decided to locate the dealership at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. It is undisputed that this location is less than two miles from the former Wilson location. Before establishing the successor dealership, however, Petitioner wrote a letter to the Department on February 5, 2010 (the letter). The letter requested the Department to confirm that the establishment of the successor dealership would be exempt under Subsection 320.642(5)(a)1. from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3). The letter explained that Wilson had filed bankruptcy and ceased operations and that the bankruptcy had prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson and appointing a successor dealership. The letter also provided the relevant dates of the bankruptcy, the lifting of the stay, and the termination of Wilson dealer agreements and advised the Department of Petitioner's intent to locate the successor dealership within two miles of Wilson’s former location. The letter asked the Department to confirm that the establishment of a successor dealership would be exempt if it was established within one year of March 10, 2009, when Petitioner terminated the Wilson dealer agreements. By separate e-mails dated February 9 and 12, 2010, the Department twice confirmed that it had consulted with counsel and determined that the establishment of a successor dealership to Wilson in the manner outlined by Petitioner would be exempt. Petitioner relied on this confirmation by the Department before proceeding with the appointment of a successor dealership. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner sent a second letter to the Department, stating Petitioner's intention to appoint North Tampa as the replacement and successor dealer for Wilson (the second letter). In the second letter, Petitioner again asserted its understanding that the establishment of North Tampa was exempt from the relevant statutory requirements for notice and protest. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner also submitted to the Department an application for a motor vehicle dealer license for North Tampa. On March 3, 2010, the Department issued a license to North Tampa for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. On March 7, 2010, North Tampa opened for business. North Tampa has operated successfully and continuously and employs approximately 30 individuals at the site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the establishment of North Tampa as a successor motor vehicle dealer is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3) pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2010.
The Issue Is Ann L. Bell (Ms. Bell) entitled to the issuance of a license to act as an independent motor vehicle dealer through A & B Auto Sales of Jacksonville, Inc. (A & B), that license to be issued by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (the Department)? See Section 320.27, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Bell made application to the Department for an independent motor vehicle dealer license. The name of the business would be A & B. The location of the business would be 7046 Atlantic Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. In furtherance of the application Ms. Bell received a certificate of completion of the motor vehicle dealer training school conducted by the Florida Independent Automobile Dealers Association on January 26 and 27, 1999. Ms. Bell submitted the necessary fees and other information required by the Department to complete the application for the license, to include the necessary surety bond. At present Ms. Bell lives at 98 Kent Mill Pond Road, Alford, Florida, some distance from Jacksonville, Florida. Ms. Bell intends to move to Jacksonville, Florida, if she obtains the license. Ms. Bell's work history includes a 35-year career with the State of Florida, Department of Insurance, from which she retired as a Deputy Insurance Commissioner. Her duties included supervision of employees and auditing. More recently Ms. Bell has worked as an insurance agent for approximately five years with Allstate Insurance. Ms. Bell also had 17 years' experience involving a business with her former husband in retail floor covering in which she dealt with sales staff and contracts. During another marriage, her then-husband was involved in the automobile business in Mobile, Alabama, as well as the Florida panhandle. Ms. Bell was not an employee of the automobile business conducted by her husband. Ms. Bell was "in and out" of the dealership and attended automobile auctions with her husband. Ms. Bell intends to locate her dealership at the address where Mr. Badreddine formerly operated an independent motor vehicle dealership. Ms. Bell has known Mr. Badreddine for approximately 10 to 12 years. Ms. Bell has purchased cars from Mr. Badreddine. Ms. Bell has borrowed money from Mr. Badreddine. Mr. Badreddine has borrowed money from Ms. Bell. Ms. Bell has a lease related to the location where she would operate her dealership. At present Ms. Bell is using the prospective business location to collect on some accounts for automobiles purchased through Mr. Badreddine in which Ms. Bell has bought the accounts receivable from Mr. Badreddine. The arrangement concerning the accounts receivable is one in which Mr. Badreddine is expected to assist in the collection of monies owed on the accounts. The customers involved with those accounts are Arabs and African Americans. Mr. Badreddine is fluent in Arabic. The amount of money which Ms. Bell has invested is approximately $35,000, in relation to the purchase of the accounts receivable. If Ms. Bell obtains the license she intends to employ Mr. Badreddine to sell automobiles at her lot and to be involved in the purchase of cars at automobile auctions. These duties would be in addition to the collection on the accounts receivable which Ms. Bell purchased from Mr. Badreddine. Ms. Bell does not intend to allow Mr. Badreddine access to the company bank accounts or the completion of the necessary paperwork when cars are sold to the public from her business. In the past, Mr. Badreddine held independent motor vehicle dealer licenses issued by the Department. He lost those licenses based upon unacceptable performance under their terms. Ms. Bell is not unmindful of Mr. Badreddine's performance as a licensee, being informed by the Department in the details. Mr. Badreddine held an independent motor vehicle dealer's license under the name A & D Wholesale, Inc. (A & D), for a business at 9944 Beach Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. The Department issued an administrative complaint against that license in Case No. DMV-94FY-566, concerning problems in cars sold by A & D in which the titles and registrations were not transferred appropriately and emissions tests were not performed appropriately. This case was disposed of through an informal hearing and a $5,000 administrative fine was imposed. A further complaint was made against the licensee for the business A & D under an administrative complaint drawn by the Department in Case No. DMV-97FY-621. This complaint involved problems in title and registration transfer, failure to pay an existing lien on a trade-in, and the payment for automobiles obtained in automobile auctions upon which the drafts were not honored. No request for an administrative proceeding was received in relation to this administrative complaint. A final order was entered which revoked the independent motor vehicle dealer's license in relation to A & D. Subsequently, Mr. Badreddine made an application for an independent motor vehicle dealer's license under the business name King Kar Auto Sales, Inc. (King Kar) for the address at which Ms. Bell would operate her business. The decision was made to grant Mr. Badreddine's request for an automobile dealer license for King Kar. Following the grant of the license to King Kar an administrative complaint was brought in Case Nos. DMV-99FY-165 and DMV-99FY-166. The complaint involved the failure to pay off a lien, in which a check intended to settle the account with the lien holder was dishonored and falsification of the application in support of the license for King Kar. The final order disposing of these cases was premised upon the recognition that the license for King Kar had been revoked by virtue of the failure to maintain the necessary surety bond, rendering the allegations in the complaint moot. In the conduct of his automobile business Mr. Badreddine was accused of obtaining property in return for a worthless check involved in dealings with GMAC Corporation. The check was in the amount of $16,671.38. This action was taken in the case of State of Florida vs. Amine Badreddine, in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, Case No. 98-13690CFCR-E. Mr. Badreddine entered a plea of guilty to obtaining property in return for a worthless check and was placed upon probation for a period of one year, with a requirement to make restitution. Adjudication of guilt was withheld. In a discussion between Ms. Bell and Cindy King, Department Compliance Examiner and Nadine Allain, Regional Administrator for the Department, Ms. Bell told the Department employees that Ms. Bell would need Mr. Badreddine to go to the automobile auctions and that "she didn't think it was lady-like to go to an auction." This is taken to mean that Ms. Bell did not believe she should go to the automobile auctions. Ms. Bell also told the Department employees that she needed Mr. Badreddine to sell automobiles for her, that he was a good salesman and that he was good at dealing with Arabs and she was not. Ms. Bell noted that she didn't live in the area where the dealership would be operated and referred to her purchase of the accounts receivable. Ms. Bell told the Department employees that Mr. Badreddine would be given an office in the back of the dealership or in the dealership. Ms. Bell told the Department employees that "she knew absolutely nothing about selling cars." Ms. Bell indicated that she would be relying upon Mr. Badreddine for advise in running her dealership. The reliance on Mr. Badreddine to deal with Arab clients was mentioned pertaining to the circumstances with the previous accounts receivable. The Department offered to license Ms. Bell upon condition that Ms. Bell provide an affidavit to the effect that Mr. Badreddine would not be involved with her dealership. Ultimately, Ms. Bell did not accept this overture. In denying the application for the independent motor vehicle dealer's license the Department gave the following reasons: Your admission of not knowing anything about the car business coupled with your stated intention to rely on the advice and experience of Mr. Amine Badreddine to operate your dealership means that Mr. Badreddine is, de facto, the dealer. Mr. Badreddine previously held independent motor vehicle dealer license number VI-15265, as A & D Wholesale, Inc. An administrative complaint was filed by the department against his dealership involving consumer complaints filed by Gladys L. Stevens, complaint number 93110148; Merrian A. Coe, complaint number 94010340; and Richard Green, complaint number 94030339. As a result of the administrative action, Mr. Badreddine's license was found in violation and fined $5,000.00 for failure to apply for transfer of title within 30 days, issuing more than two temporary tags to the same person for use on the same vehicle, violation of any other law of the state having to do with dealing in motor vehicles, failure to have a vehicle pass an emissions inspection within 90 days prior to retail sale and failure to transfer title. On December 23, 1996, a second administrative complaint was filed against A & D Wholesale, Inc. because of complaints received from Mark S. Smith, complaint number 96020168; Telmesa C. Porter, complaint number 96050435; Nijole Hall, complaint number 96070365; Ella Didenko, complaint number 96080083; Salih Ferozovic, complaint number 96100067; Charles R. Wells, complaint number 9610068; and Adessa Auto Auction, complaint number 96110372. As a result of this administrative action, a Final Order was issued on January 27, 1997 revoking Mr. Badreddine's independent motor vehicle dealers [sic] license for failure to apply for a transfer of title within 30 days, - failure to comply with the provisions of section 319.23(6), F.S., failure to have a vehicle pass an emission inspection prior to retail sale, issuance of more than two temporary tags to the same person for use on the same vehicle, failure to have a title or other indicia of ownership in possession of the dealership from the time of acquiring the vehicle until the time of disposing of the vehicle, failure of a motor vehicle dealer to honor a check or draft. Mr. Badreddine applied for and was issued another motor vehicle dealer's license on April 24, 1998, under the name King Kar Auto Sales, Inc. The license was revoked on October 20, 1998, because of a surety bond cancellation. On November 24, 1998, the department received a complaint from Treflyn N. Congraves, complaint number 98070299. Ms. Congraves filed a complaint with the state attorney which resulted in Mr. Bareddine [sic] being placed on probation for issuing a bad check to GMAC and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $16,571.38. Mr. Badreddine is currently on probation. The department's investigation showed that Mr. Badreddine had a history of bad credit, failed to continually meet the requirements of the licensure law, failed to honor a bank draft or check given to a motor vehicle dealer for the purchase of a motor vehicle by another motor vehicle dealer, and had failed to satisfy a lien. Consequently, Mr. Badreddine's poor performance as a dealer forces us to deny a license where he may have a financial interest, active participation in the management, sales or any part in the operation of the dealership.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the Facts Found and the Conclusions of Law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which grants Ann L. Bell an independent motor vehicle dealer license for the business A & B. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward P. Jackson, Esquire Jackson & Mason, P.A. 516 West Adams Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether a recreational vehicle with a gross vehicle weight in excess of 10,000 pounds meets the definition of "commercial motor vehicle" under relevant Florida law when driven by an employee of a licensed recreational vehicle dealer, rather than by the ultimate consumer.
Findings Of Fact On January 22, 2001, the Department of Transportation (Department) issued a driver vehicle inspection report (No. FL6050069 - Citation Violation) to Karl A. Nessamar. At the time the report was issued Mr. Nessamar was driving a private motor coach owned by Leisure Tyme RV, Inc. (Leisure Tyme), on a state road. A private motor coach is a vehicle which does not exceed the length, width and height limitations of Section 316.515(9), Florida Statutes, and is built on a self-propelled, bus-type chassis having no fewer than three load-bearing axles and being primarily designed to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping or travel use. See Section 320.01(b)(5), Florida Statutes. Leisure Tyme is a recreational vehicle dealer as defined in Section 320.822(i), Florida Statutes. The recreational vehicle Mr. Nessamar was operating did not have a U.S. Department of Transportation number on display. When Mr. Nessamar was issued the inspection report he did not possess a Class B driver's license; had no driver's record of duty status (log book); and had no medical certificate in his possession. Further, Mr. Nessamar was operating the vehicle in the course of his employment for Leisure Tyme at the time the inspection report was issued. The gross vehicle weight rating of the subject recreational vehicle was 33,700 pounds. When the inspection report was issued, Mr. Nessamar was an employee of Leisure Tyme and was driving the vehicle from Tampa, Florida to Mary Esther, Florida. It was being returned to Mary Esther after having been displayed at the Florida RV "Super Show." This recreational vehicle was not carrying any cargo, passengers or hazardous materials at the time it was driven by Mr. Nessamar and when the citation or inspection report was issued. Because of the issuance of the vehicle inspection report the vehicle and Leisure Tyme were placed "out-of-service," which means that none of the vehicles in its ownership or operation can be driven until those vehicles and drivers meet all of the requirements of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 390 through 395 and Chapter 322, Florida Statutes. The Department contends that whenever a recreational vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVW) exceeds 10,000, pounds and is driven by anyone other than the ultimate consumer or owner of that vehicle, it becomes a "commercial motor vehicle." It defines a commercial motor vehicle as any self- propelled or towed vehicle used on the public highways in commerce to transport passengers or cargo if such vehicle has a GVW of 10,000 pounds or more; is designed to transport more than 15 passengers including the driver; or is used in the transportation of materials found to be hazardous for the purposes of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, as amended (49 USC subsections 1801 et. seq.). See Section 316.003(66), Florida Statutes (2000). There is no question, however, that the vehicle at issue meets the definition of a "private motor coach" because it has three load-bearing axles, a self-propelled bus type chassis, is primarily designed to provide temporary living quarters for recreational camping and travel use and does not exceed the length, width and height limitations provided in Section 316.515(9), Florida Statutes. If indeed the vehicle in question is deemed to be a commercial vehicle, the driver, vehicle and owner become subject to many restrictions and regulations that do not apply to non- commercial motor vehicles. This is because the Legislature has adopted many of the federal regulations pertaining to commercial motor vehicles in Section 316.302(1)(b), Florida Statutes, specifically, 49 C.F.R. Parts 382, 385 and 390 through 397, with the exception of 49 C.F.R. Section 390.5. Thus, the pivotal question to determine concerning whether the cited violation is correct, is whether the vehicle in question is a commercial motor vehicle and, as related thereto, whether it is a recreational vehicle.
