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JOHNNY R. JENKINS vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 00-002078 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida May 16, 2000 Number: 00-002078 Latest Update: Dec. 19, 2000

The Issue Whether the Petitioner should be disqualified to work in a position of special trust.

Findings Of Fact The Department disqualified the Petitioner to work in a position of special trust and denied the Petitioner an exemption from that denial. Subsequently, the Petitioner timely challenged the agency's decision. The Petitioner is employed by Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc. (EYA) an entity that operates the Eckerd Youth Development Center at Okeechobee, Florida. He has worked as a youth counselor at that facility since 1993. EYA contracts with the state of Florida to provide facilities for the juvenile justice system and, as such, must comply with employment qualifications for persons working with the juveniles assigned to the facility. The screening of EYA employees must be updated every five years. As part of the background screening process, EYA submitted paperwork for the Petitioner in 1998. The Department did not issue its disqualification decision until February 25, 2000. Thereafter, the Petitioner sought an exemption from the disqualification decision which was also denied by the Department on April 7, 2000. The delays in the re-screening decisions were not attributable to the Petitioner. The Department based its disqualification of the Petitioner and denial of the exemption on the criminal history set forth below. In 1995, the Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the possession of a weapon charge. Adjudication of guilt on this charge was withheld by the court. Based upon the plea on the weapon charge, the Petitioner received a two-year probation, the weapon was forfeited, and he was ordered to pay court costs and fees. He successfully completed all aspects of the sentence. In 1994, the Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of domestic violence, a misdemeanor. The Petitioner was adjudicated guilty on this charge and sentenced to one year of probation. He successfully completed all aspects of the sentence on this case. The Department contends that domestic battery/violence is a disqualifying offense which precludes the Petitioner's employment in a position of special trust at the Eckerd Youth Development Center. At all times during his employment by EYA, the Petitioner has served as an outstanding employee. EYA timely filed all the necessary paperwork to have the Petitioner re-screened for employment purposes. At all times during his employment by EYA, the Petitioner has been an excellent role model. He has not exhibited any conduct that would suggest minors would be placed at risk of physical harm if placed in his care. According to Mr. Timko, the Petitioner is "probably one of the most mild- mannered, positive role models that we have out there." The Petitioner's explanations regarding his criminal record have been deemed sufficient and persuasive as to the facts of the underlying incidents. In particular as to the domestic battery/violence incident, it is found that the Petitioner did not harm the alleged victim.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order either granting the Petitioner the exemption sought or finding that he has not committed an act of domestic violence such that he must be disqualified from employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Johnny R. Jenkins 3745 Northwest 27th Avenue Okeechobee, Florida 34972 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, Suite 300 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, Suite 300 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, Suite 300 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100

Florida Laws (6) 39.001415.102415.103435.04435.07741.30
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DENISE A. WILSON vs AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 16-006360EXE (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Oct. 31, 2016 Number: 16-006360EXE Latest Update: Aug. 28, 2017

The Issue The issues are 1) whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense(s); and, if so, 2) whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from employment disqualification would constitute an abuse of discretion.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is seeking employment with The Arc of Alachua County, a service provider regulated by APD. Petitioner’s desired employment is to work as a direct service provider, which requires compliance with background screening requirements. The results of Petitioner’s background screening identified a history of criminal offenses. Petitioner received notification via letter dated April 4, 2016, from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), Respondent’s background screening entity, of her disqualification from employment due to a criminal history. The specific disqualifying offense listed in the letter was Larceny (a violation of section 810.014, Florida Statutes (2016)1/). Florida’s Legislature has designated certain criminal offenses as disqualifying offenses, which would prevent an individual from working as a direct service provider. However, an individual may seek an exemption from the employment disqualification. The granting of an exemption from employment disqualification would allow for Petitioner’s employment as a direct service provider to APD clients. APD’s clients are a vulnerable population, consisting of those individuals whose developmental disabilities are statutorily defined as: intellectual disability, autism, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and/or Phelan-McDermid Syndrome. See § 393.063(12), Fla. Stat. Without APD’s services, these clients would otherwise require institutionalization. APD’s clients often have severe deficits in their abilities to complete self-care tasks and communicate their wants and needs. These clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, neglect, and exploitation because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve; consequently, employment as a direct service provider to APD clients is regarded as a position of special trust. APD is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers for which Petitioner seeks to qualify. See §§ 110.1127(2)(c)1. and 393.0655, Fla. Stat. Many of the tasks direct service providers perform for, and/or assist individuals with disabilities with, include those of a social, personal needs, and/or financial nature. APD relies on DCF to initially receive exemption from employment disqualification requests and compile documents received related to such requests. On or around May 10, 2016, Petitioner submitted a Request for Exemption, Exemption Questionnaire, a copy of her criminal record, character references, and other various documents (the Exemption Packet) to DCF in order to demonstrate support for the granting of an exemption from employment disqualification. DCF subsequently forwarded the Exemption Packet to APD for review. In beginning its exemption review, APD considered Petitioner’s disqualifying offense. Specifically, in December 1982, Petitioner committed the disqualifying offense of Larceny/Grand Theft (a violation of section 810.014). The court’s final disposition of the case included the withholding of adjudication of guilt, two years’ probation, and payment of costs. In its continued exemption review pursuant to section 435.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes, APD considered the following non- disqualifying offenses which Petitioner committed subsequent to her December 1982 disqualifying offense: an arrest for Worthless Check on December 23, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05, Florida Statutes); a second arrest for Worthless Check on December 23, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05); a conviction for Worthless Check on December 24, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05); an arrest for Driving While License Suspended/Revoked in June 1996 (a violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes); an arrest for Worthless Check in January 2007 (a violation of section 832.05(4)(a)); and an arrest for Violation of Injunction Domestic Violence/Contempt of Court in August 2012 (a violation of section 741.31(4)(a), Florida Statutes). The Disqualifying Offense Petitioner provided an account of her disqualifying offense, Larcency/Grand Theft, in an addendum to the Exemption Questionnaire, dated August 3, 2015. Petitioner indicated in her account that she relocated to Tampa from Gainesville. She was 22 years old, single, and employed with the State of Florida. She became roommates with another female who was attending college at the University of South Florida. Petitioner stated “I have no explanation as to why the both of us committed a crime of theft.” Petitioner further explained that she received a two- year term of probation and completed all her court-ordered sanctions within a year. Petitioner also noted that “[s]ince that time, I have not committed any further crimes.” Petitioner provided the following record concerning her disqualifying offense: state attorney court record (13th Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, State Attorney). The Non-Disqualifying Offenses Court records received in evidence indicate a total of six non-disqualifying offenses as previously mentioned. Petitioner did not disclose any of her non-disqualifying offenses, nor did she provide accounts for such on the Exemption Questionnaire, despite the directions specifically requiring an applicant to do so. Petitioner did not provide records of her non- disqualifying offenses. Records of those offenses were obtained by APD as part of its detailed review process. Records of the non-disqualifying offenses obtained included: worthless check affidavit, witness form, copies of check, and no information filed court filing (Sears 12/23/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, and copy of check (Pic’n Save 12/23/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, copy of check, and court judgment (Pic’n Save 12/24/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, copy of check, copy of court diversion judgment and supporting documentation, and copy of dismissal of charge (Publix 1/30/2007); and warrant affidavit for arrest (Alachua County Sheriff’s Office, August 2012). Petitioner indicated that she has no current involvement with any court system; specifically, she stated “I have not experienced any criminal charges since my last event in 1982.” Regarding whether there was any degree of harm to any victim or property, including damage or injuries, Petitioner stated “I have not experienced any harm or damage to anyone or any property since my last event in 1982.” In answering the question about stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying incident, Petitioner indicated that there were none, other than being on probation. Regarding whether there are any current stressors in her life, Petitioner stated “I have no current stressors with the law.” Petitioner indicated that her current support system and living arrangements include being married and having one daughter and numerous grandchildren. Petitioner also explained that her community activities/volunteer efforts include volunteering with the school system (field trips/activities) and attending church and performing functions for the church’s treasury department. Regarding educational and training achievements, Petitioner stated that she graduated from high school, started a career with the State of Florida, and attended a word processing/information course where she received the Most Outstanding Student Award. The Exemption Questionnaire asks whether an applicant has ever received counseling for any reason. Petitioner indicated that she has not received counseling for any reason; if she felt stress, she would call the Employee Assistance Program. Petitioner noted she has not experienced any “major post- traumatic [stress].” As to whether she has used and/or abused drugs or alcohol, Petitioner replied that she has “not abused any type of drugs or alcohol in [her] life.” Petitioner indicated the following regarding feeling remorse/accepting responsibility for her actions: “I am the type of person to feel remorse towards everything and every person that I have contact with. I always take full responsibility for any action(s) that I encounter when I am in the wrong.” The Exemption Questionnaire asks for an applicant’s prior three years’ work history. Petitioner provided the following information: 4/2016 to 5/2016--The Arc of Alachua County (support tech/direct care); 11/2007 to 7/2014--DCF--North Florida Evaluation & Treatment Center (Human Services Worker III); 3/2004 to 7/2007—DCF--State of Florida Foster Care (word processor/data management specialist); 4/1998 to 9/2003-- American Psychiatric Association (membership coordinator/secretary). In addition to the criminal record submitted, Petitioner also provided the following additional documents that were included in her Exemption Packet: local law background checks, a volunteer award (Head Start), three letters of reference attesting to Petitioner’s character, and an Affidavit of Good Moral Character. The letters were written by persons who have known Petitioner for several years; they described Petitioner as devoted, loyal, honest, kind, and trustworthy. Finally, Petitioner submitted a copy of an exemption letter she received from DCF, dated February 12, 2016. Leslie Richards, regional operations manager for APD’s Northeast Region, advised that APD reviewed all documentation provided by Petitioner in her Request for Exemption, the information indicated in Petitioner’s Exemption Questionnaire, the various records documenting Petitioner’s criminal history, her volunteer award, character letters, and exemption from DCF. Following a review of Petitioner’s Exemption Packet, Agency Director Barbara Palmer, advised Petitioner by a letter dated September 26, 2016, that her request for an exemption from her disqualifying offense was denied. The basis for the denial was that Petitioner failed to submit clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. Petitioner sent APD a request for hearing on or around October 11, 2016. APD received this request timely and subsequently forwarded this appeal to DOAH. Along with her request for hearing, Petitioner submitted a personal statement explaining her reasons for disputing the denial and requesting the hearing, a copy of the denial letter, and a copy of a training certificate summary for APD-approved courses through her former employer, the Arc of Alachua County. At hearing, Ms. Richards explained APD’s process of reviewing exemption requests and the consideration of Petitioner’s application for such. Per Ms. Richards, APD considers the disqualifying offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the nature of the harm caused to the victim, the history of the applicant since the incident, and finally, any other evidence indicating that the applicant will not present a danger if employment is allowed. Additionally, Ms. Richards testified that APD looks for consistency in the applicant’s account of events in his or her Exemption Questionnaire, the passage of time since the disqualifying incident, whether the applicant accepts responsibility for his/her actions, and whether the applicant expresses remorse for his or her prior criminal acts. Because an applicant will be occupying a position of special trust if granted an exemption, APD weighs all of these factors in its determination. Ms. Richards testified that all of Petitioner’s submissions were reviewed and taken into consideration; she noted that the starting point of APD’s review began with the date of the disqualifying offense and any criminal conduct occurring thereafter. Ms. Richards emphasized that in APD’s review, it was noted that Petitioner failed to disclose sufficient details of the account of her disqualifying offense. Specifically, Petitioner provided what appeared to be background information about the time frame surrounding the offense and the person whom she committed the offense with, but indicated in her statement “I have no explanation as to why the both of us committed a crime of theft.” Petitioner provided other details about this time in her life, but nothing specific about the crime itself. Ms. Richards stated that it left APD with a concern that Petitioner was not forthright with disclosure of the circumstances involving the crime. Ms. Richards also explained that APD took note that Petitioner failed to disclose any of her non-disqualifying offenses, and that this fact was also of concern. APD obtained records of the non-disqualifying offenses and considered them in its review. Ms. Richards noted that the nature of the offenses, particularly the Worthless Checks and the Violation of the Injunction Domestic Violence/Contempt of Court, were troubling because those offenses involved monetary transactions and interpersonal relations. Ms. Richards observed that the individuals APD serves are highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and a person who is in a role as a direct service provider would be assisting those individuals in a social and financial capacity. APD reviewed Petitioner’s involvement with three DCF investigations involving allegations of abuse toward a vulnerable adult, Petitioner’s spouse. Although there were no findings against Petitioner in these cases, based on the issues presented, DCF did make the recommendation for Petitioner to pursue family counseling. Ms. Richards noted that there is no evidence that Petitioner followed through with DCF’s recommendation, and by Petitioner’s own admission on the Exemption Questionnaire, has “not received counseling for any reason.” In addition to both the criminal offense and DCF- related information, APD noted Petitioner’s less than stellar driving record. Ms. Richards advised that a direct service provider will often be in a position to transport clients, and Petitioner’s driving record reflects a series of both moving and non-moving violations, which pose a concern. The record reflects a total of five driving-related violations: driving while license suspended/revoked (previously mentioned); tag not assigned (criminal traffic); red light camera citation; unlawful speeding; and a second red light camera citation. Ms. Richards testified regarding APD’s consideration of Petitioner’s prior employment history with DCF, and the subsequent exemption for employment granted to Petitioner by DCF. At hearing, APD presented employment evaluations and records of written disciplinary action taken against Petitioner by DCF while in its employ. Ms. Richards specifically noted that some of the disciplinary issues for which Petitioner was cited included: sleeping on the job while employed at a forensic facility; not securing the front door of a building at a forensic facility; tardiness; inappropriately streaming media on a state-owned computer; insubordination (refusal to work a shift); failure to report to work; and poor performance/negligence (failure to answer phones/answer front door of facility). Petitioner ultimately was dismissed from DCF due to her inability to perform her job functions because of an injury. Ms. Richards explained that these disciplinary issues gave APD great pause in considering granting Petitioner an exemption, as they were indicators for potential behaviors that could pose a great risk to individuals served by APD, many of whom are unable to communicate their wants and needs. The setting in which Petitioner committed these workplace violations mirrors those in which clients of APD are served. Ms. Richards did state that APD considered the exemption granted by DCF to Petitioner, however, the weight of the prior disciplinary issues outweighed that decision when compared to the possible jeopardy in which APD clients could be placed. Should Petitioner obtain future successful employment with DCF, APD would consider that in a subsequent exemption application review. Petitioner testified on her own behalf at the hearing. She spoke about the circumstances surrounding the disqualifying offense, reiterating her statement from the addendum to the Exemption Questionnaire. She provided no new information or surrounding details about the crime. Again, she stated that she has not had any legal issues since 1982. Regarding her non- disqualifying offenses, Petitioner remarked that she “didn’t consider those bad checks as crimes,” and though she denied being convicted of such, she admitted having overdrafted checks. Petitioner also stated that regarding the DCF investigations and the Injunction Violation/Contempt of Court charge, “that’s not why we are here today, so I am not going to talk about that.” Petitioner did admit to the driving infractions on her record, but stated that two of them, running red lights, were due to the fault of her daughter, as she was the driver at the time, rather than Petitioner. Petitioner stated that she is older and wiser and has changed. She enjoyed working at the adult day care program with the Arc of Alachua County. She indicated that any bad checks she has written, she “took care of.” Petitioner offered explanations for the disciplinary situations involving her prior employment with DCF, attempting to minimize her role. She explained that she and her husband, who Petitioner described as a vulnerable, disabled adult, no longer have domestic issues; however, they are currently homeless. Petitioner stated that APD’s denial is keeping her in an adverse financial situation, stating “I cannot find a job right now because of this denial.” When cross- examined by counsel regarding her ability to obtain gainful employment with DCF and its covered providers, Petitioner admitted that she can seek a job under DCF’s purview. Petitioner presented the testimony of two witnesses. Her sister, Sherry McCrae, a retired police officer, stated that she lived with her sister the entire time she was in college; Petitioner provided a source of support to her during this period. Ms. McCrae stated that her sister has been working all the years since the disqualifying incident. She affirmed that their maiden name is Williams, Petitioner’s last name at the time of the disqualifying incident. Petitioner’s second witness, Faye Williams, testified that after Petitioner’s disqualifying incident, she got a job and was active in the community. Petitioner has a desire “to be a part of something.” She loves people, especially children. Petitioner asserted that she enjoys working with individuals with disabilities; at her last place of employment, she believed she found her “purpose and mission.” She loves helping people. She admits she made some mistakes, but that was long ago. Petitioner argued that she “really only committed one crime”; she has rehabilitated herself and that should be enough for APD. She believes APD abused its discretion in denying her request for exemption. The individuals APD serves are vulnerable and highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation, due to their developmental disabilities. APD’s representative observed that APD’s clients must be assigned to direct care providers without fear of their endangerment. This necessarily requires reliance on a caregiver’s good character and trustworthiness. Individuals who provide direct care are frequently responsible for assisting individuals in making decisions of a financial, medical, and social nature. APD must weigh the benefit against the risk when considering granting an exemption. Ms. Richards cautioned that Petitioner’s criminal history reflects a pattern of poor judgment. Petitioner’s failure to disclose certain details in her account regarding her disqualifying offense calls into question her trustworthiness. Additionally, failure to disclose her non-disqualifying offenses, along with a failure to recognize that those offenses are truly crimes, is not only troubling, but calls into question Petitioner’s trustworthiness. It also demonstrates a complete lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility for her actions. Petitioner did not admit to any of the harm she caused to her victims. Petitioner’s minimization of the discipline she received while employed by DCF also gives great pause, as the individuals she was charged with caring for were clients in a forensic setting, a clear parallel to the clients she would serve should an exemption be granted by APD. Petitioner’s multiple driving citations are concerning as well, and demonstrate a pattern of questionable decision- making, especially when considering her for a position where she could potentially transport clients. All of the aforementioned factors, along with proximity in time of her application to her last arrest (2012), caused APD to question Petitioner’s fitness for providing services to the vulnerable individuals for which it is responsible, the most vulnerable population in the state. Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation, and therefore, the denial of the exemption was proper.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities issue a final order upholding the denial of Petitioner’s exemption request. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2017.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569322.34393.063393.0655435.04435.07741.31832.05
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs GREGG CONSTRUCTION, 17-006447 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 27, 2017 Number: 17-006447 Latest Update: Sep. 27, 2018

The Issue Whether Respondent violated chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2016), by failing to secure payment of workers’ compensation coverage, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order (“SWO”) and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (“Third AOPA”); and, if so, whether Petitioner correctly calculated the proposed penalty assessment against Respondent.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence admitted at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Background The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of the Workers' Compensation Law that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for their employees and corporate officers. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. The Department is the agency responsible for conducting random inspections of jobsites and investigating complaints concerning potential violations of workers’ compensation rules. Gregg Construction is a corporation engaged in business in the State of Florida. Gregg Construction has been operating as a business since November 9, 2007. William Gregg is the owner of Gregg Construction and its sole employee. The address of record for Gregg Construction is 166 Big White Oak Lane, Crawfordville, Florida 32327. On June 15, 2017, the Department’s investigator, Lewis Johnson, conducted a routine visit to a jobsite to conduct a compliance investigation. Mr. Johnson observed Mr. Gregg use a table saw, measure, and cut a piece of wood. Mr. Johnson then observed Mr. Gregg nail the wood to the exterior wall of the home at the jobsite. After Mr. Johnson inquired about the work Mr. Gregg was performing, Mr. Gregg ultimately told Mr. Johnson that he was working as a subcontractor for Respondent. Based on Mr. Johnson’s observations, Mr. Gregg was performing construction-related work at the job site. Mr. Johnson then conducted a search of the Department’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”), which revealed that Respondent did not have active workers’ compensation coverage for Mr. Gregg. Based on the results of his investigation, on May 10, 2017, Mr. Johnson issued a SWO to Respondent for failure to maintain workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. On May 10, 2017, Mr. Johnson hand-served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculations (“Records Request”) on Respondent. The Records Request directed Respondent to produce business records for the time period of May 10, 2015, through May 11, 2017. While Respondent provided tax returns, it did not provide sufficient business records to the Department. Penalty Assessment To calculate the penalty assessment, the Department uses a two-year auditing period looking back from the date of the SWO, May 10, 2017, also known as the look-back period. Generally, the Department uses business records to calculate the penalty assessment. If the employer does not produce records sufficient to determine payroll for employees, the Department uses imputed payroll to assess the penalty as required by section 440.107(7)(e) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028. Eunika Jackson, a Department penalty auditor, was assigned to calculate the penalty assessment for Respondent. Based upon Mr. Johnson’s observations at the jobsite on May 10, 2017, Ms. Jackson assigned National Council on Compensation Insurance (“NCCI”) classification code 5645 to calculate the penalty. Classification code 5645 applies to work involving carpentry. Ms. Jackson applied the approved manual rates for classification 5645 for the work Mr. Johnson observed Mr. Gregg perform. The application of the rates was utilized by the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and rule 69L- 6.027 to determine the penalty assessment. The manual rate applied in this case was $15.91 for the period of May 11, 2015, through December 31, 2017; and $16.92 for the period of January 1, 2016, through June 10, 2017. The statewide average weekly wage, effective January 1, 2017, was used to calculate the penalty assessment. Mr. Johnson discovered that Mr. Gregg previously held an exemption, which expired on April 26, 2013. Although Mr. Gregg currently has an exemption, his exemption was not in effect during the audit period. On June 6, 2017, the Department issued its first AOPA that ordered Respondent to pay a penalty of $46,087.72, pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d). On August 1, 2017, Petitioner issued the Second AOPA based upon records submitted by Respondent, which reduced the penalty assessment to $14,752.62. After this matter was referred to the Division, on January 23, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment and issued the Third AOPA based upon records submitted by Respondent. Based on the Department’s calculation, the record demonstrates that the penalty assessment, based on records provided by Respondent, would be $9,785.50.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order finding the following: that Respondent failed to secure and maintain workers’ compensation coverage for Mr. Gregg; and that Respondent shall pay a penalty of $9,785.50.1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2018.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.68440.02440.10440.105440.107440.38
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KERMIT WILLIAM MERSING vs. DIVISION OF LICENSING, 79-002389 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002389 Latest Update: Mar. 05, 1980

Findings Of Fact The applicant is currently employed by Central Security Patrol in Jacksonville, Florida. His supervisor testified in his behalf. Mersing is a good worker, dependable and trustworthy. His supervisor has known Mersing since his employment with Central Security six months ago. Mersing has never been cautioned or disciplined on the job and is employed at Container Corporation of American in Jacksonville, Florida. The applicant testified in his own behalf. The applicant stated that he had thought that the two arrests reported on Exhibit 1 had occurred while he was a juvenile. However, the applicant stated that he was sentenced to one to ten years for this offense to the prison system of the state of West Virginia. The applicant served six months in a maximum security prison and six months in a minimum security prison prior to his parole. He was discharged from parole supervision on March 25, 1968.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the applicant's application for a Class F, unarmed guard license be denied; however, that favorable consideration be given his reapplication submitted with proof that his civil rights have been restored by the state of West Virginia in the absence of any other disqualifying grounds. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Kermit W. Mersing 301 Broome Street Fernandina Beach, Florida 32034 =================================================================

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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PAUL E. KANE vs. DIVISION OF LICENSING, 80-001117 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001117 Latest Update: Oct. 27, 1980

Findings Of Fact On October 31, 1979, Petitioner signed, under oath, Respondent's application form for an unarmed guard license, swearing that the information contained in the application is true and correct. In answer to Question 2 of the application, Petitioner gave his name as Paul Edward Kane. Question 3 of the application reads: "Have you ever been known by any other name other than that given above?" Petitioner answered in the affirmative and listed the following names: Consumer Credit Corp., Walter D. Wadsworth, Mr. E. Samuels, M. Ross, Mr. Frank, and "others." He did not advise Respondent that he had used the name Paul E. Smith both in Tampa and while he was in the U.S. Army. He additionally failed to list the name Paul H. Smith, although he has also used that name. Question 9 of the application form requests an applicant's date of birth. Petitioner gave his as January 18, 1926. Although that is his actual birth date, he has also used January 18, 1930, as a birth date while in the military service, and has used others from time to time. Question 12 of the application form requests information regarding military service. Petitioner advised that he had served in the U.S. Army from September, 1947, through November, 1953, and had received an honorable discharge. He neglected to advise Respondent that he had served on two occasions and had received two discharges. One of those discharges was a dishonorable discharge resulting from a court martial conviction on charges in Japan, which dishonorable discharge apparently was later changed to a general discharge. His other term of service did result in an honorable discharge. Question 13 on the application form requires a listing of all arrests. Petitioner advised that he had been arrested for driving while intoxicated in 1975 and in 1977, and had been fined as a result of each of those arrests. Petitioner withheld any mention of the following arrests: 1952, robbery and assault with a deadly weapon; 1952, robbery and assault with a deadly weapon; 1954, contributing to the delinquency of a minor; 1954, violation of probation resulting from one of his robbery and assault with a deadly weapon arrests; 1963, destroying personal property; 1971, two separate arrests involving four worthless checks; 1972, rape; 1973, worthless check; 1977, forgery; and 1979, two counts of violation of probation. He has also been arrested for driving without a license. While in the military service, Petitioner was charged with assaulting a Japanese national by shooting him in the face with a pistol. A court martial sentenced him to two and one-half years imprisonment. Petitioner is presently on probation pursuant to a worthless check conviction, and his probationary period will not terminate until October 31, 1982. Although not all of the arrests listed above resulted in a conviction, Petitioner was minimally convicted of one of the 1971 worthless check charges and of the charges against him while he was in the military service. Petitioner's witness had no personal knowledge of Petitioner's application, his character, or his history.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: A Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for a Class "F" Unarmed Security Guard License. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Paul E. Kane 4621 Pearl Street Tampa, Florida 33611 W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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SONYA NICOLE SAMUELS vs AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 16-006424EXE (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Leesburg, Florida Nov. 02, 2016 Number: 16-006424EXE Latest Update: Apr. 20, 2017

The Issue The issue in this case is whether it would be an abuse of discretion to deny Petitioner's request for exemption from employment disqualification.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is seeking employment with the Lake County Board of County Commissioners, in a service provider function that is regulated by the Agency. As a prospective direct service provider, Petitioner was required to comply with background screening requirements. The Agency's clients are a vulnerable population, consisting of persons with the following statutorily defined developmental disabilities: intellectual disability, autism, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and/or Phelan-McDermid Syndrome. § 393.063(12), Fla. Stat. Without the Agency's services, these clients would otherwise require institutionalization. The Agency's clients often have severe deficits in their abilities to complete self-care tasks and communicate their wants and needs. Such clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, neglect, and exploitation because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve. Consequently, employment as a direct service provider to the Agency’s clients is considered a position of special trust. The Agency is responsible for regulating the employment of direct service providers in positions of special trust such as that sought by Petitioner. See §§ 110.1127(2)(c)1. and 393.0655, Fla. Stat. Many of the tasks undertaken by direct service providers for individuals with disabilities are of a social, personal needs, and/or financial nature. The background screening unit of the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) performs background screenings for the Agency. Petitioner received notification from DCF, via letter dated January 8, 2016, of her disqualification from employment due to her criminal history. The specific disqualifying offense listed in the letter was aggravated battery with a weapon, in violation of section 784.045, Florida Statutes, a second degree felony. Because Petitioner’s screening indicated a disqualifying offense, Petitioner was required to seek an exemption from disqualification in order to proceed with her application to work as a direct service provider. On or about February 26, 2016, Petitioner submitted to DCF a Request for Exemption form, a completed Exemption Questionnaire form, various criminal records, character references, and other documents in support of granting of exemption from employment disqualification. DCF subsequently forwarded these materials to the Agency for review. The Agency began its exemption review by considering Petitioner's disqualifying offense. In June 1988, Petitioner committed the disqualifying offense of aggravated battery with a weapon. The police report of the incident stated that Petitioner stabbed her husband in the shoulder with a knife during an argument. The stab wound was serious enough to require treatment at the hospital and a subsequent visit to a specialist. On her Exemption Questionnaire form, Petitioner indicated that her husband suffered permanent scarring from the wound. An arrest affidavit for probable cause was issued by the Leesburg Police Department. Petitioner later pled nolo contendere to the disqualifying offense and adjudication was withheld. She was sentenced to thirty-six (36) months of probation, payment of fines, court costs, mental health counseling, and a drug and alcohol program. Petitioner successfully completed her probation on August 29, 1991. In the Exemption Questionnaire form, Petitioner set forth her version of the circumstances involved in the disqualifying offense: At 21 years of age, I was dealing with regular occurrences of mental distress within the home, such as emotional, mental, verbal and physical abuse by my ex-husband. On the day of this offense, my ex-husband entered our home in a rageful [sic] manner. Fear gripped me. He began to argue. He also went into the closet, pulling out a motorcycle chain. He began to strike me with it. After running outside, my ex- husband chased me with his belt off, hitting me with the belt buckle. A girl scout’s knife was already in my hand. He continued to hit me with the belt buckle, swinging his arm. As I turned around in self-defense, my ex-husband was struck with the girl scout’s knife. Realizing what happened, I began to cry frantically, (my concern was to get medical attention for him), apologizing and begging for forgiveness. Petitioner’s record indicates no other criminal offenses of any kind, whether disqualifying or non- disqualifying. The Exemption Questionnaire form requires applicants to describe the degree of harm to any victim of their disqualifying offenses. Petitioner wrote, “Thanks be unto God, my ex-husband sustained non-life threatening injuries with permanent scarring.” The Exemption Questionnaire form requires applicants to describe any stressors in their lives at the time of the disqualifying incident and at present. Petitioner wrote that there were stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying incident. She did not elaborate, but in answer to another question she wrote that at age 21 she “had begun to abuse chemical substances.” She stated that her drug use was short-lived and that she ceased it permanently after the stabbing incident. Regarding whether there are any current stressors in her life, Petitioner wrote that she is "practising [sic] unhealthy habits." Again, Petitioner did not elaborate as to the nature of these unhealthy habits, but at the hearing she explained that she was referencing overeating and not exercising. Petitioner wrote that she is single and lives with her mother, and that her community activities include her family, women's group, church, art workshops, poetry and prose writing, and volunteering for the community development center when needed. The Exemption Questionnaire form asks for an applicant's prior three years' work history and an explanation of any job changes. Petitioner’s employment record indicated she had driven a school bus for several years. Petitioner provided the following explanation for changing jobs: "changed careers from transportation to medical industry to procure an immense financial gain. Have also decided to strive above and beyond my comfort zones to secure a position of my dreams." The Exemption Questionnaire form requires the applicant to list his or her educational history and any specialized training. Petitioner listed the following: Office Support Technology, specializing in Professional Leadership Development; Master Security Officer, specializing in Basic Supervisor, Leadership, & Advanced Manager; Patient Care Technician, specializing in Pharmacy Aide, EKG Aide and Unit Secretary/Coordinator; and Private Investigation, specializing in Legal Assistant & Fraud Insurance. Petitioner listed no specific institution for these certifications or specializations, but other documents submitted by Petitioner indicate that the Office Support Technology and Patient Care Technician courses were provided by Lake Technical College in 1996-97 and 1999, respectively; the Master Security Officer certification was provided by Barton MSO in 2003; and the Private Investigator diploma was received from City College in 2011. In response to the Exemption Questionnaire form’s requirement that the applicant document any history of counseling, Petitioner wrote that she received mental health counseling in 1988 and anger management counseling in 2007. Finally, under the heading “Remorse/accept responsibility,” the Exemption Questionnaire form requires the applicant to document any relevant information related to the acceptance of responsibility for his or her offenses. Petitioner wrote as follows: The harm done to my ex-husband caused me to feel very awful. Because of the forgiveness from my trespasses, the acceptance of the offense towards my ex-husband subsided day by day. Taking responsibility for my actions made me realize that I must become a better person and live a better life by improving myself so that I would someday become a productive citizen and asset to society and my family. Petitioner listed the following specific employment record: CareMinders Home Care, February 2015 to August 2015 (certified nurse assistant); Interim Healthcare, December 2014 to June 2015 (certified nurse assistant); Lake County School Board, October 2005 to August 2013 (school bus driver). In support of her exemption request, Petitioner also submitted a copy of a “Lake County Head Start Parent of the Year” award she received in 1999, a copy of an “International Poet of Merit” award she received in 2000, and reference letters from previous employers and longtime friends. Petitioner’s friends described her as hard-working, compassionate, respectful, and considerate. By letter dated September 26, 2016, the Director of the Agency informed Petitioner that her request for an exemption from disqualification had been denied “based on a Background Screening that was performed on 1/07/2016 . . . . The Agency considered all available information that led to your disqualification, as well as all information provided by you regarding your disqualification. The Agency has denied your request for an exemption because you have not submitted clear and convincing evidence of your rehabilitation.” The Director’s letter informed Petitioner of her right to request an administrative hearing to dispute the Agency’s proposed action. Petitioner timely filed a Request for Administrative Hearing. At the hearing, the Agency presented the testimony of Michael Sauvé, the Agency’s Deputy Regional Operations Manager for the Central Region. Mr. Sauvé testified that the Agency had reviewed all of the documentation submitted by Petitioner in response to the Exemption Questionnaire, as well as additional documents she submitted with her Request for Administrative Hearing. These additional documents included an exemption from disqualification, dated March 26, 2013, granted by the Department of Health, Board of Nursing; and a letter of disqualification from employment from the Agency for Health Care Administration, dated December 30, 2015. Mr. Sauvé testified that in reviewing exemption requests, the Agency considers the disqualifying offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the nature of the harm caused to the victim, the history of the applicant since the incident, and any other evidence indicating that the applicant will not present a danger to a vulnerable population if the exemption is granted. Mr. Sauvé also stated that the Agency seeks consistency in the applicant's account of events in his or her Exemption Questionnaire, and considers the passage of time since the disqualifying incident, whether or not the applicant accepts responsibility for his or her actions, and whether the applicant expresses remorse for his or her prior criminal acts. Mr. Sauvé testified that the Agency noted marked inconsistencies between Petitioner's account of her disqualifying offense and the statements found in the police report. However, the police report of the incident consists of hearsay within hearsay, i.e., the responding officer’s narrative of events as told to him by the involved parties. The police report may not be relied upon in this tribunal for the truth of the matters asserted therein. It is of no use in establishing that Petitioner’s version of events is untruthful or minimizes the seriousness of the incident. In any event, the inconsistencies noted by the Agency were relatively minor critiques of Petitioner’s written narrative. For example, Petitioner stated in her Exemption Questionnaire that she ran outside as her husband chased her and hit her with his belt buckle and that she already had a Girl Scout knife in her hand. She offered no explanation as to how or why the knife came to be in her hand. Given that she freely admitted to stabbing her husband, Petitioner’s failure to detail exactly when she picked up the knife, as he hit her with a motorcycle chain and a belt buckle, seems of little importance. Mr. Sauvé testified that the Agency was also concerned that Petitioner appeared to minimize the seriousness of the incident when she wrote that her husband suffered “non-life threatening injuries with permanent scarring.” Mr. Sauvé contrasted Petitioner’s statement with the police report stating that the victim was “stabbed deep enough that he had to go to [the hospital] for treatment and then to have a specialist work on him due to the seriousness of the cut.” The cut was on the back of the victim’s shoulder and in no account was the incident described as “life threatening.” Petitioner’s description may have lacked detail but was more or less consistent with the police report. Mr. Sauvé testified that the Agency examined Petitioner’s driving record and found three speeding tickets. Such violations are a concern to the Agency because individuals who are granted exemptions could be called upon to transport clients. The Agency must be confident that these clients will be transported safely. More than her written statements, Petitioner’s testimony caused the undersigned to share the Agency’s concern about Petitioner minimizing her disqualifying offense. She seemed much more concerned with explaining the speeding tickets than in expanding upon her brief written statement regarding aggravated battery with a weapon. Petitioner simply read aloud her written statement about stabbing her husband, then launched into a detailed discussion of her speeding tickets. Also, Petitioner could not recall whether her driver’s license had ever been suspended. When confronted with documentation that it had, Petitioner stated that her license had never been suspended “for cause.” None of this testimony was helpful in establishing Petitioner’s unvarnished veracity or her appreciation of the seriousness of her disqualifying offense. Mr. Sauvé testified that the Agency had a concern with Petitioner’s statement that she had changed careers to the medical field to "procure an immense financial gain." Mr. Sauvé noted that it is not unreasonable for a person to seek a decent income, but that it is highly unusual and somewhat disconcerting for a person to enter the field of serving persons with disabilities with the idea of “immense financial gain.” Mr. Sauvé’s concern on this point was well taken. In another case, the undersigned might be inclined to find that the applicant had merely chosen an unartful way to express her hope of bettering her station in life, but Petitioner presents herself as the professional author of two books. She may be presumed to understand the form of the thoughts she puts to paper. Petitioner said nothing at the final hearing to allay the concern Mr. Suave expressed about her stated motivation for entering the field. Mr. Sauvé also discussed three DCF reports involving Petitioner in allegations of abuse. The first report, dated 1989, involved a verified finding of sexual battery against Petitioner's then-husband. According to the report, a relative told the investigator that the husband had a history as a sexual perpetrator. The report stated that Petitioner allowed access to her daughter and that the husband had fondled the child. The report stated that Petitioner had been made aware of what happened but chose to forgive the husband. She remained in the home with him, allowing continued access to the child. DCF cited Petitioner for failure to protect her child. The husband was subsequently arrested and charged with sexual battery. Petitioner testified that her actions should be viewed in light of the fact that she herself was an abuse victim. She stated that she took steps to protect her children as soon as she learned her husband was abusing them. Petitioner presented the testimony of her daughter, Candace Chatman, who stated that she was the child victim identified in the 1989 DCF report. Ms. Chatman testified that, contrary to the report, her mother did not know about the abuse when it was occurring. She stated that she was eight years old and was living with her grandmother at the time of the abuse, which she recalled occurring only once. Ms. Chatman stated that she did not tell her mother about the abuse; rather, she told another child at school about it. Ms. Chatman’s testimony was credible. The second DCF report, dated 1996, involved allegations that Petitioner hit her daughter in the head, resulting in migraine headaches. According to the report, the daughter stated that Petitioner "does hit her in the head" and once threw a bowl at her, hitting her in the face. DCF rendered findings of “some indicators” for the maltreatments of beatings, physical injury, and family violence that threatens a child, though the report assessed the risk as “low” because of the presence of family members to monitor the situation. Neither Petitioner nor Ms. Chatman directly addressed the 1996 report in their testimony. The hearsay report may not be relied upon for the truth of the matters asserted therein, but the undersigned is entitled to take notice of Petitioner’s silence as to the very serious allegation made in the report. Mr. Sauvé discussed the final DCF report, dated 2002. This incident pertained to an allegation involving Petitioner's sons, who were then aged 13 and 8. The older boy had been sexually abused by Petitioner’s spouse, and was now believed to be sexually “acting out” with his younger brother. The DCF report states that Petitioner denied any knowledge of an incident between the boys, and that Petitioner alternatively admitted and then denied having knowledge of the older boy’s prior molestation. Child services authorities advised Petitioner to separate the boys at any time they might be unsupervised. The younger child started going to his grandmother’s house after school, where he stayed until Petitioner picked him up on her way home from work. At the hearing, Petitioner testified that she had never seen the 2002 DCF report. She first denied that any abuse was occurring in her home in 2002, then stated that she had not been aware of anything untoward. Petitioner denied any knowledge that her older son had been molested by her husband. She testified that her admission to the authorities that molestation had occurred “was a way to get him counseling” because of the way he had been acting out in school. During cross-examination, Petitioner denied knowing why child services advised her to separate the boys. She stated that she did not ask why. The authorities simply told her that everything would be all right if she separated them and so she complied. Petitioner’s testimony as to the 2002 DCF report cannot be credited. This finding is not based on any contradiction between Petitioner’s testimony and the facts as stated in the hearsay DCF report; rather, it is based on the inherent lack of credibility in Petitioner’s statements. Especially problematic is her claim that she did not even ask the authorities why her sons should be kept apart. Petitioner’s unwillingness to admit any knowledge of, or even curiosity as to what the authorities alleged was happening in her home, raises serious concerns as to her character and judgment. Petitioner’s overall presentation tended to undermine her case. As noted above, she seemed unduly preoccupied with traffic tickets as opposed to the far more serious matters that concerned the Agency. Her testimony was rambling, discursive, and argumentative. The undersigned could not help but note that Ms. Chatman often interjected comments, sotto voce, in an effort to keep her mother on point during her testimony. As the hearing progressed, Petitioner became increasingly angry at the Agency for failing to recognize her “compassion.” Petitioner’s initial burden is to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is entitled to an exemption. The “clear and convincing” standard requires evidence sufficient “to convince the trier of fact without any hesitancy.” In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1051, 116 S. Ct. 719, 133 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1996). Petitioner’s presentation clearly failed to rise to this standard. Petitioner appears to have turned her life around somewhat after a history of abuse, but she failed to convince either the Agency or the undersigned that she is sufficiently rehabilitated to be trusted to work with persons who are vulnerable and highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation due to their developmental disabilities. In light of all the evidence presented at the hearing, it cannot be found that the Agency abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's request for an exemption. Taken in its entirety, the evidence supports the Agency's determination that the evidence of Petitioner's rehabilitation was insufficient.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying the request of Petitioner for exemption from employment disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities Suite 422 200 North Kentucky Avenue Lakeland, Florida 33801 (eServed) Sonya Nicole Samuels 496 Goss Avenue Leesburg, Florida 34748 (eServed) Michele Lucas, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569393.063393.0655435.04435.07784.045
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KARLIER ROBINSON | K. R. vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 99-000937 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Blountstown, Florida Feb. 25, 1999 Number: 99-000937 Latest Update: Mar. 06, 2000

The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to exemption from disqualification by law with regard to working in a position of special trust and responsibility related to children, disabled adults, and elderly persons?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is disqualified from working in a position of special trust because of: a 1991 conviction of grand theft auto; a 1980 conviction of battery; two counts in 1993 of uttering a forged instrument, one count of petty theft and one count of trespassing after warning. Respondent's testimony was direct, candid, and creditable. He previously engaged in a life-style that is no longer compatible with his present involvement with church and community. His testimony was well corroborated by the testimony of eight other witnesses and numerous exhibits. As established by clear and convincing evidence at the final hearing, Respondent is rehabilitated and unlikely again to engage in criminal conduct or present a threat to children, disabled adults, or elderly persons, if employed in a position of special trust. The various criminal offenses for which Petitioner has been convicted, were all committed more than three years prior to his disqualification notice from Respondent for which Petitioner now seeks exemption. Section 435.07, Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered granting Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification to work with children in positions of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Karlier Robinson 1018 Martin Street Blountstown, Florida 32424 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 252-A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (2) 120.57435.07
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ROSALYN THOMAS vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 17-005511 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Oct. 04, 2017 Number: 17-005511 Latest Update: Jan. 12, 2018

The Issue Whether Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that she has been rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense(s), and, if so, would it be an abuse of discretion for the agency to deny her exemption application under section 435.07, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") is the state agency required to conduct background screenings for employees who provide certain types of services related to health care under chapters 400, 408, and 429, Florida Statutes. § 408.809, Fla. Stat. Petitioner seeks employment in a position providing services to residents of a health care facility or under a license issued by Respondent. As such, Petitioner is required to participate in Respondent’s background screening process pursuant to section 408.809. Petitioner submitted to the required background screening, which revealed that in 2004, Petitioner was convicted of the felony offenses of grand theft and burglary, in violation of sections 812.014 and 810.02, Florida Statutes (2004) respectively, in Dade County, Florida, Case No. 132004CF030578C000XX. These offenses were used by the agency as the disqualifying offenses under chapter 435. Petitioner was subsequently convicted of felony grand theft in 2007, in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (2007), in Broward County Circuit Court, Case No. 062007CF013247A88810. In 2013, Petitioner was convicted of theft in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (2013), in Dade County, Florida, Case No. 132013CF0268560001XX. The criminal convictions in 2004 disqualified Petitioner and made her ineligible for licensure or to provide services in a health care facility licensed by Respondent. She was disqualified unless she applied for and received an exemption from AHCA, pursuant to section 435.07. In addition, Petitioner’s background check revealed that she was arrested in 1997 for Battery and Resisting Arrest; in 2009 for Petit Theft involving unemployment compensation, which was ultimately dropped; and in 2012 for retail theft. Petitioner initially submitted an application for an exemption to Respondent in accordance with sections 408.809 and 435.07 on June 9, 2017. She participated in a telephonic hearing to discuss her application conducted by Respondent on August 1, 2017. Respondent’s witness, Kelley Goff, a health services and facilities consultant for the Agency’s Background Screening Unit, testified that she was the analyst assigned to Petitioner’s case and attended the telephonic hearing on August 1, 2017. Respondent’s Exhibit R1-1 through R1-75, is AHCA's file for Petitioner’s exemption request. It contains: the exemption denial letter; internal agency notes; panel hearing notes from the August 1, 2017, teleconference; Petitioner’s criminal history; Petitioner’s exemption application; personal attestations; arrest affidavits; conviction records; probation records; court records; education records; and several letters in support of Petitioner’s requested exemption. After the telephonic hearing and discussion, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request for an exemption by letter dated August 4, 2017. Subsequently, Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. In making the decision to deny, Respondent considered Petitioner’s entire case file, including all submissions received from Petitioner and her explanations during the teleconference. Respondent also considered Petitioner’s other arrests and convictions, in addition to the disqualifying offenses. The history of Petitioner’s theft-related crimes and the recent 2012 and 2013 theft-related incidents were significant factors in Respondent’s decision to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption. The agency concluded that Petitioner was not particularly candid during the August 1, 2017, teleconference, and that some of Petitioner’s statements during the teleconference conflicted with the police reports and other documentation in Petitioner’s exemption file. This was true particularly with respect to the 2012 retail theft incident at Home Depot, which Petitioner attributed to actions by a client during the teleconference. During the telephone interview, Petitioner stated that she could not remember the arrests and/or convictions from the time period from 1997 through 2007. Although Petitioner had some positive letters of recommendation, she did not have anyone speak on her behalf during the telephonic discussion in August 2017. Based on Petitioner’s entire file and her responses during the teleconference, the agency concluded that Petitioner had not satisfied her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence of demonstrating rehabilitation from her disqualifying offenses. Goff testified that, while preparing for the hearing, she researched Petitioner’s 2007 criminal case and discovered that Petitioner still owed outstanding fines in that case in Broward County, and felt that Petitioner was not eligible to apply for an exemption until those fees were paid. During the final hearing Petitioner presented the testimony of her former client, Yohandra Sota. She testified that she had known Petitioner during the time of the 2012 incident of theft at Home Depot, that she was not with Petitioner during that time, and that she had never witnessed Petitioner involved in theft. Sota testified that Petitioner is a nice person who does not do bad things and has never fought, fussed, or threatened her. Petitioner testified on her own behalf and admitted that she has things on her record and is not happy with them. She explained that everyone does things that he or she does not necessarily have a choice over. Petitioner explained that she is asking for a second chance to get her life back on track and to get her life together. Petitioner explained that she was not aware of the outstanding fines and that when she went to Broward County Courthouse, they told her they could not find information on the case. Petitioner further explained that she is raising her three grandchildren and needs to provide for them and that she is unable to do that without a job. Petitioner stated that she is unable to work with her client because of this situation (the present disqualification). Petitioner explained that everyone makes mistakes and no one is perfect and that she had a rough childhood and had to raise herself. Petitioner then presented the testimony of her brother, Jamvar Thomas. He testified that he has seen Petitioner go through a lot of changes and that she has made some mistakes in her life. He felt that the fact that Petitioner asked for his help shows tremendous growth in her. Thomas testified that Petitioner is trying to put herself in a position so that she will not have to go back to her old habits and that she needs a second chance. Thomas stated that Petitioner has worked with Yohandra Sota for 15 years and helped Sota cope with her life. Thomas testified that helping people has helped Petitioner become a better person and that Petitioner has paid for her past mistakes and has come a long way. Thomas requested that Petitioner be given the opportunity to do the right thing and that granting the exemption would allow Petitioner to work in her field of expertise. Although Petitioner professed that she was remorseful for her criminal convictions and wants to move forward with her life, the undersigned is not persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that (1) she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offenses, or (2) that it would be an abuse of discretion for the agency to deny the exemption.1/ The undersigned finds that under the facts presented Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that she should be granted an exemption from disqualification.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification for employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2018.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57408.809435.04435.07810.02812.014
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MARCIA THOMAS vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 15-000288 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 15, 2015 Number: 15-000288 Latest Update: Aug. 20, 2015

The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of trust, pursuant to sections 408.809 and 435.07, Florida Statutes,1/ should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is authorized to conduct certain background screenings for employees providing specific types of services within health care facilities licensed under chapters 400, 408, and 429, Florida Statutes. § 408.809, Fla. Stat. Petitioner seeks employment in a position providing direct services to residents of a health care facility licensed under chapter 429 and, as such, is required to participate in Respondent’s background screening process pursuant to section 408.809. Petitioner submitted to the required background screening, which revealed that in 1999, Petitioner pleaded guilty to Felony Grand Theft/Bank Fraud in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Panama City Division, Case No. 5:99CR165PM. This conviction is akin to a felony grand theft conviction under chapter 812, Florida Statutes. The above-referenced criminal conviction makes Petitioner ineligible to provide a service in a health care facility licensed by Respondent unless Petitioner receives an exemption from Respondent, pursuant to section 435.07. Petitioner was also arrested in 2001 for Felony Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon. On that charge, Petitioner pled guilty to a lesser included charge of simple assault, in Leon County Circuit Court, Case No. 01-1020AM. In addition, Petitioner was arrested in 2009 for felony charges of larceny/grand theft and exploitation of the elderly, charges which were ultimately dismissed due to the alleged victim’s death. Petitioner submitted an application for exemption to Respondent in accordance with sections 408.809 and 435.07 on or about April 30, 2014, and attended a telephonic hearing conducted by Respondent on June 17, 2014. The results of the June 17, 2014, teleconference are not at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner submitted another application for exemption to Respondent in accordance with section 435.07 on or about September 29, 2014. A telephonic hearing was conducted by Respondent on that second application for exemption on December 9, 2014, during which Respondent and Petitioner agreed to utilize the information obtained in the June 17, 2014, hearing regarding the 1999 Grand Theft/Bank Fraud and the 2001 Assault convictions, and to only discuss the circumstances surrounding the 2009 allegations of Grand Theft and Exploitation of the Elderly. A panel consisting of Respondent’s Operations and Consulting Manager for the Background Screening Unit, Sherry Ledbetter, and Respondent’s Health and Facilities Consultants, Kelley Goff and Zack Masters, also attended the telephonic hearing. Exhibit A-1, Respondent’s file for Petitioner’s exemption request, contains the exemption denial letter; internal Agency notes; panel hearing notes from both the June 17, 2014, and the December 9, 2014, teleconferences; Petitioner’s criminal history; Petitioner’s exemption application; arrest affidavits; conviction records; probation records; court records; and several letters in support of Petitioner’s requested exemption. Exhibits A-2 and A-3 are audio recordings of Petitioner’s teleconferences from her exemption hearings from June 17, 2014, and December 9, 2014. After the telephonic hearing, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request for an exemption, and Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. At the administrative hearing, Sherry Ledbetter testified that Respondent considered Petitioner’s entire case file, including all submissions received from Petitioner, and her explanations during the teleconferences when it determined that Petitioner’s request for an exemption should be denied. Respondent is legally authorized to consider all subsequent arrests or convictions, even if those arrests or convictions are not disqualifying offenses. Respondent considered Petitioner’s subsequent arrests and convictions during the review of Petitioner’s application for exemption. Respondent also considered the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s most recent arrest, 2009 Grand Theft and Exploitation of the Elderly, even though the charges were dismissed. Petitioner admitted during the December 9, 2014, teleconference that the alleged victim made payments toward Petitioner’s bills while Petitioner was employed as her caregiver. Petitioner did not see any ethical issues with taking payments from a patient for whom she is caring, when she was already being paid by her employer for the services she rendered. Respondent explained, and it is found, that Petitioner did not appear to be totally candid and honest in her responses to the panel’s questions during the teleconferences and did not take responsibility for any of the criminal offenses. Although Respondent allows exemption applicants to have people speak on the applicants’ behalf at the teleconferences, Petitioner did not choose to have anyone speak on her behalf. Respondent considers any training, education, or certificates that an exemption applicant submits, but Petitioner did not have any such submissions, aside from Petitioner’s statement that she attended a budget class after her 1999 conviction. Based on Petitioner’s entire file and her responses during the teleconferences, Respondent determined that Petitioner did not satisfy her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence of demonstrating rehabilitation from her disqualifying offense. Respondent maintains that Petitioner still poses a risk to the vulnerable population she would serve if employed at another health care facility. At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Mutaqee Akbar, her criminal defense attorney for her 2009 charges of Grand Theft and Exploitation of the Elderly, who testified that the 2009 charges against Petitioner were dismissed by the prosecutor. On cross examination, Mr. Akbar admitted that the prosecutor cited the death of the alleged victim as the reason for the case’s dismissal. Mr. Akbar also admitted that law enforcement records reflect that the alleged victim made a statement to law enforcement prior to her death that she did not give her consent for the payments made toward Petitioner’s bills. In her testimony at the final hearing, Petitioner discussed how she is a changed person and has overcome a great deal of adversity to get to where she is now. Petitioner is presently involved in her community, specifically with her church and children’s schools, and takes care of her goddaughter and four children. Petitioner has a daughter who attends community college and Petitioner has been striving to set a good example for her daughter. Petitioner’s daughter, Sierra Thomas, who is in community college, gave credible testimony that she always favored her mother and did not believe the 2009 allegations against her mother. One of Petitioner’s good friends, Sheria Hackett, testified that Petitioner is a good person and deserves to be granted the exemption. Petitioner’s Exhibit P-1 is a composite exhibit consisting of additional information relating to Petitioner’s criminal cases and a letter from her probation officer. Petitioner’s Exhibit P-2 consists of a letter from Respondent dated May 22, 2014, requesting additional information from Petitioner during the exemption application process. Petitioner’s Exhibit P-3 consists of Petitioner’s petition for formal hearing. Although Petitioner appeared remorseful for her criminal convictions, considering all of the facts, circumstances, and evidence presented to AHCA and at the final hearing, it cannot be said that she proved by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated and should not be disqualified from employment. Moreover, AHCA’s intended action of denying Petitioner’s request for exemption was not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, Petitioner failed to meet her burden of showing that she is entitled to the exemption she seeks from Respondent.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification for employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2015.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68408.809435.04435.07 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.217
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