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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs SCALLY FAMILY DAY CARE HOME, 16-000736 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Feb. 11, 2016 Number: 16-000736 Latest Update: Oct. 18, 2016

The Issue The issue in this matter is whether the Department of Children and Families should deny Respondent’s application for registration as a family day care home.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating providers that are licensed or registered as family day care homes. Family day care homes must register annually with the Department. See § 402.313(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Respondent is owned and operated by Cherrie Scally. Ms. Scally has registered Respondent as a family day care home since 1997. In or about August 2015, Ms. Scally filed an application with the Department to renew Respondent’s registration as a family day care home for 2016. Respondent's registration for 2015 expired on October 30, 2015. Upon receiving Ms. Scally’s application, the Department reviewed whether to renew Respondent’s registration as a family day care home. As part of its determination, the Department examined the Florida Central Abuse Hotline Records Search (“CAHRS”). In CAHRS, the Department identified an Investigative Summary involving Respondent that verified a finding of “inadequate supervision” in March 2015. Based on the CAHRS Investigative Summary, the Department issued an Administrative Complaint in November 2015, revoking Respondent’s registration as a family day care home.2/ The Department determined that it could no longer approve Respondent’s registration “based on the verified finding of inadequate supervision.” The CAHRS resulted from an incident that allegedly occurred on March 5, 2015. On March 6, 2015, the Central Abuse Hotline received an anonymous phone call reporting an injury to a child at Respondent’s family day care home. A four-year-old girl who attended Respondent’s family day care home reported to her mother that another child had hurt her.3/ Jessica Baloy, a child protective investigator with the Department, was assigned to investigate the incident. Her duties include investigating facilities regarding complaints of child abuse and neglect. Ms. Baloy prepared the CAHRS Investigative Summary. Ms. Baloy visited Respondent's family day care home on March 9, 2015, to investigate the allegation. Ms. Scally informed Ms. Baloy that she had no knowledge of how or when the child was injured. Ms. Scally did not learn of the incident until the child’s mother called her the evening after the child was picked up. Ms. Scally thought that the incident may have occurred in her “playroom” while she was in her kitchen either cleaning up another child or preparing snacks.4/ During her visit, Ms. Baloy found that the part of Ms. Scally’s home used for childcare consists of two rooms, a “playroom” and a kitchen. The rooms are located next to each other, but a wall separates them. Ms. Baloy observed that the wall obstructs the view between the playroom (where the injury allegedly occurred) and the kitchen where Ms. Scally believes she was located at the time of the incident. Ms. Scally admitted to Ms. Baloy that, while she is able to hear the children in the playroom from the kitchen, she is unable to see directly from the kitchen into the playroom. In her investigation, Ms. Baloy reported that the child had “no indicator” of physical injury. In other words, Ms. Baloy did not find evidence to suggest the child had sustained an injury. Ms. Baloy personally interviewed the child and did not observe any discomfort or physical injuries. Ms. Baloy also received information from the child’s mother that a doctor had examined the child and determined that she had not suffered any trauma, just “some irritation.” The child’s mother decided that no further medical treatment or examination was needed. In her Investigative Summary, Ms. Baloy reported that “[o]bservations of the home daycare were positive that it was not hazardous for the children.” Ms. Baloy also declared that Ms. Scally “once notified by a parent completed the proper notifications needed in regards to this incident.” However, Ms. Baloy did have “some concerns in regards to supervision.” She found that when Ms. Scally was working/standing in her kitchen, she could not view the children in the playroom. Consequently, if something bad happened, she would not be able to see it. Also during her visit to Respondent, Ms. Baloy observed 11 children in Respondent’s facility. Consequently, Respondent was over capacity by one child. (As discussed below, family day care homes are restricted to a maximum of ten children at one time.) After her visit, Ms. Baloy closed her investigation with “verified findings for inadequate supervision.” Ms. Baloy was not aware of any prior investigations involving Respondent. Dinah Davis is the policy supervisor for the Department’s Office of Childcare Regulation. Her responsibilities include approving applications for family day care home registrations with Samantha Wass de Czege, the Department’s Director for the Office of Childcare Regulation. Ms. Davis expressed that the Department was concerned with Ms. Baloy’s Investigative Summary because the finding of “inadequate supervision” indicated that Ms. Scally left the children unattended outside of her direct supervision. The Department’s “rule of thumb” regarding supervision is that a caregiver must be within “sight and sound of the children and [be] able to respond to emergency situations.” Ms. Davis expressed that a constant sightline is crucial to allow the caregiver to respond to and prevent an emergency or potentially harmful situation. Adequate “sight” supervision means that children should be at least within the caregiver’s peripheral vision. In addition, Ms. Davis explained that, by statute, no family day care home is allowed to care for more than ten children at one given time. Ms. Davis referred to section 402.310 as the Department’s authority to deny Ms. Scally’s application. Although section 402.310 allows the Department to place a family day care home registration on probation status, Ms. Davis stated that the Department did not consider the option to place Respondent on probation. Ms. Wass de Czege also testified regarding the Department’s decision to revoke (deny) Respondent’s application for registration. Ms. Wass de Czege stated that the Department’s action was based on the child protective investigator’s findings of “inadequate supervision” and overcapacity. Ms. Wass de Czege agreed with Ms. Davis that supervision in a family day care home requires “direct sight and hearing of the children at all times” so that the caregiver is “able to respond to meet the needs of the children.” Ms. Wass de Czege explained that based on the floor design of Ms. Scally’s home, “she could not have the children in her sight. So, she was not meeting that parameter of the definition of supervision.” Ms. Wass de Czege explained that the Department’s definition of “inadequate supervision” for family day care homes is found in Florida Administrative Code Chapters 65C-22 and 65C-20.5/ Ms. Wass de Czege also remarked that having more than ten children in care at a family day care home is considered overcapacity. Therefore, having 11 children present in the home at the time of Ms. Baloy’s visit caused Respondent to be out of compliance with the governing regulation. Ms. Wass de Czege also conveyed that registration of a family day care home is basically a paper process. The applicant submits the paperwork. The Department checks off the information listed in section 402.313(1)(a). If approved, the applicant can care for children. Ms. Wass de Czege commented that, because of a lack of manpower and resources, a registered family day care home is not subject to routine inspections by the Department. Consequently, the Department has little regulatory oversight of Ms. Scally’s home. Based on its review of the CAHRS, the Department determined that Respondent failed the background check necessary to register as a family day care home for 2016. Ms. Scally testified on behalf of Respondent at the final hearing. Ms. Scally has operated her family day care home since 1997. She has successfully registered with the state every year since then. She cares greatly for the children entrusted to her. This current matter is the first issue she has encountered regarding her registration. Regarding the incident on March 5, 2015, Ms. Scally did not learn that a child may have been harmed at her home until the child’s parent called her that evening to report an injury. The parent relayed that her daughter told her that another child had poked her in a sensitive area, drawing blood. Upon learning of the injury, Ms. Scally immediately took action. That evening, she spoke with the parents of both children involved to make sure all parties were aware of the situation. The next morning, Ms. Scally called the injured child’s parent back to inquire of her well-being. Ms. Scally also contacted her own pediatrician seeking advice on the situation. Ms. Scally offered to arrange for her pediatrician to examine the child. Ms. Scally herself was the anonymous caller reporting the incident to the Central Abuse Hotline.6/ She called the abuse hotline on the next morning. (The CAHRS Investigative Summary notes that the call was received on March 6, 2015, at 10:38 a.m.) Ms. Scally called the abuse hotline because she knew reporting the injury was the proper and legally required step to take. Ms. Scally commented that the Department would not have learned of the incident but for her phone call. Ms. Scally conceded that, when she is standing in her kitchen, she does not have a direct line of sight with the children in her playroom. Consequently, Ms. Scally admitted that if the child was injured in the playroom while she was in the kitchen, the child was out of her sight for a short period of time. On the other hand, Ms. Scally asserts that she can always hear her children from the kitchen. Furthermore, no child is ever out of her eyesight for more than a couple of moments. Ms. Scally also represented that she has taken steps to ensure that she can maintain “sight and sound” supervision over her children in the future. She has purchased a mirror to place in the hallway between the playroom and the kitchen. This mirror allows her to see into either room from the other. Ms. Scally stated that in her 19 years of childcare, she has never had any incidents in her family day care home. Ms. Scally acknowledged that she might have had 11 children in her care on the occasion of Ms. Baloy’s visit to her home on March 9, 2015. Ms. Scally explained that it was likely during a “transition” period as her children were being picked up and dropped off and was not a regular occurrence or for an extended period of time. Based on this incident, Ms. Scally asserts that she will be extra cautious about the interactions between the children in her care. Ms. Scally presented testimony from several parents whom she serves. They each asserted that Respondent provides a valuable service, and they trust her with their children in her home. Mia Carla Hagins placed her daughter with Respondent from 2009 through 2014. Ms. Hagins testified that Ms. Scally ensures safety, nurturing, and care for the children she supervises. Thomas Breck placed two children with Ms. Scally from 1996 through 2000. Mr. Breck testified that Ms. Scally provided excellent care and demonstrated complete professionalism. Mizanne Brown placed her child with Ms. Scally for ten years. Ms. Brown testified that Ms. Scally was fabulous, nice, and wonderful. Ms. Scally also produced 26 letters of recommendation from parents and teachers of children for whom she has cared. Ms. Scally asserted that these letters show how positively her community views her, her home, and her childcare services. Based on the competent substantial evidence presented at the final hearing, the Department failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, sufficient grounds to deny Respondent’s application for registration as a family day care home under the provisions of section 402.310. Accordingly, the Department should approve Respondent’s application to register as a family day care home.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order approving Respondent’s application for registration as a family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2016.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.5739.201402.301402.302402.310402.312402.313402.31990.801
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs PROGRESSIVE LEARNING CENTER, INC., 96-001223 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Mar. 06, 1996 Number: 96-001223 Latest Update: Nov. 12, 1996

Findings Of Fact Respondent corporation operates a licensed day care center in Duval County, Florida. Marie Flood owns Respondent and personally operates the day care center. She holds 51 per cent of the corporate stock for the Respondent corporation. Her husband is a 49 per cent stock holder. In the day care center is located a large room. The room is divided into smaller spaces by shelves which are called "cubbies". Those shelves are three feet high. The areas divided by the shelves constitute separate rooms for purposes of defining the proper ratio for day care staff members to children cared for in the facility. In May, 1995, an inspection was made at the day care center facility by an inspector working for Petitioner. That inspector was Joyce E. Bates. During the visit Ms. Bates observed a day care worker leave one of the small areas in the large room that was divided from other spaces in the room by the presence of the shelves. The worker went to put plates out for toddlers who were cared for at the facility. When the worker left the first area to go and put the plates in place, Ms. Bates considered that the appropriate staff ratio to children had been compromised in the area where the worker had been located. Ms. Bates indicated in her inspection report that this departure by the worker from one area where children were kept to another area where the plates were being placed constituted a deficiency in delivering the care to the children by not maintaining the proper ratio for staff and children. Ms. Flood did not believe that the departure by the worker for a brief period of time necessary to set out plates for the toddlers constituted non- compliance with the proper arrangement for staff in the requirement to monitor the children's activities. Ms. Flood believed that the worker while in another area placing the plates was still able to directly supervise the children in the area that had been left by watching and directing their activities within close proximity to the children. Given the difference of opinions Ms. Flood asked Ms. Bates to arrange for Ms. Flood to meet with Ms. Bates' supervisor to discuss the disagreement between those individuals concerning maintenance of the proper ratio for staff and children. Shortly after the May, 1995 inspection was conducted Ms. Flood met with Andrea J. Trzcinski, a supervisor for Petitioner for whom Ms. Bates worked in the child care licensure field. At this meeting Ms. Flood told Ms. Trzcinski about the concern that workers would be temporarily away from the areas in which children were located in the small spaces within the large room where care was provided. Ms. Flood explained that those short intervals where the workers were unavailable in the immediate areas where children were being attended were associated with various types of staff emergencies, staff preparing bottles for infants, or staff going to the restroom. Ms. Flood believed that to meet the exact terms for the staff to children ratio would require extra staff to meet the various contingencies where workers were absent from the discrete space where care was delivered to the children. Ms. Flood believed at the time and continues to believe that she cannot afford to have extra staff available to meet the contingency where the principal care giver has left the discrete space. Ms. Trzcinski explained to Ms. Flood that the choices which Ms. Flood had concerning the staff to children ratio were to divide the large room into discrete areas to deliver care or to leave the room as one area where care was given, thus requiring more staff than would be needed to maintain smaller areas within the large room. In the conversation between Ms. Flood and Ms. Trzcinski, Ms. Flood expressed the belief that the ability to look over the tops of the dividers which were only three feet tall would meet the requirements for maintaining the proper ratios when the staff was away from the immediate area where the children were located. Ms. Trzcinski explained to Ms. Flood that Ms. Flood's perception concerning the ability to maintain direct supervision by looking over the divider walls was not providing the direct supervision that was necessary. Ms. Trzcinski made Ms. Flood aware that Ms. Trzcinski's interpretation was that direct care meant having staff in the immediate area of the infants not monitoring from some other part of the overall large room by looking over the divider walls back into the area where the infants had been left. In summary, Ms. Trzcinski told Ms. Flood that a caregiver could not leave the discrete space where the children were located and move to another area and still maintain the called for ratio for staff to children. On October 11, 1995, Ms. Bates made another visit to the facility. The visit was as a follow up to an inspection that was conducted on September 29, 1995, unrelated to proper ratios for staff to children and upon a complaint that had been made concerning care provided to a child in the facility, again, unassociated with the proper ratio of staff to children. While Ms. Bates was inspecting the facility on October 11, 1995, she observed that in the room referred to as an infant room there were five children and one staff member. One child in that room was younger than one year old. Consequently, the ratio which Ms. Bates believed was appropriate for staff to children was 1 to 4, there being a child in the group who was not a year old. During the October 11, 1995 inspection Ms. Bates spoke to Marjorie James who was in charge of the facility on that occasion and explained the problem concerning the ratio in the infant room, in that the Florida Administrative Code required a ratio of 1 staff member to 4 children, not 1 staff member to 5 children as discovered in the inspection. Ms. Bates expressed to Ms. James the importance of maintaining those ratios in an instance where infants are involved in the receipt of care. A check-list for the inspection was prepared and provided to Ms. James who signed for the document. The document pointed out the problem of the ratios for staff to children wherein an infant not 1 year old was in the group of children. Ms. Bates made Ms. Trzcinski aware that the inspection of October 11, 1995, was being conducted and the results pertaining to that inspection wherein the ratio problem for staff to children had been identified. On November 8, 1995, Ms. Flood intended to work at the facility as a caregiver. By that arrangement it would allow Ms. James to leave the facility and go to a different location to pick up children from a kindergarten and return those children to the facility for care. Before arriving at the facility on November 8, 1995, Ms. Flood called the personnel at the facility and stated that Ms. Flood was going to be late. Ms. Flood recognized that the consequence would be that the ratios for staff to children would not be met for a short period of time. The reason Ms. Flood was tardy for her assignment was based upon an automobile accident on the road between her location and the facility. Ms. Flood explained to the other caregiver at the facility that she wanted to place a 22-month old child in the front room of the facility creating a problem for the staff to children ratio in that room, while maintaining the proper ratio in another room where infants less than one year old were found. As described before, the ratio for staff to children in the infant room should be 1 staff member for 4 children. The staff member who received Ms. Flood's call abided by the instructions and moved the 22-month old child to the front room. That meant that the ratio for staff to Children should be 1 to 6. In reality the ratio of staff to children was 1 to 9. Coincidentally on November 8, 1995, beyond the point and time at which Ms. James left to pick up the kindergarten children and the ratios where modified for staff to children in the front room, Ms. Bates arrived to conduct a follow-up inspection to check the ratios of staff to children. Ms. Bates discovered that the ratio of staff to children in the front room was 1 staff member for 9 children, whereas the ratio anticipated by Ms. Bates for the front room in which the 22-month old child was found should have been 1 staff member for 6 children. When Ms. Bates arrived to conduct the inspection on November 8, 1995, Virginia Sikes was caring for the children in the front room, and another caregiver was taking care of children in the infant room. Shortly after Ms. Bates arrival Ms. Flood came into the facility to provide care, thus the problem with the ratio with staff to children was corrected. Not long after Ms. Flood arrived Ms. James returned to the facility with the kindergarten children. The inspection which Ms. Bates conducted on November 8, 1995, was unannounced. Because the problem with staff ratios for children had been observed on both October 11, 1995 and November 8, 1995, Petitioner determined to impose an administrative fine in the amount of $150.00. The fine was perceived by Ms. Trzcinski to be a fine of $50.00 for each child over the ratio allowed as discovered on November 8, 1995, in which the proper ratio was 1 staff member for 6 children as opposed to the ratio discovered which was 1 staff member for 9 children. From Petitioner's view, expressed through Ms. Trzcinski, the violation was a Class II violation. Ms. Trzcinski characterized the violation as a "middle" violation. Respondent, through Ms. Flood, takes no issue that the ratios discovered for staff to children in the inspections performed on October 11, 1995 and November 8, 1995 were incorrect. Her principle concern is that the Respondent not be required to pay an administrative fine for the events which transpired on November 8, 1995. Her reasoning is that you cannot get substitute personnel quickly when contingencies arise such as were encountered on November 8, 1995. Also, her belief is that the problem was quickly corrected making imposition of a fine uncalled for.

Recommendation Upon the consideration of the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered imposing a $100.00 administrative fine for the failure to comply with the requirements related to maintenance of ratio for staff to children on November 8, 1995. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX CASE NO. 96-1223 The following discussion is given concerning the findings of fact by the parties: Petitioner's facts are subordinate to facts found with the exception that Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Respondent's submission constitutes legal argument which was considered in entering the recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger L.D. Williams, Esquire HRS District 4 Legal Office Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, FL 32231-0083 Marie Flood Progressive Learning Center 1855 Hamilton Street Jacksonville, FL 32210 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building 7 Suite 728 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700

Florida Laws (4) 120.57402.301402.310402.319
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs CHILDREN'S HOUR DAY SCHOOL, 14-004539 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 29, 2014 Number: 14-004539 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2015

The Issue Whether Respondent, a day-care center, committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and if so, the penalties Petitioner should impose against Respondent.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the regulatory authority responsible for licensure and enforcement of day-care centers in Florida. Respondent is a day-care center in Miami, Florida, and currently holds child care license C11MD0340. Respondent has operated as a day-care center since April 19, 1990. At the time of the formal hearing, Kevin Lennon was the owner and operator of Respondent. S.B. and L.B. are young sisters who stayed at Respondent’s day-care center in July 2014. On July 9, 2014, one of Respondent’s employees gave S.B. and L.B. a small cup of Cheez-Its as a snack. Mr. Lennon was present when the two girls were sharing the cup of Cheez-Its. After S.B., who is the older and bigger child, finished her share of the Cheez-Its, S.B. began to hit her sister to take her sister’s share of the Cheez-Its. Mr. Lennon separated the two girls and permitted L.B. to eat her share of the Cheez-Its. Mr. Lennon testified, credibly, that he did not take the Cheez-Its from S.B. to punish S.B. Petitioner offered no competent, credible evidence to refute Mr. Lennon’s testimony. On March 25, 2014, Petitioner received from Respondent an “Application for a License to Operate a Child Care Facility” (the application). Mr. Lennon completed the application on behalf of Respondent. The application contained an attestation section that required Mr. Lennon’s signature to be notarized. On March 25, 2014, Petitioner received an attestation section (first attestation section) signed by Kevin Lennon on February 28, 2014. The first attestation section contains Ivanne Albarran’s notary seal and a signature dated February 28, 2014. Mr. Lennon testified, credibly, that he signed the first attestation section as Kevin Lennon. Mr. Albarran testified, credibly, that he signed the first attestation section as the notary public. Petitioner offered insufficient evidence to refute that testimony. The application package contains a second attestation section that was received by Petitioner on March 28, 2014. The second attestation section contains Mr. Lennon’s signature and a date of March 26, 2014. The second attestation section contains Mr. Albarran’s notary seal and a signature dated March 28, 2014. Mr. Lennon testified, credibly, that he signed the second attestation section as “Kevin Lennon.” Mr. Albarran testified, credibly, that he signed the second attestation section as the notary public. Petitioner offered no competent, credible evidence to refute that testimony.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Howard J. Hochman, Esquire Law Offices of Howard J. Hochman 7695 Southwest 104th Street, Suite 210 Miami, Florida 33156 (eServed) Karen A. Milia, Esquire Department of Children and Families 401 Northwest Second Avenue, Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 (eServed) Paul Sexton, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Rebecca Kapusta, Interim General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Mike Carroll, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.68402.305402.3055402.319
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LEE ANN FLAGG vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 93-002297RU (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 23, 1993 Number: 93-002297RU Latest Update: Sep. 30, 1994

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Petitioner, Lee Ann Flagg, is a 22-year-old resident of Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Since 1991, she has received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits for her 22-month-old son. Petitioner wants to learn a marketable skill, so she can obtain a job and stop receiving AFDC. Based on the information in Petitioner's AFDC case file, her total income was her AFDC grant of $241 per month. Petitioner is exempt from Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program due to the age of her child. On May 26, 1992, Petitioner volunteered for Project Independence (PI). On June 5, 1992, Petitioner attended PI orientation at which she stated her desire to attend school in the fall of 1992. At all times material hereto, Petitioner met PI target group criteria in that she is under the age of 24 and had not been employed for the past 12 months. On July 28, 1992, Petitioner requested child care assistance from Respondent. She advised her PI case manager that the lack of child care was a barrier to her being self-sufficient and that she needed child care to attend school in the fall of 1992. In July 1992, Petitioner's case manager informed Petitioner that, due to the child care freeze, Respondent could not provide her with child care and placed Petitioner in "limited contact." During the time in "limited contact," Petitioner provided monthly attendance verification to her PI worker until February 1993. In August 1992, Petitioner enrolled in business classes at Lively Area Vocational Technical School (Lively) in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Needing child care assistance, Petitioner's parents assisted her with child care temporarily. In February 1993, because Respondent could not provide Petitioner with child care, she requested disenrollment from the PI program. However, Petitioner can re-enroll in the PI program at any time. Petitioner continues to attend classes at Lively. But, due to her inability to obtain child care services from Respondent, she has been forced to reduce her classes. Additionally, Petitioner has taken a part-time clerical job at below poverty wages, for which she receives child care. Because of the child care freeze, Petitioner cannot receive child care assistance from Respondent for education and training activities. Background The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program is a joint federal-state assistance program authorized by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 602. The AFDC program is administered by states under the supervision of the Federal Department of Health and Human Services. A "Job Opportunities and Basic Skills" (JOBS) program must be developed by each state participating in the AFDC program. The purpose of the JOBS program is to provide training, education and work opportunities for AFDC recipients, pursuant to the Family Support Act of 1988, that will help avoid long-term public assistance dependency. Supervision of the JOBS program and contracting for the provision of support services, such as child care, is the responsibility of the state agency administering the AFDC program (referred to as the IV-A agency). In Florida, Respondent is the IV-A agency, and the Department of Labor and Employment Security administers the JOBS program. Florida's JOBS program is called Project Independence (PI). The criteria governing PI is found in Section 409.029, Florida Statutes, the Florida Employment Opportunity Act. For PI purposes, all AFDC recipients are either exempt or nonexempt from participating in PI and are either target group or non-target group members. Exempt recipients are persons who have barriers to participating in PI, such as having young children or being disabled, based on federally defined exemption criteria. These recipients are not required to participate in PI, but may volunteer to participate. Nonexempt recipients are persons who do not meet the federal exemption criteria and are referred to as mandatory. These recipients may be referred to PI by their Respondent caseworker, and if referred, they are required to participate in PI as a condition of receiving AFDC, so long as resources are available. Conversely, if resources are not available, a nonexempt referred recipient is not required to participate in PI, but may volunteer to participate in PI. Furthermore, even if a nonexempt recipient is not referred to PI, such recipient may volunteer to participate in PI. Target group members are AFDC recipients who, based on certain characteristics such as work history or number of years already on AFDC, are likely to become long-term public assistance recipients. Non-target group members are AFDC recipients who do not meet target group criteria. Both target group members and non-target group members may be either exempt or nonexempt. Caseload Prioritization Rule Participation requirements for AFDC recipients in PI is set forth in Section 409.029, Florida Statutes, the Florida Employment Opportunity Act. In April 1992, Respondent promulgated Rule 10C-32.002 AFDC Employment and Training Program, Florida Administrative Code, implementing Section 409.029, Florida Statutes. Section (4) of Rule 10C-32.002, referred to as the caseload prioritization rule, sets forth Respondent's PI caseload prioritization procedures, implementing Subsection 409.029(9)(c), Florida Statutes. Subsection 409.029(9)(c) states: (9) PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS (c) All exempt and nonexempt AFDC recipients who do not meet target group criteria shall be permitted to volunteer. Nonexempt AFDC recipients who meet target group criteria shall be required to participate in the pro- gram. Exempt AFDC recipients who meet target group criteria shall be permitted to volun- teer. If the department lacks resources to provide the services necessary for participa- tion under this section, nonexempt AFDC recip- ients who do not meet the target group crit- eria shall be required to participate in in- itial job search if they are approved for ini- tial job search, but shall be deferred from further participation after completing up to 3 weeks of job search activities. If the department continues to lack resources to pro- vide the services necessary for participation under this section, nonexempt recipients who do not meet target group criteria and who are not approved for initial job search shall also be deferred from further participation after completing orientation. If deferring such recipients from mandatory participation does not alleviate budget constraints on ser- vices, the department shall defer nonexempt AFDC recipients who do not meet target group criteria from mandatory participation and may also defer participants who meet target group criteria from mandatory participation so long as the department is meeting federal particip- ation rates and target group expenditure re- quirements. If the department cannot, after making a good faith effort, meet federal part- icipation rates and target group expenditure requirements by deferring nonexempt target group AFDC recipients from participation, the department may limit service to AFDC recip- ients who meet target group criteria and may mandate the participation of those target group members who are non-target-group volun- teers only after the department has attempted to conserve its resources under the proce- dures established in this section. (Emphasis added.) Rule 10C-32.002(4) states: Effective October 1, 1991, the Florida Employment Opportunity Act, F.S. 409.029, was revised to allow the department to prioritize and disenroll participants based on target groups and assessment status where funds are insufficient to serve all partici- pants. Caseloads may be reduced to allow for sufficient case management when they exceed a staff/client ratio of 1:150. Staff/client ratios for the teen parent caseload should not exceed 1:100. Each district will init- iate case load disenrollment procedures as needed. Case managers must identify three cate- gories of participants in their caseloads: Priority One, exempt volunteers; Priority Two, mandatory target group participants; and Priority Three, mandatory non-target group participants. When caseloads exceed a staff/client ratio of 1:150, all Priority Three cases, mandatory non-target participants, will be offered an opportunity to continue partici- pation or disenroll. Priority Three participants who wish to continue in the program must be allowed to do so and will be placed in Priority One category. Priority Three participants who do not wish to continue in the program should be disenrolled after Orientation, and Job Search if the participant meets the criteria for Initial Job Search. To reach or main- tain the 1:150 staff/client ratio, new mand- atory non-target referrals may be disen- rolled after Orientation, and Job Search, if applicable, if they do not wish to continue to participate. If the staff/client ratio remains above 1:150 after disenrollment of Priority Three cases, then all Priority Two, mandatory tar- get groups may be allowed the opportunity to disenroll from the program after Orientation, and Job Search, if applicable. Information about disenrollment and re- entry into the program must be provided, verbally and in writing, to each participant being given these opportunities. This infor- mation must include: A participant who is given the opport- unity to disenroll will not be sanctioned, nor will disenrollment affect the AFDC grant amount. An individual who disenrolls may re- enroll in the program at a later date by con- tacting the local AFDC employment and train- ing office. An individual who disenrolls and becomes employed may be eligible for child care dur- ing the hours of employment and should con- tact the AFDC employment and training case manager. A participant who is given the opport- unity to disenroll and chooses to continue participating in the AFDC employment and training program can do so. A participant who does not meet an exemp- tion from program participation and who chooses to remain in the program although given the opportunity to disenroll can be sanctioned for failure to complete assigned activities. A participant who does not meet an exemp- tion from program participation and chooses to disenroll may be required to re-enter the program at a future date. Failure to do so without good cause will cause a sanction to be imposed. Support Services will be terminated for a participant who chooses to disenroll unless the individual is employed. If new referrals are not sufficient to maintain the staff/client ratio of 1:150, disenrolled cases should be identified for program re-entry. Program re-entry will be based on continuing eligibility for AFDC, priority group status, and length of time since disenrollment. The first individual disenrolled from the highest priority group will be re-enrolled first, etc. If the state fails to meet the feder- ally required expenditure rate for target groups, participation in the program may be limited to and required for target group members. (Emphasis added) The caseload prioritization rule only applies in situations in which PI staff/client ratio exceeds 1:150; staff meaning case manager. Respondent contends that Subsection 409.029(9)(c), Florida Statutes, was needed for the determination as to when PI's resources were sufficient to provide services to clients. In the caseload prioritization rule, Respondent interprets the statutory phrase "lacks resources" as the point at which the staff/client ratio exceeds 1:150. Respondent's districts meet this "limited resources" point when the staff/client ratio exceeds 1:150. The factors considered in the measuring stick used by Respondent to determine the limited resources were staff allocations and staff availability to provide services. Child care was not included, since it was, and is, a support service as interpreted by Respondent from Subsection 409.029(7), Florida Statutes. At the time Subsection 409.029(9)(c) was passed by the Florida Legislature, the staff/client ratio exceeded 1:400 and 1:500 in some of Respondent's districts. Respondent determined that a ratio exceeding 1:150 prevented a case manager from providing the services needed for clients, i.e., spending the amount of time needed, and that the lack of time, translating into the lack of services needed, could affect Respondent's PI federal funding. Respondent contends that the caseload prioritization rule was necessary for the administration of Subsection 409.029(9)(c). The rule in Respondent's view provided and clarified the procedures to be used for the disenrollment of clients to reduce caseloads. Respondent further contends that the caseload prioritization rule was necessary for the proper administration of Subsection 409.029(7), Florida Statutes, which Respondent interprets as applicable to the offering of child care services. According to Respondent, the rule gave Respondent the ability to identify specific reasons to defer individuals from participation in the PI program. On July 10, 1992, Respondent's caseload prioritization procedures were issued statewide and were generally applicable to all PI participants in Respondent's districts. Notwithstanding, because the staff/client ratio did not exceed 1:150 in Respondent's District 2, the procedure was not utilized in District 2. The caseload prioritization procedures were not invoked prior to instituting the child care freeze in Respondent's District 2. Child Care Freeze For the 1992-93 fiscal year, the Florida Legislature failed to appropriate sufficient funds to meet the needs of PI child care in Respondent's District 2. Subsequently, again, for the 1993-94 fiscal year, the Legislature did not appropriate sufficient funds. On July 10, 1992, Respondent issued a memorandum, effective that same date, freezing child care in Respondent's District 2 only for new enrollments of AFDC recipients who wished to participate (volunteers) in PI education and training activities and who needed child care in order to participate. The challenged child care freeze policy purports to be as follows: Due to the large over annualization we are projecting for FY 92-93 in Service I, Ser- vice II and Family Support Act child care services, I am directing you to immediately freeze new enrollments except for entitled groups (TCC and AFDC Employed) and the high- est at-risk group (Priority 1 in Service I). We will closely monitor utilization and let you know as soon as spending is within bud- get limits. This freeze applies to new enrollments only. Children currently in care should continue to receive services as appropriate. Respondent instituted the child care freeze because of projected annualized budget deficits; that is, Respondent annualized its current PI child care expenditures and projected a budgetary deficit if expenditures increased beyond what was currently spent. The child care freeze did not affect Transitional Child Care (TCC) recipients and AFDC recipients who work. Transitional Child Care is child care for former AFDC recipients who lost their AFDC eligibility due to earned income and who meet other federal requirements. TCC and AFDC employed individuals are guaranteed child care. Also, the child care freeze did not affect those individuals who Respondent requires to participate in PI. Respondent's District 2 is divided into two districts: Subdistrict 2A and Subdistrict 2B. Subdistrict 2A is comprised of Bay, Calhoun, Franklin, Gulf, Holmes, Jackson and Washington counties. Subdistrict 2B is comprised of Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla counties. Child care services are provided through contract with central agencies. Two child care provider agencies serve Respondent's District 2: Big Bend Child Care, serving Subdistrict 2B and Early Childhood Services, serving Subdistrict 2A. PI child care monies are split between the two provider agencies. Due to the child care freeze, from July 10, 1992, no AFDC recipient in Subdistricts 2A and 2B, who needed child care for education and training, received it. However, on January 19, 1993, child care slots became available in Subdistrict 2A with Early Childhood Services. On January 19, 1993, Early Childhood Services had 318 children of AFDC recipients on a waiting list. Only 35 slots became available. On March 15, 1993, Respondent allowed Early Childhood Services to provide child care services on a "one-in one-out" basis--equal number of child care slots filled as are vacated. As of January 1993, in Respondent's District 2, 542 children of AFDC recipients were waiting to receive child care services. Approximately 70 of the children, all residing in Subdistrict 2A, have been placed since January 19, 1993. For the offering of child care services, Respondent looks to both Subsection 409.029(7), Florida Statutes, and Rule 10C-32.002(10)(b)2, Florida Administrative Code, for guidance as to what action to take when child care resources are limited. Respondent contends that Subsection 409.029(7) is applicable to child care services. Subsection 409.027(7) includes child care services as a support service and provides that child care services "shall be provided according to federal law to the extent funds are available." Rule 10C- 32.002(10)(b)2 provides that a PI participant, meeting the requirements for a deferred status and not required to participate, "will be placed in limited contact status" due to the "temporary unavailability of support services." In August 1992, Respondent conferred with the regional office of the federal agency overseeing the AFDC program, regarding the subject of guaranteeing child care to AFDC recipients as it relates to availability of funds. Respondent and the federal agency agreed to certain principles on the subject, which included the following: "To the degree resources are available" is acceptable as a factor in limiting participa- tion in a program component when child care is a determining factor (other than AFDC-emp- loyed and TCC). The state may determine the criteria for those required and/or allowed to participate in the program as long as the state meets the federal participation rate and target group expenditure requirements. [W]hen a state finds itself without sufficient resources, including child care resources, it may place individuals on a waiting list. Before placing an individual on a waiting list, the individual will be given an opportunity to make provisions for her own child care, or other services, in order to remain in the program. [W]ith the exception of AFDC-employed and TCC, the guarantee of child care to both JOBS and non-JOBS participants is directly tied to the conditions under which the participant is required or allowed to participate. One clear and explicit condition is the extent to which state resources permit such partic pation. Respondent interprets Florida law, as it relates to budgeting, that the law requires Respondent not to exceed its budget. To stay within its budget, Respondent instituted the child care freeze instead of the other available options which would involve the disenrollment of children already in care, including the entitled groups. The child care freeze required Respondent to constantly be aware of the status of the child care budget (on a monthly basis) due to its constant fluctuation. Also, in administering the child care freeze, Respondent interprets the federal law and Subsection 409.029(9)(c), Florida Statutes, to state that it is not required to provide child care to volunteers of the PI program. But, even with this interpretation, volunteers for the PI program are not denied participation in the PI program during child care constraints. An individual who does not need child care, or even one who does need child care but can provide it through other means can volunteer for participation in the PI program. No child care will be provided, but the participants can receive other services associated with the PI program. The child care freeze was never promulgated pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 602 Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.54120.56120.57120.68
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VERNETTA A. ROSSI vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 02-000930 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Mar. 04, 2002 Number: 02-000930 Latest Update: Oct. 14, 2002

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent properly denied Petitioner's application for renewal of her family child care home license.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services (Department), issued a family child care home license to Vernetta Rossi (Petitioner) on January 15, 2001. The license was effective for a year, and automatically expired one year later. The maximum number of children for which Petitioner was licensed was ten. On or about November 11, 2001, Petitioner submitted an application for renewal of her family child care home license. On December 4, 2001, Donna Richey, an inspector with the Department went to Petitioner's home to conduct a re- licensing inspection. The purpose of the inspection was to determine if Petitioner was complying with the licensing rules and to make a recommendation on Petitioner’s application for renewal. Ms. Richey arrived at Petitioner’s house at about 1:30 p.m. Through a pane glass window, Ms. Richey observed a child sleeping on a mat in the dining room hall area. She also heard a child whimpering. Because Ms. Richey knew that there were children in the house and it was naptime, she knocked softly on the door for a few minutes. After getting no answer, Ms. Richey rang the doorbell twice, but still received no answer. After there was no response to Ms. Richey’s knocking on the door and ringing the doorbell, she walked to the back of Petitioner’s house, thinking that Petitioner may have been out in the back of the house. Finding no one there, Ms. Richey then returned to the front of the house and rang the doorbell again. When Ms. Richey returned to the front of the house, she observed that the child on a mat in the dining room hall area was still asleep. Upon returning to the front of the house, Ms. Richey tried the front door handle and discovered that it was unlocked. Ms. Richey then entered the house where she observed Petitioner asleep on the couch in the family room. Ms. Richey then called Petitioner, who woke up and appeared startled. Petitioner had dozed off and advised Ms. Richey that the reason she may not have heard the doorbell ring or the knock on the door was that she had a hearing loss and was lying on her “good” ear. Ms. Richey and Petitioner then toured the areas of Petitioner’s house where the five children, in Petitioner's care that day, were down for their naps. At the time of the tour, all five of the children, who were ages three and four, were in their designated napping areas and on their mats. One child was asleep on a mat in the dining room hall area; two children were on separate mats in one bedroom; one child was on a mat in the hallway; and another child was sleeping in the classroom area. During the time Ms. Richey was at Petitioner’s house for the re-licensure inspection, none of the children were crying, all the children were clean, and Petitioner’s house was neat and clean. There was a fence around the children’s playground in Petitioner's backyard. The fence had been approved by the Department as part of the licensure process. Also, there was a lock on the back door of Petitioner's house that was placed at a height that was not within the children's reach. There was a canal behind Petitioner’s house, which was about 60 yards from the house. In addition there was a five- foot high chain link fence that extended across the back of Petitioner’s property that served as a barrier between Petitioner’s yard and the canal. The fence provided a barrier that made it impossible for the children to easily access the canal. However, the Department determined that the canal was a potential hazard for the children in Petitioner’s care, when she was asleep and the front door of the house was unlocked. There was a main road within the subdivision in which Petitioner's house was located that was about 100 yards from her house. The Department was concerned that because Petitioner’s front door was unlocked and Petitioner had dozed off, the main road could have been a possible hazard to the pre-school children. During the approximately ten minutes that Petitioner was asleep, the children in her care were not being supervised. The Department requires that individuals licensed to provide child care supervise the children in their care. Following the Department’s re-licensing inspection on December 4, 2001, a report of neglect was made and an investigation was conducted. The results of that investigation and the findings and conclusions thereof are summarized in Abuse Report 2001-194692 (abuse report), which was completed on or about December 21, 2001. The abuse report found that on December 4, 2001, Petitioner fell asleep for a few minutes after she had put the five children in her care down for their afternoon nap and that during the time Petitioner was asleep, the children were not supervised. With regard to observations of Petitioner's “day care center,” the investigator noted in the abuse report that Petitioner’s home was “very clean and well kept” and “hazard free” and that there were no hazards observed in the home. Based on the findings of the investigator, relative to Petitioner’s falling asleep, the case was “closed with verified findings of neglect due to inadequate supervision with caretaker present.” The abuse report notes that officials closed Petitioner's facility on or about December 5, 2001. In addition to the incident that occurred on December 4, 2001, the abuse report referred to alleged incidents that took place prior to Petitioner’s being licensed in January 2001. These alleged incidents are not relevant or material to this proceeding in that they were not stated in the January 9, 2001, denial letter to Petitioner as the basis for the Department’s decision to deny Petitioner’s application for renewal of her family child care home license.1 The Department’s January 9, 2002, letter denying Petitioner’s application for renewal of her family child care home license stated in relevant part the following: This letter is to advise you that your application to renew your family day care license, dated November 11, 2001, is denied. In accordance with Section 402.310(10)(a), Florida Statutes, the department may deny a license for the violation of any provision of Sections 402.301-402.319, Florida Statutes, or rules adopted thereunder. The decision is based on the fact that abuse report number 2001-194692 indicates you have a verified report of child neglect for inadequate supervision-caretaker present. On December 4, 2001, during a re-licensing inspection, you were found to be asleep while five children ages, 3 years to 4 years, were in your care. This is in violation of Section 65C-20.009(3)(a), Supervision by Staff, Florida Administrative Code. This states[,] “At all times which includes when children are sleeping, the operator shall remain responsible for the supervision of children in care and capable of responding to the emergencies and needs of children. During the daytime hours of operation, children shall have adult supervision which means watching and directing children’s activities, both indoors and outdoors, and responding to each child’s needs.” Additionally, your actions were in violation of Section 402.301, Florida Statutes, which express [sic] the intent of the Florida Legislature to protect the health, safety, and well being of the children of the state and to promote their emotional and intellectual development and care. Petitioner does not dispute that she dozed off a few minutes on December 4, 2001, but testified credibily that this was an isolated incident. This is substantiated in a letter of support from Cynthia Ray, a former employee of Petitioner who worked at the center. Ms. Ray also served as a substitute for Petitioner and was listed on Petitioner's family child care home license as such. The letter from Ms. Cheryl Ray states that Petitioner has a high energy level, seldom sits down for any length of time, and is always "preparing, cleaning, organizing and doing book work." According to Ms. Ray's letter, it "was out of character for [Petitioner] to fall asleep" while the children were napping or at the center. With regard to the front door being unlocked, Petitioner explained that over the years, the policy or practice of the Department has changed. Petitioner was aware that at one time, the Department required that the door of a child care facility be unlocked so that parents could come in unannounced. Apparently, the Department’s current policy or procedures require that the doors of a child care facility be locked. In light of the policy, Petitioner stated that she would ensure that the doors of her family child care home would be locked. Petitioner has a combined 30 years of experience as a teacher and a principal in Montessori schools. At the time she was licensed by the Department, Petitioner used the Montessori method of instruction and had her home set up consistent with this approach. Parents of children who have been cared for by Petitioner expressed satisfaction, trust, and confidence in Petitioner’s ability to care for their children. They also believe that she has had a positive influence on the children's intellectual and emotional well-being. Many of the parents who testified had several years of experience working with Petitioner as the child care provider for their children. The parents believe that the educational program provided to their children while they were in Petitioner’s care is exceptional. Those parents whose children have left Petitioner’s program to attend kindergarten believe that the educational program provided by Petitioner prepared the children for kindergarten and made the transition to school easier for them. Parents who have had children in Petitioner’s care over the years and up until December 2001, have “dropped in” Petitioner’s home during the day when children were in her care and have never seen anything “amiss” or of concern to them. Parents who have had children in Petitioner's care testified credibly that Petitioner never neglected their children and that they felt their children were safe at Petitioner’s home and not in any danger. Despite the incident that occurred on December 4, 2001, the parents who testified at hearing continue to trust Petitioner to care for their children. The four-year-old daughter of Kevin and Rachel Walsh attended Petitioner's center from the time she was four weeks old, until the center closed in December 2001. The Walshes also have an older son who attended Petitioner's center for four years. During the time Petitioner has been caregiver for their children, the Walshes have been very pleased and satisfied with the care and the education that Petitioner provided to the children. For the past six years, Mrs. Walsh has dropped in unannounced at Petitioner's center and has been satisfied with what she has observed. According the to the Walshes, when in Petitioner's care, their children were in a "clean, safe, happy and learning environment" and learned "not only reading, writing, and math, but also manners and respect." The Walshes indicated that "those qualities make it comfortable for us to relax at our jobs knowing our kids are comfortable and happy." The Walshes live in the same neighborhood as Petitioner and, like Petitioner, they also have a canal behind their house. Because there is a fence which serves as a barrier between Petitioner's yard and the canal, the Walshes do not believe the canal was a hazard for children at Petitioner's center on December 4, 2001, or at any other time. On the day of the re-licensure inspection, the Walsh's daughter was not at the center. Nonetheless, the Walshes expressed utmost confidence in Petitioner to care for their daughter. Since Petitioner's center has been closed, the Walshes have not placed their daughter in another center. It is their desire to return their daughter to the care of Petitioner. Keith and Sharon Delafield's daughter was in the care of Petitioner on the day of the re-licensure inspection and had been in Petitioner's care for about three years. Mr. Delafield testified that during the time that his daughter attended the center, he visited the center, was satisfied with the care his daughter received, and always found the home to be neat and clean. Mr. Delafield believes that his daughter was the child who was whimpering on the day of the re-licensure inspection because she does not like to take naps. However, Mr. Delafield does not believe that she would have gone out of the house without permission of Petitioner. Moreover, despite the events of December 4, 2001, the Delafields trust Petitioner "whole heartedly" with the care of their daughter. According to the Delafields, during the time that their daughter was in the care of Petitioner, there was not a day that she "came home unfed, unclean, untaught, or unloved." Mr. and Mrs. Delafield, are planning to have another child and when they do, it is their desire to place the child with Petitioner. Valerie Senden has had two children attend Petitioner's center even though it is a 30 to 40 minute drive from her house. Ms. Senden's decision to place her children with Petitioner was made after she visited six other centers, all of which she found unsatisfactory. The basis of her dissatisfaction was her observation of the way that children were treated at those centers. During the time that Ms. Senden's children attended Petitioner's center, Ms. Senden made unannounced visits to the center and also spent the day and various parts of the day at the center helping Petitioner. During these visits, Ms. Senden never saw anything that caused her to be concerned about Petitioner's care of the children. Had Ms. Senden seen anything she didn't like or that she believed to be improper, she would have "pulled her children out of the center." Since Petitioner's center was closed, Ms. Senden has not placed her children in another center. Diann Myrick has a son who attended Petitioner's center from about August 2001 until it was closed in December 2001. Ms. Myrick does not believe that her child was ever neglected by Petitioner and is completely satisfied with the care that he has received from her. Moreover, Ms. Myrick testified that every time that she has come to the center to pick up her son, the door is always locked. According to Ms. Myrick, with Petitioner's guidance, her son is learning discipline as well as receiving an education. Ms. Myrick believes that these are things that she has been unable to find in private day care centers. With regard to Petitioner, Ms. Myrick testified that Petitioner is a good caregiver, and that both the children and the parents love Petitioner. Ms. Myrick testified that she wants to put her son in Petitioner's center when and if it is re-opened. Eight letters of support for Petitioner substantiate the testimony at hearing. In these letters, parents whose children have been in the care of Petitioner describe her as "a wonderful teacher and caregiver," an individual who is "honest, competent, and genuine," and a "teacher with compassion, care, and respect for others." Petitioner's center is described as being "not just clean, but immaculate." The parents expressed satisfaction with the education and care that Petitioner provided to their children; indicated that they trust Petitioner to care for their children; and believe it would be a disservice to the children, the parents, and the community to refuse to allow Petitioner to re-open her center.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order that denies Petitioner's application for renewal of her family child care home license without prejudice to her right to re-apply for such license in the future. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2002.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57402.301402.310402.313402.319
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SHERILL P. GOMEZ vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 98-005078 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Nov. 17, 1998 Number: 98-005078 Latest Update: Jun. 24, 1999

The Issue The issue for disposition in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to relicensure as a family day-care home.

Findings Of Fact Sherill Gomez resides in Kissimmee, Osceola County, Florida, and had a provisional license to operate a family day- care home at her residence. The license was issued on April 13, 1998, and expired six months later on October 13, 1998. In 1989, Ms. Gomez was involved in an incident of child neglect. She had been babysitting in her home and left two children under the age of 3 sleeping but unattended when she went out shopping. In her absence a 2 1/2-year-old, Andre, got out the door and was picked up by the police. When Ms. Gomez returned she called the police and learned that they had Andre. Apparently all she knew about the child's mother was that she worked at Disney Village. Ms. Gomez took a three-hour course for family day-care and received explicit instructions regarding her duty to provide adult supervision at all times, both inside and outside the house. When she applied for licensure and assured DCFS that the 1989 incident never would occur again, the licensing supervisor, Kathy Swaggerty, agreed to a six-month provisional license with close agency scrutiny of the home during that period. During the provisional license period, Barbara Ivey inspected Ms. Gomez's home several times, both announced and unannounced. She found several violations in July 1998 regarding record-keeping, bedding for the children, and access to unsafe items such as bleach, kitty litter, a weed-wacker, bicycles, and barbeque grills. Concerned that Ms. Gomez did not understand her obligation, Ms. Ivey spent about two and one-half hours with her on that visit explaining the rules. Ms. Ivey also explained the importance of adequate supervision. Ms. Ivey returned on August 5, 1998, and found some violations had been corrected, but there were still problems with two of the children's records; the bicycles were still accessible, and the carpet was dirty. On a subsequent visit in August everything but a nutrition card for one infant had been corrected. Ms. Ivey and Ms. Gomez discussed supervision again and Ms. Ivey emphasized that with one adult caregiver all of the children needed to be in the house or out in the play yard together. Ms. Gomez applied for relicensure and Ms. Ivey scheduled another inspection visit on September 30, 1998, shortly before the provisional license was due to expire. Ms. Ivey arrived at the home and was admitted by Ms. Gomez, who led her into the kitchen area where there was a round table with chairs in front of a large picture window looking onto the backyard. Through the window Ms. Ivey could see two children, ages 3 and 4 years, playing in the yard. A 5-month old infant was in a carry-all near the table in the kitchen. Ms. Ivey told Ms. Gomez that the children needed to come in. Ms. Gomez said that the children were all right, that they could be watched through the window, but Ms. Ivey insisted that the children should come in. When Ms. Ivey went out the backdoor she found another child, an infant, sitting alone on the patio out of view of the window and unable to be observed from inside the house. The backyard is not fenced and leads into a wooded area. The infant could have crawled away into that area. After the children were brought inside Ms. Ivey continued with her inspection but explained that the lack of supervision was a problem. Ms. Gomez also had six children enrolled, a number which was in excess of her approved capacity when her own child was home from school. In the October 13, 1998, license denial letter, inadequate supervision was the specific basis for DCFS' finding that Ms. Gomez's home failed to meet minimum standards. At the hearing Ms. Gomez explained that the reason the children were left alone is that she had to go the door when Ms. Ivey arrived. This explanation does not justify her leaving the infant alone unobserved on the patio nor does it justify Ms. Gomez's delay in retrieving the children after Ms. Ivey's arrival. Moreover, under DCFS standards, she should have brought all of the children inside when she went into the house.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: that the Department of Children and Family Services enter its final order denying Sherill Gomez' application for family day-care home licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Sherill Gomez 3689 Penshurst Place Kissimmee, Florida 34758 Carmen M. Sierra, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57402.313 Florida Administrative Code (1) 65C-20.009
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DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs THE EARLY YEARS CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, 16-006249 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Oct. 26, 2016 Number: 16-006249 Latest Update: Dec. 22, 2017

The Issue The issue in this matter is whether the Department of Children and Families should impose an administrative fine on Respondent.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating licensed or registered child care facilities in Florida. Respondent is licensed to operate a child care facility in Lakeland, Florida. The Department seeks to sanction Respondent based on an incident that occurred on November 2, 2015. The Department’s Administrative Complaint specifically alleges that: The facility driver, Antuan Bunkley was looking at his phone while transporting children in the facility’s vehicle. Two witnesses observed Antuan Bunkley texting and/or scrolling while driving. The witnesses observed a phone in Antuan’s hands and him looking down several times while driving with children in the van. Several children on the van told the Department that Antuan text [sic] while he drives, plays games on his phone, and receives calls while driving. The Department asserts that Mr. Bunkley must “be able to respond to the needs of the children” and “be alert and avoid any and all distractions in order to effectively respond to those needs.” The Department categorized Respondent’s (i.e., Mr. Bunkley’s) actions as a Class I violation of a child care licensing standard. The Department desires to fine Respondent in the amount of $250 because Mr. Bunkley’s “inadequate supervision posed an imminent threat to the child, or could or did result in death or serious harm to the health, safety or well-being of a child.” The Department issued the Administrative Complaint following a complaint received from Shana Nicholes, who had observed Mr. Bunkley driving Respondent’s van. At the final hearing, Ms. Nicholes testified that on November 2, 2015, at approximately 3:30 p.m., she was driving her sports utility vehicle on Highway 98 North in Lakeland. Her brother was riding with her in the passenger seat. As she drove, her brother called her attention to Respondent’s van which was driving in front of them. He commented that the van was full of children who were not wearing seat belts. As her vehicle drew closer to the van, Ms. Nicholes observed that not only were the children not wearing seat belts, but she believed that she saw the driver (Mr. Bunkley) looking down at his cell phone while driving. Ms. Nicholes explained that Highway 98 North has four lanes through Lakeland. Over a stretch of about three to four miles, Ms. Nicholes drove in the left side lane roughly parallel to Mr. Bunkley. Ms. Nicholes testified that during that drive, she saw Mr. Bunkley holding a phone. She further stated that he looked down at the phone in his lap several times as he drove. Ms. Nicholes guessed that Mr. Bunkley lowered his eyes for approximately 10 to 20 seconds each time he glanced down. She stressed that “he wasn’t paying attention to the road.” Ms. Nicholes expressed that the two vehicles drove as fast as 45 mph. Ms. Nicholes was quite alarmed by Mr. Bunkley’s actions. As she drove next to him, she took several photographs of him with her cell phone. Copies of Ms. Nicholes’ photographs were introduced at the final hearing. The photographs show Mr. Bunkley looking down as he is sitting in the driver’s seat. However, neither Mr. Bunkley’s right hand nor a cell phone are visible in the pictures. (Respondent disputes that the van was moving at the time Ms. Nicholes took the pictures.) Ms. Nicholes was shocked by the incident. She was worried for the safety of the children in the van. She commented that if her child were riding in the van, and the driver was distracted like Mr. Bunkley was, she would be furious. Later that day, Ms. Nicholes posted her photographs of Mr. Bunkley driving Respondent’s van on her Facebook page. She added the caption, “Well, this is safe, we’re doing about 45 down 98 and this guy is texting with a van full of children. Not cool, dude.” The next morning, Ms. Nicholes was still distressed by what she had witnessed. Therefore, she decided to visit Respondent’s place of business to discuss the incident. Ms. Nicholes had no knowledge of Respondent prior to November 2, 2015. She identified Respondent from the name on the side of the van. Ms. Nicholes maintained that her only interest in approaching Respondent was to alert Respondent of the risk to the children in the van because of a distracted driver. When Ms. Nicholes arrived at Respondent’s facility, she spoke to Elizabeth Jackson. Ms. Nicholes advised Ms. Jackson that she had observed her van driver using his cell phone while driving, and she showed Ms. Jackson her photographs. Ms. Jackson informed Ms. Nicholes that the driver was her son, Antuan Bunkley. Ms. Jackson told Ms. Nicholes that she would be taking him off driving until the matter was resolved. After her meeting with Ms. Jackson, Ms. Nicholes drove to Subway for lunch. While standing in line, she was approached by a woman who identified herself as an employee of Respondent. The employee asked Ms. Nicholes if she was the one who had posted the photos of the van driver on Facebook. At that point, Mr. Bunkley entered Subway. Ms. Nicholes took a picture of Mr. Bunkley while he was standing in line behind her. The next day, Ms. Nicholes reported the incident to the Department. Upon receiving Ms. Nicholes’ complaint, the Department initiated an investigation. The case was assigned to Brandy Queen, a Child Protective Investigator. Cheryl Dishong, a Child Care Regulations Counselor, assisted her. Ms. Queen testified that she started her investigation by visiting Respondent’s facility. She was accompanied by Ms. Dishong. There, she met Ms. Jackson. During their conversation, Ms. Jackson acknowledged that her facility owned the van and that the driver was Mr. Bunkley. Ms. Jackson told Ms. Queen that Mr. Bunkley had picked up six children on the afternoon of November 2, 2015. She provided the children’s names to Ms. Queen. Ms. Jackson also allowed Ms. Queen and Ms. Dishong to examine the van. Ms. Queen and Ms. Dishong spent some time climbing through the van. The van has two bucket seats in the front row and three rows of back seats. Ms. Queen and Ms. Dishong sat in different seats to determine the vantage point of the driver by the children riding in the van. They wanted to see if the children could have observed Mr. Bunkley texting while he drove. Ms. Dishong climbed into the back rear seat. Taking into account that she is taller than the children who rode in the van, Ms. Dishong slouched down to simulate a child passenger. Ms. Queen stated that Ms. Dishong believed that a child could adequately see the driver from the back, rear seat. However, Ms. Queen conceded that during their inspection of the van, no one was sitting between the rear back seat and the drivers’ seat. Neither did a driver sit in the front seat to determine whether Mr. Bunkley’s body would prevent a clear view of his hand while he was driving (particularly, a driver as large as Mr. Bunkley as discussed below). Next, Ms. Queen interviewed the six children who had been riding with Mr. Bunkley on the afternoon of November 2, 2015. At the final hearing, Ms. Queen explained that, before she asked the children about Mr. Bunkley’s driving, she presented several preliminary questions to ascertain whether the children understood the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie. Ms. Queen testified that she believed the children were telling her the truth during her interview. However, the children’s statements were not given under oath.3/ Ms. Queen stated that, based on the evidence she gathered, which included the children’s statements, Ms. Nicholes’ pictures,4/ and her own observations of the van, she “verified” that Mr. Bunkley’s conduct constituted inadequate supervision. Ms. Queen further stated that Mr. Bunkley’s driving while distracted caused concern since he ran “the risk of getting into a wreck.” She believed that he had placed himself and the children in his care “at risk of harm, of dying.” Of the six children, the Department presented A.O. at the final hearing to tell her story.5/ A.O. was seven years old at the time of the incident. (She was eight years old on the date of the final hearing.) A.O. testified that she had attended Respondent’s child care facility for about a year. A.O. was familiar with Mr. Bunkley and identified him in Ms. Nicholes’ photographs. A.O. relayed that three to four different people had driven her in Respondent’s van, including Mr. Bunkley. A.O. stated that on the afternoon in question, Mr. Bunkley picked her up after school in Respondent’s van. At the final hearing, A.O. demonstrated proficient knowledge of the functions of a cell phone. A.O. described various uses of a cell phone including talking, texting, playing games, and looking at Facebook. A.O. testified that Mr. Bunkley used his cell phone when he drove the van. A.O. stated that Mr. Bunkley texts while driving. By “texting,” A.O. recounted that she observed Mr. Bunkley moving his fingers on the phone at the same time he was driving. A.O. also described seeing Mr. Bunkley looking at Facebook on his cell phone while he was driving the van. A.O. added that sometimes when she was riding with Mr. Bunkley, he swerved off the road while he was using his phone. She also described how the van would sometimes get near other cars on the road. She commented that Mr. Bunkley occasionally drives the van with his knees. She imparted that the way he drove scared her sometimes. A.O. expressed that when she rode in the van, she sat in the very back seat on the right side. A.O. conveyed that, despite sitting in the very back row, she could still see Mr. Bunkley hold and use a cell phone. At the final hearing, Mr. Bunkley acknowledged that he was driving Respondent’s van on November 2, 2015, and was the individual seen in Ms. Nicholes’ photographs. Mr. Bunkley also confirmed that he was transporting children in the van at that time. Mr. Bunkley firmly denied that he was texting while driving Respondent’s van. He denied ever using his phone while driving the van. Mr. Bunkley admitted that he does carry his cell phone when he drives. However, he claimed that he routinely keeps his phone in his pocket. Mr. Bunkley asserted that he would only use his cell phone in the case of an emergency. Mr. Bunkley expressed that Ms. Nicholes must have seen him looking down at his transportation log when she observed him on November 2, 2015. Mr. Bunkley explained that his log sheet registers when and where he is to pick up and drop off children. Mr. Bunkley relayed that he periodically reviews the log sheet as he transports children. However, he only checks the transportation log when the van is stopped. He remarked that Ms. Nicholes must have taken her pictures of him on Highway 98 North when they were stopped at a stoplight. Mr. Bunkley stated that he is 5’11” tall and weighs 330 pounds. Because of his large size, he did not believe that it was possible for A.O. to see anything he held in his lap from her seat in the right rear of the van. Mr. Bunkley offered his cell phone records to support his assertion that he was not texting on the afternoon of November 2, 2015. However, the phone records do not confirm whether Mr. Bunkley was accessing or reading text messages as he was driving. Nor do they provide any information regarding his alleged “scrolling” or using Facebook. Respondent is owned and operated by Ms. Jackson. She is also Mr. Bunkley’s mother. Ms. Jackson did not believe that Mr. Bunkley was texting on his cell phone while he was driving the van. Instead, she posited that the van was stationary when Ms. Nicholes took her pictures, and that Mr. Bunkley was looking down at his transportation log. Based on the competent substantial evidence presented at the final hearing, the clear and convincing evidence in the record does not establish that Mr. Bunkley was scrolling and/or texting on his cell phone while driving Respondent’s van on November 2, 2015. Accordingly, the Department failed to meet its burden of proving that Respondent committed “inadequate supervision” which would support an administrative fine under section 402.310.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent, The Early Years Child Development Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2017.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57402.301402.305402.310402.312402.31990.801
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SELINA BREW vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 04-003002 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 24, 2004 Number: 04-003002 Latest Update: Aug. 11, 2005

The Issue Whether Petitioner's license to operate a day care center should be suspended or revoked. Whether Petitioner's license to operate a day care center should be renewed.

Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: The Parties Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating child care facilities. Respondent routinely conducts inspections of licensed child care facilities to determine whether facilities are in compliance with the applicable statutes and rules. Any problems found during the inspections are noted on a report, which is provided to the facility's operator immediately following the inspection. When appropriate, the inspection report provides a time frame within which the problems must be corrected. Regular inspections are conducted approximately twice a year. More frequent inspections--monthly or every six weeks-- are conducted on child care facilities which have a provisional license rather than a standard license. Respondent also conducts inspections in response to complaints it receives, and it has the authority to inspect child care facilities at any time with or without notice. Petitioner is the owner and operator of a licensed child care facility located at 2625 North Hiawasee Road, Orlando, Florida, which is operated under the business name: Today's Kids Daycare Center (hereinafter "Petitioner's facility" or "the facility"). Petitioner has operated the child care facility at the above address for approximately five years and previously worked as director of another child care facility for five years. Petitioner has taken all required training in order to be licensed. As a result, she is, or should be, familiar with the rules regulating child care facilities. The Incident Following a complaint, Susan Wujastyk, former child protective investigator for Respondent, interviewed the mother of the child, W.P., at the child's school on March 5, 2004, in relation to an alleged incident which occurred at Petitioner's facility on March 3, 2004. She then prepared a preliminary report and went to Petitioner's facility to investigate further. Respondent's child care licensing division was also notified and an inspector came to the facility, as well. On or about March 3, 2004, the child, W.P., a pre- kindergarten student at Petitioner's facility, swallowed an unknown solid substance while in Tangela Muskin's classroom. Muskin believed the substance to be rat pellets and lead W.P. to Petitioner, who was in another room, and told her of her suspicions. Petitioner, who had taken some nursing courses at the local community college, put on a rubber glove and swabbed the child's mouth to dislodge any other substances that might still be in the child's mouth. She also gave him some milk, with the intent to make him throw up. Petitioner then inspected the vomit but found no foreign substances in it. Petitioner did not call "9-1-1" for emergency assistance, nor did she call the poison control center. Instead, she observed W.P. for a period of time and sent him back to his classroom. Muskin also testified that she found the child, W.P., with a bag labeled rat pellets and claimed that Petitioner, in the presence of another employee at the facility, threw the rat pellets in the trash and told Muskin and the other employee not to report this to anyone. This statement is not credible. Petitioner testified that she attempted to call the child's mother, but could not reach her by telephone. Thereafter, she waited for the child's father to come and pick him up and she told him that W.P. had swallowed something but that Petitioner believed that she got all of the material out of his mouth. She advised him to take the child to the emergency room, but the father declined to do so. This statement appears to be credible. Susan Wujastyk inspected the facility on March 5, 2004, as part of her investigation of this matter and found two pellets under a toy chest in Muskin's classroom. Wujastyk thought they were rat pellets; however, that fact was never verified. An examination of the child, W.P., on March 5, 2004, found no evidence of ingestion of a toxic substance, and his condition was found to be stable. Petitioner retains a pest control company that performs regular services at the facility, but does not use rat pellets or any form of rodent control devices. Three of Petitioner's employees testified that they perform regular inspections of the facility and none of them ever found rat pellets or other toxic substances on the premises. Following the joint investigation, a joint report was prepared and approved by Respondent's staff, and it was recommended that Petitioner's license be revoked. Thereafter, on March 23, 2004, the acting district director sent a letter to Petitioner informing her that her license was being revoked and advised Petitioner of her right to "appeal" that decision through the administrative process. Subsequently, on June 10, 2004, Petitioner was sent a letter informing her that her license would not be renewed. The basis for the denial was the same as the revocation letter. At the hearing, Patricia Richard testified that she was particularly concerned that Petitioner was aware the W.P. may have swallowed a toxic and other dangerous substance and did not take immediate action to report it to "9-1-1" or the poison control center; and did not take it upon herself to take the child to a health care professional for examination but waited for the parents to arrive to inform them of the incident. Richard also testified that it was improper for Petitioner to put her fingers down the child's throat in order to induce vomiting. She characterized these as serious child safety violations and failure to follow proper emergency procedures. These were the primary reasons she recommended that Petitioner's child care license be revoked and not renewed. Petitioner, in her testimony, did not deny giving the child milk and swabbing his mouth with her finger, but did deny that she stuck her fingers in his mouth in order to induce vomiting. The evidence is not clear and convincing that the child, W.P., swallowed a toxic or hazardous material; and it is not at all clear from the evidence what it was that the child swallowed. However, it is clear that the child swallowed something that was suspected to be toxic; and when this fact was reported to Petitioner, she did not follow proper emergency procedures and did not properly notify the child's parents promptly. Petitioner has demonstrated that her license for a child care facility should not be denied or revoked but that a lesser penalty should be imposed.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services issue a final order as follows: Finding Petitioner guilty of violating the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.004(2)(d)1. and 2. (one count each). Finding Petitioner not guilty of violating the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-20.010(1)(b) or similar provisions. Imposing a fine of $200, and a one-month suspension of Petitioner's license, followed by the issuance of a provisional license. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 2004.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57402.26402.301402.310402.319
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