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TILTON H. DAVIS vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 90-000036 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 04, 1990 Number: 90-000036 Latest Update: Aug. 31, 1990

The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to retain retirement benefits received by him during the time periods May 19, 1983, through December 31, 1983; May 18, 1984, through December 31, 1984; and May 17, 1985 through June 30, 1985.

Findings Of Fact On June 26 and 27, 1990, respectively, the Respondent and the Petitioner submitted to the Hearing Officer their proposed Findings of Fact. In the Appendix to the Recommended Order the Hearing Officer submitted recommended rulings thereon. The following constitutes the rulings in this Final Order on those proposed Findings of Fact. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 1, 2, and 3 are hereby accepted and adopted in that they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 4 is hereby rejected as an ultimate finding of fact in that it a recitation of isolated bits and pieces of testimony of witnesses, and it is not proper as an ultimate finding of fact. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 5 is hereby rejected upon the authority of Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So.2d 173 (Fla.), in that it is based upon statements of the parties as to the working relationship, which under the Cantor case is not competent evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 is hereby rejected upon the grounds and for the reason stated in Paragraph No. 3. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is accepted to the extent that on November 1, 1984, the Petitioner was an employee of the Union County School Board, and continued as such through June 30, 1987, but the remainder of that proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is hereby rejected in that it is based on the statements and arrangements of the parties, which, based upon the Cantor case do not constitute competent evidence. The Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, and 11, are hereby rejected in that each of them is ambiguous, irrelevant, not based upon any competent substantial evidence in the record, and do not serve to either prove or disapprove any of the issues in this cause. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 10, is hereby rejected in that is erroneous as to the dates in question and as to the number of hours in the School Board workweek. The dates in 1983, 1984, and 1985, during which the Petitioner's retirement benefits had been suspended because of exceeding the 780-hour work limitation were as follows: May 19, 1983, through December 31, 1983; May 18, 1984, through December 31, 1984; and May 17, 1985, through June 30, 1985. The Respondent's proposed Finding of Fact Nos. 1 through 8 are each hereby accepted and adopted in that they are each based upon competent, substantial evidence.

Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner was overpaid retirement benefits for the time periods of May 25, 1985 through June 30, 1985, in the amount of $3024.66. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1990.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68121.091
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JULIE E. REEBER, ALEXANDER REEBER, AND CHRISTINE TADRY vs DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 92-000215 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Deland, Florida Jan. 13, 1992 Number: 92-000215 Latest Update: Jul. 21, 1992

The Issue The ultimate issue is whether Julie E. Reeber, Alexander Reeber and Christine Tadry are entitled to receive survivor benefits payable under the Florida Retirement System (FRS) for Marjorie A. McCollum, deceased, under the facts and circumstances of the Case. The factual issue is whether Marjorie A. McCollum was incompetent when she made the designation of beneficiary and under the undue influence of her daughter Suzanne L. Benson.

Findings Of Fact In August of 1991, Ms. Marjorie A. McCollum, a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) applied for disability retirement benefits. (Deposition of Stanley Colvin). As part of her application for disability retirement benefits on Form FR-13 (Florida Retirement System Application for Disability Retirement), Ms. McCollum designated her daughter, Suzanne L. Benson, as her beneficiary. (Exhibit 1 of the deposition of Stanley Colvin). The designation reads, "All previous beneficiary designations are null and void. The beneficiary whom I designate to receive the benefit or refund at my death is Suzanne L. Benson." (Deposition of Stanley Colvin, Exhibit 1). According to the date on the form, Ms. McCollum signed the application on August 28, 1991, and was properly witnesses by a notary public, John T. West. (Testimony of Mary Shere). According to the application, Ms. McCollum was suffering from cancer. She selected the Option 2 retirement benefit. (Exhibit 1 of Stanley Colvin deposition). Ms. McCollum's application for disability retirement benefits, with the Option 2 retirement benefit, was approved by the Division of Retirement with an effective date of September 1, 1991. (Deposition of Stanley Colvin, Exhibit 9). Prior to receiving her first check, Ms. Marjorie McCollum died on September 23, 1991. (Deposition of Stanley Colvin, Exhibit 9). On November 4, 1991, the Division, by letter, notified Suzanne L. Benson that as designated beneficiary of Ms. Marjorie McCollum, she was entitled to the Option 2 benefit in the amount of $280.69 per month through August 31, 2001, for ten years. On November 19, 1991, the Division received a letter from Julia Reeber, another daughter of Ms. McCollum (the deceased), disputing the designation of her sister Suzanne L. Benson as the beneficiary. (Deposition of Stanley Colvin, Exhibit 16). As a result of the notice of dispute by Julia Reeber, the Division on November 26, 1991, notified Ms. Benson by letter that payment of the Option 2 benefit would not be forthcoming until the dispute was resolved. (Deposition of Stanley Colvin, Exhibit 12). The designation of beneficiary executed by Ms. McCollum was properly executed and filed with the Division of Retirement in accord with the Florida Statutes and rules pertaining to the designation of beneficiaries for Florida retirement benefits. (Deposition of Stanley Colvin). Suzanne L. Benson was the properly designated beneficiary, and the Division intended to pay the Option 2 benefit to Suzanne L. Benson in accord with the Division's rules. (Deposition of Stanley Colvin). Ms. McCollum suffered some deterioration of her mental faculties prior to her death because of her illness, she could no longer handle her financial matters, and needed aid from her children in the payment of her bills. However, at no time was the Petitioner legally declared incompetent. Testimony of Julie Reeber). Despite suffering from the ravages of the disease, Ms. McCollum was at times able to function in a normal matter without evidence of diminished mental capacity. (Testimony of Mary Shere). On August 23, 1991, the deceased came to the office of Ms. Mary Shere. Ms. McCollum had been a regular customer of Ms. Shere's beauty parlor and later her accounting service. Ms. Shere had known Ms. McCollum for over ten years. (Testimony of Mary Shere). On August 23, 1991, Ms. McCollum and Ms. Shere talked for an hour to an hour and a half regarding her illness and her application for disability retirement. Ms. McCollum expressed her desire for Ms. Shere to notarize the application for disability retirement benefits. Ms. McCollum told Ms. Shere that Ms. McCollum wanted her daughter Suzanne to be the beneficiary of her death benefits. However, they could not complete the designation of beneficiary because the form had not come. Another discussion concerning the arrival of the forms took place by telephone on August 24, 1991, between Ms. Shere and the Deceased. On August 26, 1991, Suzanne Benson telephoned Ms. Shere advising Ms. Shere that her mother had been hospitalized, and that she needed to come to the hospital in order to notarize the disability application. (Testimony of Mary Shere). On August 26, 1991, Ms. Shere accompanied by one of her employees, John West, visited Ms. McCollum in the hospital. In her presence, the application was signed by Ms. McCollum and notarized by John West. (Testimony of Mary Shere). Ms. Shere's very credible testimony was that Ms. McCollum knew what she was doing, was aware of what she possessed and knew she was terminal. Ms. McCollum made a knowing and rational decision to designate Suzanne L. Benson as her beneficiary.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Division holding that Marjorie McCollum retired with an Option 2 retirement benefit and that Suzanne L. Benson, her designated beneficiary, receive the Option 2 benefit. DONE and ENTERED this 29 day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29 day of May, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie E. Reeber 133 Kirkwood Drive Debary, FL 32713 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 Rhonda B. Goodson, Esquire Post Office Box 4319 South Daytona, FL 32121 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2539 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 415 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550

Florida Laws (4) 120.56120.57121.031744.3215
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BABU JAIN vs FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY, 05-003990F (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 26, 2005 Number: 05-003990F Latest Update: Mar. 01, 2006

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what amount?

Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. § 57.105(5), Fla. Stat.; and Order and Mandate in Case No. 1D04-4167, First District Court of Appeal. Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, reads as follows: (5) In administrative proceedings under chapter 120, an administrative law judge shall award a reasonable attorney's fee and damages to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and a losing party's attorney or qualified representative in the same manner and upon the same basis as provided in subsections (1)-(4). Such award shall be a final order subject to judicial review pursuant to s. 120.68. If the losing party is an agency as defined in s. 120.52(1), the award to the prevailing party shall be against and paid by the agency. A voluntary dismissal by a nonprevailing party does not divest the administrative law judge of jurisdiction to make the award described in this subsection. Subsection (5) of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, directs the undersigned to the preceding subsections which set forth standards to be applied in the analysis of entitlement to attorney’s fees. Subsection (1) provides that reasonable attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party to be paid by the losing party where the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense, when initially presented to the administrative tribunal or at any time before the administrative hearing, “[w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense or [w]ould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.” The standards set forth in Subsection (1) and incorporated by reference in Subsection (5) were the result of an amendment to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, in 1999. s. 4, Ch. 99-225, Laws of Florida. Prior to that amendment, the statute provided for the award of attorney’s fees when “there was a complete absence of justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of the losing party.” These new standards became applicable to administrative hearings in 2003 by s. 9, Ch. 2003-94, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of June 4, 2003. Petitioner filed his Petition for Administrative Hearing in September 2003. Accordingly, the newer standards of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, apply to this case. In the case of Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), the court discussed the legislative changes to Section 57.105: [T]his statute was amended in 1999 as part of the 1999 Tort Reform Act in an effort to reduce frivolous litigation and thereby to decrease the cost imposed on the civil justice system by broadening the remedies that were previously available. See Ch. 99- 225, s. 4, Laws of Florida. Unlike its predecessor, the 1999 version of the statute no longer requires a party to show a complete absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law, but instead allows recovery of fees for any claims or defenses that are unsupported. (Citations omitted) However, this Court cautioned that section 57.105 must be applied carefully to ensure that it serves the purpose for which it was intended, which was to deter frivolous pleadings. (Citations omitted) In determining whether a party is entitled to statutory attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, frivolousness is determined when the claim or defense was initially filed; if the claim or defense is not initially frivolous, the court must then determine whether the claim or defense became frivolous after the suit was filed. (Citation omitted) In so doing, the court determines if the party or its counsel knew or should have known that the claim or defense asserted was not supported by the facts or an application of existing law.(Citation omitted) An award of fees is not always appropriate under section 57.105, even when the party seeking fees was successful in obtaining the dismissal of the action or summary judgment in an action. (Citation omitted) Wendy's v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 523. The court in Wendy’s recognized that the new standard is difficult to define and must be applied on a case-by-case basis: While the revised statute incorporates the ‘not supported by the material facts or would not be supported by application of then-existing law to those material facts’ standard instead of the ‘frivolous’ standard of the earlier statute, an all encompassing definition of the new standard defies us. It is clear that the bar for imposition of sanctions has been lowered, but just how far it has been lowered is an open question requiring a case by case analysis. Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 524 citing Mullins v. Kennelly, 847 So. 2d at 1155, n.4. (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). More recently, the First District Court of Appeal further described the legislative change: The 1999 version lowered the bar a party must overcome before becoming entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes . . . Significantly, the 1999 version of 57.105 ‘applies to any claim or defense, and does not require that the entire action be frivolous.’ Albritton v. Ferrera, 913 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), quoting Mullins v. Kennelly, supra. The Florida Supreme Court has noted that the 1999 amendments to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, “greatly expand the statute’s potential use.” Boca Burger, Inc. v. Richard Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 570, (Fla. 2005). The phrase “supported by the material facts” found in Section 57.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes, was defined by the court in Albritton to mean that the “party possesses admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the finder of fact.” Albritton, 913 So. 2d 5, at 7, n.1. Therefore, the first question is whether FAMU or its attorneys knew or should have known that its defense of Dr. Jain’s claim was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the defense when the case was initially filed or at any time before trial. That is, did FAMU possess admissible evidence sufficient to establish its defense. The parties filed a Pretrial Stipulation the day before the hearing. The Pretrial Stipulation characterized FAMU’s position as follows: It is the position of the University that Dr. Babu Jain retired at the close of business on May 30, 2003, pursuant to the provision of the DROP retirement program. Dr. Jain did not have the right, nor the authority, to unilaterally rescind his resignation and retirement date. In a letter dated May 5, 2003, the Division of Retirement informed Dr. Jain that it was providing him with the “DROP VOID” form that had to be signed by himself and the University, for his participation in DROP to be rescinded. No University official signed that form nor agreed to rescind his retirement. On May 30, 2003, Dr. Babu Jain knew that his retirement through DROP had not been voided and that he had in-fact retired. The University included the position that Dr. Jain occupied in its vacancy announcement in the ‘Chronicle of Higher Education.’ The University, through Dr. Larry Robinson notified Dr. Jain that his retirement rescission was not accepted. Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003. Finally, there was never a ‘meeting of the minds’, nor any other agreement between the University and Dr. Jain to void his retirement commitment. It [is] the University’s position that Dr. Babu Jain retired from Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University effective at the close of business on May 30, 2003. Pretrial Stipulation at 14-15. (emphasis in original) The material facts known by FAMU necessary to establish its defense against Petitioner's claim at the time the case was filed included: Petitioner’s initial Notice of Election to Participate in DROP and Resignation of Employment in which Dr. Jain resigned effective the date he terminated from DROP (designated as May 30, 2003); Dr. Robinson’s letter dated May 27, 2003, which asserted that the University was not in agreement with Dr. Jain's decision and that the decision to terminate from DROP is a mutual one; Dr. Robinson's letter of May 30, 2003, which informed Dr. Jain that the two summer semester employment contracts were issued to him in error and informing Dr. Jain that he would be paid through May 30, 2003, his designated DROP date; the refusal of anyone from FAMU to sign the DROP-VOID form provided to Dr. Jain by the Division of Retirement; the reassignment of another instructor to take over Dr. Jain’s classes the first Monday following the designated DROP termination date; and the Refund of Overpayment of Salary Form and resulting salary deduction from Dr. Jain’s sick leave payout. It is difficult to determine what, if any, additional facts FAMU learned through discovery. That is, whether deposition testimony of FAMU officials enlightened FAMU or its attorneys as to material facts not known at the time the case was filed by Dr. Jain, is not readily apparent. However, a review of the pre-trial depositions reveals material facts which supported FAMU’s defense that the summer contracts were issued in error and that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties regarding voiding Dr. Jain’s DROP participation. In particular, Dr. Robinson, Provost and Vice- President for Academic Affairs, testified in deposition that when he signed Dr. Jain’s summer employment contracts on May 20, 2003, he had no knowledge of Dr. Jain’s participation in the DROP program; that he first became aware that Dr. Jain was in DROP with a DROP termination date of May 30, 2003, upon receiving a May 21, 2003, memorandum from Nellie Woodruff, Director of the FAMU Personnel Office; and that Dean Larry Rivers did not have the authority to issue work assignments for any of his faculty beyond their DROP dates. Additionally, Dr. Henry Williams, Assistant Dean for Science and Technology, testified in deposition that when he signed the Recommendation for Summer Employment on May 5, 2003, which recommended Dr. Jain for teaching summer courses beginning May 12, 2003, he was unaware that there was a 30-day window during which a DROP participant could not be employed. Obviously, when the undersigned weighed all of the evidence, including evidence presented at hearing which is not part of this analysis, it was determined that the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of Dr. Jain’s position. However, that is not the standard to be applied here. The undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU possessed admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact that it did not give written agreement to his decision to abandon DROP and resume employment if accepted by the finder of fact. While the finder of fact ultimately did not agree with FAMU, FAMU possessed the material facts necessary to establish the defense, i.e., admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the trier of fact, when the case was filed and prior to the final hearing. The second question is whether FAMU’s defense would not be supported by the application of then existing law to those material facts, when the case was initially filed or at any time before the final hearing. In the Pretrial Stipulation, the parties referenced Sections 121.091(13) and 121.021(39), Florida Statutes, as provisions of law relevant to the determination of the issues in the case.2/ These statutory provisions were also referenced by the undersigned in the Recommended Order as “two competing statutory provisions.” Recommended Order at 15. Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, establishing the DROP program, was created by s. 8, Ch. 97-180, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of January 1, 1999.3/ Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: DEFERRED RETIREMENT OPTION PROGRAM.--In general, and subject to the provisions of this section, the Deferred Retirement Option Program, hereinafter referred to as the DROP, is a program under which an eligible member of the Florida Retirement System may elect to participate, deferring receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with his or her Florida Retirement System employer. The deferred monthly benefits shall accrue in the System Trust Fund on behalf of the participant, plus interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of the DROP participation, as provided in paragraph (c). Upon termination of employment, the participant shall receive the total DROP benefits and begin to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee employment for the specified period of DROP. Participation in the DROP by an eligible member beyond the initial 60-month period as authorized in this subsection shall be on an annual contractual basis for all participants. Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: 'Termination' for a member electing to participate under the Deferred Retirement Option Program occurs when the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant ceases all employment relationships with employers under this system in accordance with s. 121.091(13), but in the event the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant should be employed by any such employer within the next calendar month, termination will be deemed not to have occurred, except as provided in s. 121.091(13)(b)4.c. A leave of absence shall constitute a continuation of the employment relationship. Unlike the situation in Albritton, supra, the DROP program was relatively new and the statutes creating the same were not well established provisions of law. Dr. Jain was in the first “class” of DROP for FAMU. FAMU and its lawyers did not have the benefit of established case law that discussed DROP and its provisions when this case was filed or at any time before the hearing. While general contract law also came into play, it had to be considered in the context of the DROP program, which had no precedent of case law. FAMU argues in its Response to the Motion for Attorney's Fees that it interpreted the provision in Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, that requires written approval of the employer to be either the DROP VOID form provided by the Division of Retirement or a written document, executed by the designated University official, specifically approving Petitioner's decision. "The University did not believe the employment contracts that were issued to Petitioner in error, would constitute written approval." FAMU's Response at 5. This argument is consistent with the position FAMU took in the Pretrial Statement quoted above, that there was never a meeting of the minds "or any other agreement" that Dr. Jain's retirement rescission was accepted. A critical conclusion in the Recommended Order is found in paragraph 38: "Moreover, while the FAMU administration did not sign the DROP-VOID form, the contracts issued to Dr. Jain constitute written approval of Dr. Jain's employer regarding modification of his termination date." FAMU also took the position in the Pretrial Stipulation that Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003, based upon the material facts recited above. Under that reading of the facts, Dr. Jain did not work during the next calendar month after DROP, and, therefore terminated employment consistent with the definition of "termination" in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes. Again, while the undersigned did not agree with FAMU's application of the material facts to the then-existing law, FAMU's interpretation was not completely without merit. See Mullins v. Kennerly, 847 So. 2d 1151, 1155. (Case completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by reasonable argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law is a guideline for determining if an action is frivolous.) Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU did not know and could not be expected to know that its defense would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to the material facts necessary to establish the defense. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is ORDERED: Petitioner’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2006.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.57120.68121.021121.09157.105
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NATHANIEL GLOVER, JR. vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 04-004157 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Nov. 18, 2004 Number: 04-004157 Latest Update: Sep. 16, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether payment of Petitioner's retirement benefits should have commenced after the filing of an application to retire with the Division of Retirement, with an effective date of April 1, 2004, or be retroactively changed to the date of his termination of employment, July 1, 2003.

Findings Of Fact On July 19, 1995, Petitioner applied for membership in the Special Risk Division of the Elected Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). On August 14, 1995, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter admitting him into FRS. On September 6, 1995, Sarabeth Snuggs, Chief of the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions for Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter revoking his membership in FRS. On December 17, 1996, Petitioner wrote to Sarabeth Snuggs responding to Respondent's decision to revoke his membership in FRS. Petitioner cited Section 121.052(2)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that membership in FRS includes "any constitutional county elected officer assuming office after July 1, 1981, including any sheriff." The Consolidated City of Jacksonville was created by the Florida Legislature with the enactment of Chapter 67-1320, Laws of Florida. Section 1.01 of the Jacksonville Charter provides that the county government of Duval County and the municipal government of the City of Jacksonville are consolidated into a single body politic. The Charter further provides that the consolidated government succeeds to and possesses all of the properties of the former government. After being denied membership in FRS, Petitioner and other members of the consolidated government and its instrumentalities worked diligently to convince Respondent to admit Petitioner into FRS. During Petitioner's attempts to be included in FRS, Respondent repeatedly took the position that Duval County did not exist as a county agency. In a letter to Petitioner dated January 15, 1997, Ms. Snuggs wrote that the consolidated Duval County government "chose to consolidate as a 'city' government." Mr. Keane worked with the Duval County Legislative Delegation to amend Chapter 121 to specifically clarify the fact that the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court are constitutional officers entitled to participate in FRS. In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted language to clarify the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court's status with respect to FRS. In a letter dated June 24, 2002, Petitioner thanked Ms. Snuggs for recognizing his right to elect membership in FRS. Petitioner observed that, since he was in the last year of his second term as Sheriff (Duval County allows only two consecutive terms), he wanted confirmation of his "right to connect the previous seven (7) years of service as Sheriff." The June 24, 2002, letter also asked for "guidance" from Respondent. The purpose of the June 24, 2002, letter was for Petitioner to learn how Respondent intended to treat his first six years of service. Petitioner sought to avoid any problems since his retirement date was rapidly approaching. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner and Mr. George Dandelake, the Chief of the Budget and Management Division of the Sheriff's Office, wrote to Ms. Snuggs requesting a calculation of the amount of employer contributions required on Petitioner's behalf. The October 10 letter also requested that Respondent "identify what documents are required, in addition to the contribution amount which will be paid by the City, that must be supplied to the Florida Retirement System." Petitioner re-applied for membership in FRS, which was granted on June 1, 2002, after the effective date of the legislation designed to specifically admit the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court into FRS. On June 18, 2003, twelve days before the expiration of his term of office, still not having received confirmation of the status of his prior service, Petitioner sent a letter to Ms. Snuggs advising that FRS had not recognized his service from 1995 through 2002. Petitioner again stated in the letter that he was terminating his position as Sheriff on June 30, 2003. Less than a week prior to the termination of his term, Petitioner received two "Statement[s] of Account" dated June 24, 2003, indicating that "you have until retirement to pay the amount due on your account." The statements further indicated that "when you become vested for monthly benefits, we will provide you an estimate of benefits with and without this service." According to the first Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 1.6 percent multiplier rate for the FRS regular class. According to the second Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 2.0 percent multiplier rate for the FRS special risk class. Neither Statement of Account was correct, as both failed to permit Petitioner to purchase service at the 3.0 percent rate for special risk, despite the fact that Petitioner had served a continuous and uninterrupted term as Sheriff. The Statement of Account did not advise Petitioner that he must submit a separate retirement application, Form FR-11, in order to preserve his retirement date. The statement did advise Petitioner that interest would be assessed at a rate of 6.5 percent. This warning appeared in bold face on the Statement of Account. The June 24, 2003, statements were the first time that Petitioner was supplied with the amount due to purchase service credit. Since neither statement applied the correct multiplier rate (3.0 percent) for all eight years of Petitioner's service as Sheriff, neither statement was correct. Recognizing that only six days remained prior to the expiration of Petitioner's term as Sheriff, Mr. Keane advised Petitioner to submit payment to Respondent on an expedited basis. After receiving the June 24, 2003, Statements of Account, Petitioner prepared a letter dated June 26, 2003, to Cal Ray, the Director of the Department of Administration and Finance for the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. In this letter, Petitioner requested an employer contribution in the amount of $163,554.32 to purchase his prior service. Petitioner further requested an expedited preparation of the check to ensure delivery to Respondent by July 1, 2003. The letter to Mr. Ray requested payment of the amounts that would have been periodically contributed by the City of Jacksonville if Respondent had been acknowledged as a participant in FRS in 1995. On June 27, 2003, three days prior to the expiration of his term of office, Petitioner drove from Jacksonville to Tallahassee to meet with Respondent's representatives, including Ms. Snuggs, regarding Petitioner's retirement. Mr. Dandelake accompanied Petitioner on this trip. At the June 27, 2003, meeting, Petitioner personally delivered a check to Respondent in the amount of $163,554.32. Respondent accepted the check and issued a written receipt signed by Sarabeth Snuggs. Petitioner was never told during the June 27, 2003, meeting with Respondent that he would forfeit benefits if he failed to complete an application. Respondent knew that Petitioner was leaving office on June 30, 2003. Respondent never discussed the filing of an application for retirement benefits at any time during the course of its conversations and correspondence with Petitioner. Petitioner was never told by Respondent to complete any forms to protect his rights to the 2.0 percent multiplier during the pendency of his dispute with Respondent. Petitioner was never provided any handbook, notice, statutes, or rules indicating he would forfeit benefits under any circumstances. When Petitioner left the June 27, 2003, meeting, both he and Mr. Dandelake understood that he was still engaged in a dispute with Respondent over his entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Petitioner knew that he was required to file an application in order to receive retirement benefits. Petitioner testified that if he had left the June 27 meeting with any indication that he would forfeit benefits by not filing an application, he would have filed something, with advice of counsel, to preserve his rights. Petitioner received an Estimate of Benefits via fax from Respondent on June 27, 2003, reflecting an annual benefit of $23,105.90. This statement valued 6.92 years of Petitioner's uninterrupted special risk service as Sheriff using the 2.0 percent multiplier, and 1.08 years of service as Sheriff using the 3.0 percent multiplier. The June 27, 2003, statement lists Petitioner's retirement date as July 1, 2003. The estimate does not warn Petitioner that he must do anything in order to preserve his July 2003 retirement date. The estimate states only that it is subject to "final verification of all factors." Petitioner's term of office as elected Sheriff ended on June 30, 2003. Petitioner's employment terminated when his term expired on that date. Respondent was aware of the dates of the expiration of Petitioner's term of office as well as his employment termination date. When Petitioner's employment terminated on June 30, 2003, it was unclear whether he would be credited with the 3.0 percent multiplier for his eight years of special risk service. Petitioner was not notified by Respondent prior to the expiration of his term as Sheriff on June 30, 2003, that he needed to submit a retirement application. The first time Petitioner was advised by Respondent of the need to file an application for retirement benefits was in the comment section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefits provided to him by letter dated March 4, 2004. The warning was printed in bold face type. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated June 27, 2003, did not include the bold face warning to file an application. Respondent was not provided with a Division of Retirement publication entitled "Preparing to Retire" prior to his leaving service on June 30, 2003. In fact, the copy of the publication offered into evidence by Respondent is dated "July 2003," subsequent to Petitioner's retirement. As the only member of FRS in his office in Jacksonville, Petitioner had no staff or employees trained in FRS or Florida retirement benefits. Petitioner was provided with a "Preparing to Retire" booklet in March 2004. On November 3, 2003, Florida Attorney General Opinion 2003-46 confirmed that Petitioner, as the elected Sheriff, was eligible for membership in the Elected Officer's Class of the Florida Retirement System. On December 31, 2003, and on January 16, 2004, Petitioner's counsel attempted to obtain clarification from Respondent regarding Petitioner's retirement benefits. The December 31, 2003, letter noted that the "extraordinary delay" in resolving the issue of Petitioner's benefits was at no time due to fault on the part of Petitioner. Respondent never refuted or disputed this statement. By letter dated March 4, 2004, Petitioner was finally advised by Respondent that he was entitled to be credited with the higher 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight years of his service as Sheriff. Petitioner noted that the March 4, 2004, Statement of Account, while properly applying the 3.0 percent multiplier, now had changed Petitioner's retirement date to April 2004 from the previous estimates showing a retirement date of July 2003. The March 4, 2004, statement included the bold face notice to Petitioner that he must file an application for retirement benefits. No prior notices or correspondence from Respondent had informed Petitioner that he must file Form FR-11 in order to retain his retirement date of July 1, 2003. After formally being notified that he would receive the 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight of his years of service as Sheriff, and after having received the notice that he must file Form FR-11, Petitioner submitted the form in April 2004. Respondent is a fiduciary charged with acting in the best interest of participants in FRS. Andy Snuggs, who travels around the state educating employers and employees in FRS, acknowledged that Petitioner was not responsible for the delay by Respondent in recognizing Petitioner's entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Mr. Snuggs acknowledged that he does not tell employees that they will forfeit benefits if they delay the filing of their applications. Petitioner received his first retirement check in May 2004 which was based upon the benefit established in March 2004 of $32,624.58 annually, not the $23,105.90 previously established by Respondent in June 2003. Petitioner has received no retroactive benefits for the period of July 1, 2003, through April 30, 2004. In a letter dated May 6, 2004, Petitioner stated that his acceptance of the first retirement check was not to be construed by Respondent of a waiver of his rights to retroactive benefits from July 1, 2003, forward.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be awarded retirement benefits at the rate of 3.0 percent per year for his eight years of Elected Officer's Class of service, retroactive to July 1, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 10059 Northwest 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000

Florida Laws (5) 1.01120.569120.57121.052121.091
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RICHARD S. MITCHELL vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 03-000417 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Feb. 06, 2003 Number: 03-000417 Latest Update: May 22, 2003

The Issue Whether Petitioner is "vested," as that term is defined in Subsection (45) of Section 121.021, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Prior to July of 2000, Petitioner worked on a permanent part-time basis as an adult education teacher for the Miami-Dade County School Board (School Board), accumulating 7.10 years of retirement credit. On Sunday, July 2, 2000, Petitioner was hospitalized because of a "blood disorder." Since his hospitalization on July 2, 2000, Petitioner has been under a doctor's care and has not been physically able to return, and therefore has not returned, to work. Petitioner was hospitalized again in 2001 and for a third time in 2002 for the same ailment. After each visit he has made to the doctor during the time he has been out of work, Petitioner has apprised the principal of the South Dade Adult Education Center (South Dade), where he had worked before his July 2, 2000, hospitalization, of his condition. It is now, and has been at all times following his July 2, 2000, hospitalization, Petitioner's intention "to return to work upon clearance from [his] doctor." Petitioner has not been paid by the School Board during the time he has been out of work. In April of 2001, Petitioner spoke separately with a representative of the United Teachers of Dade (UTD) and with a School Board staff member concerning his employment situation. The UTD representative advised Petitioner that Petitioner "was on an approved leave of absence." The School Board staff member told Petitioner that he "should be on an approved leave of absence"; however, she was unable to "find that authorization in the computer." She suggested that Petitioner go to School Board headquarters and inquire about the matter. Petitioner went to School Board headquarters, as the School Board staff member had suggested. The persons to whom he spoke "couldn't locate the [leave] authorization either." They suggested that Petitioner contact the principal of South Dade. Taking this advice, Petitioner wrote two letters to the principal inquiring about his employment status. He received no response to either letter. During the summer of 2001, Petitioner contacted the Division to ask about his eligibility to receive retirement benefits. Lisa Skovalia, a Benefits Specialist with the Division, responded to Respondent's inquiry by sending him the following letter, dated August 22, 2001: Our records indicate that you were neither actively employed (physically working and earning salary) as of July 1, 2001, nor on a school board approved leave of absence through that date. As such, you must return to active employment, to earn one additional year of service credit, before you will be vested in the Florida Retirement System and eligible for retirement benefits. I have enclosed a copy of the FRS Retirement Guide for the Regular Class for your information. Please call or write if you have any further questions. In February of 2002, Petitioner again made contact with School Board personnel and "was told that [his] name [had been] removed from the computer (school records)." In July of 2002, Petitioner wrote United States Senator Bob Graham "seeking [Senator Graham's] assistance in helping [Petitioner] get [his] retirement form Miami-Dade Public Schools." Petitioner's letter to Senator Graham was referred to the School Board's Superintendent of Schools, who responded by sending the following letter, dated August 29, 2002, to Petitioner: Your letter . . . to Senator Bob Graham was referred to me for response. A review of our records indicates that your earnings as a part-time teacher ended in July 2000. As a part-time employee, you were not eligible for a Board-approved leave of absence. You were notified by letter (copy attached) dated August 22, 2001 from Ms. Lisa Skovalia, Benefits Specialist, State of Florida, Division of Retirement, that because ". . . you were neither actively employed (physically working and earning salary) as of July 1, 2001, nor on a school board approved leave of absence through that date," you would have to return to active employment and earn one additional year of service credit before being vested in the Florida Retirement System. The State of Florida Division of Retirement is solely responsible for developing rules and procedures for implementing changes in the retirement law. If you disagree with their determination, you may request an administrative hearing by sending a written request to the Bureau of Retirement Calculations, Cedars Executive Center, 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. On September 12, 2002, Petitioner sent a letter to the Division's Bureau of Retirement Calculations (Bureau) "seeking [its] assistance in helping [him] get [his] retirement from Miami-Dade Public Schools." The Bureau responded to Petitioner's letter by providing him with the following Statement of Account, dated September 20, 2002: We audited your retirement account and you have 7.10 years of service through 07/2000. Please note that the vesting requirement for FRS members has been changed to 6 years of creditable service effective July 1, 2001 for those members who were actively employed on that date or on a board approved leave of absence. Former members with 6 years, but less than 10 years of creditable service who were not employed with a participating FRS employer on July 1, 2001, must return to covered employment for one year to become eligible for the six-year vesting provision. Per Maria Perez at the Miami-Dade County School Board you were not on a board approved leave of absence on July 1, 2001, nor were you eligible for a board approved leave of absence due to your position as a part time adult school instructor. Although your school may have allowed you to take a leave of absence, only board approved leaves fulfill the vesting requirements required by law. On November 15, 2002, Petitioner sent the Bureau a letter expressing the view that it was not "fair that, after all [his] efforts as a teacher, [he] should lose out [on his] retirement" and requesting "an administrative hearing concerning [his] efforts to get retirement benefits from Miami-Dade Public Schools." The State Retirement Director responded to Petitioner's letter by sending him the following letter, dated December 18, 2002: This is in response to your recent letter concerning your vesting and eligibility for retirement benefits. You currently have 7.10 years of retirement credit through July 2000, your last month of employment in a Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered position. [Section] 121.021(45)(b)1, F.S., states that "Any member employed in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001, who completes or has completed a total of 6 years of creditable service shall be considered vested. . ." An FRS employer (Dade School Board) last employed you in a regularly established position in July 2000 and you were not granted a leave of absence to continue the employment relationship. Dade School Board has informed us that as a part-time teacher, you were not eligible for an approved leave of absence. Therefore, you do not meet the statutory requirement for coverage under the six year vesting provision. [Section] 121.021(45)(b)2, F.S., provides the vesting requirement for members who were not employed on July 1, 2001, as follows: "Any member not employed in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001, shall be deemed vested upon completion of 6 years of creditable service, provided that such member is employed in a covered position for at least 1 work year after July 1, 2001 (emphasis supplied). It is certainly unfortunate that you had to leave your employment because of your illness, but the current retirement law requires that you must return to covered employment and earn one year of service credit to be vested and eligible for retirement benefits. This letter constitutes final agency action. If you do not agree with this decision and wish to appeal this action, you must file a formal petition for review in accordance with the enclosed Rule 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.) within 21 days of receipt of this letter. Your petition should be filed with the Division of Retirement at the above address. Upon receipt of the petition, you will be notified by the Division or the Administrative Law Judge of all future proceedings and hearings. If you do not file an appeal within the 21-day period, you will waive your right to request a hearing or mediation in this matter in accordance with Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C. By letter dated January 2, 2003, Petitioner "appeal[ed]" the "final agency action" announced in the State Retirement Director's December 18, 2002, letter.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order finding that Petitioner is not "vested," as that term is defined in Subsection (45) of Section 121.021, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2003.

Florida Laws (7) 112.021120.569120.57121.021121.091121.19057.10
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JAMES B. ANDERSON vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 15-005416 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 25, 2015 Number: 15-005416 Latest Update: Mar. 18, 2016

The Issue The issue in this case is whether James B. Anderson, a deceased retiree in the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, selected Option 1 (maximum retiree’s monthly benefit without any spousal benefit after death of the retiree) or Option 3 (a reduced retiree’s monthly benefit with continued spousal benefit after death of the retiree).

Findings Of Fact On June 30, 2007, the named Petitioner, James B. Anderson, terminated his employment with the University of South Florida (USF) at the age of 69 years and 9 months. At the time, his tenure at USF spanned 27 years and entitled him to receive pension benefits under the Florida State Retirement System Pension Plan. Also on June 30, 2007, Mr. Anderson completed an application for retirement. By applying Mr. Anderson, who was USF’s Director of Insurance and Risk Management, acknowledged that he would not be able to add service, change options, change his type of retirement (regular, disability, and early) or elect the Investment Plan once his retirement became final, which would be when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Also on July 2, 2007, Mr. Anderson and his wife, Mitzi Anderson, executed a Statutory Official Form FRS 110 before a notary public. By doing so, they selected Option 1, which provides the maximum pension benefits to Mr. Anderson until his death and no pension benefits to his wife after his death. The form stated clearly, in bold print, that Option 1 did not provide a continuing benefit after Mr. Anderson’s death and that the selection of Option 1 would be final when Mr. Anderson cashed or deposited any benefit payment. The next day, Mr. Anderson faxed the executed form to the Division of Retirement, which mailed Mr. Anderson an acknowledgement of receipt of the executed form. The acknowledgement included a clear statement, in bold print, that Mr. Anderson would not be able to change his benefit option selection after retirement and that his retirement would become final when he cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Mr. Anderson had second thoughts about his benefit option selection and contacted Donna Pepper, a retirement specialist employed by USF, to discuss changing to Option 3, which would give him a reduced pension benefit that would continue and be paid to his wife after his death. On July 6, 2007, Ms. Pepper sent an email to Mr. Anderson stating: “Here is another option selection form so that you can change your option.” The email attached a blank Statutory Official Form FRS 110. Ms. Pepper’s email also stated: “As we discussed, you may want to indicate that this form should supersede the previously submitted form.” It also advised the Petitioner to keep a copy for his records and send the original to the Division of Retirement as soon as possible. On July 20, 2007, at 12:53 p.m., a comment was entered on the Integrated Retirement Information System (IRIS) telephone log, documenting that Mr. Anderson was considering changing his benefit option selection and would “either FAX a form with a change of option on it or call to let them know he would not make the change.” The comment also documented that Jan Steller in retirement payroll was asked to hold Mr. Anderson’s first check until “this is resolved.” Later the same day, at 2:30 p.m., another comment was added to document that Mr. Anderson had called back to say he had decided to stay with Option 1 and that Jan Steller had been called back and asked “to release his check.” On July 31, 2007, an initial pension check was sent to Mr. Anderson in the amount of $4,188.45, in accordance with his selection of benefit Option 1, which was about $1,200 more than it would be under Option 3. This check was not immediately cashed. On August 31, 2007, a second Option 1 pension check in the same amount was sent to Mr. Anderson. On September 4, 2007, Mr. Anderson deposited the first two benefit checks into his Bank of America account. He continued to receive and cash or deposit monthly Option 1 benefit checks through January 2015. Mr. Anderson died on February 14, 2015. His wife notified the Division of Retirement, which stopped benefit payments in accordance with Mr. Anderson’s Option 1 selection. In March 2015, Mrs. Anderson found among her husband’s papers a copy of an executed Form FRS 110 that selected Option 3. Notwithstanding the telephonic communications with the Division of Retirement on July 20, 2007, the executed form indicates that it was notarized on July 23, 2007. Included in handwriting at the bottom of the executed form was the language, as suggested by Ms. Pepper: “This option supersedes option dated 7-02-07.” Mrs. Anderson also found a copy of Donna Pepper’s e-mail dated July 6, 2007, with instructions on how to change the selection of pension payments. Mrs. Anderson sent copies to the Division of Retirement and requested Option 3 spousal benefit payments. The Division of Retirement denied Mrs. Anderson’s request because it did not receive an Option 3 benefit selection before the copy Mrs. Anderson sent in March 2015. There was no evidence that the form was sent to the Division of Retirement before then. This, together with the fact that Mr. Anderson received and cashed or deposited seven and a half years’ worth of monthly Option 1 benefit checks, which were each over $1,200 more than the Option 3 benefit would have been, support a finding that Mr. Anderson actually selected Option 1 and never switched to Option 3. It is not clear from the evidence why Mr. Anderson kept a copy of an executed change from Option 1 to Option 3 after deciding not to send it to the Division of Retirement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that Mr. Anderson selected benefit Option 1, finally and irrevocably and that Mrs. Anderson is not entitled to Option 3 spousal benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Nicholas E. Karatinos, Esquire Law Office of Karatinos Suite 101 18920 North Dale Mabry Highway Lutz, Florida 33540 (eServed) Joe Thompson, Esquire Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) J. Andrew Atkinson, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Ste. 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68121.09157.105
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MICHAEL A. FEWLESS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 18-005787 (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 01, 2018 Number: 18-005787 Latest Update: Oct. 25, 2019

The Issue Whether the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (“the Department”) should be equitably estopped from requiring Michael A. Fewless to return $541,780.03 of retirement benefits.

Findings Of Fact The following findings are based on witness testimony, exhibits, and information subject to official recognition. FRS and the Termination Requirement FRS is a qualified plan under section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and has over 500,000 active pension plan members. The Department administers FRS so that it will maintain its status as a qualified pension plan under the Internal Revenue Code. Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (2018),1/ describes the benefits available to FRS members through the “Deferred Retirement Option Program (“DROP”): In general, and subject to this section, the Deferred Retirement Option Program, hereinafter referred to as DROP, is a program under which an eligible member of the Florida Retirement System may elect to participate, deferring receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with his or her Florida Retirement System employer. The deferred monthly benefits shall accrue in the Florida Retirement System on behalf of the member, plus interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of the DROP participation, as provided in paragraph (c). Upon termination of employment, the member shall receive the total DROP benefits and begin to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Section 121.091 specifies that “[b]enefits may not be paid under this section unless the member has terminated employment as provided in s. 121.021(39)(a). ” Section 121.021(39)(a) generally provides that “termination” occurs when a member ceases all employment relationships with participating employers. However, “if a member is employed by any such employer within the next 6 calendar months, termination shall be deemed not to have occurred.” § 121.021(39)(a)2., Fla. Stat. Moreover, the employee and the re-employing FRS agency will be jointly and severally liable for reimbursing any retirement benefits paid to the employee. § 121.091(9)(c)3., Fla. Stat.2/ The termination requirement is essential to the FRS maintaining its status as a qualified plan under IRS regulations. As a qualified plan, taxes on FRS benefits are deferred.3/ The Department’s position is that after an entity becomes a participating employer, all new hires within covered categories are “compulsory members” of the FRS. If an entity has a local pension plan, then that entity must either close the plan before joining FRS or keep the plan open for members who exercise their right to remain in that plan. However, even if the entity chooses to keep the local plan open for current members, the local plan is closed to new members. The City of Fruitland Park, Florida (“Fruitland Park”), became an FRS employer on February 1, 2015. The mayor and commissioners of Fruitland Park passed a resolution on November 20, 2014, providing in pertinent part, that: It is hereby declared to be the policy and purpose of the City Commission of Fruitland Park, Florida that all of its General Employees and police officers, except those excluded by law, shall participate in the Florida Retirement System as authorized by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. All General Employees and police officers shall be compulsory members of the Florida Retirement System as of the effective date of participation in the Florida Retirement System so stated therein. (emphasis added). The Department notified Fruitland Park during its enrollment into FRS that all new hires were compulsory members of FRS for covered groups. Facts Specific to the Instant Case After graduating from the Central Florida Police Academy in 1985, Mr. Fewless began working for the Orange County Sheriff’s Office (“OCSO”) as a deputy sheriff and patrolled what he describes as “the worst area of Orange County.”4/ After five years, Mr. Fewless transferred into the detective bureau in OCSO’s criminal investigations division. Mr. Fewless received a promotion to corporal two years later and returned to patrolling.5/ Mr. Fewless soon received a transfer to OCSO’s special investigation’s division and worked in the gang enforcement unit.6/ It was not long before he was promoted to sergeant and sent “back to the road.” After 10 months, OCSO asked Mr. Fewless to take over the gang enforcement unit where he was promoted to lieutenant and ultimately to captain.7/ During his tenure as a captain, Mr. Fewless was in charge of OCSO’s internal affairs unit for five or six years. Mr. Fewless concluded his nearly 30-year tenure with OCSO as the director of the Fusion Center and the Captain of the criminal intelligence section.8/ In sum, Mr. Fewless’s service with OCSO was exemplary, and he was never the subject of any disciplinary actions. Mr. Fewless entered the DROP program on June 1, 2011. As a result, he was scheduled to complete his DROP tenure and retire on May 31, 2016. On June 1, 2011, Mr. Fewless signed a standardized FRS document entitled “Notice of Election to Participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and Resignation of Employment.” That document contained the following provisions: I elect to participate in the DROP in accordance with s. 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (F.S.), as indicated below, and resign my employment on the date I terminate from the DROP. I understand that the earliest date my participation in the DROP can begin is the first date I reach normal retirement date as determined by law and that my DROP participation cannot exceed a maximum of 60 months from the date I reach my normal retirement date, although I may elect to participate for less than 60 months. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee my employment for the DROP period. I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a monthly retirement benefit and my DROP benefit under Chapter 121, F.S. Termination requirements for elected officers are different as specified in s. 121.091(13)(b)(4), F.S. I cannot add service, change options, change my type of retirement or elect the Investment Plan after my DROP begin date. I have read and understand the DROP Accrual and Distribution information provided with this form. Mr. Fewless realized by 2015 that he was not ready to leave law enforcement. However, he was scheduled to retire from OCSO by May 31, 2016. Mr. Fewless had several friends who left OCSO as captains and took police chief positions with municipalities in Florida. Therefore, in anticipation of a lengthy job search, he began looking for such a position in approximately March of 2015. Mr. Fewless applied to become Fruitland Park’s police chief on March 26, 2015, and was offered the job in June of 2015 by Fruitland Park’s city manager, Gary LaVenia. Mr. Fewless learned from Mr. LaVenia that Fruitland Park had joined FRS and told him that he could not work within the FRS system. Mr. LaVenia then erroneously told Mr. Fewless that he would not be violating any FRS conditions (and thus forfeiting his DROP payout) because Fruitland Park had a separate city pension plan into which Mr. Fewless could be enrolled. As noted above, Fruitland Park had passed a resolution mandating that “[a]ll General Employees and police officers shall be compulsory members of the Florida Retirement System as of the effective date of participation in the Florida Retirement System. ” While Mr. Fewless was pleased with what Mr. LaVenia told him, he called an FRS hotline on July 9, 2015, in order to verify that he would not be endangering his retirement benefits by accepting the police chief position with Fruitland Park. Mr. Fewless’s question was routed to David Kent, and Mr. Fewless described how he was going to work for Fruitland Park and that Fruitland Park was an FRS employer. Mr. Kent told Mr. Fewless that he could go to work for Fruitland Park immediately without violating any FRS requirements so long as he was not enrolled into the FRS system. Instead of being an FRS enrollee, Mr. Kent stated that Mr. Fewless could enroll into Fruitland Park’s pension plan or enter a third-party contract.9/ Mr. Fewless assumed that Mr. Kent was an FRS expert and remembers that Mr. Kent sounded very confident in the information he relayed over the telephone. On July 14, 2015, Mr. Fewless filled out and signed a form entitled “Florida Retirement Systems Pension Plan Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) Termination Notification.” The form indicates that Mr. Fewless would be ending his employment with OCSO on August 1, 2015. In addition, the form notified Mr. Fewless of the requirements associated with receiving his accumulated DROP and monthly benefits: According to our records, your DROP termination date is 08/01/2015. You must terminate all Florida Retirement System (FRS) employment to receive your accumulated DROP benefits and begin your monthly retirement benefits. You and your employer’s authorized representative must complete this form certifying your DROP employment termination. Termination Requirement: In order to satisfy your employment termination requirement, you must terminate all employment relationships with all participating FRS employers for the first 6 calendar months after your DROP termination date. Termination requirement means you cannot remain employed or become employed with any FRS covered employer in a position covered or noncovered by retirement for the first 6 calendar months following your DROP termination date. This includes but is not limited to: part-time work, temporary work, other personal services (OPS), substitute teaching, adjunct professor or non-Division approved contractual services. Reemployment Limitation: You may return to work for a participating FRS employer during the 7th – 12th calendar months following your DROP termination date, but your monthly retirement benefit will be suspended for those months you are employed. There are no reemployment limitations after the 12th calendar month following your DROP termination date. If you fail to meet the termination requirement, you will void (cancel) your retirement and DROP participation and you must repay all retirement benefits received (including accumulated DROP benefits). If you void your retirement, your employer will be responsible for making retroactive retirement contributions and you will be awarded service credit for the period during which you were in DROP through your new employment termination date. You must apply to establish a future retirement date. Your eligibility for DROP participation will be determined by your future retirement date and you may lose your eligibility to participate in DROP.[10/] (emphasis in original). Mr. Fewless’s Reliance on the Representations Made to Him Mr. Fewless placed complete trust in the representations made during his July 9, 2015, phone call to the FRS hotline and during his discussions with Fruitland Park’s city manager. When he left OCSO and accepted the police chief position with Fruitland Park, Mr. Fewless took a $33,000.00 annual pay cut and stood to receive $70,000.00 less from his DROP payout. It is highly unlikely he would have accepted those circumstances if he did not have a good faith basis for believing he was utilizing an exception to the termination requirement. In the months preceding his departure from OCSO, Mr. Fewless’s wife was being treated for a brain tumor. Following her surgery in May of 2015 and subsequent radiation treatment, Ms. Fewless returned to work for a month or two. However, given that the retirement checks Mr. Fewless had begun to receive were roughly equivalent to what Ms. Fewless had been earning, she decided to retire in order to spend more time with their grandchildren. During this timeframe, Mr. and Ms. Fewless decided to build their “dream home,” and Ms. Fewless designed it. They used a $318,000.00 lump sum payment from FRS to significantly lower their monthly house payment. Those actions would not have been taken if Mr. Fewless had suspected that there was any uncertainty pertaining to his retirement benefits. The Department Discovers the Termination Violation In November of 2017, the Department’s Office of the Inspector General conducted an audit to assess Fruitland Park’s compliance with FRS requirements. This audit was conducted in the regular course of the Department’s business and was not initiated because of any suspicion of noncompliance. The resulting audit report contained the following findings: (a) Fruitland Park had failed to report part-time employees since joining FRS; (b) Fruitland Park had failed to report Mr. Fewless as an employee covered by FRS; (c) Mr. Fewless’s employment with Fruitland Park amounted to a violation of FRS’s reemployment provisions; and (d) Fruitland Park failed to correctly report retirees filling regularly established positions. Because he had failed to satisfy the termination requirement, the Department notified Mr. Fewless via a letter issued on August 15, 2018, that: (a) his DROP retirement had been voided; (b) his membership in FRS would be retroactively reestablished11/; and (c) he was required to repay $541,780.03 of benefits. Mr. Fewless’s Reaction to Learning That He Had Violated the Termination Requirement Mr. Fewless learned on June 25, 2018, of the Department’s determination that he was in violation of the termination requirement. He responded on July 5, 2018, by writing the following letter to the Department: On the evening of, June 25, 2018, I was notified by Mr. Gary LaVenia, the City Manager for Fruitland Park, that he was contacted by members of the State of Florida’s DMS Inspector General’s office regarding a problem with my current retirement plan. No additional information was shared during this initial telephone conversation and we scheduled a meeting for the following day. On June 26, 2018, I met with Mr. Gary LaVenia, Ms. Diane Kolcan, Human Resource Director and Ms. Jeannine Racine, the Finance Director regarding this matter. I was advised that members of the Department of the Florida Retirement System told them that I was in violation of receiving my current retirement benefits because I failed to take a six month break between my retirement with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and joining the City of Fruitland Park. I explained to them that there must be some mistake because I am not currently enrolled in the Florida Retirement System through the City of Fruitland Park. The City enrolled me in their “City” pension plan. Mr. LaVenia agreed with me and we closed the meeting with me advising them I would do some additional research on the matter. * * * I then reached out to Mr. Chris Carmody, an attorney with the Gray/Robinson Firm, whom I worked with on legislative issues in the past. . . . I explained to him that according to the Inspector General’s report, I needed to have a six month separation between the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and the City of Fruitland Park, because both agencies participated in the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Carmody still did not feel that was a violation because I was not enrolled in the FRS Plan with the City of Fruitland Park, but rather their independent City pension plan. I felt the same way; however he wanted to continue to research the issue. A few hours later I received a telephone call from Mr. Carmody indicating the problem appears to be that the “City” participates in the FRS Pension Plan and even though I do not, I would be prohibited from working there for the six month period. After hearing this news, I immediately contacted Ms. Amy Mercer, the Executive Director of the Florida Police Chief’s Association. I explained the dilemma to her and just like the previously mentioned individuals she said “so what did you do wrong, that sounds ok to me. ” Ms. Mercer said she would reach out to the two attorneys that support the Florida Police Chief’s Association to get their opinion of the situation. The following morning, Ms. Mercer advised me that according to Attorney Leonard Dietzen my actions were in violation of the Florida Retirement Pension Plan Rules. Mr. Dietzen explained to her that I needed a six month separation from my employment with the Florida Retirement System and the City of Fruitland Park, because the City participated in the FRS Pension plan. Therefore, based on the above information [and] the realization that an innocent mistake had been made, please let me explain my actions: * * * In either June or July of 2015, I officially interviewed for the position of Police Chief for the City of Fruitland Park. . . . Approximately one week after the interviews, I was offered the position of Police Chief for the City of Fruitland Park. In July of 2015, I contacted the official FRS Hotline regarding my potential decision to join the Fruitland Park Police Department. I informed them that I was currently employed with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and enrolled in DROP. I advised them that I was considering accepting the position of police chief with the City of Fruitland Park; however I wanted to confirm with them that I would have no issues with my retirement. I explained that the City of Fruitland Park was currently an FRS department; however they also had a separate “City” pension plan which I was going to be placed in. I wanted to confirm that this would not negatively impact my retirement benefits. I was advised that as long as I was enrolled in the “City” pension plan, I would be fine. The FRS employee also added that he heard other “new chiefs” were doing an “independent contract” with the City for a one year period, but he assured me either way would be fine. I concluded my telephone conversation and proceeded forward. I then began the employee benefits negotiations process with Mr. LaVenia. At the time of the negotiations, I realized I would be receiving my Florida Retirement check on a monthly basis and my wife was also employed as the vice-president of the Orlando Union Rescue Mission in Orlando, Florida. Therefore money was not my primary concern for this position and I surrendered my much larger salary with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office to become the Chief of Police for Fruitland Park for $70,000 per year. I officially accepted the position with the City of Fruitland Park, and informed Mr. LaVenia that I could not participate in the Florida Retirement System; however according to the FRS Hotline employee I could be placed in the city pension plan or sign a contract for a one year period. Mr. LaVenia recommended that I be placed in the city pension plan and had the appropriate paperwork completed. * * * It is important to recognize that I felt I took all the necessary steps to act within the guidelines of the Florida Retirement System. After all, I had worked for over thirty years with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office with an impeccable record and with the intent of securing a retirement package that would protect my wife and family for life. In conclusion, I feel I have been let down by the system in two very key areas regarding this matter: In July 2015, not only was I preparing for retirement and a new job; but my wife was experiencing serious medical issues that required surgery and radiation treatments for months at Shands Hospital. Although my mind was focused on her condition, I still felt it was extremely important to contact the FRS Hotline regarding my potential new position. My desire was to make sure I did not do anything that would jeopardize the retirement plan I worked for my entire career. The advice I was given by the FRS Hotline employee/professional apparently was terrible. Not only did he indicate I could go under the “City” pension plan, he further recommended that other chiefs have decided to do a “contract” with the city for a one year period to account for the separation from the FRS system. Clearly had this employee indicated by any means that the position with Fruitland Park would or possibly could jeopardize my retirement, I would have run away from this opportunity . . . * * * In July and August of 2015, while I was completing the hiring process with the City of Fruitland Park, management and/or staff should have cautioned me about the potential risk to my Florida Retirement Pension if I proceeded with the process. * * * Clearly, whoever made the decision to proceed with processing me was unaware of two things. (1) I would be violating the six month separation rule if I stopped my employment with the Orange County Sheriff’s Office on August 1, 2015 and began employment with Fruitland Park one day later on August 2, 2015. (2) The only pension plan available to new employees with the City of Fruitland Park had to be the Florida Retirement System. * * * I now understand from going through this procedure that there [was] an unintended error in how I officially retired from the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and began my employment with the Fruitland Park Police Department. It is important to mention that Sheriff Kevin Beary and Sheriff Jerry Demings chose me to command their Professional Standards Division on two separate occasions because they knew I was a man of integrity and would always “do the right thing.” I had no intent to skirt the system and/or do anything unethical. I can assure you nobody raised a red flag over this position prior to this incident; and I would have immediately stopped my efforts had I been aware of this rule. Mr. Fewless’s Current Situation While working as Fruitland Park’s police chief, Mr. Fewless’s salary and retirement benefits totaled $12,000.00 a month. In order to avoid accumulating more penalties, Mr. Fewless retired from his police chief position with Fruitland Park on August 31, 2018. Mr. Fewless has not received any FRS benefits since September 1, 2018. There was a three-month period when he was receiving no money. Mr. Fewless has been employed by the Groveland Police Department since March 4, 2019. Mr. Fewless describes his current financial situation as “dire” and says he and his wife are “wiped out.” They may need to sell their “dream house,” and they borrowed $30,000.00 from their daughter in order to litigate the instant case. In addition, the contractor who built the Fewless’s dream home failed to pay subcontractors for $93,000.00 of work. While the Department notes that Mr. Fewless stands to receive a higher monthly benefit, he disputes that he is somehow in a better position: No, I am not in a better position. The $542,000 that will be taken away from me because of what clearly could have been handled with one phone call from a representative of FRS – the difference in pay between my former retirement salary and my new retirement salary based on the recalculations will go from $6,000 to $7,000 a month. That means in order for me to recoup the $542,000 that the state was referring to, I would have to work 542 months. I don’t think I’ll live that much longer, No. 1. And No. 2, that doesn’t take into consideration interest and everything else that was part of that, if that makes sense. Mr. Fewless has filed a lawsuit against Fruitland Park. Ultimate Findings of Fact12/ Mr. Fewless’s testimony about his July 9, 2015, phone call to the FRS hotline is more credible than Mr. Kent’s. Mr. Fewless’s descriptions of that phone call are very consistent, and the Department has not directed the undersigned to any instances in which an account of that phone call by Mr. Fewless differed from his testimony or his July 5, 2018, letter to the Department.13/ This finding is also based on Mr. Fewless’s demeanor during the final hearing. Moreover, Mr. Fewless was not attempting to “game the system.” Given Mr. Fewless’s exceptional record of public service, it is very unlikely that he would knowingly and intentionally attempt to engage in “double dipping” by violating the termination requirement. It is equally unlikely that Mr. Kent can accurately remember what he told Mr. Fewless during a single phone call on July 9, 2015. Rather than questioning Mr. Kent’s veracity, the undersigned is simply questioning his ability to recall the content of a single phone call that appears to have been unremarkable.14/ It is also difficult to believe that Mr. Fewless would accept the police chief position with Fruitland Park and build an expensive “dream house” after being told by Mr. Kent that he would be violating the termination requirement.15/ Mr. Fewless’s reliance on Mr. Kent’s statement was entirely reasonable given that the arrangement described by Mr. LaVenia sounded like an imminently plausible exception to the termination requirement. Mr. Fewless’s subsequent actions in reliance of that statement were extremely detrimental to himself and his family. Finally, the circumstances of the instant case are analogous to other cases in which appellate courts have held that the enhanced requirements for estopping the government had been satisfied. In other words, Mr. Kent’s misrepresentation amounted to more than mere negligence, the Department’s proposed action would result in a serious injustice, and the public interest would not be unduly harmed by Mr. Fewless retaining the retirement benefits he earned through his public service with OCSO.

Conclusions For Petitioner: Ryan Joshua Andrews, Esquire Brian O. Finnerty, Esquire Johana E. Nieves, Esquire The Law Offices of Steven R. Andrews, P.A. 822 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Sean W. Gillis, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order rescinding its proposed action that Michael A. Fewless’s FRS DROP retirement be voided and that he be required to repay all retirement benefits as provided in Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S- 4.012. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2019.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.68121.021121.091 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-4.012 DOAH Case (1) 18-5787
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JUDITH A. RICHARDS vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 20-004558 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Kissimmee, Florida Oct. 14, 2020 Number: 20-004558 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024

The Issue Whether Petitioner, Judith Richards, is eligible for the health insurance subsidy offered to Florida Retirement System retirees.

Findings Of Fact In November 2011, Petitioner was hired by the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office to work as a crossing guard. The Osceola County Sheriff’s Office is an FRS-participating employer, and the position held by Petitioner was in the 2 It is well established that issues related to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time during the pendency of a proceeding. 84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). “Regular Class” of FRS membership. In 2011, newly hired eligible employees (members) of the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office were required to participate in either the FRS pension plan or the investment plan. Petitioner elected to participate in the investment plan. Generally, the pension plan offers eligible employees a formulaic fixed monthly retirement benefit, whereas an employee’s investment plan benefits are “provided through member-directed investments.” Pursuant to section 112.363, Florida Statutes, retired members of any state-administered retirement system will receive an HIS benefit if certain eligibility requirements are satisfied. Section 112.363(1) provides that a monthly subsidy payment will be provided “to retired members of any state- administered retirement system in order to assist such retired members in paying the costs of health insurance.” Section 112.363(3)(e)2. provides that beginning July 1, 2002, each eligible member of the investment plan shall receive “a monthly retiree health insurance subsidy payment equal to the number of years of creditable service, as provided in this subparagraph, completed at the time of retirement, multiplied by $5; … [and] an eligible retiree or beneficiary may not receive a subsidy payment of more than $150 or less than $30.” On July 18, 2019, Petitioner’s employment with the Osceola County Sheriff’s Office ended, and at that time she had 7.77 years of FRS creditable service.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying the application for retiree health insurance subsidy submitted by Mrs. Richards. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Gayla Grant, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Judith Richards 2337 Louise Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (5) 112.363120.569120.57121.021768.28 DOAH Case (1) 20-4558
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MALBA LANIER vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 80-000128 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000128 Latest Update: Jun. 13, 1980

The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent's (Division of Retirement) denial of Petitioner's claim to buy for retirement credit purposes, service while she was a student nurse during the period August, 1941 through December, 1944 was proper.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. The facts herein are virtually undisputed. From August, 1941, through December, 1944, Petitioner was a student nurse at Florida State Hospital (Hospital) at Chattahoochee, Florida. As a student nurse, Petitioner worked twelve (12) hours a day, six and one-half (6-1/2) days per week with one full day off each month. During the weekdays, Petitioner spent time in class, with the remainder of time spent in the wards at the Hospital. Petitioner averaged between thirty-nine (39) and forty-seven (47) hours of work per week at the Hospital. As a student nurse, Petitioner received a salary of $15.00 per month in addition to her room, board, uniform and various fringe benefits such as medical care and leave, much like other Hospital employees. Personnel problems were resolved through the personnel office as with other employees. Petitioner returned to work at the Hospital as a Registered Nurse in October, 1954, and has worked almost continually to the present time. During the period 1970 through early 1972, employees of Florida State Hospital were given the opportunity to participate in the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). Petitioner participated in that retirement system. During the period 1970 through 1972, various state retirement systems, including SCOERS, merged and formed the present Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner was given the option to transfer to FRS and in fact exercised that option by designating that election on a ballot provided by the personnel office at Florida State Hospital (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). The effective date of that transfer to FRS is December 1, 1970. During the period 1970 through early 1972, Respondent permitted transferees of the SCOERS retirement system to transfer student nurse credits as part of the retirement credits in the same manner as "full-time work" for retirement credit purposes. In early 1972, Respondent changed its policy of allowing work as a student nurse to be credited toward retirement benefits. C. J. Brock has been the personnel manager at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee since approximately 1968. He was initially hired at the Hospital in 1955. As personnel manager, Mr. Brock is in charge of submitting employee claims for retirement credits for various types of employment service to FRS for retirement benefits.' Mr. Brock recalled Petitioner visiting his office pan various occasions between the periods 1963 through 1972 inquiring as to the manner for purchasing student time for retirement credit purposes. Mr. Brock advised Petitioner that he would research the wage statements to determine the exact amount of student time she had earned and would refer the matter to FRS for a decision, Mr. Brock is not authorized to act for or on behalf of Respondent. The interaction between the Hospital's personnel officer and Respondent is limited to the referral of claims and certification of wage and employment statements. As such, there is no agency relationship between the Hospital and Respondent. This referral was made by Mr. Brock on Petitioner's behalf on December 20, 1972, and the request was denied. Former student nurses who were members of SCOERS and transferred to FRS during the periods 1970 through early 1972 had been allowed to purchase retirement credit for their student nurse service. This practice ended in early 1972. In this regard, Mr. Brock has certified the payroll records for student nurses who purchased retirement credit for their student nurse time, Ruth Sampson, Assistant Bureau Chief for the Division of Retireent, has primarily been involved in reviewing retirement benefit calculations since approximately 1969. Mrs. Sampson is familiar with the merger of SCOERS and FRS. Mrs. Sampson affirmed that Respondent had a policy which allowed members of SCOERS who transferred to FRS to purchase retirement credit for student employment time and that such policy was followed from December 1, 1970 (the inception of FRS) to early 1972. This policy was also followed by the SCOERS administrator prior to December 1, 1970. This unwritten policy was changed, according to Mrs. Sampson for two primary reasons. First, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, did not permit the purchase of student time. Secondly, with the combination of SCOERS and the Teacher Retirement System (TRS) into the combined FRS system, an inequity existed since TRS members, unlike student nurses, were not allowed to purchase student time. As stated, the letter from Mr. Brock certifying Petitioner's employment and wage statements for the period in question was dated December 20, 1972. Mrs. Sampson, by letter dated March 30, 1973, requested additional information respecting the salary paid Petitioner and the amount of time she actually spent working at the Hospital during the period in question. Mr. Brock replied by letter dated April 4, 1973, advising that during the period in question, Petitioner was a student nurse at the Hospital which paid a full-time salary of $15.00 per month. By letter dated May 14, 1973, Mrs. Sampson denied Petitioner's claim since Petitioner was primarily a student during the period that the prior service claim was submitted (Joint Exhibit No. 1). Mr. Robert L. Kennedy, Jr. , the former Director of FRS, appeared and related that the policy decision was made to discontinue the practice of allowing student time to be credited for retirement purposes since that practice was not contemplated by pertinent statutes. Former Director Kennedy disagreed with the Comptroller's policy decision which had previously allowed this practice.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's appeal of the State Retirement Director's decision denying her request to purchase prior service credit for her service as a student nurse be DENIED. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the State Retirement Director be SUSTAINED. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Diane K. Kiesling, Esquire PATTERSON and TRAYNHAN Division of Retirement 1215 Thomasville Road Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32302 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box .81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================

Florida Laws (8) 1.04120.57121.011121.021121.051121.091216.011216.262
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