Findings Of Fact Petitioner is licensed by the State of Florida as a laboratory technologist. Petitioner applied to the Respondent for licensure as a supervisor. On February 2, 1982, Respondent denied Petitioner's application to take the supervisory examination for the stated reason that Petitioner did not have ten years of experience. Petitioner holds a Bachelor's degree in Fine Arts from Florida International University. Petitioner has supplemented his education by taking additional science courses. The science courses taken before and after Petitioner received his Bachelor's degree total 26 semester credits. The courses taken after receipt of his degree have been specifically related to his field. Petitioner has been employed by the Miami Heart Institute since July 11, 1976, except for the period between September, 1976, and August, 1977. Dr. Jerome Benson is a pathologist and is the Director of Laboratories at the Miami Heart Institute. He is also Vice Chairman of the National Accreditation for Clinical Laboratory Sciences, the organization which accredits approximately 1,000 programs in the medical technology field and which is responsible for the Committee on Higher Education and Accreditation of the United States Office of Education, which accredits laboratories. He is familiar with accreditation of medical technology programs throughout the country and locally. He serves on the Advisory Committee at Miami-Dade Community College, and he planned the curriculum for the medical technology programs at both Miami- Dade Community College and at Florida International University. He was recognized as an expert by both parties. Dr. Benson believes that Petitioner is qualified to sit for the supervisory examination in terms of education, in terms of experience time, in terms of intent of the law, and in terms of protecting the public safety. He further believes that the science courses Petitioner has taken, both pre-baccalaureate and post-baccalaureate, qualify Petitioner for a Bachelor's degree in medical technology. Norman Bass was formerly Petitioner's immediate supervisor. He evaluates Petitioner's performance in the laboratory as excellent and believes that Petitioner is qualified through experience and academic courses to sit for the supervisory examination. At the time of the formal hearing in this cause, Petitioner had a total of 12,935 hours of work time at the Miami Heart Institute. Respondent considers 37.5 hours as constituting a full work week. George S. Taylor, Jr., reviewed Petitioner's application on behalf of Respondent. The application was received on January 18, 1982, and was denied on February 2, 1982, for the reason that Petitioner did not have ten years' experience. At the time, Respondent did not have current transcripts reflecting courses taken by Petitioner. Respondent did not request any, but simply used transcripts on file with Respondent which had been filed when Petitioner applied for his technologist's license, even though Petitioner's application for licensure as a supervisor reflected that he had taken various science courses at Miami-Dade Community College. Taylor is of the opinion that an applicant with 120 college credits must have between 25 and 30 of those credits in science courses in order to have a major in science; an applicant with 90 semester hours in college is required to have 17 to 24 credits in science in order to have a science major.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application to take the examination for a supervisor's license. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Samuel S. Forman, Esquire The Counsel Building 2016 Harrison Street Hollywood, Florida 33020 Morton Laitner, Esquire Dade County Health Department 1350 North West 14th Street Miami, Florida 33125 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from January 1, 2000, through June 13, 2002, on the basis of his employment with Florida Community College at Jacksonville (FCCJ).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert Burns, has been employed as an adjunct instructor of FCCJ since March 1989. FCCJ is a member employer under FRS. Adjunct instructors traditionally have been employed by FCCJ on a class-by-class, semester-by-semester basis, and have no expectation of employment beyond any single semester. Petitioner knew this from his date of first hire. When Petitioner began work with FCCJ, all adjunct instructors were given a contract for each term and each course. This practice continued for all instructors and classes until the year 2000. Despite the semester-to-semester, repetitive contracts, occasionally Petitioner's courses were of a duration longer than one semester, and Petitioner was sometimes evaluated only on an annual basis. These evaluations were for purposes of certifying Petitioner and similarly situated adjunct instructional personnel for further semester contracts. At all times material, Petitioner taught on three campuses and taught college courses in biology and earth science; acted as a facilitator in the laboratory; and taught Adult Studies courses. At all times material, sixty percent of Petitioner's time was spent teaching Adult Studies courses. From 1989 until January 1, 2000, Petitioner was provided semester contracts for each of the three foregoing functions: college courses, lab facilitation, and Adult Studies courses. Every contract clearly acknowledged, in pertinent part, 3. This contract shall at all times be subject to any and all laws, Florida State Board of Education Rules and Florida Community College at Jacksonville Board of Trustees rules and regulations now existing or hereinafter lawfully enacted or promulgated. In furtherance thereof, the Contractor expressly agrees to become aware of and comply with all such applicable regulations, including but not limited to those addressing discrimination/affirmative action and sexual harassment. * * * The Contractor agrees and understands that he/she is not entitled to receive benefits made available by the College to its full-time employees. The Contractor further agrees and understands that his/her services are of a temporary nature, and that the College does not agree to provide the Contractor with any future employment or contract whether temporary, permanent or otherwise. The relationship hereby created between the Contractor and the College shall be deemed to have been voluntarily terminated by the Contractor upon the termination or expiration of this agreement. The Contractor agrees and understands that the compensation described herein is the entire compensation due to Contractor for performance of services pursuant to this contract. Specifically, Contractor agrees and understands that he/she shall not be entitled to wages or hours similar to those provided to College employees. * * * 9. The Contractor and the College understand and hereby agree that this contract does not and shall not be deemed to create an employment relationship. From January 1, 2000, through June 2002, Petitioner was not provided individual contracts for his Adult Studies classes, but was provided contracts for his other courses and lab facilitation work. In 2000, FCCJ began implementing a new computer system and, as a result, some adjunct instructors were not given individual contracts for each course. Adult Studies was one program area where time cards, rather than individual contracts, were used. No one at FCCJ ever told Petitioner that he had become a full or part-time employee, as opposed to an adjunct instructor. At various times during the period after January 1, 2000, Petitioner and other adjunct instructors approached Dean of Adult Studies, Lloyd Watkins, and asked him where their contracts were. The Dean inquired of FCCJ's Human Resources Department and was told there were too many contracts to do and so they would not be issued. It is not certain that Dean Watkins ever conveyed this information to Petitioner. However, throughout the period at issue, Petitioner used the time cards and understood that his employment was on a class by class, semester by semester basis. The issue of FRS benefits vis-á-vis independent contractor status did not arise until after Petitioner had been terminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to participate in FRS from January 1, 2000, through June 13, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Al Millar, Esquire 4627 Ocean Street Mayport, Florida 32233 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Simone Marstiller, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Constance M. Liccione, is a licensed clinical laboratory technician, having received said license in October, 1979 from respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). In the summer of 1983, petitioner began making inquiry with HRS concerning the requirements to take the clinical laboratory supervisor examination. Because of either a communication's breakdown, or a failure of the agency to promptly reply to her request, she was not told of the specific requirements until 1984, and it was only in April, 1985 that she was able to get confirmation from HRS that she had nine years and one month of clinical experience, and when coupled with her 90 semester hours of academic study in the science field, she was eligible to sit on the supervisor examination. For some unexplained reason, she also was unable to obtain an application form from HRS and finally she had to obtain one from a local junior college. On April 5, 1985, Liccione filed her application to take the October, 1985 supervisor examination. At that time, the examination consisted of two parts: (a) administration and supervision, and (b) technical specialties for which the applicant wished to be licensed. In June, 1985, HRS adopted a sweeping change in its rules (Chapter lOD-41) governing eligibility for all supervisor examinations taken after October, 1985. Under the new rules, HRS requires an applicant for licensure as a supervisor to meet all new requirements for a clinical technologist. This will require Liccione to either have a bachelor's degree in science, or to have completed 90 semester hours or equivalent and to have completed a one-year internship in an approved school of Medical Technology. In addition, in view of the more stringent eligibility requirements, the examination no longer includes testing on the technical specialties, but only has testing in the administration and supervision area. Liccione meets neither of the two new requirements. Therefore, she is barred from taking any examination after the October 1985 examination until she either obtains a college degree in science or completes a one-year internship. Liccione is understandably upset because it took almost two years to learn from HRS if she was qualified under the old rules to take the supervisor examination, and therefore she missed 3 or 4 opportunities to take the examination under the old criteria. Because of the new rules, it is now an all or nothing proposition on the October, 1985 examination. When Liccione became aware of the impending rule change, she contacted HRS to determine if she could get a waiver of the old rule which required her to take an examination in various technical specialties. The old rules required supervisor candidates to pass an examination in each of the specialties or subspecialties for which the license is sought. Based upon her nine plus years of experience, Liccione desired a waiver in the five technical specialties of microbiology, serology, chemistry, hematology and immunohematology for which she is already licensed as a technologist. After considerable give and take between the two, HRS agreed to present her request for a waiver to the Clinical Laboratory Advisory Council (Council). The Council considered the same on October 3, 1985 and denied her request. That prompted the instant proceeding. As a result of HRS's decision, she was required to take both parts of the old examination. Her results are not of record. There have been no waivers of the technical specialty part of the examination granted since HRS began regulating clinical laboratories in 1967. However, under the provisions of Rule 10D-41.27, Florida Administrative Code, as they existed prior to June, 1985, examination in each of the specialties area was permissive, and not mandatory since the rule merely required that ". . . supervisors. . . may be required to pass an examination given by (HRS) in each of the specialties. . . for which the license is sought." (Emphasis added.) Liccione presently has an HRS issued temporary supervisor license which expires after she receives the results of the October, 1985 examination. She is acting as the supervisor of a clinical laboratory for a medical doctor in Port St. Lucie, Florida and as such is in charge of all technical aspects of the operation. She has written the procedures manual for the laboratory which was approved by HRS inspectors, and is active in all five specialties for which she seeks a waiver. As noted above, by this time she has almost ten years of practical experience, and has worked in hospitals and laboratories in both a technician and supervisor capacity. These qualifications were not disputed. At final hearing HRS did not question the above qualifications but relied instead upon statistics which reflected that candidates with qualifications comparable to Liccione had done poorly on the examination. It also pointed out that when Liccione took the specialties examination for a technician, her scores were "never. . . more than 4% higher than minimum established competency in any technical specialty." From this, HRS opined that Liccione's chance of success on the examination was not good, and that she was not entitled to the requested waiver. It also fears that a bad precedent will be set if Liccione's request for a waiver is approved. However, the undersigned finds the uncontradicted practical experience, education and training to be the more persuasive and credible evidence on the issue of whether such training, education and experience is adequate to warrant a waiver of the five technical specialties on the examination. In this regard, it is noted that there was no evidence to show that such experience, education, and training was not comparable to the new requirements in Rule 10D-41.69(2), Florida Administrative Code, or that such experience, education and training was not adequate to demonstrate competence in the five specialties in question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's request for a waiver of the technical specialty part of the October, 1985 examination be GRANTED, and if petitioner receives a passing grade on the administration and supervision portion of the examination, she be issued a clinical laboratory supervisor license. All other requests for relief should be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2Oth day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: James A Liccione 168 S.W. Selva Court Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 K. C. Collette, Esquire 111 Georgia Ave., Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioners were the victims of an unlawful employment practice by being denied promotions allegedly on account of their age.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Little was employed by Monsanto, the Respondent, for 34-1/2 years until his retirement on January 1, 1990. Petitioner Akins is currently employed by Monsanto and commenced employment with that firm on December 13, 1955. The Monsanto Company operates a manufacturing facility in the vicinity of Pensacola, Florida, which converts certain chemical feed stocks to synthetic filaments and/or yarns for use in the textile and fiber industries. Petitioner Akins is currently a "Group 12 Maintenance and Instrument Mechanic", an hourly "manufacturing unit" position. Prior to his retirement, Petitioner Little was a "Group 11 Maintenance and Instrument Mechanic", also an hourly manufacturing unit position. Monsanto's Pensacola facility operates with a manufacturing unit employing hourly wage employees and a Technical Center which employs essentially all salaried employees. The two facilities within the plant are separate and distinct units. In December 1989, Monsanto posted two vacancies for a salaried "Operations Technician" position in the Technical Center. The procedure for a promotion or transfer from an hourly job to a salaried Technical Center job is contained in the Nonexempt Selection Procedure Manual, in evidence as Petitioners' Exhibit 1 and Respondent's Exhibit 1. When a vacancy is announced in a salaried position, interested employees submit a "Request for Salaried Job" and "Employee Placement Profile" to the plant employment office. Thereafter, a screening committee comprised of plant personnel determines whether the self- nominated candidates are qualified for the vacancy. That committee selects the qualified candidates and submits the list of those candidates to the Technical Center personnel superintendent. The department with the vacancy thereafter receives notification from the Technical Center personnel department of the candidates to be interviewed. The employees who nominated themselves for the vacant Operations Technician position were Petitioners Little and Akins, Terry Nettles, W. D. Tidwell, and Joni Troutman. All of the candidates who were self-nominated for that Operations Technician position were interviewed by a committee consisting of three technical employees; Charles Livingston, Lawrence Brantley, and Gary Green. All these individuals on the committee were over the age of 40. The committee interviewed each candidate in accordance with the evaluation criteria set forth in the Nonexempt Job Selection Procedure Manual. Some of the factors which the committee considered were the knowledge and skills of each candidate, applicable experience, past job performance, communication skills, attendance records, human-relation skills, and employee initiative. The committee's objective was to select the most qualified candidate for the position based upon the aforementioned factors. Seniority was considered by the committee, but only as one of many factors. Although seniority is a deciding factor in manufacturing unit professions, seniority is not the deciding factor in the selection process in the Technical Center. In accordance with Monsanto's equal employment opportunity policy, age was not a consideration in the selection process. The committee did not ask any candidate any questions about age, nor did the committee ask the candidate when he or she planned to retire from the company. Following the interview, the committee selected Richard T. Nettles, age 47, as the most qualified candidate for the Operations Technician position. Mr. Nettles had been employed by Monsanto from December 1963 until he was terminated by a reduction in force or layoff in June 1985. After leaving Monsanto, Mr. Nettles worked for the James River Corporation at a similar type of plant in an Operations Technician position, the type of position at issue in this proceeding. His job was very similar to the one he held at Monsanto. Mr. Nettles was subsequently rehired by Monsanto in September 1989 as an hourly Manufacturing Unit Employee. During his previous employment with Monsanto, Mr. Nettles had been in an Operations Technician position in the Technical Center for approximately 18 years. During that time, Mr. Nettles' performance evaluations were consistently above average or excellent. Additionally, Mr. Nettles had recently completed college level courses in computers, science and metallurgy, as well as a chemical operator training course at Pensacola Junior College. Mr. Nettles was the only applicant for the Operations Technician job who had ever performed the Operations Technician job in the past. Mr. Nettles was a probationary employee at the time he applied for the Operations Technician position. Monsanto has no policy which prohibits probationary employees from applying for promotions. Rather, the probationary period is simply a period in which a newly hired employee is being evaluated for purposes of retention and during which no job-related benefits accrue. Further, Mr. Nettles was not barred from applying for the Operations Technician position because he was required to spend any length of time in his prior job. Promotions or transfers from hourly to nonexempt salaried positions in the Technical Center are governed by the Nonexempt Selection Procedure Manual. The Nonexempt Selection Procedure Manual contains no restrictions on upward mobility. Monsanto has never followed a policy of restricting the upward mobility of its employees. Ultimately, Mr. Nettles was evaluated by the committee, the appropriate recommendations were made, he was found to be the most qualified candidate for the job and thus was offered the Operations Technician position, which he accepted. Petitioners Little and Akins were dissatisfied with the committee's selection and thereafter pursued the plant's appeal procedure to appeal the decision to hire Mr. Nettles for that position. In the final step in that appeal procedure, the Petitioners met with plant manager Leon Hebert. Mr. Hebert played no part in the selection of Mr. Nettles. Indeed he has no authority over the Technical Center hiring process at all. In their meeting, Mr. Hebert explained to Petitioners why Mr. Nettles was selected over them for their Operations Technician position, most notably, because of his past experience on the job. Mr. Hebert also explained the differences in the selection procedure in the manufacturing unit as compared to the Technical Center. Mr. Hebert made no comments about the Petitioners ages during this meeting, although Mr. Akins maintains he made a comment to the effect that the job in question was not to be a "swinging gate for retirees." Even if Mr. Hebert made such a comment, it is not probative of discrimination or discriminatory intent on the part of the employer for the reasons discussed in the conclusions of law below involving Mr. Hebert playing no part in the decision concerning who to hire for the position in question. Shortly after the vacancy for the Operations Technician position was filed, a similar vacancy was announced for a Spinneret Technician position in the Technical Center. The candidate selected for that position, Mr. Walter Williams, was the oldest candidate who applied for the job.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petitions of Bennie J. Little and Carlton E. Akins in their entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1992.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner school board has good cause to reject the Walton County School superintendent's recommendation of Ann Farrior (Respondent) for renewal of an annual contract to serve in the position of school psychologist.
Findings Of Fact Ann Farrior was employed as a school psychologist by the Walton County School District for the 1998-1999 school year. She was employed on the recommendation of the superintendent and under an annual contract for that school year. Title 20, United States Code, Chapter 33, is known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The intelligence testing and questions regarding assessment and placement of exceptional education students is governed by that federal statute and rules pendent thereto. The federal regulations implementing the IDEA provide certain federal funds to assist in their implementation by local school districts. The Walton County School District receives federal funding to implement the IDEA. The failure to comply with appropriate federal regulations governing testing, assessment and placement of exceptional education students can result in a loss of such federal funding for the District. The Superintendent, Mr. Bludworth, nominated Ms. Farrior for the school psychologist position at issue for the 1998-1999 school year with the understanding that although she was not certified as a school psychologist, she was eligible to be certified as such. During the course of her employment as a school psychologist that school year, state audit personnel determined that she was not properly credentialed to administer intelligence testing as part of the assessment process for exceptional education students, which is necessary to the formulation of Individualized Educational Plans (IEPs) which is in turn a necessary element of the ultimate decision of proper placement of such students in the educational system in a school district. In view of this situation, Mr. Sam Goff of the Bureau of Instructional Support and Community Services of the Department of Education wrote the superintendent on January 20, 1999, outlining specific requirements that the District would have to meet in order to bring itself into compliance with the IDEA as a result of Ms. Farrior's ineligibility to administer intelligence testing as part of the assessment and evaluation process for exceptional students. The superintendent also received notice by memorandum of January 28, 1999, and by letter of January 29, 1999, from the Auditor General's staff and the Auditor General (in evidence as Petitioner Exhibits 4 and 5), that audit findings had determined that the District employed a person as a school psychologist (the Respondent) concerning whom school district records did not indicate a basis for that person being qualified for the school psychologist's position. The Auditor General's findings noted that the position description for school psychologist employed by the school district included responsibilities for administering testing and assessing placement for all exceptional education students. The preliminary findings noted that the employee, the Respondent, then serving as a school psychologist possessed only a temporary Florida teaching certificate in "psychology" which had expired on June 30, 1998, and which did not constitute certification as a "school psychologist." District records did not show that the Respondent had renewed her teaching certificate or had otherwise met the minimum job requirements for the school psychologist position. The Auditor General recommended that the school district document its records with a basis upon which the individual, the Respondent, was determined to be qualified for the school psychologist position or to take appropriate action to provide for a licensed or certified school psychologist for administering testing and for assessing placement for exceptional students. As a result of receiving these communications and preliminary findings, the superintendent met with the Respondent and felt compelled to request her resignation. Nancy Holder had been the school psychologist in the position that Ann Farrior assumed. Early in the 1998-1999 school year, Ms. Holder, who is a certified school psychologist, had been transferred to the position of "Staffing Specialist" upon which occurrence Ann Farrior then occupied the position of school psychologist. Ms. Holder, in her testimony, described the duties of school psychologist as including, in addition to performing intelligence testing of students, testing for academic achievement, and personality testing as well as counseling duties involving students, their parent, and teachers. The school psychologist must also participate in staffing meetings and in the IEP formulation process and resulting decisions regarding placement of exceptional students; she must assist classroom teachers and parents with the particular problems involving both exceptional students as well as students who do not have exceptionalities or diagnoses. Because of the above-referenced preliminary audit findings by the Department of Education, Ms. Holder was required to assume the additional responsibility of supervising Ms. Farrior's activities for the remainder of her annual contract year as well as undertaking to re-test those students whom Ms. Farrior had previously tested. The school district alternatively obtained a consultant to perform the educational testing that otherwise would have been done by Ms. Farrior as school psychologist had she been qualified under the pertinent regulations to do so. The school district received a statement from the Department of Education's Bureau of Teacher Certification, dated March 22, 1999, concerning the Respondent's eligibility to apply for or to receive certification as a school psychologist. That statement of eligibility noted that the Respondent lacked 27- semester hours of graduate school credit in school psychology which would necessarily have to include six-semester hours of graduate credit in a supervised school psychology internship. Additionally, Ms. Farrior would have to submit a passing score on the state-required teacher certification examination. Ms. Farrior enrolled in an appropriate school psychology internship program for the 1999-2000 school year, but as of the date of the hearing in this case, she still lacked 24 of the required semester hours of graduate credit in school psychology and had not yet submitted a passing score on the Florida State Teacher Certification examination. The Walton County School Board has a written policy adopted August 13, 1996, and in force at times pertinent hereto which authorizes the superintendent "to select and recommended non-certificated instructional personnel for appointment pursuant to Section 321.1725, Florida Statutes, and State Board of Education Rule 6A-1.0502, when special services are needed to deliver instruction." Section 228.041(9), Florida Statutes defines the term "instructional personnel" as including "school psychologists." There is no showing in the evidence of record, however, that "special services" are needed to deliver instruction. That is, although the school psychologist position is statutorily deemed to be in the category of "instructional personnel" it does not involve the teaching of students. Rather the school psychologist position, which is the subject of this case, involves testing, evaluation, assessment, and assistance in the placement of exceptional students in appropriate courses of instruction. There was no showing that special services were needed to actually deliver instruction, as envisioned by the above-referenced written policy of the School Board concerning the appointment of non-certificated instructional personnel, such as Ms. Farrior. Given the above-referenced audit findings in relation to the controlling federal regulations referenced above and the Board's policy allowing employment of certificated personnel "out-of-field" only in cases where special services are needed to deliver instruction, it has not been demonstrated that the School Board realistically had an option, in the proper exercise of its discretionary authority, to hire Ms. Farrior "out-of-field" as a "school psychologist" based merely on her only certification, which was a temporary certificate authorizing the teaching of psychology (not certification as a school psychologist which is really a pupil support position). Moreover, the School Board's policy authorizes the employment of teachers for instruction in areas other than that for which they are certificated only in the absence of available qualified, certified instructors. Although the school psychologist position at issue remains unfilled, there is no evidence to demonstrate why it is unfilled and no evidence of record to demonstrate that there are not qualified, certified personnel available to be hired as a school psychologist to fill that position. When the superintendent recommended the Respondent for a second annual contract in April of 1999, he was already aware that she was not qualified to perform the duties of a school psychologist and that the District would have to contract with outside consultants or other qualified persons to at least secure the administration of intelligence and other psychological testing, which testing is a part of the job description and duties of a school psychologist. The then exceptional education director for the District, Ms. Rushing, had suggested to the superintendent that he recommend the Respondent in April of 1999 for the position of "evaluation specialist." This would more represent the actual duties Ms. Farrior had been performing after the Department of Education audit finding that she was not qualified to serve as a school psychologist. Unfortunately, however, there was no authorized position of "evaluation specialist" and the superintendent has no authority to set the qualifications for a particular position or a recommend a person for a position that had not otherwise been approved nor its qualifications approved of by the School Board. In summary, as of the date of the hearing, the Respondent was not yet eligible to receive either a regular or temporary certificate from the Department of Education as a school psychologist and still lacked 24 semester hours of graduate credit necessary for such certification; she had not yet passed the Florida State Teacher Certification Examination for school psychologist although she had secured and enrolled in an appropriate internship to satisfy the above-referenced six-hour internship requirement.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the School Board of Walton County rejecting the nomination of Ann Farrior to serve in the position of school psychologist for the school year 1999-2000, because good cause for such action has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence in the manner found and concluded above. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire Hammons & Whittaker, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 George R. Mead, II, Esquire Clark, Pennington, Hart, Larry, Bond, Stackhouse & Stone 125 West Romana Street, Suite 800 Post Office Box 13010 Pensacola, Florida 32591-3010 John F. Bludworth Superintendent of Schools Walton County School District 145 Park Street, Suite 3 DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32433
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed unlawful employment practices contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2007)1/, by terminating Petitioner's employment in retaliation for her filing a formal grievance asserting that a co-worker made a racially discriminatory comment to her at a staff meeting.
Findings Of Fact The District Board of Trustees of LCCC is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, an African-American female, was hired by the College and began work on January 29, 2007. She worked in the cosmetology department as a Teaching Assistant II until the College terminated her employment on June 28, 2007. In addition to Petitioner, the College's cosmetology department consisted of two instructors, Carol McLean and Vicki Glenn. Ms. McLean was also the department coordinator, meaning that she supervised Petitioner and Ms. Glenn. The instructors performed classroom instruction and supervised students "on the floor" in the department's laboratory, where the students practiced their skills on clients who made appointments with the department to have their hair styled. Petitioner's duties included answering the telephone, making client appointments, ordering and stocking cosmetology supplies, and recording the hours and services performed by the students. Petitioner was a licensed cosmetologist and was expected to assist on the floor of the lab, but only when an instructor determined that her presence was necessary. Petitioner was not authorized to perform classroom instruction. Petitioner was at all times employed on a probationary basis under LCCC Policy and Procedure 6Hx12:8-04, which provides that all newly hired career service employees must serve a probationary period of six calendar months. This Policy and Procedure also requires that conferences be held with the employee at the end of two and four months of employment. The conferences are to include written performance appraisals and should be directed at employee development, areas of weakness or strength, and any additional training required to improve performance. Petitioner acknowledged that she attended orientation sessions for new employees during which this Policy and Procedure was discussed.4/ The evidence at hearing established that the orientation sessions covered, among other subjects, an explanation of the probationary period, the College's discipline and grievance procedures, and how to find the College's Policies and Procedures on the internet. The employee orientation process also required Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Carol McLean, to explain 14 additional items, including Petitioner's job description and the College's parking policies. The evidence established that Ms. McLean covered these items with Petitioner. Petitioner's first written evaluation covered the period from January 29, 2007 through March 29, 2007. The evaluation was completed by Ms. McLean on April 13, 2007, and approved by the Dean of Occupational Programs, Tracy Hickman, on April 30, 2007. The College's "Support Staff Job Performance Evaluation" form provides numerical grades in the categories of work knowledge, work quality, work quantity and meeting deadlines, dependability, co-operation, judgment in carrying out assignments, public relations, and overall performance. A score of 1 or 2 in any category is deemed "unsatisfactory." A score of 3 or 4 is "below norm." A score of 5 or 6 is "expected norm." A score of 7 or 8 is "above norm." A score of 9 or 10 is rated "exceptional." Petitioner's scores in each area were either 5 or 6, within the "expected norm." Ms. McLean graded Petitioner's overall performance as a 6. The evaluation form also provides questions that allow the supervisor to evaluate the employee's performance in a narrative format. In response to a question regarding Petitioner's strengths, Ms. McLean wrote that Petitioner "has demonstrated she is very capable handling conflicts/situations concerning clients. She is also good working with the students when needed. Her computer skills/knowledge has been an asset." In response to a question regarding Petitioner's weaknesses, Ms. McLean wrote, "Kay5/ needs to be a little more organized. I feel confident with the move to the new building, she will be able to set her office up to be more efficient for herself." Petitioner testified that she has excellent organizational skills and that she is, in fact, a "neat freak." Her problem was the utter disorganization of the cosmetology department at the time she started her job. She could not see her desk for the pile of papers and other materials on it. Boxes were piled in the middle of the floor. There were more than 100 unanswered messages in the recorded message queue. Petitioner testified that neither Ms. McLean nor Ms. Glenn could tell her how to proceed on any of these matters, and that she was therefore required to obtain advice via telephone calls to either Wendy Saunders, the previous teaching assistant, or Jeanette West, secretary to the Dean of Occupational Programs. Neither Ms. McLean nor Ms. Glenn recalled the complete departmental disorganization attested to by Petitioner at the outset of her employment. In fact, Ms. McLean recalled having to work 80-hour weeks to restore order to the department's workspace after Petitioner was discharged. No other witness testified as to disorganization prior to Petitioner's hiring. The evidence presented at the hearing established that Petitioner dramatically overstated the poor condition of the cosmetology department's offices at the time she started work, and also greatly overstated any contribution she made to improve its organization. Petitioner's second and final evaluation covered the period from March 29, 2007, through May 29, 2007. The evaluation was completed by Ms. McLean on May 22, 2007, and approved by Dean Hickman on May 23, 2007. Petitioner's numerical scores in each of the categories, including overall performance, was 4, meaning that her performance was "below norm." In a typewritten attachment, Ms. McLean wrote: Employee Improvement: Strengths: Kay is very good with the students and has strong desires to help them. Weaknesses: A concern is Kay's words and actions have shown that she would rather teach than be in the office. There is still a lack of organization in the office. We have had a couple incidents where we have to search for invoices, etc. I am still receiving complaints about the phone not being answered. Other comments: Too often Kay's actions have made it difficult for the department to operate effectively. Since Kay's arrival, it have discussed [sic] that each person must respect the protocol of communicating within the chain of command. On numerous occasions Kay ignored those instructions, In spite of my direct instructions to notify/discuss an incident report to Dean Hickman before doing anything else with it, Kay distributed it to others.6/ The College terminated Petitioner's employment on June 28, 2007, roughly five months after she began work and well within the six-month probationary period. Petitioner's dismissal was due to inadequate job performance and to several episodes displaying poor judgment and disregard of the College's rules and regulations. As to day-to-day job performance, the evidence established that Petitioner often had to be asked several times to do things that she conceded were within the scope of her duties. One of Petitioner's duties was to track the department's inventory, order supplies as needed, check the supplies against the invoices as they arrived, and unpack the supplies and restock the department's shelves. If the supplies were not removed from their shipping containers and stocked on the shelves, it was difficult for the instructors and students to find items or know when the department was running low on a given supply. Student cosmetologists at the College were frequently required to use caustic chemicals, and it was critical that the supplies be correctly inventoried and shelved to avoid mistakes in application of these chemicals. Ms. McLean had to tell Petitioner repeatedly to unpack the supplies. Petitioner would tell Ms. McLean that she would take care of it, but later Ms. McLean would notice that the supplies were still in their boxes.7/ Ms. McLean testified that there were multiple occasions when paperwork could not be located due to Petitioner's lack of a filing system. Ms. McLean and Petitioner would have to rummage through stacks of paper to find the item they needed because Petitioner failed to file the department's paperwork in a coherent manner. Another of Petitioner's duties was to set up "product knowledge" classes conducted by vendors of hair care products used in the cosmetology program. In February 2007, Ms. Glenn asked Petitioner to set up a class with Shirley Detrieville, the Redken representative for the College. Over the next month, Ms. Glenn repeatedly asked Petitioner about her progress in setting up the class, and Petitioner consistently responded that Ms. Detrieville had not returned her calls. Finally, in March, Ms. Glenn happened to see Ms. Detrieville on the campus. Ms. Detrieville informed Ms. Glenn that all the paperwork for the class had been completed long ago, and she was just waiting for Petitioner to call and let her know when to come. Ms. Glenn's class never received the Redken training. The evidence established that Petitioner consistently failed to return phone calls made to the department. There was a core group of women, mostly retirees that constituted an important segment of the regular patrons at the department's lab. Keeping track of their appointments was important because the students needed practical experience in order to meet the requirements for licensure. It was also important to keep track of the training needs of each student, because a student working on hair coloring, for instance, needed to be matched with a customer requesting that service. Among Petitioner's duties was to make the appointments for the patrons, and to coordinate the appointments with the students. Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn testified that they consistently received complaints that Petitioner did not return phone calls from patrons attempting to make appointments. Ms. McLean recalled an elderly woman named Ms. Grammith, who was a weekly customer at the lab. Ms. Grammith phoned Ms. McLean at home because she was unable to get Petitioner to return her calls for an appointment.8/ Ms. Glenn recounted an occasion when she received a phone call from Ms. Grammith, complaining that Petitioner was not returning her calls. Ms. Glenn walked into Petitioner's office and asked her to return Ms. Grammith's call and make her appointment. Petitioner assured Ms. Glenn that she would. Ms. Glenn then went to teach a class. When she returned to her office, Ms. Glenn had another message from Ms. Grammith. Ms. Glenn asked Petitioner about the situation, and Petitioner admitted that she had not yet returned the call. Still later on the same afternoon, Ms. Glenn received a third call from Ms. Grammith. Again, Ms. Glenn inquired of Petitioner, who again admitted that she had not phoned Ms. Grammith. The next morning was a Friday, and Ms. Glenn received another call from Ms. Grammith. Ms. Glenn walked into Petitioner's office and told her to call Ms. Grammith. Ms. Glenn knew Petitioner never made the call because Ms. Grammith called Ms. Glenn yet again on the following Monday. Another elderly regular customer, Ms. Caldwell, stopped Ms. Glenn in the hallway one day to ask "what in the world was going on here." Ms. Caldwell complained that Petitioner never got her appointment right, and always told her that she had come in on the wrong day or at the wrong time. On this day, Ms. Caldwell was left sitting in the hallway outside the lab for three and one-half hours because Petitioner failed to schedule her appointment correctly. On another occasion, Shirley Rehberg, an LCCC employee, emailed Ms. Glenn to inquire about making an appointment for a pedicure. Ms. Glenn responded that Petitioner handled appointments, and provided Ms. Rehberg with information as to Petitioner's office hours. On three different occasions, Ms. Rehberg informed Ms. Glenn that she had attempted to make appointments with Petitioner but had received no response. Ms. Glenn also recalled going to the College registrar's office on unrelated business and being asked by Debbie Osborne, an employee in that office, whether the cosmetology department had stopped taking appointments. Ms. Glenn told her that all she had to do was call Petitioner. Ms. Osborne replied that she had emailed Petitioner several times and never received a response. Ms. McLean concluded that Petitioner was much more interested in the occasional teaching aspect of her position than she was in the quotidian matters of filing, ordering and answering the phone that constituted the bulk of her job. Ms. McLean believed that Petitioner's eagerness to teach, even when her presence on the floor was not requested or needed, sometimes caused Petitioner to neglect her other duties. Petitioner admitted that she preferred teaching, but also testified that she was forced to teach students at least two days per week because Ms. McLean simply skipped work every Wednesday and Thursday. Petitioner stated that when she was on the floor of the lab, she could not hear the phone ringing back in the office. She believed that this might have accounted for some of the missed phone calls. Ms. McLean credibly denied Petitioner's unsupported allegation that she skipped work twice per week. Ms. McLean was in the classroom and lab with her students four days per week, as required by her schedule. Ms. McLean reasonably observed that she would not remain long in the College's employ if she were to skip work every Wednesday and Thursday. When classes were not in session, faculty members such as Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn were not required to come into the office, whereas the teaching assistant was required to come in and work a full day from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On these faculty off-days, it was especially important for Petitioner to be on the job because she constituted the sole point of contact between students and the cosmetology department. New classes in cosmetology start twice a year, and prospective students may drop by the campus at any time. If no one is present during normal working hours to answer questions or assist the student in applying, the College could lose a prospective student as well as suffer a diminished public image. The evidence established that Petitioner would take advantage of the lack of supervision on faculty off-days to go missing from her position, without submitting leave forms for approval by an administrator as required by College policy. May 4, 2007, was the College's graduation day. Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn arrived at the cosmetology building at 3:00 p.m. to prepare for the cap and gown ceremony and noted that Petitioner was not there, though it was a regular work day for her. Petitioner was still absent at 4:30 p.m. when the two instructors left the building to go to the graduation ceremony. On May 15, 2007, a faculty off-day, Ms. Glenn came in at 11:00 a.m. to prepare for her class the next day. Petitioner asked Ms. Glenn to handle a student registration matter while Petitioner went out. Ms. Glenn agreed to do so. The students had yet to arrive by 2:00 p.m. when Ms. Glenn was ready to leave. Petitioner had still not returned to the office, forcing Ms. Glenn to ask Ms. West to register the students if they arrived. Ms. Glenn had no idea when or if Petitioner ever returned to work that day. Marcia Brinson was the custodian who cleaned the cosmetology building. During summer session at the College, Ms. Brinson worked from 2:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. She would often come into the cosmetology building and find that Petitioner was not there. This was the case on May 15, 2007, when Ms. Brinson entered the building at 2:00 p.m. At around 2:30, an administrator named Glenn Rice came to the cosmetology building with two students whom he was attempting to enroll.9/ Ms. Brinson phoned Ms. McLean at home to inform her of the situation. Ms. McLean phoned the cosmetology office. Petitioner did not answer. At about 2:50 p.m., Ms. McLean called Petitioner at her cell phone number. Petitioner answered and told Ms. McLean that she was at her mother's house, but was about to return to the College. Ms. McLean could not say whether Petitioner ever actually returned to the College that day. At the hearing, Petitioner claimed that the only time she left the cosmetology department on May 15, 2007, was to go to the library at 2:15 p.m. and obtain materials for a class she was going to teach on May 17. This testimony cannot be credited, given that it conflicts with the credible testimony of Ms. McLean, Ms. Glenn and Ms. Brinson. Further belying Petitioner's claim is the fact that she later submitted a leave form claiming "personal leave" for two hours on May 15, 2007. She claimed the hours from 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. Aside from its inconsistency with Petitioner's testimony, this claim was inaccurate on two other counts. First, the evidence established that Petitioner was away from the office from at least 11:00 a.m. until some time after 3:00 p.m. Second, Petitioner's regular work day ended at 5:00 p.m., thus giving her no cause to claim leave for the half-hour between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. The College has a "wellness" program in which employees are allowed to take 30 minutes of leave, three days per week, in order to engage in some form of exercise. Petitioner considered wellness time to be the equivalent of personal leave, and would leave her job at the College early in order to keep an appointment at a hair-styling salon at which she worked part-time. Finally, Petitioner was unwilling or unable to comply with the College's parking decal system. At the time she was hired, Petitioner was issued a staff parking pass that entitled her to park her car in any unreserved space on he campus. As noted above, many of the cosmetology customers were elderly women. For their convenience, the College had five spaces reserved for customers directly in front of the cosmetology building. Customers were issued a 5 x 8 "Cosmetology Customer" card that they would leave on their dashboards. If all five of the reserved spaces were taken, the card allowed the customer to park in any space on the campus. On May 30, 2007, the College's supervisor of safety and security, Tony LaJoie, was patrolling the campus on his golf cart. Petitioner flagged him down, asking for help with a dead battery in her car. Mr. LaJoie stopped to help her, but also noticed that Petitioner's car was parked in a space reserved for customers and that Petitioner had a "Cosmetology Customer" card on her dashboard. When he asked her about it, Petitioner told Mr. LaJoie that she had lost her staff parking pass and therefore needed to use the customer pass. Mr. LaJoie told Petitioner that she could go to the maintenance building and get a new staff pass, or get a visitor's pass to use until she found the first pass. Petitioner told Mr. LaJoie that she could not afford the $10 replacement fee for the pass. Mr. LaJoie told her that the $10 replacement fee was cheaper than the $25 to $50 fines she would have to pay for illegally parking on campus. Petitioner promised Mr. LaJoie that she would go to maintenance and take care of the situation. On June 5, 2007, Mr. LaJoie found Petitioner's car again parked in a customer reserved space and with a customer card on the dashboard. Mr. LaJoie wrote Petitioner a parking ticket. Petitioner was well aware that the customer spaces were reserved at least in part because many of the department's customers were elderly and unable to walk more than a short distance. Petitioner nonetheless ignored College policy and parked her car in the reserved spaces. Petitioner never obtained a replacement parking pass.10/ Dean Hickman was the administrator who made the decision to recommend Petitioner's termination to the College's Vice-President, Charles Carroll, who in turn presented the recommended decision to LCCC President Charles W. Hall, who made the final decision on termination. She based her recommendation on the facts as set forth in Findings of Fact 19 through 48, supra. Petitioner's termination was due to her performance deficiencies. Dean Hickman considered Petitioner's pattern of conduct, including her repeated violation of parking policies and her practice of leaving her post without permission, to constitute insubordination. Ms. McLean, who provided input to Dean Hickman as to Petitioner's performance issues, testified that Petitioner's slack performance worked to the great detriment of a department with only two instructors attempting to deal with 20 or more students at different stages of their training. Petitioner's position was not filled for a year after her dismissal. Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn worked extra hours and were able to perform Petitioner's duties, with the help of a student to answer the phones. The fact that the instructors were able to perform their own jobs and cover Petitioner's duties negates Petitioner's excuse that she was required to do more than one full-time employee could handle. Furthermore, Ms. McLean testified that, despite the added work load, Petitioner's departure improved the working atmosphere by eliminating the tension caused by Petitioner. Because Petitioner was still a probationary employee, the College was not required to show cause or provide specific reasons for her dismissal. Nevertheless, the evidence established that there were entirely adequate, performance-based reasons that fully justified the College's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. The evidence further established that Petitioner's dismissal was not related to the formal grievance Petitioner filed on June 5, 2007. However, because Petitioner has alleged that her termination was retaliatory, the facts surrounding her grievance are explored below. The grievance stemmed from an incident that occurred between Petitioner and Ms. Glenn on May 16, 2007, the first day of the summer term. A student named Russia Sebree approached Ms. Glenn with a problem. Ms. Sebree was not on Ms. Glenn's summer class roster because she had not completed the Tests of Adult Basic Education ("TABE"), a test of basic reading, math and language skills. Students were required to pass the TABE in their first semester before they would be allowed to register for their second semester. Ms. Glenn told Ms. Sebree that, because the initial registration period had passed, they would have to walk over to the Dean's office and have Dean Hickman register Ms. Sebree for the class. Ms. Glenn phoned Dean Hickman's secretary, Ms. West, to make an appointment. Ms. West told Ms. Glenn that Dean Hickman was out of the office, and that she would make a return call to Ms. Glenn as soon as the dean returned. While waiting for Ms. West's call, Ms. Sebree apparently drifted into Petitioner's office. She mentioned to Petitioner that she hadn't passed the TABE test, and Petitioner told her she could take care of the matter by making an appointment for Ms. Sebree to take the test. Ms. Glenn overheard the conversation and walked in to stop Petitioner from making the call. She told Petitioner that she had a call in to Dean Hickman, and that she and Ms. Sebree would have to meet with the dean to determine whether Ms. Sebree could register for Ms. Glenn's summer class or whether she would be required to complete the TABE and wait until the next semester. Ms. Glenn was angered by Petitioner's interference in this matter. Petitioner's actions were beyond the scope of a teaching assistant's duties, unless requested by an instructor.11/ She jumped into the situation without inquiring whether Ms. Sebree had talked to her instructor about her problem and without understanding the steps that Ms. Glenn had already taken on Ms. Sebree's behalf. Eventually, Ms. West returned the call and Ms. Glenn and Ms. Sebree met with Dean Hickman. After the meeting, Ms. Glenn requested a private meeting with Dean Hickman. She told the dean that she was very upset that Petitioner had taken it upon herself to take over the situation with Ms. Sebree, when Ms. Glenn was taking care of the matter and Petitioner had no reason to step in. Dean Hickman told Ms. Glenn that she would not tolerate a staff person going over an instructor's head in a matter involving a student. Dean Hickman asked Ms. Glenn to send Petitioner over to her office. Dean Hickman testified that she met with Petitioner for about 30 minutes, and that Petitioner left her office requesting a meeting with Ms. Glenn. Dean Hickman did not testify as to the details of her meeting with Petitioner. The dean knew that Petitioner was angry and cautioned her to conduct herself in a professional manner when speaking with Ms. Glenn. Petitioner testified that Dean Hickman "yelled" at her, "I will not have you undermine my instructor's authority." Petitioner professed not to know what Dean Hickman was talking about. The dean repeated what Ms. Glenn had said to her about the incident with Ms. Sebree. According to Petitioner, Ms. Glenn had told the dean "some lie," an "outlandish" tale in which "I went in telling Russia that she didn't have to do what Vicki said, or something like that." Petitioner told Dean Hickman her version of the incident, which was essentially that nothing happened. She was showing Ms. Sebree "some basic algebraic equations and stuff and there was no conflict or anything in the office." Petitioner asked for a meeting "so I can see what's going on." Petitioner returned to the cosmetology department. She was visibly upset. She asked for a departmental meeting with Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn that afternoon. Ms. McLean agreed to move up the weekly departmental meeting in order to take care of this matter. The meeting convened with Ms. McLean going over the usual day-to-day matters involving the program. Once the regular business was completed, Ms. McLean stated that she wanted Petitioner and Ms. Glenn to air out their problems. Petitioner asked Ms. Glenn why she wanted to tell lies about her. Ms. Glenn said, "What?" and Petitioner stated, "You're a liar." Ms. Glenn denied the accusation. Petitioner repeated, "You're nothing but a liar." In anger and frustration, Ms. Glenn stated, "Look here, sister, I am not a liar." Petitioner responded, "First, you're not my sister and, secondly, my name is Stephanie K. Taylor, address me with that, please."12/ Ms. McLean testified that both women were "pretty heated" and "pretty frustrated" with each other. She concluded the meeting shortly after this exchange. After the meeting, Petitioner and Ms. McLean spoke about Ms. Glenn's use of the word "sister," which Petitioner believed had racial connotations. Ms. McLean told Petitioner that she did not believe anything racial was intended.13/ Ms. Glenn had never been called a liar, and in her frustration she blurted out "sister" in the same way another angry person might say, "Look here, lady." Petitioner seemed satisfied and the matter was dropped for the remainder of the day. Dean Hickman testified that Petitioner brought some paperwork to her office that afternoon after the departmental meeting. Petitioner told her that she felt better about the situation, that they had aired their differences and everything now seemed fine. The dean considered the matter resolved. By the next morning, May 17, 2007, Petitioner had changed her mind about the comment. She sent an email to each member of the College's board of trustees, President Hall, Dean Hickman, and various other College employees that stated as follows: Hello. I am Stephanie K. Taylor, Teaching Assistant for Cosmetology. I am writing because of an incident that took place on yesterday, May 16, 2007. Nancy Carol McLean (Coordinator/Instructor), Vicki Glenn (Instructor) and I met for a meeting to discuss concerns in our department approximately 11:35 am. During our discussion, Vicki Glenn made a racial comment to me. I disagreed with her concerning a statement she made. Her reply to me was: "No, 'Sister', I did not!" I was very offended by her remark and I replied, "My name is Stephanie Kay Taylor." Following the meeting, I spoke with Ms. McLean and I decided to write this incident statement. If I allow an instructor to call me something other than my name, these incidents will continue. Ms. McLean had repeatedly cautioned Petitioner to respect the College's chain of command. As Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Ms. McLean was supposed to be Petitioner's first resort insofar as work-related complaints. Petitioner was in the habit of going straight to Dean Hickman with complaints before discussing them with Ms. McLean. However, in this instance, Petitioner did show Ms. McLean the text of her statement before she distributed it. Ms. McLean advised Petitioner to take the matter straight to Dean Hickman and discuss it with her before distributing the statement. Petitioner did not take Ms. McLean's advice. Though Petitioner emailed the statement to Dean Hickman, the dean did not actually see the statement until it had been distributed to several other people. No evidence was presented that Petitioner suffered any adverse consequences from distributing her written statement outside the College's chain of command. To the contrary, Petitioner testified that Ms. McLean advised her that if she felt strongly about the matter, she should file a formal grievance pursuant to the LCCC Policy and Procedure 6Hx12:6- 10.14/ Ms. McLean provided Petitioner with the forms she needed to file a written grievance. Petitioner also sought and received the advice of a human relations specialist at the College as to how to file a formal grievance. Both Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn convincingly testified that they had no ill feeling toward Petitioner for filing a grievance. Ms. McLean stated that the grievance had no impact on her at all. Ms. Glenn was not disturbed by the grievance because she had done nothing wrong and believed the process would vindicate her. Petitioner filed her formal written grievance on June 5, 2007. Vice president Marilyn Hamm began the investigation in the absence of Human Resources Director Gary Boettcher, who picked up the investigation upon his return to the campus. Dean Hickman also participated in the investigation of Petitioner's grievance. They interviewed the witnesses to the incident. They also interviewed 11 cosmetology students and asked them whether they had ever heard Ms. Glenn make any "derogatory or racial slurs or comments" relative to Petitioner. None of the students had heard Ms. Glenn make any remarks fitting the description in the query.15/ One student told the investigators that he had heard Petitioner speak disparagingly of Ms. Glenn, but not vice versa. On June 19, 2007, Mr. Boettcher issued a memorandum to Petitioner that stated as follows: You filed a grievance alleging that Ms. Vickie Glenn made a racial comment to you by calling you "sister." You further stated that you want the same respect that you have given to others and that you be referred to by your name, Stephanie K. Taylor. I was not available when you filed the grievance therefore it was referred to Vice President Hamm who began the investigation and upon my return it was referred to me. Ms. Hamm interviewed yourself, and Carol McLean. Ms. Hamm and I then interviewed Ms. Glenn. Subsequently, Ms. Hickman, the Dean of your department, and I interviewed a random sampling of students in the cosmetology program. The incident you described, when you were referred to as "sister" was discussed with both Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn, who were in the meeting when the comment was made. They both acknowledged that you were in fact referred to as sister. Neither of them viewed it as a racial comment but a term that was used in the heat of the discussion in which you and Ms. Glenn were very much at odds on a subject. The students were interviewed and asked if you had discussed or made mention of an evaluation that you received and also whether that had ever heard Ms. Glenn talk derogatorily or made any racial comments relative to you. Some of the students heard of talk of your evaluation but none of them heard it first hand from you. None of the students ever heard Ms. Glenn refer to you in any racial or disparaging way. In view of the investigation it is concluded that you were called "sister" but not in a negative or racial inference and that Ms. Glenn has not referred to you in a derogatory or racial manner. This has been discussed with Ms. McLean and Ms. Glenn in that they were asked to refer to you strictly by your name and in a professional manner. I trust this will be satisfactory to you and if you have any questions please feel free to contact me. Petitioner's employment with the College was terminated on June 28, 2007, nine days after Mr. Boettcher's memorandum. No evidence was presented to establish a causal connection between these two events, aside from their temporal proximity. As noted extensively above, the College had more than ample justification to terminate Petitioner's employment before the conclusion of her six-month probationary period. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Petitioner was terminated from her position with the College due to poor job performance and conduct amounting to insubordination. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the College did not retaliate against Petitioner for the filing of a grievance alleging that Ms. Glenn had made a racially discriminatory remark towards Petitioner. Rather, the greater weight of the evidence established that College personnel assisted Petitioner in filing her grievance and that the College conscientiously investigated the grievance. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the College has not discriminated against Petitioner based on her race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Lake City Community College did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2010.
Findings Of Fact James A. Campbell was employed by Sherba Brothers, Inc. on public work project at the Florida International University Interrama Campus between June 9, 1976 and August 20, 1976. Campbell was employed as an electrician helper. Campbell worked a total of 416 hours and was paid at the rate of $3.75 per hour. Work performed by Campbell closely approximates the work performed by laborers. The prevailing wage rate for laborers at Florida International University Interrama Campus Project was $6.50 per hour. If Campbell had been compensated as a laborer, he would have received $1,144 of additional compensation. Campbell first saw the schedule of prevailing wage rates within two to three weeks after he began working with Sherba Brothers. Campbell never objected to the amount of his paychecks and he was satisfied with what he was paid. Campbell made the decision to file this claim after he was laid off by Sherba Brothers. Charles Anthony Farina worked at a public work project on the Florida International University Interrama Campus for Sherba Brothers, Inc. from April 2, 1976 through October 8, 1976. Farina worked 324 hours at a wage rate of $4.00 per hour, 384 hours at a wage rate of $4.25 per hour, and 259 hours at a wage rate of $4.75per hour. Farina was employed as a first class-helper. Helpers and laborers perform basically the same duties. The prevailing wage rate for laborers at the Florida International University Interrama Campus Project was $6.50 per hour. If Farina had been paid at the prevailing wage rate, he would have been entitled to $2,127.25 of additional compensation. Farina first saw the posted schedule of prevailing wage rates some time prior to the time that he ceased working on the Florida International University Interrama Campus Project. He did not immediately take any action to seek additional wages because he feared that he would lose his job. After October 8, 1976 Farina no longer worked at the Florida International University project. He continued to work for Sherba Brothers at a different project. He was fired two months after he filed his prevailing wage affidavit. Robert B. Turner was employed at the Florida International University Interrama Campus Project from March 26, 1976 through October 8, 1976. Turner worked 821 hours on the project act a wage rate of $7.00 per hour, and 267 hours at a wage rate of $7.50 per hour. He was employed as an electrician foreman. The prevailing wage rate for electricians on the Florida International University Interrama Campus Project was $10.75 per hour. The prevailing wage rate for electrician foreman during that time was not posted on the prevailing wage rate schedule. The prevailing wage rate for electrician foremen in Dade County was $1.50,per hour higher than for electricians. If Turner had been compensated in accordance with the prevailing wage rate for electrician foreman, he would have received $5,858.50 in additional compensation. Turner first saw the schedule of prevailing wage rates for the Florida International University Interrama Campus Project within two weeks after he began working on the project. Turner took no steps to object to the wage that he was receiving until the last week of his employment. He at that time asked the project supervisor what would happen if he tried to collect the prevailing wage, and he was told that others who tried to collect were immediately laid off. The Florida International University Interrama Campus Project, designated State Project #BR-804-B, was a public work project. The prime contract for the project was for an amount in excess of $5,000. The prime contractor was Tom Murphy Construction Company, Inc. Sherba Brothers, Inc. was a subcontractor. The contracting authority, the State of Florida, Department of General Services withheld from its payments to Tom Murphy Construction Company, Inc. an amount of money equal to the claims of Campbell, Farina, and Turner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is licensed by the State of Florida as a Clinical Laboratory Technician. He applied to the Respondent for licensure as a Clinical Laboratory Technologist, specializing in clinical chemistry. On April 1, 1980, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for a technologist's license for the reason that Petitioner does not have the sixty semester hours required by Section 10D- 41.25(9), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner is a high school graduate. There after he graduated from Charron-Williams Paramedical College, technician training school. He has not attended an accredited college or university. Petitioner has been employed as a technician for approximately five years, and his witnesses testified as to the quality of his work. Petitioner has not taken the U.S. Public Health Service proficiency examination in clinical laboratory technology.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for a technologist's license pursuant to the provisions of The Florida Clinical Laboratory Law. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Collins Building Room 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Devon L. Carter 16615 S.W. 103rd Court Miami, Florida 33157 Morton Laitner, Esquire Dade County Department of Public Health 1350 N.W. 14th Street Miami, Florida 33125 Mr. Alvin J. Taylor, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has 13 semester hours of science credits in college. She is also certified with the American Society of Clinical Pathologists. Petitioner's sole contention is that her certification is the equivalent of the seven remaining semester hours of academic instruction she needs to reach the 20 hours of science courses required for licensure by Rule 10D-49.68, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Peter F. Camfferman was employed as a vocational instructor with the Seminole Vocational School by the Pinellas County School District. Peter F. Camfferman is certified by the State to teach in the area of cabinet making/wood working. He is not certified to teach in any other field and has never been certified to teach in any other field in the past. On March 11, 1993, J. Howard Hinesley, the Superintendent of Schools notified Mr. Peter F. Camfferman by letter that he would be recommending the termination of Mr. Camfferman's teaching position because there was not sufficient demand for cabinet making instruction to support the continuance of a full time instructor at the Seminole Vocational School. In the past, Peter F. Camfferman was allowed to teach out of field in the areas of practical construction trades and basic gas engines at Seminole Vocational School. During the 1992-93 school year, Mr. Camfferman was notified that, in accordance with Florida State Board of Education Rule 6A-10.0503, he would not be allowed to continue teaching out-of-field in the 1993-94 school year unless he took at least six semester hours toward infield certification or completed certification requirements within the twelve months from the date of his assignment to that out-of-field course of instruction. After notification, Mr. Camfferman made no efforts to complete any instruction or accomplish certification in any other areas of instruction. Enrollment of forty-five to fifty students is required in a vocational course to support the assignment of a full time instructor. For the 1993-94 school year less than twenty-five students have applied for the course of cabinet making at Seminole Vocational School. State funding for vocational education is based on the amount of demand for a certain vocational course. FTEs or full time equivalents are assigned based on the total number of students who have enrolled for a certain vocational course. Units of funding are then allotted in accordance with the number of FTEs established. If there are insufficient FTEs to establish a full unit then State funding for that course will be less than what is required to provide for a full time instructor. When it was determined that there was an insufficient demand to justify the continuance of a full time instructor in the area of cabinet making at Seminole Vocational School, other areas of employment within the school district were considered for Mr. Peter F. Camfferman. There were no openings in positions for the teaching of cabinet-making in the district. There were two other cabinet-making instructional positions within the district. Both of those positions were filled by instructors who had obtained a professional service contract. In accordance with prior district policy, which had been consistently followed, these instructors who had obtained professional service contracts were not removed from their positions in order to place Mr. Camfferman. There was an attempt to employ Mr. Camfferman in a supporting services position. Two positions were offered to Mr. Camfferman. A roofer's position and a carpenter's position were offered to Mr. Camfferman. He refused to accept either of these positions. The agreement between the School Board of Pinellas County and the Pinellas Classroom Teachers' Association, which was in effect for the school year 1992-93, states in Article XXI, Section C, that except in an emergency, to ensure that students are taught by teachers working within their areas of competence, teachers shall be assigned to teach only in the grades and subject fields for which they are qualified as well as in accordance with the regulations of the State Board of Education. The agreement also stated in Article XXII, Section A, that should economic circumstance dictate a reduction of personnel, the Board shall take whatever steps are necessary to assign personnel to appropriate positions within the district for which they are qualified consistent with this agreement and the law. Attempts were made during the 1992-93 school year to improve enrollment in the cabinet-making program at Seminole Vocational School. Those efforts include attendance at evening career fairs and encouragement of guidance counselors to suggest the area of cabinet-making to students considering taking a carpentry or wood working type course. Mr. Camfferman had every opportunity to attempt to improve the demand for the cabinet making course at Seminole Vocational School by attending these evening fairs. He chose not to attend.
Recommendation That a final order be entered sustaining Peter F. Camfferman's dismissal as a Vocational Instructor at the Seminole Vocational School. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1643 Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner are incorporated in the Hearing Officer's findings. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent are accepted except as noted below; Rejected. Mr. Camfferman was informed that he needed to take additional courses to continue to teach out of fields for which he was not certified. Last sentence rejected. Accepted. However, these rules and requirements were also available to Mr. Camfferman. 6.-7. Rejected as not supported by credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith B. Martin, Esquire Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 34649-6202 Lawrence D. Black, Esquire 650 Seminole Boulevard Largo, Florida 34640-3625 Dr. J. Howard Hinesley, Superintendent Pinellas County School Board Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Hon. Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
