The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was overpaid by the Medicaid program as indicated in Respondent's Final Agency Audit Report dated June 20, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Henson was an authorized Medicaid provider during the audit period of January 1, 1998 through September 30, 2000.1 During the audit period, Dr. Henson had been issued Medicaid provider number 0467243-00.2 No dispute exists that, during the audit period, Dr. Henson had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement(s) with AHCA.3 During the audit period, Dr. Henson was employed by Latin Quarter Medical Center, located at 855 Southwest 8th Street, Miami, Florida, at which he treated Medicaid recipients. Dr. Henson had been a surgeon but had suffered a stroke in December 1997, which caused him to be incapable of continuing to practice as a surgeon. He agreed to become employed with Latin Quarter Medical Center to work at its new clinic and to receive compensation for his services every two weeks. Latin Quarter Medical Center's patients were suffering from AIDS. Dr. Henson agreed to several terms and conditions in executing a Medicaid Provider Agreement (Agreement) with AHCA. Those terms and conditions included the following: Quality of Service. The provider agrees to provide medically necessary services or goods . . . agrees that services and goods billed to the Medicaid program must be medically necessary . . . The services and goods must have been actually provided to eligible Medicaid recipients by the provider prior to submitting the claim. Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with all local, state and federal laws, rules, regulation, licensure laws, Medicaid bulletins, manuals, handbooks and Statements of Policy as they may be amended from time to time. Term and signatures This provider agreement . . . shall remain in effect until July 1, 1999, unless otherwise terminated. . . . Provider Responsibilities. The Medical provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain . . . all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical . . . records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid. . . . The Agreement was signed by Dr. Henson in 1996. In a Noninstitutional Professional and Technical Medicaid Provider Agreement, Dr. Henson agreed to terms and conditions including the following: The provider agrees to keep complete and accurate medical . . . records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid program . . . . The provider agrees that services or goods billed to the Medicaid program must be medically necessary . . . and the services and goods must have been actually provided to eligible Medicaid recipients by the provider prior to submitting a claim. The provider agrees to submit Medicaid claims in accordance with program policies and that payment by the program for services rendered will be based on the payment methodology in the applicable Florida Administrative Rule. . . . * * * 8. The provider and the Department [Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services] agree to abide by the provisions of the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. The Agreement was signed by Dr. Henson in 1988. AHCA audited certain of Dr. Henson's Medicaid claims pertaining to services rendered between January 1, 1998 and September 30, 2000. By Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) dated April 12, 2001, AHCA notified Dr. Henson that, after a physician consultant with a specialty in infectious disease reviewed the Medical claims and medical records provided by Dr. Henson, a preliminary determination was made that certain claims in the amount of $124,556.83 were not covered by Medicaid. After the issuance of the PAAR, no further documentation was submitted by Dr. Henson to AHCA. As a result, AHCA issued a FAAR dated June 20, 2001, upholding the overpayment of $124,556.83. The FAAR indicated, among other things, that the documentation provided by Dr. Henson supported a lower level of office visit than the one billed and for which payment was received and, therefore, the difference between the payment for the appropriate level of service and the amount actually paid was an overpayment; that some of Dr. Henson's medical records failed to contain documentation for services which were billed and for which payment was made and, therefore, the payments for the inappropriate documentation was an overpayment; that some of the services rendered were inappropriately coded and the difference between payment for the proper code and the inappropriate code was an overpayment; and that some of the services for which billing was made and payment received were not medically necessary and those services were disallowed and were, therefore, an overpayment. The FAAR further provided how the overpayment was calculated, indicating, among other things, that a sample of 30 recipients of the 2936 claims submitted by Dr. Henson were reviewed for the period from January 1, 1998 through September 30, 2000; that a statistical formula for cluster sampling, with the formula being presented, was used; that the statistical formula was generally accepted; and that the statistical formula showed an overpayment in the amount of $124,556.83, with a 95 percent probability of correctness. The majority of the overpayment was due to denied claims for intravenous infusions of multi-vitamins, epogen and nupogen to adult HIV/AIDS patients. AHCA's representative primarily responsible for handling the audit of Dr. Henson was Sharon Dewey, a registered nurse employed in the Medicaid Program Integrity (MPI) division of AHCA. Nurse Dewey conducted an audit of Medicaid payments only under Dr. Henson's Medicaid Provider number. An on-site visit of Dr. Henson's office was made by Nurse Dewey. During the on-site visit, she provided Dr. Henson with a questionnaire, which was completed by her and signed by Dr. Henson, and which indicated that Dr. Henson was the only Medicaid Provider at the office at which he was located, Latin Quarter Medical Center, 855 Southwest 8th Street, Miami, Florida. At the on-site visit, Dr. Henson provided all of the medical documentation and medical recipient records for the audit period involved. All the Medicaid claims for the medical recipients were paid Medicaid claims originating only from Dr. Henson's Medical Provider number. Dr. Henson made available and provided to AHCA or AHCA's representatives any and all required Medicaid-related records and information pertaining to the audit that he had in his possession.4 He never refused to allow access to the records or information. Having received the medical recipient records from Dr. Henson, Nurse Dewey organized the records by patient names and dates of service and provided them to Dr. Joseph W. Shands, Jr., along with a worksheet for the audited claims for each patient. Dr. Shands is an expert in infectious diseases and the treatment and management of AIDS and HIV. Dr. Shands retired in 2002, and his practice was basically the same as Dr. Henson. No objection was made at hearing that Dr. Shands met the statutory definition of "peer." § 409.9131(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1999).5 The undersigned finds Dr. Shands' testimony persuasive. Dr. Shands reviewed the medical documentation provided by Dr. Henson to AHCA. The medical documentation that he reviewed indicated that the patients were "all HIV AIDS patients." Dr. Shands reviewed the particular medications given the patients; reviewed the reasons why the medications were given; considered and made a determination as to whether a justification existed for the administration of the medication; and, based on his determination, either allowed or disallowed the claim. He made no determinations as to the actual dollar amount of services provided. After reviewing the medical records, Dr. Shands made notations on the worksheets, signed the worksheets, and returned the worksheets to Nurse Dewey. Specific instances of acute attention involved the administration of intravenous (IV) multi-vitamins, epogen, nupogen, and Intravenous Immunoglobulin (IVIG). As to the IV of multi-vitamins, Dr. Henson prescribed this administration for almost all of his patients. Dr. Shands found that the patients were coming into the facility two to three times a week for the treatment, but he found no documented medical information to justify the use of IV multi-vitamins and determined these services were not medically necessary. In Dr. Shands' opinion an oral multi-vitamin would have been more appropriate and achieved the same result. An oral multi-vitamin is not recommended, according to Dr. Shands, where the patient is unable to digest the oral multi-vitamin. Notably, for one patient a notation was made that the patient refused pills, but a further notation indicated that Dr. Henson had prescribed the same patient pill-based medications for treatment, which negated the basis for the intravenous use. Furthermore, IV administration to an HIV/AIDS patient places the patient at an unnecessary risk of infection, which is not present with oral multi-vitamins. Dr. Henson testified that he was continuing the treatment of another physician, but he failed to make an independent medical judgment based upon his own medical findings. Further, no justification was in the medical records for the former physician's administration of IV multi-vitamins. Additionally, IV multi-vitamins were more costly than oral administration. And, with patients returning to the facility two to three times a week, the cost increased even more. Regarding epogen, Dr. Shands opined that certain administration was not medically necessary for the HIV/AIDS' patients. As to nupogen, Dr. Shands opined that certain administration was not medically necessary for the HIV/AIDS' patients. Regarding the administration of IVIG, Dr. Shands opined that the administration was not medically necessary for the HIV/AIDS' patients. As to certain office visits for the administration of IV multi-vitamins, epogen, nupogen, and IVIG, Dr. Shands opined that the office visits were unnecessary. Using the worksheets, with Dr. Shands' notations on them, together with Dr. Shands denials or reductions, Nurse Dewey calculated the overpayment associated with each of Dr. Henson's patients. Subsequently, a statistical calculation was applied by AHCA to extend the audit sample's total overall payment to all of Dr. Henson's Medicaid claims during the audit period, which resulted in a determination of an overpayment in the amount of $124,556.83. Dr. Henson suggests that his signature may have been falsified or forged on the medical records and information that he submitted to AHCA for its audit. Prior to hearing, he had an opportunity to review the medical records and information but could not identify one instance that his signature was falsified or forged. Consequently, a finding of fact is made that Dr. Henson signed the medical records and documentation provided to AHCA by him for the audit. Dr. Henson presented no expert testimony or any testimony to support the medical necessity or cost-effectiveness of the procedures that he used. Further, Dr. Henson contends that Latin Quarter Medical Center, the facility that employed him, received the Medicaid payments, not he. However, as the Medicaid Provider, he was not relieved of his responsibility to make sure that the medical procedures were medically necessary and cost-effective.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Arthur Henson, D.O., received overpayments in the Medicaid program in the amount of $124,556.83, during the audit period January 1, 1998 through September 30, 2000, and requiring Arthur Henson, D.O., to repay the overpayment amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 2006.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner received a Medicaid overpayment for claims paid during the audit period, August 1, 1997, through August 25, 1999, and if so, what is the amount that Petitioner is obligated to reimburse to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of its duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner is a licensed psychiatrist and an authorized Medicaid provider. His Medicaid provider number is No. 048191200. Chapter Three of the Limitations Handbook describes the procedure codes for reimbursable Medicaid services that physicians may use in billing for services to eligible recipients. The procedure codes are Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS), Levels 1-3. The procedure codes are based on the Physician's Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book, published by the American Medical Association. The CPT book, includes HCPCS descriptive terms, numeric identifying codes, and modifiers for reporting services and procedures. The Limitations Handbook further provides that Medicaid reimburses physicians using specific CPT codes. The CPT codes are listed on Medicaid's physician fee schedule. The CPT book includes a section entitled Evaluation and Management (E/M) Services Guidelines. The E/M section classifies medical services into broad categories such as office visits, hospital visits, and consultations. The categories may have subcategories such as two types of office visits (new patient and established patient) and two types of hospital visits (initial and subsequent). The subcategories of E/M services are further classified into levels of E/M services that are identified by specific CPT codes. The classification is important because the nature of a physician's work varies by type of service, place of service, and the patient's status. According to the CPT book, the descriptors for the levels of E/M services recognize seven components, six of which are used in defining the levels of E/M services. They are history, examination, medical decision making, counseling, coordination of care, nature of presenting problem, and time. The most important components in selecting the appropriate level of E/M services are history, examination, and medical decision making. However, since 1992, the CPT book has included time as an explicit factor in selecting the most appropriate level of E/M services. At all times relevant here, Petitioner provided services to Medicaid patients pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement. Therefore, Petitioner was subject to all statutes, rules and policy guidelines that govern Medicaid providers. The Medicaid provider agreement clearly gives a Medicaid provider the responsibility to maintain medical records sufficient to justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made pursuant to Medicaid policy. This case involves Respondent's Medicaid audit of claims paid to Petitioner for Medicaid psychiatric services during the audit period August 1, 1997, through August 25, 1999 (the audit period). Petitioner provided these services to his Medicaid patients, which constituted approximately 85 to 90 percent of his practice, at his office and at hospitals in the Jacksonville, Florida, area. During the audit period, Petitioner billed Medicaid for services furnished under the following CPT codes and E/M levels of service: (a) 99215, office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient; (b) 99223, initial hospital care per day for the evaluation and management of a patient; (c) 99232, subsequent hospital care per day for the evaluation and management of a patient; (d) 99233, subsequent hospital care per day for the evaluation and management of a patient; (e) 99238, hospital discharge day management; (f) 99254, initial inpatient consultation for a new or established patient; and (g) 90862, other psychiatric service or procedures, pharmacologic management. Except for CPT code 90862, the E/M levels of services billed by Petitioner require either two or all three of the key components as to history, examination, and medical decision- making. The CPT book assigns a typical amount of time that physicians spend with patients for each level of E/M service. The CPT book contains specific psychiatric CPT codes. CPT codes 90804-90815 relate to services provided in the office or other outpatient facility and involve one of two types of psychotherapy. CPT codes 90816-90829 relate to inpatient hospital, partial hospital, or residential care facility involving different types of psychotherapy. CPT codes 90862- 90899 relate to other psychiatric services or procedures. CPT code 90862 specifically includes pharmacologic or medication management; including prescription, use, and review of medication with no more than minimal medical psychotherapy. CPT code 90862 is the only psychiatric procedure code that Petitioner used in billing for the psychiatric services he provided. CPT code 90862 does not have specific requirements as to history, examination, and medical decision-making or a specified amount of time. Most of Petitioner's hospital patients were admitted to the hospital for psychiatric services through the emergency room. As part of the admission process, Petitioner performed psychiatric and physical examinations. However, testimony at hearing that Petitioner generally performed the psychiatric evaluations and the physical examinations on separate days is not persuasive. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that the hospital physical examinations were conducted as part of the routine admission process and appropriately included in claims for the patients' initial hospital care. Some of Petitioner's hospital patients had complicated conditions. Some patients required crisis intervention and/or lacked the ability to perform activities of daily living. The initial hospital care of new hospital patients required Petitioner to take an extensive medical and psychiatric history. Petitioner attended his hospital patients on a daily basis. However, there is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner routinely spent 20-25 minutes with his hospital patients for each subsequent daily visit until the day of discharge. Petitioner used a team approach when attending his hospital patients. On weekdays, the team consisted of Petitioner, a social worker, a music therapist, and the floor nurses. On weekends, Petitioner generally made his rounds with the floor nurses. Petitioner's use of the team approach to treat hospital patients did not change the level of service he provided in managing their medication. Petitioner did not document the time he spent with patients during hospital visits. However, his notations as to each of these visits indicate that, excluding admissions and discharges, the hospital visits routinely involved medication management. Petitioner's testimony that his treatment during subsequent hospital visits involved more than mere medication management is not persuasive. Petitioner also failed to document the time he spent with patients that he treated at his office. He did not present his appointment books as evidence to show the beginning and ending time of the appointments. Petitioner's notes regarding each office visit reflect a good bit of thought. However, without any notation as to time, the office progress notes are insufficient to determine whether Petitioner provided a level of service higher than medication management for established patients. Petitioner and his office manager agreed in advance that, unless Petitioner specified otherwise, every office visit for an established patient would be billed as if it required two of the following: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and a medical decision making of high complexity. With no documented time for each appointment, Petitioner's records do not reflect that he provided a level of service higher than medication management for the office visits of established patients. Petitioner's testimony to the contrary is not persuasive. Petitioner treated some patients at their place of residence in an adult congregate living facility (ACLF). Respondent does not pay for psychiatric services in such facilities. Instead of entirely denying the claims for ACLF patients, Respondent gave Petitioner credit for providing a lower level of service in a custodial care facility. Sometime in 1999, Respondent made a decision to audit Petitioner's paid claims for the period of time at issue here. After making that decision, Respondent randomly selected the names of 30 Medicaid patients that Petitioner had treated. The 30 patients had 282 paid claims that were included in the "cluster sample." Thereafter, Respondent's staff visited Petitioner's office, leaving a Medicaid provider questionnaire and the list of the 30 randomly selected patients. Respondent's staff requested copies of all medical records for the 30 patients for the audit period. Petitioner completed the Medicaid questionnaire and sent it to Respondent, together with all available medical records for the 30 patients. The medical records included Petitioner's progress notes for office visits. Petitioner did not send Respondent all of the relevant hospital records for inpatient visits. The original hospital records belonged to the hospitals where Petitioner provided inpatient services. Petitioner had not maintained copies of all of the hospital records even though Medicaid policy required him to keep records of all services for which he made Medicaid claims. When Respondent received Petitioner's records, one of Respondent's registered nurses, Claire Balbo, reviewed the records to determine whether Petitioner had provided documentation to support each paid claim. Ms. Balbo made handwritten notes on the records of claims that were not supported by documentation. Ms. Balbo reviewed the documentation in the records between February 10, 2000, and March 7, 2000. Next, one of Respondent's investigators, Art Williams, reviewed the records. Mr. Williams made his review on or about January 23, 2001. In some instances, Mr. Williams changed some of Petitioner's CPT codes from an inappropriate hospital inpatient or office visit procedure code to a psychiatric procedure code with a lower reimbursement rate. Additionally, Mr. Williams noted Petitioner's visits in ACLF's that, according to Medicaid policy, were not reimbursable. Finally, Mr. Williams noted that Petitioner occasionally made several claims on one line of the claim form contrary to Medicaid policy. Mr. Williams made these changes to the CPT codes based on applicable Medicaid policy. His review of the audit documents and patient records did not involve a determination as medical necessity or the appropriate level of service. A peer reviewer makes determinations as to medical necessity and the appropriate level of service for each paid claim in the random sample of 30 patients. Respondent then sent the records to Dr. Melody Agbunag, a psychiatrist who conducted a peer review of Petitioner's records. Dr. Agbunag's primary function was to determine whether the services that Petitioner provided were medically necessary and, if so, what the appropriate level of service was for each paid claim. Dr. Agbunag conducted the peer review between June 8, 2001, and August 29, 2001. She agreed with Respondent's staff regarding the adjustments to the procedure codes that corresponded with the level of service reflected in the medical records. When Dr. Agbunag returned the records to Respondent, Ms. Balbo calculated the monetary difference between the amount that Medicaid paid Petitioner for each claim and the amount that Medicaid should have paid based on Dr. Agbunag's review. The difference indicated that Respondent had overpaid Petitioner for claims that in whole or in part were not covered by Medicaid. Respondent sent Petitioner a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) dated December 27, 2001. The PAAR stated that Petitioner had been overpaid $54,595.14. The PAAR stated that Petitioner could furnish additional information or documentation that might serve to reduce the overpayment. Petitioner responded to the PAAR in a letter dated February 28, 2001. According to the letter, Petitioner challenged the preliminary determinations in the PAAR and advised that he was waiting on additional patient records from a certain hospital. In a letter dated June 30, 2002, Petitioner advised Respondent that he generally spends 15-20 minutes with his hospital inpatients. The letter does not refer to any additional hospital records. Petitioner's office manager sent Respondent a letter dated August 1, 2002. The letter discusses every service that Petitioner provided to the 30 patients during the audit period. Some of these services were not included in the random "cluster sample" because Medicaid had not paid for them during the audit period. According to the August 1, 2002, letter, Petitioner's office manager attached some of the patient records that Petitioner had not previously provided to Respondent. The additional documentation related to multiple claims involving several of Petitioner's hospital and office patients. Sometime after receiving the additional documentation, Dr. Agbunag conducted another peer review. She did not change her prior determination regarding the level of service as to any paid claim. In 2003, Vicki Remick, Respondent's investigator, reviewed the audit, the patient records, and all correspondence. Her review included, but was not limited to, the determination of the appropriate CPT code and amount of reimbursement, taking into consideration Medicaid policy and Dr. Agbunag's findings regarding medical necessity and the level of care for each paid claim. On or about October 1, 2003, Respondent issued the Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR). The FAAR informed Petitioner that he had been overpaid $39,055.34 for Medicaid claims that, in whole or in part, were not covered by Medicaid. The FAAR included a request for Petitioner to pay that amount for the overpayment. The FAAR concluded, as to some patients, that Petitioner's documentation did not support the CPT codes that Petitioner used to bill and that Respondent used to pay for services. Thus, Respondent "down graded" the billing code to a lesser amount. As a result, the difference between the amount paid and the amount that should have been paid was an overpayment. The FAAR also stated that Petitioner billed and received payment for some undocumented services. In each such instance, Respondent considered the entire amount paid as an overpayment. The FAAR indicated that Petitioner billed Medicaid for some services at acute care hospital psychiatric units without documenting the medical records as to the appropriate CPT codes and medical illness diagnosis codes. Respondent adjusted the payments for these services to the appropriate psychiatric CPT codes. According to the FAAR, Petitioner billed and received payment for services which only allowed one unit of service per claim line. For this audit, Respondent allowed charges for the additional units of service where Petitioner's documentation for the additional dates of service supported the services allowed by the peer reviewer. The FAAR stated that Petitioner billed for psychiatric services at an ACLF or an assisted living facility. Medicaid normally does not pay for such services. However, in this case, Respondent adjusted the claims to a domiciliary or custodial care visit. Sometime after Petitioner received the FAAR, Petitioner sent Respondent some additional patients' medical records. Some of the records were duplicates of documents that Petitioner previously had furnished to Respondent. Other records were for services that may have been provided during the audit period but which were not a part of the random sample because Medicaid did not pay for them during relevant time frame. Respondent requested Dr. James R. Edgar to conduct a second peer review of Petitioner's correspondence and patient records to determine the appropriate level of service. Respondent provided Dr. Edgar with a copy of the patients' medical records, a copy of Respondent's worksheets, including Dr. Agbunag's notes, and the appropriate policy handbooks. Respondent requested Dr. Edgar to make changes in the level of service as he deemed appropriate. Dr. Edgar performed his review between July 25, 2004, and July 29, 2004, making an independent determination regarding issues of medical necessity and level of care. Initially, as to every disputed paid claim, Dr. Edgar agreed with Dr. Agbunag that Petitioner's patient records were insufficient to justify the procedure code and higher level of service claimed by Petitioner. Specifically, Dr. Edgar presented persuasive evidence that a number of paid claims, which Petitioner billed under CPT codes 99215, 99223, 99232, 99233, and 99238, were properly adjusted to CPT code 90862. Petitioner was not entitled to bill at a higher level of reimbursement because he failed to adequately document as to history, examination, medical decision-making, and time. Dr. Edgar agreed that, upon reconsideration, Petitioner's claim for Recipient 14, date of service September 7, 1998, billed under CPT code 99238, was appropriate. As to Recipient 1, date of service March 9, 1999, Petitioner was not entitled to bill for services using CPT code 99255, initial inpatient consultation for a new or established patient. CPT code 99222, initial hospital care, per day, for the E/M of a new or established patient, was more appropriate because Petitioner provided the consultation for one of his established patients. His services included a comprehensive history, a comprehensive examination, and medical decision making of moderate complexity. An independent analysis of the selection of the random sample, the statistical formula used by Respondent, and the statistical calculation used to determine the overpayment, confirms the conclusions in the FAAR. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent properly extrapolated the results from the sample to the total population. Out of a population of 222 recipients and a population of 2,123 claims, 30 recipients selected at random with 282 paid claims capture most of the characteristics of the total population. In this case, the statistical evidence indicates that 29 of the 30 recipients had overpayments. The odds that 29 out of 30 randomly selected recipients would have overpayments, if no overpayments existed, are greater than the odds of winning the Florida Lotto Quick Pick three weeks in a row. In fact, within a statistical certainly, the amount claimed in this cause based on the records of 30 recipients is lower than the reimbursement amount that Petitioner would owe if all records were reviewed. Respondent incurred costs during the investigation of this matter. The amount of those costs was not known at the time of the formal hearing.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner owes Respondent for an overpayment in the amount of $39,055.34, less an adjustment for the September 7, 1998 claim for Recipient 14, plus interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan Levine, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Know Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Debora E. Fridie, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Station 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Carter, P.A. 117 South Gadsden Street Post Office Box 1049 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Is proposed rule 59G-3.010(4)(b)2.c. an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, for reasons described in the respective petitions that formed the basis of this dispute? See Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The party Florida Medical Association, Inc., a not for profit corporation is organized and maintained for the benefit of approximately 17,000 licensed physicians who are its members. It represents the common interests of those members. Some of its members provide services under the terms contemplated by proposed rule 59G-3.010(4)(b)2.c. Likewise, Robert Anthony Savona, D.O.; John F. Hull, D.O.; and Robert Kagan, M.D., as licensed physicians, provide services contemplated by a proposed rule 59G- 3.010(4)(b)2.c. Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state Medicaid Program under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396 et seq. and Section 409.901, et seq. Florida Statutes. This responsibility includes reimbursement of Medicaid providers. Respondent offered the proposed rule for adoption. The services contemplated by proposed rule 59G- 3.010(4)(b)2.c., in which the rule describes a payment mechanism, are in association with patients who are Medicare and Medicaid eligible. The arrangement contemplated by the proposed rule is in relation to Medicaid reimbursable services which complement Medicare. Under the proposed rule, Medicare Supplemental Insurance (Part B) is paid for the deductible and coinsurance for the Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipients by the Medicaid fiscal agent, in accordance with a rate identified in the proposed rule. The recipients of the services from physicians under the proposed rule, eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid benefits, are also referred to as Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs). QMBs are described as poor, elderly and disabled persons. In pertinent part the proposed rule states: 59G-3.010 Medicaid Services Complementing Medicare. * * * (4) Medicaid Reimbursable Services which Complement Medicare. * * * (b) Medicare Supplemental Insurance (Part B). * * * 2. The Medicare Part B deductible and coinsurance is paid for the Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipient by the Medicaid fiscal agent at the following rates: * * * c. Physician services, including doctors of medicine, doctors of osteopathy, and providers of chiropractic and podiatric services are reimbursed 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance only to the extent that the total payment received does not exceed the Medicaid fee for the service provided. If there is no comparable Medicaid fee for the service, the Medicaid fee is calculated to be 50 percent of the Medicare approved charge for the service provided. In these situations, whether the physician did or did not receive a payment from Medicaid, by billing Medicaid he is bound to the Medicaid payment schedule as payment in full. Other parts of proposed rule 59G-3.010(4)(b)2. at a., b., d., and e. address Medicare Part B deductibles and coinsurance for other providers as follows: Part B patient hospital services are reimbursed 100 percent of the deductible and coinsurance. Rural health centers, federally qualified health centers and county health departments are reimbursed their encounter rate minus the amount of Medicare's payment. * * * Pharmacy providers are reimbursed 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance only to the extent that the total payment does not exceed the Medicaid fee for the service provided. Other Part B suppliers are reimbursed 100 percent of the coinsurance and 100 percent of deductible. Under Medicare Part B, 80 percent of reasonable costs or charges for the delivery of health care to Medicare eligible patient is paid through the Medicare program as a premium. That program is administered by the federal government under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 1395 et seq. That payment is a form of insurance. The remaining 20 percent is anticipated to be paid by the patient as copayments or coinsurance, in addition to an annual deductible. The proposed rule in relation to physician services addresses the manner in which some portion of the 20 percent is "crossed-over" to be paid for potential payment through the Medicaid program administered by Respondent using federal and state funding, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 1396 et seq. and Section 409.901 et seq., Florida Statutes. Payment to the physicians for their services in relation to the deductible and coinsurance depends upon the application of the formula in the proposed rule. The formula contemplates reimbursement to the physicians at less than 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance because the Medicaid fee schedule is generally lower than the federal Medicare fee schedule for the same services. In fact, in most cases the physicians will receive no payment for the deductible or coinsurance above the 80 percent payment under the Medicare fee structure in relation to the basic Medicare premium. By comparison to other health care and service providers discussed in the proposed rule, some other individuals and entities are reimbursed at 100 percent of the deductible and coinsurance and others are not guaranteed reimbursement at 100 percent. The formulas for reimbursement for services provided under the proposed rule related to Medicare Part B deductible and coinsurance are influenced by the results of quarterly estimating conferences held between legislative and executive branch staff. Those estimators, within respective categories of services, examine the performance of the various categories of services concerning fiscal impact through a comparison of available revenues against expenditures. This assists in the preparation of future budgets upon the recommendation of the governor to be passed by the legislature. Respondent assists in preparation of budget requests, to include recommendation for policy changes related to the amount of expenditures for the various services performed for the benefit of Medicare and Medicaid eligible recipients, QMBs, who are entitled to the payment of their deductible and coinsurance under Medicare Part B. However, the impetus for the reimbursement formula for physician services described in the proposed rule has a more precise origin, for reasons now explained. A prior version of Rule 59G-3.010(4), Florida Administrative Code in effect on April 8, 1996, was challenged in an administrative proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings. That version limited the amount of reimbursement for physician services associated with Medicare Part B deductible and coinsurance in a different manner than the proposed rule. In the decision of Reynolds v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 18 F.A.L.R. 3474 (Fla. DOAH 1996) the rule was held invalid. Among the cases cited for this decision was Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Snider, 29 F.3d 886 (3d Cir. 1994) and Haynes Ambulance Service, Inc. v. State of Alabama, 36 F.3d 1974 (11th Cir. 1994). The federal court cases refer to the recipients of cost reimbursement for deductibles and coinsurance as QMBs. Essentially, they are the same persons who are described in the proposed rule as Medicare and Medicaid eligible. Although the rule had been declared invalid, Respondent continued to exercise the policy of denying payment of Medicare deductibles and coinsurance on physician crossover claims at 100 percent of the deductible and 100 percent of the coinsurance as contemplated by the federal court cases. Following Respondent's return to the policy of not paying the deductible and coinsurance at 100 percent for physician services, Petitioner's Savona, Hull, and Kagan brought a lawsuit in federal count to compel payment for physician services to QMBs at the Medicare rate. On March 3, 1997, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted a final injunction that required Respondents to pay the physician class in the lawsuit at the Medicare rate for services provided to QMBs. See Savona v. Cook, Case No. 4:96CV14-WS (N.D. Fla. 1997). After the decision in Savona, Respondent pursued a policy of paying the deductible and coinsurance at 100 percent of the Medicare rate. This policy lasted from March 3, 1997 until October 1, 1997. To facilitate the payment for physician services at 100 percent of the Medicare rate for the crossover claims related to the deductible and coinsurance, Respondent amended its state Medicaid plan, with the federal Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). In addition, Respondent sought an appropriation through the legislature to fund the increase in copayments to assure that physician services were reimbursed at 100 percent of the Medicare rate for the deductible and coinsurance. This led to the passage of Chapter 97-152, Laws of Florida, Item 248, the 1997-98 General Appropriations Act, which set aside monies from the General Revenue Fund and from the Medical Care Trust Fund, totaling $87 million for Medicare Part B copayment for reimbursement of physician services for the dually eligible recipients. This refers to recipients eligible for services under Medicare and Medicaid. The 1997-98 fiscal year for that appropriation began July 1, 1997, and continues until June 30, 1998. The amount appropriated has proven more than adequate to meet the copayment for physician services at the 100 percent Medicare rate. Another document, prepared by persons unknown, was associated with the appropriations process for 1997-98. That document is referred to as Respondent's Ex No. 1 and is entitled 1997-98 General Appropriations and Summary Statement of Intent. It sets out the exact language in Chapter 97-152, Laws of Florida, Item 248, related to the $87 million for full Medicare Part B copayment for physician services. It also sets out a summary statement of intent that is not found within the General Appropriations Act. The language in that summary statement of intent is as follows: It is the intent of the Legislature that the funds in Specific Appropriation 248 which are provided to pay the full Medicare part B co- payment for physician services to clients who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, be expended only to the extent currently required by federal law. In the event that changes in federal law relating to reimbursement for these services occurs, the Agency for Health Care Administration shall directly submit to the federal Health Care Financing Administration any amendments to the state Medicaid Plan which are necessary to realize cost savings options permitted by and in compliance with federal law. As anticipated by the summary statement of intent, federal law relating to reimbursement for physician services did change in August of 1997 when Congress enacted the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Section 4714. In pertinent part it stated: * * * (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), a State is not required to provide any payment for any expenses incurred relating to payment for deductibles, coinsurance or copayments for medicare cost-sharing to extent that payment under title XVIII for the service would exceed the payment amount that otherwise would be made under the State plan under this title for such service if provided to an eligible recipient other than a medicare beneficiary. That law became effective October 1, 1997. By its terms it created the option for states to reduce payments on crossover claims to the state Medicaid rate, although it did not mandate that outcome. The payment option created by the congressional enactment had application to all categories of providers. In view of the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Respondent decided to change its payment policy to disallow payment for physician services at the 100 percent Medicare rate in all instances for physician services related to the deductible and coinsurance for dually eligible recipients. The effective date of the change in policy was October 1, 1997, coinciding with the effective date of the Congressional Budget Act. Respondent implemented its policy change without the benefit of rule adoption. The failure to implement the payment policy by rule adoption was challenged in the case of Savona v. Agency for Health Care Administration, DOAH Case No. 97-5909RU (Fla. DOAH 1998). On January 16, 1998, Respondent gave notice of rule development, to include the preliminary text of the rule. For this reason, the February 12, 1998, order entered in DOAH Case No. 97-5909RU denied the petition for determination of invalidity of the non-rule policy brought in accordance with Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes. Consistent with its notice of rule development, Respondent published notice of proposed rulemaking pertaining to the rule under challenge here. That publication was made on February 13, 1998, through the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 24, No. 7. The specific authority for rule promulgation was Section 409.919, Florida Statutes, and the law to be implemented was Section 409.908, Florida Statutes. No mention was made of the summary statement of intent associated with the 1997-98 General Appropriations Act in Florida and the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The testimony of Richard T. Lutz, Director of the Division of State Health Purchasing, Agency for Health Care Administration, at hearing established his reliance upon those latter two items as authority for promulgating the proposed rule in relation to the copayment for physician services under Medicare Part B, for the deductible and coinsurance. Mr. Lutz was principally responsible for the promulgation of the rule as policymaker for the Respondent. In addressing the difference in the reimbursement policies for physician services, contrasted with other services detailed in the proposed rule, Mr. Lutz indicated that changes in relation to reimbursement policies, other than for physicians, would be the product of an estimating conference showing the financial impact of the changes, followed by a budget item to effect the changes. In the absence of that impetus, Mr. Lutz described that he had been instructed that the methodologies that were in place for various services under Medicare Part B utilizing established methodologies for the reimbursement practices would remain in effect. Unlike the circumstances existing in the proposed rule, for classes of providers other than physicians, Mr. Lutz in behalf of Respondent took the initiative in dealing with reimbursement for physicians care under Medicare Part B when promulgating the proposed rule. He concluded that the terms of the federal court order in Savona were subject to the language in the summary statement of intent, and with the advent of the Congressional Balanced Budget Act of 1997 Respondent was at liberty to change its reimbursement scheme for physician services effective October 1, 1997. In making the policy choice to promulgate the proposed rule, Mr. Lutz recognized the option which Florida had to either limit copayments or continue copayments at the Medicare rate for physician services under Medicare Part B. In promulgating the proposed rule Mr. Lutz identified that the Agency did not consider language in Section 409.908(13), Florida Statutes. He did indicate in his testimony the belief that the preamble to Section 409.908, Florida Statutes, creates authority for promulgation of the proposed rule in its comment about the Respondent's ability to make payments in accordance with methodologies that are set forth in its rules, manuals, and handbooks, consistent with limitations placed in the General Appropriations Act and any statement of legislative intent. Mr. Lutz in promulgating the proposed rule recognized that the physician services under Medicare Part B copayment for deductible and coinsurance would eventuate in no payment beyond the 80 percent premium in many instances. Although Mr. Lutz expresses the opinion that the proposed rule for payment of physician services under Medicare Part B has retroactive application to October 1, 1997, he acknowledges that the language in the proposed rule makes no reference to its retroactivity to that date.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner received a Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $11,077.65 for claims filed between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of its duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner is a licensed chiropractor in the State of Florida. His Medicaid provider number is No. 3801578-00. At all times relevant here, Petitioner provided services to Medicaid patients pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement. Therefore, Respondent was subject to all statutes, rules, and policy guidelines that govern Medicaid providers. Specifically, Petitioner was required to follow the guidelines set forth in the Medicaid Coverage and Limitation Handbook and the Medicaid Reimbursement Handbook. Additionally, Petitioner was required to maintain all "Medicaid-related records" that supported his Medicaid invoices and claims and to furnish those records to Respondent upon request. In 1997 and until April 1998, Petitioner's advertisement in the yellow pages of the Panama City, Florida, telephone book invited the public to make an appointment for a "free spinal exam," which specifically included two X-rays, if medically necessary. The advertisement indicated that Petitioner's office accepted patients with major medical insurance, workers' compensation insurance, and Medicare and Medicaid coverage. The advertisement did not specifically exclude Medicare and Medicaid patients, but specifically stated that the free spinal exam did not include further examination, treatment, or workers' compensation and personal injury cases. However, Petitioner's subsequent advertisements in the telephone book specifically included Medicaid as a type of case that Petitioner excluded from the offer of free services. The original and subsequent advertisements further stated as follows: Our office policy: The patient and any other person responsible for payment has the right to cancel payment, or be reimbursed for payment for any other service, exam, or treatment which is performed as a result of and within 72 hours of responding to the ad for the free service, exam or treatment. ($99.00 value) Respondent's investigator, Julie Canfield-Buddin, saw the advertisement excluding Medicaid patients as recipients of the free services. After confirming that Petitioner was a Medicaid provider, Ms. Canfield-Buddin performed an audit of Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims between April 15, 1998, and December 31, 2001. The audit revealed that Petitioner had not provided the advertised free services to Medicaid patients. In other words, Petitioner had received Medicaid reimbursements for initial office visits and X-rays of new patients who were Medicaid eligible. Petitioner received reimbursements for these services even though Medicaid policy prohibits payments to providers for services that are given to non-Medicaid patients free of charge. In April 2002, Respondent sent Petitioner a preliminary audit report. The preliminary report indicated that for the period beginning April 15, 1998, up to and including December 31, 2001, Petitioner had received $13,522.02 for certain claims that were not covered by Medicaid. The report included a request for Petitioner to send Respondent that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. After receiving the preliminary report, Petitioner's office contacted Ms. Canfield-Buddin, stating that Petitioner had some issues with the denied claims. Ms. Canfield-Buddin responded that Petitioner should state his concerns in writing and furnish Respondent with any additional medical documentation that would serve to reduce the overpayment. Petitioner sent Ms. Canfield-Buddin a letter dated April 25, 2002. Petitioner did not send Respondent any additional medical documentation with the letter to substantiate his position regarding the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner did not provide Respondent with any written office policy that delineated any difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients. In a final audit report dated May 9, 2002, Respondent informed Petitioner that he had been overpaid $13,522.02 for Medicaid claims that, in whole or in part, were not covered by Medicaid. The final audit report included a request for Petitioner to pay that amount for the Medicaid overpayment. Ms. Canfield-Buddin subsequently received a telephone call from Petitioner's office on May 30, 2002. She received Petitioner's written request for a formal administrative hearing on June 3, 2002. After receiving Petitioner's request for a hearing, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reviewed Petitioner's account statements that related to the Medicaid overpayments. Based on that review, Ms. Canfield-Buddin reduced the amount of overpayment to $11,077.65. The revised overpayment reversed denied charges for X-rays of Medicaid patients in excess of the two X-rays that should have been provided free of charge pursuant to the offer for free services. For example, Petitioner was reimbursed for services provided to B.A. on August 10, 2001. These charges included an initial office visit under the Current Procedures Terminology (CPT) code 99203, two X-rays under the CPT code 7240, two X-rays under the CPT code 72072, and two or three X-rays under the CPT code 72100. The final audit denied reimbursement for all charges except the two or three X-rays under CPT code 72100. The revised overpayment reversed the denied charges for two X-rays under the CPT code 72070. The end result was that Respondent denied Petitioner reimbursement only for the initial office visit and two X-rays that ordinarily would have been provided free to non-Medicaid patients. Medicaid allows reimbursement for services equal to the lesser of the Medicaid fee or the provider's usual and customary charge. Petitioner's advertisement offered free services to the public at large with certain exceptions. Petitioner cannot exclude Medicaid patients from that offer by also excluding patients with personal injury or workers' compensation claims. All patients who are not Medicaid eligible are non-Medicaid patients regardless of their payment source. Just because Petitioner excludes free services to non-Medicaid patients with personal injury and workers' compensation claims, does not mean that he can deny those free services to Medicaid patients when his usual and customary practice is to provide the services free to non-Medicaid patients. Some of the denied charges at issue here allegedly involve spinal manipulations that Petitioner claims he performed on Medicaid patients during their initial office visits. Medicaid reimbursement policy requires a spinal manipulation performed during an initial office visit under a 99203 CPT code for a new patient visit to be included as part of the examination conducted during that visit. Medicaid does not allow Petitioner to be separately reimbursed for a spinal manipulation performed on the same day of service as an initial office visit. Petitioner did not include more than two X-rays or any spinal manipulations in his offer of free services for any patient. When a patient has an initial office visit in response to Petitioner's offer of free services, Petitioner first takes the patient's history, performs an examination, and reviews the first two free X-rays. Depending on the results of the evaluation, Petitioner may or may not advise the patient that additional X-rays and/or a spinal manipulation are medically necessary. Petitioner then allows the patient to arrange for payment of those services with his office staff. If the patient is non-Medicaid eligible and is able to pay for services, Petitioner proceeds to take the additional X-rays and/or to perform the spinal manipulation immediately or during a subsequent visit with payment due as arranged. If a non-Medicaid patient requires subsequent examinations during the course of treatment, Petitioner bills the patient or his or her insurance carrier for those services. If the patient is Medicaid eligible, Petitioner may either proceed with taking the X-rays and/or performing the spinal examination immediately, knowing that he will not be separately reimbursed for the spinal manipulation, or make an appointment for the Medicaid patient to return on another day so that he can be reimbursed for the spinal manipulation. In any event, Medicaid regulations do not allow reimbursement for further examinations within a three-year period. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that some of the denied charges for initial office visits under the CPT code 99203 included spinal manipulations that he never intended to be free and that he did not provide spinal manipulations as a free service to non-Medicaid patients. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not credited for two reasons. First, he did not produce any medical documentation to support his testimony as to any Medicaid patient receiving a spinal manipulation during an initial office visit. Second, he did not identify any such patient during his testimony. Respondent performs Medicaid audits after a provider renders services. Therefore, it is essential for providers like Petitioner, who contest denied claims, to be able to substantiate their billing with appropriate documentation. Such documentation must be created at the time of service, maintained pursuant to statutory and rule requirements, and furnished to Respondent upon request. Petitioner never responded to Ms. Canfield-Buddin's request for medical documentation to substantiate Petitioner's challenge to the denied claims. Additionally, Petitioner testified that the services he performed for some Medicaid patients were not equivalent to the free services he performed for non-Medicaid patients because they often involved a higher level of service, including additional services, tests, or examinations. According to Petitioner, some of the Medicaid patients required more extensive screening and counseling that consumed more of Petitioner's time. Despite this testimony, Petitioner admitted that the histories he took of Medicaid patients and non-Medicaid patients were basically the same. Petitioner testified that the difference in the level of service provided to all patients varied based upon the individual patients and did not depend on whether they were or were not Medicaid patients. He had no written or unwritten guidelines or policies that limited the scope of screening or level of service in an initial office visit for either type of patient. Petitioner's testimony that the level of services provided to Medicaid patients differed from the level of services offered to non-Medicaid patients is not persuasive. Once again, Petitioner failed to provide the required medical documentation to support his testimony or to identify in his testimony Medicaid patients who required a higher level of service. Moreover, Petitioner knew, when he made his offer of free services, that he would not be able to claim reimbursement for services provided to Medicaid patients that were not separately reimbursable even if Petitioner was entitled to exclude Medicaid patients from the offer. This includes cases where a Medicaid patient may have required a high level of service in terms of the time expended during the screening or a spinal manipulation during the initial office visit. Petitioner provides free services to members of his family. The provision of free services to family does not establish that Petitioner had a usual and customary practice of providing free services. At times, Petitioner treats police officers and indigent persons free of charge. However, Petitioner does not publicly advertise that he treats these patients free of charge because he does not want to be overrun with people taking advantage of the offer. There is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner routinely treats police officers covered by private health insurance and indigent patients covered by Medicaid free of charge. Therefore, it cannot be said that Petitioner's usual and customary practice is to furnish services to these patients free of charge. A Medicaid provider is allowed to use the CPT code 99203 for a new patient visit once per recipient every three years. Petitioner's offer of free services for non-Medicaid patients allows them one free office visit and two free X-rays regardless of the passage of time. According to Petitioner, this means that Respondent's interpretation of Medicare regulations would entitle a Medicaid patient to the free services every three years whereas a non-Medicaid patient would not be so entitled, showing yet another difference in the services provided to Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients under the offer of free services. However, Petitioner's testimony in this regard is not persuasive because it is not based on medical documentation or testimony showing that Petitioner ever treated a Medicaid patient as a new patient more than once.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order determining that Petitioner owes $11,077.65 for Medicaid reimbursement overpayments. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony L. Conticello, Esquire Grant P. Dearborn, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Hal Cowen ChiroNetwork Health Care Centers 127 West 23rd Panama City, Florida 32405 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency or Petitioner) is entitled to recover from Ideal Pugh, Sr., d/b/a Services on Time, LLC (Respondent), alleged Medicaid overpayments, administrative fines, and investigative, legal, and expert witness costs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order requiring Respondent, Ideal Pugh, Sr., d/b/a Services on Time, LLC: To repay the sum of $563,073.76, for overpayments on claims that did not comply with the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; To pay interest on the sum of $563,073.76 at the rate of ten percent per annum from the date of the overpayment determination; To pay a fine of $1,000 for failure to furnish all Medicaid-related records within the requested timeframe; To pay a fine of $1,500 for violations of the requirements of Medicaid laws, rules, and provider handbooks; and To pay allowable costs pursuant to subsection 409.913(23)(a), Florida Statutes. If a disputed issue of material fact arises regarding the appropriate amount of those costs, the matter may be referred back to DOAH for a further recommendation regarding costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2012.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent was overpaid $312,773.67 for claims which, according to Petitioner, did not comply with Medicaid requirements.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") is the state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program ("Medicaid"). At all relevant times, Respondent has been a Home and Community Based (HCB) Medicaid provider that is authorized to receive reimbursement for covered services rendered to Medicaid recipients. Developmental Disability Home and Community Based Services Waiver Program The alleged overpayment in this case relates to services Respondent provided through the Medicaid Developmental Disability Home and Community Based Waiver Program ("the Program"). As explained during Ms. Olmstead's final hearing testimony, the Program was established to help developmentally- disabled individuals remain in their homes or home-like settings within the community, as opposed to institutions such as nursing homes or intermediate care facilities. Medicaid recipients that desire to receive services through the Program undergo an initial evaluation performed by a waiver support coordinator. The support coordinator is a Medicaid provider that is selected by the Medicaid recipient or his or her guardian. To determine the services needed by the recipient to remain in the home, the support coordinator assesses the recipient by conducting an in-home visit. Upon completion of this initial assessment, the support coordinator formulates a "support plan," a document which describes the recipient's personality, likes, dislikes, strengths, and weaknesses, as well as the recipient's existing support system, such as family, friends, and neighbors. In addition, the support plan details the services the recipient needs to stay in the home and identifies who will provide the services. The expected costs of the proposed services are described on a form titled "cost plan," which, combined with the support plan, comprise the plan of care for the recipient. The support coordinator is required to submit the plan of care, as detailed in the support plan and cost plan, to the Department of Children and Families ("DCF"). If the plan of care is approved, DCF staff will create a "service authorization form." This form, which the support coordinator forwards to the service provider, describes the services to be rendered, as well as the duration and frequency of each service. Without the service authorization form, a provider cannot be assured payment from Medicaid. At least one time per year, the support coordinator must assess the recipient's needs, complete updated support and cost plans, and submit the updated plans for approval. If the updated plan of care is approved, DCF will draft a new service authorization form, which is forwarded to the provider by the support coordinator, along with copy of pertinent support plan information. Should the recipient's services or support require modification, the support coordinator is required to update the cost report and submit it for approval. Communication between the support coordinator and providers such as Respondent is encouraged, as the support coordinator reviews with the provider the goals to be achieved for the recipient. A service provider is expected to assist in establishing support plan outcomes for a recipient's goals and participate in the personal outcome process. Moreover, a service provider expressly consents to such communication by virtue of the provider's contract with Medicaid, which includes an agreement to participate in discussions with the support coordinator on matters such as a recipient's progress, the extent to which a recipient's needs are being met, and modifications to the recipient's support plan. The Preliminary Audit and Final Audit Exercising its statutory authority to oversee the integrity of Medicaid, Petitioner conducted a review or audit of Respondent's records to verify that claims paid by Medicaid during the period from January 1, 2003, through December 31, 2004 (the "audit period"), were billed and paid in accordance with Medicaid statutes, rules, and policies. As the average number of claims per recipient during the audit period was substantial, Petitioner utilized "two stage cluster sampling." This first stage involved a random selection of 34 receipts for whom Respondent submitted claims during the audit period. Next, from those 34 recipients, a total of 255 claims was randomly selected. On October 7, 2005, AHCA requested that Respondent provide "the documentation for services paid by the Florida Medicaid Program" in connection with the 255 claims that comprised the random sample. On or about October 21, 2005, Respondent submitted 37 packages of documents in response to Petitioner's request. Respondent also executed an affidavit which alleged that the documents were true and correct copies, and that the records were made at or near the time that the services were rendered. The documents submitted by Respondent were initially examined by Ms. Effie Green, a program analyst employed by Petitioner. Ms. Green immediately noticed that the records from at least some of the packages were covered in dust with a crystal-like appearance. Law enforcement officers called to the scene ultimately determined that the substance was harmless. There is no evidence that any of the records were tampered with or removed from Petitioner's offices during the investigation. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the documents remained in Ms. Green's office until the dust was analyzed. Following the events described above, the audit of Respondent's records was delayed for approximately one year while an appeal, which involved a different Medicaid provider, was completed. The appeal, which was resolved in AHCA's favor, concerned the validity of the statistical formula utilized in calculating probable Medicaid overpayments.4 The responsibility of reviewing the documents provided by Respondent was later transferred to Ms. Robin Satchell, an investigator employed by Petitioner in the Bureau of Program Integrity. Prior to her employment with AHCA, Ms. Satchell worked for eight years as an HCB Medicaid provider. Ms. Satchell fully reviewed the records previously submitted on October 20, 2005, and also examined additional records subsequently provided by Respondent to verify that the claims paid during the audit period were billed and paid in accordance with Medicaid statutes, rules, and policies. Rules applicable to the claims reviewed in this case are enumerated in the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, and include: Only those services that have been identified in a recipient's plan of care and which have been approved and authorized prior to delivery are covered. Providers are limited to the amount, duration, and scope of the services described on the recipient's support plan and current approved cost plan. Only those services that are medically necessary are covered. Services furnished through the developmental disability waiver program are deemed to be medically necessary only if certain elements are present, including but not limited to the following: the service is not in excess of the recipient's needs; and, the service is furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caregiver, or the provider. In order to receive payment for services, the provider must document the service appropriately. Documentation is a written record that supports the fact that a service has been rendered. Depending upon the particular service provided (e.g., Personal Care Assistance, Homemaker Services, Chore Services), the documentation requirements may vary and are detailed in the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. On May 24, 2007, AHCA issued a Final Agency Audit Report, which alleged that Respondent was overpaid $1,647,960.81 during the audit period for services that were not covered by Medicaid. Following the issuance of the Final Agency Audit Report, and as announced at the outset of the final hearing in his matter, Petitioner now alleges that Respondent was overpaid $312,773.26. The manner in which AHCA reached the alleged overpayment of $312,773.67 is as follows: of the 255 claims examined by Ms. Satchell, 197 were allowed.5 Ms. Satchell made downward adjustments to 52 claims, and 6 were denied outright. Based upon the adjustments and denials, Ms. Satchell concluded that Respondent had received $1,287.26 in reimbursement of claims in the sample for services not covered by Medicaid, either in whole or in part. Having discovered this "empirical overpayment" of $1,287.26, AHCA employed a statistical formula to ascertain the "probable total overpayment" that Respondent received from Medicaid in connection with the total number of claims made during the Audit Period.6 As noted above, Petitioner contends that the "probable total overpayment" is $312,773.67. In her Proposed Recommended Order, Respondent asserts that with respect to the entire sample of claims, only one instance of incorrect billing occurred. In particular, Respondent concedes that that services provided to Recipient number 24 on September 2, 2003, were inadvertently overbilled in the amount of $0.96. Respondent disputes the remaining 51 downward adjustments and six outright denials, which are discussed separately below by recipient.7 Recipient No. 1 The support plan for this recipient authorized Personal Care Assistance, which is described in the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook as follows: service that assists a beneficiary with eating and meal preparation, bathing, dressing, personal hygiene, and activities of daily living. The service also includes activities such as assistance with meal preparation, bed marking and vacuuming when these activities are essential to the health and welfare of the beneficiary and when no one else is available to perform them . . . . Personal Care Assistance is limited to the amount, duration and scope of the services described in the beneficiaries [sic] support plan and current approved cost plan.[8] (Emphasis added). The support plan indicates that this recipient lived with his mother and three siblings, all but one of whom were capable of completing homemaker tasks. AHCA alleges that of the five claims examined during the audit, one is problematic. In particular, AHCA contends that six of the activities performed on November 12, 2004, constituted unauthorized homemaker tasks, and therefore overbilling occurred in the amount of $12.90. According to AHCA, the unauthorized activities included organizing clothes, cleaning the kitchen, washing dishes, cleaning tables, cleaning the living room, and washing laundry. The undersigned finds that four of the six activities were unauthorized homemaker tasks: organizing clothes, cleaning the living room, washing laundry, and cleaning tables. The undersigned cannot agree, however, that Respondent inappropriately billed for washing dishes and cleaning the kitchen. Notably, and as demonstrated by the service log, meal preparation was one of the services provided to the recipient on November 12, 2004. There is no allegation that meal preparation was unauthorized, and the various exhibits submitted by AHCA plainly reveal that the service was appropriate (i.e., meal preparation was not included in AHCA's list of unauthorized activities for that date). In the undersigned's judgment, if a service provider is authorized to cook a meal for a beneficiary, it necessarily follows that the provider be permitted, and indeed expected, to wash the dishes and clean the kitchen. The undersigned's conclusion that Respondent appropriately billed for cleaning the kitchen and washing dishes is supported by the notes made by Ms. Satchell in one of AHCA's exhibits. In particular, page 3 of Petitioner's Exhibit H indicates that with respect to the October 17, 2004, services provided to Recipient No. 6 (who likewise received Personal Care Assistance), one unit of service was deducted for cleaning the kitchen because there was "no meal prep that day." The obvious implication of this notation is that cleaning the kitchen would not have been considered improper if a meal had been prepared. As Respondent was authorized to prepare a meal for the recipient on November 12, 2004, Respondent properly billed for the services of washing the dishes and cleaning the kitchen. Accordingly, the $12.90 alleged overpayment should be adjusted, as only four unauthorized activities (organizing clothes, cleaning the living room, washing laundry, and cleaning tables) were billed. Recipient No. 3 The service authorization for Recipient No. 3 provided for four hours of Homemaker Services per week. The service authorization further indicated that the Homemaker Services were intended to achieve the support plan goal of providing "the beneficiary with [a] clean environment. General household activities, such meal [sic] preparation, vacuuming, and routine cleaning." It appears from the support plan that the Homemaker Services were authorized due to the poor health of the recipient's mother. Homemaker Services are defined in the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook as follows: Homemaker services are those general household activities such as meal preparation, laundry, vacuuming and routine household cleaning provided by a trained homemaker, when the person who usually handles these tasks is unable to perform them. The intent of this service is to ensure that the beneficiary's home environment remains clean, safe, and sanitary. Homemaker services are provided only when there is no one else capable of accomplishing the household tasks . . . . * * * Homemaker services shall be provided in the beneficiary's own home or family home. This service is available in the family home only when there is documentation as to why the family cannot provide the support If approved, homemaker services will be limited to the beneficiary's primary living areas such as bedroom and bathroom. This includes the kitchen and a common area, if regularly utilized by the beneficiary. (Emphasis added). On December 11, 2004, Respondent provided four hours of Homemaker Services, which were billed in the amount of $59.20. AHCA concedes that nine of the services provided on December 11, 2004, were authorized and therefore appropriately billed: making the bed; changing the bed sheets; throwing garbage away; cleaning the room; organizing the room; organizing the clothes; cleaning the bathroom; changing the towels; organizing the bathroom; vacuuming; cleaning the rugs; and meal preparation. However, AHCA contends that ten other activities provided on December 11, 2004, were unauthorized: cleaning the kitchen; washing the dishes; cleaning the tables; cleaning / organizing the cabinets; cleaning the stove; cleaning the refrigerator; cleaning the living room; washing laundry; ironing; and cleaning windows. It is evident from Ms. Satchell's notes (in the "MPI worksheet") that she found these tasks unnecessary because they occurred "outside of recipient's bedroom / bathroom."9 As a consequence, Ms. Satchell concluded that Respondent was overpaid for one hour of services in the amount of $14.80 Once again, the undersigned cannot agree that Respondent inappropriately billed for cleaning the kitchen, washing dishes, and cleaning the stove. Cooking was permitted by the service authorization, and there is no allegation that Respondent should not have billed for the meal that was prepared for the recipient on December 11, 2004. If a provider is authorized to prepare a meal, it is only logical that he or she clean up afterward and bill for the time. Nor can the undersigned agree that Respondent should not have billed for cleaning the living room, tables, windows, and refrigerator. These four activities plainly fall within the services contemplated by the service authorization, which directed Respondent to provide "the beneficiary with [a] clean environment" and carry out "general household activities . . . such as routine cleaning." Moreover, these activities are comparable to "cleaning rugs," an activity performed on the same date that was not alleged to be improper. Although, as AHCA point out, these activities may have occurred outside of the recipient's bedroom and bathroom, that fact is not controlling, as the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook provides that Homemaker Services extend to "the kitchen and a common area, if regularly utilized by the beneficiary."10 The undersigned also finds that washing laundry was not an unauthorized activity, as it falls within the definition homemaker services. Further, in light of the recipient's incontinence, washing laundry is obviously essential to achieving the support plan goal of providing "the beneficiary with [a] clean environment." The undersigned does agree with AHCA that ironing and "cleaning / organizing cabinets" were unauthorized because these activities were not related to the support plan goals. Based on the findings herein that only two of the activities were unauthorized (ironing and "cleaning / organizing" cabinets), an adjustment should be made to the alleged overpayment of $14.80. Recipient No. 6 This recipient was authorized to receive six hours of Personal Care Assistance per day. Pursuant to the support plan, Respondent was authorized to provide bathing, dressing and eating assistance to the recipient. On October 17, 2004, Respondent provided six hours of services to the recipient, at a cost of $120.96. AHCA alleges, correctly, that one of the services provided on that date, cleaning the kitchen, was unauthorized because the service documentation provided by Respondent reflects that no meal was prepared. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Respondent was overpaid $5.04. Although Respondent has suggested that cleaning the kitchen may have been necessary due to the recipient (who is incontinent) defecating on the kitchen floor, no documentation has been provided that would support such a finding. In the absence of appropriate documentation, AHCA appropriately found that an adjustment of one unit was required for the October 17, 2004, services. Respondent also provided six hours of services to the recipient on November 26, 2004, at a cost of $120.96. With respect to this date, AHCA contends, and the undersigned agrees, that overbilling for one unit in the amount of $5.04 occurred, as one of the activities performed, "organizing clothes," constituted an unauthorized homemaker service. For the reasons expressed above, AHCA demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence overbilling totaling $10.08 with respect to this recipient. Recipient No. 7 This recipient was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance. Significantly, the recipient's support plan clearly indicated that her mother prepared meals for her. The service logs indicate that Respondent provided four hours of services to the recipient on the following dates: September 4 and November 25, 2003, and February 10 and April 26, 2004. AHCA contends that on each of the four dates listed above, Respondent provided the unauthorized service of meal preparation, and as a result, Respondent was overpaid a total of $18.68. As the recipient's support plan clearly indicated that meals were prepared by a parent, AHCA has demonstrated an overpayment of $18.68 by a preponderance of the evidence. Recipient No. 8 Recipient No. 8 was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance and Companion Services, both of which were provided by Respondent. AHCA alleges that of the eleven claims reviewed pursuant to the audit, two were problematic. Specifically, AHCA contends the service logs associated with the personal care assistance provided on October 26 and November 19, 2004, were obvious photocopies of Respondent's service log from March of 2004 for the same recipient. Accordingly, AHCA asserts that the records submitted by Respondent in connection with the October 26 and November 19 services were not contemporaneous and therefore inadequate. As no contemporaneous records document the services provided on October 26 and November 19, 2004, AHCA contends that Respondent was overpaid $275.20 ($137.60 for each of the dates). The undersigned has examined the service logs for October and November 2004 for this recipient and finds that they do not constitute contemporaneous records. As such, Respondent was overpaid in the amount alleged by AHCA. Recipient No. 9 This recipient was authorized to receive Homemaker Services. AHCA alleges, and the undersigned agrees, that of the five claims audited, two involved overpayments. In particular, Respondent's service log reveals that on April 29, 2003, the unauthorized activity of "shopping" was performed. As such, Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $3.70. Further, Respondent's service log indicates that on January 7, 2004, homemaker activities were provided from 9:00 a.m. through 11:00 a.m., which included shopping and meal preparation. As noted above, shopping is an unauthorized activity. In addition, the support plan indicates that the recipient's mother was responsible for preparing meals. Accordingly, an overpayment of $3.70 occurred with respect to this date of service. For these reasons, AHCA has demonstrated a total overpayment of $7.40 in connection with this recipient. Recipient No. 10 Recipient No. 10 was authorized to receive Companion Services, which, pursuant to the support plan, were intended to help the recipient "continue to be exposed to different options in the community." AHCA contends that two of the five claims examined during the audit are problematic. First, with respect to the July 29, 2003, claim, Respondent provided no documentation to support the $49.44 billed for the four hours of service. As such, AHCA correctly determined that Respondent was overpaid in that amount. In addition, AHCA properly found that Respondent was overpaid $3.70 in connection with the September 26, 2003, services. Specifically, the service log indicates that a meal was prepared, which is an activity unrelated to the specific goals identified in the support plan. Based on the above findings, Respondent was overpaid a total of $53.14 with respect to this recipient. Recipient No. 12 Recipient No. 12 was authorized to receive eight hours of Companion Services per week. Pursuant to the support plan and service authorization, the services were intended to help the recipient be "socially active in the community." The support plan further indicated that the recipient was able to "clean her room, clean the bathroom . . . wash dishes and help her mother with chores." AHCA correctly alleges that of the five claims examined, three involved overpayments. First, for the 32 units of service provided on December 28, 2003, Respondent was overpaid $3.70 because the service log indicates that dishwashing was provided. This was obviously inappropriate because, as noted above, the support plan expressly provided that the recipient was capable of washing dishes. Next, Respondent's service log indicates that dishwashing was performed for the recipient on April 24, 2004. As such, Respondent was overpaid $3.70. An overpayment of $3.70 was also proven in connection with the July 3, 2004, services, as the service log demonstrates that the unauthorized activities of dishwashing and "organizing the bathroom" were performed. For these reasons, AHCA appropriately determined that Respondent was overpaid in the total amount of $11.10 for the services provided to this recipient during the audit period. Recipient No. 17 This recipient was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance and Homemaker Services. Of the twelve claims reviewed concerning this recipient, AHCA alleges that only the November 11, 2004, services are problematic. In particular, a review of the service logs demonstrates that seven activities billed as homemaker services for November 11, 2004, were also provided and billed as personal care assistance for the same date. Based upon this unauthorized duplication of services, AHCA has proven that an overpayment of $14.80 occurred. Recipient No. 18 This recipient was authorized to receive forty hours of Personal Care Assistance per week. According to the support plan, the recipient lived alone with her father (who worked full time) and had little contact with her mother, who lived "far away" and visited only occasionally on weekends. The support plan further provided that the personal care assistance was intended to provide assistance with "bathing, dressing, grooming, food preparation, feeding, and transportation to . . . therapy." AHCA determined, following a review of the service logs and other documentation, that Respondent was overpaid in connection with two of the seven claims reviewed during the audit. First, AHCA alleges that Respondent was overpaid $7.72 by performing unauthorized homemaker tasks on September 19, 2003, which included shopping, washing dishes (although no meal was prepared), and assisting with household activities that would not typically be completed by an eight-year-old child. The undersigned agrees that the activities identified by AHCA in connection with the services rendered on September 19, 2003, were unauthorized, and that Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $7.72. AHCA also contends that Respondent was overpaid $7.72 in connection with the services provided on February 27, 2004. Specifically, AHCA asserts that three of the activities (shopping, laundry, and washing dishes) were unauthorized homemaker tasks. It is critical to note that in contrast to the services provided on September 19, 2003, the provider prepared a meal (as authorized by the support plan) for the recipient on February 27, 2004. As such, and for the reasons expressed previously in this Recommended Order, dishwashing should not be deemed an unauthorized activity. However, the undersigned concludes that shopping and laundry, the other two questionable activities performed on February 27, 2004, were indeed unauthorized. In light of the undersigned's finding that meal preparation was not an unauthorized activity, AHCA should make an appropriate adjustment to the February 27, 2004, overpayment. Recipient No. 19 Of the eight claims examined for Recipient No. 19, who was authorized to receive Companion Services, AHCA found fault with only one. In particular, AHCA determined that of the $59.20 billed on November 26, 2004, Respondent was overpaid $3.70 by performing the unauthorized homemaker activity of "organizing bathroom." The undersigned agrees with AHCA's finding, as organizing the recipient's bathroom is a homemaker activity that does not fall within the ambit of companion services. As such, an overpayment of $3.70 occurred. Recipient No. 20 This recipient was authorized to receive twenty hours of Companion Services per week, which were typically provided in four hour blocks from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Companion Services are defined in the Florida Medicaid Developmental Services Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook as follows: Companion services consist of non-medical care, supervision, and socialization activities provided to an adult on a one-on- one basis. This service must be provided in direct relation to the achievement of the beneficiary's goals per his or her support plan. A companion provider may also assist the beneficiary with such tasks as meal preparation, laundry and shopping . . . . Providers may also perform light housekeeping tasks, incidental to the care and supervision of the beneficiary. (Emphasis added). Significantly, the support plan expressly provided that the recipient "receive[d] assistance from her companion in some house chores, like cleaning the kitchen and meal preparation to avoid risky situations in the kitchen." (Emphasis added). AHCA contends that overpayments occurred with respect to four of the five claims audited. First, AHCA alleges that with regard to the November 11, 2003, services, Respondent was overpaid $3.70 by performing the unauthorized activity of "light housekeeping." The undersigned cannot agree, as the support plan plainly allowed the provider to assist the recipient with "some house chores," which is indistinguishable from "light housekeeping." Further, and as noted above, companion services may include "light housekeeping tasks, incidental to the care and supervision of the beneficiary." The service log for November 11, 2003, demonstrates that supervision was provided to the recipient. Accordingly, Respondent did not overbill in the amount of $3.70 for this date of service. Next, AHCA contends that with respect to the services provided on December 10, 2003 (which included non-medical care, supervision, shopping, and "goals and support plan assistant"), one activity was unauthorized: meal preparation. As such, AHCA alleges that an overpayment of $3.70 occurred. The undersigned concludes, based on the unambiguous language of the support plan, that meal preparation was authorized. As detailed above, the recipient "receive[d] assistance from her companion in some house chores, like cleaning the kitchen and meal preparation to avoid risky situations in the kitchen." (Emphasis added). Accordingly, an overpayment of $3.70 did not occur with respect to the December 10, 2003, services. Turning to the services provided on May 6, 2004, AHCA contends that the unauthorized activity of washing laundry resulted in an overbilling of $3.70. As referenced in the definition of companion services previously quoted, laundry may only be performed "in direct relation to the achievement of the beneficiary's goals per his or her support plan." In this instance, the documentation submitted by Respondent fails to make such a showing. As a result, AHCA correctly found that $3.70 was overbilled for this date. Finally, with respect to the May 12, 2004, services, AHCA alleges that Respondent was overpaid $3.70 for the unauthorized activity of "dishwashing." The undersigned does not agree that dishwashing was unauthorized, since the support plan contemplated that the recipient would receive assistance from a "companion in some house chores, like cleaning the kitchen." As washing dishes is integral to the process of cleaning a kitchen, Respondent was not overpaid in connection with this date of service. Based on the above findings, the total overbilling for this recipient was $3.70, which related to the May 6, 2004, services. Respondent was not overpaid in connection with the services provided on November 11 and December 10, 2003, and May 12, 2004. Recipient No. 21 This recipient was authorized to receive 20 hours of Personal Care Assistance per week, which was typically provided from 2:00 p.m. through 6:00 p.m. The support plan for this recipient, who is incontinent, reads in relevant part as follows: Food requires modification. Food needs to be blend [sic] or puree [sic] at all times to avoid choking . . . . [Recipient] arrives home around 2:00 p.m. Personal Care service changes her diaper. Then she prepares her a snack. She is [sic] assists with eating. AHCA contends that Respondent was overpaid in connection with three of the four dates of service examined during the audit. First, with respect to the services provided on April 14, 2004, AHCA asserts that two unauthorized activities were performed (organizing clothes and performing a massage), which resulted in overbilling of $3.86. Having reviewed the support plan carefully, the undersigned agrees that these activities were unauthorized and that an overpayment occurred in the amount alleged. Turning to the services provided on October 14, 2004, AHCA alleges that five unauthorized activities (providing a massage, washing dishes, changing sheets, organizing the bathroom, and cleaning a table) resulted in overbilling of $11.58. The undersigned concurs with AHCA's assertion that the activities of "massage," change sheets, organize bathroom, and clean table were unauthorized. However, overbilling did not occur for washing dishes, as the service log reveals that a meal was prepared for the recipient on October 14, 2004, an activity that was expressly authorized by the support plan. As meal preparation was permitted, washing the dishes constituted a permissible activity. In light of the above findings, AHCA should make an appropriate adjustment to the overpayment associated with the October 14, 2004, services. Finally, AHCA contends that with regard to the December 24, 2004, services, Respondent was overpaid $7.72 by providing four unauthorized activities: performing a massage, making the bed, changing towels, and cleaning the living room. The undersigned agrees that these activities were not approved and that an overpayment occurred in the amount alleged. Recipient No. 23 Recipient No. 23 was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance, which was typically provided multiple times each week for eight hours. AHCA contends that Respondent was overpaid in connection with eight of the nine claims examined during the audit. Six of the claims involve identical issues. In particular, with respect to the services provided on August 29, 2003, and February 2, February 17, April 5, May 28, and September 13, 2004, AHCA asserts that the unauthorized activities of "make bed, meal prep, [and] clean table" resulted in overbilling totaling $60.48 (i.e., $10.08 for each of the six dates). As it appears from a review of the support plan that the recipient's mother was able to complete these activities, the undersigned agrees that overbilling occurred in the amount alleged. AHCA also alleges, and has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, that $10.08 was overbilled in connection with the services provided on August 8, 2003. In particular, the activities of "played outside, played with castle set, and lunch" are beyond the scope of the services contemplated by the support plan. Finally, AHCA has met its burden with respect to the alleged $5.04 in overbilling associated with the September 10, 2003, services, as "went to pool" and "watered deck flowers before dinner" plainly constitute unauthorized activities. Recipient No. 24 As noted previously, Respondent concedes that an overpayment of $0.96 occurred with respect to this recipient. Recipient No. 25 Recipient No. 25 was authorized to receive 16 hours of Companion Services each week to assist with socialization and supervision. Of the six claims examined during the audit, AHCA contends that two are problematic. First, with regard to the services provided on January 29, 2003, AHCA contends that the entire billing for that date ($24.72) should be denied due to inadequate documentation. In particular, AHCA notes that the service log provided during the preliminary audit and final audit was different than a log submitted by Respondent in April of 2009. Further, the earlier log is vague (it merely indicates "assist household, escort activities, other") and fails to address any specific support plan activities. AHCA also points out that the later log was incomplete and failed to indicate the date of the activities. AHCA has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the services provided on January 29, 2003, were not adequately documented, and therefore Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $24.72. Next, AHCA alleges that the services provided on March 25, 2004, were not adequately documented, and therefore the entire billing of $44.40 should be denied for that date. Specifically, AHCA points out that the service log only reads "supervision" and "escort activities" and failed to address any of the activities enumerated in the support plan. Although a later service log was submitted, it was incomplete, vague, and failed to delineate which activities were performed on March 25, 2004, as opposed to the other nine dates of service during that month. For the reasons detailed above, AHCA demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the March 25, 2004, services were not properly documented, and therefore the $44.40 payment should be denied. Recipient No. 26 AHCA contends that of the nine claims examined during the audit concerning this recipient, one should be fully denied due to the lack of proper documentation. Specifically, AHCA alleges that the $74.00 payment for the services rendered on May 31, 2004, should be denied outright, as the service log for May of 2004 was created by photocopying the service log for the previous month and changing the date. The undersigned has examined the documents11 and concludes that the May 2004 service log was not contemporaneously prepared. As a result, AHCA has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the $74.00 payment associated with the May 31, 2004, services should be denied. Recipient No. 28 This recipient was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance to address daily needs such as grooming and dressing. Significantly, the support plan also indicates that meal preparation was authorized. AHCA contends that with respect to the services provided on May 15, 2003, four unauthorized homemaker activities were performed: cleaning the bathroom, washing laundry, cleaning the kitchen, and washing dishes. As a result, AHCA alleges an overpayment of $12.00, which represents four units of service. AHCA has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that cleaning the bathroom and washing laundry were unauthorized. However, AHCA has failed to prove that dishwashing and cleaning the kitchen were unauthorized, as the provider prepared a meal (as indicated by the service log) for the recipient on May 15, 2003, an activity that was authorized by the support plan. As explained previously in this Recommended Order, if a provider is authorized to prepare a meal, then it is entirely reasonable for the provider to wash the dishes and clean the kitchen afterward. This is particularly true with respect to this recipient, who lived alone with her stepfather (who, according to the support plan, worked "intensive hours"), and was incapable of performing basic tasks (e.g., grooming and dressing) without assistance. Accordingly, AHCA should make an appropriate adjustment to the alleged $12.00 overpayment based on the above findings that cleaning the kitchen and washing dishes were not unauthorized. Recipient No. 29 Recipient No. 29 was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance in the amount of two hours each weekday and five hours on weekends. Pursuant to the support plan, the recipient required assistance with basic activities such as dressing, bathing, brushing teeth, and preparing meals. AHCA contends that overbilling occurred with respect to four of the eight dates of service examined during the audit. First, AHCA alleges, and has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that $10.08 was overbilled for the October 6, 2004, services, as the following unauthorized homemaker activities were performed: cleaning the recipient's room, cleaning the bathroom, organizing the room, organizing the bathroom, and changing towels. In addition, AHCA has proven an overpayment of $10.08 in connection with the November 24, 2004, services, where the service log demonstrates that unauthorized homemaker activities (identical to the services identified in the previous paragraph) were performed on that date. With regard to the services rendered on December 14, 2004, AHCA has demonstrated overbilling of $10.08 for the unauthorized homemaker services of cleaning the room and changing towels. Finally, AHCA alleges, and has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, a $5.04 overpayment in connection with the December 29, 2004, services. In particular, the service logs demonstrate that the unauthorized homemaker activities of vacuuming, organizing the bathroom, and taking out garbage were performed. Recipient No. 31 This recipient was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance, which was provided eight hours per day, Monday through Friday, and ten hours on both Saturday and Sunday. As the recipient is a quadriplegic, personal care assistance was obviously necessary for feeding and maintaining personal hygiene. Of the nine claims examined during the audit concerning this recipient, AHCA alleges that overbilling occurred with respect to two. First, with regard to the October 27, 2003, services, AHCA contends that insufficient documentation was provided by Respondent to support ten hours of billing. In particular, AHCA asserts that "ate well" is the only activity described in the contemporaneous service log.12 As a result, AHCA argues that one hour of billing should be permitted for meal prep, and that the remaining billing in the amount of $181.44 should be disallowed. Contrary to AHCA's contention, "ate well" is not the only event described in the contemporaneous service log. Significantly, the log also reads, "Incontinent B & B." Given the recipient's physical condition, this notation obviously means that the service provider was required to address at least one episode of bladder and bowel incontinence during the ten hours of service. As such, billing should be permitted for toileting. Based on the above finding that services were documented for toileting, AHCA should make an appropriate adjustment to the October 27, 2003, overpayment. Next, AHCA contends that that due to inadequate documentation, overbilling of $161.28 occurred with regard to the ten hours of services provided on February 16, 2004. In particular, AHCA contends that the documentation submitted by Respondent supports only two hours of billing, as bathing was the only activity described in the contemporaneous service log. Once again, however, the contemporaneous service log also indicates that the service provider was required to address the recipient's bladder and bowel incontinence. Accordingly, additional billing should be permitted for toileting, and AHCA should make an appropriate adjustment to the February 16, 2004, overpayment. Recipient No. 32 Recipient No. 32 was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance and Companion Services. AHCA contends that Respondent was overpaid in connection with eight of the fifteen claims examined pursuant to the audit. With respect to the services provided on March 21 and 23, 2003, AHCA has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent was overpaid $61.80 in connection with each of the two dates (totaling $123.60) where the documentation does not support the units of service billed. Next, AHCA contends, and the undersigned agrees, that Respondent inappropriately billed for recreational activities in connection with the personal care assistance services provided on August 13, 2003, and December 1, 2003. As a result, $3.86 was overbilled for each date, for a total of $7.72. AHCA also alleges, and has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence, that unauthorized homemaker activities were billed in connection with the companion services rendered on October 7 and 11, 2003, and December 2, 2003, which resulted in overbilling of $11.10, $11.10, and $7.40, respectively. In particular, the service logs indicate that meal prep, laundry, and housekeeping were performed on October 7 and 11, 2003, and that laundry and housekeeping were provided on December 2, 2003. Finally, AHCA has proven an overpayment of $15.44 with respect to the personal care assistance services provided on March 25, 2004. Specifically, the service log indicates that the service provider "walked the dog" and "checked live bait," tasks which do not fall within the scope of personal care assistance. Based on the above findings, AHCA demonstrated a total overpayment of $176.36 with respect to this recipient. Recipient No. 33 This recipient was authorized to receive three hours per week of Companion Services, which were intended to "increase awareness of community resources and increase community integration skills." AHCA alleges that Respondent was overpaid in connection with one of the two claims examined during the audit. Specifically, with respect to the services provided on July 15, 2003, the only activities described in the service log are "shopping" and "exercise." AHCA contends, and the undersigned agrees, that neither shopping nor exercise constitute goal oriented activities in under the circumstances of this recipient. Accordingly, AHCA has demonstrated an overpayment of $15.44, which represents one hour of billing. Recipient No. 34 This recipient was authorized to receive Personal Care Assistance. Pursuant to the support plan, the recipient lived with her able-bodied mother and older brother. Of the five claims examined during the audit, AHCA contends that Respondent was overpaid with respect to two. First, AHCA alleges that $5.29 was overpaid in connection with the August 4, 2004, services, where the service log suggested that the provider took the recipient to the park. The undersigned has examined the monthly summary, and agrees with AHCA's assessment of the documentation. Accordingly, AHCA has demonstrated an overpayment in the amount alleged. Turning to the services provided on December 9, 2004, AHCA has demonstrated an overpayment of $5.29 by a preponderance of the evidence, as "cleaning the living room" is an activity that could have been performed by the recipient's mother.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that AHCA: Make appropriate adjustments to the empirical overpayment; Recalculate the probable total overpayment using the adjusted empirical overpayment and the statistical formula previously employed, and enter a final order requiring Respondent to repay AHCA the amount determined through such recalculation; The final order should further require Respondent to pay interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the recalculated total overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2010.
The Issue Whether Rules 59G-4.150, 59G-4.160, and 59G-4.230, Florida Administrative Code, and several sections of the Florida Medicaid Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook and the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook incorporated in these rules are invalid because they contravene the specific provisions of law implemented by the rules.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: AHCA is the state agency that administers the Medicaid program in Florida. The Florida Legislature has conferred this responsibility on AHCA in Section 409.902, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides in pertinent part: The Agency for Health Care Administration is designated as the single state agency authorized to make payments for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act. These payments shall be made, subject to any limitations or directions provided for in the General Appropriations Act, only for services included in the program, shall be made only on behalf of eligible individuals, and shall be made only to qualified providers in accordance with federal requirements for Title XIX of the Social Security Act and the provisions of state law. This program of medical assistance is designated the "Medicaid program.". . . . Among those services included in the Medicaid program are physicians' services that are "medically necessary for the treatment of an injury, illness, or disease within the scope of the practice of medicine or osteopathic medicine as defined by state law." Section 409.905(9), Florida Statutes. Statutes and rules at issue. The Florida Legislature has directed the manner in which AHCA is to make payments on behalf of Medicaid recipients. Section 409.908, Florida Statutes (2002), provides in pertinent part: Subject to specific appropriations, the agency shall reimburse Medicaid providers, in accordance with state and federal law, according to methodologies set forth in the rules of the agency and in policy manuals and handbooks incorporated by reference therein. . . . In carrying out this mandate, AHCA has enacted Rules 59G-4.150, 59G-4.160, and 59G-4.230, Florida Administrative Code, which govern the procedures applicable to providers of inpatient and outpatient hospital services and physician services: 59G-4.150 Inpatient Hospital Services. This rule applies to all hospital providers enrolled in the Medicaid program. All hospital providers enrolled in the Medicaid program must comply with the Florida Medicaid Hospital [Services] Coverage and Limitations Handbook and the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, both incorporated by reference in 59G-4.160. Both handbooks are available from the fiscal agent contractor. 59G-4.160 Outpatient Hospital Services. This rule applies to all hospital providers enrolled in the Medicaid program. All hospital providers enrolled in the Medicaid program must comply with the Florida Medicaid Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, January 2001, and the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, UB-92, October 1998, both incorporated by reference in this rule. Both handbooks are available from the fiscal agent contractor. 59G-4.230 Physician Services. This rule applies to all physician providers enrolled in the Medicaid program for physician services under section 409.906, F.S. All physician services providers enrolled in the Medicaid program must be in compliance with the Florida Medicaid Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook, January 2001, which is incorporated by reference, and the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA 1500 and Child Health Check-Up 221, which is incorporated by reference in Rule 59G-5.020, F.A.C. Both handbooks are available from the Medicaid fiscal agent. Section 409.919, Florida Statutes, is cited in each of these rules as specific authority for AHCA to adopt the rules; and Sections 409.905, .908, and .9081, Florida Statutes, are cited as the laws implemented by the rules. The following is included on page 2-56 of the Florida Medicaid Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook, January 2001,6 which is incorporated by reference into Rule 59G-4.230: Obstetrical Care Services, continued * * * Abortions Federal regulations allow payment for abortions only for specific reasons and require the physician to certify the reason for the abortion. Medicaid reimburses for abortions for one of the following reasons: The woman suffers from a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life endangering physical condition caused or arising from the pregnancy itself, that would place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion is performed; When the pregnancy is the result of rape as defined in Section 794.011, F.S.; or When the pregnancy is the result of incest as defined in Section 826.04, F.S. Abortion procedures are reimbursed for only the following diagnoses: 635.00 through 635.92. These diagnosis codes require a fifth digit for reimbursement. An Abortion Certification Form must be completed and signed by the physician who performed the abortion. The form must be attached to the HCFA-1500 claim form. The physician must record the reasons for the abortion in his medical records for the recipient. Note: See Chapter 7 of the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 and Child Health Check-Up 221, for a copy of the Abortion Certification Form and the instructions for completing the form.[7] Illustration 7-10 appears on page 7-39 of the Florida Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 and Child Health Check-up 221, July 1999,8 which is incorporated by reference into Rule 59G-5.020.9 Illustration 7-10 is the Abortion Certification Form for the State of Florida. A physician is required to complete Section I of the form with the recipient's name, address, and Medicaid identification number; in Section II, the physician must sign the following statement: 4. On the basis of my professional judgment, I have performed an abortion on the above-named recipient for the following reason: _ The woman suffers from a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused or arising from the pregnancy itself that would place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion is performed. _ Based on all the information available to me, I concluded that this pregnancy was the result of an act of rape. _ Based on all the information available to me, I concluded that this pregnancy was the result of an act of incest. I have documented in the patient's medical record the reason for performing the abortion; and I understand that Medicaid reimbursement for this abortion is subject to recoupment if medical record documentation does not reflect the reasons for the abortion as checked above. Instructions for completing the form are found on page 7-40. Physicians must file Medicaid claims in Florida with AHCA's Medicaid fiscal agent, ACS Consultec, either by paper or electronically. The Medicaid fiscal agent is responsible for processing and paying claims. Medicaid reimburses physicians who are Medicaid providers for all medically necessary procedures except for certain organ transplants and for abortions that do not meet the criteria set forth on page 2-56 of the Florida Medicaid Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook, January 2001. Under Florida's Medicaid rules, Medicaid reimbursement for a medically necessary abortion is denied unless a completed State of Florida Abortion Certification Form signed by the physician is included with the reimbursement request. In addition, pre-authorization for Medicaid funding for a medically necessary abortion is denied unless a completed State of Florida Abortion Certification Form signed by the physician is included with the pre-authorization request. Petitioners. Edward R. Watson, M.D. Dr. Watson is a medical doctor who is board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. Watson began performing abortions in 1982, and he performs several thousand abortions each year. He has been the medical director of A Choice for Women since 1993, where he performs abortions and provides other obstetric and gynecological medical care. Dr. Watson has been registered as a Medicaid provider since 1982, and he is the Medicaid provider for A Choice for Women. Dr. Watson is currently on the staff of the University of Miami medical school, training third and fourth year medical students in reproductive health services, including abortions. It is Dr. Watson's understanding that the Florida Medicaid program reimburses physicians for abortions if the woman's life is in danger unless she has an abortion or if the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. Dr. Watson also understands that he must send a completed and signed State of Florida Abortion Certification Form with all claims for Medicaid reimbursement for medically necessary abortions. Approximately 10-to-20 percent of Dr. Watson's abortion patients have a medical condition that complicates their pregnancies, conditions which include, but are not limited to, Type I diabetes, HIV or AIDS, renal disease, mental illness, morbid obesity, and heart disease. In Dr. Watson's medical opinion, an abortion is medically necessary for many of his patients with these and other medical conditions, even though the lives of the women are not in danger if they continue their pregnancies. Dr. Watson does not, therefore, submit claims for Medicaid reimbursement for medically necessary abortions when he cannot provide the certification required on the State of Florida Abortion Certification Form that, in his medical opinion, the patients are in danger of death unless they have an abortion. Dr. Watson, in his practice at A Choice for Women, sees patients each week who are seeking abortions because the fetuses they are carrying have been diagnosed with significant birth defects or with birth defects incompatible with life. Dr. Watson considers abortions in these cases medically necessary, even though the lives of the women are not in danger if they continue their pregnancies. Dr. Watson does not, however, submit claims for Medicaid reimbursement for medically necessary abortions performed on these patients because he cannot provide the certification required on the State of Florida Abortion Certification Form that, in his medical opinion, the patients are in danger of death unless they have an abortion. Dr. Watson experiences adverse financial consequences when patients seeking medically necessary abortions cannot qualify for Medicaid funding because they are not in danger of death without an abortion. Many of Dr. Watson's patients are unable to afford medically necessary abortions without Medicaid funding, and, as a result, Dr. Watson does not perform as many medically necessary abortions as he would were Medicaid funding available. In addition, Dr. Watson discounts the cost of medically necessary abortions for Medicaid-eligible patients who do not qualify for Medicaid funding, with the result that these patients pay less than patients who are not eligible for Medicaid and also pay less than the amount Medicaid would reimburse for the procedure if the patient were in danger of death or the pregnancy the result of rape or incest. The undisputed evidence supports a finding that Dr. Watson has established a real and immediate injury to his financial interests as a result of the Rule 59G-4.230, Florida Administrative Code, because the rule places a restriction on the circumstances in which Medicaid funding is available to physicians for medically necessary abortions. The evidence establishes that Dr. Watson has suffered economic harm because he offers a substantial discount to Medicaid-eligible women seeking medically necessary abortions and that Dr. Watson performs fewer abortions because Medicaid-eligible women seeking medically necessary abortions cannot afford to pay even the discounted cost of an abortion. A Choice for Women The staff of A Choice for Women provides counseling to women regarding the various alternatives to abortion. The staff also spends a great deal of time providing financial counseling to Medicaid-eligible patients seeking abortions and working with them to secure private funding. A Choice for Women receives little or no compensation for these services when Medicaid- eligible patients cannot obtain Medicaid funding for medically necessary abortions. A Choice for Women has failed to prove that it has suffered a real and immediate injury to financial interests that are independent of the financial interests of Dr. Watson as a result of the challenged rules. A Choice for Women did not present any evidence to establish that it is entitled to Medicaid reimbursement for any of the services provided to a patient seeking medically necessary abortions by employees other than Dr. Watson, and it did not, therefore, establish that it suffered a direct financial injury as a result of the restriction on Medicaid funding in the challenged rules. Monica E. Navarrete Ms. Navarrete is a thirty-two-year-old woman with three children. At the time of the hearing, Ms. Navarrete was receiving public assistance in the form of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamps, and Medicaid. Ms. Navarrete was diagnosed as a child with petit mal seizures. In 1999, Ms. Navarrete had an abortion in Connecticut, after she was told that the fetus was brain-dead. Ms. Navarrete was advised that the baby died because she had seizures during the pregnancy; although she was put on anti-seizure medication, it was too late to save the baby. In 2000, Ms. Navarrete gave birth to a son. After her experience in 1999, she took anti-seizure medication during this pregnancy. Her child was born with osteogenesis imperfecta, a severe bone disorder. When Ms. Navarrete became pregnant in 2001, she was told that she would have to take Dilantin to control her seizures. Because she was afraid that the medication would make the baby ill, she chose to have an abortion. Ms. Navarrete went to A Choice for Women for an abortion and was seen by Dr. Watson. According to Dr. Watson, Ms. Navarrete's seizure disorder is long-standing, and it is complicated by grand mal seizures. Dr. Watson was aware that Ms. Navarrete had taken anti-seizure medication during a previous pregnancy and that her baby had a serious birth defect. When Dr. Watson first examined Ms. Navarrete, she was in the early stage of her pregnancy and had stopped taking her anti-seizure medication. Dr. Watson would not perform the abortion until Ms. Navarrete had been given medical clearance; after she received this clearance, Dr. Watson terminated Ms. Navarrete's pregnancy by abortion. In Dr. Watson's opinion, Ms. Navarrete's abortion was medically necessary, but it was not life threatening because she could have taken her anti-seizure medication and continued the pregnancy without the risk of having grand mal seizures. Consequently, Dr. Watson was unable to certify on the State of Florida Abortion Certification Form that Ms. Navarrete was in danger of death unless she had an abortion. Dr. Watson did not, therefore, submit either a pre-authorization request for Medicaid funding for Ms. Navarrete's abortion or a claim for Medicaid reimbursement after he performed the abortion. Ms. Navarrete was told by a member of the staff at A Choice for Women that Medicaid would not pay for her abortion, and she was charged $200.00 for the abortion, on the sliding scale used by A Choice for Women.10 Ms. Navarrete did not have the funds to pay for the abortion, so she obtained part of the money by not paying her utility bills on time; the remainder of the $200.00 was paid by an abortion fund to which she had been referred by staff at A Choice for Women. At the time she had the abortion, Ms. Navarrete was working five to six hours per week, and she earned between $40.00 and $60.00 per week. She had been working full-time at the airport, but her hours were cut substantially after September 11, 2001. According to Mr. Sharpe, who is AHCA's deputy secretary for Medicaid and is familiar with the eligibility categories for Medicaid, a pregnant woman earning $60.00 per week would be eligible for Medicaid unless she had substantial assets. At the time of the abortion, Ms. Navarrete was enrolled in what she described as the "shared cost Medicaid" program. Each month, she took her medical bills to her caseworker at the Department of Children and Family Services, where, if she had satisfied her deductible, her Medicaid coverage would be activated and she would be reimbursed. The undisputed testimony of Mr. Sharpe and of Ms. Navarrete supports a finding that Ms. Navarrete was eligible for Medicaid when she had the abortion in October 2001.11 Ms. Navarrete suffered a real and immediate injury in fact as a direct result of the Medicaid funding restriction imposed by the challenged rules. The undisputed evidence supports a finding that Ms. Navarrete's October 2001 abortion was medically necessary because of her seizure disorder but that, because Dr. Watson could not certify that Ms. Navarrete's life was in danger if she did not have an abortion, any pre- authorization request for Medicaid funding for the abortion and any claim for Medicaid reimbursement for the abortion would have been denied under the challenged rules as incomplete. Ms. Navarrete was, therefore, required to pay the $200.00 cost of the abortion, which she did using her own funds and funds she obtained from a private organization.
