Conclusions This cause came before the Agency for Health Care Administration for issuance of a Final Order. 1. On May 26, 2013, the Agency sent a letter to the Petitioner notifying the Petitioner that it owed an overpayment in the amount of $152,181.02 to the Agency based upon an adjustment in the Petitioner’s overpayment rates (Exhibit A). 2. On April 16, 2013, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Hearing and the Agency Clerk referred the Petition for Formal Hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. 4. On May 13, 2013, the Administrative Law Judge assigned to the case entered an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction based upon a Joint Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction filed by the parties. 5. On May 23, 2014, the Agency rescinded the overpayment letter (Exhibit B). 6. The Agency’s rescission of the overpayment letter has rendered this matter moot. Filed August 14, 2014 9:25 AM Division of Administrative Hearings Based on the foregoing, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: Respondent’s right to a hearing in this matter has been rendered moot and the Agency’s May 11, 2013 overpayment letter is rescinded. The parties shall govern themselves accordingly. DONE AND ORDERED this g day of Awe yuk , 2014 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION
The Issue Whether the Petitioner should reimburse the Respondent for alleged Medicaid overpayments in the amount of $44,581.50.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner, Roosevelt T. Jackson, Jr., M.D., has been a Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for Medicaid services provided to Medicaid recipients. Dr. Jackson is an ophthalmologist. All services in this cause related to Medicaid claims for procedures performed between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 1999. The Respondent is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program within the State of Florida. Medicaid Program Integrity is the arm of the Agency that oversees the activity of the Florida Medicaid providers and recipients to ensure that they are in compliance with the Medicaid program. As part of its duties, the Agency audits the records of providers to verify compliance with all Medicaid rules. In this case the audit of Petitioner's records was triggered by a computer program that reviews data from similar Medicaid providers. The Surveillance Utilization Review Section (SURS) of the Medicaid Program Integrity office found that the Petitioner had exceeded the norm in Medicaid billings when compared to his peers. When the SURS kicked back the Petitioner's name, it represented that the Petitioner had exceeded his peers in the total number of Medicaid recipients serviced, total number of evaluation and management procedures, average number of evaluation and management procedures per recipient, number of office visits, average number of office visits per recipient, and average number of services per recipient. Based upon the SURS responses, the Agency elected to conduct a sample audit of the Petitioner's records. Records for 30 Medicaid recipients were requested and obtained from the Petitioner. The results of that sample audit were then extended to calculate the overpayment for which the Respondent currently seeks reimbursement. The Respondent's audit established that the Petitioner had failed to comply with Medicaid provisions in three specific areas. First, based upon the records submitted to the Agency, the Petitioner billed for services at a higher level than actually performed. Second, the audit established that the Petitioner billed for services that were "medically unnecessary" as that term is utilized by Medicaid. And third, the audit found that the Petitioner billed for services that were not properly documented by the records maintained. Such records were created, maintained and produced to the Agency by the Petitioner. The results of the audit were set forth in the Final Agency Audit Report and were provided to the Petitioner. The report requested reimbursement from the Petitioner in the amount of $44,581.50. The report was completed on or about June 27, 2001. Thereafter, the Petitioner timely challenged the results of the audit, and requested a formal administrative hearing to dispute the amounts set forth in the report. As to all amounts claimed in the report, the evidence presented in this cause supports the Agency's conclusions as to the overpayment. Prior to January of 1999, the Petitioner was not authorized to bill for a level 4 visit. Thus all services billed at that rate prior to January 1999 should be reduced. Secondly, none of the records supplied by the Petitioner supported the complexity required for a level 4 billing. Therefore, services billed at the level 4 rate should be reduced to the appropriate level. The Petitioner also billed for services that were not medically necessary. A normal examination (with no retinal problem identified in the record) would not warrant additional retinal examinations. Therefore, billings for additional procedures would not be warranted in such cases. Finally, Medicaid rules require that a physician maintain records in compliance with documentation guidelines. The Petitioner's records did not comply with such guidelines. Accordingly, Medicaid payments for services that lack the required documentation may be recouped. After a full review of the records submitted, the Agency used a standard formula to extend the sample data throughout the population from which the sample was taken. That is, from the 30 patient records reviewed, the results were applied by statistical formula to the entire Medicaid patient population served by the Petitioner. This computation resulted in the amount of the overpayment currently sought. The statistical formula used by the Agency to compute the overpayment was reasonable and within the guidelines of the law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order confirming the Medicaid overpayment in the amount of $44,581.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Roosevelt T. Jackson, Jr., M.D. 3740 West Broward Boulevard Plantation, Florida 33312 Kim A. Kellum, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner received a Medicaid overpayment for claims paid during the audit period, August 1, 1997, through August 25, 1999, and if so, what is the amount that Petitioner is obligated to reimburse to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid Program. One of its duties is to recover Medicaid overpayments from physicians providing care to Medicaid recipients. Petitioner is a licensed psychiatrist and an authorized Medicaid provider. His Medicaid provider number is No. 048191200. Chapter Three of the Limitations Handbook describes the procedure codes for reimbursable Medicaid services that physicians may use in billing for services to eligible recipients. The procedure codes are Health Care Financing Administration Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS), Levels 1-3. The procedure codes are based on the Physician's Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) book, published by the American Medical Association. The CPT book, includes HCPCS descriptive terms, numeric identifying codes, and modifiers for reporting services and procedures. The Limitations Handbook further provides that Medicaid reimburses physicians using specific CPT codes. The CPT codes are listed on Medicaid's physician fee schedule. The CPT book includes a section entitled Evaluation and Management (E/M) Services Guidelines. The E/M section classifies medical services into broad categories such as office visits, hospital visits, and consultations. The categories may have subcategories such as two types of office visits (new patient and established patient) and two types of hospital visits (initial and subsequent). The subcategories of E/M services are further classified into levels of E/M services that are identified by specific CPT codes. The classification is important because the nature of a physician's work varies by type of service, place of service, and the patient's status. According to the CPT book, the descriptors for the levels of E/M services recognize seven components, six of which are used in defining the levels of E/M services. They are history, examination, medical decision making, counseling, coordination of care, nature of presenting problem, and time. The most important components in selecting the appropriate level of E/M services are history, examination, and medical decision making. However, since 1992, the CPT book has included time as an explicit factor in selecting the most appropriate level of E/M services. At all times relevant here, Petitioner provided services to Medicaid patients pursuant to a valid Medicaid provider agreement. Therefore, Petitioner was subject to all statutes, rules and policy guidelines that govern Medicaid providers. The Medicaid provider agreement clearly gives a Medicaid provider the responsibility to maintain medical records sufficient to justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made pursuant to Medicaid policy. This case involves Respondent's Medicaid audit of claims paid to Petitioner for Medicaid psychiatric services during the audit period August 1, 1997, through August 25, 1999 (the audit period). Petitioner provided these services to his Medicaid patients, which constituted approximately 85 to 90 percent of his practice, at his office and at hospitals in the Jacksonville, Florida, area. During the audit period, Petitioner billed Medicaid for services furnished under the following CPT codes and E/M levels of service: (a) 99215, office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient; (b) 99223, initial hospital care per day for the evaluation and management of a patient; (c) 99232, subsequent hospital care per day for the evaluation and management of a patient; (d) 99233, subsequent hospital care per day for the evaluation and management of a patient; (e) 99238, hospital discharge day management; (f) 99254, initial inpatient consultation for a new or established patient; and (g) 90862, other psychiatric service or procedures, pharmacologic management. Except for CPT code 90862, the E/M levels of services billed by Petitioner require either two or all three of the key components as to history, examination, and medical decision- making. The CPT book assigns a typical amount of time that physicians spend with patients for each level of E/M service. The CPT book contains specific psychiatric CPT codes. CPT codes 90804-90815 relate to services provided in the office or other outpatient facility and involve one of two types of psychotherapy. CPT codes 90816-90829 relate to inpatient hospital, partial hospital, or residential care facility involving different types of psychotherapy. CPT codes 90862- 90899 relate to other psychiatric services or procedures. CPT code 90862 specifically includes pharmacologic or medication management; including prescription, use, and review of medication with no more than minimal medical psychotherapy. CPT code 90862 is the only psychiatric procedure code that Petitioner used in billing for the psychiatric services he provided. CPT code 90862 does not have specific requirements as to history, examination, and medical decision-making or a specified amount of time. Most of Petitioner's hospital patients were admitted to the hospital for psychiatric services through the emergency room. As part of the admission process, Petitioner performed psychiatric and physical examinations. However, testimony at hearing that Petitioner generally performed the psychiatric evaluations and the physical examinations on separate days is not persuasive. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that the hospital physical examinations were conducted as part of the routine admission process and appropriately included in claims for the patients' initial hospital care. Some of Petitioner's hospital patients had complicated conditions. Some patients required crisis intervention and/or lacked the ability to perform activities of daily living. The initial hospital care of new hospital patients required Petitioner to take an extensive medical and psychiatric history. Petitioner attended his hospital patients on a daily basis. However, there is no persuasive evidence that Petitioner routinely spent 20-25 minutes with his hospital patients for each subsequent daily visit until the day of discharge. Petitioner used a team approach when attending his hospital patients. On weekdays, the team consisted of Petitioner, a social worker, a music therapist, and the floor nurses. On weekends, Petitioner generally made his rounds with the floor nurses. Petitioner's use of the team approach to treat hospital patients did not change the level of service he provided in managing their medication. Petitioner did not document the time he spent with patients during hospital visits. However, his notations as to each of these visits indicate that, excluding admissions and discharges, the hospital visits routinely involved medication management. Petitioner's testimony that his treatment during subsequent hospital visits involved more than mere medication management is not persuasive. Petitioner also failed to document the time he spent with patients that he treated at his office. He did not present his appointment books as evidence to show the beginning and ending time of the appointments. Petitioner's notes regarding each office visit reflect a good bit of thought. However, without any notation as to time, the office progress notes are insufficient to determine whether Petitioner provided a level of service higher than medication management for established patients. Petitioner and his office manager agreed in advance that, unless Petitioner specified otherwise, every office visit for an established patient would be billed as if it required two of the following: a comprehensive history; a comprehensive examination; and a medical decision making of high complexity. With no documented time for each appointment, Petitioner's records do not reflect that he provided a level of service higher than medication management for the office visits of established patients. Petitioner's testimony to the contrary is not persuasive. Petitioner treated some patients at their place of residence in an adult congregate living facility (ACLF). Respondent does not pay for psychiatric services in such facilities. Instead of entirely denying the claims for ACLF patients, Respondent gave Petitioner credit for providing a lower level of service in a custodial care facility. Sometime in 1999, Respondent made a decision to audit Petitioner's paid claims for the period of time at issue here. After making that decision, Respondent randomly selected the names of 30 Medicaid patients that Petitioner had treated. The 30 patients had 282 paid claims that were included in the "cluster sample." Thereafter, Respondent's staff visited Petitioner's office, leaving a Medicaid provider questionnaire and the list of the 30 randomly selected patients. Respondent's staff requested copies of all medical records for the 30 patients for the audit period. Petitioner completed the Medicaid questionnaire and sent it to Respondent, together with all available medical records for the 30 patients. The medical records included Petitioner's progress notes for office visits. Petitioner did not send Respondent all of the relevant hospital records for inpatient visits. The original hospital records belonged to the hospitals where Petitioner provided inpatient services. Petitioner had not maintained copies of all of the hospital records even though Medicaid policy required him to keep records of all services for which he made Medicaid claims. When Respondent received Petitioner's records, one of Respondent's registered nurses, Claire Balbo, reviewed the records to determine whether Petitioner had provided documentation to support each paid claim. Ms. Balbo made handwritten notes on the records of claims that were not supported by documentation. Ms. Balbo reviewed the documentation in the records between February 10, 2000, and March 7, 2000. Next, one of Respondent's investigators, Art Williams, reviewed the records. Mr. Williams made his review on or about January 23, 2001. In some instances, Mr. Williams changed some of Petitioner's CPT codes from an inappropriate hospital inpatient or office visit procedure code to a psychiatric procedure code with a lower reimbursement rate. Additionally, Mr. Williams noted Petitioner's visits in ACLF's that, according to Medicaid policy, were not reimbursable. Finally, Mr. Williams noted that Petitioner occasionally made several claims on one line of the claim form contrary to Medicaid policy. Mr. Williams made these changes to the CPT codes based on applicable Medicaid policy. His review of the audit documents and patient records did not involve a determination as medical necessity or the appropriate level of service. A peer reviewer makes determinations as to medical necessity and the appropriate level of service for each paid claim in the random sample of 30 patients. Respondent then sent the records to Dr. Melody Agbunag, a psychiatrist who conducted a peer review of Petitioner's records. Dr. Agbunag's primary function was to determine whether the services that Petitioner provided were medically necessary and, if so, what the appropriate level of service was for each paid claim. Dr. Agbunag conducted the peer review between June 8, 2001, and August 29, 2001. She agreed with Respondent's staff regarding the adjustments to the procedure codes that corresponded with the level of service reflected in the medical records. When Dr. Agbunag returned the records to Respondent, Ms. Balbo calculated the monetary difference between the amount that Medicaid paid Petitioner for each claim and the amount that Medicaid should have paid based on Dr. Agbunag's review. The difference indicated that Respondent had overpaid Petitioner for claims that in whole or in part were not covered by Medicaid. Respondent sent Petitioner a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR) dated December 27, 2001. The PAAR stated that Petitioner had been overpaid $54,595.14. The PAAR stated that Petitioner could furnish additional information or documentation that might serve to reduce the overpayment. Petitioner responded to the PAAR in a letter dated February 28, 2001. According to the letter, Petitioner challenged the preliminary determinations in the PAAR and advised that he was waiting on additional patient records from a certain hospital. In a letter dated June 30, 2002, Petitioner advised Respondent that he generally spends 15-20 minutes with his hospital inpatients. The letter does not refer to any additional hospital records. Petitioner's office manager sent Respondent a letter dated August 1, 2002. The letter discusses every service that Petitioner provided to the 30 patients during the audit period. Some of these services were not included in the random "cluster sample" because Medicaid had not paid for them during the audit period. According to the August 1, 2002, letter, Petitioner's office manager attached some of the patient records that Petitioner had not previously provided to Respondent. The additional documentation related to multiple claims involving several of Petitioner's hospital and office patients. Sometime after receiving the additional documentation, Dr. Agbunag conducted another peer review. She did not change her prior determination regarding the level of service as to any paid claim. In 2003, Vicki Remick, Respondent's investigator, reviewed the audit, the patient records, and all correspondence. Her review included, but was not limited to, the determination of the appropriate CPT code and amount of reimbursement, taking into consideration Medicaid policy and Dr. Agbunag's findings regarding medical necessity and the level of care for each paid claim. On or about October 1, 2003, Respondent issued the Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR). The FAAR informed Petitioner that he had been overpaid $39,055.34 for Medicaid claims that, in whole or in part, were not covered by Medicaid. The FAAR included a request for Petitioner to pay that amount for the overpayment. The FAAR concluded, as to some patients, that Petitioner's documentation did not support the CPT codes that Petitioner used to bill and that Respondent used to pay for services. Thus, Respondent "down graded" the billing code to a lesser amount. As a result, the difference between the amount paid and the amount that should have been paid was an overpayment. The FAAR also stated that Petitioner billed and received payment for some undocumented services. In each such instance, Respondent considered the entire amount paid as an overpayment. The FAAR indicated that Petitioner billed Medicaid for some services at acute care hospital psychiatric units without documenting the medical records as to the appropriate CPT codes and medical illness diagnosis codes. Respondent adjusted the payments for these services to the appropriate psychiatric CPT codes. According to the FAAR, Petitioner billed and received payment for services which only allowed one unit of service per claim line. For this audit, Respondent allowed charges for the additional units of service where Petitioner's documentation for the additional dates of service supported the services allowed by the peer reviewer. The FAAR stated that Petitioner billed for psychiatric services at an ACLF or an assisted living facility. Medicaid normally does not pay for such services. However, in this case, Respondent adjusted the claims to a domiciliary or custodial care visit. Sometime after Petitioner received the FAAR, Petitioner sent Respondent some additional patients' medical records. Some of the records were duplicates of documents that Petitioner previously had furnished to Respondent. Other records were for services that may have been provided during the audit period but which were not a part of the random sample because Medicaid did not pay for them during relevant time frame. Respondent requested Dr. James R. Edgar to conduct a second peer review of Petitioner's correspondence and patient records to determine the appropriate level of service. Respondent provided Dr. Edgar with a copy of the patients' medical records, a copy of Respondent's worksheets, including Dr. Agbunag's notes, and the appropriate policy handbooks. Respondent requested Dr. Edgar to make changes in the level of service as he deemed appropriate. Dr. Edgar performed his review between July 25, 2004, and July 29, 2004, making an independent determination regarding issues of medical necessity and level of care. Initially, as to every disputed paid claim, Dr. Edgar agreed with Dr. Agbunag that Petitioner's patient records were insufficient to justify the procedure code and higher level of service claimed by Petitioner. Specifically, Dr. Edgar presented persuasive evidence that a number of paid claims, which Petitioner billed under CPT codes 99215, 99223, 99232, 99233, and 99238, were properly adjusted to CPT code 90862. Petitioner was not entitled to bill at a higher level of reimbursement because he failed to adequately document as to history, examination, medical decision-making, and time. Dr. Edgar agreed that, upon reconsideration, Petitioner's claim for Recipient 14, date of service September 7, 1998, billed under CPT code 99238, was appropriate. As to Recipient 1, date of service March 9, 1999, Petitioner was not entitled to bill for services using CPT code 99255, initial inpatient consultation for a new or established patient. CPT code 99222, initial hospital care, per day, for the E/M of a new or established patient, was more appropriate because Petitioner provided the consultation for one of his established patients. His services included a comprehensive history, a comprehensive examination, and medical decision making of moderate complexity. An independent analysis of the selection of the random sample, the statistical formula used by Respondent, and the statistical calculation used to determine the overpayment, confirms the conclusions in the FAAR. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent properly extrapolated the results from the sample to the total population. Out of a population of 222 recipients and a population of 2,123 claims, 30 recipients selected at random with 282 paid claims capture most of the characteristics of the total population. In this case, the statistical evidence indicates that 29 of the 30 recipients had overpayments. The odds that 29 out of 30 randomly selected recipients would have overpayments, if no overpayments existed, are greater than the odds of winning the Florida Lotto Quick Pick three weeks in a row. In fact, within a statistical certainly, the amount claimed in this cause based on the records of 30 recipients is lower than the reimbursement amount that Petitioner would owe if all records were reviewed. Respondent incurred costs during the investigation of this matter. The amount of those costs was not known at the time of the formal hearing.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner owes Respondent for an overpayment in the amount of $39,055.34, less an adjustment for the September 7, 1998 claim for Recipient 14, plus interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan Levine, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Know Building III 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Debora E. Fridie, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Mail Station 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Carter, P.A. 117 South Gadsden Street Post Office Box 1049 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner overpaid Respondent Medicaid funds, for which Section 409.913(10), Florida Statutes (2002), authorizes Petitioner to seek repayment from Respondent.
Findings Of Fact During 1998, Respondent was an authorized Medicaid provider, pursuant to Medicaid provider number 105425200, and was a party to a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with Petitioner. Respondent filed claims with Petitioner for payment, under the Medicaid program, for the goods and services that are the subject of the audit described below, and Petitioner paid Respondent for these claims. The audit period in this case is 1998. During 1998, Respondent submitted to Petitioner 36,257 claims for nearly 5.5 million units of over one thousand types of drugs. These claims totaled $3,075,449.88, which Petitioner paid Respondent. On June 2, 1999, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent informing it of a review of its pharmacy claims for 1998. The letter requests documentation of all purchases of 12 named drugs for 1998 and documentation of all credits for these drugs during the same period. The letter states that acceptable documentation includes itemized wholesaler sales history reports, itemized manufacturer sales history reports, itemized invoices, and credit return receipts. By letter dated June 5, 1999, Respondent provided the requested information. By letter dated June 23, 2000, Petitioner advised Respondent that it had examined the paid Medicaid claims for 1998 and the acquisition documentation that Respondent had provided in June 1999. The letter states: "You have failed to provide adequate documentation to the effect that the available quantity of certain drugs of given strength was as great as the quantity of those drugs billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid.” Thus, Petitioner made a "provisional" determination that it had overpaid Respondent $1,092,205.32. The letter invites Respondent to provide additional information to reduce the overpayment determination. The June 23 letter contains an Overpayment Attachment that lists ten of the twelve drugs for which Petitioner had sought documentation in its earlier letter. For each of these ten drugs, the Overpayment Attachment lists the generic code, number of units for which Medicaid paid, the total amount of Medicaid payments, the total units documented by Respondent to have been available during the relevant period, and the number of units for which Respondent provided no availability documentation. The Overpayment Attachment also calculates the amount of Medicaid payments attributable to the unavailable units and the total overpayment, which is $1,092,205.32. The overpayment calculations described in the preceding paragraph assume that all available units of the audited drugs were sold to Medicaid patients. The effect of this improbable scenario reduces the amount of the overpayment. The overpayment calculations attempt no extrapolation of overpayments on the over 10,000 other drugs for which Respondent received Medicaid payments during 1998. The effect of limiting the overpayment calculation to the ten listed drugs reduces the amount of the overpayment. However, the ten listed drugs are the drugs that generated the most Medicaid payments to Respondent and account for over one-third of the total Medicaid payments during the relevant period. Respondent provided additional information to Petitioner on August 30 and November 3, 2000. However, after examining the information, Petitioner advised Respondent, by letter dated April 8, 2002, that its final determination was that Respondent owed $1,096,489.77 due to its receipt of Medicaid overpayments. The overpayment increased by over $4000 due to the determination that Respondent's records documented 1000 fewer available units of two dosages of Risperdone than Petitioner had previously determined.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner $1,096,489.77, plus interest, to repay overpayments that it received from the Medicaid program for the sale of drugs in 1998. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Grant P. Dearborn Assistant General Counsel Building 3, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5407 Jose M. Herrera Jose M. Herrera, P.A. 1401 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent properly maintained and supplied required records to support and document prescription claims, which it billed to Medicaid and for which it received payment from the Medicaid program during the audit period of April 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001. If that is not the case, it must be determined whether the Agency is entitled to recoup from the Respondent the sum it seeks of $108,478.77, as the purported amount overpaid to the Respondent by the Agency. It must also be determined whether the applicable laws and regulations referenced herein were complied with by the Respondent, in terms of its accepting and filling prescriptions, dispensing relevant drugs, and recording and documenting such activities in its pharmacy records. Finally, it must be determined whether the statistical methodologies employed by the Agency, through its audit and investigation of the Respondent, were sufficiently representative and accurate so as to support the calculation of estimated overpayments.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an Agency of the State of Florida charged by the statutes and rules referenced herein with ensuring that proper reimbursement is effected to providers, including pharmacies, by the Medicaid system. Because of its duty to enforce and regulate the Medicaid system, the Petitioner Agency has an audit and oversight function, as well as an enforcement function, to ensure that Medicaid payments and the general operations of the Medicaid system are carried out correctly. It is through this duty imposed by the cited Florida Statutes and rules, as well as the federal regulations it is charged with enforcing, that the Petitioner carried out an audit of the Respondent, Brown Pharmacy, concerning the audit period of April 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001. The Petitioner conducts audits of providers such as Brown in order to ensure compliance with the Medicaid provisions and Medicaid provider agreements. These are called "integrity audits" and are routinely performed by auditors contracted from private firms such as Heritage. Brown Pharmacy (Brown) is licensed in the State of Florida as a pharmacy (license Number PH562). Brown maintained a business location at 312 West 8th Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32206, at times pertinent to this case. During the audit period Brown was an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to provide Medicaid prescriptions pursuant to a provider agreement with the Agency. The terms of the provider agreement governed the contractual relationship between Brown and the Agency. Pursuant to that provider agreement, Brown was to maintain the Medicaid-related records and documentation for at least five years. Any Medicaid provider, such as Brown, not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies may be subject to the recoupment of Medicaid payments. During the audit period, Brown dispensed prescription drugs to Medicaid recipients. Medicaid claims were filed and paid electronically as "point of sale" transactions during the audit period. Each claim reviewed and at issue in this case was a paid Medicaid claim subject to the provider agreement and pertinent regulations. As a condition of participating in the Medicaid program, a Medicaid provider must comply with all provisions of a provider agreement, which is a voluntarily agreement between the Agency and the provider. Those provisions include the provider's agreement to comply with all relevant local, state and federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure laws, bulletins, manuals, and handbooks, etc. The provider must agree to keep and maintain, in a systematic and orderly manner, all Medicaid- related records as may be required by the Agency and make them available for state and federal agencies and review. It must maintain complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that will justify and disclose the extent of goods and services rendered to customers or patients and rendered as billings to the Medicaid system. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.250 promulgates, as part of the rule, the above-referenced handbook (handbook) which sets out Medicaid polices and rules. The polices and rules govern the rights and responsibilities of drug providers, such as Brown, including coverage and payment methodologies for services and goods rendered to Medicaid recipients and billed to the Medicaid program. The types of records that must be maintained are as follows: Medicaid claim forms, professional records such as patient treatment plans, prior and post authorization information, prescription records, business records, including accounting ledgers, financial statements, purchase and acquisition records etc., tax records, patient counseling information and provider enrollment documentation. Providers who are not in compliance with the Medicaid documentation and record retention policies described in the handbook are subject to administrative sanctions and/or recoupment of Medicaid payments. Medicaid payments for services that lack required documentation and/or appropriate signatures will be recouped. Chapter five of the handbook, in defining overpayment provides that any amount not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program, whether paid as a result of inaccurate or improper cost reporting, improper claims, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse or mistake, constitutes overpayment. Incomplete records are records that lack documentation that all requirements or conditions for the providing of services have been met. Medicaid may recoup payments for services or goods when the provider has incomplete records or cannot locate the records. The Agency contracted with Heritage to conduct an on- site audit at Brown. The audit was conducted March 18th through March 20, 2002. Heritage isolated a sample of 205 prescription claims, known as the "judgmental sample" out of a total universe of paid pharmacy claims from Brown totaling 16,727 for the audit period. Heritage also selected 250 random prescription claims out of the remaining total universe of paid pharmacy claims of 16,522, which remained after the 205 judgmental sample claims had been removed or isolated from the remainder of the total claims. With the acquiescence of the Agency, Heritage chose the 205 claims by weighing it in favor of the "high dollar" or more expensive drug prescriptions. Those prescriptions are primarily for HIV and Aids therapy drugs and psychotherapeutic drugs for various mental conditions, including schizophrenia. Weighing of the judgmental sample strongly in favor of the high dollar prescription claims would seem to render the judgmental sample fundamentally unfair against Brown if the judgmental sample had then been extrapolated to the entire universe of claims ($16,727). This was not done, however. The judgmental sample was audited and compiled by doing an actual count and totaling of claim amounts in dollars represented by all the discrepant prescriptions, including all those the Agency and Heritage maintained resulted in "overpayments" to Brown. Therefore, the judgmental sample is an actual number rather than an extrapolated calculation so that weighing the sample in favor of the high dollar prescriptions does not result in an unfair or biased sample, as to the judgmental sample. Because the judgmental sample was drawn from the total pool of audited claims and removed from that claim pool prior to the identification and drawing of the random sample, the two are mutually exclusive and the amounts calculated do not represent a duplication or overlap. Thus the findings from the judgmental sample and then the random sample may be properly added together. The randomly selected claims (random sample) were taken of the remaining 16,522 claims in the audit claim pool after the judgmental sample of 205 claims had been removed. According to the report rendered by Heritage, the 250 randomly selected claims totaled $10,632.59 in paid Medicaid dollars. The Heritage auditors determined that there were 56 discrepant claims out of these which totaled, according to their calculation, $2,450.13 in apparent overpayments. This resulted in an average overcharge per claim of $9.80 (determined by dividing the documented "sanction amount" by the total number of claims in the random sample (250), multiplied by the universe of claims from which the random sample was taken (16,522) which yielded an extrapolated overcharge of $161,924.19. Applying the statistically appropriate 95 percent "one-sided" lower confidence limit of this extrapolation resulted in a purported overpayment extrapolated from the randomly selected claims of $102,700.85. This means that the overpayment amount calculated by Heritage represents an amount statistically 95 percent certain to be the lowest amount overpayment based on the extrapolation of the overpayment represented in the 250 randomly selected claims. The non-extrapolated judgmental findings showed, according to Heritage, that there were 72 discrepant claims. Heritage then determined that, of these, there were $29,381.09 in apparent actual overcharges. The discrepancies determined by Heritage involved the failure to produce documentation of refill authorizations for 80 prescription claims; 31 prescription claims containing an incorrect Medicaid provider number; the failure to produce 12 "hard copy" prescriptions representing 25 claims; four claims that did not have the prescriber's DEA number on the prescription for controlled substances; three claims for prescriptions that did not contain the original date of service; two claims that were billed for quantities greater than that authorized by the physician; one claim that was billed for an incorrect day's supply; one claim that was billed in excess of the maximum allowable quantity of prescription of the drug, set by Medicaid policy; and one prescription claim that was billed for an incorrect prescriber's Medicaid provider number (although this should not be a discrepancy because the correct prescriber was documented in the pharmacy's computer, which the regulations allowed). Additionally, there was one claim billed for a drug different than that prescribed by the physician, according to Heritage in its report. Heritage also conducted an invoice review using utilization reports provided by the Respondent. This was apparently a review of 25 different drugs that purportedly showed that the prorated purchases of those drugs were insufficient to cover the number of units billed to Medicaid for all 25 drugs reviewed, and thus yielded a purported shortage of $87,942.13, representing the amount billed to Medicaid above the amount the records of purchases from suppliers proved that Brown had purchased of those drugs. Based upon the Heritage audit as well as documentation findings and overpayments calculations (see Exhibit 8), the Agency issued a PAAR dated September 27, 2002, determining that Brown had been overpaid $150,036.71 for Medicaid claims during the audit period. That report advised Brown that it was a provisional report only and encouraged Brown to submit any additional information or documentation which might serve to change the overpayment. The report listed examples of documentation that the Agency would consider for a possible reduction in the overpayment amount initially claimed. Thereafter, the Agency agreed to an extension of time for Brown to submit additional documentation and sent a letter to Brown dated October 31, 2003, advising that the audit had been placed in abeyance pending the outcome in a related case, but that the Agency expected to resume the audit and that therefore all Medicaid-related records and documentation regarding paid claims should be maintained and preserved until the audit was finalized. The FAAR was addressed in the testimony of Ms. Stewart for the Agency. Through her testimony it was revealed that certain corrections should be made to the FAAR updating it from the findings in the Heritage initial audit report. The Agency corrected the information in the FAAR for this reason and for the reason that it secured some additional information from the Respondent. Thus, for the audit period it was established that there were 16,727 total claims for prescriptions dispensed by Brown, for which it was paid $795,564.59 during the 21-month audit period, of those claims, 205 were pulled out from the total universe of claims as the judgmental sample. There were some 72 allegedly "discrepant claims" totaling $36,393.51 in dollars paid to Brown. The Agency's position is that $29,381.09 of those are so called "documented overcharges." The random sample of 250 claims was extrapolated to the remaining universe of 16,522 prescription claims. The Agency now takes the position that it found 49 "discrepant claims" in the random sample which totaled $2,154.40 in dollars paid to Brown's pharmacy and of that it maintains that $1,927.55 are "documented overcharges" for the 250 randomly selected claims (for which Brown had been paid $10,632.59). Thus the Agency found an average overcharge for the 250 randomly sampled claims of $7.71 per claim. The $7.71 average per claim overcharge was then multiplied by the remaining universe of 16,522 claims, yielding an extrapolated purported overcharge of $127,387.92. The Agency then applied the 95 percent "one-sided lower confidence limit" to this extrapolation, that is, that it or its statistician, Dr. Johnson, felt that there was a 95 percent chance that the lower confidence limit number it calculated was accurate. That number is $79,097.68. When that number is combined with the Agency's position as to overcharges from the judgmental sample results in a total postulated overcharge of $108,478.77. This is the final amount the Agency claims as an overpayment that must be recouped for Medicaid. The FAAR summarized the discrepant claims for the judgmental sample as follows: 61 claims involve refills which exceeded the authorized number of refills without documentation of reauthorization; 10 claims showed an incorrect prescriber license number but the correct prescriber license number was documented in the pharmacy's computer; and For two claims the hard copy description did not have an original date of service depicted on it and did not reference a DEA number. The discrepant claims shown in the FAAR as to the random sample were as follows: There were 19 claims for refills without documentation of refill authorization (refills had been previously authorized, but for the 19 claims at least one refill had been issued beyond the authorization limit); Fifteen claims showed an incorrect prescriber license number on the claim and the license number was not documented in the Respondent's computer; Seven claims showed an incorrect prescriber license number, but the correct license number was documented in the pharmacy's computer; There were seven claims for which the original hard copy prescriptions could not be found on file during the audit period; For one claim the hard copy prescription did not have an original date of service or DEA number; For one claim the quantity paid exceeded the quantity authorized by the prescriber or dispensed to the recipient; and For one claim the number of days supply submitted by the pharmacy was not consistent with the quantity and directions of the prescriber and the quantity exceeded the limit set by the plan. The most common discrepancies with regard to the judgmental sample and the random sample occurred when the Respondent billed refills in excess of the number authorized by the prescriber, without any written authorization for such being provided in the audit process or later. Concerning the random sample, the second most common discrepancy occurred when the claim depicted an incorrect precriber number on the claim and the license number of the prescriber was not documented in the computer. In the judgmental sample the second most common discrepancy occurred when the claim showed an incorrect prescriber number, but the correct prescriber number was documented in the pharmacy's computer. The discrepancies in the FAAR with the indication "UR", references "unauthorized refills." The records of the pharmacy showed that Brown issued refills of prescriptions to Medicaid recipients in excess of the presriber's limit depicted on the prescriptions but showed no written record of a telephonic or written authorization by the prescriber allowing the additional refill or refills. It is also true that as to some or even many of these the Respondent may have obtained verbal authorization, but failed to document that re- authorization. Medicaid policy, the statutory authority cited herein, and the PDSCLR Handbook provide that all verbal orders authorized by the prescriber of a prescription must be recorded either as a "hard copy" or noted in the pharmacy's computer in order to comply with the relevant law cited herein, for record- keeping and auditing purposes under Medicaid policy. The Agency's Statistical Methodology Mark E. Johnson, Ph.D., testified on behalf of the Petitioner. He was qualified as an expert witness in the area of statistical formulas, statistical methodology, and random sampling, including the random sample statistical methodology employed by the Agency in determining the overpayment amount. He is a professor of statistics at the University of Central Florida. Dr. Johnson reviewed the statistical methodology, numbers and calculations arrived at by the Agency and its extrapolation method of arriving at the overpayment amount. He also used his own independent analysis based upon a software package he commonly uses in the practice of his discipline in testing the methodology employed by the Agency and the random sample employed by the Agency and Heritage. The statistical formula employed by Dr. Johnson and the Agency is a standard one routinely used in Dr. Johnson's profession and statistical sampling. He established through his own testing of the methodology that the random sample was appropriate for Medicaid program integrity audits and determinations as employed in this case. The random sampling, according to Dr. Johnson, was employed because it would be time and cost prohibitive to examine individually each of 16,522 claims regarding overpayment issues. The random sampling methodology using 250 randomly chosen samples is a time and cost saving device and yet still presents a "plausible estimate" as established by Dr. Johnson. He established that for the universe of 16,522 claims which were subjected to the random sample and extrapolation statistical analysis and calculation, that such is a reasonable sample for purposes of this audit and that the 250 random samples employed by the Agency are indeed statistically appropriate random samples. His calculation of overpayment was at variance with the Agency's by 55 cents. He established that is not a significant difference since the 95 percent certainty limit of $79,097.68 for the random sample extrapolation analysis is so much lower than the estimate established at $108,478.22. Dr. Johnson established that the Agency had employed appropriate and valid statistical methods in its determination of the above-referenced overpayment amount based upon the random sample of paid claims. The expert testimony of Dr. Johnson, together with his written report in evidence, is credible and persuasive as to the validity of the random sampling of the claims during the audit period and as to the random sample portion of the analysis employed in arriving at the final overpayment calculation and numbers depicted in the FAAR. Dr. Johnson established the appropriateness of the statistical formula, including extrapolation, used to calculate the overpayment amount, the appropriateness of the sample size relative to the universe of claims, and the improbability that the overpayment amount is attributable to chance causes alone. Thus Dr. Johnson's testimony is accepted as credible and persuasive in establishing the validity of the Agency's method of overpayment calculation, and the overpayment calculation in conjunction with the statistical evidence in this record, except as modified by the findings below.1/ The Respondent's Position Gary Steinberg testified on behalf of the Respondent, Brown Pharmacy. He was accepted as an expert witness in the areas of Medicaid policy, audits and pharmacy practice, including Florida pharmacy practice. Mr. Steinberg acknowledged that Brown had not properly documented all claims that had been paid by the Medicaid program nor maintained all required records. He emphasized in his testimony, however, that Brown had not fraudulently billed the Medicaid program with claims for prescription medications that it had not actually dispensed to the patients or recipients. Rather, all medications involved in the subject prescription claims had actually been dispensed. There is no evidence or claim on the part of the Agency that Brown charged and collected more than the appropriate approved price for the prescriptions at issue. Through the explanation given in his testimony, Mr. Steinberg opined that although Brown was guilty of technical errors in record keeping and documentation as to the prescriptions involved in the subject claims, Brown had made substantial compliance with the Medicaid program requirements of the Medicaid provider agreement and the statutes and rules at issue and policies embodied in the subject handbook. He explained in his testimony that in the pharmacy practice setting in which Brown has operated, whereby it serves a large indigent population in an inner city environment, it is difficult to contact a prescriber at the time when a patient needs a critical prescription refilled in order to get a refill authorization. The prescriptions at issue mostly involve critical medications for HIV/Aids and psychotropic medications for severe mental conditions such as schizophrenia. The patients who need these critical medications (and there are very few patients, since most of the procedures involve filling and refilling for a small number of such recipients) are patients of clinics operated at the nearby university hospital (Shands). In these circumstances, where the patient literally needs the HIV/Aids medication refilled on an immediate basis, possibly even to prevent death, and the mental health patient critically needs a refill in order to prevent harm to the patient or harm to the members of the public if the patient goes without medication and "decompensates," the ethical thing for a pharmacist to do is to refill the prescription and seek authorization later. Mr. Steinberg established that it is often difficult to obtain authorization from the original prescriber since the medication were prescribed by residents practicing in the various clinics at the Shands Hospital and that the residents can not always be identified or contacted easily since they do not maintain a fixed medical practice in the area. Consequently, some of the prescriptions were not documented as to authorization, although in some cases the pharmacy actually obtained authorization and entered it in its computer. In some cases, being unable to obtain re-authorization from the resident who originally prescribed the medication the pharmacy used the DEA license or prescribing number of the hospital itself. He explained that although under the law a pharmacy can refill a prescription on an emergency basis for up to a 72-hour supply, that this is generally impracticable and unsafe for patients in this plight because such indigent, mental health and HIV/Aids patients tend to be non-compliant with their medication regimes quite often anyway, and it is often unreasonable to expect them to return to the pharmacy for another refill within two or three days. He thus opined that the ethical and safe thing for the pharmacist to do was to refill and re-dispense the medical approved medication for up to a 30 or 34-day supply (the normal refill supply duration). He further explained that the Shands Hospital license number was used in some of these circumstances because the resident doctor who originally issued the prescription could not be identified on the Shands Hospital prescription forms and because the resident doctors at the Shands clinics only have and can use Shands Hospital prescription forms in any event. Mr. Steinberg thus established that 35 percent of those prescription claims classified as "WMP," that is the prescription claims contained an incorrect prscriber license number were for these reasons and the pharmacist could only use the Shands Hospital license number because the resident could not be identified from the Shands Hospital prescription forms. He thus opined that 35 percent of the random sample extrapolation amount, the 95 percent statistical confidence limit amount of $79,097.00, should be deleted from that amount in determining the correct amount of overpayment predicated on the random sample. Likewise, with regard to the judgmental sample concerning the HIV/Aids and mental health patient prescriptions and related claims, he opined that, in effect, $19,500.00 of the total $29,381.09 overpayment amount claimed by the Agency pursuant to the judgmental sample portion of the claims, should be deleted from that portion of the overpayment claim by the Agency; this is a result of his explanation regarding "substantial compliance" in the critical refill situation he described concerning the HIV/Aids and mental health patients and their prescription drugs. The preponderant, persuasive evidence does establish (and indeed the Agency acknowledged in its Proposed Recommended Order) with regard to the judgmental sample, that 10 of the claims at issue listed an incorrect prescriber license number, but that the correct prescriber license number was actually documented in the pharmacy's computer record with the name of the prescriber. This circumstances comports with the law referenced below and in the Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order. This results in a reduction in the overpayment claim with regard to the judgmental sample of 13.88 percent of the judgmental sample claims or a reduction of $4,078.09. Likewise, with regard to the random sample extrapolation calculation of overpaid claims, the preponderant, persuasive evidence, also as acknowledged by the Agency in its Proposed Recommended Order, disclosed that seven claims listed an incorrect prescriber license number on the claims, but had been correctly documented in the pharmacy's computer system and therefore were in compliance with the relevant statutes, rules, and the subject handbook. Thus the discrepant claims and the overpayment amount related to the random sample portion of the audit claims should be reduced by 14.28 percent of the total amount of $79,097.00 for a $11,295.05 reduction of that $79,097.00 random sample overpayment amount. Mr. Steinberg demonstrated that Brown was not overcharging on the drugs prescribed and dispensed and was charging the Medicaid-authorized amount for the drugs involved in the prescription claims at issue. The Agency is not claiming that there was any fraudulent practice or illegal overcharging for the prescriptions involved. In fact, Brown was earning only a very small profit on the drugs dispensed that are the subject of the prescription claims at issue. Mr. Steinberg thus opined that since Brown did indeed dispense all the drugs at issue and was only paid the legal authorized amounts for the drugs and prescriptions at issue that recoupment of the amounts sought by the Agency or, in effect, established in these findings of fact, would be fundamentally unfair. He and the Respondent contend, rather, that since Brown performed substantial compliance, but was guilty of technical non-compliance with the relevant rules, agreement, and Medicaid policy, that the Agency should impose a lesser fine instead of seeking recoupment. In summary, in view of the preponderant persuasive evidence establishing the above facts, it has been shown that the documentation and record-keeping, dispensing errors, and omissions in the manner found above, with regard to the prescription claims and types of claims addressed in the above findings of fact, occurred. If those deficiencies amount to violations of the authority cited and discussed below which justify recoupment, then the amount of overpayment established by the above findings of fact is $93,104.95.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Agency for Health Care Administration providing for recoupment of $93,104.95, and that the Respondent, Brown Pharmacy, must re-pay that amount to the Petitioner Agency, through a reasonable re- payment plan established between the parties. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 2006.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner received Medicaid overpayments, and, if so, what is the aggregate amount of the overpayments.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration, is the single state agency charged with administration of the Medicaid program in Florida under Section 409.907, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, The Doctor's Office, was a Florida corporation approved by the Agency to provide group Medicaid services. At all times relevant to this matter, Petitioner was owned entirely by non-physicians who employed salaried physicians to provide Medicaid services. Petitioner, at all times relevant to this matter, offered physician services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to a contract with the Agency under provider number 371236P-00. Petitioner, pursuant to the specific terms in the contract with the Agency, agreed to abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program, and Federal laws and regulations. Petitioner, pursuant to its contract with the Agency, agreed to only seek reimbursement from the Medicaid program for services that were "medically necessary" and "Medicaid compensable." The Audit In mid-1996, the Agency, pursuant to its statutory responsibility, advised Petitioner that it intended to audit Petitioner's paid Medicaid claims for the alleged medical services it provided between July 1, 1994 and June 30, 1996. In September 1996, the Agency conducted an initial audit site visit, and randomly selected 61 patient files for review. The complete patient files, provided by Petitioner, were reviewed by Sharon Dewey, a registered nurse consultant and Agency employee, as well as Dr. Solenberger, a physician consultant and Agency employee. In accordance with its procedure, the Agency determined that Petitioner had submitted a total of 580 claims for reimbursement relating to the 61 patient files and had received full payment from the Medicaid program for each claim. On March 3, 1997, the Agency issued a Preliminary Agency Audit Report (PAAR), and advised Petitioner that it had over-billed Medicaid and received an overpayment from the program. Shortly thereafter, the Agency auditors, Dr. Solenberger and Ms. Dewey, met with Frank Colavecchio, Petitioner's Corporate Representative, and discussed the Medicaid violations alleged in the review. During the meeting, the Agency requested Mr. Colavecchio to instruct Petitioner's staff physicians to review their records and provide a written rebuttal to the Agency's initial determinations. Within days, and prior to any further action, the Agency placed the audit on indefinite hold. The Agency decided to delay the audit until certain proposed legislation relating to peer review and the integrity of the Medicaid reimbursement program was enacted. Two years later, Section 409.9131, Florida Statutes, was enacted during the 1999 legislative session and became law. Shortly thereafter, in 1999, the Agency hired Dr. Larry Deeb, a board-certified, practicing pediatrician, to perform a peer review of Petitioner's practices and procedures. Dr. Deeb has performed similar medical records reviews for the Medicaid program since 1981 and possesses a thorough understanding of CPT coding and the EPSDT requirements. Dr. Deeb received the medical files provided by Petitioner, and reviewed each patient file in the random sample, including the medical services and Medicaid-related claim records. On November 11, 1999, Dr. Deeb completed his peer review of 564 of the 580 claims provided in the random sample and forwarded his findings to the Agency. Dr. Deeb advised the Agency that 16 reimbursement claims involved adult patients and he therefore did not review them. Utilizing Dr. Deebs findings, the Agency employed appropriate and valid auditing and statistical methods, and calculated the total Medicaid overpayment that Petitioner received during the two year audit period. On July 17, 2000, approximately four years after the original audit notification, the Agency issued its Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR). The Agency advised Petitioner that, based upon its review of the random sample of 61 patients for whom Petitioner submitted 580 claims for payment between 1994 and 1996, Petitioner received $875,261.03 in total overpayment from the Medicaid program during the audit period. Petitioner denied the overpayment and requested a formal administrative hearing. Following the initial commencement of the final hearing in this matter in December 2001, Dr. Deeb, again, reviewed the disputed claims and modified his opinion relating to 6 claims. Thereafter, the Agency recalculated the alleged overpayment and demanded Petitioner to pay $870,748.31. The Allegations The Agency alleges that specific claims submitted by Petitioner, which were paid by the Medicaid program, fail to comply with specific Medicaid requirements and therefore must be reimbursed. Since its inception, the Medicaid program has required providers to meet the Medicaid program's policies and procedures as set forth in federal, state, and local law. To qualify for payment, it is the provider's duty to ensure that all claims "[a]re provided in accord with applicable provisions of all Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies and in accordance with . . . state . . . law." Section 409.913(5)(e), Florida Statutes (1993). Medicaid manuals are available to all Providers. Petitioner, as a condition of providing Medicaid services pursuant to the Medicaid program, is bound by the requirements and restrictions specified in the manuals, and under the contract, is required to reimburse the Medicaid program for any paid claims found to be in violation of Medicaid policies and procedures. The evidence presented at hearing established that Petitioner frequently violated various Medicaid policies and procedures. First, Petitioner repeatedly failed to comply with Section 10.9 of the Medicaid Physician's Provider Handbook, (MPPH), and Sections 409.905(9), 409.913(5)(e), 409.913(7)(e), and 409.913(7)(f), (1993, 1994 Supp. 1995, and 1996), Florida Statutes, which require all medical services to be rendered by, or supervised by a physician, and attested to by the physician's signature. Medical records reflecting services for paid claims must be physician signature certified and dated, or the services are not defined as physician's services. In addition, Petitioner routinely failed to correctly document the provision of certain physician's assistant (P.A.) Medicaid services that require the personal supervision of a physician or osteopath. See Chapter 1 of the Physician Assistant Coverage and Limitations Handbook, March 1995, and Appendix D (Glossary) in the Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Handbook, HCFA-1500 (HCFA-1500). In addition, Petitioner failed to comply with Medicaid regulations that require an approved physician to be present in the facility when certain P.A. services are delivered and to attest to it by signature within twenty-four hours of service. See Section 11.1 of the MPPH, effective July 1994, and Sections 409.905, and 409.913 (1993, 1994 Supp., 1995, and 1996 Supp.), Florida Statutes. The evidence presented at hearing also demonstrates that Petitioner repeatedly violated specific record keeping requirements located in Section 10.9 of the MPPH, Sections 10.6 and 11.5 of the Medicaid EPSDT Provider Handbook (EPSDT), and Sections 409.913(5)(e), 409.913(7)(e), and 409.913(7)(f), (1993, 1994 Supp., 1995, and 1996), Florida Statutes. In addition, the Agency demonstrated that Petitioner occasionally failed to document support for the necessity of certain services or simply billed for services that were not medically necessary. As indicated, Medicaid policy limits a physician to bill only for services that are medically necessary and defines the circumstances and varying levels of care authorized. In fact, Section 11.1 of the MPPH, effective July 1994, provides in part: The physician services program pays for services performed by a licensed physician or osteopath within the scope of the practice of medicine or osteopathy as defined by state law . . . . The services in this program must be performed for medical necessity for diagnosis and treatment of an illness on an eligible Medicaid recipient. Delivery of all services in this handbook must be done by or under the personal supervision of a physician or osteopath . . . at any place of service . . . . Each service type listed has special policy requirements that apply specifically to it. These must be adhered to for payment. The manual further provides clear guidelines defining authorized services for reimbursement which Petitioner apparently overlooked. For example, the manual defines the four types of medical history exams that Medicaid providers may conduct, the nature of the problems presented, and the appropriate and authorized tests. The manual also identifies the varying degrees of medical decision-making complexity related to Medicaid services and provides instructions relating to the method of selecting the correct evaluation and management code for billing. Petitioner consistently violated coding restrictions. Moreover, the Medicaid policy manual also outlines the specific procedures and billing requirements necessary for seeking payment for medical services including the early periodic screening for diagnosis and treatment (EPSDT) services. Chapter 10 and 11 of the MPPH specifically state that services that do not include all listed components of the EPSDT are not defined as an EPSDT, and upon audit, the Agency re-calculated Petitioner's medical services at the appropriate procedure code. Stipulation Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated that certain paid claims were correctly determined by the Agency to be overpayments. Specifically, the parties agreed that portions of samples 1, 3, 14, 21, 28, 41, 46, 47, 51, 53, and 56 could not be claimed for reimbursement since lab services which are part of an office visit reimbursement and/or lab service fees performed by an independent outside lab are not permitted. In addition, the parties agreed that specific portions of samples 1, 13, 14, 27, 28, 33, 35, 43, 46, 47, 52, 53, and 55 could not be claimed since Modifier 26 billing, the professional component, is only appropriate when the service is rendered in a hospital and Petitioner's services were rendered in an office. Pediatric Sample With regard to the random sample of pediatric files, upon careful review, the evidence presented at hearing sufficiently demonstrates that Petitioner was overpaid the following amounts on the following paid claims for the following reasons: The prolonged physician's services billed to Medicaid were not documented as having been provided or medically necessary. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 1 1/18/1996 99354 $ 36.64 1 5/14/1996 99354 $ 36.64 13 9/25/1995 99354 $ 36.64 19 9/28/1994 99354 $ 39.50 21 12/18/1995 99354 $ 36.64 28 3/06/1995 99354 $ 36.64 42 6/04/1996 99354 $ 36.64 43 12/19/1994 99354 $ 36.64 47 9/28/1994 99354 $ 39.50 47 10/17/1995 99354 $ 36.64 51 4/05/1995 99354 $ 36.64 53 11/02/1995 99354 $ 36.64 56 5/01/1996 99354 $ 36.64 The level of care billed to and reimbursed by Medicaid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care provided was at the 99213 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 1 9/14/1995 $ 34.14 1 1/18/1996 $ 34.14 1 5/14/1996 $ 34.14 33 9/28/1994 $ 20.00 47 10/17/1995 $ 34.14 The level of care billed and paid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99214 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 53 5/31/1995 $ 21.69 The level of care billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99204 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 25 7/27/1994 $ 2.00 The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99203 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 35 5/11/1995 $ 37.96 51 12/08/1994 $ 15.00 55 11/21/1995 $ 37.96 58 9/22/1995 $ 37.96 The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99215 office visit procedure code level was improper since the level of care that was provided was at the 99204 office visit procedure code level. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 43 12/11/1994 ($ 3.00) credit The level of care that was billed and paid at the 99205 office visit procedure code level was improper since the medical services provided and documentation supported an EPSDT visit. Cluster Number Date of Service Overpayment 53 2/06/1995 $ 16.53 The required components of the EPSDT were not documented as being performed at the office visit that had been claimed and paid as an EPSDT and therefore, the difference between the EPSDT payment received and the value of the procedure code for the documented level of office visit that occurred (i.e., 99214, 99213, 99212, 99211, or 99203), is deemed an overpayment. Cluster Number Date of Service Level of Visit Overpayment 1 7/28/1995 99213 $ 39.82 3 6/28/1995 99213 $ 39.82 5 3/03/1995 99203 $ 21.43 6 7/07/1994 99213 $ 5.00 10 8/17/1995 99212 $ 43.82 12 1/31/1996 99204 $ 0.00 14 5/31/1995 99213 $ 39.82 18 10/04/1994 99213 $ 5.00 18 1/29/1996 99214 $ 27.37 20 8/25/1994 99213 $ 5.00 21 12/11/1995 99214 $ 27.37 29 8/17/1994 99212 $ 9.00 Cluster Number Date of Service Level of Visit Overpayment 29 9/06/1995 99213 $ 39.82 40 7/25/1994 99203 $ 0.00 41 5/06/1996 99214 $ 27.37 46 9/19/1994 99213 $ 5.00 46 10/19/1995 99213 $ 39.82 47 11/02/1994 99213 $ 5.00 51 9/07/1995 99213 $ 39.82 53 7/10/1995 99213 $ 39.82 53 1/19/1995 99213 $ 39.82 59 5/02/1996 99203 $ 43.39 Adult Samples At hearing, Petitioner disputed all of the Agency's findings relating to patients over the age of 21 and objected to Dr. Deeb, a pediatrician, performing any review of their files. While Dr. Deeb is not the appropriate peer to review adult patient files, the following adult claims did not require substantive peer review and resulted in overpayment due to the stated reason: There were not any medical records in existence to indicate that any medical services were performed. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 2/20/1995 99215 $ 53.00 2 7/11/1995 99215 $ 59.14 2 8/09/1995 99215 $ 57.14 2 9/07/1995 99213 $ 23.00 2 10/11/1995 99213 $ 23.00 2 1/02/1996 99213 $ 23.00 2 3/22/1996 73560/Rad.Ex. $ 16.36 2 4/01/1996 99215 $ 57.14 2 4/05/1996 99213 $ 23.00 2 4/23/1996 99213 $ 23.00 15 2/16/1996 99213 $ 23.00 15 2/19/1996 99215 $ 57.14 16 5/14/1996 Blood Count $ 8.00 Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Code Billed and Paid Overpayment 16 5/14/1996 UA $ 3.00 16 5/14/1996 99215 $ 57.14 23 7/28/1994 99213 $ 23.00 23 5/09/1995 72069/26 Rad.Ex. $ 6.98 23 5/09/1995 72069/Rad.Ex. $ 17.45 23 10/20/1995 99213 $ 23.00 34 4/24/1996 99214 $ 35.45 57 11/17/1995 99215 $ 59.14 60 4/10/1996 99215 $ 57.14 61 5/22/1995 99213 $ 23.00 The medical records failed to contain the required physician's signature and date authenticating the fact that the services billed were performed by either P.A. Olsen or P.A. Avidon under physician supervision. The services provided by the non-physician employee were reviewed and down-coded by the Agency to the appropriate level physician's office visit code. Cluster Number Date of Service Proc. Code Pd./ P. Code Allowed Overpayment 2 6/30/1995 99215/99212 $ 36.14 2 7/20/1995 99215/99213 $ 34.14 2 7/28/1995 99215/99213 $ 34.14 2 9/05/1995 99215/99212 $ 36.14 8 4/17/1995 99205/99203 $ 35.96 17 3/27/1995 99205/99203 $ 35.96 23 5/09/1995 99215/99213 $ 32.14 23 6/09/1995 99215/99213 $ 32.14 34 4/23/1996 99205/99203 $ 35.96 The medical records failed to contain the required physician signature authenticating the fact that the services were provided by a physician. The services provided were reviewed and down-coded by the Agency to the appropriate level physician's office visit code. Procedure Code Cluster Number Date of Service Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 6/14/1995 99215/99211 $ 45.14 16 5/15/1996 99215/99211 $ 45.14 61 5/05/1995 99205/99204 $ 14.53 The provider improperly sought payment for lab services that were part of the office visit reimbursement and/or lab services performed by an independent outside lab. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 3/08/1996 UA $ 3.00 2 4/03/1996 UA $ 3.00 15 2/08/1996 UA $ 3.00 16 5/15/1996 Blood Count $ 8.50 16 5/15/1996 Blood Count $ 8.00 The provider improperly sought payment for Modifier 26 billings (professional component) which are only appropriate when the service is rendered in a hospital. Cluster Number Date of Service Procedure Billed and Paid Overpayment 2 2/17/1995 Radiologic exam $ 6.98 2 6/14/1995 Radiologic exam $ 7.20 8 4/17/1995 Tympanometry $ 9.00 16 5/13/1996 Radiologic exam $ 5.45 16 5/15/1996 Radiologic exam $ 6.98 In addition to the policy and procedural violations, Petitioner, in egregious violation of the Medicaid program, admittedly submitted Medicaid claims for the services of specialist physicians (such as an allergist, OB/GYN, podiatrist, psychologists, and ophthalmologists) not within its Provider group, collected Medicaid funds based on those claims, and reimbursed the respective specialist. While Petitioner's corporate representative, Mr. Colavecchio, was admittedly responsible for the coding and billing of the Medicaid services submitted for reimbursement, he was minimally aware of the Medicaid policy requirements and possessed limited working knowledge of CPT coding and EPSDT billing. In addition, Petitioner's employees, Dr. Keith Wintermeyer and Dr. Marcia Malcolm, were only moderately familiar with the CPT coding and EPSDT component requirements. They provided little input to Petitioner regarding CPT coding and the sufficiency of certain physician's services relating to EPSDT billing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency re-calculate the overpayment consistent with the Findings of Fact, and include only those identified violations in the cluster samples of the adult patient files, and issue a Final Order requiring Petitioner to reimburse, within 60 days, the Agency for the Medicaid overpayments plus any interest that may accrue after entry of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Felker-Little, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Charles D. Jamieson, Esquire Ward, Damon & Posner, P.A. 4420 Beacon Circle West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent Agency must be reimbursed by the Petition for purported overpayments regarding Medicaid claims, as delineated in the Respondent's Final Agency Audit Report of December 12, 2003, related to the audit period of July 1, 2000 through July 31, 2002.
Findings Of Fact The Agency is responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. The Agency is thus charged with a duty to recover overpayments to medical service providers enrolled in that program. The term "overpayment" means any amount not authorized to be paid by the Medicaid program, whether paid as a result of inaccurate reporting or improper reporting of costs, improper claims, unacceptable practices, fraud, abuse, or by mistake. See § 409.913.(1).(d), Fla. Stat. The Petitioner, Maria Lourdes Burgos, M.D., is a pediatrician duly licensed in the State of Florida, practicing as an authorized Medicaid provider for purposes of the relevant portions of Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, at times pertinent hereto. During the period July 1, 2000 through July 31, 2002, (the audit period) the Petitioner had a valid Medicaid provider agreement with the Respondent Agency. During the period of the audit the Petitioner provided services to Medicaid recipients or patients and submitted claims for those services and was compensated for those services. This case is a result of the Agency's attempt to recover purported overpayments from Dr. Burgos. In choosing to become a Medicaid provider, a physician such as Dr. Burgos must assume the responsibilities enumerated in Section 409.913(7), Florida Statutes (2004), which provided generally that such a provider had an affirmative duty to supervise the provision of such services and be responsible for the preparation and submission of claims. The claims are required to be true and accurate, the services are required to actually have been furnished to the recipient by the provider submitting the claim; the services are required to be medically necessary, of a comparable quality to those furnished to the general public by the provider's peers; and to have been provided in accordance with all applicable provisions of Medicaid rules, regulations, handbooks, and policies. They must be in accordance with federal, state, and local law. Additionally, the provision of medical services are required to be documented by records made contemporaneously with the provision of the services, demonstrating the medical necessity for them and the medical basis and specific need for them must be properly documented in the recipient's medical record. The "audit period" involved in this proceeding is July 1, 2000 through July 31, 2002. The Medicaid program reimbursed Dr. Burgos in excess of $43,238.57 in payments pursuant to the Medicaid program during that audit period. The Final Agency Audit Report is in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit One and the calculations pertaining to the overpayment amount are included in that report as part of Respondent's Exhibit One in evidence. The Agency contends that $43,238.57 is an overpayment and subject to recoupment because of Medicaid policy, as alleged in the Final Agency Audit Report (FAAR). Medical records reveal that some services billed, and for which payment was received, were not documented and that documentation provided supported a lower level of office visits than the one for which the Medicaid program was billed and for which payment was received by the Petitioner; and, because payments can be made only for those services listed in the provider handbook, that the Petitioner billed and received payments for services not covered by Medicaid as overpayments. The Agency furnishes all authorized Medicaid providers a manual entitled The Physician Coverage and Limitations Handbook (Handbook). The Handbook contains the requirements demanded of Medicaid providers and it and the procedure code manual (CPT) manual that was in effect during the audit period is in evidence in this proceeding. The handbook has been incorporated by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.230. This handbook sets forth Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-4.230 and sets forth pertinent applicable Medicaid policies and claims processing requirements applicable to this proceeding. Upon convening of the audit procedure, the Agency requested certain records from the Petitioner and the Petitioner fully complied with the relevant requirements of Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, submitting copies of all records dealing with the recipients who where the subject of the audit. See Exhibit Eight in evidence. The Petitioner, in effect, does not dispute the statistical methodology employed by the agency, but does dispute the manner in which it was applied to certain procedure codes (CPT codes) and the result of the overpayment calculations. Additionally, for every office visit that the Petitioner had with Medicaid patients, she personally made an individual judgment about the level of service that she provided and accordingly billed for that level of care and treatment provided. She was consistent in this in her billing practices as to both Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients. In some instances, regarding the audited Medicaid patient/recipient records, it was demonstrated by the Petitioner that the patient presented with somewhat more complexity as to medical condition that the CPT code, postulated by the Agency as applicable, represented that thus she billed for the higher code (as for instance a "99215" instead of a "99213) or "99214"). Some of these medical judgment calls made by the Petitioner were shown to be appropriate and justified and some where shown by the Respondent's evidence, chiefly the testimony of Dr. Larry Deeb, the Respondent's expert, to be not really appropriate and that they should have been coded and therefore billed at a lower level. In any event, based upon the testimony of Dr. Larry Deeb, as well as the Petitioner's testimony, the submission of both a "well child" checkup billing and a "sick office visit" billing was appropriate and consistent with good medical practice under the circumstances demonstrated by the Petitioner's testimony and her records. Thus it was inappropriate for the Agency to automatically claim an overpayment due for those billings, based upon only its policy interpretation. Additionally, based upon Ms. Mocks testimony, it is apparently an Agency policy or practice in conducting audits, and in recouping overpayments, that when errors are discovered in the audit or in the billing records which happen to be in favor of the practitioner (the Petitioner) that the Agency does not provide a credit applied to any alleged overpayment. It would seem that fundamental fairness dictates that both credits and overpayments be weighed against each other in calculating the ultimate amount of any overpayment, if one exists. In any event, based upon Dr. Deeb's testimony and the Petitioner's testimony, with regard to the random sample of patients and their medical records submitted, reviewed and involved in this dispute, the evidence demonstrates that the Petitioner was not overpaid as to the following amounts and patients/recipients: Recipient Date of CPT Disallowed/ Number Service Billed and Paid Adjusted Amount 1 12/05/00 99215 $37.59 09/05/01 99215 $60.95 2 03/05/01 99214 $15.11 3 09/19/00 99215 $13.01 4 04/04/01 99215 $60.95 5 09/15/00 99214 $15.11 05/10/01 W9881 $22.70 6 01/14/02 99215 $14.52 8 11/08/01 99214 $15.11 9 05/03/01 99205 $87.24 10 05/03/01 99205 $87.241/ 11 04/04/02 90669 $ 0.002/ 04/04/01 W9881 $37.81 04/04/01 99214 $46.42 12 10/18/01 99214 $15.11 01/18/02 99215 $29.63 01/30/02 99215 $14.52 05/20/02 99214 $15.11 13 08/14/00 99215 $13.01 14 01/31/01 99214 $15.11 08/27/01 99214 $15.11 05/13/02 99214 $24.58 15 10/17/00 99356 $50.94 Recipient Date of CPT Disallowed/ Number Service Billed and Paid Adjusted Amount 10/19/00 99233 $12.53 16 10/13/00 99215 $57.14 17 05/10/01 99215 $60.95 12/11/01 W9881 $37.81 12/11/01 99214 $46.42 20 12/22/00 99205 $17.02 22 11/19/01 99223 $42.04 11/20/00 99239 $11.53 23 03/27/02 W1998 $ 0.003/ 04/03/02 99356 $49.72 04/22/02 99215 $ 0.004/ 04/29/02 99214 $13.86 05/10/02 99215 $ 0.005/ 24 08/12/01 99356 $ 0.006/ 08/15/01 99239 $12.06 25 09/30/01 99223 $22.71 10/01/01 99233 $12.66 26 12/03/01 99356 $49.257/ 12/06/01 99239 $12.06 12/14/01 99205 $18.12 01/16/02 99215 $29.63 01/23/02 99215 $29.638/ 28 10/13/01 99431 $ 0.009/ Recipient Number Date of Service CPT Disallowed/ Billed and Paid Adjusted Amount 10/14/02 99233 $12.66 10/15/01 99239 $12.06 29 02/28/02 99356 $ 5.4210/ 03/01/02 99233 $13.80 03/02/02 99239 $13.66 03/06/02 99205 $18.67 29 03/13/02 99215 $14.52 11. The Petitioner in its Proposed Recommended Order has agreed that other than the above (Proposed Recommended Order paragraph 10 patients and amounts) that the Petitioner agrees with the Agency's review and the overpayment calculations on a per office visit basis. Additionally, however, as referenced above, there were additional health insurance claim forms which were, or should have been, submitted to the Agency, representing claims for payment for dates of service that clearly fall within the relevant audit period, that were never compensated by the Agency's contracted agent. The alternative is that the claim forms for some reason were not actually submitted. Unfortunately, neither the Petitioner's records and testimony nor the Agency records can clearly show whether the claim forms were actually submitted or not. It is apparently not possible to retrieve that information from the Agency's claim filling and payment-related computer programming system, for reasons not understood by either party or the judge. There is thus no clear explanation of record concerning why these claims were not paid earlier, even though they fall within the audited period. It is clear, however, that the additional claims referenced in the Petitioner's Exhibit Seven, admitted as a late exhibit herein, do relate to that audit period and represent medical services provided by the Petitioner within that audit period. Since that audit period and the claims referenced in evidence are the subject of a "proceeding" and are pending a "court or hearing decision . . ." or, alternatively and admittedly somewhat speculatively, could be subject of a "system error on claim that was originally filed within (12) months from date of service," it appears patently apparent that fundamental fairness dictates that these health insurance claim forms related to the same audit period should be considered and a determination made as to whether and how much of those claims should be reimbursed to the Petitioner for the medical services they represent. Thus, especially as to exception (2) to the twelve- month filing requirement listed in the above-reference handbook, Exhibit Seven has been admitted into evidence and the claim forms represented therein should be considered and the amounts payable to the Petitioner should be credited against the resultant overpayment amounts calculated as a result of these Findings of Fact.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, re-calculate the amount of overpayment in a manner consistent with the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, excluding from the amount of overpayment those amounts determined above to have not constituted overpayments. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Respondent calculate the amount of reimbursement not provided pursuant to the recently submitted or re-submitted (but never paid) Exhibit Seven health insurance claim forms, and as for the reasons indicted in the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and credit that additional amount of reimbursement against the overpayment calculation amount in arriving at the new overpayment due from the Petitioner to the Respondent. The Petitioner shall repay the Respondent the re-calculated monetary amount of overpayment within a reasonable period of time and by reasonable installment payments, agreed to by both parties, but shall not be obligated to pay other costs or fees related to this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2005.
