The Issue Whether Respondent was required and failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage for his employees during the period from March 7, 1997 through March 7, 2000, and, if so, what penalty should be assessed, pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with enforcing the requirement that employers secure workers' compensation insurance for the benefit of their employees. On March 7, 2001, one of Petitioner's investigators observed two individuals, Worker 1 and Worker 2,3 painting a sidewalk, curb stops, and lines in the parking lot of a 7-Eleven store in Lake Worth, Florida. At that time, the investigator performed an on-site inspection. The investigator interviewed the two workers and completed a worksheet to determine if they were independent contractors. Worker 1 and Worker 2, among other things, worked for and were paid weekly by Respondent as painters, did not maintain a separate business from Respondent, did not control the means of performing their work, did not incur the expenses of their work, and did not incur the principal expenses related to their work. The investigator determined that the two workers were not independent contractors but were employees of Respondent. Neither Worker 1 nor Worker 2 was granted a workers' compensation exemption. Both workers were unprotected by workers' compensation insurance. Respondent provided to Petitioner's investigator federal tax Form 1099s for the years 1998 and 1999, pertaining to Worker 1 and Worker 2 and a handwritten note indicating the compensation paid to them during the year 2000. The documents indicated that Respondent paid the workers for the years 1998 through 2000 the following: Worker 1--$9,685 for 1998, $19,180 for 1999, and $3,330 for 2000; and Worker 2--$2,790 for 1999, and $240 for 2000. A compilation of approved classifications that groups employers according to their operations is published by the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI). The publication is Scopes Manual, Scopes of Basic Manual Classifications (Scopes Manual). NCCI is a rating organization in Florida, which represents workers' compensation carriers. NCCI seeks approval from Florida's Department of Insurance of rates charged by workers' compensation carriers. NCCI and Professional Insurance Associates, as well as other sources, publish tables of approved rates for each classification code. It is undisputed that NCCI's publication of class codes and rates is relied upon and used by Petitioner to determine an employer's class code and the workers' compensation insurance rate. On March 7, 2000, Petitioner's investigator issued a SWO to Respondent. On March 8, 2000, Petitioner issued a NPAO to Respondent, indicating an assessment and penalty of $18,824. The investigator determined that, based upon what he had observed and the information that he had obtained, the work being performed by Worker 1 and Worker 2 was painting and was classified under Scopes Manual Code 5474. The investigator determined the evaded premium, or the premium that Respondent would have paid had he secured workers’ compensation insurance, by multiplying the gross compensation to employees each year by the premium rate for that Code for that year. The statutory penalty on the evaded premium is twice the evaded premium. The calculated penalty was $18,724. Added to the $18,724 was $100, which represented the penalty for the one day, March 7, 2000, that Respondent was not in compliance with the workers’ compensation requirement. On October 20, 2000, Petitioner issued a Second Amended Notice and Penalty Assessment Order, which was the final assessment, against Respondent assessing a penalty of $69,569, which included the $100 penalty. Pursuant to an agreement, Respondent performs general maintenance and preventative maintenance (GMPM) for Southland Corporation at 100 or more 7-Eleven stores in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties. Petitioner was able to interview 13 of Respondent's employees, Worker 1 through Worker 13.4 As not a part of the GMPM agreement, Respondent's employees paint curbs, bumpers, and lines in the parking lot of each 7-Eleven store once each year. Respondent’s employees also engaged in the following: painting of buildings’ exterior and interior, parking lots, and loading docks; hanging drywall; setting of tile; paving of parking lots; repairing stucco and concrete; minor plumbing; carpentry, including trim, installation of doors and locks; filling potholes; and installing walls and cabinets. For example, Worker 10, who was employed with Respondent between June 1996 and January 1998, initially performed a daily activity of painting lines and curbs in parking lots at 7-Eleven stores. He could be assigned three stores in one day performing this activity. Later, Worker 10 performed under the GMPM agreement doing the following: painting the exterior and interior of stores, which could be the entire outside or a storeroom; tiling floors and ceilings; patching blacktop and repairing asphalt; and engaging in carpentry work, including putting up wooden shelves in storage rooms, cutting, nailing and screwing boards, and operating saws. Worker 10 also assisted Worker 6, who was a carpenter, repairing enclosures for dumpsters. The repairs consisted of sinking four-by-four posts into the ground, replacing slats, and occasionally replacing the entire enclosure due to damage caused by a truck backing into the enclosure. As another example, Worker 11 was employed with Respondent during 1998 and 1999 for 14 months and worked under the GMPM agreement. Worker 11 performed all activities under the agreement in maintaining the 7-Eleven stores, except for electrical and internal plumbing. The work to which he was assigned generally lasted four days a week, but for one day a week, he was assigned to handling service calls or performing line striping. Worker 11 performed the following: resurfacing asphalt; painting the entire parking lot, including lines for parking spaces and curbs; replacing or repairing ceiling and floor tile; laying tar on the roof; performing carpentry, including building shelves in storing rooms, reinforcing shelving, hanging new doors, replacing door hardware, and performing carpentry alongside Worker 6; and repairing enclosures for dumpsters by re-hanging doors, replacing slats, and replacing four-by-four posts. Even though Respondent stated that he subcontracted the repair of roofs and dumpsters, the installation of doors and electrical and plumbing work, he failed to present evidence showing to whom and when the work was subcontracted.5 Petitioner presented evidence demonstrating that Respondent’s employees performed all of the work described, except for electrical work. The work performed by Respondent’s employees included multiple class codes. NCCI requires the assignment of the highest rated classification under such circumstances. Carpentry is the highest-rated classification for all the work performed by Respondent’s employees, and the Scopes Manual Code for carpentry is 5403. Scopes Manual Code 5403 is also the code for the enclosure of a dumpster and the installation of a pre-hung door. The corresponding rate per $100 of payroll assigned to Scopes Manual Code 5403 is different for the applicable years 1997 through 2000. The rate for 1997 was 29.77; for 1998 was 29.09; for 1999 was 26.66; and 2000 was 27.96. Worker 1 through Worker 13 did not maintain a separate business from Respondent, did not control the means of performing their work, did not incur the expenses of their work, and did not incur the principal expenses related to their work. None of Respondent’s 13 employees had a valid workers’ compensation exemption. None of them were protected by workers’ compensation insurance. Respondent’s usual and customary practice was to pay his employees on a weekly basis. His usual and customary practice was to employ four or more employees during a weekly pay period. Respondent’s usual and customary practice was to employ four or more employees during any payroll period. Respondent asserts that he relied upon subcontractors for some of the work. The identity of the subcontractors, the service performed, and the frequency of their work are unknown. Whether the subcontractors had workers’ compensation insurance is also unknown. As a result, a determination cannot be made as to what Respondent’s responsibility, if any, was to the subcontractors as to workers’ compensation insurance, which in turn would affect an assessed penalty under worker’s compensation. To establish what his payroll was for the three years preceding the issuance of the SWO on March 7, 2000, Respondent used federal tax Form 1099s and cancelled business checks. For the years 1997 through 2000, Respondent’s payroll was as follows: Worker 1--1998 was $9,685, 1999 was $19,180, and 2000 was $3,330; Worker 2--1999 was $2,790, and 2000 was $240; Worker 3--1997 was $2,100, 1999 was $2,035, and 2000 was $3,045; Worker 4--1999 was $2,100; Worker 5--1997 was $1,900; Worker 6--1997 was $4,620, 1998 was $15,965, 1999 was $5,100, and 2000 was $3,303; Worker 7- -1999 was $610; Worker 8--1997 was $1,380, 1998 was $5,640, 1999 was $7,640, and 2000 was $350; Worker 9--1997 was $3,120; Worker 10--1997 was $8,450, and 1998 was $960; Worker 11--1998 was $7,095, and 1999 was $7,225; Worker 12--1998 was $2,883; and Worker 13--1999 was $2,675. Consequently, Respondent’s total payroll for 1997 was $21,570, for 1998 was $42,228, for 1999 was $49,355, and for 2000 was $10,268. Respondent’s payroll of $21,570 for 1997, was for the entire year. Petitioner made no reduction for the time period in the year 1997 prior to March 8, 1997, which would have been three years prior to the SWO on March 7, 2000. The statutory penalty assessed by Petitioner in its Second Amended Notice and Assessment Order against Respondent was $69,569, which included the penalty of $100. Petitioner’s assessment should be reduced to compensate for the Respondent’s payroll during the period of January 1, 1997 through March 7, 1997.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Compliance enter a final order against Gregory Dennis Nelly: Sustaining the Stop Work Order. Sustaining the penalty assessed in the Second Amended Notice and Penalty Assessment Order minus the calculation for the payroll during the period of January 1, 1997 through March 7, 1997. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2001.
Findings Of Fact State of Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Unemployment Appeals Commission ("Commission") is an agency affected by the petition in this matter. It exists within the Department of Labor and Employment Security ("Department"), and receives its property, personnel, and appropriations from the Department. The Commission and the Department are agencies as defined in Section 120.52(1), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Juan Alfonso, Social Security Number 034-44-0611, resides at 20082 N.W. 43 Court, Carol City, Dade County, Florida. Petitioner is a party in proceedings before the Commission to obtain unemployment compensation benefits. His case was Referee Decision Docket No. 80-901OU, and is now on appeal by Petitioner to the Unemployment Appeals Commission, UCA Docket No. 80-2199. Petitioner was denied unemployment compensation benefits by a claims examiner of the Department, who issued two claims determinations on or about May 1, 1980. The Claims Examiner is not employed by the Commission, but by the Department. Exhibits B and C attached hereto are true and correct copies of the determinations issued by the claims examiner on or about May 1, 1980. Petitioner timely appealed both decisions of the Claims Examiner. A hearing was noticed on Petitioner's appeal. Notice of the hearing was given pursuant to Form UCA-2 and Rule 38E- 5.15(2), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 38E-5.15(2), Florida Administrative Code, a rule of the Commission. Form UCA-2 is issued by the Department. Exhibit A, consisting of two pages, attached hereto, is a true and correct copy of the front and back of the notice of hearing given Petitioner in the hearing regarding his appeal from the Claims Examiner's determination. Petitioner was given no other written notice of hearing. Hearing was held before an appeals referee, an employee of the Department, on June 11, 1980, pursuant to the notice attached as Exhibit A. Petitioner appeared at the hearing on June 11, 1980, without counsel. Petitioner has standing to bring this Rule Challenge. Exhibit D attached hereto, consisting of four pages, is a true and correct copy of the Referee's decision issued as a result of the hearing held on June 11, 1980, in Docket No. 80-9010U. Petitioner timely appealed that decision to the Commission. Petitioner's appeal is currently pending before the Commission in UCA Docket No. 80-2199. Petitioner's case has not yet been decided by the Commission. Petitioner is not receiving unemployment compensation benefits at this time, due to the adverse decision of the appeals referee resulting from the June 11 hearing. When a claimant such as Petitioner files a claim with the Department for unemployment compensation benefits, he completes Claim for Benefits LES form UCA-3, which requests the name of the last employer and the reason for separation. Upon completion of the form, his last employer is furnished LES form UCA-4, which contains the reasons for the separation contained on LES form UCA- The employer is requested by the Department to provide information regarding the reason for his job separation, whether the claimant has refused an offer of work, and whether the employer would re-employ the claimant. Upon receipt of the employer's response, a fact finding interview is conducted by a claims interviewer employed by the Department, who inquires into the subject of the termination, offers of work, and work search. The interviewer verbally advises the claimant of the employer's statement. The claimant provides his response. A summary of the interview is recorded on LES form UCA-64. During or after the interview, the claims interviewer contacts the employer by telephone and advises the employer verbally of the claimant's statements made on the fact finding report. The employer provides his statement to the interviewer. A summary of the telephone interview is recorded on the Fact Finding Report. If the employer raises a new matter not raised in his initial response, the claimant is verbally advised of such matters. The claimant provides a statement in response. A summary of the claimant's response is recorded on a Fact Finding Report. A claims determination is then rendered. If the determination is favorable to the claimant, the employer may appeal. If the determination is adverse to the claimant, the claimant may appeal. Notice of hearing of the appeal is given pursuant to Rule 38E-5.15(2). If the party resides in Florida, the notice of hearing is provided on form UCA- 2. The majority of unemployment compensation claimants' are not represented by counsel at any stage of the proceedings; however, Respondent does not concede that whether a claimant is represented by counsel is relevant to the subject matter of the rule challenge hearing. A claimant who has been determined by a claims examiner to have voluntarily quit his job without good attributable to the employer can be found by an appeals referee to have been discharged for misconduct connected with work. A claimant who has been determined by a claims examiner to have been discharged can be found by an appeals referee to have voluntarily quit his job without good cause attributable to the employer. Respondent does not concede that LES Form UCA-2 is a rule. LES Form UCA-2 has not been adopted pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. In adopting Rule 38E-5.15(2), the Commission did not seek modification of the model rules as described in Section 120.54(10), Florida Statutes. SUPPLEMENTAL STIPULATION The parties stipulate as follows regarding the hearing held before the appeals referee on June 11, 1980, in Referee Docket No. 80-9010U, regarding Petitioner's claim for unemployment compensation benefits: Several times during the hearing, the petitioner asked for clarification of which job was being referred to. Petitioner stated that he did not understand the paper from the unemployment office. Petitioner stated that he did not understand what job he was supposed to have quit, or what location he was supposed to be dissatisfied with. Petitioner had difficulty answering questions about tardiness, stating he could not remember. The employer raised the issue of misconduct for the first time at the hearing.
Findings Of Fact Respondent James Seay, who had worked as a teacher in Suwannee County for many years, was out sick first with a stomach virus and then with recurring head pain for the entire school week of March 4-8, 1991. He visited physicians on March 5, 7 and 8, and took three prescribed medicines. Mr. Seay telephoned the morning of March 4, 1992, and told Sonja Suber, a secretary who was "the designated person at the school," (T.48) responsible for obtaining substitute teachers and maintaining sick leave records, that he was ill and would not be in that day. The parties agree that respondent was on sick leave through March 8, 1991. On the evening of March 4, 1991, he telephoned Nancy Roberts, director of elementary education for the Suwanee County School District and principal of Douglass Center. When Mr.Seay told her he would not be in the following day, she cancelled an observation she had scheduled for his benefit. The next day or the day after Sonya Suber telephoned respondent to relay Ms. Roberts' advice that a meeting scheduled for March 11, 1991, had been cancelled. On Saturday, March 9, 1991, Mr. Seay telephoned Ms. Suber and said "that he would be coming Monday to the school but he would not report to the classroom." T. 29. He had earlier expressed to Ms. Roberts discomfort "with the students that were assigned" (T. 46) to him. On Monday, March 11, 1991, at 7:53 o'clock in the morning, he appeared as promised and signed in at Suwanee County School District's Douglass Center. After greeting Sonya Suber, he went to the teachers' lounge. He did not give any indication that he was unwell or make any request for leave. Ms. Roberts saw Mr. Seay reading a newspaper in the lounge. She asked him to accompany her to her office, where she "let him know that he was a teacher assigned to the Alternative Program at the Douglass Center and what his responsibilities were . . . working with the students there." T.50. Respondent handed Ms. Roberts one of his attorney's cards, and told her "that there was nothing [she] could do to make him go in that classroom and that he was not going to that classroom," (T.50) and asked her "to stop harassing him." Id. After Mr. Seay's return to the teachers' lounge, Ms. Roberts gave an account of events to Mr. Charles F. Blalock, Jr., petitioner here. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. The following morning Mr. Seay signed in at the Douglass Center at ten before eight, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, but he again went to the teachers' lounge rather than to his assigned classroom. Again he told nobody he was ill, and asked nobody for sick leave. Ms. Roberts twice asked him to go to his classroom. When she told him his failure to teach the class he had been assigned "could be construed as insubordination on his part," (T.53) he asked her to clarify what she meant by insubordination and, with her permission, made a tape recording of her answer. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. He refused to go to his classroom. On Wednesday, March 13, 1991, Mr. Blalock wrote a letter to Mr. Seay advising him that he was suspended with pay, and that, as superintendent, he would recommend suspension without pay and ultimately dismissal at the next regular meeting of the School Board. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. When Ms. Roberts telephoned Thursday morning with word that Mr. Seay was at Douglass Center, Mr. Blalock went himself to speak to Mr. Seay. Twice he personally directed Mr. Seay to go to his classroom and get to work. Confronted with Mr. Seay's silent refusal, Mr. Blalock handed him the letter of suspension, dated the day before. When the School Board met, heard what had transpired, and listened to a presentation by Mr. Seay's lawyer, it decided that Mr. Seay should have a physical examination and be examined by a psychiatrist. At the school board meeting, nobody suggested that respondent was on sick leave at any time after March 8, 1991. In keeping with the collectively bargained agreement between the School Board and teachers like Mr. Seay under continuing contract with the School Board, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, petitioner demanded that respondent go for medical and psychiatric examinations, by letter dated April 10, 1991. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. A second, follow-up letter reiterating the demand, dated April 29, 1991, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9, reached Mr. Seay by registered mail. As of the time of the hearing, Mr. Seay had not complied with the Board's demand that he submit to a physical examination and be examined by a psychiatrist.
Recommendation It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner terminate respondent's employment. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1992. APPENDIX FOR NO. 91-6046 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-11 and 13-20 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 12 pertains to immaterial matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 21, respondent apparently also took the position that he had been on sick leave in the unemployment compensation case. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 22 and 23 pertain to subordinate matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-3, 5-8 and 19 have been adopted in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 4, 9-12, 21 and 24 pertain to subordinate matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 13 and 15 are immaterial since respondent never requested sick leave. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 14, 16, 17 and 18 have been rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, Ms. Roberts' testimony in that regard is unrebutted. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 22, there is no disagreement. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 23 pertains to an immaterial matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400 Charles Blalock, Superintendent Suwanee County School Board 224 W. Parshley Street Live Oak, FL 32060 J. Victor Africano, Esquire Post Office Box 1450 Live Oak, FL 32060 Linsey Moore, Esquire 50 East 2nd Street Jacksonville, FL 32206
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent failed to abide by the coverage requirements of the Workers' Compensation Law, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2002), by not obtaining workers' compensation insurance for her employees; and whether the Petitioner properly assessed a penalty against the Respondent pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of the workers' compensation law that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat (2002).1 On March 27, 2003, the Department's district supervisor, Leo Canton, assembled a compliance team of three investigators: Donald Lott, Carol Cobb, and Tracey Gilbert. They met at the Gibsonton exit of I-75, south of Tampa at the Alafia River, and began riding around the area, where a good deal of new home construction was taking place. The group was looking for potential violations of the workers' compensation statute. From the main road, they could see some workers on a two-story house with exposed trusses, and Mr. Canton decided this would be a good place to investigate. The compliance team arrived at the job site, 9734 White Barn Road, Riverview, Florida. They observed five men conducting framing activities, which included cutting two-by- fours, climbing ladders to adjust trusses and hurricane ties, and laying plywood sheathing on the trusses. The five men were later identified as Darren McCarty, Robert Stinchcomb, James King, Jeffrey Judson, and James Conner. Parked in front of the partially constructed house was a utility trailer registered to Susie Riopelle. The trailer contained an air compressor, hoses, framing equipment, ladders, nail guns, and other tools. The main hose from the air compressor was split into six or seven separate hoses so that the workers could simultaneously use multiple nail guns. Mr. Canton asked the men to stop working and talk with him. Mr. Canton testified that each of the five men told the same basic story: he was employed by Yellow Jacket Construction, Inc. ("Yellow Jacket"); he was paid by the hour and in cash; and Yellow Jacket owned the tools in the utility trailer. The only variable was the length of employment for each man. Mr. Canton told the men they would need to contact their employer. They all stated that Edward Riopelle was their boss. Mr. Canton then asked the men if they would mind giving statements to members of the compliance team. All five workers agreed to give statements. Mr. Lott and Mr. Canton interviewed Darren McCarty, who told them he worked for Yellow Jacket as a framer and carpenter and that he was paid weekly in cash by Edward Riopelle at the rate of $12 to $15 per hour, depending on the job. Mr. McCarty signed a notarized Affidavit confirming this information. Mr. Canton interviewed Robert Stinchcomb, who said that he worked for Yellow Jacket as a framer. Mr. Stinchcomb identified Edward Riopelle as his boss and stated that he was paid $10 per hour, in cash. Mr. Stinchcomb signed a notarized Affidavit confirming this information. Jeffrey Judson signed an Affidavit stating that he worked as a framer for Yellow Jacket and that he was paid $12 per hour, in cash, by Edward Riopelle. After the interviews, Mr. Canton determined that the five workers were employees of either Yellow Jacket or Edward Riopelle. None of the five workers interviewed at the job site had workers' compensation insurance on March 27, 2003. Mr. Canton directed Mr. Lott to issue a stop work order. Mr. Lott issued the order to Edward Riopelle, who had arrived at the job site after being phoned by one of the workers. Edward Riopelle informed the Department personnel that Yellow Jacket had been dissolved and that his wife, Susie Riopelle, was the sole owner of the business. As of March 27, 2003, Respondent Susie Riopelle was a sole proprietor operating in the construction industry by framing single-family homes. Ms. Riopelle had been the sole owner of Yellow Jacket, a corporation which was also in the business of framing construction. Yellow Jacket had contracted with a payroll leasing company that was responsible for paying the salaries of and providing workers' compensation coverage for Yellow Jacket's employees, who were paid by the hour. In January 2003, Ms. Riopelle and her husband Edward (who had no formal involvement with Yellow Jacket, though he often assisted his wife with aspects of the business) began planning to leave the Tampa Bay area and move to Fort White in Columbia County. They consulted with their employees, who expressed a desire to stay together and obtain construction work on their own. The Riopelles advised their employees that they would have to establish their own businesses in order to obtain work as independent contractors. Ms. Riopelle advised the employees to obtain occupational licenses, commercial liability insurance, and apply for exemptions from workers' compensation insurance requirements. At some point in March 2003, Ms. Riopelle began treating these Yellow Jacket employees as independent contractors working on houses that Ms. Riopelle had contracted to build. Among these purported independent contractors were the five men interviewed by the compliance team on March 27, 2003: Jeffrey Judson, Darren McCarty, Robert Stinchcomb, James King, and James Conner.2 Messrs. King, McCarty, Judson, and Conner obtained their own Hillsborough County occupational licenses in mid- February 2003. The "business type" listed on each of their licenses was "perform services for construction contractor." Mr. Stinchcomb already had a Hillsborough County occupational license, dated June 8, 2001, as a "sub-contractor (can't bid; works under contractor)." Messrs. Judson, King, McCarty, and Conner obtained individual general liability insurance through Commercial Casualty Insurance Company of North Carolina. Mr. Judson's and Mr. McCarty's policies covered the period February 19 through May 19, 2003. Mr. King's and Mr. Conner's policies covered the period March 14 through June 14, 2003. On March 18, 2003, Ms. Riopelle and her sister-in-law, Tina Shew, appeared at the Department's Tampa office seeking to file applications for workers' compensation exemptions on behalf of four of the former Yellow Jacket employees, including some of those who were at the job site on March 27, 2003. Mr. McCarty testified that he paid Ms. Shew to handle the paperwork so that he would not have to miss work. Ms. Riopelle testified that Ms. Shew had the same arrangement with the other workers. Mr. Canton testified that Department rules prohibit anyone other than the applicant from submitting an application for exemption and that an investigation is usually commenced when someone comes in with multiple applications. He met with Ms. Riopelle and Ms. Shew and attempted to explain that there was more to attaining non-employee status than having the exemption and an occupational license. He gave Ms. Riopelle a "Non-Employee Worksheet," a document used by investigators in the field, in an effort to explain the nine statutory factors considered by the Department in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. In speaking with Ms. Riopelle, Mr. Canton learned that she was a subcontractor for Badger Construction, a company that was building 300 houses in the Gibsonton area. Ms. Riopelle told Mr. Canton that her contact at Badger Construction was the person who told her how to qualify her employees as independent contractors. Mr. Canton testified that he had never heard of Badger Construction and was concerned that it was apparently giving bad information to its subcontractors. Mr. Canton instructed the Department's examiner not to process the applications submitted by Ms. Riopelle and Ms. Shew, pending an investigation of this matter. It is reasonable to infer that this conversation with Ms. Riopelle led Mr. Canton to choose the Gibsonton area for the compliance team's March 27, 2003, visit. On March 27, 2003, after the initial stop work order was issued, Mr. Lott served Ms. Riopelle with a "Request for Business Owner Affidavit and Production of Business Records," seeking copies of business records "to determine whether or not you or your business is required to provide Workers' Compensation insurance coverage for employees, or to determine the civil penalties you may owe for failing to carry Workers' Compensation insurance." At the time the stop work order was issued, Section 440.107(2), Florida Statutes, required each employer to keep business records that enable the Department to determine the employer's compliance with the coverage requirements of the workers' compensation law and empowered the Department to adopt rules describing the information that those business records must contain. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.015 provides, in relevant part: In order for the Division to determine that an employer is in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 440, F.S., every business entity conducting business within the state of Florida shall maintain for the immediately preceding three year period true and accurate records. Such business records shall include original documentation of the following, or copies, when originals are not in the possession of or under the control of the business entity: * * * (3) Records indicating for every pay period a description of work performed and amount of pay or description of other remuneration paid or owed to each person by the business entity, such as time sheets, time cards, attendance records, earnings records, payroll summaries, payroll journals, ledgers or registers, daily logs or schedules, time and materials listings. * * * All contracts to which the business was or is a party for services performed by an independent contractor, or in the event a written contract was not executed, written documentation including the name, business address, telephone number, and FEIN or social security number if an FEIN is not held, of each independent contractor; and proof of workers' compensation insurance held by each independent contractor during the life of the contract for his/her services or records sufficient to prove that the independent contractor was not required pursuant to Chapter 440, to have workers' compensation insurance coverage during that time period; All check ledgers and bank statements for checking, savings, credit union, or any other bank accounts established by the business entity or on its behalf. . . . On April 1, 2003, the Riopelles arrived at the Department's Tampa office and presented Mr. Lott with their business records. Mr. Lott testified that these records were not sufficient to establish that the five workers in question were independent contractors. None of the records produced by the Riopelles permitted the Department to determine receipts, the identity of entities with whom Ms. Riopelle was doing business, or the amount of money she was paid or owed as a result of business operations at the job site on March 27, 2003. Mr. Canton confirmed that the documents produced by the Riopelles did not establish the independent contractor relationship. He noted that the Riopelles produced some contracts between Susie Riopelle and the individual workers, but these contracts called for payment per linear foot, a method consistent with an employer/employee relationship. At the hearing, Ms. Riopelle introduced subcontractor agreements, general liability insurance applications, county occupational licenses, and a 28-page composite exhibit of financial records to support the claim that the five workers at the job site on March 27, 2003, were independent contractors. The subcontractor agreements are problematic for several reasons. The contract between Ms. Riopelle and Jeffrey Judson, dated March 24, 2003, specifies no contract price. It states that Mr. Judson is to perform "framing and sheathing exterrior [sic] walls," and names "Westfield Homes Plan #2350" as the specifications for construction. The contract does not specifically state that the referenced work is to be performed at 9734 White Barn Road in Riverview. Ms. Riopelle testified that the contract with Mr. Judson was for work on the house at 9734 White Barn Road. The contract between Ms. Riopelle and Mr. Stinchcomb, also dated March 24, 2003, specifies a price of $250 "to be paid on following Friday after signing this aggrement [sic]." It states that Mr. Stinchcomb is to "cut all studs, wrap garage doors and build arches," and names "Westfield Homes Plan #2350" as the specifications for construction. The contract does not specifically state that the referenced work is to be performed at 9734 White Barn Road in Riverview. Mr. Stinchcomb, a retiree who worked part-time for Ms. Riopelle, testified that he did not know how the contract price of $250 was arrived at by Ms. Riopelle. He stated that he was getting $10 per hour and surmised that $250 represented payment for a five-hour per day, five-day work week. The contract between Ms. Riopelle and James Conner, also dated March 24, 2003, specifies a price of $480 "to be paid on Friday following date of this signed agreement." It states that Mr. Conner is to "frame all interior walls to first & second floor to provide labor only," and names "Westfield Homes Plan #2350" as the specifications for construction. The contract does not specifically state that the referenced work is to be performed at 9734 White Barn Road in Riverview. The contract between Ms. Riopelle and James C. King is missing a signature page, though both Ms. Riopelle and Mr. King adopted the contract's terms in their testimony. The contract specifies a price of $400, "to be paid on the following Friday after the signing of this agreement." It states that Mr. King is "to set [trusses] on roof," and names "Westfield Homes Plan #2350" as the specifications for construction. The contract does not specifically state that the referenced work is to be performed at 9734 White Barn Road in Riverview. The contract between Ms. Riopelle and Darren McCarty, dated February 28, 2003, does not specify a contract price. It states the following terms of payment: "To pay sum of percentage of job completed by Monday each week and paid on following Friday upon receipt of purchase order at rate of $.60 per sq. ft. purchase order w/below." The items listed below the quoted statement were: "name; subdivision; lot & block; complete address; model #; total sq. footage; price; FEIN # or SSI; liability policy #; occupation license #." The contract states that Mr. McCarty is "to perform labor only framing residential." Ms. Riopelle testified that Mr. McCarty's contract was meant to establish that Mr. McCarty would be paid by the job, not by the hour. She stated that because roofs are different sizes, a set price cannot be set per roof; rather, the price must be set based on the square footage of the roof. Ms. Riopelle testified that this contract did not specify a location because it was a general contract meant to cover any roof that Mr. McCarty worked on. Testifying generally about these contractual agreements, Ms. Riopelle stated that the workers were paid 80 percent of the agreed amount upon completion of the work. The remaining 20 percent of the contract price would be paid when the work passed inspection by local authorities. At the hearing, Mr. McCarty agreed with Ms. Riopelle's explanation of the method of payment. At the hearing, Ms. Riopelle submitted documents signed by Mr. Stinchcomb and Mr. McCarty attesting that, as of February 24, 2003, these men were no longer employees of Yellow Jacket. However, the documents were notarized on April 3, 2003, after the stop work order was issued. These documents are unreliable as a basis for findings as to the relationship between the parties on March 27, 2003, given that they were apparently created after that relationship was called into question by the Department. Ms. Riopelle also submitted a similar document regarding Mr. Conner, but Mr. Conner's signature does not appear on the document. Mr. Conner did not appear at the hearing, and thus, there is no means in this record to ascertain his involvement in the creation of this document. Three of the former Yellow Jacket employees testified at the hearing. Mr. McCarty testified that he had been a carpenter for 15 years and that he owned and used his own tools, including nail gun and nails, on the job. He testified that he had worked on Yellow Jacket's payroll until two weeks before the March 27 site visit, which he offered as his explanation for why he told the compliance team that he worked for Yellow Jacket. Mr. McCarty recalled Ms. Riopelle telling him that she and her husband were planning to move. He testified that he and the other workers got together to plan how they could go into business for themselves. Ms. Riopelle advised them regarding qualification as independent contractors. Mr. McCarty testified that the group of former Yellow Jacket employees bid on the job they were working on March 27, 2003. They figured out the overall price of the house, then figured out which portion of the work each person would perform and for how much money. On this job, Mr. McCarty contracted to build the exterior part of the house, including the beam and the trusses. He would complete the skeleton part of the roof, then Mr. King would take over and complete the laying of the plywood. Mr. McCarty testified that he told the compliance team that he was paid "$12 to $15 per hour" because that is the way he computed his bid on the job. If he completed it quickly, his pay would equal $15 per hour. If he took more time, his pay would equal $12 per hour. Mr. Stinchcomb testified he was 73, retired, and working part-time for Ms. Riopelle. His function at the job site was to perform all the wood-cutting, including the fabrication of window arches. He used his own equipment. Mr. Stinchcomb recalled conversations with his fellow workers about dividing up the work "to keep everybody together but on an independent deal. That's why everybody was supposed to go get their occupation licenses and their workman's comp or whatever they were doing, but we were all going to stay together as independents." Mr. Stinchcomb maintained that he was paid $10 per hour at all times he worked for Yellow Jacket or Ms. Riopelle. James King testified he was 21 years old and had been decking roofs for eight years. He remembered being told by Ms. Riopelle that he was going to need to get a subcontractor's license but was not sure of the difference between working as an employee and as an independent contractor. Mr. King testified that he told the compliance team that he worked for Yellow Jacket because the paperwork on his workers' compensation exemption had not come back. He stated that when he worked for Yellow Jacket, he was paid by the hour; but when he worked for Ms. Riopelle, he was paid by the job. While the workers testified that they used their own tools on the job, it was undisputed that Ms. Riopelle owned the trailer containing an air compressor and that all of the workers except Mr. Stinchcomb, the wood cutter, used the air compressor at the job site. Ms. Riopelle testified that she leased the trailer and equipment to Mr. Conner at a rate of $20 per day. At the hearing, she produced a document purporting to be a contract between her and Mr. Conner, dated February 28, 2003, stating that Ms. Riopelle was leasing framing equipment and the trailer to Mr. Conner for $20 per day, payable weekly. However, the contract was notarized on April 3, 2003, raising the question whether it was created after the fact of the stop work order. Ms. Riopelle submitted no other documentation to substantiate the existence of a lease agreement for the trailer and equipment. Mr. McCarty agreed that the workers were leasing the air compressor from Ms. Riopelle, and stated that the cost came to about $20-per-week per person, which would roughly gibe with the $20-per-day figure given by Ms. Riopelle. However, Mr. King testified that he was paying Edward Riopelle $50 per week to lease the air tools. Edward Riopelle testified that once Yellow Jacket became defunct and Ms. Riopelle began to operate under her own name, the workers were paid in cash on receipt of their invoices for labor. At the hearing, no invoices were provided to indicate whether the workers were being paid by the hour or on a "commission," "per job," or "competitive bid" basis. Ms. Riopelle maintained that Messrs. McCarty, Stinchcomb, King, Judson, and Conner were independent contractors, rather than employees on March 27, 2003, and that she, therefore, was not required to secure the payment of workers' compensation for the five workers. As of March 27, 2003, Section 440.02(15)(d)1, Florida Statutes, provided, in relevant part, that the term "employee" does not include an "independent contractor" if: The independent contractor maintains a separate business with his or her own work facility, truck, equipment, materials, or similar accommodations; The independent contractor holds or has applied for a federal employer identification number, unless the independent contractor is a sole proprietor who is not required to obtain a federal employer identification number under state or federal requirements; The independent contractor performs or agrees to perform specific services or work for specific amounts of money and controls the means of performing the services or work; The independent contractor incurs the principal expenses related to the service or work that he or she performs or agrees to perform; The independent contractor is responsible for the satisfactory completion of work or services that he or she performs or agrees to perform and is or could be held liable for a failure to complete the work or services; The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services performed for a commission or on a per-job or competitive-bid basis and not on any other basis; The independent contractor may realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing work or services; The independent contractor has continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations; and The success or failure of the independent contractor's business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures. . . . Section 440.02(15)(d)1, Florida Statutes, listed the nine elements of the independent contractor exemption in the conjunctive, meaning that all nine elements must be established for the exemption to apply. This interpretation is confirmed by Section 440.02(15)(c), Florida Statutes, which at the time provided: "For purposes of this chapter, an independent contractor is an employee unless he or she meets all of the conditions set forth in subparagraph (d)1." Based upon the testimony and all the documentation submitted at the hearing, it is found that Ms. Riopelle and the five workers had an understanding that the men would no longer be employees of Yellow Jacket because the Riopelles were leaving the area. As of March 27, 2003, the men had obtained occupational licenses, obtained individual general liability insurance, and applied for workers' compensation exemptions. However, despite these actions, the evidence does not demonstrate that the employer-employee relationship had been severed as of March 27, 2003. Because several of the documents submitted by Ms. Riopelle appear to have been back-dated, the reliability of all the documents is called into question. Even assuming that the subcontractor agreements were entered into prior to March 27, 2003, they do not establish that the men were independent contractors under the criteria set forth in Section 440.02(15)(d)1, Florida Statutes. Mr. Judson's contract does not state a price. Mr. McCarty's contract calls for him to be paid per square foot of work performed, not on a per-job basis. None of the contracts states a time or place of performance, making it unclear whether the contracts pertain to the work being performed on March 27, 2003. It is significant that when the men were first questioned at the job site on March 27, 2003, they told the Department's compliance team that they were employed by Yellow Jacket and were paid by the hour. Even at the hearing, Mr. Stinchcomb continued to maintain that he was paid on an hourly basis. Mr. McCarty tried to explain his answer to the compliance team by reference to how he arrived at his bid, but this testimony was unconvincing. The men were paid in cash, and Ms. Riopelle submitted no ledgers or other documentation to support her claim that she was paying the men on a per-job basis, despite a Department rule requiring her to maintain such records. The nature of the work being performed by the five men makes it highly unlikely that any one of them could be held responsible for the satisfactory completion of the work or could be held liable for a failure to complete the work or services. While the men made some effort to separate the tasks at the job site, Mr. McCarty conceded that they helped each other out when necessary. The men were using equipment belonging to Ms. Riopelle. It was claimed at the hearing that the men were leasing the equipment from Ms. Riopelle, but the testimony did not agree on the terms of the lease. Ms. Riopelle's statement that she rented the equipment to Mr. Conner for $20 per day roughly comported with Mr. McCarty's testimony that each man paid $20 per week for the equipment. However, Mr. King testified that he paid $50 per week to Edward Riopelle for use of the air tools. There was no evidence that any of the men incurred the principal expenses related to their work, could realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing their work, had continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations, or that the success or failure of their business depended on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures. The weight of the evidence leads to the finding that Messrs. McCarty, King, Stinchcomb, Judson, and Conner were performing salaried labor as employees of Ms. Riopelle on March 27, 2003.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, directing that the Respondent stop work and cease her operations until such time as she secures workers' compensation coverage for her employees and directing that the Respondent pay a penalty in the amount of $21,100. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2004.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent was an employer in the State of Florida, required to secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage pursuant to the appropriate provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2007); whether the Respondent secured such coverage, if required; and whether the proposed penalty, if any, is warranted.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the various requirements of Chapter 440 Florida Statutes. This includes the requirement, in Section 440.107(3) Florida Statutes, that employers in the State of Florida, as defined by statute, secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for all employees, as provided in Sections 440.10(1)(a), 440.38(1), and 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2007). The Respondent is a closely held Florida corporation with a principal business address of record at 1815 West Detroit Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32534. The president of the Respondent Corporation is Richard Longoria. On October 29, 2008, an investigator for the Department, Michelle Newcomer, observed construction work being conducted at a site at 4111 Baisden Road in Pensacola, Florida. Ms. Newcomer stopped at that address and encountered Richard Longoria, the Respondent's president. In the course of their conversation, Mr. Longoria told Investigator Newcomer that he was sanding and caulking window frames in preparation for painting them. He also was engaged in painting shutters at that address. The so-called "Scopes Manual" is a manual published by the National Counsel on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI). In that manual are certain codes, related to the construction industry and trades considered to be within that industry. Painting is considered to be "construction" under the relevant codes in this manual. The manual, with its codes and classifications is relied upon in the insurance industry and has been adopted by the State of Florida, and the Department, in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021. The preparation of surfaces for painting is contemplated as being included in the construction trade or industry in that manual, under the painting classification code. Mr. Longoria performs a significant amount of painting, but also does general construction, wallpapering, general maintenance and carpentry work. He has three different occupational licenses: maintenance, carpentry and painting/wallpapering. The trades or types of work Mr. Longoria had disclosed in the course of obtaining his construction industry exemption, which was effective April 13, 2006, through April 12, 2008, included paperhanging, wallpapering and carpentry. During his conversation with Investigator Newcomer, Mr. Longoria disclosed that he did not have workers' compensation coverage because he had an exemption from such coverage. He provided her with a workers' compensation Exemption card for the construction industry. Ms. Newcomer observed that the workers' compensation exemption held by Mr. Longoria, as an officer of the Respondent, had actually expired some months previously, on April 12, 2008. Ms. Newcomer consulted the Department's automated database, called the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS). That system is routinely used and lists workers' compensation insurance policy information for each corporation, which insurance companies are required to provide to the Department, as well as the workers' compensation exemptions for corporate officers, if any. The database confirmed that Mr. Longoria's most recent exemption had expired on April 12, 2008. He thus did not have a current workers' compensation exemption on October 29, 2008, when he encountered Investigator Newcomer. That database also revealed that there was no record of a workers' compensation insurance policy in effect for the Respondent, and this was confirmed by Mr. Longoria's testimony during his deposition (in evidence). Corporate officers who qualify for a workers' compensation coverage exemption are not automatically exempt, but must submit a Notice of Election to Be Exempt. They submit a form, along with a $50 fee, to apply for an exemption. Upon receipt of a Notice of Election to Be Exempt, the Department makes a determination as to whether the applicant for the exemption meets the relevant eligibility requirements. The exemption request is then processed by the Department and a Notice of Granting the Exemption, or denial, or a Notice of Incompletion, and the necessity for more information, is sent to the applicant. A workers' compensation exemption has a duration of two years from its effective date. Its effective date is the date that is entered into the CCAS system. The only Notice of Election to Be Exempt the Department received from Mr. Longoria, as of the October 29, 2008, inspection date, was the application received on April 10, 2006. It became effective on April 13, 2006, and thus was effective until April 13, 2008. Before October 29, 2008, Mr. Longoria had three construction industry exemptions which were renewed. One exemption was as a sole proprietor and was effective from July 4, 1993, through July 4, 1995. He had another exemption extending from April 13, 2004, through April 13, 2006, and then an exemption from April 13, 2006, through April 12, 2008. Mr. Longoria stated to Ms. Newcomer, in their conversation on October 29, 2008, that he had not received notice of his April 13, 2006 exemption's expiration prior to the expiration date of April 13, 2008. Ms. Newcomer thereupon consulted the CCAS system to determine when the notification of expiration of the exemption had been sent to Mr. Longoria or the Respondent. That database revealed that a letter notifying him of the expiration of his exemption had been sent on January 29, 2008. The CCAS entry shows that the expiration notice had been mailed out to Mr. Longoria to his address of record, 1815 West Detroit Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32354. That is the same address which had been shown on Mr. Longoria's exemption certificate, effective on April 13, 2006. Mr. Longoria's wife was stricken with cancer. She is a veteran and sought treatment and therapy for her cancer at a Veteran's Administration facility in Tennessee. Consequently, Mr. and Mrs. Longoria moved to Tennessee in May 2006, soon after the effective date of his exemption. Mr. Longoria filed a mail-forwarding form with the United States Postal Service in Pensacola so that his mail would be forwarded to his residence and address in Tennessee. Mail was forwarded for approximately one year, but no mail originally sent to his Pensacola address was forwarded to his address in Tennessee after sometime in August 2007. Mr. Longoria did not notice this fact until April 2008. None of the later mail addressed to the Pensacola address was forwarded to Tennessee, even after he renewed his forwarding application with the postal service in April of 2008. In fact, he testified that "99 percent of whatever mail was sent to the Florida address between 2007 and April 2008 was never forwarded to [Mr. Longoria] in Tennessee." Mr. Longoria, however, did not file a change of address notification with the Department prior to submitting his new Notice of Election to be Exempt, which he filed on October 31, 2008. The Respondent did not change his mailing address with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations until April 9, 2008. On October 29, 2008, after the discussion between Mr. Longoria and Investigator Newcomer, concerning the matter of workers' compensation coverage, Ms. Newcomer issued a Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, and served it on Mr. Longoria and the Respondent. These were issued because of the Respondent's failure to secure payment of workers' compensation in purported violation of Sections 440.10(1), 440.38(1) and 440.107(2), Florida Statutes. Upon issuance of the Stop Work Order, Mr. Longoria promptly complied. Investigator Newcomer also requested production of certain business records in order to perform the relevant penalty assessment calculations. Mr. Longoria promptly provided the necessary business records to the Department. The parties stipulated that work was being performed by the Respondent between the dates of April 12, 2008, and October 29, 2008. This was the period of time when the exemption was in an expired state. Based upon the Respondent's records, Investigator Newcomer calculated an amended penalty, for the period of noncompliance with the workers' compensation law (the period of expiration of the exemption) using the penalty calculation worksheet adopted in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.027. The total penalty based upon that formula resulted in an assessment of less than $1,000. The penalty assessed was therefore $1,000, pursuant to Section 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that the penalty to be assessed will be based on the formula provided in the referenced provision of Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, and the above-cited rule, or a minimum of $1,000, whichever is greater. The parties stipulated that the penalty assessed is accurate, if it is ultimately determined that the penalty was properly and lawfully assessed. After being served with the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on October 31, 2008, Mr. Longoria promptly paid the penalty in full, in the form of a cashier's check. He submitted a new Notice of Election to Be Exempt for himself, as a corporate officer of the Respondent, which exemption became effective on that same date. The Respondent was subsequently issued an Order of Release from the Stop Work Order and an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, which allowed the Respondent to resume working. The expiration of the exemption, for the number of months referenced above, occurred because the Respondent, through Mr. Longoria, inadvertently failed to renew the exemption. Mr. Longoria had not been reminded of his expiration because he had not received the Notice of Impending Expiration from the Department. There is no dispute that Mr. Longoria and the Respondent corporation qualified for the exemption and were thus not required to secure the payment of workers' compensation, if the exemption had been effective at times pertinent hereto. This is because of the corporate business entity under which the Respondent and Mr. Longoria operated, with Mr. Longoria as the sole employee and sole corporate officer and owner.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties it is, therefore, Recommended that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, finding that the Respondent failed to properly secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employee in violation of Sections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes, and that a penalty in the amount of $1,000 be assessed, as mandated by Section 440.107(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Tracey Beal, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Justin H. Faulkner, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Samuel W. Bearman, Esquire Law Office of Samuel W. Bearman, L.C. 820 North 12th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation in violation of Sections 440.10(1), 440.38(1) and 440.107(2), Florida Statutes, by materially misrepresenting and concealing employee duties as to avoid proper classification for premium calculation, and if so, what is the appropriate penalty?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation for the benefit of their employees. Respondent is a commercial welding corporation based in Putnam County, Florida. It has been in business as an active Florida corporation since the early 1950s. Its principal office is located at 1301 Madison Street, Palatka, Florida 32177. Petitioner is an “employer” for purposes of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Respondent is in the business of welding, fabrication and erection of structural steel, fabrication and installation of metal handrails and fire escapes to existing buildings, and various other metal fabrication and welding operations. Respondent is engaged in the construction industry. At all material times, Respondent maintained a policy of workers’ compensation insurance for all of its employees. Respondent’s workers’ compensation insurance at issue in this case was obtained through the Florida Retail Federation Insurance Fund, and was in place since February 1, 2002. Pursuant to the Department's statutory authority, after receiving a referral based on a fatal accident at a site where Respondent was providing work, Investigator Daniel Pfaff of the Department's Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Compliance, conducted an investigation into Respondent’s workers’ compensation coverage. The investigator reviewed payroll records as well as certificates of insurance. Respondent cooperated with the Department’s investigation, providing all requested documents and responding to the questions of Petitioner’s investigation. Investigator Pfaff determined that Respondent had not secured workers’ compensation coverage consistent with the job descriptions of its employees. At the final hearing it was shown that, indeed, the job classification code2/ listed on Respondent's workers' compensation policy for Respondent's non-clerical work used to determine premiums paid by Respondent was not appropriate for much of the work Respondent was performing. The job classification code on Respondent’s workers’ compensation policy for the non-clerical work performed by Respondent was 3822. Classification code 3822 encompasses manufacturing or assembling automobile, bus, truck, or trailer bodies made of die pressed steel. Classification code 3822 does not encompass fabrication of iron or steel outside of a welding shop, erection of iron or steel structures, fabrication and installation of metal handrails and fire escapes to existing buildings, or operation of machinery to lift materials used to erect buildings (collectively "off-site erection work"). Based upon contracts provided by Respondent to the Department, the Department determined that the proper classification codes for the off-site erection work performed by Respondent’s employees were 5040 and 5057. Classification code 5040 encompasses the erection of iron or steel frame structures, the assembly and fabrication of iron or steel frame structures at the erection site, welding operations incidental to steel erection work, and the installation of iron or steel balconies, fire escapes, and staircases to existing buildings. Classification code 5057 encompasses iron or steel erection not otherwise classified in the Scopes® Manual. After it was determined that Respondent did not have the proper workers’ compensation insurance, Investigator Pfaff issued a Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment against Respondent on behalf of the Department on February 12, 2010. The Stop-Work Order is on a form with supporting allegations that may be selected by checking the box next to the allegation. The boxes checked on the Stop-Work Order comprise the following allegation: “Failure to secure the payment of workers’ compensation in violation of sections 440.10(1), 440.38(1) and 440.107(2) Florida Statutes by: materially misrepresenting and concealing employee duties as to avoid proper classification for premium calculation.” The allegation selected in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment refines the allegation of the Stop-Work Order by alleging “Failure to secure the payment of workers’ compensation within the meaning of section 440.107(2), F.S., by: materially misrepresenting or concealing employee duties so as to avoid proper classification for premium calculations.” The Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment contains no separate allegation, but rather references the original Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. No other charging documents were provided by Petitioner in support of the proposed penalty. At the final hearing, Petitioner presented evidence demonstrating that the appropriate job classification code for the majority of Respondent’s work was 5040. It also provided evidence that $60,873.60 was the amount of penalty that would be due if a violation had occurred. The penalty amount was calculated by using payroll amounts provided by Respondent and the approved rates for the proper job classification codes to determine the amount of premium that should have been paid and then, after giving Respondent credit for previous premiums paid, multiplying the result by 1.5 in accordance with applicable rules. Petitioner, however, did not provide sufficient evidence that Respondent failed “to secure the payment of workers’ compensation in violation of sections 440.10(1), 440.38(1) and 440.107(2) Florida Statutes by materially misrepresenting and concealing employee duties as to avoid proper classification for premium calculation” as alleged in the Stop-Work Order. Rather than showing that Respondent misrepresented or concealed employee duties to avoid proper classification, the evidence indicated that Respondent believed that its company was compliant with Florida workers’ compensation coverage requirements. While the Scopes® Manual explains the various job classification codes, there was no evidence that the Scopes® Manual has ever been provided to Respondent or that Respondent was the one who selected the job classification codes that were on its workers’ compensation policy. The job classification description for classification code 3822 provided on premium summaries and statements from the insurance agent and carrier to Respondent were different at different times. One description was “auto, bus, truck body, MFG/steel” and another was “auto, bus, truck, trailer manufacturing, die press.” The self-audit reports abbreviate job classification 3822 as “Auto bus truck body mfg/steel.” These abbreviations do not give notice that Respondent’s job classification was wrong. In addition, the evidence showed that Respondent’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier conducted regular audits of Respondent's operations. Respondent cooperated with the audits. During the course of the audits, the insurance auditor would go to Respondent’s premises where the auditor was able to observe the types of machinery, equipment, and operations used by Respondent. Despite evidence on the premises indicating that Respondent was engaged in work beyond the scope of job classification code 3822 established at the final hearing, there is no evidence that the auditors, carriers, or agents ever questioned the workers’ compensation insurance job classification codes that were on Respondent’s policy, summaries, and audit forms that they transmitted to Respondent. Aside from cooperating with regular audits and allowing inspection of its premises, Respondent also provided additional information to its agent and carrier regarding its operations through Respondent’s requests for certificates of insurance for various off-site jobs. Investigator Pfaff has substantial experience in the insurance industry as an adjustor, special investigator and supervisor in property and casualty for over 30 years. As part of the investigation, investigator Pfaff obtained a number of Respondent’s certificates of insurance. The certificates of insurance were introduced as Petitioner’s Exhibit 21. Investigator Pfaff provided credible testimony that there was no real reason to send out a certificate of insurance unless a company was planning to perform work for another company. The certificates of insurance were issued by Respondent’s insurance agent at Respondent’s request for off- site erection work for a variety of different companies located in a variety of counties, and contain information showing that Respondent was performing work outside its premises. Respondent’s representative testified that Respondent informed its insurance agent of the location of the work each time a certificate of insurance was issued. The Department demonstrated that the off-site erection work being performed by Respondent was not consistent with the workers’ compensation classification code in place for Respondent. The certificates of insurance, however, were approved by the insurance agent or carrier, and neither expressed any concern that the workers’ compensation insurance coverage was insufficient in any respect. In addition, the carrier was made aware of the type of work performed by Respondent by prior claims. Respondent had previously reported two other workers’ compensation incidents which arose from work performed off of the premises. One previous off-site erection work incident involved an injury resulting from an employee falling from a crane, and the other involved an employee’s fall through a roof skylight. The insurance carrier was made aware that off-site erection and construction work was being performed by Respondent in each of these incidents. Even though it was established at the final hearing that job classification code 3822 utilized for Respondent’s workers’ compensations insurance for those incidents should not have covered the off-the-premises incidents, Respondent’s insurance carrier and insurance agent never suggested that Respondent’s workers’ compensation coverage was deficient or erroneous. In sum, Petitioner did not show that Respondent materially misrepresented or concealed employee duties in order to avoid proper classification for premium calculation of its workers’ compensation policy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Stop-Work Order, Order of Penalty Assessment, Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued against Respondent, and ordering the return of any penalty paid by Respondent under the Periodic Payment Agreement. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2010.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent was required to obtain workers' compensation coverage for himself pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2002), during the penalty period designated in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment; and, if so, whether Petitioner should impose a penalty against Respondent in the amount of $120,467.88.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. (2002). On February 9, 2004, while conducting a random site inspection, Department investigator, Eric Duncan, observed three men performing construction work in the form of carpentry and house-framing at 720 Southwest 10th Street, Cape Coral, Florida. One of the workers on the site was Respondent, Jeremy Butzler, a sole proprietor who had employed the other two workers. Mr. Duncan interviewed Mr. Butzler at the site and requested proof of workers' compensation coverage, which Mr. Butzler was unable to provide. Mr. Duncan then issued the first Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order, directing Mr. Butzler to cease work and pay a civil penalty of $1000.00. Also on February 9, 2004, Mr. Duncan served Mr. Butzler with a "Request for Production of Business Records," seeking copies of business records to determine whether Mr. Butzler had secured workers' compensation coverage, whether he had a current valid workers' compensation exemption, and to determine any civil penalties that may be owed for failing to secure workers' compensation coverage. Mr. Butzler complied in a very limited way. Mr. Duncan testified that most of the documents provided by Mr. Butzler were records of electronic transfer of funds that did not identify their recipients. No company checkbook or ledger was produced. After the penalty was calculated, the Department issued the First Amended Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order, which increased the assessed penalty to $132,027.64. This assessment was later reduced to $120,467.88 after the Department corrected the workers' compensation premium rate it employed to calculate the penalty. At the time the Stop Work Order was issued and pursuant to Subsection 440.107(5), Florida Statutes (2002), the Department had adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 4L-6.015,1/ which stated, in relevant part: In order for the Division to determine that an employer is in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 440, F.S., every business entity conducting business within the state of Florida shall maintain for the immediately preceding three year period true and accurate records. Such business records shall include original documentation of the following, or copies, when originals are not in the possession of or under the control of the business entity: All workers’ compensation insurance policies of the business entity, and all endorsements, notices of cancellation, nonrenewal, or reinstatement of such policies. * * * Records indicating for every pay period a description of work performed and amount of pay or description of other remuneration paid or owed to each person by the business entity, such as time sheets, time cards, attendance records, earnings records, payroll summaries, payroll journals, ledgers or registers, daily logs or schedules, time and materials listings. All contracts entered into with a professional employer organization (PEO) or employee leasing company, temporary labor company, payroll or business record keeping company. If such services are not pursuant to a written contract, written documentation including the name, business address, telephone number, and FEIN or social security number of all principals if an FEIN is not held, of each such PEO, temporary labor company, payroll or business record keeping company; and For every contract with a PEO: a payroll ledger for each pay period during the contract period identifying each worker by name, address, home telephone number, and social security number or documentation showing that the worker was eligible for employment in the United States during the contract for his/her services, and a description of work performed during each pay period by each worker, and the amount paid each pay period to each worker. A business entity may maintain such records or contract for their maintenance by the PEO to which the records pertain. * * * All check ledgers and bank statements for checking, savings, credit union, or any other bank accounts established by the business entity or on its behalf; and All federal income tax forms prepared by or on behalf of the business and all State of Florida, Division of Unemployment Compensation UCT-6 forms and any other forms or reports prepared by the business or on its behalf for filing with the Florida Division of Unemployment Compensation. During the period in question, Respondent was a "sole proprietor," as that term was defined in Subsection 440.02(25), Florida Statutes (2002): "Sole proprietor" means a natural person who owns a form of business in which that person owns all the assets of the business and is solely liable for all the debts of the business. Subsection 440.02(15)(c)1., Florida Statutes (2002), in effect during the penalty assessment period, stated, in relevant part: "Employee" includes a sole proprietor . . . Partners or sole proprietors actively engaged in the construction industry are considered employees unless they elect to be excluded from the definition of employee by filing written notice of the election with the department as provided in s. 440.05 . . . A sole proprietor or partner who is actively engaged in the construction industry and who elects to be exempt from this chapter by filing a written notice of the election with the department as provided in s. 440.05 is not an employee. (Emphasis added). Section 440.05, Florida Statutes (2002), allowed an individual to apply for election to be exempt from workers' compensation benefits. Only the named individual on the application was exempt from carrying workers' compensation insurance coverage. The Department maintains a database of all workers' compensation exemptions in the State of Florida. Mr. Duncan's review of this database revealed that, although Respondent had a valid workers' compensation exemption from November 18, 1999, to November 15, 2001, there were no exemptions for Respondent for 2002, the year constituting the penalty period in this case. At the hearing, Respondent admitted that he did not obtain an exemption for the year 2002. Mr. Duncan's investigation also revealed that Respondent did not have workers compensation insurance coverage during the year 2002. During the investigation, Respondent informed Mr. Duncan that he had contracted with an employee leasing company, Southeast Personnel Services, Inc., that was responsible for paying the salaries of and providing workers' compensation insurance coverage for Respondent and his workers. Pursuant to Subsection 468.520(5), Florida Statutes (2002),2/ an employee leasing company is a business entity engaged in employee leasing. "Employee leasing" is an arrangement whereby a leasing company assigns its employees to a client and allocates the direction of, and control over, the leased employees between the leasing company and the client. § 68.520(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). When the employee leasing company accepts a client, the client becomes an employee of the leasing company. An employee leasing company is the employer of the leased employees and is responsible for providing workers' compensation pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2002). § 468.529(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). Additionally, an employee leasing company assumes responsibility for the payment of wages to the leased employees without regard to payments by the client and for the payment of payroll taxes and collection of taxes from the payroll of leased employees. § 468.525(4)(b) and (c), Fla. Stat. (2002). At the hearing, Respondent demonstrated that he had workers' compensation coverage as an employee of the employee leasing company. However, the Department did not utilize any payments made through the leasing company in its penalty calculation. The evidence demonstrated that Respondent received compensation directly from Holiday Builders, Inc., in the amount of $185,006.50, and Gatco Construction, in the amount of $10,590.00. These amounts, totaling $195,596.50, were utilized by the Department to calculate Respondent's penalty. Mr. Duncan explained that in order for workers' compensation coverage to apply through the employee leasing company, companies such as Gatco Construction would have to make payments to the leasing company, not directly to Respondent. The leasing company would then pay a salary to Respondent, as its employee, and Respondent would be covered by the employee leasing company's workers' compensation insurance. Payments made directly to Respondent would not be secured by the workers' compensation coverage obtained through the employee leasing company. Respondent claimed that the Division utilized the incorrect gross income amount in calculating the penalty. To support this claim, Respondent attempted to introduce what he claimed was his personal income tax return for the year 2002. Respondent claimed this return had been prepared and filed by his bookkeeper some time in February 2004, subsequent to the Department's investigation. However, the return produced at hearing was unsigned and indicated that it had been self- prepared by Respondent. Respondent could not recall the bookkeeper's name without prodding from his counsel. Respondent offered no proof that this return had ever been completed or filed with the Internal Revenue Service. The purported 2002 tax return was not admitted into evidence, and Respondent's testimony as to the information contained on the return is not reliable. The Department correctly calculated the penalty assessment based on the money paid to Respondent as a sole proprietor "employee" who failed to file for a workers' compensation exemption for the year 2002. The Department calculated the total penalty based on Respondent's gross payroll, the class code assigned to Respondent utilizing the SCOPES Manual (a standard classification tool published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance), and the statutory guidelines in Subsection 440.107(7), Florida Statutes (2002). Based on that calculation, the correct penalty assessment in this case is $120,467.88.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order confirming the Amended Stop Work Order and imposing a penalty in the amount of $120,467.88. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Resolution of Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Dispute, pursuant to section 440.13(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, C. G. was employed by Solo Printing, Inc., which had workers' compensation coverage through Intervenor. On March 2, 2012, C. G. was injured at work as a result of falling onto his knee during a fight with a coworker. C. G. was transported from the worksite by ambulance to Petitioner's hospital, where he was admitted. Later the same day, C. G. underwent emergency surgery to his knee. He was discharged from the hospital on March 8, 2012. On April 2, 2012, Petitioner billed Intervenor for services rendered to C. G. during his hospitalization. On May 11, 2012, Intervenor issued a Notice of Denial. On June 8, 2012, Petitioner filed with Respondent the Petition. On June 14, 2012, Respondent issued the Dismissal. Intervenor's Notice of Denial cites three grounds for denying payment for the bill: section 440.09(3), which prohibits compensation for injuries to an employee "occasioned primarily" by his willfully trying to injure another person; lack of authorization for services; and any other defense that may become available. The Dismissal cites one ground for dismissing the Petition: Petitioner's failure to submit an EOBR with its Petition. The only ground cited in the preceding paragraph that is relevant is the first cited by Intervenor. This ground raises the issue of compensability by disclosing that Intervenor has not conceded that C. G.'s injuries are compensable. Nor has a Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) ever entered an order determining that C. G.'s injuries are compensable. In fact, G. has never filed a claim for benefits. At the time in question, C. G. had health insurance, but his insurer reportedly denied coverage on the ground that it insured's injuries were covered by workers' compensation. It does not appear that Petitioner has commenced a legal action against C. G. for payment for the services that it rendered to him in March 2012.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Lorne S. Cabinsky, Esquire Law Offices of Lorne S. Cabinsky, P.A. Suite 1500 101 Northeast 3rd Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Mari H. McCully, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 James T. Armstrong, Esquire Walton Lantaff Schroeder and Carson, LLP Suite 1575 200 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Division of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390
The Issue The ultimate issue for determination is whether the Petitioner's discharge by the Respondent constituted discrimination on the basis of handicap within the meaning of the Florida Human Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Having considered all of the evidence in the record, the Hearing Officer makes the following findings of fact: Petitioner was hired as a Mechanic II (Electrician) by Respondent on January 25, 1982 in the Plant Engineering Department. The term "Mechanic II" denoted Petitioner's pay grade. The term "Electrician" designated Petitioner's speciality. Petitioner's pay grade was changed to Electrician and the Mechanic II pay grade was eliminated by Respondent for all such employees on or about November 16, 1983. Petitioner's duties as an Electrician included ladder work, running conduit and wire, repairing laundry and laboratory equipment and appliances, changing ballasts, and repairing electrical beds and nurse-call equipment. Petitioner performed all of the duties of an electrician, including ladder work until approximately November 27, 1985. Three months after he was employed in 1982, Petitioner injured his back while repairing electrical beds. Repairing electrical beds required much bending and stooping. Petitioner filed for Worker's Compensation benefits for the injury he sustained in repairing electrical beds. Petitioner suffered an off-the-job injury in 1983. Respondent permitted Petitioner to go on medical leave for two months. Petitioner again injured his back while working at the Hospital on or about November 27, 1985. Due to his injury, Petitioner was on leave of absence from November 30, 1985, through December 11, 1985. Petitioner returned to work but again went on leave of absence from January 9, 1986, through February 17, 1986. Petitioner returned to work subject to a "light duty" restriction imposed by his physician. On or about June 10, 1986, Petitioner's physician released him for full duty subject to a 15 pound restriction on any lifting. In September, 1986, Petitioner's physician indicated that it was "probably best" for Petitioner to work only 4 hours per day. The Respondent again allowed Petitioner to work 4 hours per day even though he occupied a full-time, 8 hour per day position. In early October, 1986, Petitioner was released by his physician to perform full duty work, even though Petitioner was restricted to half days. Frank Kleese, Petitioner's foreman, asked Petitioner to investigate a problem with an overhead light. Petitioner refused Kleese's directive and stated that, even though he had been released for full duty work, he would not climb a ladder unless his doctor approved it. Petitioner argued with Kleese and used "strong language". Petitioner became belligerent. Petitioner received reprimands for insubordination. When Petitioner refused Kleese's second request to do ladder work, Petitioner received a reprimand for refusing to do the job assigned to him. Both reprimands were discussed with Petitioner. Petitioner later presented a doctor's note stating he could "return to full active duty," but could work only half days with no ladder work. As a result of Petitioner's half day schedule, other electricians were required to do more work. The department as a whole fell behind in its work. Furthermore, light duty work was not always available for Petitioner. While working half days in late 1986, Petitioner was late to work on three occasions. Petitioner's reason for being late, as explained to Frank Kleese, his foreman, was that Petitioner's injury made it difficult for him to get out of bed in the morning. In November, 1986, Clark, Kleese, and Kunz met with Petitioner and advised him that he could not remain on half days indefinitely. Petitioner was advised that unless his condition was found to have improved by his upcoming doctor's appointment on December 1, 1986, he would be placed on medical leave. On December 1, 1986, Petitioner visited his physician, Dr. Richard D. Strain, Jr. Dr. Strain stated that there was no reason to think that Petitioner's condition would change quickly. Dr. Strain was going to send Petitioner home and put him on physician therapy (i.e., not allow him to work at all). Petitioner asked Dr. Strain if he could work half days, and Dr. Strain agreed. Kleese, Kunz, and Clark met with Petitioner and informed him that he would be placed on medical leave as a result of the Petitioner's medical condition. Continuation of his half-day status without any foreseeable cutoff date was not acceptable to the Respondent. On December 4, 1986, Respondent Benefits Supervisor Ralph Rettig advised Dr. Strain that Petitioner had been placed on medical leave of absence because there were no part-time positions available in Petitioner's department. Rettig requested Dr. Strain to advise him as to whether Petitioner's condition was the result of his injury at work and whether Petitioner would ever improve to the level where he could work more than half day duty. Dr. Strain responded to Mr. Rettig in a letter dated December 22, 1986, which indicated that Petitioner's condition was partially caused by degenerative changes. Dr. Strain further stated: Mr. Cabany tells me he is unable to work more than a half day, and I think that is a reasonable thing for him to do. Certainly, a man of his elderly years with the degenerative changes that he has, with super imposed trauma, that would be a good way to go. Petitioner went on medical leave beginning December 17, 1986. Prior to the beginning of his leave, Petitioner failed to fill out the leave of absence request form. When this came to Rettig's attention, Rettig requested that Vernon Clark send Petitioner the form. Clark wrote to Petitioner and informed him that he must fill out the leave of absence request form Clark had enclosed. Clark further informed Petitioner that he would have to request renewal of his leave when it expired in mid-January, 1987, in accordance with Respondent policies. During a telephone conversation several days prior to the expiration of Petitioner's leave, Clark reminded Petitioner that he still had not sent in the original request form for the leave he was then under. Clark also reminded Petitioner that, if he wished to extend his leave, Petitioner would have to submit a written request for extension. Petitioner eventually sent in the signed request form for the leave of absence which he was then under. The signed form stated: "If I do not request an extension of my Leave prior to expiration . . . my employment at Memorial Respondent will be terminated. . . ." Petitioner never submitted a request for an extension of his leave, and Petitioner was terminated. In February, 1987, Ralph Rettig became aware of a part-time porter position in the Respondent's Dietary Department. Mr. Rettig contacted Petitioner and asked him to meet with Joseph Marino, Administrative Director of Food and Nutrition Services, with regard to a job in the Dietary Department. Marino offered Petitioner a porter position which required only half days and involved no bending or lifting of heavy objects. Marino explained the duties and responsibilities of the position to Petitioner and showed him the work area. Petitioner refused the position because he felt it was "beneath his dignity". Petitioner said virtually the same thing to Rettig. Hospital Benefits Supervisor Rettig, a quadriplegic, was involved throughout in dealing with Petitioner's medical situation. Rettig testified that he has never witnessed discrimination by the Respondent based upon handicap and felt that the Respondent reasonably accommodated Petitioner's back problem. Eighty percent of an Electrician's work at the Respondent involved the use of a ladder. Petitioner could not do ladder work. Petitioner also could not work on ceilings or do much bending or lifting. Petitioner cannot work at all now, still has pain, and has not worked since leaving the Respondent's employ. Petitioner did not know of any available half-day jobs he could have performed at the Hospital other than the porter position that was offered to Petitioner by Mr. Marino. Prior to his 1985 injury, Petitioner had repeatedly requested to work part time as an Electrician because his wife had arthritis and he needed to care for her. Petitioner was consistently turned down because no such part-time position existed in his department. During his employment with Respondent, a few half-day positions existed throughout the Hospital as PBX Operators, Cashiers, and Porters. No part-time Electrician positions in the Plant Engineering Department where Petitioner was employed were ever available. Petitioner occupied a full-time position even though he worked only part-time. Sandy McNeil, a former Electrician, is now a Systems Technician/Welder who works full days on a part-time basis. Mr. McNeil operates a lathe and works full weeks when needed. Petitioner is not a welder and could not perform the duties required of Mr. McNeil. Richmond Blatch is a painter who works a full week every other week. Petitioner is not a painter and could not perform Mr. Blatch's duties. Tom Nottage, another individual who had been working in the Engineering Department, obtained a courier position with the Hospital. For a brief period, Mr. Nottage worked 2 full days a week in the Engineering Department and 3 days week as a courier. Since mid-January, 1987, Mr. Nottage has worked full-time as a courier. His job requires driving over 25,000 miles per year, lifting mail tubs weighing between 20 and 50 pounds, often lifting heavier packages, and getting in and out of his car between 20 and 40 times per day. Petitioner could not perform the duties required of Mr. Nottage. A part-time position could not be created for an Electrician. Electricians are given jobs which frequently carry through from day to day. Permanently employing someone on a half-day, health-restricted basis presented scheduling and work load problems. Jobs that do not carry through from day to day are frequently comprised of so-called bench work. Some bench work requires an entire day to complete. There was not always a half-day's worth of bench work available. During his employment with the Respondent, Petitioner had been receiving Social Security pension benefits. In 1987, Petitioner would have been required to reimburse Social Security for a portion of his pension benefits if he earned more than $8,000,00. Half day employment would have afforded Petitioner the ability to earn the maximum allowed by Social Security. Because Petitioner refused to accept a job for which he was physically qualified, the worker's compensation benefits begun as a result of his injury on the job in 1982, were stopped. If Petitioner had accepted the porter position offered to him by Mr. Marino, his worker's compensation benefits would have compensated him for the wage loss resulting from the lower paying job. Petitioner's termination had no effect on the worker's compensation benefits Respondent was paying Petitioner. Respondent would have gained a financial benefit from retaining Petitioner as a part time Electrician because there would have been less of a wage loss to make up through worker's compensation benefits. Glen Mora and Luis Villanueva, two other Electricians, were injured while Petitioner was working half days. Both individuals were allowed to take medical leave, and return to work on light duty until they returned to full duty status. Both individuals in fact returned to full duty status. Petitioner received a merit pay check from Respondent in 1986 even though Petitioner had not achieved the requisite "fully proficient" rating in his evaluation. Vernon Clark, Director of Plant Engineering, intervened on behalf of Petitioner. Mr. Clark recommended that Petitioner receive the merit pay because Petitioner would have received a higher rating had it not been for Petitioner's injury.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Human Rights Commission issue a Final Order that Respondent is not guilty of discharging Petitioner in violation of the Human Rights Act. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of October, 1989. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner submitted no proposed findings of fact. Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection NONE The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Included in Findings 1, 2 2-3 Rejected as irrelevant 4-9 Included in Findings 3-10 Included in Finding 35 Included in Finding 11 Included in Finding 25 Included in Finding 26 Included in Finding 31 15-17 Included in Findings 27-30 Included in Finding 17 Included in Finding 36 Included in Finding 32 21-28 Included in Findings 12-21 29 Included in Finding 22 30-31 Included in Findings 33-34 Included in Finding 22 Included in Findings 15, 17 34-35 Included in Findings 23, 24 COPIES FURNISHED: George Cabany 3905 Garfield Street Hollywood, Florida 33021 James S. Bramnick Muller, Mintz, Kornreich, Caldwell, Casey, Crosland & Bramnick, P. A. Hollywood Memorial Respondent Suite 3600 Southeast Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2338 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue Whether the Respondent was required to carry workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees and, if it failed to do so, whether the Amended Notice and Penalty Assessment Order is correct.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Petitioner, the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Workers’ Compensation was the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering compliance with state laws governing workers’ compensation (WC). The Respondent, A. J. Interiors, Inc., is a Florida corporation doing business at 1825 Mears Parkway, Margate, Florida. At all times material to this case, Robert Barnes was an investigator employed by the Department to perform compliance investigations for WC. On July 6, 2000, Investigator Barnes performed a random construction site inspection at a new construction project located at 16687 Jog Road, Delray Beach, Florida. While at that location, Investigator Barnes observed two men wearing T-shirts bearing the company name "A. J. Interiors, Inc." along with its telephone number. The men were installing metal framing in order to hang and finish drywall. The field interview with the two men, identified in this record as Sergio and Jaime Gonzalez, revealed that neither was covered by WC insurance. This information was later confirmed by Investigator Barnes. Additionally, neither man had obtained an exemption from coverage as the sole proprietor of a business. Based upon the field interview of the two men, a review of Department records, and contact with the Respondent's insurance agent, Investigator Barnes correctly determined that the men were the Respondent’s "employees” as that term is defined by the WC law. The men did not supply materials to the job site but agreed to perform work based upon a price described as a "per board" industry standard rate. In other words, the men would hang the drywall at a flat rate (established by and consistent with the local industry standard) for each job accepted through the Respondent. If the work were completed, the men expected to be paid by the Respondent. The men did not contract with or work for the general contractor of the job. The only requirement for payment was the performance of the work. The only risk incurred by the workers related to their relationship with the Respondent. Having concluded that the workers were not covered by WC and were not exempt, Investigator Barnes caused a stop work order to be issued against the Respondent. In conjunction with that order, the Department requested copies of the Respondent's business records. A review of the "vendor accounts” supplied by the Respondent established that its workers were paid amounts presumably based upon the number of boards hung per job identified. The payments were not always the same amount as the number of boards hung for a given job could vary. Additionally, the Respondent allowed workers to receive "draws" against the expected payments for uncompleted jobs. The Respondent’s claim that the workers were independent contractors has not been deemed credible. Based upon the testimony of the Respondent's witness all of the workers performed as outlined by the men interviewed by Investigator Barnes. The Respondent did not have a valid WC policy during the three years preceding the stop work order. The Amended Notice and Penalty Assessment Order prepared by Investigator Barnes accurately calculates the amounts owed by the Respondent for the three-year period.
