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SANTA ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 13-002915 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Aug. 02, 2013 Number: 13-002915 Latest Update: May 09, 2017
Florida Laws (2) 895.04985.686
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MISSION INSURANCE COMPANY vs. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 85-000774RX (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000774RX Latest Update: Mar. 20, 1986

The Issue Petitioner challenges the validity of Rule 3SF-2.13, Florida Administrative Code. 1/

Findings Of Fact Based on the entire record compiled herein, including the parties' factual stipulation, the following relevant facts are found. MISSION Insurance Co. (MISSION) is a corporation duly authorized to issue insurance policies, including workers' compensation insurance policies in the State of Florida. MISSION conducts its adjusting operations at North Regency One, Suite 400, 985 Regency Square Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. In the regular course of its business, MISSION adjusted the worker's compensation claim of Katrine Graham, who was injured on April 30, 1984 in an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Smiley's Mobey Dick Restaurant. MISSION received notice of the accident on May 21, 1984. On September 1, 1984, MISSION filed with the DIVISION its initial Injury Progress report (LES From BCL-13), in connection with the claim. On February 11, 1985, MISSION received from the DIVISION's Bureau of Workers' Compensation Carrier practices a letter dated February 4, 1985, notifying MISSION that the Bureau had assessed against MISSION the penalty of $100.00 for filing the form 11 days after the time prescribed by Rule 38F-3.16, F.A.C. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Joint Exhibit "A." Since at least 1979, the DEPARTMENT has had a policy of imposing a fine of $100.00 on any insurance carrier who files its initial Injury Progress Report (LES From BCL-13) more than 105 days after it receives notice of the accident. The DEPARTMENT applies this policy, through its Bureau of Workers' Compensation Carrier Practices, to all insurance carriers and self-insured employers who come within the jurisdiction of the DEPARTMENT. The DEPARTMENT imposes penalties for the untimely filing of forms other than the BCL-13 form. The penalties to be imposed for the untimely filing of the BCL-13 form, as well as other forms, are stated in a "Penalty Assessment Chart," a copy of which is attached hereto as Joint Exhibit "B." At the time the subject penalty was imposed on MISSION, this chart was used by the DEPARTMENT's workers' compensation examiners in determining whether a penalty should be imposed and, if so, the amount of the penalty. The DEPARTMENT did not implement or use Chapter 120 rulemaking procedures to adopt the Penalty Assessment Chart, or the policy it represents, as a rule. PETITIONER'S POSITION Petitioner contends that the Penalty Assessment Chart amounts to an unpublished rule which has the effect of exacting a penalty for "late" filing in excess of Respondent's legislative authority inasmuch as Respondent is only authorized to impose a penalty based on a carriers failure or refusal to file forms, reports, or notices pursuant to Section 445.185(9), Florida Statutes. Petitioner avers that in the absence of specific statutory authorization for Respondent to impose a penalty or assessment for an untimely filing, there is no basis upon which Respondent can impose the penalty involved herein, that the rule should be declared invalid and the $100.00 penalty imposed based thereon, should be rescinded. RESPONDENT'S POSITION Respondent avers that timely filings are inextricably tied to the Division's reporting requirements and that to conclude that a carrier could file reports, notices, etc. at will, without any directive, would lead to an absurd result in contravention of Respondent's long-standing reporting policy which has been effective since approximately 1979. Finally, Respondent urges that the legislature has authorized it to exact penalties for late filings based on the authority granted in Sections 440.185(5) and (9), Florida Statutes.

Florida Laws (4) 120.54120.56120.68440.185
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ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 13-002912 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Aug. 02, 2013 Number: 13-002912 Latest Update: May 09, 2017
Florida Laws (2) 895.04985.686
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MICHAEL BYNOE vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 89-004175 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Aug. 03, 1989 Number: 89-004175 Latest Update: Feb. 09, 1990

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the issue of abandonment in these proceedings, Petitioner Bynoe was a Career Service Employee, and was employed by the Department of Corrections at Hendry Correctional Institution in Immokalee, Florida, as a Correctional Officer I. In February 1989, the Petitioner submitted a written request for annual leave from June 9, 1989 to June 17, 1989. The leave was approved by the Petitioner's supervisor, Captain Jody Davis. June 6, 1989, Petitioner Bynoe was informed by Captain Davis that he did not have enough hours of annual leave accrued to cover the vacation period which was to begin on June 9, 1989. The prior written approval to the Petitioner for annual leave was revoked as the previously anticipated hours of accrued annual leave did not exist. The Petitioner had only eight hours of annual leave accrued at the time the approval of annual leave was revoked by Captain Davis. In an attempt to accommodate the Petitioner, who had already scheduled vacation plans, Captain Davis told him that the work schedule could be rearranged to allow Petitioner Bynoe to have five days off in a row from June 7, 1989 through June 11, 1989. This work schedule would give Petitioner Bynoe his regular days off of June 7th and 8th. His regularly scheduled days off of June 14th and 15th could be moved to June 9th and 10th, and the eight hours of annual leave available to Petitioner could be used on June 11th. Thus, Petitioner could have time off from work, and Captain Davis could act within his supervisory authority with regard to his approval of leave requests from the Petitioner, who was under his direct supervision. During the discussion between the Petitioner and Captain Davis, the Petitioner requested that he be allowed to take the full vacation period previously scheduled, and that the time from June 12, 1989 through June 17, 1989, be granted as leave without pay. Captain Davis informed Petitioner Bynoe that he did not have the authority to approve such a request, and that such an approval would have to come from someone higher in command. Although the two men ended their conversation with the clear intention to discuss the matter later during the work period on June 6, 1989, they were unable to discuss the matter again on that date. After the Petitioner completed work on June 6, 1989, he left for South Carolina as he had originally planned. On June 9, 1989, Petitioner telephoned Colonel Page at Hendry Correctional Institute. As Colonel Page was on leave, the call was transferred to the personnel manager, Mr. Dick Vollmer. During the conversation, the decision made by Captain Davis to revoke the Petitioner's leave from June 12, 1989 to June 17, 1989, was discussed. Captain Davis' decision was not modified by Mr. Vollmer or anyone else at the correctional institution. The Petitioner did not return to work on June 12, 1989. No additional contact with the institution was initiated by Petitioner until June 19, 1989, when he informed Captain Davis that he was to begin jury duty on that date. The Petitioner was absent from work without an authorized leave of absence on his scheduled work days of June 12, 1989 through June 18, 1989. Captain Davis expected the Petitioner back to work on June 12, 1989. Petitioner Bynoe was scheduled to work from June 12, 1989 to June 20, 1989. The Petitioner did not report to work nor did he contact anyone at the institution until June 19, 1989, when he began jury duty on that date. The Petitioner was absent from work without an authorized leave of absence on his scheduled work days of June 12, 1989 through June 18, 1989.

Recommendation Based upon the evidence, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Secretary of the Department of Administration issue a Final Order finding that Petitioner Bynoe abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accept that Captain Davis spoke with Petitioner. See HO #3 - HO #6. Reject the finding that Captain Davis had not informed the Petitioner that his previously approved leave request had been rescinded. Contrary to fact. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #7 and HO #8. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #8. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. Rejected. This testimony not believed by the Hearing Officer. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. 19.-27. Rejected. Immaterial to these proceedings. Also, Daugherty's testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer, and was rejected in full. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #3. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #8. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See preliminary statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Joan Stewart, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. Post Office Box 11239 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Perri M. King, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ALEX NIZNIK vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, 06-003657 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 22, 2006 Number: 06-003657 Latest Update: Apr. 09, 2007

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent should grant Petitioner's application for licensure as a public adjuster, despite his having pleaded guilty to (and been convicted of) a felony involving moral turpitude (conspiracy to commit mail fraud), which conviction was not disclosed on Petitioner's application.

Findings Of Fact On August 29, 2005, Petitioner Alex Niznik ("Niznik") completed an online application for licensure as a Resident Public Property and Casualty Insurance Adjuster and submitted the form electronically to Respondent Department of Financial Services ("Department" or "DFS"). The application contained 18 "screening questions" that called for a "yes" or "no" answer. Focusing primarily on matters bearing on character and fitness, these questions sought to elicit personal information about the applicant's background. One question, for example, asked: "Have you held a resident insurance license in another state during the last three years?" Another inquired: "Have you ever had an application for a license declined or denied by this or any other insurance regulatory body?" The instant dispute arose from the eighth screening question, which asked: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? Niznik answered, "no." At the end of the application, just above his electronic signature, Niznik checked a box manifesting agreement with the following declaration: Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for license and that the facts stated in it are true. I understand that misrepresentation of any fact required to be disclosed through this application is a violation of the Florida Insurance and Administrative Codes and may result in the denial of my application . . . . Despite having declared that his responses were true, Niznik's answer to the question of whether he had a criminal record was false. In fact, contrary to his denial of past criminal convictions, Niznik had pleaded guilty, about nine years earlier, to the felony charge of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, which is an offense against the United States. Following this guilty plea, the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, on July 25, 1996, had entered a judgment of conviction against Niznik, sentencing him to three years of probation and imposing a $50 fine. DFS discovered Niznik's conviction before granting him a license. Based on Niznik's criminal record and his failure to disclose its existence, DFS denied Niznik's application. DFS's decision was communicated to Niznik though a Notice of Denial dated July 27, 2006. Niznik was informed that he would not be eligible to reapply until after 17 years had elapsed, starting from the date of his conviction. Niznik timely requested an administrative hearing to determine his substantial interest in obtaining a license. Determinations of Ultimate Fact Because conspiracy to commit mail fraud is a felony that involves moral turpitude, and because it is undisputed that Niznik pleaded guilty to——and was convicted of——this federal crime, the Department is required by statute to deny Niznik's application for licensure. Pursuant to its rules, the Department must impose a waiting period on Niznik, which he is required to serve before becoming eligible to reapply. The usual waiting period for the type of crime of which Niznik was convicted is 15 years. An additional two years must be added to this, in consequence of Niznik's failure to disclose the conviction. Although Niznik failed to present persuasive evidence on any specific mitigating factors that might have given grounds to shorten the prescribed waiting period, he did persuade the undersigned that, more likely than not, he has been rehabilitated. Rehabilitation is a general mitigating factor that warrants a modest reduction of the waiting period.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (a) denying Niznik's application for licensure as a Resident Public Property and Casualty Insurance Adjuster and (b) imposing a waiting period of 16 years, from the date of his criminal conviction, which must be served before Niznik may reapply. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2007.

USC (3) 18 U.S.C 134118 U.S.C 355918 U.S.C 371 Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57624.501626.611626.621
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DWAYNE GASKIN vs AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 16-003377EXE (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jun. 16, 2016 Number: 16-003377EXE Latest Update: Dec. 19, 2016

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be exempt from disqualification from employment in a position of trust, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes (2016).1/

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Agency is the state entity which supports vulnerable persons with various developmental disabilities. The Agency contracts with direct service providers and is responsible for regulating the employment of persons serving in positions of trust with these providers. Vision Builders One, Inc., is a service provider for the Agency. Mr. Gaskin applied with Vision Builders One, Inc., to become a caregiver, a position of trust which requires completion of level 2 background screening. The Department of Children and Families conducts initial screening on behalf of the Agency. Background screening and local criminal records revealed a significant history of involvement with law enforcement for Mr. Gaskin.2/ In response to inquiries concerning possession of cocaine on December 2, 1988, Mr. Gaskin stated: I was young, not thinking straight, and decided to experiment with selling illegal drugs. I was arrested in a known location for having three cocaine rocks. I was placed on probation. On February 8, 1989, Mr. Gaskin entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, a felony of the third degree. In response to inquiries concerning violation of probation on May 31, 1990, Mr. Gaskin stated: I didn’t want to result back to selling illegal drugs. I was unable to find employment; therefore, I didn’t have money to pay my probation fees. I violated and was sentenced to 18 months in prison. In response to inquiries concerning resisting an officer without violence on April 9, 1993, Mr. Gaskin stated: I do not recall this arrest or charge. Once researched, the clerk was unable to locate court documents for this charge. In response to inquiries concerning contempt of court regarding child support on November 15, 1993, Mr. Gaskin stated: I was unemployed and unable to pay the child support purge. In response to inquiries concerning possession of cocaine on February 15, 1994, Mr. Gaskin stated: I was hanging out with a few guys, and one of them left cocaine in the backseat of my car, unknowingly to me. This charge against me was dropped. In response to inquiries concerning cocaine possession on February 5, 1995, Mr. Gaskin stated: I was parked in my car and had cocaine in my possession when the law officers approached my car. I received one year house arrest probation, six months weekend jail, and 75 hours of community service work, in addition to court fines and suspended driver license. On June 19, 1995, Mr. Gaskin entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, a felony of the third degree. In response to inquiries concerning a domestic battery on July 20, 2000, Mr. Gaskin stated: My wife and I were separated. I stayed away for four weeks and when I returned to our home, my wife had a male friend in the house. I was upset and she wouldn’t let me in our home, so I knocked the door in to enter. When entering, she and I exchanged hurtful words and we struck each other. She called police and I was arrested. Those charges were downsized to lesser charges. I was sentenced to one year probation, attend and complete an anger management class. On January 31, 2001, Mr. Gaskin entered a plea of nolo contendere to trespass of an occupied dwelling, a misdemeanor of the first degree and to domestic battery, a misdemeanor of the first degree. In response to inquiries concerning contempt of court for violation of a protective injunction regarding domestic violence on September 3, 2000, Mr. Gaskin stated: My bondsman neglected to notify me of my court date; therefore, I didn’t appear on day of court. When informed of the contempt of court, I turned myself in, so no arrest record. The bondsman notified the court of negligence and the contempt of court charges were dropped. In response to inquiries concerning failure to appear on March 1, 2002, Mr. Gaskin stated: I do not recall this arrest or charge. I will be following up on researching to receive clarification that this was actually me. Once the research is completed I will provide a detailed statement. In response to inquiries concerning violation of probation for trespassing in an occupied dwelling March 1, 2002, Mr. Gaskin stated: I was violated because my wife made an untrue statement to the police that I was harassing her. I called to ask for visitation with my son and we got into a verbal argument. In response to inquiries concerning driving while license suspended on July 24, 2010, Mr. Gaskin stated: I got a traffic ticket leaving work which violated my probation. I notified my probation officer and turned myself in, so there wasn’t an arrest. My probation was re-instated; I then paid it off and completed it to its entirety. Since September 10, 2002, Mr. Gaskin has been released from all confinement, supervision, and non-monetary sanctions imposed for the disqualifying offenses he committed. Since April 14, 2016, Mr. Gaskin has been released from all monetary conditions. Mr. Gerry Driscoll is the regional operations manager for the Southeast Region in the Agency. He has served in his current position for 3 years and has been employed with the Agency for 17 years. Mr. Driscoll credibly testified that the Agency has responsibility for a very vulnerable population, many of whom are unable to later tell others about the actions of their caregivers. This population is thus very susceptible to exploitation. Mr. Driscoll noted that the Agency must consider any prior instance of violence very carefully. While in his written submission to the Agency Mr. Gaskin stated that he never caused any harm or injury to any victim, at hearing he admitted that he caused injury to his wife when he hit her after breaking into their home and injury to others in selling them controlled substances, testimony that is credited. Mr. Gaskin submitted three character reference letters to the Agency stating generally that he is hardworking, intelligent, and committed. Mr. Gaskin further stated that he was very remorseful and admitted he had made poor choices in his life in the past. He explained that he just wants an opportunity to be a productive citizen, to work, and to take care of his family. Mr. Gaskin seems sincere in his desire to care for vulnerable persons, and asks for a chance to work with them to demonstrate that he is rehabilitated. However, the statute requires that rehabilitation be shown first through other work history and by additional means: only then may an exemption to disqualification be granted. While Mr. Gaskin stated that he is rehabilitated, he offered little evidence to clearly demonstrate that. He completed some courses toward certification as a firefighter in 2004-2005, but has evidently not pursued that further. He completed some courses required as a condition of probation, but has not participated in other counseling or coursework. Mr. Gaskin’s work history in the past decade, a very important element in demonstrating rehabilitation, has been very “sketchy,” as Mr. Driscoll testified. Mr. Gaskin indicated that his last employment ended in July 2014. He was employed by Manpower Staffing Services doing temporary work for about 14 months in several jobs such as maintenance worker, demolition worker, and equipment/maintenance technician. He also worked at United Parcel Service for a couple of months in 2010. Although Mr. Gaskin has not had steady work in recent years, he noted that when needed, he assists his father-in-law with handyman work, his son with his entertainment business, his cousin with his bail bonds business, and his nephew with his marketing business. He noted that he also assists at his church. Passage of time is a factor to be considered in determining rehabilitation, and the last disqualifying offense was many years ago. However, Mr. Gaskin’s history since his disqualifying offenses continues to reflect minor incidents and does not contain sufficient positive indications of rehabilitation. Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is rehabilitated and that he will not present a danger if he is exempted from his disqualification from employment in a position of trust.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Mr. Dwayne Gaskin’s application for exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2016.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57435.04435.07741.28784.03893.13
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CHARLES J. MCCABE vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-003854 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-003854 Latest Update: Nov. 17, 1988

The Issue Whether or not Petitioner McCabe abandoned his position as an employee of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. BACKGROUND AND EVIDENTIARY RULINGS Pursuant to case law, the employing agency bears the burden to establish job abandonment. Accordingly, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) presented its case first. DHRS presented the oral testimony of William Myrick and Joanne Register and had admitted two exhibits. In the course of DHRS' case in chief, Petitioner McCabe moved for a continuance so as to obtain legal counsel. Upon inquiry, Mr. McCabe did not demonstrate good cause for a continuance, and the motion was denied. Petitioner testified in his own behalf and had admitted two exhibits. Both of Petitioner's exhibits are letters from persons who did not take the stand to testify and who therefore were unavailable for cross-examination under oath; neither letter was established to be a "business record" either by appropriate predicate under Chapter 90 F.S. nor as commonly understood. The contents of each letter is therefore hearsay which can only be considered in these Section 120.57(1) F.S. proceedings to the extent set out in Section 120.58 F.S., and they are discussed in that context within the following findings of fact. Both parties waived the opportunity to file a transcript and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner McCabe was employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services at the Palm Beach Detention Center. At all times material, William Myrick, presently Assistant Superintendent of the Detention Center, was Petitioner's immediate superior. He reviews and approves all personnel matters and is in charge of the center on a day to day basis. When Petitioner McCabe first began employment with the Detention Center on December 6, 1986, he signed a form acknowledging receipt of the agency June 1, 1986 Employee Handbook and also signing the State Oath of Loyalty. This handbook is also designated as, "HRS Pamphlet 60-1 (Employee Handbook including the Employee Standards of Conduct)". At page three of this handbook, the agency policy concerning absences is set out as follows: If you expect to be absent from work for any reason, you must request leave from your supervisor as much in advance as possible, so that suitable disposition of your work may be made to avoid undue hardship of fellow employees and clients. As soon as you know you will be late or absent from work you must notify your supervisor. Absence without approved leave is cause for disciplinary action. If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned. Mr. Myrick had scheduled Mr. McCabe to work on June 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1988 from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Mr. Myrick stated that in scheduling Mr. McCabe for those days, he relied on a telephone conversation he had had on June 15, 1988 with Mr. McCabe in which Mr. McCabe, who had been absent from work for some time, stated that he could not get a doctor's excuse but would be in to work on June 16, 1988. Mr. McCabe denies that in the telephone conversation he said he was coming back to work. Mr. McCabe did not call in again to say he would not be in to work; he did not report for work on any of the days scheduled; and he sent in no medical certification that he was unable to work on those days. Prior to June 15, 1988, the last day Mr. McCabe had worked had been May 17, 1988. There was no evidence submitted to inform the hearing officer whether or not Mr. McCabe was on any annual, sick, or disability leave during this period from May 17 to June 16 or whether accrued leave of any kind could have been applied to the days scheduled for him to work. On June 23, 1988, DHRS mailed a certified letter to Petitioner stating, in pertinent part, as follows: You failed to report to work as scheduled on June 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1988 (from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.) and made no effort to contact the agency to request leave. For the purpose of abandonment, the three consecutive work days are June 16, 1988 from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on June 17, 1988, June 17, 1988 from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on June 18, and June 18 from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on June 19,1988. At formal hearing, Mr. McCabe offered a June 6, 1988 letter (admitted as P-1) to Mr. William J. Myrick from Kenneth B. LeClerc, L.C.S.W., whom Mr. McCabe described as a "stress counsellor". He testified that this letter had been submitted by him to Mr. Myrick in lieu of a medical excuse on or about June 6, 1988. Neither party examined Mr. Myrick as to whether he received the letter or not and so Mr. McCabe's testimony that it was delivered by him to Mr. Myrick is unrefuted. This letter's contents support Mr. McCabe's testimony that he was being counseled on a weekly basis but does not support his testimony that he was unable to report to work or unable to work on the specific dates of June 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1988. Mr. McCabe also presented a letter (admitted as P-2) dated September 1, 1988 addressed by a psychiatrist (medical physician) and psychologist to the attorney for DHRS. The writers were not available for cross-examination and Mr. McCabe admitted that the letter had never been presented, in a timely manner or otherwise, to anyone at DHRS. Although some portions of the letter may be considered as supporting Mr. McCabe's testimony that he is suffering and was suffering prior to June 21, 1988, from a variety of emotional/psychological ills, the timeframe contained in the letter does not support his contention that he was medically unable to report for work or to actually work on the June 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1988. Mr. McCabe stated that "they" said they would not do anything about his job until something happened, but he was unclear about what that was going to be or who said that nothing would happen with regard to his job. The impression his somewhat disjointed testimony leaves is that he felt that because he was referred by the agency employee assistance program to LeClerc and from the program, or perhaps from LeClerc, to medical doctors on June 21 or 22 or 23, he was therefore entitled to have his supervisor freeze his job status until that time. However, he did not specifically claim that Mr. Myrick or anyone in authority over him at DHRS had made him that promise. He also seemed to accept that leave was not further authorized by Mr. Myrick after June 15 without a medical excuse.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the a final order be entered finding that Charles J. McCabe has abandoned his position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of November, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Charles J. McCabe 137 Southeast 27th Way Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Laurel Hopper, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue, 3rd Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 32401 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ORLANDO RUEDA | O. R. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 98-000413 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jan. 23, 1998 Number: 98-000413 Latest Update: Mar. 04, 1999

The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for exemption pursuant to Section 400.512, Florida Statutes, should be granted.

Findings Of Fact On May 21, 1990, Petitioner, Orlando Rueda (Rueda), was arrested on charges of sexual battery on a child. The charges arose from incidents which occurred in 1983. On September 5, 1991, Rueda plead nolo contendere to five counts of attempted sexual battery on a child, Sections 777.04(1) and 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, and to two counts of indecent assault, Section 800.041(1), Florida Statutes. Adjudication was withheld, and Rueda was sentenced to five years probation, the terms of which included no contact with the victim or his family, no employment involving children, and a psychological evaluation. Rueda maintains that he is not guilty of the crimes for which he pled nolo contendere but states that because of financial difficulties in continuing with his defense and of the possibility that he could be sentenced to life imprisonment if he were found guilty, he pled nolo contendere rather than go to trial. On August 27, 1993, Rueda was arrested for driving with a suspended license. On September 17, 1993, his probation officer executed an affidavit of violation of probation indicating that Rueda violated probation by driving with a suspended license and failing to file with his probation officer a full report of having been arrested for driving with a suspended license. Rueda was arrested and charged with violation of probation. On October 18, 1993, Rueda admitted to the charge of violation of probation. The court revoked Rueda's probation and sentenced him to another five-year term of probation and ordered Rueda to attend a sex offender program at R.E.A.C.H. once a week. The court modified the probation by order dated May 31, 1994, to require attendance at the Fifth Street Counseling Center in place of attendance at R.E.A.C.H. Rueda was to remain in the Fifth Street Counseling Center program until further notice from the program. The program at the Fifth Street Counseling Center was headed by William Rambo, a clinical social worker. Rueda began his treatment with Mr. Rambo in June 1994. The treatment program is for a minimum of four years. The first phase, which usually lasts a year, consists of intensive weekly therapy sessions in which the patient deals with the allegations of the original sexual offense. The second phase is designed to last a minimum of one year and is a less intensive phase with bi-weekly group sessions. The emphasis in the second phase is on current functioning and monitoring of the patient's stability. The final phase is designed for two years and allows the patient to demonstrate continued stability. On January 31, 1996, Rueda admitted to his probation officer that he had used cocaine on January 24, 1996. Rueda also admitted to the use of cocaine to a Secret Service Agent, who was questioning Rueda about an incident involving a counterfeit fifty-dollar bill. Rueda said that he had been drinking with friends when one of them went to purchase cocaine. The drug was put into a cigarette, which Rueda and his friends smoked. As a result of the incident involving his use of cocaine, on February 26, 1997, the court ordered two years of community control, followed by ten years of probation which began on April 4, 1996. Community control is a form of house arrest and sometimes involves wearing an electronic monitoring device. Rueda was required to wear an electronic monitor for one year. Barring any further violations of probation, Rueda's probation is due to expire in 2008. On May 12, 1997, Rueda wrote a letter to the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), requesting an exemption and outlining his criminal background. His letter did not include any information concerning the January 1996, cocaine- related violation. On December 8, 1997, the Agency granted Rueda an informal hearing before an informal hearing committee on his request for an exemption. During the informal hearing, the committee specifically asked Rueda to describe any special conditions of his probation. Petitioner did not volunteer that at the time of the informal hearing that he was being required to wear an electronic monitor. The informal committee had learned about the electronic monitor from Rueda's probation officer. Rueda did not reveal that he was wearing a monitor until the committee specifically asked whether he was under electronic monitoring. Rueda is still in the first phase of his treatment with Mr. Rambo. Part of the reason that he has not completed the first phase is that each time he violated probation, the probation period would begin anew, and Rueda would have to begin the first phase anew. However, based on the testimony of Mr. Rambo, Rueda has made progress in his treatment, but he has not completed his treatment program. Other than the incidents for which Rueda plead nolo contendere, Rueda has not been involved in any incidents of sexual battery or indecent assault.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Orlando Rueda's request for an exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jennifer A. Steward, Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 1400 West Commercial Boulevard, Suite 110 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Kevin J. Kulik, Esquire 600 South Andrews Avenue, Suite 500 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

Florida Laws (6) 120.57400.512435.03435.07777.04794.011
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PAUL R. LAYTON vs. PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, 84-000209RX (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000209RX Latest Update: Jun. 22, 1984

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at Tomoka Correctional Institution, Daytona Beach, Florida. He is presently serving a sentence of 60 years and has a presumptive parole release date of 180 months. Petitioner specifically challenges the validity of the matrix time range contained in Rule 23-21.09(5), Florida Administrative Code. That provision contains a matrix which sets the time ranges for presumptive parole release dates. A copy of that matrix is attached to this order as Appendix I. The most current matrix was last amended effective October 1, 1982. The initial or first matrix was developed and became effective in 1979 in response to legislation adopted in 1978 which required the Parole and Probation Commission (hereafter referred to as Commission) to develop and implement objective parole guidelines. Prior to this time, the granting or denying of parole had been a subjective decision by the commissioners and required a majority vote of the commissioners. In originally developing the matrix, the Commission used the Thurston Scaling Method in ranking various criminal offenses from least to most serious offense. This method involved providing each of the Commissioners with 40 index cards on which the various criminal offenses were written. Each commissioner then ranked the various criminal offenses in order of seriousness. The Board then reviewed the results and arrived at a consensus on the ranking of the various crimes. The Thurston scaling methodology is an accepted scientific methodology for ranking different crimes by level of seriousness or severity. This methodology was recommended to the Commission by three consultants in the field of parole. These same three experts, Peter Hoffman, Director of Research for the U.S. Parole Commission, Dale Parent, Director of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission for the State of Minnesota, and Betty Taylor, a parole commissioner for the State of Oregon, advised and consulted with the board in developing the objective parole guidelines. After the initial matrix was adopted as a Commission rule, it was reviewed on an annual basis as required by statute. Since 1979, some changes in the matrix have been adopted by the Commission based upon their annual review. Each change was adopted as a rule change and the procedures for adopting or amending administrative rules were followed. The procedure for adopting the rule changes generally took at least 90 days. The present matrix contains six categories of crimes broken down by degrees. Each inmate is assigned a salient-factor score and by using this score with the offense for which the person was sentenced a time range for the Presumptive parole release date for that individual is obtained from the matrix. The Commission sets the presumptive parole release date within that range unless other factors warrant going outside that range by extending or reducing the number of months to the presumptive parole release date. The inmate's presumptive parole release date may also be extended for unsatisfactory institutional behavior while incarcerated. The Commission, in granting or denying parole, considers the total case package including those specific reasons which may serve as a basis for going above or below the matrix time range. When the Commission goes outside the matrix time range it must state its reason for doing so. Prior to March 1983, the forms of the Commission's actions were filed in a central storage area. In March 1983, the mechanism became available for feeding this information into the computer. Using the computer and data which is maintained by the Department of Corrections, the Commission now generates quarterly reports. These reports provide a statistical analysis which indicates whether the guidelines are being following by the Commission. This same data also provides a possible indicator for needed changes in the guidelines. All revisions to the guidelines must now be made based upon such statistical analysis. Sentencing guidelines and objective parole guidelines are separate. The salient-factor scores for the sentencing guidelines and objective parole guidelines are similar, but not the same. Sentencing involves a separate branch of government, a separate function, separate measurements, and separate criteria. Sentencing can be done only by a court of law and is accomplished by court order. Sentencing sets the limit of the incarceration period. The parole function is a function of the executive branch and cannot be ordered by the Commission. An offer of parole is tendered or offered by the Commission and the inmate may accept or reject the offer and its condition. If the inmate accepts an offer of parole, the form used is a contract form which must be signed and agreed to by the inmate. Parole results in release under supervision whereas completion of the sentence results in full release without conditions or supervision. Section 947.165(2), Florida Statutes, was amended by the 1982 legislature. See Session Law 82-171. Prior to this amendment, changes made in the objective parole guidelines were to be based upon the "experience" of the commission. The amended section provides that the Commission shall review the guidelines at least once each year and make any revisions considered necessary by virtue of statistical analysis of Commission actions. The initial report of the data generated by this statistical analysis was to be due January 30, 1983. See Florida Statute 947.13(3)(1982). The Commission and its staff began work immediately after the passage of 82-171 to implement the statistical analysis and reporting requirements.

Florida Laws (4) 120.5620.315947.13947.165
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