The Issue The issue in these cases is whether the Department of Juvenile Justice's (Department) proposed award of certain contracts to Bay Area Youth Services, Inc. (BAYS), based on evaluations of proposals submitted in response to a Request for Proposals is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact On July 2, 2003, the Department issued Request for Proposal (RFP) No. V6P01 for operation of IDDS programs in Judicial Circuits 1 through 20. The Department issued a single RFP and anticipated entering into 20 separate contracts, one for each circuit. Each contract was for a three-year period with the possibility of a renewal for an additional three-year period. The RFP was prepared based on a "contract initiation memo" generated within the Department and upon which the scope of services set forth in the RFP was based. The Department assigned one contract administrator to handle the procurement process. An addendum dated July 18, 2003, was issued to the RFP. As amended by the addendum, the RFP required submission of information in a tabbed format of three volumes. Volume I was the technical proposal. Volume II was the financial proposal. Volume III addressed past performance by the vendor. The addendum also allowed providers to submit some information in electronic format. The addendum requested, but did not require, that it be signed and returned with the submission. BAYS did not return a signed copy of the addendum in its proposal. Failure to sign and return the addendum was not fatal to the consideration of a proposal. The RFP set forth only two criteria for which noncompliance would be deemed "fatal" to a proposal. Failure to comply with a fatal criterion would have resulted in automatic elimination of a provider's response; otherwise, all responses submitted were evaluated. The proposals were opened on July 31, 2003. The contract administrator and staff reviewed the bids to ascertain whether required items were included, and noted the proposed costs on bid tabulation sheets. The first fatal criterion was failing to submit a properly executed "Attachment A" form to a submission. Attachment A is a bidder acknowledgment form. Both BAYS and JSP included a completed Attachment A in the responses at issue in this proceeding. The second fatal criterion was exceeding the Maximum Contract Dollar Amount. RFP Attachment B, Section XIII, provides in relevant part as follows: The Maximum Contract Dollar Amount will be the Annual Maximum Contract Dollar Amount multiplied by the number of years in the initial term of the Contract . . . . EXCEEDING THE ANNUAL MAXIMUM CONTRACT DOLLAR AMOUNT IS A FATAL CRITERION. ANY PROPOSAL WITH A COST EXCEEDING THE ANNUAL MAXIMUM CONTRACT DOLLAR AMOUNT WILL BE REJECTED. The information reviewed as to each provider's cost proposal was set forth in Volume II, Tab 1, which included RFP Attachment J. RFP Attachment J is a cost sheet where providers were required to set forth proposal costs identified as the "Maximum Payment" under their proposal. Attachment K to the RFP identifies the counties served in each circuit, number of available slots in each circuit, and the Annual Maximum Contract Dollar Amount for each circuit. JSP appears to have simply copied information from Attachment K onto Attachment J. The Department's contract administrator was the sole person assigned to review Volume II of the responses. Volume II included the cost proposal, the supplier evaluation report (SER), and the certified minority business enterprise (CMBE) subcontracting utilization plan. Neither BAYS nor JSP exceeded the Annual Maximum Contract Dollar Amount applicable to any circuit at issue in this proceeding. Both BAYS and JSP identified a Maximum Payment equal to the Annual Maximum Contract Dollar Amount as their proposal cost. Both BAYS and JSP received scores of 100 points for cost proposals in all responses at issue in this proceeding. JSP asserts that the instructions as to identification of the Annual Maximum Contract Dollar Amount were confusing and that its actual cost proposal was less than that set forth as the "Maximum Payment" on Attachment J. JSP asserts that it actually listed its cost proposal at the section identified on Attachment J as "renewal term dollar amount proposed." JSP asserts that the Department should have reviewed supporting budget information set forth in Attachment H to the RFP to determine JSP's cost proposal, and that the Department should have determined that JSP's actual cost proposal was less than that of BAYS. The Department did not review the budget information in Attachment H, but based its cost evaluation of the proposals on the total figures set forth on Attachment J. Nothing in the RFP suggests that underlying information as to cost proposals would be reviewed or evaluated. The evidence fails to establish that the Department's reliance on the information set forth on Attachment J was unreasonable or erroneous. The evidence fails to establish that the Department's scoring of the cost proposals was contrary to the RFP. The evidence fails to establish that JSP is entitled to have its cost proposal re-scored. One of the requirements of the RFP was submission of a "Supplier Evaluation Report" (SER) from Dunn & Bradstreet. The submission of the SER was worth 90 points. Dunn & Bradstreet transmitted most of the SERs directly to the Department, and the Department properly credited the providers for whom such reports were transmitted. The Department's contract administrator failed to examine BAYS submission for the SER, and BAYS did not receive credit for the SER included within its proposal. The failure to credit BAYS for the SERs was clearly erroneous. BAYS is entitled to additional credit as set forth herein. The RFP sought utilization of a CMBE in a provider's proposal. BAYS proposal included utilization of The Nelco Company, an employee leasing operation. The Nelco Company is a properly credentialed CMBE. Under the BAYS/Nelco arrangement, BAYS would retain responsibility for identification and recruitment of potential employees. BAYS performs the background screening and makes final employment decisions. BAYS retains the right to fire, transfer, and demote employees. The Nelco Company would process payroll and handle other fiscal human resource tasks including insurance matters. The Nelco Company invoices BAYS on a per payroll basis, and BAYS pays based on the Nelco invoice. JSP asserts that under the facts of this case, the participation of The Nelco Company fails to comply with the RFP's requirement for CMBE utilization. BAYS proposals also included utilization of other CMBEs. There is no credible evidence that BAYS utilization of The Nelco Company or of the other CMBEs included within the BAYS proposals fails to comply with the RFP's requirement for CMBE utilization. The Department assigned the responsibility for service proposal evaluation to employees located within each circuit. The contract administrator and staff distributed appropriate portions of Volume I of each proposal to the evaluators. The evidence establishes that the evaluators received the documents and evaluated the materials pursuant to written scoring instructions received from the Department. Some reviewers had more experience than others, but there is no evidence that a lack of experience resulted in an inappropriate review being performed. In two cases, the evaluators worked apart from one another. In one circuit, the evaluators processed the materials in the same room, but did not discuss their reviews with each other at any time. There is no evidence that evaluators were directed to reach any specific result in the evaluative process. JSP asserts that there was bias on the part of one evaluator who had knowledge of some unidentified incident related to JSP. The evidence fails to establish the facts of the incident and fails to establish that the incident, whatever it was, played any role in the evaluator's review of the JSP proposal. JSP also asserts that another evaluator had contact with JSP at some point prior to his evaluation of the RFP responses. There is no evidence that the contact was negative or was a factor either for or against JSP in the evaluation of the RFP responses. The RFP required that each provider's proposal include letters of intent from "local service resources" indicating a willingness to work with the provider and a letter of support from the State Attorney in the judicial circuit where the provider's program would operate. The RFP indicates that Volume I of a provider's response should contain five tabbed sections. The RFP provides that "information submitted in variance with these instructions may not be reviewed or evaluated." The RFP further provides that failure to provide information "shall result in no points being awarded for that element of the evaluation." JSP included letters of support in Tab 5 of Volume I. BAYS included letters of support in a tabbed section identified as Tab 6 of Volume I. JSP asserts that information included in Tab 6 of BAYS proposals should not have been evaluated and that no points should have been awarded based on the information included therein. The evidence fails to support the assertion. Based on the language of the RFP, submission of information in a format other than that prescribed is not fatal to a proposal. The Department reserved the authority to waive such defects and to evaluate the material. Here, the Department waived the variance as the RFP permitted, and reviewed the material submitted by BAYS. JSP asserts that BAYS proposal breached client confidentiality by inclusion of information regarding an individual who has allegedly received services through BAYS. Records regarding assessment or treatment of juveniles through the Department are deemed confidential pursuant Section 985.04, Florida Statutes (2003). The evidence fails to establish that an alleged violation of Section 985.04, Florida Statutes (2003), requires rejection of the BAYS proposals. There is no evidence that the information was released outside of the Department prior to the bid protest forming the basis of this proceeding. The evidence establishes that JSP misidentified the name of its contract manager in its transmittal letter. The evidence establishes that the misidentification was deemed immaterial to the Department, which went on to evaluate the JSP proposals. The results of the evaluations were returned to the contract administrator, who tabulated and posted the results of the process. On August 25, 2003, the Department posted a Notice of Intent to Award contacts based on the proposals submitted in response to the RFP. Insofar as is relevant to this proceeding, the Department proposed to award the contracts for Circuits 5, 6, and 20 to BAYS. The Department received four proposals from IDDS program providers in Circuit 5 (DOAH Case No. 03-3671BID). According to the Notice of Intended Contract Award, BAYS was the highest ranked bidder with 651.8 points. JSP was the second highest bidder with 642.6 points. White Foundation was the third highest bidder at 630.7 points, and MAD DADS was the fourth bidder at 442.8 points. The evidence establishes that BAYS included its SER in its Circuit 5 proposal. The Department neglected to examine BAYS submission for the SER, and BAYS did not receive credit for its SER. BAYS should have received an additional 90 points, bringing its total points to 741.8. The Department received two proposals from IDDS program providers in Circuit 6 (DOAH Case No. 03-3672BID). According to the Notice of Intended Contract Award, BAYS was the highest ranked bidder with 649.0 points. JSP was the second highest bidder with 648.8 points. The evidence establishes that BAYS included its SER in its Circuit 6 proposal. The Department neglected to examine BAYS submission for the SER, and BAYS did not receive credit for its SER. BAYS should have received an additional 90 points, bringing its total points to 739.0. The Department received two proposals from IDDS program providers in Circuit 20 (DOAH Case No. 03-3673BID). According to the Notice of Intended Contract Award, BAYS was the highest ranked bidder with 644.2 points. JSP was the second highest bidder with 620.6 points. The evidence establishes that BAYS included its SER in its Circuit 20 proposal. The Department neglected to examine BAYS submission for the SER, and BAYS did not receive credit for its SER. BAYS should have received an additional 90 points, bringing its total points to 734.2. MOTION TO DISMISS BAYS asserts that the Petitions for Hearing filed by JSP must be dismissed for failure to comply with Section 287.042(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), which requires that a protesting bidder post a bond or cash in an amount equal to one percent of the estimated contract amount by the time a formal written bid protest is filed. Item 8 of the RFP indicated that the bond or cash amount required was one percent of the total contract amount or $5,000, whichever was less. However, RFP Attachment "B," Section IX, indicates that it replaces RFP Item 8, and provides that the required bond or cash amount is one percent of the estimated contract amount. Pursuant to Section 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), JSP had 72 hours from the announcement of the bid award to file a Notice of Protest and an additional ten days to file a Formal Written Protest. The notice of intended bid award was posted on August 25, 2003. Accordingly, the written protest and appropriate deposits were due by September 8, 2003. The Department's Notice of Intended Award referenced the bond requirement and stated that failure to post the bond would constitute a waiver of proceedings. On September 8, 2003, JSP provided to the Department a cashier's check for $2,159.70 in relation to its protest of the award for Circuit 5. The contract amount was $647,910. One percent of the contract amount is $6,479.10. On September 8, 2003, JSP provided to the Department a cashier's check for $3,414.52 in relation to its protest of the award for Circuit 6. The contract amount was $1,025,857.50. One percent of the contract amount is $10,258.57. On September 8, 2003, JSP provided to the Department a cashier's check for $2,231.69 in relation to its protest of the award for Circuit 20. The contract amount was $669,507. One percent of the contract amount is $6,695.07. In response to JSP's insufficient cashier's checks, the Department, by letter of September 12, 2003, advised JSP of the underpayment and permitted JSP an additional ten days to provide additional funds sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute. JSP, apparently still relying on the superceded language in the RFP, forwarded only an amount sufficient to bring the deposited funds to $5,000 in each case. By letter dated September 25, 2003, the Department again advised JSP that the deposited funds were insufficient and provided yet another opportunity to JSP to deposit additional funds. On September 29, 2003, JSP forwarded additional funds to provide the appropriate deposits.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a Final Order as follows: Dismissing the Petition for Hearing filed by MAD DADS of Greater Ocala, Inc., in Case No. 03-3670BID based on the withdrawal of the Petition for Hearing. Dismissing the Petitions for Hearing filed by JSP for failure to comply with Section 287.042(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), and for the other reasons set forth herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Barclay, Esquire Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 815 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Brian Berkowitz, Esquire Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building, Room 312V 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Larry K. Brown, Executive Director MAD DADS of Greater Ocala, Inc. 210 Northwest 12th Avenue Post Office Box 3704 Ocala, Florida 34478-3704 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire The Nelson Law Firm, P.A. Post Office Box 6677 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
Findings Of Fact The findings below are based on the undisputed facts set forth in Petitioner's Protest and supplements thereto, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner's Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, and representations by the parties during the motion hearing. On October 7, 2009, Respondent electronically posted its final ranking of firms which had submitted proposals to provide mechanical engineering services for six HVAC projects for Respondent in 2010. Respondent's electronic posting of the final ranking of firms included the following language: "Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.57(3), shall constitute a waiver of proceeding under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes." On October 12, 2009, Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to Protest the final rankings. On October 22, 2009, Petitioner filed its Protest. Although Petitioner's Protest was timely filed, Petitioner initially did not file a bond or other security. The Protest alleges that Petitioner was not required to file a bond, because Respondent did not include in its final ranking notice that a failure to post a bond would constitute a waiver of proceedings under Subsection 120.57(3)(a), Florida Statutes. Additionally, the Protest alleges that Respondent: (1) failed to provide Petitioner with notice of the estimated contract amounts within 72 hours, exclusive of Saturdays and Sundays and state holidays, of the filing of a notice of protest as required by Subsection 287.042(2)(c), Florida Statutes; and (2) because Respondent had not provided that notice, Petitioner was unable to calculate the amount of the bond required and was, therefore, relieved of the obligation to file a bond. On October 30, 2009, Respondent, through counsel, wrote to Petitioner. In this correspondence, Respondent informed Petitioner that Section 287.042, Florida Statutes, did not apply to Respondent because it was not an "agency" for purposes of that law. Respondent further informed Petitioner that Section 255.0516, Florida Statutes, allowed Respondent to require a bond in the amount of two percent of the lowest accepted bid or $25,000. Respondent also notified Petitioner that because it was protesting all six project awards, all awards must be included in the calculation of the bond amount required. Finally, Petitioner was allowed ten days within which to post a bond. On November 3, 2009, Petitioner submitted to Respondent a cashier's check in the amount of $3,143.70 and noted that the check was intended to serve as security for the Protest "as required by F.S. 287.042(2)(c)." In the letter which accompanied the check, Petitioner also noted that: (1) the amount of the check was determined by calculating one percent of the largest proposed contract award amount of $314,370.00; and (2) Petitioner was providing that amount "under duress," because Respondent had "just published the contract award amounts." The relief requested by Petitioner in the Protest is that: (1) it be awarded one of the six HVAC projects comprising the final ranking; and/or (2) alternatively, all six awards be rescinded and "start the entire process over." The final ranking which Petitioner protests included six separate projects, each of which had a separate construction budget. Those projects and their respective construction budgets are as follows: Northwest--$1,144,000; Tampa Palms--$2,649,081; Yates--$2,770,828; Ferrell--$2,550,758; Stewart--$2,805,437; and Erwin--$4,191,603. The proposed fees for each project were as follows: $97,240 (Northwest); $211,926 (Tampa Palms); $221,666 (Yates); $204,061 (Ferrell); $224,435 (Stewart); and $314,370 (Erwin).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Hillsborough County School Board, issue a final order dismissing the Protest filed by Petitioner, RHC and Associates, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether the proposed award of the contract for Request for Proposals (RFP) No. P2032 to Daniel Memorial, Inc. (Daniel), is contrary to the specifications of the RFP.
Findings Of Fact DJJ issued RFP No. P2032 on April 2, 2007. The RFP solicited proposals for a “20-slot day treatment program for youth placed on Probation, being released from a residential program, transitioning back into the community or classified as minimum risk, and a 100-slot service- oriented Intervention program with comprehensive case management services for youth which the programs are currently located in Pinellas and Pasco Counties ” The contract resulting from the RFP will be for a three-year term -- July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2010 -- with a renewal option for up to an additional three years at DJJ’s sole discretion. The RFP states that the maximum annual contract amount is $948,308, and prospective providers were required to propose a price at or below that amount EYA and Daniel submitted timely, responsive proposals in response to the RFP. Daniel’s proposal offered a slightly lower price than EYA’s proposal.1 On June 11, 2007, DJJ posted notice of its intent to award the contract to Daniel. Thereafter, EYA timely filed a notice of intent to protest and a formal written protest challenging the proposed award of the contract to Daniel. The RFP provides that the proposals were to be evaluated and scored in three categories: technical proposal, financial proposal, and past performance. The past performance category focuses on the prospective provider’s knowledge and experience in operating non-residential juvenile justice programs. The criteria related to the past performance category are contained in Attachment C to the RFP. Attachment C consists of three parts: Part I - Past Performance of Non-Residential Programs; Part II - Evaluation for Past Performance in the United States Outside of Florida; and Part III - Evaluation for Professional Accreditation in the United States. The focus of the dispute in this case is on Part III. A proposal could receive a total of 1,000 points if, as is the case with both EYA and Daniel, the prospective provider operated other DJJ-contracted non-residential programs in Florida. The proposals could receive up to 240 points for Attachment C, with a maximum of 40 points for Part III. The RFP provides that the proposal that receives the highest total points will be awarded the contract. Daniel’s proposal received a total of 600.13 points, which was the highest overall score. Daniel received 176 points for Attachment C, including 30 points for Part III. EYA’s proposal received a total of 573.46 points, which was the second highest overall score. EYA received 143.7 points for Attachment C, including zero points for Part III. EYA contends that Daniel should not have received any points for Part III, which would have resulted in Daniel’s overall score being 30 points lower, or 570.13, and would have given EYA the highest overall score. Part III of Attachment C asks whether the prospective provider currently operates non-residential juvenile justice programs that are accredited and in good standing with certain accrediting agencies, including the Council on Accreditation (COA). If so, the RFP requires the prospective provider to include supporting documentation. The prospective provider receives 10 points for each accredited program listed in Part III of Attachment C. The RFP states multiple times that the supporting documentation “must include the start and end dates [of the programs], be current dated and valid at least through the start date of the Contract that results from this RFP,” and that it must state that “the program cited is a non-residential juvenile program and that is run by the prospective Provider.” The RFP also states multiple times that a prospective provider’s failure to provide the required supporting documentation “shall” result in zero points being awarded for Part III of Attachment C, and that DJJ “is not responsible for research to clarify the prospective Provider's documentation.” EYA did not list any programs in its response to Part III of Attachment C. Its wilderness programs are accredited by COA, but its non-residential juvenile justice programs are not accredited. EYA is currently seeking COA accreditation for the services provided in its non-residential programs based, in part, on DJJ’s scoring of Daniel’s proposal in this proceeding. Daniel listed three programs in its response to Part III: a behavioral management program in Circuit 4; a conditional release program in Circuits 6 and 13; and a behavioral management program in Circuit 7. The documentation provided by Daniel to show that the listed programs are accredited was a letter from COA dated August 18, 2006. The letter confirms that Daniel is accredited by COA; that the accreditation runs through September 30, 2010; and that the accreditation includes “the following programs:” Mental Health Services Psychosocial and Psychiatric Rehabilitation Services Employee Assistance Program (EAP) Services Case Management Services Foster and Kinship Care Services Supported Community Living Services Residential Treatment Services The letter does not on its face refer to the three programs listed by Daniel in its response to Part III. The letter does not on its face reflect whether the listed services were accredited in non-residential programs (as compared to residential programs) or in juvenile justice programs (as compared to adult programs or juvenile programs that do not involve the juvenile justice system). Each of the three programs listed by Daniel in its response to Part III is a non-residential program operated under contract with DJJ. Those programs were also listed by DJJ contract number in Daniel’s response to Part I of Attachment C. Paul Hatcher, the DJJ employee who evaluated the responses to the RFP with respect to Attachment C, was familiar with the three programs listed in Daniel’s response to Part III. He knew from his experience and his review of Part I of Attachment C that the programs were non-residential juvenile justice programs and he knew that the programs provided case management services and mental health services. Mr. Hatcher acknowledged that the COA letter does not specifically mention the three listed programs. He nevertheless considered the letter to be sufficient documentation of accreditation for the three programs because the letter indicated that Daniel, as an organization, was accredited and that it had specific accreditation for the services provided at the three listed programs. COA accredits organizations and services, not specific programs.2 On this issue, Dr. Hilda Shirk, a member of the COA Board of Trustees and an experienced COA peer reviewer, testified that “COA accreditation applies to the entire organization and the services that it provides” and that Daniel’s accreditation includes all of its programs that fall under the service areas listed in the COA letter, which is consistent with Mr. Hatcher’s interpretation of the letter. COA does not separately accredit services provided in residential and non-residential settings, nor does it separately accredit services provided to adults or juveniles. The standards used to evaluate case management services and mental health services, for example, are the same notwithstanding the setting or the type of client being served. COA performed its on-site accreditation review of Daniel in April 2006. It is unlikely that two of the three programs listed by Daniel in response to Part III -- the conditional release program in Circuits 6 and 13 (DJJ Contract No. P2013 and the behavior management program in Circuit 7 (DJJ Contract No. G8101 -- were evaluated by COA as part of that review because those programs had just started. That does not mean, however, that those programs are not accredited. Indeed, Dr. Shirk testified that an organization is not required to submit each new program to COA for review if the services offered in the program fit within a service area for which the organization has been accredited.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that DJJ issue a final order dismissing the EYA’s protest and awarding the contract for RFP No. P2032 to Daniel. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2007.
The Issue Whether Respondent's intended award of a contract to Ramsay Youth Services, Inc., pursuant to RFP No. K8027, is contrary to Respondent's governing statutes, applicable rules, or polices or the specifications of the request for proposals.
Findings Of Fact On August 13, 1999, Respondent, Department of Juvenile Justice (Department), advertised and released a request for proposals (RFP) for the operation of a 62-bed Male Moderate Risk Residential Education Program in Dade County, Florida, RFP K8027. Petitioner, Youthtrack, Inc. (Youthtrack), and Intervernor, Ramsay Youth Services, Inc. (Ramsay), submitted the only two proposals in response to the RFP. On September 20, 1999, the Department posted an intended contract award to Ramsay. Based on the evaluations conducted by the Department, Ramsay received 401.66 points, and Youthtrack received 376 points. The RFP requested proposals to design, develop, implement, and operate a Moderate Risk Residential Education Conservation Corps on land owned by the South Florida Water Management District located outside of Florida City. The RFP called for a daily capacity of 62 male youths who are committed to the Department after having been classified as a moderate risk to society. Youthtrack is the incumbent provider. The RFP specified the proposal award criteria. The proposals were to be evaluated on the statement of work/program services, organizational capability, management approach, and past performance. The evaluation areas were assigned a maximum number of percentage points. Each area contained subcategories, which were assigned percentage points to equal the maximum number of percentage points that could be awarded in that particular category as follows: Award Criteria STATEMENT OF WORK/PROGRAM SERVICES 50 Soundness of Approach 25 Compliance with Requirements 25 ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY 20 Soundness of Approach 10 Compliance with Requirements 10 MANAGEMENT APPROACH 20 Soundness of Approach 10 Compliance with Requirements 10 PAST PERFORMANCE 10 Historical implementation 2 Educational achievements 2 Recidivism rates 2 QA evaluation 2 Community involvement 1 CMBE subcontracting 1 In addition to the above criteria, ten bonus points were available for offerors who were certified minority business enterprises (CMBEs) or who utilized CMBEs as subcontractors. The evaluators were to rate each category using the following rating system. A rating of excellent would receive a score of five. Criteria deemed to be very good would be rated as a four. An adequate response for a category would be scored as a three. A rating of poor would garner a score of two. An unsatisfactory rating would be scored as one. If the criteria was not addressed in the proposal, a zero would be assigned. Three Department employees served on the technical evaluation committee: Robert Rojas, Anne McVey, and Joan Berni. Mr. Rojas is the facilities superintendent for the Department's Miami Halfway House, which is a 28-bed moderate risk facility similar to the 62-bed facility addressed in the RFP at issue. Ms. Beri is a program administrator over probation units in the north area. Maria Elena Cadavid served as the contract administrator for the RFP. She was responsible for overseeing the development of the RFP, the evaluation process, and the integrity of the procurement process. On September 15, 1999, Ms. Cadavid held a meeting with two of the evaluators to distribute the RFP, the Ramsay and Youthtrack proposals, and a memorandum of instructions. In addition to the instructions within the memorandum, the evaluators were provided with copies of a sample scoring sheet and an "Evaluation Factor Guide" as attachments to the memorandum. Ms. Berni did not attend the September 15 meeting. At the beginning of the evaluation process, the RFP, the proposal, and the instruction memorandum with attachments were delivered to her office. Once the technical evaluation was complete, the cost proposals were to be evaluated by Martha Bermudez. The members of the technical evaluation committee were not provided with the cost proposal. During the evaluation process, Mr. Rojas could not determine whether Youthtrack intended to provide psychiatric services to residents who were not eligible for Medicaid. In a letter attached to Youthtrack's proposal as an Appendix, (CPC), states that individual therapy and case management services are provided to eligible clients. In Mr. Rojas' past experience with (CPC), services had been provided only to Medicaid eligible clients. Mr. Rojas called Ms. Cadavid and asked whether Youthtrack's separate cost proposal included a budget item for mental health services that are not billable to Medicaid. Mr. Rojas was trying to determine the level of mental health services to be provided by Youthtrack's proposed subcontractor, (CPC). Ms. Cadavid told Mr. Rojas that there was no such budget item and that he did not need to take it into consideration. She did not provide Mr. Rojas with a "bottom-line" price or any other budget information from the Youthtrack proposal. Mr. Rojas concluded that Youthtrack would not provide mental health care unless the individual was eligible for Medicaid. The Department maintains a Contract Manager's Manual (Manual), which "establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes implementing procedures for soliciting and evaluating Offeror's proposals." Section 9.3.2.a of the Department's Manual provides: Technical as well as cost (price) proposals will be submitted to the Contract Manager who will provide technical proposals to the technical evaluators. The technical evaluation will be conducted independent of the cost (price) evaluation. Technical evaluators (unless the district appoints only one team) will not have access to cost data at any time prior to the decision. In the case of one team, the team shall complete the technical evaluation of all technical proposals before beginning the evaluation of the cost proposals. In this context, cost data does not include information required for types and quantities analysis such as labor hours, personnel qualifications, equipment and material list, and other non- rate information. Technical personnel may examine such data even if it is extracted from the cost proposal. However, they may not be given access to the complete cost proposal. The September 15 memorandum stated: Each Section of the rating sheet has a section for comments. It is requested that you explain your rationale for the scoring of the proposal under each section. The manual provides that the individual evaluators will prepare narratives, which is to be the principal means available to do a comparative analysis of the offers. The narratives are to include as a minimum the following: What is offered; Whether it meets or fails to meet the evaluation standard; Any strengths or weaknesses; and An assessment of the Offeror's proposal approach and ability to perform. Mr. Rojas included comments on his scoring sheets for Youthtrack and Ramsay. The other evaluators, Ms. McVey and Ms. Berni, did not provide any comments on their scoring sheets for either proposal. The Manual provides that the individual narratives are to be consolidated into an evaluation report that is prepared by the evaluation team. The Manual contemplates that "the strengths and weaknesses determined by the individual team members are to be distilled into an integrated, team consensus, preferably by group discussion." Based on the Manual, the evaluation report is done after both the technical and cost proposals have been evaluated. The evaluation report may be done in any format, but it must include the following information: Narrative assessment of the technical evaluation; An analysis of the Offeror's cost (price) (realism, completeness, and reasonableness); and Results of evaluating contractual considerations and any other general considerations that were evaluated by the SSET [Source Selection Evaluation Team]. In Section 9.3.7, the Manual further provides: The objective of the proposal evaluation report is to present a summary of the evaluation of each proposal against solicitation requirements based on established evaluation criteria. The proposal evaluation report encompasses information derived from the results of the evaluation of the proposals. It is an official record of the evaluation of proposals and supporting rationale and, therefore, shall be maintained as a portion of the official contract file. On September 20, 1999, the evaluation committee reconvened to hand in their scores and to allow the contract manager to ensure that there were no math errors. During the meeting, the evaluators were instructed that the points entered under "Criteria" headings on the score sheets should equal the sum of the points of the underlying subfactors. This instruction comports with the directions on the scoring sheets. As a result of this clarification, Mr. Rojas made changes to his criteria scores so that they equaled the sum of his subfactor scores. Mr. Rojas lowered his criteria scores for Youthtrack by 58 points and increased his criteria score for Youthtrack by ten points. For Ramsay's proposal, Mr. Rojas lowered the criteria scores by 13 points. After the scores were tabulated and averaged, a summary of the scoring was prepared and signed by each of the evaluators. The summary stated that Ramsay's average score was 401.66 and that Youthtrack's was 376.00. Ms. Cadavid reported these scores to Ronald E. Williams, the Department's Senior Juvenile Justice Manager, who posted the results and recommended award of the contract to Ramsay by memorandum dated September 20. 1999. At the final hearing, it was noted by Ms. Cadavid that an error had occurred in calculating the average scores. Ms. McVey's score for Ramsay was listed as 500 points, rather the 510 points that was listed on Ms. McVey's score sheet. When the correct 510-point score from Ms. McVey is used, Ramsay's average score is 405, which is 29 points higher than Youthtrack's average score. If an offeror was a CMBE, the RFP required the following: The Offeror, if applicable, shall include a copy of certification or proof of registration (letter) as an eligible certified minority business enterprise to do business in the State of Florida, as set forth in Section 287.0945, Florida Statutes. To be an eligible minority vendor/offeror you shall possess current certification issued by the State of Florida Minority Business Advocacy and Assistance Office. If an offeror planned to use CMBEs as subcontractors, the RFP required the following: The Offeror shall include a subcontracting plan in every proposal in excess of $75,000. Each subcontracting plan must include the percentage of the total proposed contract dollars the offeror anticipates expending under subcontract to CMBE's as well as the type of services/commodities that will be included as subcontracts. The subcontracting plan shall be incorporated into the contract. Minority Business Enterprise subcontracting shall be an evaluation factor and shall be used as a measure of provider past performance. The clause is not applicable to registered CMBE's. The Ramsay proposal contained a list of the CMBE vendors with whom Ramsay intended to subcontract, the dollar amounts of the intended contracts, and the types of goods or services to be performed by the CMBE subcontractors. Ramsay also included CMBE certificates for three of the subcontractors. Ramsay intended to subcontract raw food products with a minority vendor in the amount of $90,520, but no vendor was listed and no certificate was provided. Youthtrack's proposal contained the following as Youthtrack's CMBE subcontracting plan: As an equal opportunity employer and national member of the National Association of Blacks in Criminal Justice (See Appendix), Youthtrack will continue to diligently pursue the development of subcontracts with available minority business enterprise contractors. This will be accomplished by consulting Department of Labor and Employment Security, Minority Business Advocacy & Assistance Office, and by utilizing its Business Commodity Directory for Dade County. Furthermore, Youthtrack has established a goal of spending a minimum of 10% of the programs' goods and services budget on goods and services procured from local minority business enterprises. Services to be provided may include mental health services, vocational and educational services and facility maintenance services such as refuse removal, pest control, clothing, etc. Currently Youthtrack's Hurricane program is in the process of finalizing an agreement with Rockdale Auto Services which is a minority owned business, for the provision of auto repair services, and with Dr. Peterson, whose medical practice is a certified minority business, for the provision of health services. Ms. McVey had awarded Youthtrack ten bonus points for minority subcontracting. At the September 20 meeting, the evaluators were told that the CMBE bonus points could not be awarded unless the offeror submitted CMBE certificates from the Department of Labor with the proposal. As a result of this directive, the ten bonus points awarded to Youthtrack by Ms. McVey were deducted. Neither Mr. Rojas nor Ms. Berni awarded Youthtrack bonus points for CMBE subcontracting. In his evaluation comments, Mr. Rojas questioned the caseload assignments for Youthtrack's case management personnel. Youthtrack included a staffing plan in Appendix I of its proposal, indicating that case management would be provided by four team leaders and two counselors. Mr. Rojas was under the impression that the two counselors would be providing the case management for the 62 children. His notes on Ramsay indicated that Ramsay had three case managers. Mr. Rojas scored Ramsay a three for Section 1.2.2.1 and scored Youthtrack a 2 for the same section dealing with the soundness of approach for organizational capability. Mr. Rojas concluded that Youthtrack had not provided for communicating gang information to the police based on the Department's Policy No. 8.09 regarding street gangs. The policy establishes elaborate procedures for identifying members of street gangs, controlling their behavior, housing them in Department facilities and interfacing with other law enforcement and community groups. The RFP included requirements that the offerors comply with several Department policies which were specifically identified; however, Policy No. 8.09 was not part of the RFP and was not referenced in the RFP. Mr. Rojas downgraded Youthtrack's proposal for not complying with Policy No. 8.09. Mr. Rojas made the same comment concerning street gang information when he evaluated Ramsay's proposal and downgraded Ramsay's proposal for not complying with Policy No. 8.09. Mr. Rojas testified that Youthtrack's proposal failed to provide for submission of progress reports every 30 days. Mr. Rojas notes state that Ramsay also failed to provide 30-day progress reports. Youthtrack and Ramsay both provided for 30-day progress reports in their proposals. In his notes on his evaluation of Youthtrack's proposal, Mr. Rojas stated, "The offeror does not clearly demonstrate a designated health authority." On page 44 of its proposal under the section describing the health services which will be provided, Youthtrack states: Health Services are provided by the Physicians Office of Florida City who is our designated health authority and provides medical services in accordance with the 1998 Department of Juvenile Justice Health Services Manual. In the event that the youth require hospital services, Homestead Hospital is located fifteen miles from the program and has indicated in writing its intent to enter into a cooperative agreement with Youthtrack for such services. In an appendix to its proposal, Youthtrack included a letter from Physician's Office of Florida City, indicating that it was providing the medical services. In another appendix to its proposal, Youthtrack included a proposal for Claudia Hall Peterson, D.O., of Homestead, Florida, to serve as the designated health authority. Thus, when Youthtrack's proposal is read in its entirety, there is an internal conflict as to who will serve as the designated health authority. In light of this discrepancy on the face of Youthtrack's proposal, Mr. Rojas' comment was not arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. The RFP requires that the offeror provide mental health services which include psychopharmacological therapy. Youthtrack stated in its proposal that CPC would provide mental health services, and that youths placed on psychotropic medications would be under the direct medical care of the prescribing physician and that a psychiatrist from CPC would provide medication for the treatment of mental health disorders. Mr. Rojas commented that Youthtrack's proposal did not include a consulting psychiatrist for psychopharmacology. At hearing, Mr. Rojas explained his view, that it was not sufficient for Youthtrack to state that psychiatric services were to be provided by its subcontractor, CPC. Mr. Rojas was looking for the name of a specific psychiatrist that would be used by the subcontractor. Mr. Rojas also based his comment on the Department's protocol requiring one person to oversee all medication; however, this protocol was not included in the RFP. Mr. Rojas had scored Youthtrack a "2" for soundness of approach for the management approach category and had scored Ramsay a "3" for the same subfactor. Mr. Rojas made comments on his scoring sheets concerning lack of integration with Youthtrack's staff and CPC and particularly questioned the interaction with the individual therapist. Youthtrack lists two individual therapists in its programming staffing. In the narrative of its proposal, Youthtrack states that when one-on-one counseling is needed, the youth will be referred to Youthtrack's overlay counselors and other local specialized service providers. The narrative also mentions overlay case managers from CPC. The narrative further talks about individual counseling being provided by "our staff." In another section on individual counseling, the proposal indicates that some individual counseling will be done by employees of Youthtrack and some will be done by the subcontractor. The proposal is unclear if the individual therapists are employees of Youthtrack or of the subcontractor's overlay counselors. It does not indicate that the individual therapists in the staffing plan are the ones referred to in the narrative. Additionally, it is not clear from Youthtrack's program staffing chart which other staff members are employees of Youthtrack and which staff members are employees of the subcontractor. Mr. Rojas' comments were not arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. Mr. Rojas' score sheet included a note stating, "no ranking uniform issued to offenders." Mr. Rojas was concerned at the time he evaluated the proposals that the children were not being classified at the time of admission. Youthtrack's classification takes place at the orientation level which follows the admission process. Mr. Rojas was concerned about security during the admission time Mr. Rojas made a similar comment concerning Ramsay's proposal. Mr. Rojas' comment was not arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. Mr. Rojas gave Youthtrack two points out of a possible five points for community involvement under the category of past performance. As explained in his score sheet comments and at hearing, Mr. Rojas based his score at least in part on Youthtrack's failure to have executed a contract with Everglades National Park for the operation of a recycling plant, despite the fact that Youthtrack is the incumbent provider. Youthtrack claims that Mr. Rojas required more of Youthtrack because it was the incumbent provider. Youthtrack overlooks that the category, is historical implementation; thus, the evaluators looking at what Youthtrack had done in the past and how it has conducted itself on the current contract is relevant. Mr. Rojas did not penalize Youthtrack because it was the incumbent provider. Youthtrack's representative conceded at the final hearing, that there was no evidence that Mr. Rojas, or any of the other evaluators, was prejudiced against Youthtrack or in favor of Ramsay.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That a final order be entered dismissing Youthtrack's petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: William G. "Bill" Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Mary M. Piccard, Esquire Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 318 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph M. Helton, Jr., Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Gary V. Perko, Esquire Hopping, Green, Sams & Smith, P.A. 123 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Introduction On February 26, 1988 respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), through its District IX office, advertised a Request for Proposal (RFP) in the Florida Administrative Weekly inviting qualified and interested organizations and vendors to submit proposals for the designation of an Area Agency on Aging in District IX. The designation would run from May 2, 1988 through the end of the calendar year but the successful vendor could be expected to be redesignated in subsequent years. According to the advertisement: Proposals will be received by District IX until 12:00 p.m., EST, March 24, 1988, for the designation of an Area Agency on Aging authorized under Title III of the Older Americans Act as amended, within the jurisdictional areas of Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River, Okeechobee and Palm Beach Counties. * * * Contract awards will be based on approximately 75 percent federal funds, 11 percent general revenue and 14 percent local matching funds. * * * Written inquiries concerning the Request for Proposals will be received until 4:00 p.m., EST, March 11, 1988. A Bidders Conference, to review the proposed format and contract award process, will be held on March 4, 1988. * * * Under this proposal, HRS intended to award the contract to the best qualified firm since price proposals were not being submitted. To this extent, the proceeding differs from the typical state project where the contract is ordinarily awarded to the lowest and most responsive bidder. In response to the above RFP, petitioner, Banyan Area Agency on Aging, Inc. (Banyan), timely submitted its proposal. As it turned out, Banyan was the only organization that filed a bid. After being reviewed by a seven person evaluation committee, the proposal was given a score of 480 out of a possible 1525 and a recommendation that it be rejected. This recommendation was later adopted by the District Administrator. This decision was conveyed to petitioner by letter dated April 4, 1988. That prompted a request for hearing by petitioner to challenge the preliminary agency action. As grounds for contesting the action, petitioner contended the agency was arbitrary and capricious in rejecting its proposal. If its preliminary action is sustained, HRS intends to seek authority from the Department of General Services to negotiate a noncompetitive bid. Under this process, HRS desires to designate, after a screening process, one person from each of the five counties to serve on the board of a corporation to be established to run the program. Thus, HRS does not intend to readvertise the RFP and seek competitive proposals a second time. The Contract The contract in question is funded principally through federal grant dollars under the federal Older Americans Act of 1965, as amended. The monies, commonly known as Title III funds, are used to provide programs for senior citizens. Respondent is the State agency charged with the responsibility of administering the program funds. To receive federal funds, HRS was required to prepare a state plan and submit it to the U.S. Commissioner on Aging for his approval. A part of that plan calls for HRS, or District IX in this case, to designate an area agency on aging (AAA) to plan and administer a comprehensive and coordinated system of services for the aging in the five county area of Palm Beach, Okeechobee, Indian River, Martin and S. Lucie Counties. Among other things, the local AAA must develop an area plan for supportive services, senior centers and nutrition services in the five county area. The AAA will receive $300,000 to cover administrative costs in administering the program and will be in charge of dispensing several million dollars annually in grant dollars for aging programs. District IX had previously designated Gulfstream Area Agency on Aging (Gulfstream) as its AAA. However, due to a combination of faulty management, lack of supervision and other factors, Gulfstream was designated as AAA in May, 1987. Since then, HRS has received several waivers from the Commissioner on Aging but now faces a mandate to designate a District IX AAA by October 1, 1988 or lose its federal funding. To avoid a recurrence of the Gulfstream problem, the HRS District IX contract manager, and several other district personnel, prepared a comprehensive RFP to be issued in conjunction with the selection of a new AAA designee. After a draft was assembled at the local level, the RFP was forwarded to HRS' Tallahassee office where further refinements were made. The final product has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 9 and respondent's exhibit 11. According to the District IX contract manager, the RFP is the "state of the art" in terms of what an AAA ought to be. The RFP is a voluminous document, weighing some 6 1/2 pounds according to Banyan, and requires a great deal of information and detail regarding the AAA organization, procedures, and program plans and goals to satisfy the federal act. The RFP was given to interested organizations, including Banyan, around March 1, 1988. This gave vendors approximately three and one-half weeks to prepare and submit a proposal. Only Banyan was interested in being the designee and thus was the only bidder on the job. Its proposal contained 135 pages. Evaluation Process HRS created a seven person evaluation committee to review the proposals. The committee included five HRS employees and two non-HRS members. All members were given Banyan's proposal prior to the selection date. On March 28, 1988 the committee met and each member independently evaluated Banyan's proposal. Although a top score of 1525 was theoretically possible, Banyan received an average overall score from each There of 480, or a rating of approximately thirty-one and one half percent. After the scores were tallied, Banyan was given one hour to orally explain its proposal before the full committee. At the conclusion of the presentation, the committee voted unanimously to reject the proposal. The reasons for rejecting Banyan's proposal are set forth in respondent's exhibit 2. The three primary deficiencies, as broadly stated, were the "proposal did not develop ideas fully enough to demonstrate a clear understanding of the needs and conditions of the District IX 60+ population," the proposal "did not demonstrate a clear understanding of the role and responsibility of area agency on aging nor was there evidence of administrative capability,' and (c) the proposal "did not offer assurance that current board members fully understood their position as the governing board." At hearing, several members of the committee amplified on the above three shortcomings and pointed out specific deficiencies in Banyan's proposal which led them to reject the proposal. For example, the proposal failed to focus on areas outside of Palm Beach County, did not contain a proposed budget, lacked minority representation, failed to fully identify goals and objectives, did not include a detailed description of the fair hearing process and the make- up and procedure of the advisory council and omitted the corporation's bylaws. Given these deficiencies, and others, HRS was justified in rejecting the bid. Petitioner's Case Petitioner contends that three and one-half weeks was too short a time to prepare a responsible proposal to the RFP. In this regard, HRS acknowledged it was a lengthy RFP, but it considered the time adequate for a qualified and experienced organization, particularly since much of the RFP was reference material. Banyan also pointed out that its board of directors was made up of highly qualified people with impressive work experience. While this is true, as evidenced by testimony at hearing, none were experienced in managing a federally funded program of this magnitude. Banyan further stated that, after the proposal was filed, it could have corrected or expanded on many of its abbreviated responses. However, once the proposal was filed, such changes were impermissible. Finally, Banyan conceded that while many of its responses were brief and nonspecific, this was because Banyan intended to rely upon HRS for technical assistance to implement the programs. However, the RFP called for specific, detailed responses so that HRS could properly evaluate the proposal. Allegations of Bias or Impropriety There is no evidence that the committee acted unfairly or improperly during the evaluation process or that any eber was personally biased towards Banyan. There is also no evidence that HRS rejected the bid so that it could "control" the management of the program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the protest filed by petitioner be DENIED and that a Final Order be entered confirming the rejection of petitioner's proposal. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Colman B. Stein 100 Worth Avenue Apartment 416 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Laurel D. Hopper, Esquire 111 Georgia Avenue Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 R. S. Power, Esquire Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Miami-Dade Community College, has adopted a statement of agency policy in violation of Florida law.
Findings Of Fact Prior to August 2, 2002, the Respondent employed the Petitioner, Lonny Ohlfest. At the time of his termination, the Petitioner filed a request for a due process hearing with the Respondent to challenge his termination from employment. The Petitioner challenged the basis for his termination as he wanted to clear his name regarding some unflattering allegations but, equally important, he wanted to keep his job with MDC. The Respondent denied the Petitioner's request for an administrative hearing and found that the Petitioner was not entitled to a hearing. More specifically, the Respondent concluded that since the Petitioner did not have a contract of employment he was not entitled to an administrative hearing. The Petitioner disputed the Respondent's claim and argued that he did have a contract, that he had a reasonable expectation that his employment would continue, and that the Respondent unlawfully refused to afford him regress through the administrative process. When the Petitioner's appeal of his request for an administrative hearing failed, he filed the instant case to challenge the Respondent's policy of not referring administrative cases for formal hearing. The delays in the appeal process explain and support the Petitioner's delay in filing the instant challenge to the agency's alleged rule. To understand the historical perspective of this case, the following findings are made pertinent to the Petitioner's employment with the Respondent: The Petitioner began employment with the MDC on or about April 4, 2001. He was hired as a part-time, hourly worker within the school of allied health technologies. The position he assumed was funded and operated within the "Health Careers Opportunities Program" or HCOP. The HCOP was funded by a federal grant. The monies coming from the grant were renewable each year and ran concurrent with the school's fiscal year (July 1-June 30). All employees paid through the HCOP grant were considered "temporary" as the grant monies were necessary to assure continued employment. In January 2002 the Petitioner was given a full-time position within the HCOP. He was designated "Program Leader/Student Services" for the upcoming summer bridge program. At all times material to this case, all parties knew that absent federal funding the HCOP would not continue to operate. Moreover, the Petitioner knew, or should have known, that his employment with the Respondent would run only until June 30, 2002. Thereafter, it was expected that if and when the federal funding came through, the HCOP employees (including the Petitioner) would continue to work within the scope of the program. At the end of the summer program in 2001, the HCOP employees took leave until the school year started and the funding of the program was assured. Accordingly, after the summer bridge program was completed, the Petitioner expected to be on leave during the summer of 2002 until called back to work. Instead, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner from employment. The 2002 summer bridge program had not finished well for the Petitioner. Amid allegations of sexual harassment (unsubstantiated and not at issue in this proceeding) the Petitioner's working relationship within the HCOP floundered. The Petitioner was aghast that unsubstantiated claims had been reported, he wanted the accusations resolved, he wanted his name cleared, and he was disappointed by the process that failed to timely and fully resolve the issues. When the Petitioner left the campus for what he believed would be the break (similar to the one they had taken the prior year), he was uncertain as to his employment status. In fact, when he left the campus he cleaned out his desk and returned his keys. Nevertheless, on July 26, 2002, Dr. Miller directed the Petitioner to present for work on July 29, 2002. He did not do so. On July 29, 2002, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor directed him to appear for work on July 30, 2002. He did not do so. In fact, the Petitioner did not return to the office until July 31, 2002. The Petitioner did not understand that his attendance was mandatory for the two days that he did not appear for work. When the Petitioner did check in with the HCOP office on the 31st he came to understand the gravity of the situation. As a result of the absences, the Respondent cited the Petitioner with insubordination and terminated his employment with MDC. The Petitioner timely challenged the termination but the Respondent ruled he was not entitled to an administrative review of the decision. The Petitioner filed for, and received, unemployment compensation. The termination was not justified by the standards applicable to that forum. The rules governing unemployment compensation do not, however, govern the administrative process regarding whether or not one's employment constitutes a property interest that is protected by law. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's petition seeking an administrative review, the Respondent declined to afford the Petitioner with a hearing. The Respondent does not forward petitions filed by non- contract employees when such individuals seek to challenge their termination of employment. The Respondent maintains that, as a matter of law, they are not required to forward such petitions for formal review. The Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are not entitled to administrative review when their employment is terminated. Conversely, the Respondent does not have a written rule or policy stating that non-contract employees are entitled to an administrative review when their employment is terminated. The Petitioner was not a full-time, contract employee of the Respondent. The Respondent's policy affords full-time contractual personnel a right to an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether the decisions giving rise to the dispute, which concern the allocation and disbursement of funds appropriated to Respondent by the legislature and thus involve the preparation or modification of the agency's budget, are subject to quasi-judicial adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. If the Division of Administrative Hearings were possessed of subject matter jurisdiction, then the issues would be whether Respondent is estopped from implementing its intended decisions to "de- obligate" itself from preliminary commitments to provide low- interest loans to several projects approved for funding under the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program; and whether such intended decisions would constitute breaches of contract or otherwise be erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or abuses of the agency's discretion.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Pasco CWHIP Partners, LLC ("Pasco Partners"); Legacy Pointe, Inc. ("Legacy"); Villa Capri, Inc. ("Villa Capri"); Prime Homebuilders ("Prime"); and MDG Capital Corporation ("MDG") (collectively, "Petitioners"), are Florida corporations authorized to do business in Florida. Each is a developer whose business activities include building affordable housing. The Florida Housing Finance Corporation ("FHFC") is a public corporation organized under Chapter 420, Florida Statutes, to implement and administer various affordable housing programs, including the Community Workforce Housing Innovation Pilot Program ("CWHIP"). The Florida Legislature created CWHIP in 2006 to subsidize the cost of housing for lower income workers performing "essential services." Under CWHIP, FHFC is authorized to lend up to $5 million to a developer for the construction or rehabilitation of housing in an eligible area for essential services personnel. Because construction costs for workforce housing developments typically exceed $5 million, developers usually must obtain additional funding from sources other than CWHIP to cover their remaining development costs. In 2007, the legislature appropriated $62.4 million for CWHIP and authorized FHFC to allocate these funds on a competitive basis to "public-private" partnerships seeking to build affordable housing for essential services personnel.1 On December 31, 2007, FHFC began soliciting applications for participation in CWHIP. Petitioners submitted their respective applications to FHFC on or around January 29, 2008. FHFC reviewed the applications and graded each of them on a point scale under which a maximum of 200 points per application were available; preliminary scores and comments were released on March 4, 2008. FHFC thereafter provided applicants the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their applications and thereby improve their scores. Petitioners submitted revised applications on or around April 18, 2008. FHFC evaluated the revised applications and determined each applicant's final score. The applications were then ranked, from highest to lowest score. The top-ranked applicant was first in line to be offered the chance to take out a CWHIP loan, followed by the others in descending order to the extent of available funds. Applicants who ranked below the cut-off for potential funding were placed on a wait list. If, as sometimes happens, an applicant in line for funding were to withdraw from CWHIP or fail for some other reason to complete the process leading to the disbursement of loan proceeds, the highest-ranked applicant on the wait list would "move up" to the "funded list." FHFC issued the final scores and ranking of applicants in early May 2006. Petitioners each had a project that made the cut for potential CWHIP funding.2 Some developers challenged the scoring of applications, and the ensuing administrative proceedings slowed the award process. This administrative litigation ended on or around November 6, 2008, after the parties agreed upon a settlement of the dispute. On or about November 12, 2008, FHFC issued preliminary commitment letters offering low-interest CWHIP loans to Pasco Partners, Legacy, Villa Capri, Prime (for its Village at Portofino Meadows project), and MDG. Each preliminary commitment was contingent upon: Borrower and Development meeting all requirements of Rule Chapter 67-58, FAC, and all other applicable state and FHFC requirements; and A positive credit underwriting recommendation; and Final approval of the credit underwriting report by the Florida Housing Board of Directors. These commitment letters constituted the necessary approval for each of the Petitioners to move forward in credit underwriting, which is the process whereby underwriters whom FHFC retains under contract verify the accuracy of the information contained in an applicant's application and examine such materials as market studies, engineering reports, business records, and pro forma financial statements to determine the project's likelihood of success. Once a credit underwriter completes his analysis of an applicant's project, the underwriter submits a draft report and recommendation to FHFC, which, in turn, forwards a copy of the draft report and recommendation to the applicant. Both the applicant and FHFC then have an opportunity to submit comments regarding the draft report and recommendation to the credit underwriter. After that, the credit underwriter revises the draft if he is so inclined and issues a final report and recommendation to FHFC. Upon receipt of the credit underwriter's final report and recommendation, FHFC forwards the document to its Board of Directors for approval. Of the approximately 1,200 projects that have undergone credit underwriting for the purpose of receiving funding through FHFC, all but a few have received a favorable recommendation from the underwriter and ultimately been approved for funding. Occasionally a developer will withdraw its application if problems arise during underwriting, but even this is, historically speaking, a relatively uncommon outcome. Thus, upon receiving their respective preliminary commitment letters, Petitioners could reasonably anticipate, based on FHFC's past performance, that their projects, in the end, would receive CWHIP financing, notwithstanding the contingencies that remained to be satisfied. There is no persuasive evidence, however, that FHFC promised Petitioners, as they allege, either that the credit underwriting process would never be interrupted, or that CWHIP financing would necessarily be available for those developers whose projects successfully completed underwriting. While Petitioners, respectively, expended money and time as credit underwriting proceeded, the reasonable inference, which the undersigned draws, is that they incurred such costs, not in reliance upon any false promises or material misrepresentations allegedly made by FHFC, but rather because a favorable credit underwriting recommendation was a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of being awarded a firm loan commitment. On January 15, 2009, the Florida Legislature, meeting in Special Session, enacted legislation designed to close a revenue shortfall in the budget for the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Among the cuts that the legislature made to balance the budget was the following: The unexpended balance of funds appropriated by the Legislature to the Florida Housing Finance Corporation in the amount of $190,000,000 shall be returned to the State treasury for deposit into the General Revenue Fund before June 1, 2009. In order to implement this section, and to the maximum extent feasible, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall first reduce unexpended funds allocated by the corporation that increase new housing construction. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-1 § 47. Because the legislature chose not to make targeted cuts affecting specific programs, it fell to FHFC would to decide which individual projects would lose funding, and which would not. The legislative mandate created a constant-sum situation concerning FHFC's budget, meaning that, regardless of how FHFC decided to reallocate the funds which remained at its disposal, all of the cuts to individual programs needed to total $190 million in the aggregate. Thus, deeper cuts to Program A would leave more money for other programs, while sparing Program B would require greater losses for other programs. In light of this situation, FHFC could not make a decision regarding one program, such as CWHIP, without considering the effect of that decision on all the other programs in FHFC's portfolio: a cut (or not) here affected what could be done there. The legislative de-appropriation of funds then in FHFC's hands required, in short, that FHFC modify its entire budget to account for the loss. To enable FHFC to return $190 million to the state treasury, the legislature directed that FHFC adopt emergency rules pursuant to the following grant of authority: In order to ensure that the funds transferred by [special appropriations legislation] are available, the Florida Housing Finance Corporation shall adopt emergency rules pursuant to s. 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that emergency rules adopted pursuant to this section meet the health, safety, and welfare requirements of s. 120.54(4), Florida Statutes. The Legislature finds that such emergency rulemaking power is necessitated by the immediate danger to the preservation of the rights and welfare of the people and is immediately necessary in order to implement the action of the Legislature to address the revenue shortfall of the 2008-2009 fiscal year. Therefore, in adopting such emergency rules, the corporation need not publish the facts, reasons, and findings required by s. 120.54(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Emergency rules adopted under this section are exempt from s. 120.54(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 2009 Fla. Laws ch. 2009-2 § 12. The governor signed the special appropriations bills into law on January 27, 2009. At that time, FHFC began the process of promulgating emergency rules. FHFC also informed its underwriters that FHFC's board would not consider any credit underwriting reports at its March 2009 board meeting. Although FHFC did not instruct the underwriters to stop evaluating Petitioners' projects, the looming reductions in allocations, coupled with the board's decision to suspend the review of credit reports, effectively (and not surprisingly) brought credit underwriting to a standstill. Petitioners contend that FHFC deliberately intervened in the credit underwriting process for the purpose of preventing Petitioners from satisfying the conditions of their preliminary commitment letters, so that their projects, lacking firm loan commitments, would be low-hanging fruit when the time came for picking the deals that would not receive funding due to FHFC's obligation to return $190 million to the state treasury. The evidence, however, does not support a finding to this effect. The decision of FHFC's board to postpone the review of new credit underwriting reports while emergency rules for drastically reducing allocations were being drafted was not intended, the undersigned infers, to prejudice Petitioners, but to preserve the status quo ante pending the modification of FHFC's budget in accordance with the legislative mandate. Indeed, given that FHFC faced the imminent prospect of involuntarily relinquishing approximately 40 percent of the funds then available for allocation to the various programs under FHFC's jurisdiction, it would have been imprudent to proceed at full speed with credit underwriting for projects in the pipeline, as if nothing had changed. At its March 13, 2009, meeting, FHFC's board adopted Emergency Rules 67ER09-1 through 67ER09-5, Florida Administrative Code (the "Emergency Rules"), whose stated purpose was "to establish procedures by which [FHFC would] de- obligate the unexpended balance of funds [previously] appropriated by the Legislature " As used in the Emergency Rules, the term "unexpended" referred, among other things, to funds previously awarded that, "as of January 27, 2009, [had] not been previously withdrawn or de-obligated . . . and [for which] the Applicant [did] not have a Valid Firm Commitment and loan closing [had] not yet occurred." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(29). The term "Valid Firm Commitment" was defined in the Emergency Rules to mean: a commitment issued by the [FHFC] to an Applicant following the Board's approval of the credit underwriting report for the Applicant's proposed Development which has been accepted by the Applicant and subsequent to such acceptance there have been no material, adverse changes in the financing, condition, structure or ownership of the Applicant or the proposed Development, or in any information provided to the [FHFC] or its Credit Underwriter with respect to the Applicant or the proposed Development. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-2(33). There is no dispute concerning that fact that, as of January 27, 2009, none of the Petitioners had received a valid firm commitment or closed a loan transaction. There is, accordingly, no dispute regarding the fact that the funds which FHFC had committed preliminarily to lend Petitioners in connection with their respective developments constituted "unexpended" funds under the pertinent (and undisputed) provisions of the Emergency Rules, which were quoted above. In the Emergency Rules, FHFC set forth its decisions regarding the reallocation of funds at its disposal. Pertinent to this case are the following provisions: To facilitate the transfer and return of the appropriated funding, as required by [the special appropriations bills], the [FHFC] shall: * * * Return $190,000,000 to the Treasury of the State of Florida, as required by [law]. . . . The [FHFC] shall de-obligate Unexpended Funding from the following Corporation programs, in the following order, until such dollar amount is reached: All Developments awarded CWHIP Program funding, except for [a few projects not at issue here.] * * * See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67ER09-3. On April 24, 2009, FHFC gave written notice to each of the Petitioners that FHFC was "de-obligating" itself from the preliminary commitments that had been made concerning their respective CWHIP developments. On or about June 1, 2009, FHFC returned the de- appropriated funds, a sum of $190 million, to the state treasury. As a result of the required modification of FHFC's budget, 47 deals lost funding, including 16 CWHIP developments to which $83.6 million had been preliminarily committed for new housing construction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FHFC enter a Final Order dismissing these consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2010.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Bay County School Board (School Board), had just cause under Subsection 1012.67, Florida Statutes (2008), to terminate the employment of Respondent, Thomas Walker, because of his absence without leave.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is employed under a Professional Services Contract and teaches at Bozeman School in Bay County. Respondent, without approval or notice to the administrator or staff of Bozeman School, failed to appear for his teaching assignment in the latter part of November 2008. After repeated attempts to reach Respondent, Dr. Tommye Lou Richardson, Director of Human Resources for Bay District Schools, ascertained that Respondent was incarcerated in the Coffee County Jail in New Brockton, Alabama, for his failure to pay child support. Respondent's absence was willful and without approved leave.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order terminating the employment of Respondent and finding that he has forfeited any compensation since January 14, 2009, the date of his suspension without pay by the School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Franklin R. Harrison, Esquire Harrison, Sale, McCloy Duncan & Jackson Post Office Drawer 1579 Panama City, Florida 32402-1579 J. E. Sawyer, Esquire 203 South Edward Street Enterprise, Alabama 36330 Thomas Walker 26802 Highway 69A, North Altha, Florida 32421 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 William V. Husfelt, Superintendent Bay County School Board 1311 Balboa Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401-2080
