Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Frank LaRocca, Respondent, was the holder of Real Estate Broker License Nos. 0050488, 0236407 and 0170796 issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. On or about July 12, 1989, the Respondent, in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, upon a verdict of guilty rendered by a jury, was found guilty of five counts of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, a felony. On or about July 12, 1989, Respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for four years. On or about August 1, 1989, the United States District Court Judge ordered a stay of the judgment against Respondent pending completion of Respondent's appeal. Frank LaRocca was a vice-president of the Central Bank in Tampa, Florida, when he retired in May 1984 after working at this bank for 31 years. During this period, he enjoyed a good reputation in the community. Upon his retirement from the bank, he became an active real estate broker principally investing in real estate. The transactions which formed the bases for his conviction in federal court involved bank loans on condominiums he and three other partners purchased. These bank loans had all been repaid at the time of Respondent's trial but one, which had been refinanced by the bank.
Recommendation Taking all these factors into consideration, it is recommended that the licenses of Frank LaRocca as a real estate broker be revoked, but the revocation be stayed pending completion of his appeal to the court of appeals or two years whichever first occurs. At that time, depending upon the action of the court of appeals, his license be revoked or these proceedings dismissed. ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Kenneth E. Easley Division of Real Estate General Counsel 400 W. Robinson Street Department of Professional Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street Frank LaRocca Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 4814 River Boulevard Tampa, FL 33603 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801
Findings Of Fact On September 8, 1987, the Department of Insurance received a letter dated September 1, 1987, from Joseph F. Kinman, Jr., which stated: Another insurance agent (Daniel Bruce Caughey) from Pensacola, Florida and his incorporated agency (Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc.) are refusing to forward premium payments on to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. despite a final judgment for such amounts here in Hillsborough County Circuit Court. Enclosed is a copy of the Final Judgment entered August 13, 1987, as well as a copy of the Complaint. We represent Jordan Roberts & Company, as well as Poe & Associates, Inc. here in Tampa, Florida. In approximately August of 1982, Daniel Bruce Caughey and Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. entered into a brokerage agreement with Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. wherein Mr. Caughey and the Agency were to collect premiums on behalf of Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. and in turn, Mr. Caughey and the Agency were to receive commissions. Mr. Caughey signed an Individual Guarantee Agreement on October 21, 1983, guaranteeing that Brokerage Agreement with Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. Mr. Caughey and the Agency failed to forward the insurance premiums collected on behalf of Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. despite repeated demands and inquiries. Finally, a lawsuit was filed against Mr. Caughey and the Agency in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Hillsborough County in December of 1986. Final judgment for Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. against Mr. Caughey and the Agency was entered on August 13, 1987, for an amount of $6,595.94. Mr. Caughey and his Agency have unlawfully withheld monies belonging to an insurer, Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. and, accordingly, appear to be in violation of Florida Statutes 626 et seq. Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. has a judgment for unpaid insurance premiums against Mr. Caughey and the Agency, however, Mr. Caughey and the Agency refuse or fail to pay over to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. premium funds rightfully belonging to Jordan Roberts & Company, Inc. Accordingly, we would respectfully request that your office conduct an investigation of Mr. Caughey and the Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. Enclosed with this letter were copies of the complaint and final judgment in the circuit court case, Case No. 86-21454. As found in the main administrative case, Case No. 89-2651: In Count 1, JORO's complaint [in Case No. 86-21454] alleges the existence of a brokerage agreement between JORO and Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc., entered into "[o]n or about April 27, 1982"; execution and delivery of respondent's guarantee "[o]n or about October 21, 1983"; and the agency's indebtedness "for premiums on policies underwritten by [JORO] for the sum of $20,975.36." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. In Count II, the complaint also alleges execution and delivery of a promissory note "[o]n or about October 21, 1983," without, however, explicitly indicating its relationship (if any) with the guarantee executed the same date. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The final judgment does not specify which count(s) JORO recovered on. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Attached to the complaint are copies of the promissory note, executed by "CAUGHEY INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., By: D B Caughey Vice President"; the guarantee, executed in the same way; and the brokerage agreement, executed on behalf of Caughey Insurance Agency by "William C. Caughey, President." Although the Individual Guarantee Agreement names respondent as guarantor in the opening paragraph, the corporation is shown as guarantor on the signature line. The complaint does not allege and the judgment does not recite that respondent personally failed to remit premiums but says he is responsible as an officer of the agency. Without any further investigation, as far as the record shows, the Department of Insurance filed a complaint amended on April 24, 1989, to allege, inter alia, that "[o]n or about August 19, 1982 Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. entered into a brokerage agreement with Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc. . . . requir[ing] Caughey Insurance Agency, Inc. to remit premiums, unearned commissions and additional premiums to Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc."; and that respondent "personally guaranteed the [agency's] obligation under this agreement in" writing, but "failed to remit five thousand five dollars and forty-four cents due under th[e] agreement" for which sum Jordan Roberts and Company, Inc. obtained judgment. After a formal administrative hearing, a recommended order was entered on April 2, 1990, recommending dismissal of the administrative complaint, because "ambiguities in the court papers do not clearly and convincingly rule out the possibility that the court's judgment rests on the dishonored promissory note . . . [rather than] a breach of respondent's [here petitioner's] fiduciary responsibilities." In its final order, the Department dismissed the administrative complaint; Daniel Bruce Caughey was the prevailing party in that case. The parties have stipulated that "Daniel B. Caughey qualifies as a small business party as defined in Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes." The parties also stipulated that the "total value of the reasonable attorney's fees and costs at issue is $2,830."
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what, if any, disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with responsibility for prosecuting administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent is now and has been at all times material to this proceeding a licensed real estate salesman in the state, holding license number 0189734. The license was last issued as a salesperson %Say Realty & Investments, Inc., 6306 Pembroke Road, Hollywood, Florida 33023. Respondent was employed as a salesperson with Sales Alvin, Inc. from June 28, 1990, to March 10, 1991. Respondent's license was placed with Say Realty and Investments, Inc. effective March 11, 1991. During the time Respondent was employed by Sales Alvin, Inc., she carried out a series of acts in connection with the listing for rent of a condominium without the knowledge and consent of her employing broker. While Respondent was a salesperson for Sales Alvin, Inc., on or about February 19, 1991, Respondent listed an unfurnished condominium for rent at a monthly rental price of $700. The condominium was owned by Mr. Roy Barrett. Respondent listed the rental unit, and Alon Granovsky, another salesperson employed by Sales Alvin, Inc., procured a tenant for the condominium. Respondent drafted a lease between the tenant and the owner of the condominium on or about February 21, 1991. Respondent collected a check from the tenant in the amount of $2,100 for payment of the initial rent and security deposit. Respondent then delivered the check to the owner of the condominium, and the owner gave Respondent a receipt for $2,100. Respondent gave Mr. Granovsky a personal check for $210 on or about February 21, 1991, as a commission for procuring the tenant for the condominium. Respondent did not inform her employing broker of the rental transaction or that she had given a commission check to Mr. Granovsky. Mr. Granovsky disclosed the transaction to his employing broker and delivered his commission check to his broker. Respondent's broker gained additional knowledge of the transaction when he received a money order from the tenant in the amount of $700 for the rent due for the month of March. Respondent's employing broker confronted Respondent regarding the transaction. Respondent provided her employing broker with a personal check for $350 as a portion of the commission due the employing broker and subsequently delivered the balance of the commission due. The entire commission was disbursed by the employing broker. While employed by Sales Alvin, Inc., on or about March 3, 1991, Respondent solicited and obtained a listing for the sale of a house. Respondent provided the owners of the house with a Sellers Net Sheet on the letter head and form used by Sales Alvin, Inc. The Sellers Net Sheet approximated the cash to seller at closing if the house sold at the listed price. Respondent became employed by Say Realty and Investment, Inc., on or about March 11, 1991. Respondent listed the house while she was employed by Sales Alvin, Inc. When Respondent placed the house in the multiple listing service ("MLS"), she showed Say Realty and Investment, Inc., as the listing broker. When the brokers at Sales Alvin, Inc. questioned the listing with Say Realty and Investment, Inc., the listing was transferred to Sales Alvin, Inc. Respondent has no history of prior disciplinary action against her license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner should enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's license for 90 days, imposing an administrative fine of $1,000, and placing Respondent on probation for one year subject to such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the Commission. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1992.
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether Respondent's disapproval of Petitioners' terrorism rates for workers' compensation insurance (workers' comp) under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Public Law 101-297, 116 U.S.C. Section 2322 (TRIA) is based on an invalid agency statement of general applicability, which has not been adopted as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (2003); (b) whether Petitioners, as members or subscribers of the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) were required to comply with Section 627.211, Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-189.004; and (c) whether Petitioners' terrorism rate filing for the workers' comp line of business results in rates that are excessive or unfairly discriminatory.
Findings Of Fact AIG's member companies are property and casualty insurance companies that are licensed to write workers' comp in the State of Florida. OIR is the agency that is responsible for regulating the business of insurance in the State of Florida. Following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, reinsurance capacity in the United States contracted severely and other market disruptions occurred. In response to these events, Congress enacted TRIA, which became effective on November 26, 2002. The purpose of TRIA is to establish a temporary federal program that provides for a system of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting from acts of terrorism, in order to accomplish the following: (a) to protect consumers by addressing market disruptions and ensure the continued widespread availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for terrorism risk; and (b) to allow for a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, resume pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future losses, while preserving state insurance regulation and consumer protections. TRIA provides a federal reinsurance backstop for three years (2003, 2004, and 2005) and gives the federal government authority to recoup federal payments made through policyholder surcharges up to a maximum annual limit in the event of a "certified loss." The premium charged for insured losses covered by TRIA and the federal share of compensation for insured losses under TRIA must be readily identifiable. The government reinsurance is provided at no cost to the insurer and replaces reinsurance that was no longer available after September 11, 2001. TRIA required insurers to immediately notify all commercial insurance policyholders that pre-existing terrorism risk exclusions were void. Pursuant to TRIA, insurers must price terrorism coverage separately from non-terrorism coverage. For most commercial policies, separate pricing gives the customer an opportunity to accept or decline the terrorism coverage. However, workers' comp insurers are not allowed to write exclusions for terrorism coverage. TRIA requires each insurer participant or retention group (insurers who are part of the same insurer group) to pay, without federal reimbursement, losses from terrorism events up to an attachment point or retention level/deductible. That retention is computed based upon the entire direct earned premiums of the insurer group in all commercial lines of insurance covered by TRIA, including workers' comp. TRIA does not affect any state's jurisdiction or regulatory authority over the business of insurance except as specifically provided therein. As to terrorism rate filings made in 2003, TRIA suspended state laws requiring prior approval of insurance rates for the risk of terrorism. TRIA does not affect the ability of a state to invalidate a rate filing that is determined to be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. There is no limit on workers' comp losses that an insurer must pay except for the schedule of benefits adopted into law in each state. The amount of workers' comp loss arising from a terrorist event is affected in large part by the schedule of benefits and the distribution of the various types of injuries that workers may sustain from a terrorist event. AIG had to make terrorism rate filings for all lines of insurance covered by TRIA in 50 states and the District of Columbia. Instead of focusing on each state's schedule of benefits, AIG made its initial rate filings in a fairly uniform manner, allegedly to accommodate TRIA's mandate for immediate implementation. NCCI is a workers' comp rating organization that gathers data from its members or subscribers, compiles the data, and makes rate filings on behalf of its members or subscribers. NCCI makes such filings in 36 states, including Florida. Every insurer writing workers' comp in Florida, including AIG, is either a member or subscriber to NCCI. In Florida, Section 627.211, Florida Statutes (2003), requires NCCI's members or subscribers to adhere to NCCI's rates, unless the insurer makes a deviation filing, seeking a uniform percentage decrease from or increase to NCCI's approved rates. On December 19, 2002, NCCI submitted its Item B 1383 terrorism rate filing for workers' comp coverage. The rate filing included rate provisions for both terrorism and non- terrorism coverage. James Watford, OIR's workers' comp actuary, reviewed NCCI's filing. Mr. Watford has spent the last 19 years reviewing workers' comp rate filings. He is the only who reviews workers' comp rate filings for OIR. Mr. Watford holds the designations of Associate in the Casualty Actuarial Society (ACAS) and Member of the American Academy of Actuaries (MAAA). Mr. Watford's review of NCCI's rate filing was unaided by any other actuary or actuarial analyst. Mr. Watford's office is a part of OIR's Bureau of Property and Casualty Rates and Forms. That bureau is organized to function according to type of insurance business, including but not limited to personal lines, automobile, marine, commercial (property and casualty), medical malpractice, business interruption, and workers' comp. Although workers' comp is a type of commercial insurance sold to employers, Mr. Watford has not participated in meetings involving terrorism rates for other types of commercial insurance. Additionally, Mr. Watford has not been involved in setting any policy for OIR. NCCI's December 19, 2002, terrorism filing applied only to insurance coverage known in the industry as "guaranteed cost plans." It did not apply to "retrospective rating plans," "large risk plans," or "large deductible plans" (referred to collectively as loss sensitive plans). Insurers are free to make their own arrangements with their insureds with respect to loss sensitive plans, provided those arrangements comport with the insurer's previous filings. A "guaranteed cost" workers' comp plan is a policy with a known rate at the inception of the policy period. At the end of the policy period, the insurer audits the employer's actual payroll during the policy period and determines the final premium. The cost is guaranteed because an employer knows its ultimate workers' comp responsibility throughout the policy period. A "retrospective rating plan" is a policy based on actual losses that the employer incurs during a policy period. Typically, the insurer issues the policy with parameters, explaining how the insurer will rate the policy. The ultimate price for a "retrospective rating plan," with preset minimum and maximum amounts, will depend on actual losses. A "large risk plan" and a "large deductible plan" are policies that require the employer to reimburse the carrier for a substantial part of each loss. These plans must comply with an administrative rule that provides for a minimum standard premium and a minimum deductible. The rationale for minimums in these types of policies is that they provide flexibility for very large employers, with unique risks, who assume a substantial portion of the losses. NCCI's terrorism rate filing sought to charge Florida insureds three cents ($.03) per $100 of payroll. The percentage impact of TRIA's terrorism provisions in Florida was eight- tenths of one percent (0.8%) of total premium. The rate filing relied in substantial part on catastrophe modeling conducted by EQECAT. The EQECAT modeling is based on simulated terrorism events in modeled states, including Florida. NCCI's December 19, 2002, terrorism filing states as follows in part:
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That OIR enter a final order dismissing the Consolidated Petitions for Formal Administrative Proceedings in these consolidated cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Elenita Gomez, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4206 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Kelly A. Cruz-Brown, Esquire Robert W. Pass, Esquire Carlton Fields, P.A. Post Office Box 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0190 S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Elenita Gomez, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4206 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Respondent, Linda H. Abraham, was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker under license number 0323486. During the months of February and March 1983 Martha L. Tew owned a parcel of waterfront property located in Panama City Beach which was identified as being for sale by a sign on the property reflecting her husband's real estate company. Her husband was Ronald Eugene Tew and Mrs. Tew also held a salesman's license. Mr. Tew was contacted by Gregory A. Peaden, a contractor and developer in the Panama City Beach area on several occasions prior to March 1983 with offers to purchase the Tew property. The contacts with Mr. Peaden subsequently culminated in a contract dated March 8, 1983, between Greg Peaden, Inc., and the Tews in the amount of, initially, $180,000.00. During the negotiations for the property, Mr. Peaden had introduced the Respondent to the Tews as his broker. When, at the time of Use contract, Mr. Peaden advised the Tews he wanted Respondent to get a commission for the sale, Mr. Tew refused to pay any commission indicating that Respondent had performed no service for him; that he, Tew, was a broker himself; and that he had no intention of paying any commission to the Respondent or to anyone, for that matter. After some further negotiation, a second contract was prepared and agreed upon wherein the contract price was raised to $189,000.00 and the Respondent's commission was to be paid with the additional money from Mr. Peaden. The contract in question executed by the parties on March 8, 1983, reflected that the sum of $5,000.00 deposit was paid to Linda Abraham, Inc., by check. Mr. Tew contends that at this point he was led to believe that Respondent had the $5,000.00 check and, he contends, he would not have signed the contract if he had known that the check had not been delivered and placed in Respondent's escrow account. The actual signing of the contract took place in Respondent's office, a mobile home which she shared with Mr. Peaden's business. This trailer home was described as having Mr. Peaden's office on one end, and Respondent's on the other, with the living-kitchen area in the middle used as a reception area for both businesses. Mr. Peaden contends that once the contract was signed by the Tews, he gave a check drawn on one of his business accounts, that of Peaden and Guerino, a property management company he owned, to his secretary, Judy White, to deposit in Respondent's escrow account and thereafter promptly forgot about the matter until the date scheduled for closing, two months in the future. Ms. white, on the other hand, contends that Mr. Peaden at no time gave her a check for $5,000.00 to deposit to Respondent's escrow account. It is her contention that when she received the contract after it was signed, she, on her own, inserted the receipt portion on the bottom of the second page and signed as having received it merely to complete the contract. At the time, she contends, she did not know if the deposit was received from Peaden or not. She has never signed a contract like this before without a deposit and cannot give any other reason why she did it on this occasion. She is certain, however, that at no time did Mr. Peaden ever give her a $5,000.00 check or tell her to draw one for his signature on March 8, 1983, or, for that matter, at any time thereafter. What is more, neither Mr. Peaden nor the Respondent, at any time after the signing of the contract and prior to her departure under less than friendly circumstances approximately a week or so later, ever asked her whether she had made the escrow deposit or discussed it with her at all. Ms. white contends that she left Mr. Peaden's employ because he expected her to perform certain functions she was unwilling to do. When she left his employ, she did not feel there was any unfinished business that needed her immediate attention. To the best of her recollection, there were no sales contracts or deposits left in or on her desk - only bills. According to Respondent, the $5,000.00 deposit by Mr. Peaden was to stay in her escrow account. She understood Mr. Peaden was going to arrange with the bank to borrow the entire cash payment called for under the contract, including the deposit, and when that was done, it was her intention to give him back his $5,000.00 check. Under these circumstances, the amount in escrow would never be paid to the sellers but would be returned to Mr. Peaden and the Tews would receive the entire cash amount called for by the contract from the proceeds of the bank loan. Respondent also indicated that this procedure had been followed at least once, in a prior transaction. Under the circumstances, it is clear that no deposit was ever received from Mr. Peaden nor was it placed in Respondent's escrow account. Therefore, the contract, dated on March 8, 1983, was false in that it represented a $5,000.00 deposit had been received. The check for $5,000.00 dated March 8, 1983, payable to Linda Abraham, Inc. and drawn by Mr. Peaden on the Peaden and Guerino account with the stub admitted to show the date of issuance, does not establish that it was written on March 8, 1983, as contended. This check, number 1349, comes after two other checks, 1347 and 1348, which bear dates of April 4 and September 7, 1983 respectively. Mr. Peaden's explanation that the checks were drafted out of sequence is non-persuasive. Of greater probative value is the fact that neither Mr. Peaden nor Respondent bothered to review their bank statements on a regular basis. The check in question was drawn on an account not related to the construction and development business of Greg Peaden, Inc. Further, examination of Respondent's escrow account reflects that there were approximately eleven transactions over a three year period even though, according to her, she handled numerous other closings as well as this. Her explanation is that in most cases the attorney handling the closing served as escrow agent even though she was the sales broker. Her explanation is not credible. This appears to be a classic situation of movement of accounts to satisfy a particular end. The contract called for closing of the sale to be held on or before May 8, 1983, in the office of Panama Title Company. May 8, 1983, fell on a Sunday. As a result, the closing would not have been held that day, but it was not held the following day, Monday, May 9, 1983 either. Mr. Peaden admits that he had not checked with Panama Title prior to May 9 to see if everything was prepared for the closing. Instead, he contacted the title company for the first time at approximately noon on May 9. Apparently he received disquieting information because he thereafter called his attorney, Mr. Hutto, and asked him to check with the title company to see if and when the closing would be held. Mr. Hutto's inquiry reflected that the title insurance binder was ready but the closing statement and the package were not because the title company required a copy of the contract. At this point Mr. Peaden immediately had a copy of the contract delivered to the title company but later that day was advised that the closing still could not be held because of the failure to provide a survey. Mr. Hutto indicates that the reason given was that the release clauses called for in the contract required the survey to be furnished though he did not necessarily agree with that. In any event, closing was not held on May 9. At this time both Mr. Peaden and Respondent allegedly became concerned about the $5,000.00 deposit. Admittedly, neither had concerned themselves with it from the time of the signing of the contract. At this point, Mr. Peaden indicates that he examined his bank records which failed to show the deposit being made and his subsequent search of Ms. White's desk finally revealed the check, undeposited, still there. On May 11, 1983, a $5,000.00 deposit was made to the account on which the deposit check was drawn and on the same day, May 11, 1983 check number 1349, in the amount of $5,000.00 was presented against the account. When on May 10, 1983, Mr. Peaden and Respondent went to Mr. Hutto's office the primary reason for the visit was because Mr. Peaden had heard that the Tews were planning to sell the property in question to someone else at a price much higher than that agreed upon for the sale to Peaden. At this point Mr. Hutto indicated that if Peaden so desired, Hutto could "fix up the contract to jam up the works" until he could do something about it. His examination of the contract revealed that it was not recorded or acknowledged and under the laws of Florida, acknowledgment is required in order for a contract to be recorded. Hutto asked the Respondent if she had seen the parties sign the contract and when she said that she had, he had his secretary prepare a jurat. Unfortunately, his secretary prepared an affidavit type notary jurat rather than an acknowledgment and Hutto quickly admits that he did not look at it when it was given back to him. He says that if he had, he would have had it changed but in any event, without looking at what was given him, he gave it to the Respondent with the implication, at least, that she should notarize it and have the contract recorded. According to Hutto, Peaden, and the Respondent, the sole purpose for notarization and recordation was to preserve the status quo to protect Mr. Peaden's interest in the property so that the matter could be adjudicated in a lawsuit which was soon to be filed. Respondent contends she never intended any misconduct throughout this transaction nor did she do any of the things alleged in the Administrative Complaint. She contends she never saw the check which Mr. Peaden allegedly gave to his secretary for deposit to her escrow account. She merely assumed that it was given and never checked to insure that it had been placed in her account. She does not know why Mr. Peaden did not give her the check. When she took the contract to the Tews, she was operating under the assumption that the check had been received but did not verify this to insure that it had. She contends that since she represented the buyer, her duties were limited to insuring that he performed and this made it simple. She did not check on him because she had had so much experience with him, him being by far her largest account, if he said something, she believed him and when the contract was executed, she merely instructed the secretary, Judy White, to make the file and did not check on it again. As to the recordation and the notarization after the fact, she acted upon the advice of counsel, she states, and did what was suggested to her by Mr. Hutto. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Hutto did not represent her but instead represented Mr. Peaden and while because of her long-standing relationship with him and Mr. Hutto, she may have felt safe in relying on his advice, the fact remains that Hutto was not her attorney.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a registered real estate broker in Florida be suspended for six months and that she pay an administrative fine of $2,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 John D. O'Brien, Esquire P. O. Box 1218 Panama City, Florida 32402 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be licensed as a title agent by the Department of Financial Services?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Ms. Shirley Auxais, the Petitioner, was born on November 20, 1971, in Brooklyn, New York. She is presently a resident of Coral Springs, Florida. Formerly married, Ms. Auxais' married name was Shirley A. Seraphin. The Department of Financial Services, the Respondent, was created by the Florida Legislature in the 2002 Session. Section 20.121, Florida Statutes. It is responsible for taking action on the license application submitted by Ms. Auxais and has been substituted as the Respondent in this proceeding for the Department of Insurance, the agency that issued the notice of denial. See B., 1Note to Section 120.121, Florida Statutes (2002), p. 400. Unemployment Compensation Fraud On February 17, 1998, the State Attorney of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit filed an information against Ms. Auxais for unemployment compensation fraud, a felony. See Section 443.071(1), Florida Statutes. At the time of the filing, Ms. Auxais' name was Shirley A. Seraphin. The information charged the following: Shirley A. Seraphin from on or about the 13th day of August, A.D., 1995 up to and including the 16th day of September A.D., 1995, . . ., did . . . make a false statement or representation on her Pay Order Card(s), Florida Department of Labor Form UCB60 and/or UCB61, knowing said statement or representation to be false, or knowingly failed to disclose a material fact to obtain or increase benefits or other payments for her or any other person, in that the said Shirley A. Seraphin did knowingly state on her pay order cards that she was unemployed and not earning wages during the aforesaid period, when in fact and truth she was employed . . ., and earning wages which she willfully failed to report, and the said false statement was made or material fact not disclosed with the intent to obtain or increase benefits pursuant to the Florida Unemployment Compensation Law Respondent's Exhibit 3. Ms. Auxais, in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County (the "Court") entered a plea of "No Contest" to the charges. On June 18, 1998, Ms. Auxais upon the motion of the State, was ordered by the Court to pay restitution to the Division of Unemployment Compensation "in the total sum of Eight hundred twenty-five and 00/100 ($825)." Respondent's Exhibit 5. On June 18, 1998, an Order of Probation was rendered by the Court in Ms. Auxais' case pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere to Unemployment Compensation Fraud as reflected on the face of the order. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Ms. Auxais was placed on "18 months mail in probation." Respondent's Exhibit 6. Slightly more than four months later, an order was entered by the Court that terminated Ms. Seraphin's probation. Application for Licensure as a Title Agent On May 13, 2002, Ms. Auxais submitted an application for a new license as a title agent to the Department of Insurance's Bureau of Agent and Agency Licensing. The license applied for, according to the application is "04-10-Resident Title Agent." Respondent's Exhibit 2, p. 7. The application poses a number of screening questions. Two are immediately adjacent to each other in the order that follows: In the past 12 months, have you been arrested, indicted, or had an information filed against you or been otherwise charged with a crime by any law enforcement authority anywhere in the United States or its possessions or any other country. Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory, or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered. Respondent's Exhibit 2, p. 8. The answer shown on the application to both questions is "N" which stands for "no." Six months later, on November 14, 2002, the Notice of Denial was issued. The factual basis for the denial consists of two interrelated facts. First, Ms. Auxais responded "no" to the question of whether she had ever pled no contest to a crime. Second, Ms. Auxais had pled no contest to Unemployment Compensation Fraud, a felony, in the Circuit Court in and for Broward County. Explanations In the interim between the submission of the application and the denial, Ms. Auxais, in a letter to a Regulatory Consultant at the Department of Insurance, offered "explanations . . . in regard to the cases filed against [her] . . .". Respondent's Exhibit 9, page 25. The first explanation concerns a criminal charge of "larceny by credit card." The charge is not related to the Department's basis for denial. Nonetheless, the explanation sheds light on Ms. Auxais' credibility. It has value to this case, moreover, because Ms. Auxais chose in her testimony at hearing to explain further her written explanation. She did so as she attempted, at the same time, to explain away the false answer on her application with regard to the nolo contendere plea for Unemployment Compensation Fraud, the second explanation in her letter in November of 2002 to the Department of Insurance. The explanation to the unrelated charge (the first explanation offered in the letter to the Department of Insurance) follows: Arrest Date: 3/13/95. Charge: Larceny Credit Card I went shopping with an ex-associate. I was not aware of the fact that she had obtained a credit card and attempted to use it unlawfully. When security began to question the nature of the card she fled the scene and I was held, arrested and charged for Larceny Credit Card. I explained the nature of the incident to the defense attorney appointed to me who suggested I plead no-contest. The courts ruled adjudication withheld. (Respondent's Exhibit 9). With regard to a question about whether her ex-associate had ever been charged with some type of theft crime for the incident, Ms. Auxais testified, "No she was never found. I can't find her to this day." (Tr. 44, 45). The second explanation relates to the felony of Unemployment Compensation Fraud: Arrest Date: 4/29/98 Charge: Fraud/Unemployment I worked for a group of physicians one of whom split from the group. At that time the other physicians felt threatened since I worked directly for the physician who decided to leave and I got fired. During this time I filed for unemployment. While I was on unemployment and receiving benefits the physician gave me a gift (so I thought) in the sum of $400.00. I was not aware that her accountant documented the $400.00 as employment. Some months later after she re-opened her new practice and I resumed working for her I among other employees received a letter from the unemployment office notifying us of unemployment fraud and they demanded repayment of the monies I received in the amount of $800.00. When I explained the situation to the physician she agreed to repay unemployment. I set up a payment plan with unemployment however the physician's accountant did not keep up with the payment which caused me to get arrested for unemployment fraud. (Id.) At hearing, in the midst of elaborating on these two explanations, Ms. Auxais offered an explanation for how it happened that her application had been submitted with the false answer of "no" to the screening question of whether she had ever pled "no contest" to a crime when, in fact, she had pled nolo contendere or no contest to crimes twice. Her explanation in this regard was: I personally did not fill out the application for the title insurance thing on line. My supervisor did it for me[.] [A]t the time that the application was filled out for me on line[,] I was in title insurance training in Tampa . . . But you just don't go around telling everybody that yes I was charged with unemployment compensation fraud after you thought everything was done. I guess the person who filled out the application for me was not aware that I was charged with a felony, so when the question was asked, had I ever been charged with a felony, they checked no. When it came back, I had already signed the last page of that prior to leaving, because you can actually print out the application. The application was sent out with that. (Tr. 30). Before transmitting it to the Department of Insurance, Ms. Auxais did not read the filled-out application. She testified she did not have the opportunity to so "[b]ecause [she] was in the midst of trying to go out of town and [she] was in the midst of trying to get [the] application out for a deadline . . .". (Tr. 64). There are at least two problems with this explanation. Both relate to the declaration that appears above the signature line in the application: Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for licensure and that the facts stated in it are true. Respondent's Exhibit 2, p. 000011 of Respondent's Exhibits. If Ms. Auxais is to be believed, she had not, in fact, read the application with answers before signing it so that her attestation by way of her signature was false. The other problem occurs with her reading of the application after it had been signed, filled out, sent in and discovered by the Department of Insurance to be false. On this point, Ms. Auxais had yet another explanation. This explanation has as its basis Ms. Auxais' reading of the two screening questions quoted in paragraph 10, above. The first of the two has a time frame with regard to the question it asks about criminal arrests or charges. "In the past 12 months," is the predicate to the question. The second question, has no such time limitation. It asks whether the applicant has "ever" pled nolo contendere or no contest to a crime. When confronted by a Department of Insurance employee, "a Mr. Thomas" with the false answer to the second question, Ms. Auxais testified, "I . . . explained to him that even after going back and re-reading everything I would have still said no because the prior question asked within the past 12 months." (Tr. 60, 61). In other words, Ms. Auxais construed the second question to be limited by the time frame of the first so that contrary to its plain inquiry as to whether she had "ever" pled nolo contendere or no contest to a crime, it really asked whether she had so pled within the previous 12 months. Ms. Auxais is a college graduate. She plans to continue her education post-graduate by attending law school and regards employment as a licensed title insurance agent as a stepping stone to a career in law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a title insurance agent. DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Auxais 9022 West Atlantic Boulevard, No. 227 Coral Springs, Florida 33065 Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner is qualified for registration as an associated person.
Findings Of Fact On December 6, 1990, Cliff J. Guerrieri submitted a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration (Form U4) to the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) for registration as a securities dealer in Florida. A copy of this form was forwarded to the Department of Banking and Finance by NASD. On this Form U4, Petitioner answered "No" to Question 22A relating to having been convicted of or plead guilty of nolo contendere to: a felony or misdemeanor involving: fraud, false statements, or omissions, wrongful taking of property, or bribery, forgery, counterfeiting or extortion? gambling? any other felony? A check by NASD revealed that Petitioner had pleaded nolo contendere to two charges of petit theft in the County Court, Pinellas County, Criminal Division, on March 10, 1986 (Exhibits 3 and 4); pleaded nolo contendere to exposure of sexual organs in the County Court, Hillsborough County, Criminal Division, on September 7, 1989 (Exhibits 5 and 6). Petitioner's employer was notified of these omissions, and on March 7, 1991, Petitioner submitted an Amended Form U4 on which he again checked "No" to Item 22A, but checked "Yes" to Item 22B, which asks if he had ever been charged with any felony or misdemeanor specified in Questions A(1) or (2). Additionally, Petitioner submitted court records admitted here as Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 6. Although Petitioner testified that he sent Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 6 with his amended U4, Respondent acknowledged receipt of Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 6, but denied receiving a copy of the amended U4 dated March 7, 1991. Petitioner testified that the petit theft charges involved license plates in or on his brother's car, which Petitioner was driving when he was stopped and charged with these violations. No further explanation was provided from which the degree of Petitioner's culpability could be ascertained. With respect to the exposure charge, Petitioner stated that he was changing clothes in an open convertible when he was apprehended. Again, no further explanation was provided from which Petitioner's culpability could be ascertained. With respect to the failure to note his criminal conviction on his initial application, Petitioner testified that his initial reading of Item 22 on the U4 led him to conclude erroneously that all of Items 22A through N involved securities violations and since he had never committed such a violation, his sworn answers to Item 22 was correct. Respondent's sole witness testified that Petitioner's application would have been denied even if he had initially submitted a correct application based solely on his convictions. The convictions plus the failure to disclose constituted the given reason for denial of Petitioner's application.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is recommended that the application of Cliff J. Guerrieri for registration as an associated person be denied. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Cliff J. Guerrieri 4201 North "A" Street Apartment 14 Tampa, FL 33609 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Ashley Peacock, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Peter Thomas Roman. By application dated April 28, 1988, he sought licensure as a real estate salesman. By letter dated October 24, 1988, counsel for Respondent informed Petitioner of Respondent's intent to deny licensure to Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's 1985 arrest and subsequent plea in 1986 to a charge of grand theft, as well as Petitioner's suspension from membership in the Florida Bar. Question number six of the application completed by Petitioner requires a "yes" or "no" answer to the question: "Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? Petitioner responded to question number six by disclosing his entry of a plea of nolo contendere in the circuit court for Pinellas County, Florida, on December 29, 1986, to a charge of grand theft. Petitioner related that the incident alleged had taken place in November of 1979. Petitioner further stated that the sentencing court had withheld formal adjudication of guilt and had placed Petitioner on probation. Petitioner, a licensed attorney at the time of the alleged incident, was disbarred from the practice of law by the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in an opinion issued on June 2, 1988. The Fla. Bar v. Peter T. Roman, 526 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1988). Petitioner's disbarment was based on the same acts which resulted in the grand theft charge. In addition, the Supreme Court found that "[t]his case involves not only theft, but fraud on the court which strikes at the very heart of a lawyer's ethical responsibility." Fla. Bar v. Roman, p. 62. The essential facts of the grand theft charges against Petitioner were that Petitioner falsified the name of an heir in an estate where Petitioner was serving as the personal representative. Funds paid from the estate to the falsified heir were converted by Petitioner to his own use. These matters occurred between January 1978 and January 1980. Petitioner was charged with grand theft in June of 1985. He pled no contest to that charge in 1986. Thereafter adjudication of guilt was withheld and he was sentenced to five years probation a $220 fine and nine months in the Pinellas County Jail. Since the incident which is the basis for the grand theft charges filed against Petitioner, he has not been involved in any incidents or episodes of misconduct. Petitioner has been offered a job as a sales person with a local real estate firm if he is permitted to hold a real estate license. Testimony of character witnesses offered by Petitioner establishes their belief that his reputation in the community is good, despite the one criminal incident in his past, and that they believe neither the public or investors would be endangered by the granting of licensure to the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5432 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-9. Adopted in substance. Unnecessary to result. Adopted in substance. Unnecessary to result. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-8. Adopted in substance. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary to result. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary to result. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. Roman, Esquire 2340 Main Street, Suite L Dunedin, Florida 34698 Lawrence Gendzier, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Room 212 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Real Estate Legal Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's qualifications and eligibility for licensure as an insurance agent be REVOKED. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of December, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Leland L. McCharen, Esq. Department of Insurance and Treasurer Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph Dennis Turner, Sr. 2219 West Skagway Avenue Tampa, Florida 33604-1039 Hon. William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Don Dowdell, Esq. General Counsel State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301 DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, DIVISION OF INSURANCE, vs . JOSEPH DENNIS TURNER, SR., a/k/a JOSEPH D. TURNER CASE NO. 85-3225 APPENDIX Pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1983), the following are my specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties to this case. Petitioner's Findings of Fact Paragraph Ruling Accepted; see paragraph 2, R.O. Rejected as argument. Partially accepted; see paragraph 6, R.O. Respondent's Findings of Fact Paragraph Ruling Accepted; see paragraph 1, R.O. Accepted; see paragraph 3, R.O. Accepted; see paragraph 4, R.O. Accepted; see paragraph 5, R.O. Rejected as argument and conclusions of law. Accepted; see paragraph 1, R.O. Accepted; see paragraph 2, R.O. i`_ E=_
The Issue Respondents' alleged violation of subsection 475.25(1)(a), 475.25(1)(c), and 475.25(3), Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint. Inasmuch as Respondents were not represented by legal counsel at the hearing, the Hearing Officer explained their rights in administrative proceedings to James F. Catron who elected to represent himself and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. is now and was at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint a corporation registered as a real estate broker doing business at 5805 Margate Boulevard, Margate, Florida. Respondent James F. Catron is now and was at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint a registered real estate broker and the active broker and officer of Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. (Stipulation) In January, 1976, Richard H. Goodwin, Jr. and Christine S. Goodwin, his wife, owned a four-unit apartment building at 7650 Southwest 10th Court, North Lauderdale, Florida, described as Lot 7, Block 13, Lauderdale North Park, Section 3. The Goodwins were having marital difficulties and decided to separate at this time and divest themselves of mutually-owned property. In a conversation with a salesman for respondents, Mr. Goodwin learned that James F. Catron was in the business of purchasing investment properties and reselling the same whereupon he would divide any profit with the former owner. Goodwin thereafter entered into negotiations with Catron for the sale of the apartment building. It was orally agreed that Catron would pay $62,700.00 for the property with a $1,000.00 down payment, and assume a first mortgage with Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward County in the amount of approximately $57,400.00 and a second mortgage with Seacrest Homes, Inc., John E. Abdo, Trustee, in the approximate amount of $5,300.00. It was further agreed that Catron would pay the Goodwins 30 percent of 80 percent of any net profit realized when he resold the property. As a consequence of this agreement, the Goodwins, on January 19, 1976, executed a deposit receipt contract embodying the above terms except that it recited the receipt of $10.00 as a deposit rather than $1,000.00, and made no mention of assumption of the mortgages. However, the sum of $1,000.00 was paid to the Goodwins by Catron. Although Mr. Goodwin testified that Catron signed this contract, Catron denied it and no such contract signed by Catron was placed in evidence at the hearing. (Testimony of R. Goodwin, C. Goodwin, Catron, Petitioner's exhibit 1) Mr. Goodwin, on January 19, 1976, executed a document authorizing Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. to collect rents from the tenants of the apartment building. Catron, anticipating consummation of the purchase, proceeded to collect rentals in the amount of approximately $800.00 per month for the next four and one-half months, for total collections of approximately $3,600.00. He also made some repairs to the property and paid utilities bills. The Goodwins believed that he would take steps to assume the two mortgages on the property and take over the payments thereon. Although Mr. Goodwin testified that he and his wife had executed a warranty deed and delivered it to Catron, Catron denied receipt of such a deed and it was not produced at the hearing. Accordingly, it cannot be found that such a deed was in fact executed and delivered. The rents were collected by a limited partnership called Forest Run, Limited, of which Catron was a partner. Although the February payments were made on the mortgages, they were discontinued when Catron discovered that he could not assume the second mortgage from Seacrest Homes, Inc. without payment of $1,000.00 to the trustee, Abdo. As a consequence, the Goodwins filed suit against the respondents in the Broward County Circuit Court on June 23, 1976, requesting that any agreements concerning the property be rescinded, and that an accounting be ordered and a receiver appointed to administer and manage the property in question. A receiver was appointed by the court. Thereafter, in August 1976, Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association filed suit to foreclose its mortgage on the property and obtained summary judgment in the Broward County Circuit Court on January 25, 1977. The property was thereafter sold at public sale and bought in by Southern Federal. On January 25, 1977, the suit of the Goodwins against respondents was dismissed by stipulation after the parties had reached an amicable settlement in the matter. (Testimony of R. Goodwin, C. Goodwin, Petitioner's Exhibits 2-4)
Recommendation That the charges against the respondents, James F. Catron and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc., be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 James F. Catron and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. 5805 Margate Boulevard Margate, Florida 33063
