The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent violated section 1012.795(1)(d),(g), or (j), Florida Statutes (2012), or Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(5)(a). If any violations are found, it must be determined what penalty should be imposed for the violation(s).
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds State of Florida Educator?s Certificate number 944511, valid through June 30, 2014, authorizing her to provide instruction in both elementary education and exceptional student education. Respondent is also licensed as a nurse by the State of Florida, although her license number was not introduced into evidence. Respondent has resided in Pensacola, Florida, for approximately six years. Respondent has never taught school full-time. Between December 2011 and August 2013, Respondent was a substitute teacher at the United Cerebral Palsy “Capstone Academy” in Pensacola, a pre-kindergarten program where she worked with special needs children. During that same time frame, Respondent also substituted at various schools in the Escambia County School District. From approximately March 2013 through the present day, Respondent was also employed PRN (i.e., “as needed”) as a nurse with Consulate Health Care. In January 2012, Respondent began working as a substitute teacher at Lincoln Park Elementary School (Lincoln Park) in the Escambia County School District. In February 2012, Respondent was offered a position as a Long-Term Substitute (LTS) teacher with Lincoln Park.1/ On March 5, 2012, while working at Lincoln Park, Respondent was notified that she must submit to a pre-employment drug screening.2/ Respondent testified that she went to the lab for the drug screening the same day she was informed of the requirement while at work. Respondent?s urine specimen was collected at 3:15 p.m. on March 5, 2012, at LabCorp Patient Service Center, 3437 North 12th Avenue, Pensacola. Respondent?s urine tested positive for amphetamines. On March 13, 2012, Lincoln Park Principal Christine Nixon notified Petitioner that her urine test was positive, that she needed to report to the Escambia School District Office, and that Petitioner would not be allowed to return to Lincoln Park until Petitioner heard further from Human Resources (HR). Respondent reported to the District HR office at approximately 2:55 p.m. on March 13, 2012. At the HR reception counter, Respondent requested to speak with someone regarding her drug test results. Dr. Kylie Henderson, Confidential Human Resources Administrative Specialist, invited Respondent into her office, and informed her that both Dr. Keith Leonard, Director of Human Resources, and Mr. Kevin Windham, Director of Risk Management, were unavailable. Dr. Henderson offered to take Respondent?s information and leave a message for Dr. Leonard to contact Respondent. Respondent?s meeting with Dr. Henderson was brief, but Dr. Henderson clarified for Respondent that she could not return to Lincoln Park until she received clearance from either HR or Risk Management. Respondent did not receive a call from Dr. Leonard or anyone else from either HR or Risk Management on either March 13 or 14, 2012. Respondent was anxious to speak with someone regarding her drug screen results. Respondent contacted HR again on March 14, 2012, and spoke briefly with Dr. Scott, Assistant Superintendent for HR Services. Dr. Scott referred Respondent to Mr. Windham. Respondent was transferred to Mr. Windham?s voicemail, where she left a message. Respondent did not receive a return call from Mr. Windham. On March 15, 2012, Respondent sent an email to Mr. Malcolm Thomas, Superintendent of Escambia County Schools, complaining that his staff was not returning her calls and requesting a call from someone with his office. On March 16, 2012, Dr. Scott answered Respondent?s email on behalf of Mr. Thomas. He explained that unless Respondent produced a prescription for the medication for which she tested positive, or successfully contested the urine screen test, the School District would have to treat it as a positive result and withdraw the employment offer.3/ By letter dated March 15, 2012, from Bill Threadgill, Coordinator of Human Resources Management, Respondent was notified that based upon the results of her pre-employment drug screen she was not eligible for employment with Escambia County Schools.4/ Education Practices Commission On or about April 13, 2012, the Escambia County School District reported Respondent to the Department of Education (DOE), Professional Practices Services, which prompted the instant action against Respondent?s Educator Certificate. Respondent responded to the allegations of misconduct brought by Professional Practices Services in a letter dated April 21, 2013, to Ms. Lambeth, Chief of Professional Practices Services for DOE?s Bureau of Professional Practice. On May 15, 2013, Respondent filed an Election of Rights requesting a formal hearing. Meeting with Dr. Henderson The dispute in this case centers on statements Respondent made during her meeting with Dr. Henderson on March 13, 2012, at the Escambia District HR Office. Dr. Henderson took notes during the brief meeting with Respondent in order to pass on to Dr. Leonard an accurate account of Respondent?s request for a meeting with him. On a message pad, Dr. Henderson noted that Respondent had come to see Dr. Leonard at the direction of Lincoln Park Principal Nixon following the results of her positive drug screen. The message asks Dr. Leonard to call Respondent to give her further direction. After Respondent left her office, Dr. Henderson made a written account of the meeting. Dr. Henderson felt documentation was necessary as Respondent?s behavior was indicative of someone under the influence of a substance. In her written statement, which was corroborated by her testimony at final hearing, Dr. Henderson described Respondent as “extremely jittery and agitated” and noted that Respondent continually shifted in her seat, spoke very rapidly, stuttered and stammered, and repeatedly picked up and replaced her purse on the floor beside her. Dr. Henderson recounted that Respondent explained she knew what drug she had tested positive for, and that she took her son?s Adderall “every now and then” for weight loss, “to keep from eating.” At final hearing, Respondent admitted telling Dr. Henderson that she knew the identity of the drug for which she tested positive. However, Respondent denied that she identified the drug as Adderall or that she took the drug intentionally. Respondent further takes issue with Dr. Henderson?s account of her behavior, denying that she was jittery or agitated, that she spoke rapidly, shifted in her seat, or repeatedly moved her purse. Credibility Respondent?s testimony that she did not identify the drug to Dr. Henderson is undermined in several ways. First, in Respondent?s letter to Ms. Lambeth, Respondent stated that she had admitted “to the District” that she took one of her son?s Adderall. At hearing, Respondent authenticated the letter and the signature as her own. In her Election of Rights, Respondent stated: “The Petitioner states on pg.2(5) that I admitted to the district?s official that I told her that I took the Adderall. I told her that I took it by mistake on that day, and I reiterated it on the 21st of April when I addressed the office of professional practices services.” Respondent?s own testimony at final hearing conflicted on this point. On cross-examination, after repeatedly testifying that she did not recall telling Dr. Henderson the name of the medication she had taken, she testified as follows: Q. That?s what you said under oath in your direct testimony sitting in that chair. You didn?t say what the drug was. You said, took one of my son?s medications, right? A. Yes, I said that. Q. You didn?t identify to her, accidentally to my son?s Adderall? A. Yes, I did. I did identify that to her.[5/] Further, when Respondent was deposed on September 4, 2013, she denied having taken Adderall at all during the time she worked at Lincoln Park.6/ Dr. Henderson?s testimony that Respondent identified Adderall as the drug for which she tested positive during her meeting with Respondent on March 13, 2012, is accepted as credible and reliable. Respondent?s position, at final hearing, is that she took her son?s Adderall by mistake and that it was a one-time occurrence. She flatly denied that she has ever taken Adderall to curb her appetite or assist in weight loss. Respondent represented on many occasions that she took the Adderall by mistake: in her March 15, 2012, email to Superintendent Thomas when expressing her frustration with lack of response from his staff; in her March 16, 2012, email to Mr. Windham explaining that a split screen test would have the same results as her first urine screening; in her letter to Ms. Lambeth, dated April 21, 2012, in response to the Commission?s allegations of misconduct; in her Election of Rights dated May 13, 2013; and throughout her testimony at final hearing. Incredulously, at final hearing Respondent made no effort to explain how she took the Adderall by mistake. Respondent was clearly incensed by the lack of communication from HR following her meeting with Dr. Henderson. She repeatedly stated that she just wanted a chance to explain herself and that she thought she would have a chance to “clear up” the mistake. However, when presented with an evidentiary hearing of her choosing, and the opportunity to present the facts as she wanted them found, she made no effort to explain the mistake. She did not offer any facts about where the Adderall was kept in relation to any medication she might have been taking, the time of day to be administered, or any other details to explain the “mistaken” ingestion of Adderall. In fact, Respondent testified that her son, who did live with her in February and March 2012, was not even on any prescription medications at the time. Specifically, she testified, “My son is not even on Adderall. He was on that a long time. And I was keeping them in case I thought he had to go back on the medication.”7/ Respondent?s testimony that she was simply keeping the medication for her son does not support her theory that she took the Adderall by mistake. More importantly, Dr. Henderson testified credibly that Respondent did not mention to her during the meeting with Respondent on March 13, 2012, anything about taking Adderall by mistake. Dr. Henderson?s testimony and written statement were clear that Respondent told her she took the Adderall intentionally, and does so occasionally to lose weight and control her appetite. Dr. Henderson?s testimony is accepted as credible and reliable. Respondent accuses Dr. Henderson of fabricating her written account of her meeting with Respondent on March 13, 2012. No evidence was introduced to support that accusation. Dr. Henderson had never met, seen, or spoken to Respondent prior to the meeting at HR on March 13, 2012. Dr. Henderson had no information from any source regarding Respondent prior to March 13, 2012, when Respondent presented at HR to discuss her test results with someone. Respondent offered no explanation for why Dr. Henderson would fabricate her written account of their meeting. In short, there was no evidence of a motive for Dr. Henderson to make up the facts in her written statement. Respondent argues that her theory that Dr. Henderson fabricated the account is supported by the fact that Dr. Henderson?s written message to Dr. Leonard is so short and includes none of the details about her behavior or the name of the medication taken. Respondent alleges that had Respondent admitted to abusing prescription medications and behaved erratically in her presence, Dr. Henderson would have included those details in the message to Dr. Leonard. Respondent?s theory is not supported by any evidence. The message to Dr. Leonard was taken on a form message pad which includes space for identification of the caller or visitor, their phone number, and the reason for their call, followed by a series of boxes from which the message-taker may choose, such as “telephoned,” “returned your call,” “came to see you,” and “will call again.” The form includes only the briefest of lines for a message to the recipient. In the limited space provided for a message, Dr. Henderson wrote “Urine test 2 weeks ago came back positive. She was contacted by the lab and her principal sent her to HR. Can?t return to LPES until cleared. Needs to know what to do.” The message does not include details about Respondent?s behavior or statements concerning the drug for which she tested positive. Contrary to Respondent?s argument, the undersigned does not infer from the facts that Dr. Henderson fabricated the more detailed statements concerning Respondent made shortly after the meeting concluded. Ultimate Facts Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that on March 5, 2012, Respondent tested positive for amphetamines, a controlled substance for which she did not have a prescription. In the heat of the moment when faced with her positive test results, Respondent admitted to Dr. Henderson that the medication belonged to her son, that she took the medication intentionally, and that she does so occasionally. Subsequent to her admission, Respondent misrepresented the facts to the School District, the State Education Practices Commission investigator, and while under oath in deposition and in this forum.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent has violated section 102.795(1)(g) and (j), as well as rule 6A-10.081(5)(a), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. It is further recommended that the Education Practices Commission suspend Respondent?s certificate for a period of 12 months; and upon employment in any public or private position requiring an educator?s certificate, place her on probation for a period of two years on such terms as the Commission deems advisable. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 2013.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a Florida-licensed registered nurse, holding license number RN 2061632. At all times material to this case, the Respondent resided with her daughter in an unidentified city in Massachusetts. In February 2001, the Respondent sought employment at the Pleasant Manor Health and Rehabilitation Center ("Pleasant Manor"), a facility located in Attleboro, Massachusetts. As part of the employment application process, the Respondent was required to submit a urine sample to a Pleasant Manor employee. The evidence fails to establish that the procedure utilized by the Pleasant Manor employee in collecting the urine specimen was sufficient to preclude contamination of the specimen. Prior to the urine collection procedure, the Pleasant Manor employee did not require that the Respondent wash her hands. The Respondent was taken into a restroom to provide the specimen. The Pleasant Manor employee waited outside the restroom while the Respondent collected the urine sample. The water in the toilet bowl was clear. Hot and cold running water was available in the restroom sink. After the sample was taken, the Respondent remained with the Pleasant Manor employee while the sample was sealed and packaged for transportation to the testing lab. The urine specimen was submitted to a LabCorp testing facility in North Carolina for analysis. The initial LabCorp test on the Respondent's urine specimen produced results indicating the presence of cannabinoids and opiates. The Respondent's urine specimen was subjected to confirmation testing and returned a test result of 31 ng/mL for cannabinoids and 920 ng/mL for opiates/codeine. The evidence establishes that the LabCorp tests were performed according to appropriate standards and practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Nursing, enter a Final Order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent Deborah Ketz. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Alexis J. DeCaprio, Esquire Division of Medical Quality Assurance Bureau of Health Care Practitioner Regulation Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Suzanne H. Suarez, Esquire 447 3rd Avenue, North Suite 404 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dan Coble, R.N., Ph.D., C.N.A.A. C, B.C. Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3252 Reginald D. Dixon, Esquire Division of Medical Quality Assurance Bureau of Health Care Practitioner Regulation Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265
The Issue The issue is whether, as provided by Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, Petitioner may discipline the correctional and law enforcement certificates of Respondent due to his failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes. If Respondent is subject to discipline, an additional issue is the penalty that Petitioner should impose.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer, holding certificate number 200241, and a certified correctional office, holding certificate number 182381. Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional officer in 1998 and as a law enforcement officer in 2001. As a correctional officer, Respondent has worked at the South Florida Reception Center and Broward Correctional Institution. In December 2001, the Town of Golden Beach Police Department hired Respondent as a law enforcement officer. Respondent was employed at the Town of Golden Beach Police Department until December 31, 2002. He is presently unemployed. On December 12, 2002, Respondent visited a local lounge while off-duty. Sitting by himself, Respondent ordered a drink and visited the restroom before the server delivered the drink. Upon returning from the restroom, Respondent found the drink where he had been sitting. Respondent consumed the drink and went home. The next morning, Respondent reported to the police station and performed his usual duties, which included transporting witnesses to the State Attorney's Office, appearing in court, and picking up uniforms. Upon his return to the office, a fellow officer informed Respondent that the police chief had received a tip that Respondent had been smoking crack cocaine the prior night and had ordered Respondent to undergo a urinalysis. As directed by the chief, Respondent and the fellow officer immediately drove to the laboratory so that Respondent could provide a urine sample. Four days later, on December 17, 2002, the chief told Respondent that the urinalysis had returned a positive result for cocaine and placed Respondent on administrative leave. Two weeks later, Respondent resigned. The laboratory that conducted the urinalysis is certified by the National Institute of Drug Abuse as a forensic toxicology laboratory and is authorized by the Agency for Health Care Administration to perform drug-free workplace testing. On December 16, 2002, the laboratory screened the urine sample and found a positive result for a cocaine metabolite, benzoylecgonine. As is typical with initial screens that produce positive results, on December 20, 2002, the laboratory retested the urine sample by gas chromatography mass spectrometry (GC/MS), which is a sophisticated, sensitive test. The GC/MS confirmed the presence of benzoylecgonine at the level of 36,900 nanograms/milliliter (ng/ml). This level of cocaine metabolite is indicative of a large amount of cocaine ingested not long before the production of the urine sample. At the request of Respondent, the laboratory retested the urine sample a few months later and detected significant levels of a wide range of cocaine metabolites. At the request of Respondent's attorney, the laboratory sent part of the urine sample to a second, independent laboratory, which, performing GC/MS on December 10, 2003, reconfirmed the presence of cocaine metabolites. The reported level, presumably of benzoylecgonine, was over 10,000 ng/ml. The second laboratory reported a lower level because this was the maximum threshold of its testing equipment and protocol and possibly because the cocaine metabolites decompose over time, even in urine that has been frozen, as the first laboratory had done in preserving Respondent's urine sample. The only anomaly in the confirmatory test performed by the first laboratory appears at page 16 of Petitioner Exhibit 2. This document concerns the confirmatory testing performed on several samples, including Respondent's. In reporting testing parameters, the document states that the "ion ratio int. std." for Respondent's sample was 3.67. The bottom column suggests that the permissible range is 2.44-3.66. The form contains a statement at the very bottom: "REVIEWER: RESULTS OF GC/MS WERE WITHIN THE TOLERANCES ACCEPTABLE UNDER OUR SOP [STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE] FOR RETENTION TIME, QUANTIFICATION OF CONTROLS, MASS RATIOS, AND IDENTIFICATION WITH THE FULL SCAN MASS SPECTRUM." After this preprinted statement, the reviewer added in handwriting: "except 326340." This is the number assigned to Respondent's sample. Unfortunately, the parties did not address this anomaly in the confirmatory test, and the record does not explain the meaning of the reviewer's note or the out-of-range ion ratio. The only unusual feature of the first laboratory's confirmatory test, as revealed in the record, is that the laboratory used a smaller sample size because the results were so high that, absent a diluted sample, the first laboratory's equipment could not produce a concentration level. However, the process by which this adjustment is made is not unusual, and the first laboratory performed the necessary calculations to produce a correct result. The uncertainty introduced by the reviewer's note is eliminated, though, by the extremely high levels of cocaine reported by the second laboratory a few months later, and the wide range of cocaine metabolites reported by the first laboratory in its reconfirmation testing one year after the initial screening. Respondent's defense is that, unknown to him and while he was in the restroom, someone at the lounge poured a large amount of cocaine into his drink. This defense is unworthy of belief. Respondent claims that he conducted a personal investigation into his case after the drug test showed cocaine metabolites in his urine. In the course of this investigation, Respondent interviewed a bartender at a lounge some distance from the one that Respondent had visited on December 12, 2002. During this interview, a woman at the bar, Stacie Dalgleish, who had once been an inmate at a correctional facility at which Respondent had served as a correctional officer, overheard him talking about the facts of this case and interrupted Respondent's conversation to tell him that she had witnessed what happened to Respondent that night. As Ms. Dalgleish testified at the hearing, she told Respondent that, on the night in question, she had been at the same lounge and had seen another woman, Lisa Binger, who had been incarcerated with Ms. Dalgleish. While in a stall behind a closed door, Ms. Dalgleish witnessed Ms. Binger and another woman snort cocaine. Ms. Dalgleish explained that she had been able to see Ms. Binger because she was lined up perfectly with the crack between the stall door and the frame. Ms. Dalgleish testified that she then heard Ms. Binger tell her friend that she was going to get Respondent because he had gotten her friend. Later, while seated near the bar, Ms. Dalgleish testified that she saw Ms. Binger pour the white powdery contents of an envelope into Respondent's drink, while Respondent had left his drink unattended. For his part, Respondent "explained" that he had caused a friend of the Ms. Binger to lose her job as a bartender when he had reported to the bar owner that Respondent had seen the woman stealing cases of beer. The improbability that Ms. Binger would part with a large amount of cocaine to incriminate Respondent is moderate. The improbability of the chance encounter between Respondent and Ms. Dalgleish, while Respondent was conducting his investigation is high. The improbability that, in a public restroom, Ms. Binger would theatrically announce her plans to surreptitiously pour cocaine into Respondent's drink, as she recklessly snorted cocaine with another woman--all while observed by Ms. Dalgleish sitting in a closed stall, but peering through a crack in the door that happened to reveal the scene that she described--is incalculably high. Exacerbating these credibility problems was Ms. Dalgleish's performance as a witness. She was an eager witness who, upon concluding her testimony, quickly walked over to Respondent to obtain his approval of her unconvincing performance. Respondent is lying about how he came to ingest a large amount of cocaine a short time before his drug test.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order revoking Respondent's correctional officer and law enforcement officer certificates. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 James C. Casey, Esquire Slesnick & Casey, LLP 2701 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134-6020 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professional Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her, if any.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified as a correctional officer by the Petitioner on February 11, 1983, and was issued certificate number 19-82-502-08. On August 8, 1990, Respondent reported to Mount Sinai Medical Center Industrial Medicine Department in Miami Beach, Florida, for her biannual physical required by her employer, the Metro-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Respondent was provided with a sealed, sterile container into which Respondent urinated. Respondent then gave the urine sample container to a Mount Sinai employee who "split" the specimen by unsealing two sterile containers and dividing the urine specimen between those two containers. The Mount Sinai employee then capped and sealed the two specimen containers and labelled them in a manner making them uniquely identifiable as the Respondent's urine samples. An identifying bar code number was also placed on the two sealed containers, and the containers were then placed in a locked metal box. Later that afternoon, the locked metal box containing Respondent's "split" sample was transported from Mount Sinai Medical Center to Toxicology Testing Service's (hereinafter "TTS") laboratory in Miami by an employee of TTS. At TTS another employee removed the containers from the metal box, logged in both containers assigning a TTS control number to them, and inspected the containers for any evidence of leakage or tampering. The two containers of Respondent's urine were properly labelled, sealed, and intact. One of Respondent's samples was opened, and a portion of that sample was dispensed into a sterile cup for testing. The other container of Respondent's urine remained sealed. An initial chemical screen for the purpose of determining if there was evidence of controlled substances or their metabolites in the Respondent's urine sample was performed on the dispensed portion of Respondent's urine. That drug screen showed that Respondent's urine was positive for cocaine. Due to the positive reading, the technologist dispensed another portion of Respondent's urine from the container which had been unsealed and re-tested Respondent's urine. The re-test again showed that Respondent's urine was positive for cocaine. On the following day, August 9, a different TTS employee dispensed another portion of Respondent's urine from the container that had been previously unsealed and analyzed it using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, the most reliable and accurate method for confirmatory testing. Respondent's sample was confirmed positive for the presence of the cocaine metabolite benzoylecgonine in a concentration of 202 nanograms per milliliter. Respondent and her then-employer were advised of the results of the initial screening, the re-testing and the confirmatory testing. On August 20, 1990, Respondent and a representative of her then-employer went to TTS. In their presence, the second container of Respondent's "split" sample, which had been kept in a freezer at TTS since its arrival there, was inspected by the laboratory director and the others present at that meeting. That second container had never been unsealed and still bore all identifying markings, including Respondent's initials. In Respondent's presence, that second container was unsealed for the first time, and two portions of the contents of that container were dispensed so that the second container was divided into three parts. The original container with the undispensed portion was resealed, marked, and returned to the freezer for storage. One of the dispensed portions was sent to an independent laboratory for confirmatory testing. The second dispensed portion was then tested by TTS on August 24, 1990. That testing revealed that that portion of Respondent's urine was also positive for the cocaine metabolite. The confirmatory test results showed 174 nanograms per milliliter of that cocaine metabolite. The screening and confirmatory test results are consistent with, and indicative of, use of cocaine by Respondent. No other substance produces the cocaine metabolite benzoylecgonine. Respondent was terminated from her employment with the Metro-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation due to the presence of cocaine in her urine on August 8, 1990. Prior to her termination, Respondent had consistently received evaluations reflecting that she was an excellent employee, had been commended for her reliability and responsibility as a correctional officer, and had been named as officer of the month.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered Finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed in this cause; Suspending Respondent's certification as a correctional officer for a period not to exceed two years; and Placing Respondent on probation for a period not to exceed two years during which time she should be required to submit to random urine drug testing and substance abuse counselling. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of April, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SC 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-13 are adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's nine pages of excerpts entitled Proposed Findings of Fact have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony together with argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ms. Linda Bass 18101 Northwest 32nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33055 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2007),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Valderrama was certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida by the Commission on September 29, 2004, and was issued Law Enforcement Certificate No. 243605. From September 27, 2004, to November 9, 2007, Ms. Valderrama was employed by the Osceola County Sheriff's Office. On or about October 17, 2007, at approximately 1:00 p.m., Ms. Valderrama reported to the Osceola County Sheriff's Office Administration Building for random drug testing pursuant to the terms of her employment and provided a urine sample under controlled conditions. A lab technician was the only other person in the restroom with Ms. Valderrama during the collection process. Ms. Valderrama provided the specimen by urinating in a sterile, previously unused specimen cup, which she subsequently provided to a lab technician who immediately sealed the sample. Neither the sample cup, nor the urine sample it contained, had been tampered with, altered, or adulterated since the initial collection of the urine sample and had remained sealed and maintained in the chain of custody until unsealed by a qualified laboratory personnel at Total Compliance Network, a licensed drug testing laboratory contracted by Florida Hospital Centra Care to conduct random employee drug screens for the Osceola County Sheriff's Office. The laboratory analysis of Ms. Valderrama's urine specimen was found by qualified Quest Diagnostic's laboratory personnel and a Total Compliance Network medical review officer to be positive for Cocaine metabolites in a concentration of 2046 nanograms per milliliter. The minimum level of detection for Cocaine is 150 nanograms per milliliter. On October 27, 2007, Ms. Valderrama discussed her test results with Dr. Seth Portnoy, the licensed medical review officer for Total Compliance Network. Ms. Valderrama could not provide Dr. Portnoy with any medical reason for the positive test result and did not challenge the positive test results. The procedures and methods employed in the handling and analysis of Ms. Valderrama's urine specimen provided reliable safeguards against contamination, a reliable chain-of-custody, and produced, through gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, a reliable, scientifically-accepted measure of the concentration of Cocaine metabolite in the body. The laboratory standards and practices observed in conjunction with the collection, preservation, shipment, handling and analysis of Ms. Valderrama's urine specimen, for the purpose of testing for drugs, were in conformance with the applicable provisions of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 59A-24 and consistent with the requirements for reliability and integrity of the testing process pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.00225. Cocaine is rapidly metabolized by the body and can be usually detected for two to three days after ingestion. Because the minimum detection level for Cocaine is 150 nanograms per milliliter and Ms. Valderrama's test results showed a level of 2046 nanograms per milliliter, it was Dr. Portnoy's expert opinion that the tests results were indicative of ingestion of Cocaine. Dr. Portnoy's opinion is credited. Ms. Valderrama had drunk some herbal tea prior to giving her urine sample. She feels that the ingestion of the herbal tea could have resulted in the positive test for Cocaine. There was no expert testimony to establish that the ingestion of the herbal tea would result in the positive drug test. Additionally, based on Dr. Portnoy's credible expert opinion, the metabolite detected in Ms. Valderama's urine could only result from Cocaine. Cocaine is listed as a Schedule II controlled substance in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Vivian Valderrama violated Subsections 943.13(7) and 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d), and revoking her certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 2008.
The Issue Should Respondent's Law Enforcement Certificate be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Commission is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for the certification and de- certification of law enforcement officers. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer having been certified by the Commission on January 24, 1992, and issued law enforcement certificate number 20445. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by the Cape Coral, Florida Police Department (CCPD). As a certified law enforcement officer, Respondent is sworn to uphold the laws of the State of Florida, in both an on-duty and off-duty capacity, and must follow a personal code of conduct which precludes the use of marijuana in an on-duty or off-duty capacity. Respondent was aware at the time he was hired by the CCPD that law enforcement officers had to abide by the Drug Free Workplace standards. As part of the biannual physical examination required by the CCPD, the Respondent, on June 4, 1999, presented to the Lee Memorial Health Systems, a/k/a Lee Convenient Care, a Collection Site as defined in Rule 59A-24.003(4), Florida Administrative Code, for the purpose of giving a urine specimen for drug testing. Strict procedures were followed in the collection of Respondent's urine specimen taken on June 4, 1999, in order that the integrity and chain of custody of the specimen were maintained. Respondent's urine specimen taken on June 4, 1999, was collected, identified, and forwarded to Diagnostic Services Inc., d/b/a DSI Laboratories (DSI) in accordance with the procedure set forth in Section 112.0455(8), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59A-24.005, Florida Administrative Code, for the purpose of testing for drugs. DSI is a Forensic Toxicology Laboratory as that term is defined in Rule 59A-24.003(8), Florida Administrative Code, and is a certified, state and federally-licensed forensic toxicology laboratory which conducted the tests of Respondent's urine specimen taken on June 4, 1999. Respondent's urine specimen given on June 4, 1999, was given Specimen ID No. 11A, 292409 and Laboratory Accession No. 99- 157-0716. When urine is tested for the presence of marijuana, a positive result is indicated when the nanogram level of cannabinoids, or THC, reaches a level of 50 or higher on the initial screening, or immunoassay test. Rule 59A- 24.006(4)(e)1, Florida Administrative Code. If the immunoassay test is positive, the sample is subjected to a much more specific test, the Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GCMS) test. A result of a nanogram level of 15 or higher is a positive test result for the presence of cannabinoids or THC. Rule 59A-24.006(4)(f)(1), Florida Administrative Code. The establishment of the cut-off levels on the immunoassay or GCMS tests eliminates any possibility of positive test results due to accidental ingestion. Respondent's urine specimen of June 4, 1999, was first subjected to the immunoassay test which reported a level of 169 nanograms of THC in Respondent's urine. Respondent's urine sample was then subjected to the GCMS test which reported a result of the presence of 37 nanograms of THC in Respondent's system. Elizabeth Burza, n/k/a Elizabeth Brunelli, the certifying scientist on the two tests conducted on Respondent's urine specimen of June 4, 1999, reviewed and approved the integrity of the chain of custody, that the machines used to test the specimen were operating correctly, and the accuracy of the positive result for cannabinoids in Respondent's system. On June 8, 1999, Ms. Brunelli certified that urine specimen number 11A-292409 tested positive for presence of cannabinoids. The urine specimen number and laboratory accession number were that of Respondent's urine specimen submitted on June 4, 1999. Abel Natali, M.D. was the Medical Review Officer of the tests conducted on the urine specimen number 11A-292409 submitted by Respondent on June 4, 1999. On June 9, 1999, Dr. Natali reviewed and approved the testing procedures and results thereof. Dr. Natali confirmed the conclusions of Ms. Brunelli that the test results as to specimen number 11A, 292409 did not reflect abnormality, and accurately reflected a positive reading of 37 nanograms of THC, cannabinoids, in Respondent's system. On June 10, 1999, Dr. Natali telephoned Respondent to confirm that Respondent had tested positive for cannabinoids. Dr. Natali inquired of Respondent as to any valid reason for the positive test for marijuana, such as: (1) was there a possibility that medical research had exposed Respondent to marijuana and; (2) had Respondent ingested any prescription or over-the-counter drugs which may have contained marijuana. The purpose of these questions was to allow the tested person to admit or deny use, and to allow the Medical Review Officer to follow up on valid explanations for exposure controlled substances. Respondent told Dr. Natali that he had been exposed to marijuana at a party where people were smoking marijuana and that he had smoked marijuana. However, during his testimony at the hearing, Respondent could not recall making that statement to Dr. Natali, and denied smoking marijuana at the party. Dr. Natali advised Respondent that he would be reporting the positive test results for marijuana to his supervisor, and that Respondent could request a retest. Respondent did not request a retest. On June 10, 1999, the positive test results for marijuana were reported to Lieutenant Everly, CCPD. Subsequently, on June 10, 1999, Lieutenant Everly and Lieutenant Furderer requested that Respondent submit another urine sample for testing. Although Respondent was not told that failure to submit another urine specimen would result in his termination from CCPD, he was advised that failure to submit another urine specimen could possibly result in his termination from the CCPD. Respondent agreed to the submission of a second urine specimen, and on June 10, 1999, Lieutenant Furderer transported Respondent to DSI Laboratories where Respondent submitted another urine specimen for testing. The collection and testing of the second urine specimen submitted by Respondent on June 10, 1999, and identified as 11A, 303243, was handled in accordance with the rules and statutes governing the collection and testing of urine specimens for the purpose of determining the presence of illegal drugs in the person's system. Ms. Brunelli, certifying scientist, certified the results of the two tests conducted on Respondent's second urine specimen identified as number 11A,303243. Ms. Brunelli certified specimen 11A, 303243 as being positive for the presence of cannabinoids on the immunoassay test at a level of 209 nanograms, and on the GCMS test at a level of 56 nanograms. Stephen I. Merlin, M.D., Medical Review Officer, reviewed and approved the collection and testing procedures used with Respondent's urine specimen submitted on June 10, 1999, and identified as 11A, 303243, and the positive results of the tests (a nanogram level of 209 for the immunoassay test and a nanogram level of 56 for the GCMS test) as reviewed and approved by Ms. Brunelli. Dr. Merlin informed Respondent that he had tested positive for cannabinoids, and inquired as to whether Respondent had taken any prescription drugs containing marinol, or if Respondent had been exposed to marijuana. Respondent replied in the negative. Respondent did not request a retest. Respondent's only explanation for the presence of cannabinoids in his system was the possible passive inhalation of marijuana smoke at a party in a motel room on the weekend prior to giving the first urine specimen on June 4, 1999. While passive inhalation of marijuana smoke under controlled conditions may possibly result in negigible amounts of cannabinoids being detected in a person's urine, Respondent failed to show that the conditions in that motel room were such that it would have resulted in passive inhalation of marijuana smoke by Respondent to the degree that his urine would have reflected, upon testing, even negigible amounts of cannabinoids, let alone the levels found in Respondent's urine. Respondent offered no evidence to demonstrate that he may have accidentally ingested marijuana during this period of time. Respondent's June 4, 1990, and June 10, 1999, urine specimens were disposed of on July 5, 2000. Prior to their disposal, Respondent did not contact anyone and request that the specimens be retain for retesting. Subsequent to being notified of the results of the second urine test, the CCPD terminated Respondent. However, after the CCPD held an informal hearing, CCPD reinstated Respondent. At the time of this hearing, Respondent was still working with the CCPD, apparently in an administrative capacity. Respondent presented no evidence of complete rehabilitation or substantial mitigating circumstances. The nanogram levels for cannabinoids reported for the initial and confirmation tests for the urine specimen given by Respondent on June 4, 1999, and the nanogram levels for cannabinoids reported for the initial and confirmation tests for the urine specimen given by Respondent on June 9, 1999, exceeded the nanogram levels for cannabinoids set out in Rule 59A-24.006(4)(e)1.(f)l., Florida Administrative Code, for positive testing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order revoking Respondent's Law Enforcement Certificate number 20445. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Gabrielle Taylor, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Robert B. Burandt, Esquire 1714 Cape Coral Parkway, East Cape Coral, Florida 33904-9620 A. Leon Lowry, II, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professional Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, in violation of section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2011) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d), and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent has been a certified corrections officer. As a certified corrections officer employed by the Department of Corrections, Respondent was subject to random drug testing. On or about December 9, 2011, Respondent was selected for random drug testing and directed to provide a urine sample. He reported to Labcorp in Pensacola, Florida, to provide a urine specimen for testing. Respondent gave the specimen by urinating in a specimen cup provided to him by Juston Day, an employee of Labcorp. Respondent delivered the cup containing his urine to Mr. Day, who read the temperature strip on the cup, sealed the cup, and had Respondent initial it and sign the chain of custody form. Mr. Day labeled Respondent's specimen with his social security number, and assigned to the specimen a unique specimen number, in this case number 0758562291, which would not be used for any other specimen. The chain-of-custody form was then signed and dated by Mr. Day. The container with Respondent's urine specimen was sealed with a label that prevented the specimen from being opened without breaking the seal. Mr. Day packaged Respondent's urine specimen in a bag which was also sealed and labeled. Mr. Day put the bag with Respondent's urine sample in an area for pick up by Labcorp courier. The specimen was transported to a Labcorp facility in Southaven, Mississippi. The specimen was assigned a unique laboratory accession number, which was the same as the accession number used when the sample was drawn. The urine sample supplied by Respondent was received by and analyzed by Labcorp, and the report generated is for the sample provided by Respondent. Labcorp maintained the required chain-of-custody procedures in handling Respondent's specimen. The package received by Labcorp was unsealed by laboratory personnel qualified to receive it and the specimen was subjected to screening and confirmatory analysis for evidence of the presence of controlled substances in the urine. The initial test performed by Labcorp is an immunoassay test used to screen all samples. Any sample that is a presumptive positive by that screening method is then tested by a confirmatory method, i.e., gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. Respondent's urine sample tested presumptive positive for marijuana metabolite, and the confirmatory test results were consistent with those obtained for the screening test. The final report for marijuana metabolite was reported at a concentration of 48 nanograms per milliliter. The cutoff for a positive result for marijuana metabolites in the immunoassay screening test is 50 nanograms per milliliter. The cutoff for the confirmatory test is 15 nanograms per milliliter. The urine specimen also indicated the existence of other drugs of Respondent's system. However, those results were consistent with therapeutic levels, as opposed to abusive levels, and were below the relevant cutoff for those substances. The test results were reviewed by Dr. Neil Dash, M.D., the Medical Review Officer for Doctors Review Service. A physician in Dr. Dash's office then called Respondent with the results and asked him if there was any substance he was taking that could contribute to a positive result. He reported no such substance. Dr. Dash then reported the ultimate results of the testing to the Department of Corrections. Respondent claims that when he was given the cup for collection of the urine specimen, it was already open, and that contamination of the container must be the basis for the positive test. However, the Chain of Custody Form that Respondent signed states in part: I authorize the collection of this specimen for the purpose of a drug screen. I acknowledge that the specimen container(s) was/were sealed with tamper-proof seals in my presence and that the information provided on this form and the labels affixed to the specimen container is correct. I authorize the laboratory to release the results of the test to the company identified on this form or its designated agents. Respondent testified at hearing that he had been tested many times before, but had never been given an open container before. However, he did not indicate that he questioned the testing procedure at the time, nor was there any evidence that he reported any perceived irregularity to Dr. Dash or any of his staff. His testimony in this regard is not credited.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent in violation of section 943.1395(7), as defined in Florida Administrative Law Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d). It is further recommended that Respondent's certification as a corrections officer be suspended for a period of 90 days, followed by probation for a period of two years. As condition of probation, it is recommended that the Commission require random drug testing and substance abuse counseling, as contemplated by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.005(7)(c). DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Linton B. Eason, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 lintoneason@fdle.state.fl.us Anthony Wayne Hatcher Jennifer Cook Pritt, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issues in this bid protest are whether, in making a preliminary decision to award a contract for drug screening services, Respondent acted contrary to a governing statute, rule, policy, or project specification; and, if so, whether such misstep(s) was/were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Request for Proposals On March 14, 2001, the Board authorized the issuance of a request for proposals to solicit offers on a contract for drug screening services. Soon, Request for Proposals No. 149-AA10 (the “RFP”) was issued. The purpose of the RFP, as stated on the first page thereof, was [t]o obtain the services of an organization to conduct applicant and employee specimen collection and drug screening services both to meet the general requirements for collection and drug screening services; and the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA) requirements for collection and drug screening services. These professional services are described in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide (Attachment A). The deadline for submission of proposals in response to the RFP was April 10, 2001. Page 3 of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide (the “Guide”) explained that applicants and employees are tested in the following circumstances: (1) upon application for full-time employment; (2) when "reasonable suspicion"1 exists to believe that an employee has impermissibly used drugs or alcohol; (3) as part of routine "fitness for duty" medical examinations2; and (4) as a "follow up" to an employee's completion of a drug rehabilitation program. Because the District employs persons performing safety- sensitive functions and persons who hold commercial driver licenses, the District must comply with a federal law known as the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (“OTETA”). Employees covered by OTETA are subject to pre-employment testing, post-accident testing, random testing, reasonable suspicion testing, "return-to-duty" testing (after a positive test), follow-up testing, and annual testing. Guide, pp. 10-14. Unlike other employees, persons falling under OTETA are not subject to blood alcohol screening. Guide, p. 22. The type of drug test that the District most frequently requests involves urinalysis. For alcohol testing, breath analysis is the normal practice. Blood alcohol testing is used infrequently. The RFP did not explicitly disclose the District’s relative demand for these various types of tests. Section V of the RFP prescribed the technical requirements with which proposers needed to comply. Subsection C thereof stated, in pertinent part: The collection site is a place where individuals present themselves for the purpose of providing urine or blood specimens to be analyzed for the presence of drugs or alcohol. Page 15 of the Guide added that "[c]ollection sites shall have all of the necessary personnel, materials, equipment, facilities, and supervision to provide for the collection, security, temporary storage, and shipping or transportation of urine specimens to a certified drug testing laboratory." Section V, subsection K set forth four “location parameters [as] examples of locations which shall comprise the areas for collection and drug screening to insure [sic] convenience for applicants and employees.” These “location parameters” essentially divided the Miami-Dade County service area into quadrants. Section V, subsection L, provided in relevant part: “Mobile collection of specimens will be required at some of the Regional Transportation Centers[.]” The Guide, at page 15, further mandated that "[m]obile collection sites" be equipped and staffed "the same as" other collection sites. Section V, subsection M stated, in part: “A collection site is preferred in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33132, for the convenience of any potential employees who wish to provide specimen collection concurrent with a scheduled interview by the Office of Human Resources.” Section V, subsection N, stated: At least one site in the North end and [sic] of Miami-Dade County and one site in the South end of Miami-Dade County must be available to perform reasonable suspicion testing of employees. The hours of operation of these facilities must be from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight. Section VI of the RFP, which addressed the cost of proposed services, instructed that [p]roposals must include an itemization of charges for collection of specimens, initial and confirmatory tests. Such itemized charges will be used in the event a retest is necessary. Retests required as a result of defective equipment, incorrect analysis, or misinterpretation shall be done at the expense of the provider. Section VIII provided that proposals would be “evaluated by [a] selection committee . . . comprised of representatives of the school district, in order to ascertain which proposal best meets the needs of the School Board.” The selection committee (hereafter, “committee”) was to be composed of one administrator each from five separate offices, which were designated in section VIII. Section VIII also established the evaluation criteria to be used by the committee, stating: Evaluation considerations will include, but not be limited to, the following: Responsiveness of the proposal clearly stating an understanding of the work to be performed meeting all the technical guidelines in [the Guide]. Cost may not be the dominant factor, but will have some significance. It will be a particularly important factor when all other evaluation criteria are relatively equal. Documentation of current certification by DHHS; qualifications of laboratory staff members; past experience and record of performance; verification of references. Location of the laboratory and planned method of pick-up from designated collection sites and transportation of specimens according to chain of custody protocol to the drug testing laboratory; turnaround time relative to volume of expected need; accessibility relative to volume of expected need. Primary emphasis in the selection process will be placed on the independence, background, experience, and service of staff to be assigned to the project. Expertise in the areas addressed in the RFP, and the ability to respond in a timely, accurate manner to the district’s requirements is essential. Vendor must have a specific comprehensive plan in place to delineate OTETA collection/testing from general collection/testing. The School District reserves the right to reject any and all proposals submitted and to waive irregularities. . . . . Relevant Details About the Proposals Two proposers, Global and RN, submitted timely responses to the RFP. The following is a look at certain terms in their respective proposals. Global’s Proposal Global was the incumbent provider pursuant to a contract that had been entered into on June 11, 1997. Even before the establishment of the expiring contractual relationship, from 1995 forward, Global had provided general drug testing services for the District. In addition to that, Global had performed fingerprint analyses for the District prior to 1995. Thus, Global had a history with the District. In a Fee Schedule included at page VIII-1 of its proposal, Global quoted the following prices for services: Federal Drug Testing for OTETA covered employees $30.00 * * * Breath Alcohol Testing $25.00 After hour Services Flat fee per donor/employee . $75.00 plus regular testing fee Monday — Friday: 5:00 p.m. — 8:30 a.m. Saturday and Sunday All Day Florida Drug Free Work Place for general employee drug testing $25.00 * * * At page V-1 of its proposal, Global listed ten collection facilities, providing their addresses and hours of operation. According to the proposal, only one of these facilities stays open until midnight. Five of them close each weekday at 4:00 p.m., and four at 5:00 p.m. None is open on weekends. Global offered collection sites in each of the quadrants specified in subsection V.K. of the RFP. It offered a site in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, as recommended in subsection V.M. And Global offered at least one site each in the north and south ends of Miami-Dade County, satisfying the geographic requirements of subsection V.N. Global’s south-end site, however, closes at 5:00 p.m. and thus fails to satisfy the requirement, also prescribed in subsection V.N., that such facility remain open until midnight. In addition to these stationary facilities, Global offered the services of a mobile unit. Its proposal stated: ON-SITE COLLECTION After Hours Emergency24 hours Operating hours: Monday — Sunday Via Mobile Unit Global described its mobile unit, at page V-2, as a “self contained air conditioned motor coach equipped with 2 bathrooms, blood drawing chair, urine collection equipment, computerized breach alcohol analyzer with ample facilities for a physician to conduct physical exams on DOT (OTETA) employees and yearly re- certification.” Global, in fact, has three of these mobile units. The vans are available for use by all of Global’s clients. Two vehicles are maintained in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, and thus are in position to respond to service calls for the District. The third van is maintained in western Palm Beach County. Because after-hours tests generally are needed in post-accident and reasonable suspicion circumstances, which require a rapid response (within two hours of the incident), the Palm Beach County-based van would not, as a practical matter, likely be deployed for the District. Global does not maintain a mobile unit in Miami-Dade County. B. RN’s Proposal Included in RN’s proposal was the following schedule of costs: RN Expertise charges $27.80 for a 5 panel NIDA drug screen. This charge includes an adulterant panel, 5 panel drug screen, collection of the specimen, transportation charges and MRO charges. There will not be a charge for confirmation tests. RN Expertise charges $26.00 for an 8 panel drug screen. This charge will include an adulterant panel, 8 panel drug screen, collection of the specimen, transportation charges and MRO charges. If the School Board does not elect to have an adulterant panel performed on general tests the charge will be $25.00. RN Expertise charges $25.00 for a breath alcohol test. This also includes on- site testing charges. There will not be a charge for confirmation tests. RN Expertise will charge $30.00 for a blood alcohol test. RN Expertise will submit monthly invoices. These invoices will be submitted to the Office of Operation and Records and/or the Office of Professional Standards (OTETA) through a purchase order. The invoices shall reflect service provided to the Board in the prior month. Regarding collection sites and locations, RN’s proposal stated, at pages 12 through 13: Quest Diagnostics [the laboratory that RN proposed to use] has 14 collection sites in the Miami-Dade County area. Please see Appendix B for all maps of locations and zip code map with all locations that have been highlighted for your convenience. RN Expertise, Inc. will provide all on- site drug screen collections and breath alcohol tests. We have numerous certified collectors and breath alcohol technicians throughout the state who specialize in on site testing. All collectors and BATS have been certified by Christine Steele. Please see Appendix C. for certificates of RN Expertise, Inc. and insurance and licenses. Three Quest patient care centers are located very close to the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, 33232. The hours of operation are 7:00 am to 4:30 pm. RN Expertise has arranged three third party sites in the North end of Miami-Dade county and one site in the south end of Miami-Dade County that are available to perform reasonable suspicion and post- accident testing. The hours of operation are from 8:00 am to 12:00 midnight. These addresses are: Workers Compensation Medical Center 17601 N.W. 2nd Avenue Ste S Miami, Florida 33169 Workers Compensation Medical Center 6504 N.W. 77th Court Miami, Florida 33166 Homestead Hospital 160 NW 13th Street Homestead, FL 33030 If these sites are not convenient we can arrange additional sites or provide these tests on an on-site basis. RN offered collection sites in each of the quadrants specified in subsection V.K. of the RFP. It offered sites in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, as recommended in subsection V.M. And RN offered at least two sites in the north end of Miami-Dade County and one in the south, all three of which were open from 8:00 a.m. until midnight, thereby satisfying both the geographic and hours of operation requirements of subsection V.N. The Evaluation Committee(s), Mr. Bevan’s Comparison Chart, and the Evaluations A. The Original Committee To evaluate the proposals, a five-person committee was appointed in accordance with the RFP. Its members were Nelson E. Diaz, Deputy Superintendent, Personnel Management and Services; Gwendolyn Jennings Kidney, Assistant Superintendent, Employee Support Programs; Jose Montes de Oca, Assistant Chief Auditor, Management and Compliance Audits; Michael Fox, Risk Analyst, Risk and Benefits Management; and Patricia Freeman, Director, Business Development and Assistance. This committee arranged to meet for the first time on April 11, 2001. Notice of the meeting was not published in advance; the committee would convene in private. The following staff persons were asked to be present at the April 11 meeting to provide technical expertise, if needed: Vera Hirsh, Administrative Director, Personnel; William Bevan, Executive Director, Personnel Operations and Records; Frederic F. Conde, Executive Director, Office of Professional Standards; and Barbara Jones, Director, Procurement. B. Mr. Bevan’s Comparison Chart Before the April 11, 2001, meeting, Ms. Hirsh asked Mr. Bevan, as a technical advisor to the committee, to prepare a comparison of the two proposals. At the time, Mr. Bevan was most knowledgeable about the District’s procedures for drug testing, because he had been directly involved in the general drug testing program. Also, through his work experiences, Mr. Bevan had acquired personal knowledge concerning Global. Indeed, Global had listed Mr. Bevan as a reference in its proposal. Mr. Bevan prepared a comparison chart that was distributed to all the members of the committee. The following table contains the substance of Mr. Bevan's comparison chart:3 Item No. GLOBAL RN EXPERTISE 1 TURNAROUND TIME IS NEXT BUSINESS DAY 5 DAYS ON POSITIVE 24 HOURS FOR NEGATIVES 48 HOURS FOR POSITIVES 2 LOCATION IS FORT LAUDERDALE ALTAMONTE SPRINGS 3 PLAN TO DELINEATE OTETA FROM GENERAL GOOD PLAN PLUS ICON BASED DRUG TEST FORM VERY WEAK PLAN VERY WEAK ANALYSIS 4 COST $30.00 DOT BLIND SAMPLES ARE INCLUDED COST $27.80 NO MENTION OF BLIND SAMPLES 5 POLICE $25.00 ALL ALCOHOL TESTS BOTH BREATH & BLOOD ARE $25.00 $26.00 8 PANEL TEST BREATH ALCOHOL $25.00 BLOOD ALCOHOL $30.00 6 COLLECTION SITES 10 TOTAL SITES 14 TOTAL SITES LESS 4 IN BROWARD, 6 FOR BLOOD DRAW ONLY = 4 NET SITES 7 MOBILE COLLECTION DONE BY MOBILE VAN "WILL PROVIDE ON-SITE COLLECTION" 8 EXPERIENCE 4 YEARS WITH M-DCPS NO SUCCESSFUL LEGITATION [sic] AGAINST M-DCPS US SUGAR ? 9 LABORATORY LAB CORP OF AMERICA LATE IN REPORTING RESULTS ONE TIME IN FOUR YEARS QUEST LABORATORIES QUESTIONABLE 10 ADULTERANT TESTING IS PERFORMED BY LAB CORP AT A STANDARD COURSE OF PROTOCOL WITH NO CHARGE FOR THIS PROCEDURE TESTSURE IS BROKEN OUT AS A SEPARATE ENTITY Because of his personal knowledge of and experience with the drug screening program, Mr. Bevan's opinions carried great weight with the committee members. As will become clear, moreover, Mr. Bevan operated as a de facto evaluator. Thus, for good reasons, his comparison chart drew RN’s close and critical attention. It will be examined in detail below. Item No. 1. This item is helpful as a contrast to the others, for here Mr. Bevan did exactly what a technical advisor should do: provide a concise, accurate, and objective summary of details contained in the proposals without making a subjective judgment as to which proposal is superior. Item No. 2. As Mr. Bevan admitted at hearing, the RFP did not include, as an evaluation criterion, the location of a proposer's base of operations. Testifying, he explained that, "in [his] mind, [a proposer's location] was not something that was in the RFP, but it was important to me." Hearing Transcript (“T.”) 59. Of course, it was not Mr. Bevan's place to make subjective judgments about what was valuable in the proposals—— that was for the evaluators. Further, even the evaluators could not properly take into account undisclosed evaluation criteria. Thus, this comparison was irrelevant and consideration thereof was contrary to the RFP and contrary to competition. Item No. 3. This comparison pertained to the evaluation criterion specified in section VIII, subsection F, which provided: Vendor must have a specific comprehensive plan in place to delineate OTETA collection/testing from general collecting/testing. Mr. Bevan dubbed RN's proposal "very weak" and Global's "good" primarily because Global's prototype OTETA form had a transparent drawing of a school bus superimposed over the writing, and its sample form for use by school police officers had a simple, freehand outline of an officer drawn on its face, whereas RN's forms did not have such "icons." Mr. Bevan believed that the pictures of the school bus and police officer would prevent the less intelligent applicants and employees from using the wrong form.4 Although reasonable people might disagree with Mr. Bevan's analysis of the respective merits of the proposals on this criterion, his conclusion was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The problem, however, is that Mr. Bevan was not a member of the committee, and his qualitative judgment went well beyond an even-handed explanation of a technical term or process, or an objective summary of the proposals' details. In other words, as this item clearly shows, Mr. Bevan assumed the role of evaluator. Item No. 4. Mr. Bevan's comparison of "blind sample testing" is interesting because the purpose of focusing on this discrete point, among all others relating to the proposers' price quotes for OTETA testing, seems to have been to blunt the advantage that RN otherwise would enjoy for having offered the lower price. (The comparison effectively says, RN's OTETA test is cheaper, yes, but Global adds value by performing blind samples, whereas RN may not provide this service.) Mr. Bevan could have written, however, with equal accuracy, that RN's price for OTETA testing "includes an adulterant panel" while Global's proposal makes "no mention of adulterant panels," which would have made RN's price quote appear even more attractive as against Global's. RN, however, did not complain about this aspect of Mr. Bevan's analysis; consequently, the undersigned has paid little attention to, and based no ultimate factual determinations or legal conclusions on, this item. Item No. 5. According to the Guide, at page 21, school police officers are required to be tested for eight drugs or classes of drugs. This is called an "8 panel" test or screen. Other employees, in contrast, need only be tested for five drugs or drug classes, using a "5 panel" screen. In his comparison, Mr. Bevan balanced Global's supposed price of $25.00 for police tests against RN's quote of $26.00 for an 8 panel drug screen. Yet, in its Fee Schedule, Global did not specify a separate charge for police tests, 8 panel tests, or 5 panel tests.5 Rather, Global quoted a price of $25.00 for "general employee drug testing." Based on his previous experience with Global, however, Mr. Bevan assumed that Global's charge for police tests would be $25.00, the same as the cost of testing other non-OTETA employees. Mr. Bevan's assumption was dubious at best, even assuming that Global previously had been charging $25.00 for police tests.6 At worst, if Global's historical pricing were ignored (as it should have been, being a fact extrinsic to Global's proposal), Mr. Bevan's assumption was bereft of factual or logical support; it was simply arbitrary. At a minimum, though, Mr. Bevan should have stated, on the comparison chart he provided to the committee, that he was making an assumption in Global’s favor. Without such a qualification, the chart——which purported to compare "apples to apples"——unfairly depicted RN's as unequivocally the costlier proposal on this item, for RN was shown truthfully to have quoted $26.00 for an 8 panel test. Moreover, significantly, Mr. Bevan omitted the fact that RN also had offered a price of $25.00 for an 8 panel screen without an adulterant panel. Thus, not only had Mr. Bevan potentially compared "apples to oranges," he had compounded the problem by making RN's quote for police testing appear higher than it necessarily would need to be. Making the matter worse still, Mr. Bevan represented that Global's price for blood alcohol testing was $25.00 versus $30.00 for the same procedure with RN. Global, however, had not offered to perform blood alcohol tests for $25.00 apiece; it had not quoted any price for such testing. Mr. Bevan assumed that Global's price would be $25.00 based on his past experience with the company. The validity of Mr. Bevan's assumption, again, is questionable;7 at the very least, his assumption should have been disclosed to the committee on the comparison chart. As drafted, without disclosure of Mr. Bevan's Global-friendly assumption, the comparison chart was grossly inequitable to RN, creating the possibly false impression that RN's price for blood alcohol testing was 20% higher than Global's. Finally, in comparing the cost proposals, Mr. Bevan failed to note that Global had quoted a hefty $75.00 surcharge for all "after hour services," meaning tests performed on weekdays between 5:00 p.m. and 8:30 a.m., and anytime on Saturday or Sunday. RN, in contrast, did not similarly propose a 400% price increase for after-hours work, and thus would have been favored by the comparison Mr. Bevan chose not to make. Item No. 6. The issue of collection sites would become crucial. Mr. Bevan's ultimate opinion——that RN had proposed "4 net sites" as against the "10 total sites" offered by Global——was highly subjective and clearly erroneous. To begin, RN's proposal in fact described a total of 17 collection sites——not 14 as Mr. Bevan incorrectly represented. At pages 12 and 13 of its proposal, RN responded sequentially to RFP section V, subsections K (collection sites desired in four quadrants of Miami-Dade County), L (mobile collection required at some Regional Transportation Centers), M (preference for a site near 1500 Biscayne Boulevard), and N (requiring at least one site each in the north and south ends of Miami-Dade County). In response to subsection K, RN proposed to use 14 Quest patient care centers, the locations of which were further described in maps attached to RN's proposal as Appendix B. Three of the 14 Quest centers were represented to meet the preference expressed in subsection M. And RN offered three additional "third party sites" (plainly meaning, in context, sites that were not operated by Quest) to satisfy subsection N. There was and is nothing confusing about RN's response regarding collection sites. No reasonable, fair-minded person, upon reading pages 12 and 13 of RN's proposal, could reasonably conclude that RN was offering a total of only 14 collection sites. Next, four of the Quest sites proposed by RN are located in Broward County. Mr. Bevan decided that these Broward sites should be ignored. The RFP, however, did not prohibit a proposer from offering sites outside Miami-Dade County, and, significantly, RN's proposal satisfied the RFP's technical requirements concerning collection site locations without the Broward sites. Thus, an evaluator (as opposed to Mr. Bevan, who was not one) might have regarded RN's Broward sites either an added value that made RN's proposal more attractive or an unwanted option that neither added to, nor detracted from, RN's proposal. Either way, however, this qualitative decision was not properly Mr. Bevan's to make as a “technical advisor.” Mr. Bevan then subtracted six sites from RN's total because the proposal stated that the sites were available for blood draws only. (In fact, RN's proposal indicated that nine of RN's 17 total sites collected blood samples only; three of the nine are in Broward County and six in Miami-Dade.) Mr. Bevan's decision that "blood only" sites should not be counted was plainly contrary to the RFP, under which blood alcohol testing clearly was a required service. While the evidence showed that the District considers urine collection sites to be much more valuable than “blood only” collection sites, which it views as practically worthless, the RFP nevertheless did not disclose this preference or the relative weight of urine sites versus “blood only” sites. Simply put, the RFP did not allow the evaluators to ignore “blood only” collection sites. At bottom, a fair and balanced comparison (unlike Mr. Bevan's) would have shown that RN had proposed 17 total sites (four in Broward, 13 in Miami-Dade), of which nine (three in Broward, six in Miami-Dade) were "blood only" sites, leaving eight sites (one in Broward, seven in Miami-Dade) that were available for the collection of both urine and blood. An "apples to apples" comparison of Miami-Dade sites available for blood and urine testing would have been Global, ten versus RN, seven. Each evaluator, however, in weighing the relative merits of the two proposals, should have considered RN's ten additional sites——there was no warrant in the RFP for excluding them from the mix à la Mr. Bevan's analysis——and made an independent determination of the value added by those sites. Item No. 7. On this point, Mr. Bevan was unfair to RN——but only a bit. His comparison intentionally drew a distinction between Global's "mobile collection" (the term used in section V.L. of the RFP) and RN's "on-site collection," subtly implying that RN’s proposal might not be responsive, or as responsive as Global’s, to the RFP’s technical guidelines. In fact, however, in its proposal at pages II-2, V-1, V-2, and VIII-1, Global expressly had described the function of its mobile unit as being to provide "on-site" collections; even Global, in other words, considered mobile collection and on-site collection to be fungible concepts. Mr. Bevan's comparison chart thus somewhat unfairly gave Global a gentle semantic boost while concomitantly giving RN a little linguistic gig.8 Standing alone, this comparison would not be noteworthy. Viewed in the light of other, unfair contrasts, however, Mr. Bevan's mobile collection/on-site collection dichotomy takes on a slight hue of partiality.9 Item No. 8. Here, Mr. Bevan made a comparison that was highly unfavorable to RN. One the one side, he portrayed Global attractively as the incumbent vendor that, during a four- year tenure, has not exposed the District to an adverse litigation outcome, and which also provides services to U.S. Sugar (an agricultural concern in South Florida). On RN's side there was only a question mark——nothing more. The meaning was obvious: Global has good credentials, but RN's experience and litigation track record are questionable. This was terribly unfair. RN's proposal included two pages of references listing a number of current clients. Mr. Bevan's explanation at hearing for failing to acknowledge any of RN's references on his comparison chart was that RN's references "were much longer" and would not fit on the page, and that he had "put down what [he] could in the amount of time [he] had." 89. This explanation utterly fails to account for Mr. Bevan's misleading and prejudicial use of a question mark to describe RN's documented experience; it is not credible and is rejected.10 Regarding exposure to lawsuits, Mr. Bevan's comparison was gratuitous. The RFP did not ask for information concerning lawsuits; and the lack of adverse litigation outcomes, while perhaps interesting and even relevant, was not an evaluation criterion. Further, Mr. Bevan was aware of Global's litigation track record not because of information contained in Global's proposal (for such data was not included therein) but because he previously had monitored litigation against the District arising from OTETA testing. Despite relying on facts extrinsic to Global's proposal for this comparison, Mr. Bevan made no attempt to determine whether RN had exposed a client to an adverse litigation outcome and hence had no idea whether RN had or had not done so. Yet, despite the absence of any basis in logic or fact for such a conclusion, the question mark in RN's column (adjacent to the favorable comment about Global) strongly implied that RN either had omitted material information about litigation or disclosed something disturbing or questionable. The unavoidable net effect of this prejudicial and unfair comparison was to put an exclamation point on the fact that Global had served satisfactorily as the incumbent vendor (and thus was a safe choice)——while portraying RN as a pig in a poke (and hence a gamble). Item No. 9. Mr. Bevan shone a flattering light on Laboratory Corporation of America ("LCA," the laboratory used by Global)——only one glitch in four years!——while labeling Quest Diagnostics ("Quest," used by RN) "questionable." This was problematic for several reasons. First, the RFP did not specify a preference for any particular laboratory. Second, Mr. Bevan's judgment was not based on the respective proposals but on his personal experiences. He had been pleased with LCA's services and preferred that the District continue to do business with that laboratory. But, as the comparison chart pointedly neglected to mention, Mr. Bevan's negative opinion of Quest was based on just one incident in which Quest had been slow in reporting the results of a retest that had been requested by an individual who had initially tested positive at LCA and requested that Quest perform the confirmatory test.11 Third, the judgment expressed on the relative merits of the proposers' laboratories was plainly qualitative; in other words, Mr. Bevan was evaluating the proposals, which was not properly his role, for he was not a de jure member of the committee. Item No. 10. Mr. Bevan's representation to the committee that LCA performed adulterant testing at no cost to the District was not based on Global's proposal, which neither mentioned adulterant testing nor quoted a price for such service, but on his experience with Global. (Incidentally, neither Mr. Bevan's testimony, nor any other evidence, persuasively established that Global or LCA had, in fact, been performing adulterant testing. Rather, the District’s employees assumed that such was the case——as it may, or may not, have been.) Aside from the impropriety of relying on facts extrinsic to Global's proposal, Mr. Bevan's contrast with RN's proposal ("TestSure is broken out as a separate entity") was both incorrect and incomplete, producing a false, "apples to oranges" comparison. First, as four pages of descriptive information included in RN's proposal made clear, TestSure is Quest's trademark for its adulterant testing protocol, which Quest considers a "breakthrough in technology for the industry." Contrary to Mr. Bevan's statement, TestSure is not a "separate entity." Thus, the apparently-intended implication that RN's price was higher because it was proposing to use a “separate entity” (in addition to Quest) for adulterant testing was untrue. Second, the information provided by RN concerning TestSure, rather than being a negative strike against RN's proposal, as Mr. Bevan's comparison suggested, was (or should have been) helpful in evaluating RN's proposal, a plus. While the committee certainly could have chosen to discount or ignore Quest's glowing review of its own product as puffery, the fact was that while Global's proposal said nothing about adulterant testing, RN had submitted some information on the subject. Finally, Mr. Bevan did not specify that his remark about Global's supposed offer to provide adulterant testing at "no charge" was merely an assumption that, for all that appears in Global's proposal, may or may not be true. This omission was especially unfair to RN because RN had stated explicitly in its cost proposal that an additional dollar would be charged for an adulterant panel——and that the District could save the dollar by electing not to have the panel performed on general tests. An impartial summary would have acknowledged RN's prices for general tests, both with and without an adulterant panel, and noted that Global's proposal was silent as to whether its quote of $25.00 for general testing included an adulterant panel. To state unqualifiedly that Global would provide adulterant testing for free, when its proposal said nothing of the sort, was patently inequitable. The First Evaluation and Recommendation After meeting for two hours on April 11, and having considered Mr. Bevan’s comparison chart, the committee voted to recommend that the contract be awarded to Global. In the minutes of the meeting, it was reported that [b]oth Proposals were evaluated according to the criteria outlined in the proposal. A comparison was made of services provided, locations for testing, cost, and other requirements. The committee recommended that Global MRO be awarded the contract. In addition to providing a reasonable fee schedule, the locations for drug testing, and the prior outstanding service provided by Global MRO, supports the committee’s decision. RN timely protested the intended award, the Board referred the matter to DOAH, and a final hearing was scheduled for July 30, 2001. Before the final hearing, however, the Board determined that the April 11, 2001, meeting might have occurred in violation of the Sunshine Law. Accordingly, the final hearing was postponed to enable the committee to reconvene in a public meeting for the purpose of reevaluating the proposals in compliance with the Sunshine Law. The Second Evaluation and Recommendation The committee met for a second time on September 4, 2001, pursuant to a prior written notice of proceedings. The September 4 meeting was open to the public. Although each of the original members of the committee was asked to return, two of them——Mr. Diaz and Ms. Freeman——were unable to attend the second meeting. In their places appeared subordinates as “representatives,” Pat Parham for Mr. Diaz and Enrique Sacasa for Ms. Freeman. Four members of this committee had no direct involvement in or experience with the drug screening services that were the subject of the contract for which proposals had been solicited. Of the five, only Ms. Kidney was knowledgeable about the program areas and service requirements for which contractual services were being sought. Once again, staff persons were present, ostensibly to answer technical questions. Mr. Bevan and Mr. Conde returned. With them this time were Barbara M. Moss, District Director, Office of Professional Standards; Brenda Miles, Executive Director, Professional and Technical Staffing; and Linda Cantin, Supervisor, Division of Procurement Management. Mr. Bevan did not distribute his comparison chart at the committee’s public meeting and made only a couple of comments there in response to questions. After conferring, the committee found both proposals to be responsive and voted unanimously to recommend that Global be awarded the contract. In the minutes of the September 4, 2001, meeting, it was reported that [t]he committee agreed that both proposals were good, and clearly stated an understanding of the work to be performed. There were concerns expressed, however, regarding [RN’s proposal] in reference to the location and convenience of collection sites. . . . . [Global] was selected because of the larger number of collection sites for urine that are available and the locations of these sites throughout various parts of the county, which would be of convenience to applicants and employees, and its experience. RN’s Protest By letter to the Board’s counsel dated September 6, 2001, RN amended its pending protest of the first recommendation to challenge the second proposed award with a newly-revised statement of grounds.12 As bases for relief, RN asserted that Global’s proposal was materially non-responsive for failure to comply with several of the RFP’s technical requirements; it also alleged that the committee’s evaluation had been flawed in several respects. Ultimate Factual Determinations Certain Ultimate findings of fact have been rendered below under the heading “Conclusions of Law.” This has been done for organizational convenience and for clarity of analysis. Accordingly, the findings announced in paragraphs 114, 120, 130, 134, 156, 159, 161-64, 167, and 169, infra, are hereby incorporated as Findings of Fact, as if fully set forth in the instant section of this Recommended Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order rescinding the proposed award to Global. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2002.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since January 30, 1989, certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida. He holds Law Enforcement Certificate Number 31895. At all times material to the instant case Respondent was employed as a sergeant by the Miami-Dade County Police Department. During his employment, Respondent was a member of the Miami-Dade County Police Department's Tactical Narcotics Team. As a team member, he came into contact with and handled controlled substances, including cocaine, in discharging his duties. Respondent's employment with the Miami-Dade County Police Department was involuntarily terminated after his urine tested positive for cocaine. The test was part of a regularly scheduled biannual physical examination he was required to undergo by the Miami- Dade County Police Department. The examination was conducted the morning of January 24, 2002, at Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami Beach, Florida. Respondent gave the urine sample that tested positive for cocaine approximately 8:00 a.m. that morning. Respondent had almost a month's advance written notice of the examination. The written notice he received listed "all the tests" he would be given during the examination. Respondent could have requested that the examination be rescheduled (by "go[ing] through [his] station"), but he did not make such a request. The urine sample that Respondent gave as part of the examination was tested and analyzed by Toxicology Testing Service, Inc. (TTS). TTS received Respondent's urine sample "intact" (in two sealed and labeled containers) the afternoon of January 24, 2002. One of the containers was then unsealed and its contents tested and analyzed. The other container was "kept frozen." TTS's initial screening of the contents of the unsealed container indicated the presumptive presence of benzoylecgonine, a metabolite produced when (and only when) cocaine is ingested and metabolized in the body. TTS then performed confirmatory testing using gas chromotography-mass spectrometry analysis. Gas chromotography-mass spectrometry analysis is an exceptionally reliable and accurate method of confirmatory testing.2 The gas chromotography-mass spectrometry analysis, which was done on February 1, 2002, confirmed the presence of benzoylecgonine in Respondent's urine specimen at the level of 575 nanograms per milliter, a result consistent with, and indicative of, Respondent's having ingested cocaine prior to the collection of his urine specimen. There was no umetabolized "parent cocaine" detected in the specimen.3 Neither did testing reveal the presence of cocaethylene (the metabolite formed in most, but not all, persons when cocaine is ingested together with alcohol) or ethyl ecgonine ester (a metabolite which is a "breakdown" product of cocaethylene). It is undisputed that, in conducting its testing and analysis, TTS followed required testing protocol designed to ensure reliable results. The results of TTS's testing and analysis were reported to the Miami-Dade County Police Department. After receiving these results, the Miami-Dade County Police Department commenced an internal affairs investigation of the matter. Lieutenant Cynthia Machanic was assigned the task of heading up the investigation. As part of the investigation, Lieutenant Machanic asked Respondent to give a sworn statement explaining "how he would [have] come to have a positive drug test." Respondent had not at any time knowingly ingested cocaine. He therefore had to resort to speculation and conjecture to provide the explanation Lieutenant Machanic sought. He did not remember having participated on the Tactical Narcotics Team, or having engaged in any other job- related activity, in which he would have come in contact with cocaine, close in time to his January 24, 2002, biannual examination. The "only logical, plausible explanation" he could come up with was that, on the evening of January 22, 2002, while attending a bachelor party for a fellow Miami-Dade County police officer at the Play Pen South, a topless nightclub, one of the dancer's at the nightclub, with whom he had gotten into an argument over payment for a "lap dance," had "put something in [his last] drink [that evening] which caused [him] to test positive for cocaine." He had not seen anyone, including any of the nightclub's dancers, "put anything in [any of his] drink[s]" that evening, but he had left his last drink unattended before consuming its contents and he felt, at the time he was questioned by Lieutenant Machanic, that it was possible that the drink could have been tampered with when out of his sight. This last drink, a 12-ouncce beer, had been his eighth of the evening. In addition to these eight beers, he had consumed four shots of scotch while at the bachelor party. Two dancers and a bartender at the Playpen South also gave statements during the investigative process. Following the completion of the internal affairs investigation Respondent's employment with the Miami-Dade County Police Department was terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated paragraph 2(G) of the December 14, 2010, Final Order of the Education Practices Commission ("EPC"), and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Commissioner of Education, is the head of the Florida Department of Education, the state agency charged with the ultimate responsibility to investigate and take disciplinary actions against persons who hold a Florida Educator's Certificate and are alleged to have violated specified statutes. The EPC is charged with imposing discipline for violations of sections 1012.795 and 1012.796, Florida Statutes. Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate Number 519374 issued by the Department. Respondent's Employment History and Disciplinary History Respondent has been employed in the State of Florida public education system for thirty-one years, twenty-seven of which she has served as a full-time teacher. During the four years in which she was not a teacher, she served as an occupational specialist and career counselor, involved in helping at-risk students find employment and providing guidance regarding academic training for specific careers. She also served as a counselor for Project Hope, a drug rehabilitation program, and as a substitute teacher. She currently is employed as a classroom teacher by Broward County Public Schools. She has received positive job performance evaluations throughout her career. On or about May 14, 2010, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent, alleging violations of specified Florida Statutes and agency rules, and seeking to impose disciplinary sanctions against Respondent's Certificate. Following an informal hearing on the Administrative Complaint conducted pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(2), the EPC entered a Final Order dated December 14, 2010, placing Respondent on two employment years of probation, subject to specified conditions. The Final Order provides in pertinent part: "2. Upon employment in any public or private position requiring a Florida educator's certificate, Respondent shall be placed on 2 employment years of probation with the conditions that during that period, she shall: . . . G. [n]ot consume, inject or ingest any controlled substance unless prescribed or administered for legitimate medical purposes." To ensure compliance with paragraph 2(G)1 of the Final Order, Respondent is required to submit to random substance abuse testing, as directed by the Recovery Network Program for Educators ("RNP") or her employer.2 Pursuant to the Final Order, Respondent submitted to random substance abuse testing on January 28, 2011. Respondent was notified by letter from the RNP dated February 7, 2011, that she was in violation of the Final Order. The letter stated in pertinent part: "you failed to comply with Paragraph 2(G) of the Final Order, to wit: You consumed, ingested, or injected a controlled substance that was not prescribed by a doctor as evidenced by your drug test on January 28, 2011, that was positive for Cocaine Metabolite." On February 17, 2011, the EPC issued a Notice to Show Cause, requiring Respondent to show cause why a penalty for violating the Final Order should not be imposed. A hearing on the Notice to Show Cause was convened before the EPC on April 8, 2011. At the hearing, Respondent claimed that she had not consumed, injected, or ingested a controlled substance not prescribed or administered for legitimate medical purposes. Respondent's Random Drug Test of January 28, 2011 On January 28, 2011, Respondent reported to Occupational Medicine Centers of America ("OMC"), in Miramar, Florida, to submit to a random drug test as required under the Final Order, paragraph 2(H). Because she had to work that day, Respondent reported to OMC in late afternoon, before 5:00 p.m. Respondent brought a chain of custody form, formally known as a Forensic Drug Testing Chain of Custody Form ("Form"), with her to OMC.3 The Form for Respondent's testing was provided by the RNP or Respondent's employer.4 The Form is multi-layered, with the pages (or "layers") designated for specific recipients ——i.e., the collection laboratory, the testing laboratory, the employer, the medical review officer ("MRO"),5 and the donor. The Form lists "8543245" as the "Specimen ID No." for Respondent's random drug test conducted on January 28, 2011. Because Respondent's employer or the RNP provided the Form for her drug testing, OMC could not, and did not, generate a chain of custody form that could be used in collecting Respondent's specimen. The Form is to be filled out by the person collecting the specimen in accordance with the specific steps set forth on the Form. Step 1 lists the employer's name, address, and identification number, and the MRO's name, address, phone number, and facsimile number. Step 1 requires the specimen collector to fill in the donor's name and social security number or employee identification number; verify the donor's identity; identify the reason for the drug test; identify the type of test to be performed; and provide the collection site name, address, phone number, facsimile number, and collection side code. Step 2 is completed by the collector once the donor has provided the specimen. The collector identifies the type of specimen provided (i.e., split, single, or none provided) on the Form, reads the temperature of the specimen within four minutes of collection, and verifies on the Form whether the temperature is between 90 and 100º Fahrenheit. Step 3 requires the collector to pour the specimen into a bottle, seal the bottle with a tamper-evident label or seal, have the donor initial the seal, and place the specimen bottle in a laboratory bag along with the testing laboratory's copy of the Form. Step 4 requires the collector to certify that "the specimen given to me by the donor identified in the certification section on Copy 2 of this form was collected, labeled, sealed, and released to the Delivery System noted in accordance with applicable requirements." To complete Step 4, the collector must sign and date the form, fill in the time that the specimen was collected, and identify the courier service to which the specimen bottle is released. After the collector completes Steps 1 through 4 of the Form, the donor completes Step 5. Step 5 requires the donor to certify that he or she provided the specimen to the collector and did not adulterate the specimen, that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper- evident seal in his or her presence, and that the information and numbers provided on the Form and label affixed to the bottle were correct. Upon arriving at OMC, Respondent was called into the portion of the facility where drug testing is conducted. She provided the Form to OMC's medical assistant, Jackie Scialabba, who was on duty at that time. Scialabba completed Step 1 of the Form, and instructed Respondent to place her belongings in a locker, wash her hands, and provide a urine specimen in the collection cup. While Respondent was in the restroom providing the specimen, Scialabba completed Step 4 of the Form. Specifically, she signed and dated the form, filled in the portion of the Form stating the "Time of Collection" as 4:25 p.m., and checked the box identifying the delivery service courier. Respondent emerged from the restroom and handed Scialabba the specimen to pour into a specimen bottle for sealing and delivery to the testing laboratory. At that time, Scialabba discovered that Respondent had not provided a specimen of sufficient quantity to be tested. Scialabba provided water to Respondent so that she would be able to produce a specimen of sufficient quantity for testing. Respondent waited in the lobby of the facility until she was able to provide another specimen. Scialabba's shift ended at 5:00 p.m. and she left for the day. By the time Respondent was able to provide another specimen, Scialabba was gone. Before she left, Scialabba informed Christin Visbal, also a medical assistant at OMC,6 that Respondent's drug test was incomplete and that Visbal needed to complete the test. Scialabba left the partially completed Form with Visbal. Scialabba testified that Respondent did not complete Step 5 of the Form in her presence. Once Respondent indicated she was able to provide another specimen, Visbal called Respondent back into the testing facility. Both Visbal and Respondent stated that they were the only people present in the testing facility at that time.7 Visbal had Respondent her wash her hands, gave her the specimen collection cup, and instructed her regarding providing the specimen. At that time, Respondent provided a urine specimen of sufficient quantity to meet the testing requirements. Visbal checked the temperature of the specimen as required on Step 2 of the Form, and completed the portion of Step 2 requiring verification that the specimen temperature was between 90 and 100º Fahrenheit.8 Visbal poured the urine into a specimen bottle, sealed the bottle with a tamper-evident seal, and had Respondent initial the seal. Respondent then completed Step 5 of the Form, which constituted her certification that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper-evident seal in her presence.9 Visbal placed the sealed urine specimen and the testing laboratory's copy of the Form in a bag, and sealed the bag. Visbal provided Respondent with the donor copy of the Form. Respondent collected her belongings from the locker and left the facility. Because Scialabba had prematurely completed Step 4 of the Form while attempting to collect Respondent's specimen before she left work for the day, Visbal was unable to complete Step 4. However, Visbal provided a sworn statement and testified at hearing regarding the substance of the certification in Step 4——specifically, that the urine specimen given to her by Respondent was collected, labeled, sealed, and released to the delivery service10 in accordance with applicable requirements. The evidence establishes, and the undersigned determines, that Visbal correctly followed the established protocol in collecting, labeling, sealing, and releasing the specimen to the courier in accordance with the applicable chain of custody requirements. Accordingly, the chain of custody for Respondent's urine specimen was maintained. Scialabba's paperwork error did not compromise the chain of custody for Respondent's urine specimen. On February 7, 2011, FirstLab provided a document titled "Participant Call Test Edit" to the RNP, showing a positive test result for cocaine metabolite. The document bears "Specimen ID No. 8543245"——the same specimen identification number as was listed on the Form that Respondent brought to OMC on January 28, 2011, for use in her drug test that day. Respondent does not dispute that the tested specimen yielded a positive test result for cocaine metabolite. She maintains that she did not produce the tested specimen. Respondent's Subsequent Random Drug Test Results Since January 28, 2011, Respondent has been randomly tested for drug use each month. Respondent's drug test results have been negative every time that she has been tested since the January 28, 2011 test——nine times as of the hearing date. Respondent served a subpoena duces tecum on FirstLab in August 2011, seeking to obtain all documents related to Respondent's random drug test results, including the negative test results. The subpoena provided the correct spelling of Respondent's full name but did not list her social security number, employee identification number, date of birth, address, or school system by which she is employed. Instead of producing Respondent's test results, FirstLab produced test results for another teacher having a similar name who is employed by Miami- Dade County Public Schools.11 Ultimate Facts Regarding Alleged Violation and Penalty For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned determines that the chain of custody for Respondent's urine specimen was maintained. The evidence does not support an inference that Respondent's specimen was tampered with, tainted, or otherwise compromised in the collection, sealing, labeling, or delivery process. Therefore, either Respondent had cocaine metabolite in her system when she donated the urine specimen on January 28, 2011, or the testing laboratory or MRO made a mistake in testing or reporting the test results of her urine specimen. Respondent maintains it is the latter, but did not present any persuasive evidence to support her position. To that point, FirstLab's error in producing the wrong person's records in response to Respondent's subpoena does not provide a sufficient basis to infer that in this case, FirstLab reported another person's drug test result instead of Respondent's. It shows only that FirstLab makes mistakes when not provided sufficiently specific information about the person whose records are being subpoenaed. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent, in violation of paragraph 2(G) of the Final Order, consumed, injected, or ingested a controlled substance not prescribed or administered for a legitimate medical purpose, as revealed by the random drug test to which Respondent submitted on January 28, 2011. However, there is no evidence in the record showing that Respondent's violation of the Final Order presented any danger, or caused physical or mental harm to any students or to the public. Nor is there any evidence that the violation caused any actual damage, physical or otherwise, or that Respondent benefited from the violation. To the contrary, the sole evidence shows that Respondent is a good teacher who has performed well as a public school employee for thirty-one years. There is no evidence that the violation has in any way impaired her performance of her duties as a classroom teacher. Moreover, the sole evidence regarding Respondent's subsequent random drug test results shows that Respondent is now complying with the Final Order, and apparently has complied ever since her January 28, 2011, test. This evidences Respondent's contrition and her recognition of the seriousness of this matter. At hearing, Petitioner elicited testimony from Respondent regarding her criminal history, and an excerpt of the transcript of the EPC hearing, during which her criminal history was discussed, was admitted into evidence.12 However, her criminal history and alleged failure to report that history were the basis for the EPC's Final Order imposing penalties against Respondent, including the probation that she now is charged with violating. Respondent already has been penalized by the EPC on these bases, and they are not relevant to this proceeding. As justification for the penalty it seeks, Petitioner asserts that Respondent "never accepts responsibility for her own behavior, but blames others for her miscreant deeds." However, the evidence does not support this position. With respect to the hearing before the EPC that resulted in issuance of the Final Order, Respondent offered a plausible explanation for not having previously reported her criminal history on her Florida Educator's Certificate applications——specifically, that when she filled out the previous certification application forms, she did not realize that the form required the reporting of all prior criminal history, including offenses for which adjudication had been withheld. Indeed, when she filled out an updated version of the application form that apparently was clearer regarding criminal history disclosure requirements, she reported all prior offenses.13 Respondent acknowledged responsibility for her actions more than once during the EPC hearing. Moreover, the undersigned finds credible Respondent's testimony that she understood she was to be drug tested on a monthly basis as a condition of her probation.14 To the extent Respondent may have been incorrect regarding this detail, that mistake is more likely attributable to confusion (which is understandable under the circumstances) rather than lack of truthfulness on her part.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a Final Order determining that Respondent violated the December 14, 2011, Final Order of the Education Practices Commission, and suspending Respondent's Florida Educator's Certificate for a period of six consecutive calendar months, followed by two years of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 2011.
