The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of any violations of the Insurance Code, including Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed as a general lines insurance agent, holding license number A129688. At all material times, Respondent has been the sole owner and director of America Security Insurance Agency, Inc., formerly known as America Auto Security Insurance Agency, Inc. (America Security). On April 1, 2000, Dionne Jacques purchased a motor vehicle from Sawgrass Ford in Fort Lauderdale. She did not own a vehicle at the time and testified that she purchased a model that was selected for her by someone at the dealership. In closing on the purchase, Ms. Jacques dealt extensively with a dealer employee named Herbert McKenzie. Ms. Jacques financed the motor vehicle purchase with Ford Credit. In the course of completing the required paperwork at the dealership, Mr. McKenzie referred Ms. Jacques to American Security for motor vehicle insurance. Mr. McKenzie mentioned that he dealt with someone named "AJ" at the insurance agency. According to Ms. Jacques, Mr. McKenzie informed Ms. Jacques that one year's insurance would cost $468 or $468.99. Mr. McKenzie did not testify, but Respondent testified that he spoke with Ms. Jacques on the telephone and explained the relevant features of the policies that were available to her. Although it is unclear who quoted the premium to Ms. Jacques, Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. McKenzie did so. Ms. Jacques agreed to purchase the insurance and produced a credit card for the amount due. The testimony of Ms. Jacques suggests that she allowed Mr. McKenzie to charge her credit card for the insurance premium. However, the more definitive testimony of Respondent, which is credited, is that he took her credit card information over the telephone and arranged for the card debit. In return, according to Ms. Jacques, Mr. McKenzie gave her a document that she believed would document her coverage until she received an insurance policy in the mail in about 30 days. It is impossible to determine on this record that Mr. McKenzie attempted to bind coverage on behalf of the insurer. At no time prior to the purchase of the insurance did Respondent, Mr. McKenzie, or anyone else disclose to Ms. Jacques that she was purchasing other ancillary products besides insurance. Likewise, no one informed her that she was financing part of the annual insurance premium. For unclear reasons, Respondent did not obtain insurance coverage for Ms. Jacques until May 2000. At that time, he took the $468 that she had charged and, without her knowledge, applied only $143 of this sum toward the policy premium. Without Ms. Jacques' knowledge, Respondent, or someone at his direction, signed Ms. Jacques' name to a premium finance agreement, evidencing an unpaid premium balance of $504. At the same time, also without Ms. Jacques' knowledge, Respondent used $300 of the initial $468 that Ms. Jacques paid to purchase ancillary coverage that she had not agreed to purchase. This ancillary coverage included towing, supplemental medical coverage, replacement rental car, and emergency cash. These coverages supplemented a $647 personal injury protection policy containing no personal liability or uninsured motorist coverage. At no time has American Security designated a primary agent. By Immediate Final Order entered March 12, 1991, the Florida Department of Insurance, now known as Petitioner, ordered Respondent to cease and desist from the unlicensed sale of insurance. However, Respondent has made substantial restitution to Ms. Jacques, who suffered no significant financial injury as a result of Respondent's misdealings.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order suspending Respondent's license for one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Gregg S. Marr Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Charles P. Randall Charles P. Randall, P.A. Bank of America Tower, Suite 500 150 East Palmetto Park Road Boca Raton, Florida 33432-4832
Findings Of Fact Introduction At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Charles Lee Anderson, was licensed as a general lines insurance agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer. Respondent presently resides at 2291 Northwest 12th Court, Pompano Beach, Florida. He has been licensed by petitioner since 1968, and, prior to this proceeding, had no blemishes on his record. When the events herein occurred, Anderson was the president and director of Payless and Save Insurance Underwriters Corporation (Payless), an insurance agency located and doing business at 2401 Northwest 21st Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Anderson was also the general lines agent of record for the corporation. Count I In early January, 1984 Anderson was working from midnight until 8:00 a.m. as a security guard. Because of this, he hired one Mamie Baugh as an independent contractor to operate his insurance agency. Anderson authorized Baugh to sell policies and sign his name on insurance applications and other documents. Anderson would drop by his office two or three times a week to "check on (Baugh)" and "look at the paperwork." On or about January 3, 1984 Blanche Jones went to Payless to purchase an automobile insurance policy. She chose Payless because it was located just around the corner from her home in Fort Lauderdale, and was more convenient than her former insurance agent in Hallandale. Because Anderson was not present, Jones met with Baugh and discussed her insurance needs. Baugh filled out an application on behalf of Jones for automobile insurance with Industrial Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (Industrial) in Hollywood, Florida. Anderson was a licensed agent with Industrial, and authorized to act as a brokering agent for that company. Baugh signed Anderson's name on the application as brokering agent. Jones then gave Baugh a check for $456 as payment for the policy and was given a receipt. In February Jones had not received her policy or any evidence that she was insured. Her husband decided to visit the Payless office and obtain an insurance identification card in the event they had an accident. He met with Anderson who promised to give him a card. The following day, Anderson went to Jones' house and dropped off a business card. 1/ While there, Jones told Anderson she had paid for a policy but had never received anything. Anderson promised to "check into the particulars." After not hearing from Anderson for two months, Jones' husband went to Payless' office and found it closed. Jones thereafter went to her old insurance agent in Hallandale, and then to Public Insurance Agency (Public) in Hollywood. Public was the managing general agent for Industrial, the insurance company with whom Jones thought she had a policy. Public had no record of having received Jones' application or the $456 premium paid to Anderson. It also had no record of Anderson having telephoned Public on its "application telephone", a procedure that Anderson should have followed in order to have a binder issued on the policy. Consequently, Public never issued a policy insuring Jones. In late 1985 Jones was reading a copy of the Hollywood Sun Tattler, a local newspaper, and noticed an article about Anderson, who was then running for chief of police in Dania. She contacted the reporter who wrote the story who in turn contacted Anderson. Respondent telephoned Jones the next day and promised to return her money. A week later (January 10, 1986) Jones received a $456 money order from Anderson. A representative of Public established that Anderson was given a copy of an underwriting guide which contained explicit instructions on how to bind coverage and fill out applications. Among other things, the guide required that Anderson, and not his surrogate, sign all applications. Therefore, he was not authorized to allow Baugh to sign in his stead. Count II On or about December 20, 1983 Joseph V. Baxter visited Payless for the purpose of purchasing insurance coverage on various rental properties he owned. Baxter met with Anderson who prepared six "Homeowners Application for Quotation Only" with International Bankers Insurance Company (IBIC). Baxter gave Anderson a check for $818 as payment for the coverage. Anderson later endorsed the check. On January 11, 1984 Baxter returned to Payless and made application for a seventh insurance policy on another rental property. He gave Anderson a $318 check which Anderson subsequently endorsed. At that time Baxter was given a certificate of insurance indicating coverage with Great Southwest Fire Insurance Company (GSFIC). Several months later Baxter received a telephone call from a representative of the lending institution which held the mortgages on his property. Baxter then instructed Anderson to contact the institution and certify that Baxter had coverage on his properties. Anderson telephoned the institution in Baxter's presence and told the representative that Baxter was insured. Sometime later Baxter was again contacted by the mortgagee concerning his insurance coverage. Baxter attempted to visit Anderson but found Payless had closed its offices and gone out of business. Baxter then filed a complaint with petitioner. He never received insurance policies from IBIC or GSFIC. On January 10, 1986 Anderson repaid Baxter $1,136, the amount received by Anderson some two years earlier. A representative of IBIC established that Anderson never remitted the premiums or mailed the six quotation forms to the home office. It was further established that although GSFIC quoted a rate for Anderson on Baxter's seventh piece of property, it never received the follow-up application or premium. Respondent's Case Respondent blamed the Jones mishap on Baugh, who he claimed may have misplaced the application and taken the money. According to Anderson, she now lives in California and was unable to attend the hearing. However, he had no explanation for failing to follow up on Baxter's applications. Anderson said he closed his business in February, 1984 after a series of break- ins at his office, and left a note on the door giving a telephone number where he could be reached. However, he made no effort to personally contact those persons who held policies. Anderson further stated that he was unaware of the Jones and Baxter complaints until contacted by the newspaper reporter and petitioner, and then promptly repaid all monies due.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of the violations set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this order, and that his license and eligibility for licensure be REVOKED. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1986.
Findings Of Fact Introduction At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Florence Mounts Williams (Williams or respondent), was licensed as an insurance agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department or petitioner). When the events herein occurred, Williams was an officer and director of Mr. Auto Insurance of Okeechobee, Inc. (Mr. Auto), an incorporated general lines insurance agency located in Okeechobee, Florida. She was also an officer and director of Florida Insurance Agency, Inc. (FIA), an insurance agency doing business in the same city. Respondent sold insurance to the public through both businesses. Williams is charged with violating the Florida Insurance Code while dealing with nine customers during the period between 1984 and 1986. These business transactions were made either through Mr. Auto or FIA, and, with certain exceptions, generally relate to Williams accepting a premium for a policy and then failing to procure a policy for the customer, or falling to refund the premium after the customer cancelled the policy. Some of these customers eventually filed complaints with the Department, and after an investigation was conducted, the administrative complaint, as amended, was issued. That prompted this proceeding. The State of the Industry and Williams in 1984-86 Before discussing the specific charges, it is appropriate to describe the industry conditions and practices as they existed in 1984-86. These were established without contradiction by expert witness Beverly. It is within this broad framework that Williams operated when the transactions in question occurred. The expert's bottom line conclusion, after reviewing the nine customers' files, was that no impropriety had occurred. The agent-customer interface normally begins when a customer visits an insurance agent to purchase a policy. The agent will generally get a rate quotation by telephone from a managing general agent (MGA) who brokers policies on behalf of various insurance companies. An MGA may more accurately be described as a branch office of the insurance company under contract. If the rate quoted by the MGA to the agent is acceptable to a customer, the agent has the applicant complete an application and pay the quoted premium, or at least make a down payment on the same. The application and premium are then forwarded by the agent to the MGA for risk review to determine if the applicant meets underwriting requirements. At the same time, the agent will issue a binder to the customer which evidences temporary coverage until the application is accepted or rejected by the insurance company. In the event coverage is later declined, industry practice dictates that the agent obtain coverage with another company as soon as possible since the agent has the responsibility to maintain coverage on a customer. However, what constitutes a reasonable period of time to do so was not disclosed. In obtaining new coverage, the agent need not have the customer execute a new application since the validity of the original application is not affected. The customer should, however, be notified at the earliest convenient time that coverage is with a different company. In some cases, a customer may choose to finance his premium through a premium finance company. If he does, the finance company pays the entire premium to the MGA or insurer when application is made, and the customer pays the amount owed (plus a finance charge) to the finance company through installment payments over an agreed period of time. If for some reason an application is not accepted by the insurer, it is the responsibility of the MGA or insurer to so notify the premium finance company and return the money. The finance company must then refund any money paid by the insured. When the events herein occurred, it was established through expert testimony that the Florida insurance marketplace was in a "chaotic" condition and could be described as a "zoo." During this time, a small agent such as Williams might find herself doing business with as many as fifteen different MGAs, each with a different set of rules. Thus, it was common for an agent to be confused as to her binding authority with a particular MGA and whether the proper amount of coverage was obtained. Moreover, because of the chaotic marketplace, it became increasingly difficult to find companies who would write coverage on certain types of policies. It was further established that in 1984-1986 the MGAs were "overflowed with work" thereby causing delays of up to "months" for an agent to learn from an MGA if the risk had been accepted and a policy issued. Applications and checks were also lost or misplaced by the MGA and carrier during this time period. Consequently, the agent would think that coverage had been obtained, and so advise the customer, but would later learn that the application had been rejected, or the company had no record of one ever being filed. There were also lengthy delays in MGAs and insurance companies returning unearned premiums to the agent for repayment to the customers. According to industry practice, once a refund is received by an agent, checks to customers would typically be issued only once a month. In Williams' case, she made refunds on the twenty-fifth day of each month. A further prohibition on an agent is that a refund can be paid to a customer only after the agent receives the refund check from the insurance company or MGA. In other words, refunds from an agent's own funds are prohibited. As a result of this confusion, the number of occasions when an agent was cited for an error or omission (E&O) went up "astronomically." Indeed, industry statistics tell us that one in six insurance agents has a claim filed against his E&O policy for failure to provide coverage as promised. For this reason, no reasonable agent, including Williams, would do business without an E&O policy. When the policies in question were sold, Williams had approximately 4,000 active and inactive files in her office. Her office help was mainly persons with no prior training in insurance, and who only stayed on the job for a matter of weeks or months. Consequently, there was some confusion and disarray in her two offices. Even so, Williams was responsible for the conduct of her employees. At the same time, however, it was not unreasonable for Williams to assume that, due to the overload of work on the MOAs, an agent could expect no action on an application to be taken by an MGA or carrier for many months, and that applications and checks might be misplaced or lost. Count I This count involves an allegation that Williams violated nine sections of the Insurance Code in conjunction with the sale of a boat insurance policy to David and Margaret Copeland on September 19, 1984. The evidence reflects that Margaret Copeland applied for insurance on her boat with Mr. Auto on or about September 19, 1984. Copeland had previously been turned down for insurance by several other local agents. After Williams received a telephonic quote of $168 per year from an MGA, and relayed this advice to Copeland, Copeland gave a $30 check as a down payment on her policy. The remaining premium was paid by two partial payments made on October 6 and November 7, 1984, respectively. Copeland was issued a binder to evidence her insurance coverage, and a receipt for the $30 down payment. The binder indicated that Barnett Bank was the loss payee and that coverage was with "Professional." In actuality, "Professional" was Professional Underwriters Insurance Agency, Inc. (Professional), an MOA in Altamonte Springs for various insurance companies doing business in the state. According to Williams, the application and check were forwarded to Professional shortly after the application was executed. Because the boat was being financed with Barnett Bank, and the lender required evidence of insurance, Copeland instructed Mr. Auto to furnish a copy of the policy to the bank. A copy of the binder was furnished by Williams to the bank on November 19, 1984, and again on December 7, 1984. However, after Margaret Copeland did not receive a copy of a policy, she contacted Mr. Auto on several occasions to obtain a copy but was given "excuses" why one had not been issued. At this point Williams simply believed Professional was "dragging its feet" since past experience had taught her Professional typically took three to four months to forward a copy of the policy. Nonetheless, in response to Copeland's requests, Williams wrote Professional on December 3, 1984, asking that it "please check on the (Copelands') boat policy which was written 9-19-84" because the lienholder needed a copy. Professional did not respond to Williams' request. After no policy was received, Margaret Copeland contacted Professional's office in Altamonte Springs by telephone and learned no policy had been issued by that firm. The Copelands then requested Mr. Auto to cancel their policy on March 12, 1985, and demanded a full refund of their premium. After having the Copelands execute a notice of cancellation, the same was forwarded by Williams to Professional with a note reading "Karen, check this out and see what is happening," together with a copy of her previous request that Professional check on the whereabouts of the policy. Again, Professional did not respond to this inquiry. Williams then telephoned Professional and spoke to its office manager seeking advice on the amount of refund due the Copelands. She was told to make a proration. On May 19, 1985, Williams offered David Copeland a partial refund ($89) of his premium but he declined. This amount of refund was based on Williams' belief that coverage existed from September 18, 1984, when she received a quotation, until March 12, 1985, or for approximately six months, and $59 represented the remaining unearned premium. Given the climate of the industry at that time, it was reasonable for Williams to make such an assumption. After Copeland declined her offer, Williams wrote Professional seeking further assistance and stating that "Insured was in here today, wanted his refund. I tried to prorate it and give it to him." Again, Williams received no formal reply from the MGA. To date, a policy has not been produced. Williams eventually refunded the entire premium to the Copelands in February 1987. Through testimony from a Professional representative, it was established that Williams had no binding authority with Professional except on homeowners and dwelling fire policies. On all others, including the type the Copelands desired, it was necessary for the agent to first telephone Professional and receive a "telephone bind" from a Professional representative. In a letter to petitioner dated August 7, 1985, Professional acknowledged that there was "a possibility this risk may have been quoted," but it could find no record of an application having been filed or verification of coverage bound through a binder number or cashed check. It did acknowledge receiving the Copelands' request to cancel their policy in March 1985. If a binder had been authorized, it would have been recorded in a binder book with a number assigned to that binder unless the company lost the policy or otherwise inadvertently failed to record this information. The representative also confirmed that Professional routinely brokered this type of policy in 1984, and that it binds several thousand policies per year. Given this volume of work, the representative acknowledged it was possible that Williams or an employee of her firm may have been given a telephone quote for the Copeland policy, or that the application could have been misplaced. C. Count III On June 19, 1985, William C. Norton, a retired railroad conductor, went to Mr. Auto to purchase an insurance policy for two automobiles. After being quoted an annual premium of $315 by an MGA (Jergen & Roberts), Williams gave this advice to Norton who then gave her a check in that amount. Norton was given a receipt and a binder to evidence his coverage. The binder reflected Norton's application had been placed with "Foremost," which is Foremost Insurance Company (Foremost) in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Williams forwarded the application to the MGA but it was later returned unbound because of several traffic violations by Norton. She then "shopped" the application around and was able to procure a policy from Orion Insurance Company (Orion) through Standard Underwriters, an MGA, at an estimated cost of $528.70 instead of the previously quoted rate of $315 per year. It should be noted that during this period of time, Norton was covered through binders executed by Williams. After Williams paid the amount ($528.70) due the MGA, a policy number (PA-102390) was issued. However, through "neglect" Williams never billed Norton for the difference between the originally quoted premium and the $528. After Orion reviewed Norton's driving record, it increased the annual premium to $622. When Williams received a bill for $622 per year, she sent Norton a notice on October 24, 1985, requesting an additional $144. 2/ When he refused, the policy was cancelled by the company for nonpayment in February 1986. By this time, Norton had gone to another company to obtain coverage. He had also requested from Williams a copy of his policy on four or five occasions but one was never produced. Norton also demanded a full refund of his money even though he had been covered by binders and a policy from June 1985 until February 1986, and was not entitled to a refund. When Williams refused, Norton filed an action in small claims court in February 1986, and won an uncontested judgment for $315. Williams stated she did not contest the matter because of several stressful events then occurring (e.g., a divorce and an employee theft) and the expense of hiring legal counsel. Mobile Home Division of Florida (MHD) is an MGA in Fort Lauderdale that reviews applications for automobile insurance with Foremost (and others), and determines if the applicant meets Foremost's underwriting requirements. It is one of five MGAs in the State representing Foremost. A representative of MHD reviewed his firm's records, and found no evidence of having received the Norton application. However, this was not surprising since Williams had not used MHD to obtain Norton's policy. Count VI Terryl J. Wisener is a college student with numerous traffic violations on his record. Because of this, he was forced to obtain automobile insurance through the Florida Joint Underwriters Association (FJUA), a small group of companies who write policies for high risk drivers such as Wisener. Insurance agents are "assigned" to one of the companies writing policies, even though they are not a regular agent of that company. Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) happened to be a servicing carrier for FJUA in 1986, and Williams accordingly filed FJUA applications with that carrier when seeking insurance for high-risk customers. Under then existing rules, Williams could temporarily "bind" Allstate by writing a binder on a policy, but approval of the application and issuance of permanent coverage rested with Allstate. Until the application was rejected by Allstate, the driver was insured through the binder. During this same time period, it was "commonplace" for an FJUA carrier to return an application because of an "insignificant error" to avoid having to write a policy on a high-risk customer. On December 30, 1985, Wisener purchased a six-month automobile insurance policy through Williams. When the policy was due to expire on June 30, 1986, he returned seeking a renewal. Williams attempted to place the liability coverage with Allstate and the physical damage coverage through "Coastal," an MGA for Adriatic Insurance Company. She was quoted premiums of $996.70 and $814.70, respectively, for the two policies. After accepting a down payment of $552 from Wisener, she issued a binder and mailed the application to Allstate and Coastal with drafts for the entire premiums due. Because Wisener's Chevrolet Camaro was an eight-cylinder automobile, Coastal rejected the application in October 1986. Williams then attempted to replace the physical damage coverage with Allstate in November 1986. By virtue of Williams' binding authority, Wisener had coverage with Allstate until it rejected his application. The application, along with about fifty or sixty others, was eventually rejected by Allstate on February 27, 1987, because of a lack of "information." Until this occurred, Williams properly assumed that Wisener was covered and that Allstate was reviewing his application. In the meantime, and apparently without advising Williams, Wisener decided in October 1986 to purchase a policy through his parents' Allstate insurance agent in Port St. Lucie. He did so because he "believed" he had no insurance. However, he never made inquiry with Williams to confirm or deny this, or asked for a refund of his money. A representative of Allstate searched his firm's records and could find no evidence that a policy was ever written for Wisener through Williams. The company does acknowledge that it received Wisener's application and that it eventually returned the same "unbound" almost four months later. It gave no explanation for the delay. Although Wisener had not received a refund as of the time of hearing, this responsibility rests with Allstate (and not Williams) since it has never refunded to Williams the money paid by her for Wisener's policy. Count VII This count concerns a mobile home insurance policy purchased by Samuel and Mary Jo Moore in June 1985 from FIA. On June 25, 1985, Mary Jo Moore made application to renew her insurance policy on the mobile home. The policy had been in force for some ten years. Moore paid Williams $118 by check which was deposited and cashed by Williams. A check for $23 was also paid at a later date due to a premium increase. Williams issued Moore a binder evidencing coverage with Mobile Home Insurance Association (MHIA), an MGA in Gainesville, Florida. Shortly afterward, Williams learned from the MGA that the Moores' previous carrier, American Pioneer, had gone bankrupt and that there was a limited market for the Moores' application. Williams thereafter forwarded the application to another MGA, Jerger & Sons, Inc. (Jerger), in early August 1985. Temporary coverage was eventually issued by Jerger on August 23, 1985. However, the application was deemed to be incomplete because information regarding the number of spaces in the Moores' trailer park was lacking. This was not surprising since the Moores lived on private property and not in a trailer park. The application was returned to Williams with a reminder that unless the missing information was submitted to Jerger by September 6, 1985, coverage would be terminated. When no information was filed by that date, Jerger cancelled its coverage and returned the unbound policy on September 12, 1985. The Moores were not notified of this lapse in coverage. By allowing the coverage to lapse, and not notifying the Moores, Williams was negligent in her duties as an agent. After Jerger returned the application to Williams in late August 1985, Williams attempted to get the Moores to furnish photographs of the trailer site, and to sign the new application. Because both worked at jobs during business hours, Williams claimed she was unable to reach them prior to September 6, 1985. Williams continued her efforts to place the insurance and eventually filed the application with Foremost in March 1986. Although Williams concedes a lapse in coverage did occur, there is no evidence that this was an intentional or debilitate act on her part. After having the application returned twice, coverage was finally obtained for $201 in July 1986, or almost a year after the Moores first approached her concerning a renewal of their policy. This policy is effective through July 1987. Williams paid out of her own funds the difference between the original premium ($141) and the $201. In view of the original premium being applied to the 1986-87 premium, the Moores are not due a refund. On October 31, 1985, a tornado struck in the Okeechobee area causing damage to the Moores' trailer. The Moores contacted respondent who, at her own expense, had an adjuster from Vero Beach survey the damage in November. The adjuster learned no coverage was in force. The Moores then contacted respondent who, for some reason, had Jerger search for a policy. As might be expected, none was found, and Jerger would not agree to cover the loss. Williams instructed the Copelands to proceed against her E&O carrier for payment of their claim. At the time of final hearing, the claim had not yet been resolved. Count VIII On or about February 19, 1986, William A. McClellan, a retiree, purchased an automobile insurance policy from FIA. He paid $201 by check to Williams and received from her a receipt and binder evidencing coverage with "AIB" (Associated Insurance Brokers), the MGA for Balboa Insurance Company in Newport Beach, California. After the application was forwarded to AIB, it was initially returned because the agency check was drawn on insufficient funds. Thereafter, the check was made good (with no lapse in coverage) and Williams subsequently received a bill from Balboa for $247, or $46 more than she had previously quoted McClellan. When McClellan was presented the bill for an additional premium on May 1, 1986, McClellan told Williams to cancel his policy and to refund the unearned premium. She relayed this request to AIB and coverage was cancelled effective June 13, 1986. Thereafter, McClellan visited Williams' office at least seven or eight times seeking his refund, but was always told it was still being processed. This was a correct representation by Williams since AIB was less than diligent in processing a refund check. McClellan also filed a complaint with petitioner. Upon inquiry by petitioner, Williams advised the Department that McClellan would be paid as soon as AIB issued her a check. On or about July 29, 1986, AIB finally cut a check in the amount of $91.22 payable to Williams, and eventually issued a second check in the amount of $25.38 on October 1, 1986. The delay in issuing the checks was attributable to AIB and not Williams. After Williams received the first check, she offered McClellan a partial refund of $91.22 but he declined the offer. On October 10, 1986, or the day after Williams received the second check by mail, a representative of AIB flew by private plane to Okeechobee and obtained $133 in cash from Williams, who by then had received the second check from AIB. 3/ The representative paid McClellan the same day. Count IX On or about March 16, 1985, Luther B. Starnes purchased an insurance policy for his two automobiles from Mr. Auto for which he paid $473 by four installments over the next few months. After Williams received a telephone bind, Starnes was issued a binder evidencing insurance with a company called "Integrity." He also received a "Florida Vehicle Identification Card" evidencing PIP and liability coverage on his vehicles. In this case, Williams placed the coverage by telephone with AIB, the MGA for Integrity, which authorized her to temporarily bind the coverage. The application and check were thereafter sent by Williams to the MGA. After not receiving a policy by the fall of 1985, Starnes telephoned a district office of Integrity and learned his name was not on its computer. However, he did not contact Williams after that, or ask for a refund of his premium. Despite the accusation that Williams had no basis to believe that a policy had ever been issued by Integrity, an AIB representative confirmed at hearing that Starnes' application and premium had been received by AIB, and that AIB had issued a policy number covering Starnes. Indeed, respondent's exhibit 10 reflects that Integrity cashed the check, and simultaneously placed a sticker on the check which read "Integrity Insurance Co. Private Passenger Auto 100-FAB- 0206809." This indicated that AIB had assigned a policy number on behalf of Integrity and that Starnes' coverage was in effect. Indeed, Williams properly relied upon her cancelled check in believing that Starnes was insured. Moreover, it was appropriate for Starnes to pay for this coverage until Integrity formally rejected his application. Although Starnes never received a copy of a policy, the responsibility to issue one rested upon MGA or Integrity, but not Williams. Count X On or about July 11, 1986, David and Carolyn Douglas purchased an insurance policy for two trucks owned by David. The policy cost $1300 per year and Carolyn paid Williams this amount by check. A binder was given to Carolyn reflecting coverage through Dana Roerig and Associates (Roerig), an MGA in St. Petersburg for Canal Insurance Company (Canal). Under the MGA's then existing policy, it was necessary for Williams to forward the application to Roerig and request a rate quotation. After receipt of the application Roerig would normally telephone the agent, quote a rate, and then bind if the rate was acceptable. In this case, the quoted rate was unsatisfactory, and Roerig returned the application unbound on August 10, 1986. Williams then attempted to place the coverage through an MGA in Lakeland (E&S Agency). However, Williams was quoted a rate on September 25 which she knew was too expensive. After obtaining the second excessive quote, Williams immediately bound coverage with Allstate and forwarded the Douglas application to that carrier with an agency check on September 25, 1986. Because Allstate accepted only money orders or cashiers checks, and the application was undated, the application and check were returned by Allstate to Williams on October 7. Williams then sent Allstate a dated application and a money order in the amount of $1500, or $200 more than the original Douglas policy required. Although Allstate did not formally issue a policy, it assigned the Douglas application a policy number on December 15, 1986, and simultaneously issued a refund check for $121 to Douglas, since the policy cost $1,179 and not $1,300 as had been originally quoted to Carolyn Douglas. Therefore, at that point the coverage remained in effect. On December 23 Allstate issued another refund check to Douglas in the amount of $776 and advised it was cancelling coverage effective February 6, 1987. Allstate later returned the remainder of the $1,300 owed David and Carolyn Douglas. Therefore, even though they had coverage for some six months through various binders and the policy itself, the Douglases paid no premium. Although Carolyn Douglas made several attempts to obtain a copy of the policy, Williams could not produce one since the two MGAs and Allstate had held the application almost continuously for six months. It is noted that Allstate has never repaid Williams the $1500 sent by her with the Douglas application in October, 1986. Count XI Francis Carr is a locktender on Lake Okeechobee whose duties require him to open and close the locks. The job is subject to bids, and all bidders must have evidence of general liability insurance. Desiring to submit a bid, Carr purchased a one-year general liability policy from Mr. Auto on September 20, 1985, and paid Williams $540.75 for the coverage. Carr received a copy of a policy from Scottsdale Insurance Company (Scottsdale) on a later date. On April 15, 1986, Carr asked that his policy be cancelled. This was done the next day. Carr was due a $181 refund as unearned premium. Through no fault of Williams, the refund check was not issued by Scottsdale until October 21, 1986, or some six months later. Williams later endorsed the check without recourse to a local dress shop. In July 1986, Carr again bid on the locktender job, and, through his wife, made application on July 7 for a new policy so that he could submit a bid. Although the annual premium had now increased to approximately $1,500 per year, Mrs. Carr paid only a $215 down payment. Under this type of policy, Carr was responsible for thirty-five percent of the entire year's premium even if he cancelled the policy after one day. Therefore, the policy had a minimum cost of $525 regardless of its term. Because he had not paid this minimum amount, Williams applied Carr's $181 refund check from the prior year to the minimum amount owed. This was consistent with the industry practice of agents applying credit refunds to new policies of this nature. She also paid $85 from her own funds in early October 1986 to meet the thirty-five percent threshold amount. By then, however, Carr had instructed another employee to cancel his policy since his bid had not been accepted. When he didn't get a refund from the prior year, Carr filed a complaint with petitioner. However, Carr is not entitled to a refund from either year since he still owes Williams $85 for the 1986-87 policy, even after the 1985-86 refund is applied to the second policy. I. Count XII Frank I. Henry and Margaret J. Henry (no relation) lived together in a rented mobile home in 1984. Margaret purchased a policy on the mobile home contents from Mr. Auto in July 1984. She paid Williams a $40 premium, and then made three payments of $47.28 each to Envoy Finance Corporation (Envoy), a Deerfield Beach finance company which financed the balance of the amount owed. Margaret received a binder from Williams reflecting coverage with Mobile Homes Division (MHD), an MGA in Fort Lauderdale Envoy submitted a check for $118.50 to MHD on July 16, 1984, reflecting full payment for the policy. After forwarding the application to MHD, Williams assumed Henry had coverage through American Fidelity Company (AFC), a company which later went out of business that fall. According to MHD, however, the application should have been returned to Williams a few days after it was received because it had no insurance company writing those types of policies. Williams denied receiving the application, and MHD had no record of the application being returned. Williams' version is corroborated by the fact that MHD never advised Envoy that the policy had been returned, something MHD should have done if coverage was rejected. Moreover, MHD has never refunded the $118.50 paid by Envoy in July 1984. According to uncontradicted expert testimony, it is the responsibility of the MGA or carrier to advise the finance company of a coverage denial, and to make a refund to the finance company, which then makes a refund to the customer. Therefore, MHD or AFC, but not Williams, is at fault for not refunding Henry's money. Around April 20, 1985, Frank's mobile home was damaged by a fire. His claim was rejected by MHD since it had no record of coverage. Prior to this time, no request for a copy of the policy had been made by Henry, and Williams properly assumed that Henry's coverage was in effect. Williams has since notified her E&O carrier of a possible liability. As of the time of hearing, Henry's claim was still unpaid and he has not received a refund of his premium from MHD, AFC or Envoy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of a single violation of Subsection 626.621(6), Florida Statutes (1985), and that all other charges be dismissed. Respondent should be given a reprimand for this violation. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of May 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May 1987.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert Charles Anderson, currently is eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a life and health (debit) agent, life, health and variable annuity contracts agent, general lines property, casualty, surety and miscellaneous agent, and health insurance agent. The Respondent moved to Florida from Michigan in September, 1983. In January, 1984, the Respondent and a partner bought Guaranteed Underwriters, Incorporated, a corporate general lines insurance agency doing business as Security Insurance Agency (Security) in New Port Richey, Florida. The Respondent's background was primarily in the life and health insurance business; his partner's background was primarily in property and casualty insurance. They planned to divide responsibilities for Security's operations along the lines of their respective areas of expertise. However, the partnership dissolved, leaving to the Respondent responsibility for all of the operations of the agency. After the dissolution of the partnership, the Respondent delegated to unlicensed employees most of the day-to-day responsibilities for the property and casualty and workmen's compensation side of the agency's business. The Respondent was personally involved primarily in the day-to-day operations of the health and life insurance side of the business, as well as in selected large commercial accounts. The conduct of Security's business, as described above, went smoothly (there were no charges of any license violations) until two disruptive factors entered into the picture. One was financial in nature; the other was personal. In 1986, Security bought an existing insurance agency (Sunland Insurance Agency) in Holiday, merged it into Security, and attempted to operate it as part of Security's overall business. In 1987, Security bought another, large agency (Village Insurance Agency) and also merged it into Security and attempted to operate it as part of Security's overall business. At this point, the Respondent essentially was attempting to operate three insurance agencies, something he never attempted before. With the purchase of Sunland and Village, in addition to Security, the Respondent incurred significant debt which had to be met for his business to just break even. By approximately 1988, the Respondent owed approximately $150,000 still outstanding on the purchase of Security, $100,000 borrowed to finance the purchase of Village, $43,000 to three different relatives and $3,500 to the NCNB bank on loans made in connection with the business. Payments on these debts, together with payroll, rent and other business expense left Security with a monthly operating budget of almost $12,000. At this expense level, the business was losing money. In calendar year 1989, the business lost between approximately $12,600 and (counting unpaid bills outstanding at the end of the year) $17,900. At the end of 1988, severe personal problems added to the Respondent's financial woes. In December, 1988, the Respondent's wife had to be hospitalized in Tampa for eight weeks for treatment for symptoms of mental illness. During this time, in addition to trying to supervise the operations of Security, the Respondent was required to travel back and forth to Tampa (about an hour drive by car, each way) to visit his wife and also make arrangements for the care of his eighteen month old son (either by himself or by a baby-sitter). As if the Respondent's personal problems were not enough, when his wife was discharged from the hospital (with a diagnosis of a chemical imbalance), she informed him that she wanted a divorce. She took up a separate residence in Tampa where she lived pending the dissolution of the marriage. As a result of the his personal problems, the Respondent delegated more and more responsibility to his unlicensed employees. He would go to the office only for an hour or two a day. Sometimes he was not able to get into the office at all. Judy Nelson (Count V). Judy Nelson, who is self-employed doing business as Pedals 'N' Presents, used Security for her insurance needs since 1986. In January, 1989, she applied through Security for renewal of a special multi-peril (SMP) insurance policy with American Professional Insurance for another year beginning January 21, 1989. On January 10, 1989, she gave Security her check for $485 as partial payment for the coverage. The $485 was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. Security never processed Nelson's application or secured the coverage. On or about March 10, 1989, Nelson received notice from American Professional that no application for renewal of coverage or premium had been received and that coverage was being cancelled. Nelson immediately contacted Security regarding the notification, and one of the Respondent's unlicensed employees acknowledged an error on Security's part but assured Nelson that Security would correct the situation and have Nelson's coverage reinstated. Security never got the policy reinstated, and the policy was cancelled on March 21, 1989. On or about April 8, 1989, Nelson's business was burglarized, and Nelson made a claim on her MPS policy. At this point, in handling the claim, the Respondent realized that the policy had been cancelled and that Nelson had no coverage. But, instead of telling her the facts, the Respondent paid the claim himself. Nelson thought the claim was paid under the terms of her SMP policy and still thought she had coverage. Later, Nelson had a question about a signature on her policy and telephoned the Professional American to get her question answered. Professional American told her that she had no coverage. At about the same time, Nelson was contacted by a Department investigator, who asked her not to contact the Respondent yet as he would make arrangements for a refund for her. On or about December 6, 1989, after the Department investigator cleared it, Nelson telephoned the Respondent and asked for a refund. This time, the Respondent acknowledged that Nelson had no coverage and agreed to a refund. The Respondent paid Nelson the refund at the end of December, 1989, or the beginning of January, 1990. Nelson still does business with Security. She has in force workmen's compensation insurance through Security. Fred J. Miller (Count VI). On or about February 24, 1989, Fred J. Miller came into the Security offices to get commercial automobile insurance for the vehicles he uses in his recycling business. He dealt with one of the Respondent's unlicensed employees. Several application and other papers for coverage with Progressive American Insurance Companies were prepared and were signed by Miller. Miller also made a partial payment for the coverage in cash in the amount of $296, for which the employee gave Miller a receipt. As he left the office, the Security employee assured him that he had coverage. A few days later, on or about February 28, 1989, Security contacted Miller and told him an additional $606 was needed to obtain the coverage for which he had applied. Miller returned to Security and gave the employee he was dealing with an additional $606 cash, for which he was given another receipt. It was not proven, and is not clear, whether the cash received from Miller was placed in the Security operating account. Security never submitted Miller's application for insurance. Contrary to Miller's understanding, Miller had no insurance on his vehicles. As of April 6, 1989, Miller had neither a policy (or copy of one) nor an insurance identification card. On or about April 6, 1989, Miller bought a new vehicle and had to contact Security to get an insurance policy number in order to have the vehicle registered in his name. The Security employee speaking to Miller discovered that Miller's undated application still was in the "pending matters" file and told Miller he could not get the policy number at that time. Miller said he had to have the policy number immediately. At that point, the employee brought the problem to the Respondent's attention. The Respondent had the employee tell Miller they would call right back. Security then dated Miller's application April 6, 1989, telephoned Progressive American to secure coverage effective April 6, 1989, and called Miller back with the policy number he needed. Security then processed Miller's application to secure the coverage for a year, through April 6, 1990. Miller has renewed the Progress American coverage through Security and still has his vehicles insured under the policy. Donald E. Wilkins (Count IV). Donald E. Wilkins, President of Apple Paradise Landscaping, Inc., used Security for his general liability and automobile insurance needs. He has no complaint about, and no issue is raised in this proceeding, as to Security's handling of those coverages. (The evidence is that the coverages Wilkins applied for were placed in the normal course of business.) On or about March 9, 1989, Wilkins decided he wanted a workmen's compensation insurance certificate. He went to Security's office, and one of the Respondent's unlicensed employees completed an application for the insurance and for premium financing. Wilkins gave her a $250 check "just for the certificate." The check was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. On March 9, 1989, Wilkins also specifically requested that Security furnish to Hawkins Construction of Tarpon Springs, Florida, a certificate of insurance. In response to the request, Security furnished to Hawkins Construction a certificate that Apple Paradise with the "S. Atlantic Council on Workers Compensation." A policy number appears on the certificate, and the certificate states that coverage was effective March 13, 1989, to expire on March 13, 1990. There is no evidence that the Respondent personally was involved in providing this certificate of insurance. The evidence did not prove whether Wilkins ever got any workmen's compensation insurance. The Department proved that Security never processed the premium financing application, and Wilkins testified that he never got a payment book or other request for payment from any premium financing company. But the representative of the National Council on Compensation Insurance gave no testimony on Wilkins or Apple Paradise. Wilkins himself did not appear to have any complaint against the Respondent or Security. Theoharis Tsioukanaras (Count III). Theoharis (Harry) Tsioukanaras owned and operated Harry's Painting and Enterprises, Inc. He had been doing business with the Respondent to meet his business and personal insurance needs since the Respondent first bought Security (and did business with the prior owner for a year before that). He had his business and personal automobile insurance, as well as his workmen's compensation insurance through Security. In the normal course of their business relationship, either Harry would telephone Security when he had insurance needs or Security would telephone Harry when it was time to renew insurance. Harry would then drop by the office to complete the necessary paperwork and pay the premium. When Harry did not have the necessary premium money when it was time to buy or renew insurance, the Respondent regularly loaned Harry premium money and Harry would pay the Respondent back later. Harry usually dealt with the Respondent's unlicensed employees, not with the Respondent directly. On or sometime after July 7, 1989, Harry telephoned Security for proof of insurance on a 1987 Subaru so that he could avoid having to pay for lender insurance on the vehicle at a bank where he was seeking to obtain financing. One of the Respondent's unlicensed employees gave Harry a purported insurance identification card for "Progressive American," listing a purported insurance policy number and purported policy effective dates of July 7, 1989, to January 7, 1990. The lending institution did not accept the card. In fact, no Progressive American policy had issued on the vehicle. At some point, Harry came by the Security office and told the Respondent that he (Harry) was due a $640 refund for automobile insurance renewal premium money on a policy that never issued. By the Respondent's own admission, he checked with his records and his unlicensed employees and confirmed that Harry was owed the money. On September 28, 1989, he gave Harry a check for $640. 1/ Despite the circumstances that resulted in the false Progressive American insurance identification card, in Harry's need to buy Allstate insurance on a vehicle he thought was insured through Security, and in Harry's need for a $640 refund from Security, Harry continues to do his insurance business with the Respondent and Security and also refers friends to the Respondent for insurance needs. John Stuiso (Count I). On or about June 7, 1989, John Stuiso, a self-employed building contractor, applied for both general liability and workmen's compensation insurance through Security. (Stuiso had been insured through Security for the preceding four years with no apparent problems.) Stuiso paid Security $3,250 as partial payment of the premiums on the policies and also applied for premium financing through Security. At least $3,000 was paid by check; the evidence is not clear how the other $250 was paid. The $3,000 check was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. It is not clear what happened to the other $250. It was understood between Stuiso and Security that Security would have the applications processed and would inform Stuiso if there was any problem with coverage. Not having heard anything to the contrary, Stuiso believed he had the general liability and workmen's compensation insurance for which he had applied. In fact, Security never processed either application for insurance or either application for premium financing. In late July or early August, 1989, Stuiso requested that Security furnish a certificate of insurance for him to provide to a customer, APCO Building Systems of Oldsmar, Florida. On August 4, 1989, Security issued to APCO a certificate that Stuiso had both general liability insurance with American Professional Insurance Company and workmen's compensation insurance with "South Atlantic Council on Work Comp." Purported policy numbers also appeared on the certificate. When Stuiso never received a payment book for his premium financing, he became concerned about his coverage and was about to approach the Department for assistance when he received a telephone call from a Department investigator who had been investigating the Respondent (unbeknownst to the Respondent.) The investigator told Stuiso that he had no coverage. Stuiso then approached the Respondent and asked for a refund. The Respondent checked his records and asked his unlicensed employees about Stuiso's claim that he had paid for and applied for insurance that never issued. He learned for the first time the facts about Stuiso and immediately wrote Stuiso two refund checks, one for $3,000 and one for $250. Due to the financial problems the Respondent was having, his $3,00 check was returned for insufficient funds. The Respondent tried to borrow the money to cover the $3,000 check from a friend who declined on advice of counsel. Stuiso then went to the police and had the Respondent charged with writing a worthless check. The Respondent was advised of this and turned himself in to the police. He was given a week to make good on the check. The Respondent was able to borrow the money from another friend and paid Stuiso in full. However, his encounter with the police brought home to him the depths to which he had sunk. He decided to commit suicide by monoxide poisoning but changed his mind before it was too late. He telephoned his wife in Tampa to report what he had just done, and she initiated steps to have him committed involuntarily for treatment for mental illness under Florida's Baker Act. He spent four days in the Community Hospital in New Port Richey, Florida, where he was diagnosed as having "adjustment reaction." He was released to the custody of his wife and spent the next week to ten days with her in Tampa. After the Respondent recovered, he decided to do whatever was necessary to save his business and pay off his debts. He laid off office staff and, to take up the slack, himself assumed the responsibilities he had been delegating to his unlicensed employees. He also decided, in light of the Harry's and Stuiso matters, to himself investigate to see if there were any other Security customers who did not have insurance coverage for which they had paid. He found Wanda Mae Riley (Custom Plumbing of Pasco, Inc.). Wanda Mae Riley (Count II). In about August, 1988, the Respondent himself called on Wanda Mae Riley of Custom Plumbing of Pasco County to advise her that the company's general liability and automobile insurance policies for its fleet of four trucks were up for annual renewal on August 24, 1988. The Respondent filled out applications for renewal of the policies and for premium financing and accepted Riley's check in the amount of $3,244 as down payment for the renewal policies. The $3,244 was deposited into Security's general operating account which Security used to pay the operating expenses of the business. The Respondent telephoned American Professional Insurance Company to bind the coverage. He or his office also issued proof of insurance identification cards for Custom Plumbing. But, for reasons he cannot explain (having no recollection), he never processed the applications and the binders expired when the applications were not processed and policies were not issued in the normal course of business. Having had a lapse of memory as to the matter and as to Security's responsibilities to Custom Plumbing, the Respondent did not know and never told Riley or Custom Plumbing that the insurance policies were not renewed and that Custom Plumbing did not have the coverage it thought it did. Later in 1988, Security also arranged for workmen's compensation insurance for Custom Plumbing. The evidence did not prove that there were problems in the way Security obtained this coverage for Custom Plumbing. In approximately April, 1989, Custom Plumbing requested that Security furnish a certificate of insurance for him to provide to the Barnett Bank of Hernando County. On April 21, 1989, Security issued to the bank a certificate that Custom Plumbing had automobile insurance with American Professional Insurance Company. The expired binder number (which perhaps was the same as the policy number of the prior year's policy) appeared on the certificate as the purported policy number. There is no evidence that the Respondent personally was involved in providing this certificate of insurance. When, in approximately late October or early November of 1989, the Respondent discovered that Security had not obtained the coverages for which Custom Plumbing had made down payments in August, 1988, he telephoned Riley to inform her 2/ and tell her that he would refund the down payments Custom Plumbing had made in August, 1988. When the refund was not made promptly, Riley went to a lawyer to have a promissory note drawn for the Respondent's signature. The promissory note reflected the $3,244 the Respondent owed to Custom Plumbing, payable $500 a month. On or about December 9, 1989, the Respondent signed the note, which was paid in full in accordance with the terms of the note. (As previously found in Finding 14, by this time the Respondent also had heard from Nelson.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent, Robert Charles Anderson, guilty of the charges contained in Counts I, II, III, V and VI of the Administrative Complaint, as set forth in the Conclusions of Law, above; and (2) suspending the Respondent's licenses and eligibility for licensure for six months. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1991.
Findings Of Fact From January 15, 1980, until November 30, 1981, Respondent was the only licensed general lines agent at the C&M Insurance Agency of Dade County, located at 1014 Northwest 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida. At the same time, Respondent also sold insurance as Authorized Insurance Agency at The North Miami Flea Market, 14135 Northwest Seventh Avenue, Miami, Florida. While Respondent was the only licensed agent at that C&M address, his contract with C&M Insurance Agency expressly prohibited him and his employees or agents from soliciting or selling any form of insurance. Rather, the contract provided That Respondent was only permitted to use office space to prepare and file income tax returns at the C&M Northwest 27th Avenue address and also at C&M's other offices located on South Dixie Highway and on South State Road Seven. While doing business at the North Miami Flea Market, Respondent held himself out as president of Authorized Insurance Agency. During the same time period, Respondent wrote business at The North Miami Flea Market during the week and not just on weekends. Further, on December 19, 20 and 22, 1920, Respondent wrote business at both The North Miami Flea Market and at the C&M Northwest 27th Avenue address. On September 9, 1981, John G. Holmes completed an application and paid $639 for automobile insurance with National Security Insurance Company. The application was signed by Respondent and contains C&M's Northwest 27th Avenue address. Neither the application nor the insurance premium monies were ever forwarded to National Security Insurance Company. Holmes has never received either insurance coverage on his automobile or a refund of his insurance premium. On October 6, 1981, Antje Kalb purchased an automobile. The salesman at the dealership told her she needed to purchase insurance and gave her the name and telephone number for C&M's Northwest 27th Avenue office. She called C&M, and someone from that Agency came to the dealership. Kalb gave to C&M's representative $783 for full automobile insurance coverage, and the C&M employee gave Kalb a receipt for her premium. The receipt carries the C&M Northwest 27th Avenue address, and the binder given to Kalb carries Respondent's signature. Neither Kalb's application nor her premium payment were ever forwarded to the insurer, Commercial Union Insurance Company, and Kalb has never received either her automobile insurance coverage or a refund of her premium payment. On July 14, 1980, Sidney Sugarman from C&M's South State Road Seven office entered into a written agency agreement with Fortune Insurance Company. Between November 1, 1980, and January 31, 1981, Respondent signed and sent 23 applications for automobile insurance to Fortune Insurance Company, which applications reflected that the business had been written out of C&M's Northwest 27th Avenue address. Fortune issued policies to The insureds based upon those applications. Respondent performed all The acts and duties of a general lines insurance agent for Fortune Insurance Company. On October 24, 1980, Respondent entered into a written agency agreement on behalf of Authorized Insurance Agency with Fortune Insurance Company. Between October 31, 1980, and January 31, 1981, Respondent signed and sent 14 applications for automobile insurance from Authorized Insurance Agency to Fortune Insurance Company. Fortune issued policies to the insureds based upon these applications. Respondent performed all The acts and duties of a general lines insurance agent for Fortune Insurance Company. Respondent was not licensed with Fortune Insurance Company until June 17, 1981. Fortune Insurance Company and Respondent had no brokerage arrangements prior to June 17, 1981; rather, all applications submitted by Respondent to Fortune Insurance Company prior to that date were written as direct contracts and not through any brokerage arrangement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Count II of the Administrative Complaint filed herein; finding Respondent guilty of The allegations contained in Counts I, III, IV, V and VI of the Administrative Complaint filed herein; and revoking all licenses currently possessed by Respondent and his eligibility to hold a license pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis A. Billingsley, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Eugene Lipofsky 1851 NE 168th Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Should discipline be imposed by Petitioner against Respondent's licenses as a general lines agent (2-20) and Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriters Association (FRPCJUA) agent (0-17), held pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2001)?
Findings Of Fact Facts Admitted by Answer Pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, you Jennifer L. Faloon, currently are licensed in this state as a general lines (2-20) agent and a FRPCJUA (0-17) agent, and were so licensed at all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referenced herein. Your license identification no. is A080736. Pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, the Department of Financial Services has jurisdiction over your licenses and appointments. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referenced herein you, Jennifer L. Faloon, were employed with Beck Insurance, in Jacksonville, Florida. Additional Facts Established by Responses to Requests for Admissions Respondent was licensed as a general lines (2-20), and a Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriters Association (0-17) agent, in Florida, from June 25, 2001, until and including the present time. From June 25, 2001, until and including February 19, 2002, Respondent was employed with Beck Insurance, in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent signed the insurance application on February 19, 2002, to bind coverage for Ms. Wilson (Danyetta Wilson). Respondent signed the insurance application on January 21, 2002, to bind coverage for Mr. Appling (Marc Appling). Respondent signed the insurance application on January 22, 2002, to bind coverage for Ms. Brown (Laura Brown). Anna Michelle Mack transacted insurance business with Laura Brown on January 22, 2002. Respondent signed the insurance application on June 25, 2001, to bind coverage for Mr. Henderson (William Henderson). Respondent's Duties at Beck Insurance Respondent began her employment with Beck Insurance, in September 1996. She began as an unlicensed person. While working with Beck Insurance she obtained her (4-42) license allowing limited customer service related to the sale of automobile insurance. She subsequently obtained her (2-20) insurance agent license related to property and casualty, which would allow the sale of automobile, homeowners, and commercial insurance. Prior to this case Respondent has had no complaints filed against her in her capacity as insurance agent. In addition to selling insurance at Beck Insurance, Respondent is familiar with ancillary products offered through that agency. In particular, she is familiar with the sale of contracts involving towing a disabled car operated by a party who has contracted for those services. Respondent is also conversant with rental car contracts sold at Beck Insurance. The rental car contract allows for the customer to rent a car when the customer's personal car is unavailable. During the years 2001 and 2002, the years in question in this case, Respondent served as a supervisor at Beck Insurance in her capacity as a licensed (2-20) agent for persons employed by Beck Insurance, both unlicensed and licensed. The licensed agents that she had supervisory responsibility for were (4-42) limited or unlimited customer service licenses for automobile insurance and (4-40) full customer service agents. Respondent also was expected to deal with issues of underwriting for the insurance policies sold. As few as five and as many as ten agents were employed with Beck Insurance in the relevant time frame. This included another supervising (2-20) agent named Lon Woodward. Both Respondent and Mr. Woodward supervised the licensed (4-42) and (4-40) agents at Beck Insurance, who could not conduct business without supervision from the licensed (2-20) agent. The office hours in the relevant time period were from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, and 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. In any given month in excess of 100 customers might be served. Not all activities in providing service were in relation to writing insurance policies. Beck Insurance, at times relevant to the inquiry, represented numerous insurance companies involved with the sale of automobile insurance. The clientele that purchased automobile insurance from Beck Insurance was principally constituted of persons with problematic driving records, including suspensions, DUIs, lapses in coverage, as well as persons who only intended to pay the minimum amount necessary for a premium to obtain insurance that would allow that person to operate a motor vehicle in Florida. As a non-standard agency, the majority of Beck Insurance customers are persons who would not be provided insurance by the standard insurance companies such as State Farm, AllState, and Nationwide. Typically, when a customer initially contacted Beck Insurance by telephone they wanted the best price. In response, the Beck Insurance employee would consider the price structure among the 35 insurance companies represented by Beck Insurance to choose the most economical policy. When telephone inquiries were made about purchasing automobile insurance through Beck Insurance no mention was made of the All World towing and rental plan. Beck Insurance trains its employees in the manner those employees will serve the customers. Respondent was included in that training, having received training and provided training in those approaches. Ordinarily when a customer inquired concerning the purchase of automobile insurance at Beck Insurance, he or she was asked about the type coverage he or she was interested in purchasing. Information was gathered concerning the automobile to be insured. A questionnaire was completed. Within that document is a reference to towing and rental car reimbursement coverage, as well as information about the automobile insurance itself. The questionnaire which was used at times relevant to this case sought information about the customer and the use of the automobile that was being considered for coverage with blanks being provided to the left of the questions for initialing by the customer and blanks to the right for an affirmative or negative response. By contrast to other items, item 11 within the questionnaire was declarative in nature. It had a space for the initials of the customer, but not one to declare acceptance or rejection of what was described. By its terms it stated: "Motor Club - I am aware that towing and rental car reimbursement is optional. I want to carry this coverage. (This coverage can only be renewed by coming into the office, as it is not written with your auto carrier)." The parenthetical reference within item 11, was by smaller type, unlike the interrogatories that were found within the questionnaire. The statement in item 11 has an internal contradiction. In its initial sentence, it talks about the optional opportunity to obtain towing and rental car reimbursement, but it is followed by a sentence which says that the customer wants to carry the coverage with no apparent opportunity within the document to decline that coverage. Moreover, at the bottom of the questionnaire, there was the opportunity for the customer to say that he or she did not want to carry and was rejecting bodily injury liability, uninsured motorist, medical payments, comprehensive and collision, and custom or special equipment coverage, by initialing the blank provided with each category of coverage, but there was no similar opportunity to reject the towing and rental car reimbursement that was described earlier in the document. The insurance coverages were referred to as optional, as was towing and rental. An example of the text within the document, aside from its execution, is found as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. The execution of that document will be discussed subsequently in relation to the customer Danyetta Wilson. According to Respondent, the typical customer for automobile insurance at Beck Insurance is told "In this price we are also giving you towing and rental reimbursement." The nature of the plan for towing and rental is described. For example, if it is Plan 3, the customer is told "you will receive free tow reimbursements for six months for $100.00 each. You will also receive -- -- if you are involved in an automobile accident with another vehicle and you have to have your vehicle in a shop for repair, you will receive $25.00 a day reimbursement for five days. These claims have to be filed through our agency. You bring us the receipt within 60 days, we file it." The towing and rental services being sold by Beck Insurance, which are the subject in this dispute, are offered through All World All Safe Drivers (All World), part of Beck Insurance. Once more specific discussion is entered into concerning the automobile insurance policy applied for, the Beck Insurance employee also returns to the discussion of the All World towing and rental products. Beyond the presentation of the information concerning the purchase of the insurance coverage that has been chosen, Respondent testified that during the time in question the customer would be told "this is your towing and rental reimbursement contract." The details concerning the towing and rental in the contemplated agreement between Beck Insurance and the customer are as set forth in Respondent's Exhibit numbered 28, a form application for towing and automobile rental reimbursement through All World. The form application which constitutes the basis for providing the coverage makes no mention concerning the charge for the various plans offered to the customer for the towing and rental. The terms set forth in the application bundle the reimbursement plan for automobile rental and towing services, as opposed to separate coverage for automobile rental reimbursement and towing reimbursement. Notwithstanding the lack of explanation within the form application for All World rental reimbursement and towing service reimbursement, concerning the costs for the various plans described, Respondent indicated in her testimony that those packages are $35, $60, and $75, in costs. The discussion of the amount charged for towing and rental is included in the price breakdown that also pertains to the costs for the automobile insurance purchased. Approximately 50 percent of the customers solicited purchased All World towing and rental contracts in the time in question. Customarily, the application for automobile insurance is signed by an appointed licensed (2-20) agent at Beck Insurance who has authority to review the application to make certain that it has been correctly executed. When the transaction is complete between a customer and the Beck Insurance employee, there is but one receipt provided to the customer. That receipt sets out the aggregate charges and then breaks out individual charges for the automobile insurance policy, All World, and the motor vehicle report (MVR) fee that some insurance companies charge. As the receipt suggests, the amount tendered at the time that the automobile insurance is purchased and towing and rental reimbursement is purchased is a single amount that would have cost components for the automobile insurance, towing and rental, and a MVR fee. Another form is provided to customers with Beck Insurance. An example is found as Respondent's Exhibit numbered 27. That form outlines automobile insurance coverage by providing explanations about the types of coverage and advice on making certain that the insurance company pays claims made by the customer. There is a reference within this form to a subject other than automobile insurance, namely a reference to towing and rental-car reimbursement wherein is stated: "Reimbursement for towing charge when your covered vehicle is unable to safely proceed under its own power. Reimbursement for rental car when your covered vehicle has been involved in an accident. This coverage is optional. Consult individual plans for different payment amounts and certain restrictions that may be applied to each optional plan." As anticipated by law, persons who work for Beck Insurance, other than the licensed (2-20) agent, may take information supporting the application for automobile insurance sold through Beck Insurance. Count II Danyetta Wilson Danyetta Wilson was interested in purchasing automobile insurance in February 2002. She called Beck Insurance and spoke to Respondent concerning that purchase. After receiving a telephone quote, Ms. Wilson immediately went to Beck Insurance to transact business. The date was February 19, 2002. Before arriving at Beck Insurance, Ms. Wilson had told Respondent what she wanted in the way of automobile insurance coverage, and Respondent indicated that everything necessary to conclude the transaction would be prepared in advance before Ms. Wilson arrived at Beck Insurance. Of course, the application for insurance had not been executed, but pertinent information had been written down by Respondent on scratch paper. Essentially Ms. Wilson told Respondent in the telephone call that she wanted a minimum down-payment and low monthly payments, without discussing the amount of the deductible. When Ms. Wilson arrived at Beck Insurance, she saw Respondent. Both the Respondent and Tracy Laroe assisted Ms. Wilson in the transaction. Ms. Laroe was employed by Beck Insurance. Her application to become a licensed (4-42) limited customer representative was authorized by Petitioner on December 11, 2001. Petitioner issued license no. EO10041 (4-42) to Ms. Laroe on March 8, 2002, as recognized by Beck Insurance on March 29, 2002. As of July 1, 2002, Ms. Laroe's license was inactive based upon cancellation by Beck Insurance as the appointing entity. On February 19, 2002, Respondent was responsible for Ms. Laroe as supervisor at Beck Insurance, in relation to Ms. Wilson's transaction with Beck Insurance in purchasing automobile insurance through Progressive Insurance and automobile rental and towing reimbursement through All World. Most of the activities involved with the transaction occurred between Ms. Wilson and Ms. Laroe when addressing the purchase of automobile insurance on the date in question. During the transaction at Beck Insurance, Ms. Laroe, while assisting Ms. Wilson, did not suggest possible interest in buying the motor club also referred to as a towing and rental contract. Nor was there mention of All World as the company to provide that ancillary product. What was established in discussion was the amount of down-payment and the monthly payments for the automobile insurance. The down-payment was made by cash. Ms. Wilson was told that the down-payment would be $332, which is the amount that she paid. Ms. Wilson completed and was provided copies of certain documents in the transaction. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2 is the application for the automobile insurance questionnaire that was completed by providing answers and initials in relation to the underwriting information that was requested in the application form. Ms. Wilson signed the application on February 19, 2002. She did not read the document carefully because she was, as she describes it, "in a rush." The completed application was counter-signed by Respondent as producing agent on February 19, 2002, at 1:41 p.m. On February 19, 2002, Ms. Wilson was provided a receipt indicating a total amount of $332. The receipt reflected that $269 was a down-payment for Progressive Insurance, an amount of $60 as related to All World rental and towing, and $3 for a MVR fee. Ms. Wilson did not examine the receipt at the time it was provided to her. The receipt was filled out by a cashier at Beck Insurance, a person other than Respondent and Ms. Laroe. No explanation was made concerning its several parts. In addition to the questionnaire associated with the application for insurance coverage pertaining to the Progressive Insurance policy, Ms. Wilson executed the Beck Insurance questionnaire which described automobile insurance generally and the All World towing and rental. That questionnaire is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 creates the impression that towing and rental is an integral part of the purchase of automobile insurance. It was signed by Ms. Wilson on February 19, 2002, and initialed in its numbered parts. Those parts included the reference to the motor club at number 11 where it stated, "Motor Club - I am aware that the towing and rental care reimbursement is optional. I want to carry this coverage. (This coverage can only be renewed by coming into the office, as it is not written with your auto carrier.)" Again, while the towing and rental car reimbursement was stated as being optional, the quoted material was ambiguous as to its optional nature, and there was no opportunity in the latter portion of the questionnaire to specifically decline this ancillary product. In connection with the rental and towing service through All World, Ms. Wilson signed as applicant for the product. This application which formed the basis for charging Ms. Wilson $60 for rental and towing is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4. It is in the manner described earlier as to its form, in which no indication is made concerning the amount charged to purchase Plan 3. Ms. Wilson did not read Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4, which described the automobile rental and towing reimbursement offered through All World. She signed her name by a red "X" on the application line. The document which described the nature of the reimbursement plan offered through All World was not specifically explained to her. Ms. Wilson was not told that there was an additional charge for the towing and rental. She had no interest in towing and rental, having been provided similar services through her cell-phone plan. In this process, Respondent came over to the location where Ms. Wilson was seated and pointed out certain places in the insurance application to check-off and initial.1 Respondent did not sit at the desk with Ms. Wilson when the transaction took place. During the transaction, Ms. Laroe told Ms. Wilson that the questions she was asking would have to be directed to Respondent, in that Ms. Laroe could not help Ms. Wilson by providing the answers. Ms. Laroe mentioned that her participation was part of the customer service. Ms. Wilson also was involved with a sheet which was informational in nature describing the various types of insurance coverage. Respondent showed Ms. Wilson that form. It is Respondent's Exhibit numbered 1, which was signed by Ms. Wilson on February 19, 2002. It indicates that Ms. Wilson declined uninsured motorists and medical payments coverage. Zeros are placed next to those explanations. Within the document is a reference to towing and rental reimbursement, wherein it is stated: Towing and Rental Car Reimbursement. Reimbursement for towing coverage when your covered vehicles are unable to safely proceed under its own power. Reimbursement for rental car when your covered vehicle has been involved in an accident and is being repaired. This coverage is optional. Consult individual plans for different payment amounts and certain restrictions that may be applied to each optional plan. The towing and rental had a dash placed by that item together with the balance of the items on the information sheet that described insurance coverage. Respondent saw Ms. Wilson place the marks by the side of the forms of coverage and the information about towing and rental reimbursement, which is not part of automobile insurance coverage as such. The overall expectation within Respondent's Exhibit numbered 1 is to generally describe available products. It does not serve as an application. The status of the document is not changed by having Ms. Wilson sign the document. Respondent saw Ms. Wilson initial item 11, concerning the motor club found within Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. Ms. Wilson did not ask any questions of Respondent concerning Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. Respondent was present when Ms. Wilson signed the application for towing and rental, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4. Respondent in relation to that document asked if there were any questions. Ms. Wilson did not indicate that she had questions. In relation to Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4, Respondent recalls the nature of the explanation that she gave to Ms. Wilson as: "What this is, is this is your towing and rental contract. It gives you three tows per six months, $100.00 reimbursement on every tow, on each tow with a limit of three per six months. The rental benefit is $25.00 a day for five days if you are involved in an automobile accident and you need reimbursement. All claims have to be brought here to the office within 60 days in the form of receipts. We file the claims for you. Now, I need you to sign there." Nothing in that explanation indicates that there was an opportunity to decline to participate. The explanation did not establish the cost for the plan. Respondent indicated hat Ms. Laroe in her participation in the transaction with Ms. Wilson was there to listen and learn. Count III Marc Appling On January 21, 2002, Marc Appling purchased automobile insurance from Beck Insurance. He wanted full coverage for his car. The amount quoted for the insurance as a down-payment was $288. On January 21, 2002, $200 was paid. On January 24, 2002, the additional $88 was paid. Of the $288 paid, $222 was a down- payment for automobile insurance through Superior American Insurance Company (Superior), $60 was for All World automobile towing and rental reimbursement, $3 for a MVR fee, and $3 for some unexplained charge. The receipt provided Mr. Appling when he paid the initial $200 reflects $222 for down-payment to Superior, $60 for All World, and $3 for a MVR fee. That receipt is Exhibit numbered 9 to the Appling deposition, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 16. On January 21, 2002, Mr. Appling primarily dealt with Lance Moye, an employee of Beck Insurance who gave him a price quotation for the purchase of insurance through Superior. Mr. Moye explained to Mr. Appling the details, to include the amount of payment per month beyond the down-payment. Michelle Mack, an employee for Beck Insurance was sitting next to him. If Mr. Moye experienced problems in carrying out the transaction, he would ask Ms. Mack her opinion. Mr. Moye has never been licensed by the Petitioner in any capacity. During 1991 and 1993, he had applied for a (2-20) general lines property and casualty license. On the date in question, Michelle Mack, known to Petitioner for licensing purposes as Anna Michelle Mack, was licensed as a (4-42) limited customer representative agent. Mr. Appling executed the Beck Insurance questionnaire and acknowledgement form that has been previously described, to include initialing item 11, related to the motor club which says: "I am aware that the towing and rental car reimbursement is optional. I want to carry this coverage. (This coverage can only be renewed by coming into the office as it is not written with your auto carrier.)" This form that was signed and initialed and answered yes or no in various places was Exhibit numbered 8 to the Appling deposition, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 16. Mr. Moye told Mr. Appling that "you pay," addressing Mr. Appling, "X amount of dollars for rental car coverage and everything like that." However, Mr. Appling was not satisfied with the explanation. The questionnaire Exhibit numbered 8 to the Appling deposition, describing towing and rental car reimbursement as optional, did not create below that statement the specific opportunity to decline that option as would have been the case as items such as uninsured motorist and medical payments. Mr. Appling was left with the impression that the motor club was part of the insurance policy that he purchased and that the $288 down-payment included the motor club. Because Mr. Appling was interested in full coverage, he believed that the automobile insurance itself would cover rental reimbursement. Notwithstanding that the form questionnaire, Exhibit numbered 8 to the Appling deposition referred to towing and rental car reimbursement as an optional item, Mr. Appling did not understand that it was an optional purchase. Had he been persuaded that it was a separate item he would not have purchased the motor club. Exhibit numbered 7 to the Appling deposition, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 16, is the application for All World towing and rental reimbursement. The automobile insurance application through Superior is found as Exhibit numbered 5 to the Appling deposition, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 16. It was executed and signed by Mr. Appling on the date in question, then was marked as bound and signed by Respondent on that date. Although Respondent signed the Appling application for automobile insurance with Superior, she had no specific recollection of the event and was not otherwise involved in the transaction. Count IV Laura Brown On January 21, 2002, Laura Brown purchased automobile insurance through Beck Insurance. She dealt with Valerie Lynn Webster and Anna Michelle Mack, employees at Beck Insurance. At various times in 2002 and 2003, Ms. Webster had applied to Petitioner to be licensed as a (2-14) life, including variable annuity agent and a limited customer representative (4-42). No licenses were issued to Ms. Webster. Before arriving at Beck Insurance, Ms. Brown had obtained a preliminary quotation by telephone from the agency related to the purchase of automobile insurance. Ms. Brown was interested in obtaining full coverage for her car. The nature of the discussion once Ms. Brown arrived at the agency was about the purchase of automobile insurance, not about a towing and rental contract, motor club membership or the All World plan. A down-payment was made with installments to follow, associated with the automobile insurance. Ms. Brown thought that the entire amount of the down-payment was for the insurance premium. No explanation was made to the effect that the motor club was separate from the automobile insurance policy. When Ms. Brown left the Beck Insurance agency, she did not realize that she had purchased anything other than automobile insurance. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 12 is the automobile insurance application through Superior, executed by Ms. Brown on the date in question. It was signed by Respondent, noting that the policy was bound. Respondent had no other direct involvement in the transaction. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 13 is a receipt dated January 22, 2002, issued to Ms. Brown by Ms. Webster and Ms. Mack, totaling $247 that Ms. Brown paid on that date. It is broken out as $184 for Superior, $60 for All World, and $3 for a MVR fee. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 14 is an executed application for All World automobile reimbursement and towing service reimbursement executed by Ms. Brown for the period January 22, 2002, through June 22, 2002, under Plan 3 in the form that has been previously described. As reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 15, Ms. Brown executed the Beck Insurance questionnaire in the form that has previously been described that contains item 11, relating to the motor club stating, "I am aware that the towing and rental car reimbursement is optional. I want to carry this coverage. (This coverage can only be renewed by coming into the office, as it is not written with your auto carrier.)" The questionnaire additionally sets forth that the towing and rental car reimbursement is optional but without the opportunity to decline that option that is specifically described for other optional coverage in the form, such as uninsured motorists and medical payments. In an affidavit containing Ms. Brown's statement prepared on May 23, 2002, Ms. Brown stated, "I knew that I had purchased towing or rental reimbursement policy for my policy 1/22/2002/2003 because I saw the form and I asked questions about it. The lady in picture number 10 (Ms. Mack depicted on Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17) told me I would get so many tows for free, she also told me it was from Beck Insurance." But in that affidavit Ms. Brown goes on to state, "I did not know that I paid an additional $60 for the towing policy. I thought this was just something I got with the car insurance policy." Again, nothing in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 14, the application for All World towing and rental, reflects the cost of Plan 3. That was made known in the receipt, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 13. Count V William Henderson On June 25, 2001, William Henderson purchased automobile insurance from Beck Insurance. He dealt with Daphne Ferrell, a person Respondent claims was a licensed agent at the time. No proof has been presented to contradict Respondent's position, and it is found that Ms. Ferrell was a licensed agent when the transaction took place. On the date in question, Mr. Henderson was interested in purchasing full coverage for his automobile. He executed an application with Atlanta Casualty Company (Atlanta Casualty) to purchase the automobile insurance. That application is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 6. Respondent's involvement in the purchase was the signing of the application in the place indicated for the agent's statement vouching for the application's correctness. The automobile that was covered by the purchase was inspected by Ms. Laroe as evidenced in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 7. The inspection was not a function that required a licensed person to perform. Mr. Henderson paid Atlanta Casualty $306 on June 25, 2001, for automobile insurance. That payment is reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 8, a copy of the check written to Atlanta Casualty. The money that was paid was acknowledged by a receipt from Ms. Ferrell dated June 25, 2001, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 9. That receipt reflects $306 down-payment for the automobile insurance to Atlanta Casualty and $75 for a rental contract involved with All World, for a total of $381. Whether Mr. Henderson paid the $75 for towing and rental, aside from the $306 check written for the insurance to Atlanta Casualty, is not clear from the record. Mr. Henderson had made application on the form related to All World for auto rental reimbursement and towing service reimbursement, which has been previously described. The specific application by Mr. Henderson is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 10, relating to Plan 3. Mr. Henderson executed the Beck Insurance questionnaire form that has been previously described setting forth item 11, the motor club, which states: "I am aware that the towing and rental car reimbursement is optional. I want to carry this coverage. (This coverage can only be renewed by coming into the office, as it is not written with your auto carrier.)" While Mr. Webster initialed item 11 on the form, as other customers had done in the circumstances addressed in the Administrative Complaint, the form he executed, as with other customers, did not create an opportunity to opt out of the motor club. While the form at item 11 spoke of the optional nature of the motor club, it was followed by a statement that made it appear that the opportunity to decline the coverage had already been determined, when it said: "I want to carry this coverage." The reference to the optional nature of the towing and rental car reimbursement in the latter portions of the form was not followed by an opportunity to specifically decline the motor club, as allowed in reference to other forms of optional insurance coverage pertaining to such items as uninsured motorist and medical payments, for example. The executed questionnaire is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 11. In completing the Beck Insurance questionnaire, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 11, his instructions were to initial where the solid arrow runs from items 1 through 14, at the top of the page, and by the Xs at the bottom of the page. The arrow and the Xs were placed by someone other than Mr. Webster. Only a brief explanation was given to Mr. Webster concerning the questionnaire. Mr. Webster has no recollection of someone specifically reading item 11, related to the motor club. During the transaction at issue, Mr. Webster remembers a discussion of towing and rental. He indicated that he was not interested in rental reimbursement. He did want towing. Mr. Webster, like the other customers who have been discussed, did not carefully read the documents presented to him for his consideration in purchasing the automobile insurance and in relation to the motor club. Mr. Webster has a vague recollection of someone placing an "X" on the applicant's signature line in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 10 and signing that application for the All World motor club, but he thought that he was only purchasing towing not rental. The application covers both rental and towing.
Recommendation Upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding Respondent in violation of those provisions within Count II that have been referred to, dismissing the others within that count, dismissing Counts III through V; suspending Respondent's licenses for nine months, placing Respondent on two years' probation and requiring attendance at such continuing education courses as deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2004.
The Issue Should discipline be imposed by Petitioner against Respondent's insurance agent licenses, life including variable annuity (2-14), and general lines (2-20), pursuant to Chapters 624 and 626, Florida Statutes (2004)?
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Respondent is licensed by Petitioner as a life including variable annuity (2-14) and a general lines (2-20) insurance agent and has been issued license D029506. During the time referenced in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was licensed as a customer representative (4-40) and a life including variable annuity (2-14) agent. The Department has jurisdiction over Respondent's insurance licenses and appointments. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referenced in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed or affiliated with Direct General Insurance Agency, Inc., a Tennessee corporation, doing business in Florida as Florida No-Fault Insurance Agency (Cash Register). Additional Facts: At times relevant to the case Respondent held his life including variable annuity license (2-14) under an appointment with Direct Life Insurance Company. At times relevant to the case Respondent had a customer representative license (4-40) under appointment with Direct General Insurance Agency, Inc. At present Respondent continues to hold the life including variable annuity license (2-14) under an appointment with Direct General Life Insurance Company. At present he has a general lines license property and casualty license (2-20) under appointments with Direct General Insurance Company and American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida. On February 8, 2005, Brandi Dean called Cash Register to receive a quote for the purchase of basic automobile insurance coverage. She was provided a quote at that time. On February 8, 2005, Brandi Dean, went to the Cash Register to purchase basic automobile insurance coverage. She had done business with the insurance agency before. Her policy with Direct General Insurance Company was Policy No. FLCR162714439, as reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 15, with a scan cover sheet entitled "Renewal Auto." On February 8, 2005, Ms. Dean purchased automobile insurance coverage that would be effective from February 10, 2005 through February 10, 2006. She was charged $316 for property damage liability (PD) and $216 for basic injury protection (PIP) for a total of $532, with a $25 policy fee. The application information within the exhibit reflects the customer's name, signature, and initials in various places. On February 8, 2005, Ms. Dean was provided another form referred to as an Explanation of Policies, Coverages and Cost Breakdown (including non-insurance products). Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 16. She signed that document. It reflected the auto policy coverage information. It also set forth under a category referred to as optional policies, the purchase of Lloyd's Accident Medical Protection Plan for $110. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17 is additional information concerning the Accident Medical Protection Plan application by the customer signed by her. It details a $110 annual premium for individual coverage of $1,000 medical expense, and 125/day-365 day hospital coverage. Within that same exhibit there is a form signed by the customer titled 100% certain underwriters @ Lloyd's/London (DB/33) Accident Medical Protection Plan. This reflects $110 cost, $125 daily coverage and the total annual benefit of $45,625. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 18 is a scan cover sheet entitled Renewal Finance with Premium Finance Agreement Information in association with Direct General Financial Services, Inc., in which the customer Ms. Dean paid $69.63 down, financed $599.82, with a total price of $748.61 when considering the annual percentage rate for financing. This document in totality was initialed and signed by Ms. Dean. Ms. Dean was provided a receipt for her cash down-payment on the purchase. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 14. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 19 is an Insurance Premium Financing Disclosure Form signed by the customer, reflecting the cost of the automobile insurance and the hospital indemnity plan, the amount of total cost and includes the policy fee for the automobile insurance, document stamp tax, the down payment, and the total amount financed $599.82. Ms. Dean was left with the impression that she had only purchased automobile insurance. She believed that the monthly payments for the financing were only in relation to automobile insurance. Ms. Dean does not recall having the accidental medical protection plan explained to her as to its terms. She does not recall anyone explaining that it was an optional plan unassociated with automobile insurance. She told the agent that she dealt with that she was only interested in purchasing the state-required automobile insurance coverage. Had she realized that she was purchasing optional accident medical protection, not part of the automobile insurance purchase, she would have declined the optional policy. Ms. Dean does recall that the agent she dealt with made some brief explanation about the documents involved in the transaction but not every page was explained. Ms. Dean recalls explanations about the automobile policy but nothing about optional coverage. Ms. Dean glanced over the documents but did not read every word included in the documents. Ms. Dean does not recall whom she dealt with on February 8, 2005. Otherwise, the record does not reflect the person who sold the automobile insurance and accidental medical protection plan to her at that time. At times relevant, Denise Daley Turnbull worked at Cash Register. She was a customer representative license (4- 40), appointed by Direct General Insurance Agency, Inc. On March 24, 2005, William L. Green, Jr., came to Cash Register to purchase automobile insurance. He dealt with Ms. Turnbull. He made a $170.02 down payment for his purchases, as reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4, which is a receipt provided to Mr. Green. A scan cover sheet related to an auto policy purchased, together with the application information for the automobile insurance purchased through Direct General Insurance Company is found within Petitioner's Exhibit numbered Mr. Green purchased automobile insurance for property damage liability (PD) in the amount of $590 and basic personal injury protection (PIP) for $370, with a $25 policy fee, totaling $985. He signed and initialed parts of the forms in association with the automobile insurance. Ms. Turnbull also signed forms in association with the automobile insurance. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 6 is an explanation of policies, coverages and cost breakdown (including non-insurance products) reflecting the overall purchases by Mr. Green. He signed that form. It relates the automobile insurance purchase. It also relates the purchase of an American Bankers Travel Protection Plan for $60, a Lloyd's Accidental Medical Protection Plan for $110 and life insurance of $98. With fees and other costs the total purchase was $1270.99. Of relevance here, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 9 is a scan cover sheet in relation to the life policy signed by Ms. Turnbull. It also includes application information to Direct Life Insurance Company with certain questions reflected that were initialed by the purchaser. Mr. Green signed the application. Respondent also signed the application, as well as printing his name and insurance license number on the form. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 10 is a scan cover sheet for a New Finance with Direct General Financial Services, Inc., which reflects a $162.03 down-payment, $1105.17 in amount financed, with a $129 finance charge. The total sales price for all purchases was $1396.20, to include the life insurance with Direct Life Insurance Company. Mr. Green signed the premium finance agreement. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 11 is a copy of the Insurance Premium Finance Disclosure Form signed by Mr. Green. Ms. Turnbull has no recollection of the Respondent's participation in the sale of the life insurance policy to Mr. Green. She does recall that Respondent was in the insurance agency office when the life insurance was purchased. She recognizes Respondent's signature in association with the life insurance application and purchase. Mr. Green had no intention of purchasing life insurance when he went to Cash Register on March 24, 2005. He recalls dealing with Ms. Turnbull. No one else sat with Mr. Green and explained policy information to him. Specifically, Respondent did not sit with Mr. Green and offer explanations about the policy. Mr. Green did not see Respondent sit with Ms. Turnbull and Respondent remained silent while she sold the life policy. Had Mr. Green realized that he was purchasing life insurance he would have declined the opportunity.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order finding a violation under Count I as set forth in the conclusions of law, dismissing Count II and suspending Respondent's license for six months for the violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: William Gautier Kitchen, Esquire Gregg Marr, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 L. Michael Billmeier, Jr., Esquire Galloway, Brennan and Billmeier, P.A. 240 East Fifth Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Michael L. Rothschild, Esquire Larry S. Davis, P.A. 1926 Harrison Street Hollywood, Florida 33020 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Sumner, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue Whether the School Board of Broward County's award of a contract for Excess General and Auto Liability insurance coverage to United National Insurance Company is barred because of illegality?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Ranger Insurance Company, Petitioner, is the holder of a Certificate of Authority dated September 9, 1996 and issued by the Department of Insurance and Bill Nelson, Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer. Good through June 1, 1997, the certificate authorizes Ranger to write in a number of lines of insurance business, including, Private Passenger Auto Liability, Commercial Automobile Liability, Private Passenger Automobile Auto Physical Damage, Commercial Auto Physical Damage and Other Liability. As such, Ranger is an "authorized" or "admitted" insurer in the State of Florida. L.B. Bryan & Company, Alexander & Alexander, Inc., and Benefactor Financial Group, Inc., is a joint venture and co- petitioner with Ranger in this proceeding through whom Ranger proposed to procure the Excess General and Auto Liability (“Excess GL/AL”) coverage. A timely proposal under Request for Proposal 97- 072S was submitted to the School Board of Broward County by the petitioners to provide the Excess GL/AL Insurance Coverage sought by the RFP. United National Insurance Company is an "eligible" surplus lines insurer, approved by the Florida Department of Insurance to transact all surplus lines coverages in the State of Florida and licensed as such. The Department has notified insurance agents of United Nation's eligibility as a surplus lines insurer since 1978. It is the insurer of the Excess General and Excess Auto Liability insurance coverage awarded by the School Board under RFP 97-072S. Arthur J. Gallagher & Company ("Gallagher,") is the eighth largest insurance broker in the world. It has four sales offices, nine service offices, and approximately 150 employees in the State of Florida alone. The office from which it conducted business related to this proceeding is in Boca Raton, Florida, an office for which Area President David L. Marcus is responsible. Gallagher submitted a timely proposal (the "Gallagher proposal,") in response to the RFP on behalf of United National. The School Board of Broward County is the authority that operates, controls, and supervises all free public schools in the Broward County School District, "[i]n accordance with the provisions of s. (4)(b) of Article IX of the State Constitution ...". Section 230.03(2), F.S. In accord with its powers, the School Board may contract directly to purchase insurance. It is not required by its purchasing rules to use a competitive bidding or procurement process to purchase insurance. Nonetheless, on Friday, April 26, 1996, it issued a request for proposals, the RFP at issue in this proceeding, for insurance coverages including for Excess GL/AL insurance coverages. Siver Insurance Management Consultants Siver Insurance Management Consultants ("Siver,") are the drafters of RFP 97-072S. The School Board relied on Siver to draft the RFP, particularly its technical sections. Technical review of the proposals made under the RFP was conducted by Siver. And Siver put together for the School Board's use a summary of the policies proposed by both United National and Ranger. The summary was considered by the School Board's Evaluation Committee when it evaluated the competing proposals. The determination of whether the competing proposers were properly licensed was made by Siver. The School Board's Evaluation Committee, indeed the School Board, itself, played no role in determining the licensing credentials of the proposers while the proposals were under consideration. Under the arrangement between Siver and the School Board, however, the School Board retained the primary responsibility for administering the RFP. The RFP Request for Proposal 97-072S was mailed to 324 vendors (prospective proposers) the same day as its issuance, April 26, 1996. None of the vendors knew the contents of the RFP until it was issued. The RFP sought proposals for seven coverages, each of which was severable from the remainder of the coverages and was allowed to be proposed separately. The scope of the request was described in the RFP as follows: The School Board of Broward County, Florida ... is seeking proposals for various insurance coverages and risk management services. To facilitate distribution of the underwriting data and the requirements for each of the coverages, this consolidated Request for Proposals ... has been prepared. However, each of the coverages is severable and may be proposed separately. The following are included: Boiler & Machinery Excess General and Automobile Liability Excess Workers' Compensation School Leaders Errors & Omissions Crime Including Employee Dishonesty - Faithful Performance, Depositor's Forgery Claim and Risk Management Services (Including Managed Care Services) Statutory Death Benefits Petitioner's Ex. 1, pg. I-1. Since the seven coverages are severable and no proposer had to submit a proposal on all seven coverages, one way of looking at RFP 97-072S is as a consolidated RFP composed of seven, separate proposals, each for a different type of insurance coverage. Of the 324 vendors to whom the RFP was sent, only two, Gallagher, on behalf of United National, and Ranger, through the action of the joint venture, submitted proposals with respect to the Excess GL/AL coverages. Reasons for Using an RFP The School Board, under the auspices of Siver, chose to seek insurance coverage through an RFP rather than an Invitation to Bid, or what is colloquially referred to as a "straight bid," for a number of reasons. As one familiar with RFPs and Invitations to Bid might expect, the School Board and Siver were attracted to the RFP by the increased flexibility it offered in the ultimate product procured in comparison to the potentially less flexible product that would be procured through an invitation to bid. More pertinent to this case, however, Siver chose to use an RFP for the School Board in this case because "as explained ... by the Department of Insurance over the ... years, while there may... [be a] prohibition against any surplus lines agents submitting a straight bid, there would not be a prohibition against a ... [surplus lines] agent responding to a request for proposal " (Tr. 149.) The RFP approach was not chosen, however, in order to avoid any legal requirement or to circumvent the Insurance Code. As explained by Mr. Marshall, the approach was born of hard reality: Id. [O]ne of the primary motivations [for using an RFP rather than an Invitation to Bid] was to allow us [The School Board and Siver] to consider surplus lines companies because of the fact that very often they were the only insurers that would respond on the number of coverages and clients that we were working for. The Insurance Code and the Surplus Lines Law The Insurance Code in Section 624.401, Florida Statutes, requires generally that an insurer be authorized by the Department of Insurance (the "Department,") to transact business in the State of Florida before it does so: (1) No person shall act as an insurer, and no insurer or its agents, attorneys, subscribers, or representatives shall directly or indirectly transact insurance, in this state except as authorized by a subsisting certificate of authority issued to the insurer by the department, except as to such transactions as are expressly otherwise provided for in this code. One place in the code where transactions are "expressly otherwise provided for ...," is in the Surplus Lines Law, Section 626.913 et seq., Florida Statues. The purposes of the law are described as follows: It is declared that the purposes of the Surplus Lines Law are to provide for orderly access for the insuring public of this state to insurers not authorized to transact insurance in this state, through only qualified, licensed, and supervised surplus lines agents resident in this state, for insurance coverages and to the extent thereof not procurable from authorized insurers, who under the laws of this state must meet certain standards as to policy forms and rates, from unwarranted competition by unauthorized insurers who, in the absence of this law, would not be subject to similar requirements; and for other purposes as set forth in this Surplus Lines Law. Section 626.913(2), F.S. Surplus lines insurance is authorized in the first instance only if coverages cannot be procured from authorized insurers: If certain insurance coverages of subjects resident, located, or to be performed in this state cannot be procured from authorized insurers, such coverages, hereinafter designated "surplus lines," may be procured from unauthorized insurers, subject to the following conditions: The insurance must be eligible for export under s. 626.916 or s. 626.917; The insurer must be an eligible surplus lines insurer under s. 626.917 or s. 626.918; The insurance must be so placed through a licensed Florida surplus lines agent; and The other applicable provisions of this Surplus Lines Law must be met. Section 626.915, Florida Statutes, and then only subject to certain other conditions: No insurance coverage shall be eligible for export unless it meets all of the following conditions: The full amount of insurance required must not be procurable, after a diligent effort has been made by the producing agent to do so, from among the insurers authorized to transact and actually writing that kind and class of insurance in this state ... . Surplus lines agents must verify that a diligent effort has been made by requiring a properly documented statement of diligent effort from the retail or producing agent. However, to be in compliance with the diligent effort requirement, the surplus lines agent's reliance must be reasonable under the particular circumstances surrounding the risk. Reasonableness shall be assessed by taking into account factors which include, but are not limited to, a regularly conducted program of verification of the information provided by the retail or producing agent. Declinations must be documented on a risk-by-risk basis. It is not possible to obtain the full amount of insurance required by layering the risk, it is permissible to export the full amount. Section 626.916, F.S. Authorized vs. Unauthorized Insurers Unlike authorized insurers, unauthorized insurers do not have their rates and forms approved by the Department of Insurance, (the "Department.") Similarly, unauthorized insurers are not member of the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, which guarantees payment of claims if an insurer becomes insolvent. Unauthorized insurers may qualify to transact Florida insurance business under the Surplus Lines Law and so, for purposes of the Surplus Lines Law, be considered "eligible" to transact surplus lines business in Florida. When a Surplus Lines insurer is eligible, Department of Insurance employees refer to the insurer in Surplus Lines terms as "authorized," a term in everyday English that is synonymous with "eligible." But an eligible surplus lines insurer remains an "unauthorized" insurer when compared to an "authorized" insurer for purposes of the Insurance Code and that part of the code known as the Surplus Lines Law. Submission and Review of Proposals Both L.B. Bryan & Company, Alexander & Alexander, Inc., and Benefactor Financial Group, Inc., (the "Joint Venture") and Gallagher submitted timely proposals with regard to Excess GL/AL coverage in response to the RFP. The Joint Venture's proposal was submitted, of course, on behalf of Ranger, an authorized insurer, and Gallagher's was submitted on behalf of United National, an insurer eligible to transact insurance in the State of Florida as a surplus lines insurer but otherwise an unauthorized insurer. The School Board's Insurance Evaluation Committee met on May 30, 1996, to evaluate proposals received pursuant to the RFP. Although briefly discussed by the Evaluation Committee, the issue of proper licensing was not determined independently by the committee. Instead of making that determination, the committee turned to its insurance consultant, Siver. Siver had determined that both proposers, Ranger and United National, were properly licensed for purposes of responding to the RFP and being considered by the committee. Siver communicated that determination to the committee. The committee relied on Siver's determination. Aside from receiving Siver's determination of proper licensing when "briefly discussed" (Tr. 108,) the Evaluation Committee did not address whether either Ranger or United National were properly licensed. Certainly, no issue of whether Ranger should take precedence over United National by virtue that it was an authorized insurer when United National was an unauthorized insurer and a mere eligible Surplus Lines insurer was ever discussed by the committee. In evaluating the proposals, the Committee awarded 73 points to the Gallagher proposal and 69 points to the Ranger proposal. Points were awarded on the basis of three criteria or in three categories: Qualifications (20 points maximum); Scope of Coverages/Services Offered (30 points maximum); and, Points for Projected Costs (50 points maximum.) The Ranger proposal outscored the Gallagher proposal in the "projected cost" category, 50 to 23, but it scored lower in the "qualifications" category, 14 versus 20 for Gallagher, and significantly lower in the "scope of coverages" category, five points versus 30 for Gallagher. The United National coverage was more than twice as costly as Ranger's, a $491,000 annual premium as opposed to Ranger's $226,799, which explains the points awarded in the "projected cost" category. The Gallagher proposal received more points than the Ranger proposal in the "qualifications" category because United National has provided the School Board with Excess GL/AL coverage for a number of years and Ranger has never provided the School Board with such coverage. The Ranger proposal fell so drastically short of the Gallagher proposal in the "scope of coverages/services offered" category primarily because of an athletic participation exclusion appearing in a rider to the specimen policy appearing in its proposal. Ranger had intended to cover athletic participation and the rider was included with the Ranger proposal in error. Ranger notified the School Board of its intent immediately after the tabulations were released. Nonetheless, the Evaluation Committee was never informed of the error and no attempt was made by the School Board to negotiate with Ranger to improve the coverages offered, despite authority in the RFP for the School Board to negotiate with any of the proposers. (The language used in the RFP is "with one or more" of the proposers.) The Ranger proposal also fell short of the Gallagher proposal in the "scope of coverages/service offered" category because the Gallagher proposal was made in several ways. One way was as to only Excess GL/AL coverage. Another way included School Leaders' Errors and Omissions ("E & O") coverage. The E & O coverage was offered by United National in the Gallagher proposal together with the Excess GL/AL coverage in a "combined lines" package, similar to United National coverages already existing for the School Board. Furthermore, the Ranger proposal expressly excluded coverage for Abuse and Molestation, a needed coverage due to the School Board's prior claims history. On June 5, 1996, the Evaluation Committee submitted its recommendations to the School Board's Purchasing Department. With regard to GL/AL coverage, the Evaluation Committee recommended the purchase of the GL/AL/E & O "combined lines" coverage offered by Gallagher through United National. The School Board posted its Proposal Recommendation/Tabulations adopting the recommendation, two days later, on June 7, 1996. Ranger Seeks Redress from the Department Following the School Board's award, Ranger, thinking that it should have received the award under the RFP as the only authorized insurer to submit a proposal for Excess GL/AL coverage, sought redress from the Department. On June 14, 1996, Ranger personnel met with the head of the Department's Surplus Lines Section, Carolyn Daniels, alleging a violation of the Insurance Code's Surplus Lines Law. On June 18, 1996, Ranger reiterated its complaint in writing and asked Ms. Daniels to find a violation that day. On June 24, 1996, Ranger, now through its attorneys, met with Ms. Daniels and her supervisor. Again, on July 4, 1996, Ranger's attorneys wrote to Ms. Daniels, further pleading for her to find a violation and asking for an administrative hearing if Ms. Daniels did not find in favor of the Ranger position. On a fifth attempt, Ranger wrote Ms. Daniels on July 11, 1996, requesting that she adopt Ranger's position. Ms. Daniels reviewed Ranger's five complaints with her supervisor, the Chief of the Bureau of Property and Casualty Solvency and Market Conduct. In a letter dated August 14, 1996, to the School Board's Purchasing Agent, Ms. Daniels announced her determination: I did not find any evidence to indicate that Mr. David L. Marcus of Arthur J. Gallagher & Company or United National Insurance Company violated the Surplus Lines Law in providing a quote for the School Board. Intervenor's Ex. No. 2. Ms. Daniel's determination was based on a number of factors, including the School Board's position in the transaction as an "informed consumer," (Tr. 422-423,) and that the School Board had possessed a United National policy for 13 years. But, the determination was primarily based on the fact that Gallagher had received three declinations from authorized insurers to provide Excess GL/AL coverage and so had performed that which was required prior to deciding that the coverage was eligible for export and provision by a surplus lines insurer: due diligence. Due Diligence Section 626.916(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides, [n]o insurance coverage shall be eligible for export unless it meets ... the following condition[]: ... [t]he full amount of insurance required must not be procurable, after a diligent effort has been made by the producing agent to do so, from among the insurers authorized to transact and actually writing that kind and class of insurance in this state, and the amount of insurance exported shall be only the excess over the amount so procurable from authorized insurers. (e.s.) The statute goes on to require that the diligent effort, "be reasonable under the particular circumstances surrounding the export of that particular risk." Reasonableness is assessed by taking into account factors which include, but are not limited to, a regularly conducted program of verification of the information provided by the retail or producing agent. Declinations must be documented on a risk-by- risk basis. Section 626.916(1)(a), F.S. "'Diligent effort' means seeking coverage from and having been rejected by at least three authorized insurers currently writing this type of coverage and documenting these rejections." Section 626.914(4), F.S. Under this definition, the "producing agent should contact at least three companies that are actually writing the types of clients and the business in the area [that they are] wanting to write." (Tr. 268.) A specific form to help insurance agents document their three rejections is adopted by Department rule. The rule provides: When placing coverage with an eligible surplus lines insurer, the surplus lines agent must verify that a diligent effort has been made by requiring from the retail or producing agent a properly documented statement of diligent effort on form DI4-1153 (7/94), "Statement of Diligent Effort", which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference. Rule 4J-5.003(1), F.A.C. Fully aware of the requirement for documentation of diligent effort to find authorized insurers, and cognizant that it would be unlikely that an authorized insurer could be found based on experience, Gallagher began soliciting proposals for coverage in the middle of April, 1996, several weeks before the School Board had issued the RFP. In fact, at the time that Gallagher started soliciting bids, the School Board had not yet assembled or distributed the underwriting data needed by bidders. Nonetheless, with good reason based on experience, Gallagher expected that the School Board would seek a "combined lines" package of GL/AL/E & O coverages like the School Board then received through United National, and that it would be unlikely that an authorized insurer would step forward to propose coverage. Gallagher, therefore, used the policy form current in April of 1996, that is the form providing Excess GL/AL/E & O coverage in a "combined lines" package, "as an example of what the School Board had been looking for this type of program and seeking a program similar to that and similar in coverage." (Tr. 242.) But it also sought Excess GL/AL without combination with E & O coverage. As Mr. Marcus testified, when seeking coverage from authorized insurers beginning in April of 1996, Gallagher "would be looking at a variety of different ways, whether they were package or not." (Tr. 243.) One authorized insurer, Zurich-American, declined to quote because it could not offer a combined line SIR program (a package of excess general liability and excess auto liability coverages) as requested by the RFP. Furthermore, the School Board risk was too large for Zurich-American to handle. A second authorized insurer, American International Group, declined to quote due to the School Board's adverse loss experience. A third authorized insurer, APEX/Great American, declined to provide a quote to Gallagher due to the large size of the School Board account. The responses of these three authorized insurers were listed in a Statement of Diligent Effort provided to Ms. Daniels, which she considered in determining that Gallagher and Mr. Marcus had committed no violation of the Surplus Lines Law. Gallagher also provided Ms. Daniels with a second Statement of Diligent Effort. The statement documented the attempt to attract quotes by adding a school leaders errors and omission component to the Excess GL/AL coverage. It, too, was used by Ms. Daniels in making her determination of no violation of the Surplus Lines Law by Gallagher. The same three insurers refused to quote for the "combined lines" program. Attempts by other Authorized Insurers Gallagher requested that any responses to its requests for quotes be submitted by May 10, 1996, so that it could prepare and submit its proposal by the RFP's deadline for submission of original proposals by all vendors, 2:00 p.m. May 16, 1996. One insurer, Discover Re/USF&G attempted to submit a quote on May 15, 1996, one day before the RFP deadline but five days after May 10. By then, Gallagher had already started printing its 625 page proposal. Furthermore, the company failed to provide the required policy forms until the day after the School Board's deadline for filing proposals. Coregis Insurance Company offered coverage of up to $700,000 for each claim and for each occurrence, but like Discover Re/USF&G, failed to provide the required policy forms until after the RFP deadline. Furthermore, definitive coverage under the Coregis policy would only be provided on the condition that the Florida Legislature pass a Legislative Claims bill, a limiting condition not authorized in the RFP or requested by Gallagher. American Home Assurance Company never responded to Gallagher with the School Board's required quote or policy forms. Rather, the company merely provided an "indication" that the company declined to provide a quote. An "indication" consists of an approximate premium rate, without any terms or conditions. A "quote," on the other hand, includes the terms and conditions of a policy. The Department places with the producing agent the responsibility of determining whether an insurer's communication constitutes and "indication" or a "quote." An agent, according to Ms. Daniels, can only violate the Surplus Lines Law if the agent receives a reliable quote. Gallagher even requested a quote from Ranger, despite never having been appointed to transact insurance on its behalf. But Ranger declined. In response to a request by Gallagher's minority business partner, McKinley Financial Services, Ranger, through E. Michael Hoke on American E & S letterhead, wrote in a letter dated May 6, 1996, "[w]e have received a prior submission on this account so we are returning the attached." Intervenor's Ex. No. 7. The Petition Ranger's petition for formal administrative hearing is the letter dated June 19, 1996, to the Director of Purchasing for the School Board under the signature of E. Michael Hoke, CPCU, Assistant Vice President of AES/Ranger Insurance Company. The letter asks its readers to "bear[] in mind we are not attorneys," p. 1 of the letter, before it outlines three protest issues. The third protest issue is the one about which Ms. Daniels made her determination that no violation of the statute had been committed by Gallagher or its employees: "3) Florida Statute 626.901 (Representing or aiding unauthorized insurer prohibited)." The other two issues deal not with the propriety of Gallagher's actions but the legality of the School Board's award to an unauthorized insurer, United National, when coverage was available from an authorized insurer, Ranger: Florida Statute 626.913 (Surplus Lines Law). . . Our Position * * * Ranger Insurance Company is an admitted authorized insurer ... Its proposal for excess general and auto liability is proof that the Board requested coverage was procurable. United National Insurance Company is an unauthorized insurer under the laws of the State of Florida ... . The United National Insurance Company proposal and/or its offer to extend it's current policies appear to us as "unwarranted competition." Ranger Insurance Company is protected from unwarranted competition from United National Insurance Company in accordance with the Florida Statute 626.913. Florida Statute 626.913 (Eligibility for Export) ... Our Position * * * Ranger Insurance Company is an admitted authorized insurer under the laws of the State of Florida. ... It's proposal for excess general and auto liability is proof that the Board requested amounts were available. The proposal and/or contract extensions offered by United National are for the full amount of coverage sought and not excess over the amount procurable from Ranger, an authorized insurer. The petition, therefore, set in issue not just whether Gallagher acted illegally but whether the School Board acted illegally when it made the award to United National, an unauthorized insurer when Ranger, an authorized insurer, had also submitted a proposal. Extension As soon as the School Board was made aware of the Ranger protest, it extended the existing insurance contracts procured under RFP 92-080S, awarded approximately five years earlier. The extension was on a month-to-month basis until resolution of the protest. The extension was necessary to avoid a lapse in the School Board's coverage during this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the award to United National under the Gallagher proposal in response to RFP 97-072S be rescinded. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul R. Ezatoff, Esquire Christopher B. Lunny, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Marks, Bryant & Yon, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Edward J. Marko, Esquire Robert Paul Vignola, Esquire Office of the School Board Attorney K.C. Wright Administrative Building 600 Southeast Third Avenue - 11th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 A. Kenneth Levine, Esquire Blank, Risby and Meenan, P.A. Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 Dr. Frank Petruzielo, Superintendent Broward County School Board 600 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-3125
Findings Of Fact In October 1981, Respondent Edward Willison Carroll, III, purchased the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency from Richard Paul Jackson. On or about February 5, 1982, Bobby L. Hancock and Janice Fels Hancock went to the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency to purchase liability coverage and comprehensive coverage on one of their vehicles. An employee of Respondent, Judy Conrad, completed one application for liability and another for comprehensive insurance, listing the drivers as Bobby Hancock, Janice Hancock, and Michael Fels, who was Mrs. Hancock's 16-year-old son. About two weeks later the Hancocks were notified that Michael Fels' driver license number was needed and that there was an error regarding Mr. Hancock's birth date which needed to be corrected. Very shortly after being notified, Mr. Hancock and Michael Fels returned to the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency to provide the requested information. The underwriting information referred to in paragraph 4, supra, was not supplied to Protective Casualty Insurance Company, which provided the liability insurance on the Hancocks' vehicle through the negligence of the Respondent or his agents. Protective Casualty mailed several requests for the missing underwriting information to the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency and finally, on April 1, 1982, mailed to Friendly Auto a notice of cancellation effective May 16, 1982. Neither Respondent nor any of his employees at the Friendly Auto Insurance Agency notified the Hancocks of the cancellation of the liability coverage by Protective Casualty. In July 1982, the Hancocks separated. Janice Hancock retained the vehicle which the Hancocks had insured through Respondent's agency, and she and her son continued to drive it. On or about July 1, 1982, Respondent instructed his employee, Laurie Starr, to complete a second application for liability insurance for the Hancocks. Accordingly, Ms. Starr completed an application and signed Respondent's name to it. Bobby Hancock's signature was placed upon the application to Allied by someone other than Bobby Hancock and without his knowledge or consent. Said application differed from the original application of Bobby and Janice Hancock by omitting coverage on Michael Fels, Mrs. Hancock's son. These were willful acts. In October 1982, Janice Hancock received a partial refund from Perry, her insurance financing company. This check reflects a different policy number than the insurance policy issued by Protective Casualty Insurance Company, the policy which was cancelled. It was only after the Hancocks received the refund checks that they became aware that their liability insurance had been cancelled and that the Allied policy had been obtained for their benefit by Respondent's agency.
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent's license and eligibility for licensure as an Ordinary Life, Disability and a General Lines agent should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for reasons set forth hereinafter by the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner on September 24, 1982. EXHIBITS The following exhibits were made part of the record: An Insurance Binder dated October 7, 1980, issued to Colon Aveiga by Center Insurance Agency, Inc., and signed by Jon Scott Robbins evidencing payment of $554 for an auto insurance policy issued by Dixie Insurance Company (Petitioner's Exhibit 53). An application for a Fireman's Fund auto insurance policy, dated October 10, 1980, signed by Colon Aveiga and Jon Scott Robbins evidencing payment of $514 (Petitioner's Exhibit 44). An Insurance Binder dated April 20, 1981, issued to Colon Aveiga and signed by Jon Scott Robbins evidencing payment of $767 credit for premiums paid and $299 for premiums due (Petitioner's Exhibit 56). A copy of a cancelled personal check (numbered 128) written by Colon Aveiga, dated April 20, 1981, made payable to Metro Insurance Agency in the amount of $299 for payment of premiums due (Petitioner's Exhibit 57). A Notice of Cancellation of a Fireman's Fund auto insurance policy dated March 25, 1981, and issued to Colon Aveiga for nonpayment of premiums due (Petitioner's Exhibit 52). An Amended Fireman's Fund Auto Insurance Policy dated February 6, 1981, issued to Colon Aveiga and showing a premium adjustment of $271 due (Petitioner's Exhibit 49). A Fireman's Fund Interoffice Memo dated March 23, 1981, written by Albert Sons, FJUA Underwriting Manager for Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, discussing Colon Aveiga's insurance policy application (Petitioner's Exhibit 42). A Fireman's Fund FJUA Underwriters Request for Information from Metro Insurance Agency regarding Colon Aveiga, dated December 1, 1980 (Petitioner's Exhibit 46) A Fireman's Fund Underwriting memo dated January 14, 1981, requesting information about Colon Aveiga from Metro Insurance Agency and containing a new address for Colon Aveiga (Petitioner's Exhibit 47). A Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles' transcript of Gaston Aveiga's certified driving record, dated September 16, 1981 (Petitioner's Exhibit 43). An Insurance Binder dated October 2, 1980, issued to Marc Gavidia by Metro Insurance Agency and signed by Jon Scott Robbins, evidencing a payment of $140 for an auto insurance policy issued by Fireman's Fund (Petitioner's Exhibit 97). An Insurance Premium Finance Agreement dated October 23, 1980, issued to Marc Gavidia by the Metro Insurance Agency and signed by Jon Scott Robbins (Petitioner's Exhibit 98). A Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles' transcript of Marc Gavidia's certified driving record, dated September 16, 1981 (Petitioner's Exhibit 99). An application for a Fireman's Fund auto insurance policy, dated October 9, 1980, signed by Marc Gavidia and Jon Scott Robbins (Petitioner's Exhibit 101). A Policy Change Request for a Fireman's Fund auto insurance policy, dated February 10, 1981, issued by Metro Insurance Agency, signed by Jon Scott Robbins, concerning Marc Gavidia's policy and listing his address as 5361 S.E. 11th Street, Tallahassee, Florida (Petitioner's Exhibit 111). A Notice of Cancellation of Marc Gavidia's auto insurance policy, dated February 27, 1981, issued by Fireman's Fund and citing material misrepresentation as the grounds for the cancellation (Petitioner's Exhibit 112). A copy of a cancelled personal check (No. 1726) written by Juana Perez, dated March 12, 1981, made payable to Metro Insurance Agency in the amount of $299 for payment of premiums due (Petitioner's Exhibit 62). An Insurance Binder dated March 12, 1981, issued to Rogelio Perez by Metro Insurance Agency and signed by Jon Scott Robbins, evidencing auto insurance coverage by Utah Home Insurance Company (Petitioner's Exhibit 63). An Insurance Premium Finance Agreement dated March 12, 1981, issued to Rogelio Perez by Metro Insurance Agency, and signed by Jon Scott Robbins (Petitioner's Exhibit 78). An application for a Fireman's Fund auto insurance policy, dated March 12, 1981, signed by Rogelio Perez and Jon Scott Robbins (Petitioner's Exhibit 65). A Declarations Form for auto insurance coverage by Rogelio Perez by Fireman's Fund showing a premium due of $978 (Petitioner's Exhibit 75). A Declarations Form for auto insurance coverage by Rogelio Perez by Fireman's Fund showing a premium due of $881 (Petitioner's Exhibit 66). A receipt from Luby's Chevrolet of Miami, Florida, showing $1,084 received from Luis G. Capon (Petitioner's Exhibit 80). An Insurance Binder dated January 26, 1981, issued to Luis Capon by Metro Insurance Agency, signed by Jon Scott Robbins and evidencing auto insurance coverage provided by Utah Home Insurance Company (Petitioner's Exhibit 81). An application for a Fireman's Fund auto insurance policy dated January 28, 1981, signed by Jon Scott Robbins (Petitioner's Exhibit 84). A Policy Change Request for a Fireman's Fund auto insurance policy stating that Luis Capon's address had been changed to 2560 S.W. 34th Street, Gainesville, Florida, and signed by Jon Scott Robbins (Petitioner's Exhibit 86). A Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles' transcript of Luis Capon's certified driving record, dated September 12, 1981 (Petitioner's Exhibit 79). A cancelled policy advisal dated July 8, 1981, regarding Luis Capon's Fireman's Fund auto insurance policy (Petitioner's Exhibit 90). A letter from Albert M. Sons, dated September 22, 1981, in his capacity as FJUA Manager stating that an inspection by Fireman's Fund established that Luis Capon had not moved to Gainesville, Florida, and that in fact he lived in Miami and was therefore in a higher rating zone (Petitioner's Exhibit 89). An Interoffice Memo from the file of Fireman's Fund dated March 23, 1981, in reference to Luis Capon questioning certain inconsistencies in that individual's application for insurance (Petitioner's Exhibit 83). An application for a Fireman's Fund auto insurance policy, dated September 10, 1980, issued to Javier Alvarez, showing a signature of "Javier Alvarez" and signed by Jon Scott Robbins (Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 4). A Declarations Form for auto insurance coverage of Javier Alvarez by Fireman's Fund showing a premium due of $737 (Petitioner's Exhibit 5). A Return to Sender letter from Fireman's Fund to Javier Alvarez bearing the address of 4902 S.W. 84th Street, Plantation, Florida (Petitioner's Exhibit 6). A Fireman's Fund FJUA Underwriters request for Javier Alvarez' correct address, issued to Metro Insurance Agency, dated November 14, 1980 (Petitioner's Exhibit 7). An Insurance Premium Finance Agreement allegedly signed by Javier Alvarez, issued by Metro Insurance Agency, and signed by Jon Scott Robbins (Petitioner's Exhibit 19). A letter from the National Insurance Finance Company to Javier Alvarez, 251 Crandon Boulevard, Miami, Florida, informing Alvarez of dates and terms of due payments (Petitioner's Exhibit 20). Deposition of A. M. Beverly, taken February 22, 1983 (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). FJUA Rating Manual (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). Fireman's Fund FJUA Rating Examination (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). The following witnesses testified on behalf of the Petitioner: Gaston Aveiga, Albert M. Sons, Peter Gavidia, Marc Gavidia, Juana Perez, Luis Capon, and Javier Alvarez. The Respondent testified on his own behalf. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, post-hearing memoranda, documentary evidence received, pre-hearing stipulations and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant:
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jon Scott Robbins, was, during times material herein, licensed as an Ordinary Life, Disability and General Lines agent. By its Administrative Complaint filed herein dated September 24, 1982, Petitioner, Department of Insurance, charged that the Respondent engaged in the following acts and/or conduct (in summary fashion) which amounts to conduct violative of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, to wit: Respondent failed to account for or pay to the insurer, insured, or other persons entitled to premiums or other funds received belonging to insurers or others in transactions under his license in a fiduciary capacity, in violation of Section 626.561(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent diverted or appropriated such funds or portions thereof for his own use, in violation of Section 626.561(2), Florida Statutes. Respondent collected a sum as premium or charge for insurance in excess of or less than the premium or charge applicable to such insurance, in violation of Section 626.9541(15)(b), Florida Statutes. Respondent misappropriated, converted, or unlawfully withheld monies belonging to insurers, insureds, beneficiaries, or others received in the conduct of business under his license, in violation of Section 626.611(10), Florida Statutes. Respondent knowingly filed with a supervisor or other public official, or made, published, disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public, or caused directly or indirectly to be filed with a supervisor, or other public official, or made, published, disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public, any false material statement, in violation of Section 626.9541(d), Florida Statutes. Respondent knowingly made a false material statement, in violation of Section 626.9541(5)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Respondent knowingly made a false entry of material fact in a book, report, or statement of any person, or knowingly omitted to make a true entry of a material fact pertaining to the business of such person in a book, report, or statement of such person, in violation of Section 626.9541(5)(b), Florida Statutes. Respondent made false or fraudulent statements or representation on, or relative to, an application for an insurance policy for the purpose of obtaining a fee, commission, money, or other benefit from an insurer, agent, broker or individual, in violation of Section 626.9541(11)(a), Florida Statutes. Respondent knowingly made a false or fraudulent statement or representation in or with reference to an application or negotiation for insurance, in violation of Section 626.9541(11)(b), Florida Statutes. Respondent willfully violated a provision or provisions of the Insurance Code, in violation of Section 626.611(13), Florida Statutes. Respondent demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance, in violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes. Respondent engaged in fraudulent or dishonest practices, in violation of Section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes. Respondent engaged in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts as prohibited under Part VII of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes. Respondent violated a provision of the Insurance Code, in violation of Section 626.611(10), Florida Statutes. Respondent has shown himself to be a source of injury or loss to the public, or detrimental to the public interest, in violation of Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes. During times material herein, Respondent served as a General Lines agent and represented Fireman's Fund Insurance (Fireman's Fund). The complaint allegations, in summary fashion, may be grouped in two classifications; (1) that Respondent knowingly filed false statements of material facts concerning insureds in an attempt to attract more insureds by offering lower rates and (2) Respondent received premiums from insureds in excess of the actual premiums he submitted to Fireman's Fund and thereby unlawfully appropriated the excess monies to his own use. Albert Sons is the underwriting manager for the Florida Joint Underwriters Association (FJUA) in his capacity for Fireman's Fund and is a direct contact for Fireman's Fund with the Respondent. All FJUA premium rates are identical given the same variables such as age, type of vehicle, use and territory. Any variation of these factors changes the rate in a uniform manner and that change is uniform throughout the industry. As an example, Miami is a substantially higher rated territory than Gainesville (TR 31-32). An insured who cancels his insurance coverage is charged the amount of premium based on the amount of time that the coverage remained in effect plus a service charge exacted by the company for processing the application. Pursuant to negotiations for the purchase of auto insurance, Gaston Aveiga, speaking on behalf of his father Colon Aveiga, informed Respondent of his Florida driver's license number and date of birth. The same information was provided to the Respondent on behalf of Colon Aveiga. Gaston advised the Respondent that he would be the principal driver of the car to be insured. Colon Aveiga purchased an auto insurance policy from the Respondent on October 7, 1980 and was quoted a premium of $544. Colon received an insurance binder from Respondent reflecting his correct address: 1215 NE 110th Street, Miami, Florida (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 53). Approximately three days later, an application was made to Fireman's Fund on October 10, 1980, reflecting that Colon Aveiga's address is 1534 SW 34th Street, Gainesville, Florida. The Aveigas have never lived in Gainesville nor have they indicated any intention of moving to Gainesville (TR 15). The insurance application further provides that Colon Aveiga is the only driver of the car and that he had an international drivers license whereas the Aveigas only have Florida driver's licenses; they specifically informed the Respondent of the same and that Gaston would be the principal driver of the insured car. The application submitted to Fireman's Fund on behalf of the Aveigas reflects a total premium of $514 which is, of course, $30 less than the premium quoted and collected from Colon Aveiga. On October 2, 1980, Marc Gavidia, and his father, Peter, purchased an auto insurance policy from the Respondent, doing business as Metro Insurance Agency. 2/ Respondent provided the Gavidias an insurance binder containing their correct address: 10441 SW 50th Street, Miami, Florida and evidencing a payment of $140 towards the balance due (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 97). The insurance was purchased to insure Marc Gavidia's Dodge van of which he was the principal driver. Marc Gavidia purchased the auto insurance from Respondent because of the cheaper rate (TR pp. 41-45). On October 4, 1980, an auto insurance application was tendered to Fireman's Fund on behalf of Marc Gavidia reflecting that he was self-employed (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 101). Marc Gavidia did not list himself as self- employed on the application (TR 49). Marc Gavidia gave Respondent his Florida driver's license which reflected a birth date of February 7, 1960 whereas the application submitted by Respondent on behalf of Marc Gavidia reflects a birth date of February 14, 1950 with a different driver's license number (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 101). On February 14, 1981 Respondent sent a policy change request for Florida auto insurance stating that the insured, Marc Gavidia, transferred schools to Tallahassee and now lives at 5361 SE 11th Street, Tallahassee, Florida (petitioner's Exhibit No. 111). Marc Gavidia has never lived in Tallahassee nor has he communicated to the Respondent any intent of moving to Tallahassee. (TR pp. 49-50). Juana Perez and her husband, Rogelio Perez purchased auto insurance from the Respondent based on the low rate quoted by Respondent. Ms. Perez wrote a check in the amount of $275 payable to Metro Insurance and received an insurance binder (TR pp. 53-54). Ms. Perez gave David Einhorn (a salesman of a local automobile dealership who was representing Respondent) Mr. Perez's Florida driver's license and Mr. Einhorn made a copy of the license (TR p. 56). An application for insurance was submitted to Fireman's Fund on behalf of the Perezes and reflects a total premium of $893. The application states further that the applicant has an international drivers license whereas Mr. Perez has never had an international drivers license (TR p. 59). The application reflects further that Mr. Perez was unemployed whereas he was employed at the time of his application for insurance (TR pp. 59, 63 and 65). An insurance premium finance agreement dated December 30, 1981, entered into by Mr. Perez shows $978 as a total amount of premiums minus the $275 downpayment leaving $704.20 as the amount to be financed (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 78). This represents approximately eighty-five ($85.00) dollars more than the premium sent to Fireman's Fund. On January 28, 1981, Luis Capon, purchased auto insurance from the Respondent and an application was submitted to Fireman's Fund reflecting a total premium of $789. At that time, Luis Capon paid $1,084 in cash to the Metro Insurance Company (TR p. 68). The application submitted by Respondent reflected further that Luis Capon had an international drivers license No. 1581934 and was born on January 15, 1944. At the time Luis Capon made application with the Respondent for auto insurance, he provided his Florida Drivers license which reflected his correct address: 419 NW 15th Avenue, Miami, Florida and his birth date, November 28, 1956 (TR p. 71). A policy change request for Fireman's Fund issued to Luis Capon states that Capon changed his address to 2560 SW 34th Street, Gainesville, Florida. The policy change request form was signed by Respondent. Luis Capon has never lived in Gainesville nor has he evidenced to Respondent any intent of living in Gainesville. Further, Luis Capon has never received any refund from Respondent and in fact had to pay additional premiums (TR p. 73). The additional premium seems to have stemmed from additional violations as reflected by a DMV Driving Report. Javier Alvarez purchased an auto insurance policy from Respondent and was advised that the total cash premium for the policy was $830. Javier Alvarez paid $250 and financed the remaining $580 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 19). An application submitted on behalf of Mr. Alvarez reflects a total premium of $730 which was submitted with the application. Mr. Alvarez has not received a refund of the difference in the amount quoted i.e. $830 and the amount $730 actually paid to Fireman's Fund by Respondent. When negotiating for the purchase of the auto insurance policy from the Respondent, Javier Alvarez gave the Respondent his Florida driver's license which contained his license number, birth date and address. The application submitted on behalf of Mr. Alvarez shows a Plantation, Florida address and reflects that Javier Alvarez has a Massachusetts driver's license and a birth date of August 16, 1940 whereas his correct birth date is February 22, 1961 and his address is 251 Crandon Boulevard, Apartment 342, Key Biscayne, Florida (TR p. 106). Mr. Alvarez has never had any address other than the Key Biscayne, Florida address and has never possessed a Massachusetts driver's license. On April 2, 1981, Respondent sent an endorsement request to Fireman's Fund advising that Javier Alvarez had transferred schools and was living in Gainesville, Florida (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2). Javier Alvarez has never attended any school in Gainesville, Florida nor has he indicated to Respondent any intent to do so (TR p. 110). THE RESPONDENT'S POSITION The Respondent testified on his own behalf and has been licensed since 1978. Respondent was first employed as a managing agent and as an underwriter for several years with another agency. During that employment, Respondent did not have the guidance and/or the assistance of a tutor. Respondent acknowledged that there were indeed numerous errors in addresses but he attributes same to the fact that he was a new agent without proper checks and balances in his office at the time, and that he, more than anyone else, was the victim of such mistakes. Respondent points to the fact that he earns commissions based on the amount of premiums and that the lower premiums quoted result in lower commissions to him. Finally, Respondent points to the fact that other agencies such as the chief complaining party in this case, Fireman's Fund, had a greater error ratio than the Respondent in the conduct of its insurance agency and that these errors were the result of sloppy clerical work and language barriers more than any intentional act on Respondent's part. 3/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's insurance license as referred to herein be suspended for a period of two (2) years. It is further RECOMMENDED that eighteen (18) months of the subject suspension be suspended during which time the Respondent's license shall be placed on probation. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of September, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 1983