Recommendation Having found the Respondent technically guilty of a violation of Section 489.129(1)(d), and thereby guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, and based upon the matters in mitigation, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Respondent receive a private letter of reprimand for his technical violation. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael E. Egan, Esquire 217 South Adams Street Post Office Box 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. David H. Otto 1527 C Road Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 J. K. Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues in this instance are promoted in keeping with an administrative complaint brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent, charging violations of Sections 943.13 and 943.145, Florida Statutes. These allegations relate to the claim that Respondent was involved in a liaison with a prostitute in which he exchanged Valium for sex. The encounter between the Respondent and the prostitute is alleged to have occurred while the Respondent was on duty. This Valium was allegedly obtained from an automobile which was examined as part of the Respondent's duties as a law enforcement officer. It is further alleged that the Valium should have been turned in as part of his responsibilities as a law enforcement officer.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a holder of a certificate as law enforcement officer, Certificate No. 98-10527. That certificate is issued by the State of Florida, Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, and Respondent has held that certificate at all relevant times in this proceeding. Respondent has been employed as a police officer by the Daytona Beach, Florida, Police Department in the relevant time period and it was during that tenure that Respondent is accused of having committed the offense as set forth in the administrative complaint. Debbie Ofiara is the only witness to the Respondent's alleged indiscretion while on duty. Ms. Ofiara is an admitted prostitute, who has drug problems so severe that she required specific program treatment to address them. In particular, that drug difficulty relates to the drug Dilaudid. In addition, Ofiara has served six months in jail for grand theft, a felony conviction. At the time of the alleged incident with the Respondent she was under the influence of drugs and was under the influence of drugs when she reported that incident to a police investigator in the Daytona Beach Police Department. When testimony was given at the hearing, Ofiara was attending a drug program while awaiting a sentence for a drug offense related to cocaine. She had pled guilty to that drug charge, a felony. Ofiara has been arrested for prostitution, arrests made by the Daytona Beach Police Department on three different occasions. She had been arrested for hitchhiking by Officer Cadenhead prior to the incident which underlies the administrative charges and indicates that she "took offense" at the arrest. Moreover, she acknowledges some past concern about her treatment in encounters with Officer Gary Gallion of the Daytona Beach Police Department in his official capacity. Ms. Ofiara claims that sometime in November 1982, in the evening hours, the Respondent, while on duty as a police officer, in uniform and driving a marked patrol car, approached Ofiara and made arrangements to meet her. She further states that this rendezvous occurred in Daytona Beach, Florida, and that in exchange for Valium tablets which the Respondent had obtained from an examination of a car he had been involved with in his police duties, which tablets were not turned in, Ofiara performed oral sex for Respondent's benefit. Some time later, Ofiara related the facts of the encounter with Officer Cadenhead to an internal affairs investigator with the Daytona Beach Police Department, Lieutenant Thomas G. Galloway. She also gave Galloway a bottle which she claimed was the bottle in which the Valium was found. The vial or container was not examined for any residue of the substance Valium or examined for fingerprints of the Respondent. Following Galloway's investigation of the allegations, the Daytona Beach Police Department determined to terminate the Respondent from his employment. That termination was effective February 11, 1983. Respondent was subsequently reinstated after service of a four-week suspension without pay by order of the City of Daytona Beach Civil Service Board, effective March 9, 1983. Having considered the testimony of Ms. Ofiara and the testimony of the Respondent in which he denies the incident with her, and there being no corroboration, Ms. Ofiara's testimony is rejected for reasons of credibility. As a prostitute, drug user, felon and person with a certain quality of animosity toward the Respondent and in consideration of the demeanor of the accusing witness and Respondent, her testimony is rejected.
Findings Of Fact In May 1979, Respondent issued invitation for bids for office space in West Palm Beach, Florida, for the purpose of establishing a combined claims, tax, and appeals unemployment compensation office in the West Palm Beach area. The lease on the present office in West Palm Beach expires in December, 1979. Two prior invitations for bids on the required office space had failed to result in the receipt of any bids. The invitation for bids provided that Respondent reserved the right to reject any and all bids and to make the award deemed to be in the best interests of the State of Florida. (Testimony of Bradner, Exhibit 15) On May 30, 1979, Petitioner Richard S. Weinstein submitted the sole bid in response to the May 1979 invitation. He proposed to lease his building located at 1814 North Dixie Highway, West Palm Beach, and to meet all bid specifications and requirements. At the time of bid submission, Petitioner was leasing the building in question to a tenant who operated a used furniture store on the premises. In order to meet the specifications of the bid, the property required considerable renovation and improvement which Petitioner agreed to accomplish. (Testimony of Petitioner, Exhibit 2) A bid selection committee composed of four departmental employees in Respondent's Tallahassee headquarters was appointed to consider Petitioner's bid and arrive at appropriate recommendations. On June 7, 1979, one of the committee members, accompanied by several officials of the West Palm Beach Office, inspected Petitioner's building and the surrounding area to determine its suitability for the proposed unemployment compensation office. Based upon statements made by those officials and the building's tenant that the area was unsafe and subject to frequent vandalism and theft, the committee member thereafter recommended to the selection committee that the bid be rejected and that the Department should readvertise for new bids. The committee unanimously accepted the recommendation and, on June 13, 1979, Petitioner was advised in a letter from the Respondent's support services director that his bid had been rejected based on the "inability of the building to meet our programmatic needs." Petition thereafter protested the decision and, as a result, the Secretary of the Department, Wallace E. Orr, directed the entire committee to make an on-site evaluation of the property and surrounding area. Thereafter, on July 18, 1979, the committee visited the site. At this time, each committee member, together with one of the officials of the local office, inquired of various businessmen in the surrounding area as to local criminal activity and solicited their opinion as to safety and security problems. One of the committee members also telephoned a city police desk sergeant concerning crime statistics in the area. (Testimony of Petitioner, Lowhorn, Orr, Bradner, Exhibits 3-4, 12) Petitioner gave the committee members a petition from a number of local businessmen supporting his bid, and a letter from the nearby Good Samaritan Hospital advising that it may construct a medical office building adjacent to the hospital in the future. Letters were also sent to the Department by the manager of an apartment building adjacent to Petitioner's premises stating that the area was safe and that there had been no break-ins in more than four years, and from the Mayor of West Palm Beach to the Secretary of the Department describing the area and asserting that it was making a resurgence in character as a result of city improvements and that it was no more unsafe than most of the areas of the city. Another letter, dated July 20, 1979, was sent to the Department from the West Palm Beach Downtown Development Authority Executive Director stating that the area was growing, new buildings were being developed, and that the downtown area generally was becoming a "hub" for governmental facilities. Upon return to Tallahassee, each member of the bid committee rendered a report and recommendations concerning Petitioner's bid. They applied weighted criteria in its consideration, and concluded that the bid was unacceptable because it failed to meet the two criteria of "condition of immediate vicinity of location" and "security of the facility." In these respects, they basically found that (a) the various businesses in the area were essentially "fortified" against burglary and vandalism, (b) the proposed office would be subjected to break-ins and possible loss of valuable office equipment and unemployment compensation checks, (c) the local departmental employees would be fearful of working in an unsafe area and (d) an office located at Petitioner's premises would be "depressing" to members of the public who utilized the departmental services. No mention was made in the various reports of the petition or letters sent to the Department by civic officials. The committee again recommended rejection of the bid and, by letter of August 1, 1979, Petitioner was advised of this fact and that new calls for bids would be made in the near future. Secretary Orr had viewed the premises himself and agreed with the committee recommendations that the site was unsuitable for the establishment of a local office. He felt that placement of the office in the area where Petitioner's building was located would be inconsistent with departmental goals to upgrade their state offices and improve their "image." He had not been made aware of most of the various letters and the petition provided to the committee, but had considered the letter of the West Palm Beach Mayor prior to arriving at his decision. (Testimony of Butler, Frisch, Radner, Baker, Orr, Lowhorn, Renfroe, Quigg, Petitioner, Exhibits 6-10, 11-12, 16) The street on which Petitioner's building is located is commercial in nature, although it is on the fringe of a residential community. It is an older part of the city and, until about five years ago, was in a rundown and depressed condition. In recent years, however, there has been an upgrading of the character of the downtown area of West Palm Beach which extends northerly to encompass the businesses in Petitioner's vicinity. The establishment of governmental facilities in the downtown and adjacent areas have been encouraged and a state office building is located in the area. A Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services "halfway house" has been erected approximately two blocks from Petitioner's building. Additionally, a branch banking facility, professional offices, several quality restaurants, and other modern business establishments are in the near vicinity. A laundry plant is across the street from Petitioner's building and at the present time presents an unsatisfactory appearance. It is intended, however, by the owners to expand and remodel the building in the near future. The City of West Palm Beach has the second highest crime incident rate in the state based on population. The city is divided into ten zones for police purposes, and during 1978, the zone in which Petitioner's building is located was average from the standpoint of crime statistics. In the opinion of the City Chief Police Inspector, it is typical of the various commercial areas located along U.S. Federal Highway No. 1, and as safe an area in the daytime as any in the city. He is of the further opinion that a burglar alarm would be a sufficient security precaution for nighttime safety, and that with such protection, a building would have adequate security. The highest crime rate in the city is located in the zone where the city hall, police station and other governmental buildings are located. Although business and professional individuals in the area near Petitioner's building have experienced minor vandalism and occasional illegal entries in the past, they uniformly are of the opinion that the area is safe with normal security precautions, such as a burglar alarm. A local boat sales establishment has a fence around the premises and a watch dog, but no burglar alarm. These precautions are designed to protect the expensive boats which are located out- side the building. The apartment building next to Petitioner's premises has not experienced break-ins in recent years although some of its elderly patrons have been exposed to occasional purse snatching on the street. The laundry plant across the street from Petitioner's building experiences various window breakage by youths on the weekends, and had a break-in recently in the nighttime through a poorly secured door in the rear of the premises. (Testimony of Lowhorn, Stackhouse, Hauser, Hodges, Lee, Lunney, Eddy, Ring, Eaton, DeSanti, Witt (Deposition - Exhibit 1), Exhibits 12-14).
Recommendation That Petitioner's bid be accepted by Respondent and recommended for approval to the Department of General Services. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John C. Moyle, Esquire 707 North Flagler Drive Post Office Box 3888 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Kenneth H. Hart, Jr. and Chad J. Motes, Esquires Department of Labor and Employment Security 2561 Executive Center Circle E. Suite 131 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made. At all times material to this case the Respondent, Willie Whittington, was licensed as a certified general contractor in the State of Florida, holding license number CG C006966. At all times material to this case the Respondent was the sole qualifying agent for Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. On May 15, 1987, Edwin W. Brown and Sandra J. Brown, husband and wife, contacted Respondent, in response to Respondent's advertising, to discuss the construction of a log house and an outbuilding on a lot owned by the Browns in Palm Beach County, Florida. The outbuilding was to be used as a combination garage and barn. During this initial meeting, the Browns described the project to Respondent. At the conclusion of the meeting on May 15, 1987, the Browns gave Respondent a $2,000.00 deposit to get started on the project. Respondent was to use that deposit to have plans drawn for the two buildings and to secure the necessary building permits. On June 23, 1987, Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. entered into two contracts with the Browns, one for the house and the other for the outbuilding. Respondent signed both contracts on behalf of Whittington & Sons Builders, Inc. Both contracts were clear and unambiguous as to the work that was to be performed, as to the price that was to be paid for the work, and as to the schedules by which the construction draws would be made. The price for the house was set at $73,506.00. The price of the outbuilding was set at $11,665.00. Both contracts provided that construction would be completed within 130 days. On June 23, 1987, the Browns paid to Respondent the sum of $6,871.60 as required by the two contracts. Sandra Brown began keeping a log of her contacts with Respondent as of August 4, 1987, because she had experienced difficulty reaching Respondent by telephone and because no progress was being made on the project. Around August 4, 1987, Respondent told the Browns that he needed an additional $175.00 to pay to the architect to complete the plans. Because this was not provided for by their contracts, the Browns refused Respondent's request for this additional sum of money. On August 7, 1987, the Browns paid to Respondent the sum of $3,822.90 that Respondent was to use to order the logs. The building permits were not obtained until October 9, 1987. The permits were not obtained earlier than that date because Respondent did not diligently pursue his obligation to get the permits. As of early November 1987, the only work that had been done was the preparation of the lot for the foundation. On November 7, 1987, Respondent requested that the Browns advance him $5,000.00 so he could proceed with the construction. Respondent was financially unable to proceed because the Internal Revenue Service had garnished the account in which Respondent had placed the Browns' deposits. The Browns refused to advance Respondent this additional sum of money, but they remained willing to pay Respondent according to the draw schedules of the contracts. In December 1987 the Browns received a notice to owner form from Rinker Materials. In response to this notice, the Browns paid to Rinker Materials the sum of $2,664.77 and asked that no further materials be delivered on a credit basis to the job site. The Browns received a release of lien from Rinker Materials on December 28, 1987, for the materials Respondent had previously ordered on credit. In the middle of December 1987, the Browns learned that Respondent had neither ordered the logs for the construction nor determined the quantity of logs that would be required. On or about December 18, 1987, the foundation for the house was poured. Little work was done on the project between that date and January 4, 1988, the date Respondent told the Browns that his back was hurt and he could not work. The Browns filed a written complaint with the Palm Beach County Contractors Certification Board on January 8, 1988. As of January 13, 1988, Respondent was unable to account for the funds the Browns had deposited with him. At a meeting on January 19, 1988, among Respondent, the Browns, and a representative of Palm Beach County Contractors Certification Board, Respondent agreed to furnish receipts and an accounting of the construction funds by the next meeting on January 27, 1988. Respondent also agreed, during the meeting of January 19, 1988, to perform certain work on the project before the next meeting. At the next meeting, Respondent did not provide the Browns with receipts or with an accounting of the construction funds. Instead Respondent submitted a non-itemized bill in the amount of $18,131.20 for labor and materials supposedly expended by Respondent through January 27, 1988. The Browns refused to pay this bill. Respondent had worked only approximately 16 hours on the project between January 19 and January 27 and had not completed the additional work he had promised to have done January 27, 1988. The Browns fired Respondent and his company on January 27, 1988. At that time, Respondent had completed approximately 10% of the project `whereas it should have been approximately 60-70% completed. The delays by Respondent throughout his association with this project were not justified. After the Browns fired Respondent, they were forced to pay a materialman, MacMichael Lumber Company, to prevent the foreclosure of a lien against the property. This lien resulted because Respondent did not pay for certain materials he had ordered on credit before the Browns fired him. On February 4, 1988, Respondent agreed to repay the Browns the sum of $4,200.00. As of the date of the final hearing, Respondent owed the Browns $1,400.00. A subsequent contractor completed the project without undue delay in June 1988 for an additional $74,000. This price reflects changes the Browns made after the subsequent contractor began his work. Petitioner is the state agency charged with the regulation of contractors in the State of Florida. The Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner against Respondent alleges, in pertinent part, the following: Respondent failed to perform in a reasonably timely manner, and or abandoned said job(s), in violation of 489.129(1)(m),(k). There was financial mismanagement and/or misconduct in connection with this matter, attributable either to Respondent directly, or to Respondent's failure to properly supervise, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(h) & (m), as generally exhibited by, but not limited to, the following: Subject double billed Customer on several occasions; failure to pay subcontractors and suppliers; and failure to buy materials. There was no allegation in the Administrative Complaint or evidence presented at hearing that Respondent has been the subject of prior disciplinary action. Respondent has been licensed as a certified general contractor by the State of Florida since 1973. Following receipt of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent denied the violations and timely requested a formal administrative hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which finds Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(h), Florida Statutes and which imposes a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,500 for such violation and which further finds Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes and which imposes a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1,500 for such violation so that the total fine to be imposed against Respondent is $3,000. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX CASE NO. 89-0743 The proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner are addressed as follows. Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 27. Addressed in paragraph 3. 4-5. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 5. Addressed in paragraph 6. Rejected as being unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 7. Addressed in paragraph 8. Addressed in paragraph 9. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 10. 14-15. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 12. Addressed in paragraph 17. Rejected as being unnecessary to result reached. Addressed in paragraph 14. Addressed in paragraph 15. Addressed in paragraph 15. Addressed in paragraph 16. 22-26. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 17. Addressed in paragraph 19. Addressed in paragraph 23. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 24. Rejected as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. Addressed in paragraph 22. 34-35. Rejected as being recitation of testimony and as being subordinate to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth R. Alsobrook, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Willie Whittington 342 Walker Street Greenacres City, Florida 34974 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Kenneth Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Hurley was 53 years of age when hired by Advance in 1998. He was born on June 19, 1944. His employment relationship with Advance was "at will." His work schedule was determined by Advance and was based entirely on the determination by Advance of its requirement to adequately serve its customers. When Mr. Hurley started working there, he worked Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday from 7:30 a.m. until 5:00 p.m., although sometimes he worked until 6:00 p.m. Advance is a large retail auto parts retailer. It has many stores. Mr. Hurley was employed as a driver in the Advance store located at 52 North Young Street, Ormond Beach, Florida, during all times pertinent. William G. Nulf was the store manager of the Ormond Beach Store during 2006. The assistant store manager was Jose Rivera. Jim Ashcraft was the "commercial parts pro." All of these men were authorized to supervise Mr. Hurley. On October 30, 2006, Mr. Hurley returned in his assigned vehicle after completing deliveries for the store. Mr. Rivera asked Mr. Hurley about receipts for the parts he had delivered. Mr. Hurley believed the receipts should be accounted for in one way and Mr. Rivera another way. These divergent views resulted in a disagreement that devolved into loud speech. Mr. Rivera told Mr. Hurley to leave the store and go home, but Mr. Hurley refused on the ground that he believed Mr. Rivera was without authority to send him home. During the disagreement Mr. Hurley was on one side of a counter, and Mr. Rivera was on the other side. As the argument progressed, Mr. Rivera stated that Mr. Hurley was a dirty, old, perverted man who should have been discharged a long time ago. Mr. Hurley also made inappropriate comments. Mr. Rivera dared Mr. Hurley to come from behind the counter and fight him. He put his fist in front of Mr. Hurley's face. Ultimately, the "commercial parts pro," Mr. Ashcraft, intervened, and his intervention ended the threat of actual physical violence. Neal Potter, the division manager for Advance having responsibility for the Ormond Beach store, investigated the incident. He used the employee handbook as a guide. The employee handbook of Advance states, "Any threats, incidents of violence, or intimidation of any nature whatsoever (including indirect threats or acts of intimidation) directed against a Team Member or other party by another Team Member will result in immediate termination." Mr. Potter took written statements from the participants and witnesses. He determined that the incident did not rise to the level of workplace violence as described in the handbook. He determined that both parties were at fault, and the incident was no more than a heated argument. Mr. Potter transferred Mr. Rivera to the Daytona Store with an effective date of November 8, 2006, because as a manager Mr. Rivera was held to a higher standard, and he had allowed the incident with Mr. Hurley to get out of control. Mr. Rivera was informed that if any similar issues occurred in the future, he would be terminated. This was memorialized in an Employee Action Report. Mr. Hurley told Mr. Potter that he was very afraid of Mr. Rivera. Subsequent to this incident, Mr. Hurley performed his job satisfactorily and rarely was in the presence of Mr. Rivera, although he did on occasion make deliveries to the Daytona Store where Mr. Rivera was then working. Mr. Hurley did not complain of discrimination as a result of this incident. The Employee Handbook has detailed guidance on how to complain of discrimination or a hostile work environment. Mr. Hurley was familiar with the process. He had complained to Mr. Potter on numerous occasions about a variety of issues, including payroll matters, vacation time, new policies and procedures, and other matters. Mr. Potter regarded him as someone who was quick to complain about almost any matter. Prior to March 4, 2007, Tom Estes was the store manager at the Daytona Store. During his tenure at the Daytona Store, Mr. Rivera was transferred to his store and served as Mr. Estes' assistant. Although Mr. Estes was aware that Mr. Rivera had been transferred from the Ormond Beach store because of an altercation with a fellow employee, he did not know that the employee involved was Mr. Hurley. Mr. Estes had prior experience with Mr. Rivera, thought him to be an excellent employee, and was happy that he had been transferred to his store. On March 4, 2007, Mr. Estes was transferred by Advance and became the manager of the Ormond Beach store. He had required drivers at the Daytona store to maintain delivery logs. He instituted this practice when he took over the Ormond Beach Store. This conformed to company policy. Mr. Hurley did not like this policy. From January 6, 2007, until March 10, 2007, Mr. Hurley's hours generally were Monday and Tuesday from 7:30 a.m. until 5:00-5:30 p.m., and Wednesday from 8:00 a.m. until noon. A short period after becoming manager of the Ormond Beach Store, Mr. Estes determined that more coverage was needed in the late afternoon hours. He made the specific determination that the commercial business required coverage until 6:00 p.m. For the week ending March 31, 2007, he changed Mr. Hurley's hours to Monday and Tuesday from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. and Wednesday from 8:00 a.m. until noon. This change was based solely on Mr. Estes' estimate of the business needs of the store. When Mr. Hurley learned of this on March 21, 2007, he displayed anger. He told Mr. Estes that he could not work until 6:00 p.m. because he had to feed his pet birds. On March 26, 2007, the first day he was to work the new schedule, Mr. Hurley was excused from work based on a doctor's note. As events transpired, he never worked the new schedule and, as of the hearing date, he had not returned to work. He did not assert at the time he departed that the proposed change in hours was discriminatory, harassing, or retaliatory. The only person involved in requiring Mr. Hurley to maintain trip logs, and the only person involved in the decision to change Mr. Hurley's hours was Mr. Estes. Mr. Estes was unaware of Mr. Hurley's statement to Mr. Potter. Mr. Estes could not have made changes in Mr. Hurley's work requirements based on retaliation because he was unaware of a complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Mr. Hurley's Petition for Relief DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Glasser, Esquire Glasser and Handel Suite 100, Box N 150 South Palmetto Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Steven David Brown, Esquire LeClair Ryan 951 East Byrd Street Richmond, Virginia 23219 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Philip Lee Sullivan (Sullivan), has served as Chief of Police for the City of Panama City Beach, Florida since August 10, 1977. Sullivan's salary as Police Chief was $62,326.12 in 1994, and will total $63,211.20 in 1995. As Police Chief, Sullivan's duties include planning, organizing, and directing all activities of the Panama City Beach Police Department. He is also charged with supervision of all members of the police force, with particular attention to personnel at the administrative and supervisory level, and with the investigation and disposition of complaints against police officers. In his official capacity, Sullivan is also required to cooperate with state and federal officers in the apprehension and detention of wanted persons and with other agencies where activities of the police department are involved. Sullivan has the authority to take disciplinary action against an employee of the police department up to and including suspension without pay for 30 days, and can recommend termination to the City Manager. He also completes written performance evaluations on members of his command staff, which is comprised of the Patrol Division Commander, the Investigative Division Commander, the Assistant to the Chief, and the Reserve Division Commander. In 1987, Sullivan began a business as a loss prevention and security consultant, operating as a sole proprietorship. Sullivan's first client was Hilton, Inc. Charles Hilton is the Chief Executive Officer of Hilton, Inc. It was Mr. Hilton who made the initial decision to hire Sullivan. He considered one other person for the work, but rejected that individual based on the fee sought. Sullivan verbally sought approval from the City Manager to contract with Hilton, Inc. The City Manager verbally approved the arrangement. Hilton, Inc. owns and operates five hotels in Panama City Beach: The Holiday Inn Sun Spree, Ramada Inn, Days Inn, Best Western Del Coronado, and Best Western Casa Loma. All except Sun Spree, which was added in 1990, were owned by Hilton, Inc., when Sullivan began contracting with the corporation. Hilton, Inc. pays Sullivan $2,000 a month with an additional fee for background checks. Sullivan's next client was the Bay Point Improvement Association (Bay Point). Bay Point is outside the city limits of Panama City Beach. By letter dated February 2, 1989, Sullivan formally requested approval from the City Manager to accept the position of Director of Security for Bay Point. Approval was granted by letter dated February 15, 1989. Sullivan was initially hired in February, 1989, as Director of Security, but his employment status was subsequently changed to that of an independent contractor, similar to his position with his other private employers. Bay Point pays Sullivan $18,000 per year for his services. Sullivan's next client was the La Vela Beach Club ("La Vela") in March, 1993. He was hired by the club's owner, Alois Pfeffer. Sullivan no longer works for the La Vela Beach Club, but while he was working for the club he was paid $6,000 per year. Sullivan's next client was Boardwalk Beach Resorts, which hired him in September, 1993. Boardwalk Beach Resort is the fictitious name for a limited partnership, Resort Hospitality Enterprises, Ltd. ("Resort Hospitality"). The majority of the stock of Resort Hospitality is owned by People's First Properties, Inc. ("People's First"). Resort Hospitality owns and operates four hotel properties, totaling approximately 625 rooms, on Panama City Beach. Robert Henry, the chief financial officer for People's First, was the person who decided to contract with Sullivan after independently determining to the satisfaction of People's First that Sullivan did not have a conflict of interest. People's First pays Sullivan $18,000 per year with additional fees for background checks. In 1994 Sullivan was paid $6,450 for background checks and as of September 11, 1995, he was paid $4,720 for the background checks performed in 1995. Sullivan incorporated his business as Beach Security, Inc. on December 12, 1993. Sullivan's next client was the Miracle Strip Park/Shipwreck Island (Miracle Strip). He was hired in May, 1994 by the Miracle Strip's General Manager, Shelton Wilkes. Miracle Strip is located on Panama City Beach. Sullivan receives $7,200 per year from Miracle Strip. Sullivan's next client was Spinnakers, where he was hired in July, 1994, by W. B. Sparkman, III. Spinnakers paid Sullivan $6,000 per year. As of the date of the final hearing it was not known whether Spinnakers would continue its contract with Sullivan for the next season. Except for Bay Point, there are no written contracts between Sullivan and any of the businesses with which he contracts. Sullivan has no job description, no set work hours, and no regular meetings with his employers. As part of the services offered by Beach Security, Sullivan makes recommendations to his clients in developing their safety and security policies and procedures, particularly with respect to policies, procedures and training for the security staff. The ultimate decision whether to implement any of Sullivan's recommendations rests with Sullivan's clients. Sullivan is also expected to defend those policies and procedures in court as an expert witness in the event his employer adopts his recommendations and is sued. Sullivan neither sets nor manages security for his clients. He makes recommendations. Sullivan does not hire, fire, or make other employment decisions for the security personnel of his clients. He does not supervise or evaluate the performance of his clients' security staff on a daily basis, and does not evaluate the individual performance of any of his clients' employees. As part of Sullivan's services to Hilton, Inc., Boardwalk Beach Resort and La Vela, Sullivan did background checks for potential employees. Sullivan hired an employee of the police department to do the background checks for him. The background checks were performed at the Bay County Courthouse for local applicants. If the information needed was located in another county or state, Sullivan would contact the clerk of the court at the appropriate location for the information. Getting information from another county or state can be a slow process. The information which Sullivan uses in doing the background checks is information which is available to the general public. The Police Department of Panama City Beach (Police Department) has an agreement with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to allow the Police Department access to criminal history record information. Access to the information is limited to police department business. If a police department employee desires to access the information, the employee must log in on the computer, which creates a computer-generated log at FDLE. Sullivan personally does not know how to access the information. Sullivan could request a police department employee to access the information for him. Panama City Beach is a popular resort area, which experiences a large influx of teenagers and young adults during spring break. Problems associated with alcohol consumption, including traffic violations and accidents, assaults, and disorderly conduct, are commonplace police concerns, particularly during spring break. Spinnakers and La Vela are clubs located on Panama City Beach which cater to the spring break crowd and serve alcohol. The La Vela has a capacity for about 6,000 people and Spinnakers about 4,000. The Hilton, Inc. hotels, the Boardwalk Beach Resort, and the Miracle Strip also do heavy spring break business. The Miracle Strip deals with more than 600,000 visitors over the course of its season. The police department investigates crimes and responds to calls and complaints made by citizens. The department also investigates accidents and is routinely called any time an ambulance is called. In the past two years the police department has received more than five thousand calls for service at businesses which are located in Panama City Beach and which contract with Sullivan. No evidence was presented that Sullivan has ever disregarded public duty in favor of private interests, or misused confidential police information for the benefit of his private employers. In February 1993, Spinnakers was sued for the wrongful death of one of its patrons. The Complaint alleged that the deceased, Robert Gaither, was involved in an altercation with one or more of the club's other patrons. Spinnaker security became involved, and the other patrons were ejected. When Mr. Gaither left, security allegedly saw these individuals in Spinnakers' parking lot, but took no action. After leaving the club, Mr. Gaither was beaten to unconsciousness by these same people, and was either left or passed out in the street, where he was run over by a drunk driver. The Complaint alleges that Spinnakers' security staff was negligent in its handling of the incident. Although the incident took place before Spinnakers hired Sullivan, Sullivan has given a deposition in the case as a potential expert witness. The Panama City Beach Police Department investigated the death of Mr. Gaither. Part of Sullivan's services to Le Vela has been to instruct its staff on how to handle fights. The owner of the club has complained to Sullivan about reaction from Panama City Beach police officers when fights have occurred at the club. It is the club owner's observation that the police, in protection of their own physical safety, often leave the burden of breaking up a fight to the security officers, or wait until the participants wear themselves out. Since the club's insurance will not pay for damages if the club's security officers get involved in the fight, the owner wants the police officers to intervene at an earlier stage in the fight and has so complained to the police department. At the June 23, 1994 meeting of the Panama City Beach City Council, Sullivan's outside employment as a consultant was thoroughly discussed. Sullivan gave a detailed account of his operation. At that meeting the City Council voted to continue the City's policy of encouraging outside employment of its police officers and allowing police officers to use the police vehicles during off-duty hours as long as the police officer is on call. On October 12, 1995, the City Council of the City of Panama City Beach enacted Ordinance No. 455, which codified the rules governing secondary or off- duty employment by employees of the City of Panama City Beach. Section 2-46 of the ordinance deals specifically with law enforcement officers, including the Chief of Police. Section 2-46(d)(1) of Ordinance 455 provides: The following types of off-duty employment do not, on their face, constitute a conflict of interest for law enforcement officers: Security guard duty protecting premises or property. Security consultant within or without the City. Providing dignitary or official's protection. Conducting pre-employment checks into the applicant's previous criminal history provided that only public records are accessed. Performing accident investigations or providing technical services as otherwise per- mitted by the Department. Ordinance 455 requires that police officers who desire to have outside employment must submit an "Off-Duty Employment Request" form. The forms were made available to the police officers sometime during the early part of December, 1995. Shortly after Sullivan received the forms, he submitted authorization requests for off-duty employment with Bay Point Resort, Miracle Strip Amusement Park, Boardwalk Beach Resort, and Hilton, Inc.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Philip Lee Sullivan's employment with businesses within the jurisdiction of the Panama City Beach Police Department and his employment in doing pre-employment application background checks is in violation of Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and recommending that Philip Lee Sullivan be dismissed from his employment as Police Chief of the Panama City Beach Police Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4141EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted to the extent that the computer database can be accessed from the Police Department but rejected to the extent that it implies that Sullivan, himself, can physically access the information based on his testimony that he does not know how to operate the computer to get the information. Paragraph 6: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found Paragraph 7: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 8-12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: The first two sentences are accepted. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 14-21: Accepted. Paragraph 22: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 23: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is accepted. Paragraphs 24-28: Accepted. Paragraphs 29-32: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 33-34: Accepted. Paragraph 35: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 36: The first sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that the information is available at the Police Department and can be accessed by Police Department staff pursuant to an agreement with FDLE. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance except for the employment outside the police department jurisdiction. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance that Sullivan requested approval for employment as Director of Security for Bay Point. Rejected to the extent that the request could be construed as a request for blanket approval for Sullivan to do security consulting services. It appears from Sullivan's letter that his employment at that time dealt with more than consulting services given that he had the authority to hire, fire, and direct the security force at Bay Point. Paragraph 3: Accepted to the extent that Beach Security Inc. was incorporated in December, 1993. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted to the extent that Sullivan has submitted the off-duty employment authorization requests. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 8: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found Paragraph 9: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 11-15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Accepted as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 17: The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence that such an arrangement could not tempt dishonor. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The first part of the second sentence is accepted in substance. The last part of the second sentence is rejected to the extent that although the businesses were anticipating that Sullivan would gather his information from public records, human nature being what it is, if Sullivan knew that an applicant was a suspect in a criminal investigation the employers would not want Sullivan to recommend that the applicant be hired. Paragraphs 19-22: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mary Ellen Davis, Esquire Hilton, Hilton, Kolk, Penson & Roesch Post Office Box 1327 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Does a statement by an agency that its regulatory authority is limited by Section 161.58, Florida Statute, constitute a non- rule policy? Does a statement by an agency that fees levied under authority of Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, by county governments for beach driving do not constitute revenue for purposes of invoking its regulatory jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.005 (Rule 18-21.005) constitute a non-rule policy?
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Petitioner Shirley Reynolds (Reynolds) resides and owns beachfront property overlooking the Atlantic Ocean in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Florida. Reynolds does not own to the mean high water line, and her property is not adjacent to the sovereign submerged lands held by the Trustees. Reynolds “shares riparian rights with the public.” Reynolds has owned her oceanfront home since 1981. She has observed beach driving by the general public on the beach and in the shallow water in the vicinity of her home. She enjoys the beachfront for “regular recreational, traditional recreational purposes.” Petitioner Diann Bowman (Bowman) resides and owns property that extends to and adjoins the mean high water line of the Atlantic Ocean in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Florida. Bowman has observed the general public driving on the beach and in shallow waters of the Atlantic Ocean in the vicinity of her property. Bowman goes swimming in the ocean, builds sand castles by the edge of the water with her grandchildren, and walks on the beach with friends. Petitioners did not have any requests for leases or applications for action pending before the BOT, and Volusia County had not made an application to the Trustees for any activity permit or lease. Petitioner Bowman was not even aware of Reecy's e- mail, and could not articulate how she was affected by it. Although Reynolds testified at length about the impacts of beach driving and beach concessions between her home and the ocean, she failed to show how she was affected by Reecy's statements that the BOT does not regulate beach driving. In response to counsel’s question of what personal interest she has in whether or not the Trustees require authorization to use state land for motor vehicle traffic in front of her home, she responded, “[I]f and when they ever deal with it, it will certainly raise the consciousness of the human safety element.” Petitioners testified regarding the adverse impacts of beach driving on their property and their enjoyment of their property. Beach driving has an adverse impact upon the property values and upon their enjoyment of their property. Respondents The BOT is an agency of the State of Florida, consisting of the Governor and Cabinet. (Art. IV, s. 4 (f), Fla. Const.) The BOT holds the title to the State’s sovereign submerged lands acquired at statehood “for the use and benefit of the people of the state,” pursuant to Chapter 253, Florida Statutes. (§§ 253.001, 253.03, and 253.12, Fla. Stat.) Private use of such lands generally requires consent of the BOT and must not be contrary to the public interest. The BOT is required to manage and conserve state-owned lands, including sovereignty lands, by law and is granted rulemaking authority to that end. The Department functions as the staff for the BOT, and issues leases and other authorizations for private parties to use sovereign submerged lands under Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 18-21, Florida Administrative Code. In carrying out its duties with relationship to the BOT, the Department implements policy as determined by the BOT, to include taking some final agency actions. The Department would be the agency through which the BOT would initiate rulemaking. The Department does not have delegated authority to adopt rules for the BOT. Ken Reecy (Reecy) is a Senior Management Analyst Supervisor in the Department’s Division of State Lands. One of Reecy’s job duties is to provide responses to requests for BOT’s public records housed in the Division of State Lands of the Department. On August 5, 2003, Ross Burnaman e-mailed Eva Armstrong of the Department the following public records request: Hi Eva-I am hoping that you can assist me with this inquiry for public records. I'm looking for any Trustees authorization for the use of state lands (including uplands and submerged lands) for beach driving by the general public or commercial vendors. While I'm aware of Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, I'm of the opinion that Trustees' authorization is still required for beach driving on state lands. Most local governments that allow beach driving (e.g. Gulf County, Volusia County) charge a fee for that activity. That would appear to trigger, Rule 18-21.005(b)(2), FAC, and the requirement for a lease. As I understand it, public beach driving is allowed in parts of the following counties: Nassau, Duval, Flagler, St. Johns, Volusia, Gulf and Walton counties. Thanks in advance for you assistance. Best regards, Ross Burnaman (phone number deleted) Ms. Armstrong passed this request to Ken Reecy of the Department who replied to Mr. Burnaman with the following e-mail message: Mr. Burnaman Concerning your request as to any authorization by the Board of Trustees for beach driving and fees triggering Rule 18- 21.005(b)(2)[sic]: We are unaware of any instance in which the issue of beach driving has been brought before the Board of Trustees for authorization. Further, in discussions with staff from our legal department, it is felt that s. 161.58 sufficiently covers the issue and that authorization from the Board is not necessary. We are also of the opinion that fees counties charge for beach driving would not trigger Rule 18-21.005(b)(2)[sic]. If you have any further questions on this issue, please contact Suzanne Brantley in EIP's Office of General Counsel (phone number deleted) The e-mail above contains two potential policy statements; one concerning a statute and the other concerning a rule. The analysis of each differs slightly. The BOT was authorized at one time to regulate all the uses of state sovereignty lands, to include regulation of driving on the state's beaches, i.e., that portion of land seaward of the mean high water line (hereafter: beach.) The BOT restricted the operation of private vehicles on the beaches via rule. The Legislature of the State of Florida enacted Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, which authorized those counties which had traditionally permitted driving on the beach to regulate the operation of privately owned vehicles on the beaches in their counties. Several of the counties which had traditionally permitted driving on the beach permitted privately owned vehicles to be operated on the beach in their counties and charged a small fee to defray the costs of providing parking, life guards, and traffic direction on the beaches. The BOT attempted to intervene in those counties which charged fees for beach driving on the basis that the fees being charged were "revenue" producing. The Legislature of the State of Florida amended Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, to specifically authorize the counties to collect reasonable fees to defray their costs of regulating beach driving. The statements that are challenged have not been adopted as a rule. Reecy testified at the hearing. Reecy only intended to give Burnaman information related to his public records request. The portion of Reecy's e-mail that is being challenged was intended to explain why no records were found. Reecy responded because Burnaman had sent follow-up e-mails to Reecy’s supervisor, Armstrong, the Director of the Division of State Lands. Reecy knew that Armstrong had a practice of providing information to the public when it was requested. Reecy is not charged with implementing or interpreting Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21 and does not process applications for leases or other authorizations from the BOT. Reecy's statement that no records were found is not a policy statement and has not been alleged to be one by Petitioners. Reecy conferred with Department legal staff before issuing his statement about Section 161.58, Florida Statutes. Reecy did not state that Section 161.58 exempted counties from getting BOT authorization for beach driving, as Petitioners state in their Petition, for several reasons: first, Reecy is not the person on the BOT’s staff who makes such determinations; second, there was no factual determination pending, i.e., no request for declaratory statement or request for an exemption or authorization; and third, the statute cited and its history indicate that the Legislature has vested the exclusive authority to regulate beach driving in those counties in which it traditionally occurred to county government in those counties. James W. Stoutamire (Stoutamire) is the principal Department employee who is charged with interpreting and applying the BOT’s rules. Stoutamire was the person to whom authority had been delegated to make such policy determinations. Burnaman's request was not presented to Stoutamire, and Reecy did not consult with Stoutamire. Although it is a statement concerning general law, Reecy's first statement regarding Section 161.58, Florida Statutes, does not assert agency jurisdiction or exempt a specific factual predicate from agency jurisdiction. Reecy also discussed Burnaman’s reference to Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.005(1)(b)2. with the Department's legal staff. Reecy's references to the section mistakenly cites it as Rule 18-21.005(b)2. Regardless of Reecy's intent, his answer constitutes an interpretation of the rule as applied to the fees charged by counties for beach driving. The BOT's rules provide what types of private activities must have consent prior to their being undertaken on sovereign submerged lands. They do not contain a list of all of the many public activities that occur on Florida’s beaches, shores, and waters that do not require consent. The BOT's rules in Chapter 18-21 are not intended to prevent air or noise pollution, promote public safety, protect property values, provide peace and quiet, or protect quality of life. These are the concerns about which Petitioners testified as diminishing their peaceful enjoyment of their property rights. Beach concessions above the mean high water line do not fall within the Trustees jurisdiction or control.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent. The Respondent, Charles Polk, served as the President of Daytona Beach Community College from 1974 to 1990. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Polk resigned as President of Daytona Beach Community College in 1990. Mr. Polk's Purchase of Real Estate from Anargyros N. Xepapas. In November, 1985, Mr. Polk and his wife purchased a life estate and one-half interest in a condominium unit from Anargyros N. Xepapas. Mr. Xepapas owned the other one-half interest in the condominium unit. [Stipulated Fact.] The purchase price of the life estate and one-half interest in the condominium unit was $150,000.00. [Stipulated Fact.] The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this price was not the fair market value or that the transaction was not an arms-length transaction. Under the terms of the agreement, Mr. Polk and his wife were required to pay $30,000.00 immediately. They subsequently executed and delivered to Mr. Xepapas a note and mortgage for the remaining $120,000.00. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Polk was a mortgagor and Mr. Xepapas was a mortgagee. Under the terms of the agreement, Mr. Polk was required to pay maintenance fees of approximately $5,000.00 per year, taxes, insurance and all other expenses of the unit, which totaled approximately $14,000.00 per year. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Xepapas agreed to maintain the payments on the first mortgage. [Stipulated Fact.] Following the closing, Mr. Polk paid Mr. Xepapas an additional $60,000.00 on the mortgage, reducing the principal balance to $60,000.00. [Stipulated Fact.] A warranty deed was provided to Mr. Polk for the purchase of the property. [Stipulated Fact.] Neither the deed nor the mortgage were recorded. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Polk and his wife used the condominium as their residence. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Xepapas action in selling the condominium to Mr. Polk and his wife was a business transaction. Mr. Xepapas. Mr. Xepapas is an architect and developer who designs, builds, and sells property in the Daytona Beach area. [Stipulated Fact.] At the time Mr. Polk purchased the one-half interest in the condominium unit from Mr. Xepapas, Mr. Xepapas was the owner of the condominium building in which the unit was located. [Stipulated Fact.] In addition to being the owner of the condominium building at issue, Mr. Xepapas was the architect, developer and contractor for the condominium and for other condominium buildings in the areas. Mr. Xepapas was trying to sell the condominium units as part of his business because of cash-flow problems. [Stipulated Fact.] The condominium sales market was "soft" and Mr. Xepapas was trying to eliminate the carrying costs for unsold units. Mr. Xepapas sold a total of four condominium units pursuant to an arrangement similar to the arrangement by which he sold the condominium unit to Mr. Polk. Mr. Xepapas had made offers to sell one-half interests in condominium units to various other persons besides Mr. Polk. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Xepapas was a sole proprietor. He entered into his relationship with Mr. Polk in his capacity as a sole proprietor. Mr. Xepapas has known Mr. Polk for ten to fifteen years and considers himself a friend of Mr. Polk. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Xepapas' Business with Daytona Beach Community College. In 1987, the Board of Trustees of the Daytona Beach Community College decided to expand the College's educational facilities by obtaining a new center in the Deltona area. [Stipulated Fact.] In September, 1987, the Board of Trustees instructed staff to develop a request for proposal for the design and construction of the facility which would be leased to the College. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Polk was involved to some extent in the decision as to whether the new center should be purchased or constructed, and whether it should be acquired through a long-term lease/purchase agreement. In response to the advertisement of the request for proposal in September, 1988, Mr. Xepapas submitted a proposal. [Stipulated Fact.] There were a total of nine persons or businesses that responded to the request for proposal for the Deltona facility. Mr. Polk knew that Mr. Xepapas had picked up a bid proposal package and, therefore, believed that Mr. Xepapas would submit a proposal. Mr. Polk appointed the committee which reviewed the proposals. This committee ultimately narrowed the acceptable proposals to two, including Mr. Xepapas, and directed that those two proposers submit final proposals. In January, 1989, Mr. Xepapas, in his capacity as a sole proprietor, was the successful bidder on the contract; however, there is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Polk abused his position in order to ensure this result. [Stipulated Fact.] Mr. Xepapas and Mr. and Mrs. Polk were co-owners of the condominium prior to and at the time that Mr. Xepapas was awarded the Daytona Beach Community College contract. Ultimately, Mr. Xepapas was not able to fulfill his obligations under the contract with Daytona Beach Community College. Although the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Polk asserted any influence over the decision to award the contract to Mr. Xepapas, Mr. Polk was involved to some small degree in the award of the contract to Mr. Xepapas. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Polk disclosed his co-ownership of the condominium with Mr. Xepapas to the Board of Trustees of the Daytona Beach Community College, that he refused to participate in any way in the bidding process or that he attempted to take the more drastic step of severing his relationship with Mr. Xepapas while the bidding process was going on. In May, 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Polk ultimately quit claim deeded the property to Mr. Xepapas. The evidence failed to prove why. They, therefore, lost their investment in the property. Mr. Polk also resigned as President of Daytona Beach Community College as a result of the allegations concerning his relationship with Mr. Xepapas.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order and Public Report finding that the Respondent, Charles Polk, violated Section 112.313(7), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Complaint No. 89-80. It is further RECOMMENDED that Mr. Polk be subjected to public censure and reprimand. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 3-11. 3 13. 4 14-16. 5 16 and 18. 6 4, 12 and 19-20. 7 Hereby accepted. 8 3, 21, 27-28 and 30. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-2. 2 13. 3 3, 11 and 14. 4 20. 5 16. 6 4 and 17-18. 7 5 and 8-9. 8 6-7. 9 21. 10 22. 11 24. 12 26 and hereby accepted. See 23, 27 and 30. 13 27 and 30. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 David A. Monaco, Esquire Post Office Box 15200 Daytona Beach, Florida 32015 Bonnie J. Williams Executive Director Commission on Ethics The Capitol, Room 2105 Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
