Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Peter Alagona, Jr., is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. He is board-certified in internal medicine with a subspecialty in cardiology and has practiced cardiology since 1981. There is no evidence that the Respondent has been the subject of professional discipline except for this proceeding. In 1989, the Respondent became acquainted with V.P., who worked as a receptionist at a hospital where he had practice privileges. Their work relationship became friendly and, although the Respondent was married and had children, he and V.P. responded to each other's friendly manner by mutual flirtation. At first, their flirting was discrete but later became more open and romantic. The Respondent began to write V.P. notes and greeting cards and send her flowers. In approximately May, 1989, V.P. indicated her willingness to begin an intimate and sexual relationship. The Respondent did not hesitate to oblige her. There is no evidence that the Respondent used a doctor-patient relationship to induce V.P. to engage in sexual activity with him, as alleged. When the sexual relationship began, there was no doctor-patient relationship between them. During her tenure at work at the hospital, V.P. from time to time complained of a rapid heart beat, and one of the four cardiologists at the hospital would respond to her complaint. The Respondent was one of the several doctors who had occasion to respond. No treatment ever was required. V.P.'s heart beat would soon return to normal, and everyone would return to work. No true doctor-patient relationship was established, and neither the Respondent, the other doctors nor V.P. ever thought one had been established. The allegation that the Respondent essentially intentionally used drugs he prescribed for V.P. during the course of their affair to control her and prolong the sexual relationship with V.P. against her will hinges on the following reference in V.P.'s deposition transcript: Q. Just so that I'm clear, did Alagona ever tell you that if you did not have sex with him, he would not write prescriptions for you? A. Those aren't the words. He has made comments about, "Where are you going to get your prescriptions?" Q. When did he make those comments? A. I don't know. During the relationship, at the end of the relationship. Q. Give me some of the circumstances surrounding those comments. A. It was, I'm sure, during an argument or something. I don't know. In view of all the evidence, that allegation is rejected as not proven. It is factual that, in another poor judgment that flowed from the poor judgment in initiating and conducting the affair in the first place, the Respondent began to act as V.P.'s personal physician for limited purposes during the course of the affair. When she complained of migraine headaches, he prescribed pain medication such as Tylox, a Schedule II controlled substance containing oxycodone, and Inderal, a beta-blocker and a legend drug. For stress, he prescribed Valium, which contains diazepam, also a legend drug. Although the Respondent clearly was acting as the doctor in a doctor-patient relationship when he prescribed these drugs, he still did not view himself as acting in that role and did not keep a written record of the drugs or the course of treatment in connection with those prescriptions. The allegation that the Respondent failed to practice medicine in accordance with required standards of care by not ordering the patient to receive mental health counseling but instead inappropriately allowing the patient to remain on Tylox also depends in large part on the testimony of V.P. In view of all the evidence, V.P.'s testimony pertinent to this allegation is rejected. The evidence was that the Respondent repeatedly advised V.P. to seek counseling, albeit not for drug abuse. Until April, 1990, the Respondent was not aware that V.P. was abusing drugs. The Respondent's Tylox prescriptions were not excessive and would not, in and of themselves, have indicated to the Respondent that V.P. was abusing Tylox or inappropriately remaining on Tylox; nor did V.P. exhibit clear signs of drug abuse or addiction prior to April, 1990. However, V.P. apparently was obtaining Tylox and other legend drugs from other sources without the Respondent's knowledge. She was seeing other physicians for the purpose of obtaining prescriptions, and she also was forging the Respondent's and other doctors' names to prescriptions to obtain additional drugs illegally. (One of the doctors whose name she forged predeceased the date of the forged prescription.) In April, 1990, the Respondent was notified that V.P. had been hospitalized for a drug overdose. In response to the request for advice from the attending physician, the Respondent recommended a psychiatrist for counseling. However, V.P. did not cooperate. She attended only one counseling session and refused further counseling. After the overdose hospitalization, the Respondent did not prescribe any more Tylox. However, again without the Respondent's knowledge, V.P. continued to obtain Tylox and other drugs from her other sources. The Respondent's judgment continued to be distorted and poor as a result of his intense sexual and romantic relationship with V.P. He continued to urge V.P. to obtain counseling for several reasons but, again, not specifically for drug abuse. By mid-1990, V.P. had dissolved her marriage, and she began putting pressure on the Respondent to divorce his wife and marry her. She began acting erratically, and her judgment also was poor. During a week- long visit to her family's home during the summer of 1990, she contacted an old boy friend, married him, changed her mind, and began annulment proceedings. By late 1990, V.P. started dating another doctor, and the pressure on both V.P. and the Respondent increased. The Respondent was unable to decide what to do, and the stress got ever greater as V.P. threatened to end the affair with the Respondent. While probably genuinely concerned for V.P.'s welfare, the Respondent probably also believed that, if V.P. got counseling, she would "see the light" and decide not to end their affair. Finally, the Respondent himself felt the need for counseling due to the stress of the affair, and he probably believed that she felt the same stress. Eventually, in early 1991, V.P. followed through on her threat and made it known to the Respondent that she was dropping him and choosing the other doctor. For some time, the Respondent was devastated and continued to try to persuade V.P. to return to him. Meanwhile, V.P. remained less than resolute, holding out to the Respondent some hope that she would return to him if he divorced his wife. Finally, practically an emotional wreck and despairing of any other way to get over his affair with V.P., the Respondent checked himself into an out-of-town residential psychiatric program. He purposely did not tell V.P. where he was, but she found out and, on the day of his discharge, sent him flowers with a card saying that she would never let him go. Eventually, the affair ended, and V.P. married the other doctor soon after.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent not guilty under Counts I and II but guilty under Count III; (2) placing him on probation for two years; (3) requiring him to take appropriate continuing medical education, if available, dealing with the physician-patient relationship and the prudence of avoiding the dual sexual/physician-patient relationship; and (4) imposing on him an administrative fine in the amount of $2,500. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2467 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-5. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, as to second sentence of 5., although he cannot now remember when he prescribed Tylox, the Respondent's testimony is accepted that, at the time, and for this extraordinary patient, he was able to bear in mind adequately approximately when and what he last prescribed so as not to expose V.P. to a health risk. 6. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, as to the last sentence, although he cannot now remember his prescriptions, the Respondent's testimony is accepted that, at the time, and for this extraordinary patient, he was able to bear in mind adequately when and what he last prescribed so as not to expose V.P. to a health risk. 7.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that patients need to be kept under "surveillance." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. As to last sentence, rejected as not proven that all "drugs," in all doses, "control a patient's emotional state and level of pain." Accepted that some can, in certain doses, and otherwise accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted that it is not the only indication; subordinate to facts contrary to those found, and unnecessary. 13.-16. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the Respondent "did not follow through with V.P.'s medical problems." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First two sentences, rejected as not proven; third, accepted that she said it, but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. First sentence, rejected as not proven; rest, accepted that she said it, but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. Rejected as not proven that he reviewed all of the prescription and hospital records. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. To the extent not conclusion of law, accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as not proven; second, cumulative; third, in part cumulative and in part rejected as not proven (that he had no justification); fourth, accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found (he did some diagnostic testing); and last two rejected as not proven in that the evidence was that V.P. rejected the Respondent's repeated recommendations to her that she seek mental health counseling, but otherwise accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, accepted but not necessary; rest, rejected as not proven. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-22. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate. Conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated. 26.-27. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. In large part, argument and conclusion of law; in part, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is "clear . . . that V.P. feels that Alagona left her." (Much of their behavior is difficult to explain, such as why V.P. would act as if she did not want to let Alagona go, while chosing Palay over Alagona.) Otherwise, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence of C), rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence that it is "safe to infer that V.P. forged these prescriptions." (The evidence raises the question and possibility of forgery, especially in the absence of testimony on the subject from V.P. and Palay, but it is not "safe to infer.") Otherwise, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. First four sentences, argument and subordinate. Rest, generally accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (However, while V.P. may have been "in the emotional driver's seat," it does not appear that she knew where she was going.) Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the Respondent did not suggest psychiatric counseling. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Second sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the Respondent did not suggest psychiatric counseling. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Second sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence in that the Respondent did not suggest psychiatric counseling. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. As to the third and fourth sentences, there was no evidence as to the nature of doctors' "orders." But, based on the evidence, the Respondent did not "order" counseling. He suggested or recommended it and offered to help her get it, and V.P. declined. If the Respondent had "ordered" counseling, the patient still may or may not have followed his "order." In either case, it would appear that the critical decision is what a physician does in the face of the patient's failure to comply. It would seem that the only thing a physician reasonably can do in this situation is stop prescribing and, if necessary, terminate the physician-patient relationship. As to the rest, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 39.-42. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Rothenburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Regional Office VI-Legal Division 9325 Bay Plaza, Suite 210 Tampa, Florida 33619 L. D. Murrell, Esquire 319 Clematis Street, Suite 400 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-4618 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jerome W. Hoffman, Esquire General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue Whether Respondent, a registered nurse, committed the acts alleged in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of nursing pursuant to Chapters 20, 456, and 464, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a licensed registered nurse in the State of Florida, having been issued license number RN 832942. In the fall of 1997, Respondent enrolled in FAU's ARNP program, which she continued until the spring of 1999, when she was dismissed from the program. Respondent was dismissed from FAU's ARNP program after she received a failing grade (an F) in a required clinical course (NGR 6602L). All students in the FAU ARNP program are required to make a grade of B or higher in clinical courses to continue in the program. On May 7, 1999, Ellis Younkin, the Graduate Program Coordinator for FAU and an associate dean, advised Respondent in writing that she had been dismissed from the ARNP program. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was advised of her right to seek permission to retake the clinical program she had failed and her right to appeal her dismissal from the ARNP program. Respondent attempted to gain permission to retake the clinical program and to appeal her dismissal from the ARNP program. In the spring of 2000, after her dismissal from the FAU ARNP program, Respondent asked Dr. Morris, a physician in private practice, to be her preceptor for the FAU clinical program she had failed (NGR 6602L). Respondent told Dr. Morris that she had failed the earlier clinical program (NGR 6602L), but she misled Dr. Morris into believing that she was nevertheless a student in good standing in the FAU ARNP program by her statements and by the papers she showed him, including an outdated preceptor request form, a cooperative agreement form, and a form cover letter. In the spring of 2000, when Respondent had the dealings with Dr. Morris described in this Recommended Order, Respondent knew or should have known that she had been dismissed from the FAU ARNP program and she knew or should have known that her actions to appeal that dismissal had not stayed her dismissal from the program. The preceptor arrangement was for Respondent to perform the clinical duties of an ARNP under Dr. Morris's supervision and responsibility for a total of 60 hours. Dr. Morris would thereafter evaluate her performance and submit that evaluation to the FAU ARNP program. Because of Respondent's deception, that arrangement was a sham. The FAU ARNP program requires that all preceptor arrangements and the physicians who are to serve as preceptors be approved before a preceptor program begins. When he agreed to the preceptor arrangement with Respondent, Dr. Morris was unaware that FAU required prior approval of a preceptor program, and he believed that Respondent would be responsible for any required paperwork. Respondent never requested the FAU ARNP program's approval of her preceptor arrangement with Dr. Morris, nor did she request authorization from FAU for Dr. Morris to serve as her preceptor. Between May 2 and May 26, 2002, pursuant to her arrangement with Dr. Morris, Respondent routinely talked to patients alone in the examination room about the reasons for the patient's visit, to obtain a medical history, and to ascertain the patient's current medication regime. Respondent would make a diagnosis and create a treatment plan, which could include the prescription of medication, for Dr. Morris's consideration. Dr. Morris would next come in and examine the patient. Respondent wrote patient notes in the medical records that were subsequently reviewed and co-signed by Dr. Morris. Respondent performed acts in Dr. Morris's office that were beyond the scope of her license as a registered nurse. Ms. Harriett Brinker testified, credibly, that as a registered nurse Respondent could not prescribe treatment plans for patients, nor could she prescribe medication. Respondent completed approximately 60 hours of clinical work with Dr. Morris under the guise of the preceptor arrangement. Dr. Morris would not have permitted Respondent to perform the work she performed in his office but for the sham preceptor arrangement. Respondent asked Dr. Morris to submit certain paperwork pertaining to the preceptor arrangement that had been completed, including an evaluation of her performance as an ARNP student, to FAU's School of Nursing. Thereafter, Dr. James Fisher, Associate Provost at FAU, contacted Dr. Morris about the paperwork he had submitted to FAU at Respondent's request. Dr. Morris learned from Dr. Fisher that Respondent was not a graduate nursing student at FAU. Until his conversation with Dr. Fisher, Dr. Morris believed that Respondent was a student in good standing in the FAU ARNP program. After working for Dr. Morris, Respondent provided FAU with her work evaluations from Dr. Morris, medical records from patients she had cared for, clinical encounter logs containing patient-specific information, and a taped recording containing a series of questions posed by Respondent to one of her patients and the patient's responses. The questions and answers pertained to the level of care Respondent provided the patient. Respondent did not have the permission of Dr. Morris or of any patient to provide these medical records to FAU. G.M. is a patient Respondent saw when she was serving as an ARNP student while she was enrolled in the FAU clinical course NGR 6602L. Dr. Archie McLean was Respondent's supervisor for that clinical course. Respondent hand-copied a portion of G.M.'s medical record and submitted it to FAU. Respondent did not have the permission of Dr. McLean or of G.M. to copy G.M.'s medical records or to submit the copied record to FAU at the time she did so. G.M. subsequently gave Respondent permission to use his copied medical record in the manner she did.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of Sections 464.018(1)(h) and 456.072(1)(m), Florida Statutes, as set forth in this Recommended Order. For each violation, Respondent's license to practice nursing in the State of Florida should be reprimanded; she should be fined in the amount of $1,000.00 ($750 for the Count I violations and $250 for the Count II violation); she should be required to take continuing education classes on the topic of patient's rights and the topic of nursing ethics; and her license should be placed on probation for four years for the Count I violations and four years for the Count II violation, which should be served concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2003.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct. Whether her license as a registered nurse, certificate no. 8829 should be suspended or revoked or whether Respondent should be put on probation.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Christine Richter, who holds license no. 88294-2 was employed as a registered nurse at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital, Tallahassee, Florida, during the month of February, 1977. She worked as a certified nurse and anesthetist under Ann Marie Connors, the chief nurse anesthetist. The chief nurse anesthetist reported to the Associate Executive Director April 11, 1977, that there were gross discrepancies in the narcotics record kept by the Respondent and at that time she presented him with some of the records. On April 12, 1977, Respondent was requested by the Associate Executive Director to report to his office for a conference. Nurse Connors, the chief nurse anesthetist, was also called to be present at that conference. At the conference the Associate Executive Director asked Respondent for an explanation as to the discrepancies between the narcotic and barbiturate administration record and the patient records. In reply the Respondent stated that she needed a hysterectomy and could not afford it. Upon the insistance of the Associate Executive Director that she give an explanation for the discrepancy in the hospital records, she indicated that she needed to improve her charting. She gave no explanation for discrepancies in the narcotics chart which she signed, and indicated that she would resign. The Director stated that he would accept her resignation and she left the conference. The Respondent mailed her written resignation to the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital the following day. The Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, 1976 edition, published by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals "Anesthesia Services" pages 59 through 64 is used as the standard for anesthetic procedure. A department standard book approved by the American Hospital Association and the joint commission on the accreditation of hospitals is required to be read by each employee of the Tallahassee Memorial Hospital as it pertains to the department in which the work is to be performed. The instructions in the department standards book are the same as in the Accreditation Manual for Hospitals as far as anesthesia services is concerned. Medical records of eight patients were introduced into evidence together with Narcotic and Barbiturate Record no. 081291. This shows the date, time, patient's name, room number, doseage, attending physician and administering nurse. The doseage of drugs secured by and signed for by the Respondent, Christine Richter, was more than the records show was administered to the various patients. No accounting was made for the difference between the amounts of drugs secured and the amounts, if any, administered to the patients, although it is the duty of the nurse checking out drugs to account for its use in writing on a form provided for that purpose. The Respondent offered no verbal explanation for the missing drugs when given the opportunity to explain her actions by the Associate Executive Director at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital and her immediate supervisor, Ann Marie Connors, chief nurse anesthetist.
Recommendation Revoke the license of Christine Richter. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire 1005 Blackstone Building 233 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Rivers Buford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 647 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
