The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in conduct proscribed by the Insurance Code as is particularly set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed December 7, 1993.
Findings Of Fact During times material, Respondent, Nelson Speer Benzing, was licensed with Petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, as a life insurance and as a life and health insurance agent. During times material, Respondent was an employee of U.S. Savings Trust Management (herein USSTM). During times material, Respondent was never appointed with Petitioner to represent Wisconsin National Life Insurance Company (herein Wisconsin). However, Respondent did attend a workshop sponsored by Wisconsin. At some time prior to March 5, 1992, Respondent met with George Cantonis, President of Mega Manufacturing, Inc. (herein Mega) in order to obtain Cantonis' permission to make a sales presentation to Mega's employees. Cantonis granted Respondent permission to make a sales presentation to Mega's employees. On March 5, 1992, Respondent made a sales presentation to Mega's employees. The purpose of said presentation was to enroll the employees of Mega in a "savings plan" offered by USSTM. The presentation lasted approximately 15- 30 minutes. Employees were told that the plan, as presented, incorporated an insurance savings plan which had a "liquid" component as well as a long term savings component. At no time during this sales presentation did Respondent explain to employees of Mega that he was a licensed life insurance agent. During the course of his presentation, Respondent described USSTM's product variously as an "insurance saving plan", as an "investment in insurance companies" and as a "retirement savings plan". At no time during the presentation did Respondent specifically state that he was selling life insurance. At the conclusion of the presentation, Respondent enrolled all interested employees in USSTM's plan. During the enrollment procedure, Respondent told the employees to complete portions of at least three documents which included a form entitled "Employee History", a Wisconsin's life insurance application, and an employee payroll deduction authorization. Cantonis enrolled through the above procedure and signed a blank Wisconsin National Life Insurance application. Subsequent to the group sales presentation, Respondent made a similar presentation to Tina Netherton, Mega's office manager, who was working in the office and answering the telephone. At the conclusion of the presentation to Netherton, she enrolled in the plan and also signed a blank Wisconsin National Life Insurance application pursuant to instructions from Respondent. Both Netherton and Cantonis believed that the "savings plan" consisted of both a short term "liquid cash element and a long term investment". Neither were aware that they had purchased life insurance. Both Netherton and Cantonis had, in their opinion, adequate life insurance at the time of Respondent's sales presentation, and would not have purchased additional life insurance if they had been told (by Respondent) that they were purchasing life insurance. Both Netherton and Cantonis executed beneficiary designations on their belief that such was needed so that disbursements, if any, could be made to their designee in the event of their death. Approximately three weeks after enrollment, Netherton and Cantonis received brochures from USSTM which acknowledged their enrollment and detailed the benefits of the "savings plan". The brochure advised that Netherton and Cantonis had enrolled in an insurance "savings plan" and failed to state that they had purchased life insurance. Cantonis and Netherton attempted to withdraw funds from the liquid portion of the plan and were unable to do so. Four to five months after their enrollment, Cantonis and Netherton received life insurance policies from Wisconsin. Pursuant to the insurance applications, Cantonis and Netherton were issued Wisconsin life insurance policy numbers L00566485 and L00566483, respectively. Cantonis and Netherton maintained their Wisconsin policies in order to realize some gain from their overall loss in dealing with Respondent and USSTM. At the time that Respondent made his presentation to Mega's employees and officials, he had never before made sales presentations in order to enroll employees in plans offered by USSTM. Respondent's general manager, Vincent Radcliff, was the agent of record of Wisconsin. The insurance application and policies issued to Cantonis and Netherton were signed by an agent other than Respondent. Respondent's supervisor, Vincent A. Radcliff, III, was disciplined by Petitioner and Respondent cooperated with the Petitioner in investigating the complaint allegations filed against his supervisor, Radcliff. Respondent was first licensed by Petitioner on November 15, 1989. Respondent has not been the subject of any prior disciplinary actions by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent's life and health insurance licenses for a period of three (3) months. It is further RECOMMENDED that Petitioner order that Respondent engage in continuing education respecting the manner and means of soliciting on behalf of insurance companies, and to the extent that he completes the required courses within an acceptable time frame, that the suspension be suspended pending the outcome of Respondent's satisfactory completion of such continuing education courses. 1/ RECOMMENDED this 1st day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1994.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Respondent's license as a viatical settlement provider in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated June 29, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Department of Insurance (Department), was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of viatical settlement providers and the regulation of the viatical settlement industry in this state. The Respondent, Accelerated Benefits Corporation (ABC), was licensed as a viatical settlement provider in Florida. Pursuant to an investigative subpoena issued by the Department, in November and December 1999, investigators of the Department examined the records of the Respondent, as well as other viatical settlement providers operating within the state, looking into the viatical settlement industry's practices in Florida. As a part of the investigation, Janice S. Davis, an examiner/analyst with the Department, copied records of the Respondent relating to at least six individual viatical settlement transactions in which the Respondent was involved. These files relate to Counts 5 through 7 and 9 through 11 of the Administrative complaint. Ms. Davis also obtained from the Respondent the information regarding the location of several other cases, the files for which had been confiscated by the Statewide Prosecutor as a part of an ongoing investigation into the viatical settlement industry, and subsequently obtained copies of those files from the office of the Statewide Prosecutor. Those files relate to Counts 1 through 4 and 8 of the Administrative Complaint. As outlined in Count Five of the Administrative Complaint, in May 1998, D.K. applied to The United States Life Insurance Company (US Life) for a $250,000 life insurance policy. As a part of the policy application, D.K. stated that he had not consulted with any physician or other practitioner within the five years prior to the application. On July 29, 1998, Life Benefit Services (LBS), a viatical settlement broker used by ABC, obtained a "Confidential Application Form" completed by D.K. which revealed that sometime in 1982, D.K. had been diagnosed as HIV positive. LBS prepared a "Policy Summary Sheet" regarding D.K.'s application on which it noted that D.K. had been diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. LBS also had records from D.K.'s physician reflecting that D.K. had been under a doctor's care during the preceding five years. The policy was issued to D.K. on or about August 1, 1998. Notwithstanding the information it had on hand, LBS brokered the sale of the instant policy to ABC. On or about August 25, 1998, D.K. and the Respondent entered into a contract which called for the Respondent to purchase D.K.'s $250,000 life insurance policy for $25,000. At that point, the policy was still contestable. As a part of the transaction, the Respondent gave D.K. written instructions not to contact his insurance company until advised to do so by ABC. The Respondent also had D.K. sign an addendum to the purchase contract in which he agreed to not advise US Life that he had sold his policy and acknowledged his recognition that his life insurance policy was still contestable. D.K. was also asked and agreed to sign an undated change of ownership form for use by ABC at the expiration of the period of contestability. While the policy was still contestable, an employee of the Respondent, Jennifer Grinstead, paid the annual premium on the policy out of her personal checking account. This served to conceal the fact that D.K. had sold the policy to the Respondent. Ms. Grinstead was reimbursed for the premium payment by American Title Company of Orlando. American Title was the Respondent's trustee. The Respondent did not report any of the information it had regarding D.K.'s actual health history to US Life or the Department. A review of the documentation related to this transaction reflected that the Respondent purchased the policy rights from D.K. after it knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that D.K. had made material misrepresentations regarding his health to US Life, and nonetheless attempted to conceal those misrepresentation from US Life. With regard to Count Six, the evidence of record indicates that on May 4, 1997, W.E. applied for a $45,000 life insurance policy from Life USA Insurance Company (Life USA). On the application form he signed and submitted, W.E. specifically stated he had not received any medical or surgical advice or treatment within the preceding five years, had not been advised by a medical doctor that he had AIDS or ARC, and was not, at the time, taking any medication. Based on the representations made by W.E., the policy was issued on November 12, 1997. Notwithstanding the representations made by W.E. to Life USA, W.E. also advised United Viatical Settlements (UVS), the settlement broker used by the Respondent, on December 17, 1997, through a corollary application form, that he had been diagnosed with HIV "a few years ago," and several different other forms utilized by the Respondent reflect that the Respondent knew W.E. had AIDS or HIV, and was under a doctor's treatment for the condition during the preceding five years. Nonetheless, UVS brokered the sale of this policy to the Respondent. In late December 1997, at which time the policy was still contestable, the Respondent entered into a contract with W.E. for the purchase of the $45,000 policy for $4,914.25. As a part of the sales procedure, the Respondent issued to W.E. instructions not to contact his insurance company until instructed to do so by the Respondent's representative, and it also had W.E. sign an addendum to the purchase agreement in which W.E. acknowledged that the policy in issue was still contestable. W.E. was also asked to agree not to inform Life USA of the sale of the policy to the Respondent and to sign an undated change of ownership form for use by the Respondent to transfer ownership when the contestability period had expired. The arrangement between the Respondent and W.E. called for Jennifer Grinstead to pay the annual premium on the policy for W.E. from her personal account and to receive reimbursement for those payments from American Title Company, the Respondent's trustee. This arrangement served to conceal from Life USA the fact that W.E. had sold the policy to the Respondent. The Respondent did not report the fact that it had knowledge of W.E.'s medical condition to the Department. The evidence of record reflects that at the time of the purchase of W.E.'s policy, the Respondent knew or should have known that W.E. had made material misrepresentations regarding his medical state to Life USA on his application for life insurance from that company, and it thereafter took actions which served to conceal those material misrepresentations from the company. In the Case of Count Seven, on April 26, 1997, A.T. applied for a life insurance policy from Lincoln Benefit Life (Lincoln) in the amount of $48,000. On the application form, A.T. specifically stated that he had not been under medical observation or treatment within the preceding five years, and that he had not been diagnosed as having AIDS or ARC, or tested positively for HIV. The policy was issued by the company on or about June 2, 1997. Notwithstanding those representations, on January 14, 1998, Medical Escrow Society, a viatical broker used by the Respondent in its dealing with Lincoln, received an application form from A.T. on which A.T. indicated he had tested positive for HIV on August 8, 1989, had been diagnosed with AIDS ON August 10, 1994, and was under the care of a physician. Medical Escrow Society nonetheless brokered the sale of the policy to the Respondent. Shortly after the contestability period on this policy expired. On June 25, 1999, the owner of the policy, Ralph Cahall, entered into a contract with the Respondent whereby the Respondent bought Cahall's interest in the proceeds for $29,238.72. At the Respondent's request, ownership of the policy was changed from Cahall to American Title Company of Orlando, the Respondent's trustee without either Lincoln or the Department being informed of the transfer. The file relating to this policy indicates that the Respondent brought about the transfer from Cahall after it knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that A.T. had made material misrepresentations regarding his health on the application to Lincoln, and that the Respondent, though it did not report what it knew to the Department, also thereafter undertook a course of action which was designed to conceal that information from Lincoln. With regard to Count Nine, the evidence indicates that on or about September 30, 1996, R.M. submitted an application for a $100,000 life insurance policy to Interstate Assurance Company (Interstate). On the application, R.M. indicated he had not been diagnosed with an immune system disorder within the preceding ten years, and the policy was issued on October 9, 1996. Notwithstanding that representation, on July 18, 1997, R.M. completed an application form for Benefits America, a broker used by the Respondent with regard to this policy, in which he stated he had been tested positive for HIV on February 11, 1994. A "Policy Acquisition Worksheet" utilized by the Respondent on or about July 22, 1997, when R.M. was dealing with Benefits America regarding the viatication of his life insurance policy, reflects that the company was aware at that time that R.M. had been diagnosed with HIV in 1994. Even with that knowledge, the Respondent went through with the viatication, and on July 31, 1997, while the policy was still within the contestability period, bought the policy for $15,430. On August 4, 1997, R.M. executed an addendum to the purchase agreement at the behest of the Respondent, wherein he recognized the policy was still contestable and agreed, among other things, not to contact his insurance company or tell them he had sold the policy to a viatical settlement provider. He also was asked to sign, and signed, an undated change of ownership agreement for use by the Respondent at the end of the contestability period. Jennifer Grinstead, an employee of the Respondent, paid R.M.'s annual premium on the policy during the contestibility period out of her personal checking account. This action, when done in conjunction with R.M.'s failure to advise the insurance company of the sale, served to conceal the transfer of ownership from R.M. to the Respondent. Ms. Grinstead was reimbursed for the premium payments by the Respondent's trustee. The Respondent did not report to Interstate or to the Department that R.M. had made material misrepresentations regarding his health in procuring the issuance of the policy even though it knew or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have known that the material misrepresentations had been made. As to Count Ten, on May 12, 1997, J.R. submitted an application to Interstate for a life insurance policy on his life in the amount of $980,000. On his application, J.R. indicated he had not been diagnosed with an immune system disorder within the preceding ten years, had not been treated by a member of the medical profession in the preceding five years, and was not, at the time, on medication or undergoing treatment or therapy. The policy was issued on May 19, 1997. Notwithstanding those representations, on July 9, 1997, J.R. filled out an application form for the Respondent's broker for this transaction, Life Benefit Services, on which he indicated he had been diagnosed as HIV positive in May 1996. A "Mortality Profile" provided to the Respondent by AVS indicated that J.R. was first diagnosed as being HIV positive in August 1995, nine months or so earlier than he admitted, and that he had been undergoing treatment by a doctor and receiving medications well within the five years preceding the application. On August 20, 1997, J.R. entered into a contract with the Respondent calling for the sale of this insurance policy to ABC for a net sum of $107,800. At this point, the policy was still contestable. At that time, the Respondent instructed J.R. in writing not to contact his insurance company until told to do so by the Respondent's representative. The Respondent also had J.R. sign an addendum to the purchase agreement in which he acknowledged the policy was still contestable, that he would not inform Interstate of the sale, and that he would sign an undated change of ownership form for use by ABC when the contestability period expired. Notwithstanding that the Respondent knew of the material misrepresentations made by J.R. as to his health when he procured the policy, it did not report what it knew to the Department, and took steps to insure Interstate was not informed of what was going on. With regard to Count Eleven, on May 16, 1996, the same J.R. applied to Massachusetts General Life Insurance Company, later, Conseco Life Insurance Company (Conseco), for a $99,900 life insurance policy. On his application, J.R. stated he had never had any medical tests or any known indication of diseases, conditions, or physical disorders which were not mentioned on the form. AIDS, ARC, and HIV positive were not mentioned on the form, and if known to have been present, should have been noted. About a year and three months later, on July 9, 1997, J.R. submitted an application form to Life Benefit Services, the broker used by ABC on this policy, on which he stated he had tested positive for HIV in May of 1996. By letter dated July 28, 1997, Life Benefit Services advised ABC that J.R. was terminally ill and had been on medication and undergoing treatment by a physician within the preceding five years. In addition to this information, the Respondent had available to it the information regarding J.R.'s condition discovered as a result of the purchase of the Interstate policy. Notwithstanding this knowledge, on September 17, 1997, while the policy was still contestable, ABC purchased the Conseco policy from J.R. for the net sum of $13,986. By letter dated September 17, 1997, the Respondent advised J.R. not to contact his insurance company until instructed to do so by Ms. Holman, the Respondent's Director of Contracts, and requested he execute an addendum acknowledging those instructions and that the Conseco policy was still contestable. He was also asked to agree to sign an undated change of ownership assignment for use by ABC after the contestability period had expired. While the policy remained contestable, the annual premiums due from J.R. were paid from her personal checking account by Ms. Grinstead, an ABC employee, who was reimbursed therefor by American Title, ABC's trustee. None of the above information was reported by the Respondent to Conseco or the Department even though it knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that J.R. had made material misrepresentations regarding his physical health in his application for life insurance to Massachusetts General Life Insurance company, and it appears the Respondent attempted to conceal those misrepresentations from Conseco.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing Counts One through Four and Eight of the Administrative Complaint, but finding the Respondent guilty of Counts Five though Seven and Nine through Eleven of the Complaint, and both revoking its license and its eligibility for licensure as a viatical settlement provider in Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael H. Davidson, Esquire Department of Insurance 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Mark K. Logan, Esquire Smith, Ballard & Logan, P.A. 403 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents offered and sold securities in Florida, in violation of the registration requirements of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes; offered and sold securities in Florida while Respondents were unregistered, in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; or committed fraud in the offer, sale, or purchase of securities in Florida, in violation of Section 517.301(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is the penalty to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent James A. Torchia (Respondent) held a valid life and health insurance license. Respondent was the president and owner of Respondent Empire Insurance, Inc. (Empire Insurance), a now-dissolved Florida corporation. Empire Insurance was in the insurance business, and Respondent was its sole registered insurance agent. At no material time has Respondent or Empire Insurance held any license or registration to engage in the sale or offer for sale of securities in Florida. At no material time were the investments described below sold and offered for sale by Respondent or Empire Insurance registered as securities in Florida. These cases involve viaticated life insurance policies. A life insurance policy is viaticated when the policy owner, also known as the viator, enters into a viatical settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the viator sells the policy and death benefits to the purchaser for an amount less than the death benefit--the closer the viator is perceived to be to death, the greater the discount from the face amount of the death benefit. The viatical industry emerged to provide dying insureds, prior to death, a means by which to sell their life insurance policies to obtain cash to enjoy during their remaining lives. As this industry matured, brokers and dealers, respectively, arranged for the sale of, and bought and resold, life insurance policies of dying insureds. Prior to the death of the viator, these viaticated life insurance policies, or interests in such policies, may be sold and resold several times. In these cases, viators sold their life insurance policies to Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. (FinFed). Having raised money from investors, American Benefit Services (ABS) then paid FinFed, which assigned viaticated policies, or interests in the policies, to various trusts. The trusts held the legal title to the policies, and the trust beneficiaries, who are the investors from whom ABS had obtained the funds to pay FinFed, held equitable title to the policies. Sometimes in these cases, a broker or dealer, such as William Page and Associates, intervened between the viator and FinFed. At some point, though, ABS obtained money from investors to acquire policies, but did not pay the money to FinFed to purchase viaticated life insurance policies. The FinFed and ABS investment program eventually became a Ponzi scheme, in which investor payouts were derived largely, if not exclusively, from the investments of other investors. ABS typically acquired funds through the promotional efforts of insurance agents, such as Respondent and Empire Insurance. Using literature provided by ABS, these agents often sold these investments to insurance clients. As was typical, Respondent and Empire Insurance advertised the types of claims described below by publishing large display ads that ran in Florida newspapers. Among the ABS literature is a Participation Disclosure (Disclosure), which describes the investment. The Disclosure addresses the investor as a "Participant" and the investment as a "Participation." The Disclosure contains a Participation Agreement (Agreement), which provides that the parties agree to the Disclosure and states whether the investor has chosen the Growth Plan or Income Plan, which are described below; a Disbursement Letter of Instruction, which is described below; and a Letter of Instruction to Trust, which is described below. The agent obtains the investor's signature to all three of these documents when the investor delivers his check, payable to the escrow agent, to purchase the investment. The Disclosure states that the investments offer a “High Return”: “Guaranteed Return on Participation 42% at Maturity.” The Disclosure adds that the investments are “Low Risk”: “Secured by a Guaranteed Insurance Industry Receivable”; “Secured by $300,000 State Insurance Guarantee Fund”; “Short Term Participation (Maturity Expectation 36 Months)”; “Principal Liquid After One Year With No Surrender Charge”; “State Regulated Participation”; “All Transactions By Independent Trust & Escrow Agents”; and “If policy fails to mature at 36 months, participant may elect full return of principal plus 15% simple interest.” The Disclosure describes two alternative investments: the Growth Plan and Income Plan. For the Growth Plan, the Disclosure states: “At maturity, Participant receives principal plus 42%, creating maximum growth of funds.” For the Income Plan, the Disclosure states: “If income is desired, participation can be structured with monthly income plans.” Different rates of return for the Growth and Income plans are set forth below. For investors choosing the Income Plan, ABS applied only 70 percent of the investment to the purchase of viaticated life insurance policies. ABS reserved the remaining 30 percent as the source of money to "repay" the investor the income that he was due to receive under the Income Plan, which, as noted below, paid a total yield of 29.6 percent over three years. The Disclosure states that ABS places all investor funds in attorneys’ trust accounts, pursuant to arrangements with two “bonded and insured” “financial escrow agents.” At another point in the document, the Disclosure states that the investor funds are deposited “directly” with a “financial escrow agent,” pursuant to the participant’s Disbursement Letter of Instruction. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction identifies a Florida attorney as the “financial escrow agent,” who receives the investor’s funds and disburses them, “to the order of [FinFed) or to the source of the [viaticated insurance] benefits and/or its designees.” This disbursement takes place only after the attorney receives “[a] copy of the irrevocable, absolute assignment, executed in favor of Participant and recorded with the trust account as indicated on the assignment of [viaticated insurance] benefits, and setting out the ownership percentage of said [viaticated insurance] benefits”; a “medical overview” of the insured indicative of not more than 36 months’ life expectancy; confirmation that the policy is in full force and effect and has been in force beyond the period during which the insurer may contest coverage; and a copy of the shipping airbill confirming that the assignment was sent to the investor. The Disclosure states that the investor will direct a trust company to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. When the life insurance policy matures on the death of the viator, the insurer pays the death benefits to the trust company, which pays these proceeds to the investor, in accordance with his interest in the trust. Accordingly, the Letter of Instruction to Trust directs FinFed, as the trust company, to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. The Letter of Instruction to Trust provides that the viaticated insurance benefits obtained with the investor's investment shall be assigned to this trust, and, at maturity, FinFed shall pay the investor a specified sum upon the death of the viator and the trustee's receipt of the death benefit from the insurer. The Disclosure provides that, at anytime from 12 to 36 months after the execution of the Disclosure, the investor has the option to request ABS to return his investment, without interest. At 36 months, if the viator has not yet died, the investor has the right to receive the return of his investment, plus 15 percent (five percent annually). The Disclosure states that ABS will pay all costs and fees to maintain the policy and that all policies are based on a life expectancy for the viator of no more than 36 months. Also, the Disclosure assures that ABS will invest only in policies that are issued by insurers that are rated "A" or better by A.M. Best "at the time that the Participant's deposit is confirmed." The Disclosure mentions that the trust company will name the investor as an irrevocable assignee of the policy benefits. The irrevocable assignment of policy benefits mentioned in the Disclosure and the Disbursement Letter of Instruction is an anomaly because it does not conform to the documentary scheme described above. After the investor pays the escrow agent and executes the documents described above, FinFed executes the “Irrevocable Absolute Assignment of Viaticated Insurance Benefits.” This assignment is from the trustee, as grantor, to the investor, as grantee, and applies to a specified percentage of a specific life insurance policy, whose death benefit is disclosed on the assignment. The assignment includes the "right to receive any viaticated insurance benefit payable under the Trusts [sic] guaranteed receivables of assigned viaticated insurance benefits from the noted insurance company; [and the] right to assign any and all rights received under this Trust irrevocable absolute assignment." On its face, the assignment assigns the trust corpus-- i.e., the insurance policy or an interest in an insurance policy--to the trust beneficiary. Doing so would dissolve the trust and defeat the purpose of the other documents, which provide for the trust to hold the policy and, upon the death of the viator, to pay the policy proceeds in accordance with the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The assignment bears an ornate border and the corporate seal of FinFed. Probably, FinFed intended the assignment to impress the investors with the "reality" of their investment, as the decorated intangible of an "irrevocable" interest in an actual insurance policy may seem more impressive than the unadorned intangible of a beneficial interest in a trust that holds an insurance policy. Or possibly, the FinFed/ABS principals and professionals elected not to invest much time or effort in the details of the transactional documentation of a Ponzi scheme. What was true then is truer now. Obviously, in those cases in which no policy existed, the investor paid his money before any policy had been selected for him. However, this appears to have been the process contemplated by the ABS literature, even in those cases in which a policy did exist. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction and correspondence from Respondent, Empire Insurance, or Empire Financial Consultant to ABS reveal that FinFed did not assign a policy, or part of a policy, to an investor until after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In some cases, Respondent or Empire Insurance requested ABS to obtain for an investor a policy whose insured had special characteristics or a investment plan with a maturity shorter than 36 months. FinFed and ABS undertook other tasks after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In addition to matching a viator with an investor, based on the investor's expressed investment objectives, FinFed paid the premiums on the viaticated policies until the viator died and checked on the health of the viator. Also, if the viator did not die within three years and the investor elected to obtain a return of his investment, plus 15 percent, ABS, as a broker, resold the investor's investment to generate the 15 percent return that had been guaranteed to the investor. Similarly, ABS would sell the investment of investors who wanted their money back prior to three years. The escrow agent also assumed an important duty--in retrospect, the most important duty--after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents; the escrow agent was to verify the existence of the viaticated policy. Respondent and Empire Insurance sold beneficial interests in trusts holding viaticated life insurance policies in 50 separate transactions. These investors invested a total of $1.5 million, nearly all of which has been lost. Respondent and Empire Insurance earned commissions of about $120,000 on these sales. Petitioner proved that Respondent and Empire Insurance made the following sales. Net worths appear for those investors for whom Respondent recorded net worths; for most, he just wrote "sufficient" on the form. Unless otherwise indicated, the yield was 42 percent for the Growth Plan. In all cases, investors paid money for their investments. In all cases, FinFed and ABS assigned parts of policies to the trusts, even of investors investing relatively large amounts. On March 21, 1998, Phillip A. Allan, a Florida resident, paid $69,247.53 for the Growth Plan. On March 26, 1998, Monica Bracone, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $900,000, paid $8000 for the Growth Plan. On April 2, 1998, Alan G. and Judy LeFort, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on June 8, 1998, the LeForts paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In the second transaction, the yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement notes a 36-month life expectancy of the viator. The different yields based on life expectancies are set forth below, but, as noted above, the standard yield was 42 percent, and, as noted below, this was based on a 36-month life expectancy, so Respondent miscalculated the investment return or misdocumented the investment on the LeForts' second transaction. On April 29, 1998, Doron and Barbara Sterling, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on August 14, 1998, the Sterlings paid $100,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield for the second transaction is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement notes that the Sterlings were seeking a viator with a life expectancy of only 30 months. When transmitting the closing documents for the second Sterling transaction, Respondent, writing ABS on Empire Insurance letterhead, stated in part: This guy has already invested with us (15,000) [sic]. He gave me this application but wants a 30 month term. Since he has invested, he did some research and has asked that he be put on a low T-cell count and the viator to be an IV drug user. I know it is another favor but this guy is a close friend and has the potential to put at least another 500,000 [sic]. If you can not [sic] do it, then I understand. You have done a lot for me and I always try to bring in good quality business. If this inventory is not available, the client has requested that we return the funds . . . In a third transaction, on February 24, 1999, the Sterlings paid $71,973 for the Growth Plan. The yield is only 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects the typical 36-month life expectancy for the viator. Although the investors would not have received this document, Respondent completed an ABS form entitled, "New Business Transmittal," and checked the box, "Life Expectancy 2 years or less (28%). The other boxes are: "Life Expectancy 2 1/2 years or less (35%)" and "Life Expectancy 3 years or less (42%)." On May 4, 1998, Hector Alvero and Idelma Guillen, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $6000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on October 29, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a third transaction, on November 30, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. For this investment, Ms. Guillen requested an "IV drug user," according to Respondent in a letter dated December 1, 1998, on Empire Financial Consultants letterhead. This is the first use of the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants, not Empire Insurance, and all letters after that date are on the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants. In a fourth transaction, on January 29, 1999, Ms. Guillen paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On April 23, 1998, Bonnie P. Jensen, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $120,000, paid $65,884.14 for the Growth Plan. Her yield was 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 20, 1998, Michael J. Mosack, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $70,600 for the Income Plan. He was to receive monthly distributions of $580.10 for three years. The total yield, including monthly distributions, is $20,883.48, which is about 29.6 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 27, 1998, Lewis and Fernande G. Iachance, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On June 3, 1998, Sidney Yospe, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $1,500,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 30-month life expectancy. On June 12, 1998, Bernard Aptheker, with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 10, 1998, Irene M. and Herman Kutschenreuter, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 9, 1998, Daniel and Mary Spinosa, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 5, 1998, Pauline J. and Anthony Torchia, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000 and the parents of Respondent, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 29, 1998, Christopher D. Bailey, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction on the same day, Mr. Bailey paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. Petitioner submitted documents concerning a purported purchase by Lauren W. Kramer on July 21, 1998, but they were marked "VOID" and do not appear to be valid. On July 22, 1998, Laura M. and Kenneth D. Braun, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $150,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan, as Respondent completed the Participation Agreement. However, the agreement calls for them to receive $205.42 monthly for 36 months and receive a total yield, including monthly payments, of 29.6 percent, so it appears that the Brauns bought the Income Plan. In a second transaction, also on July 22, 1998, the Brauns paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Roy R. Worrall, a Florida resident, paid $100,000 for the Income Plan. The Participation Agreement provides that he will receive monthly payments of $821.66 and a total yield of 29.6 percent. On July 16, 1998, Earl and Rosemary Gilmore, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on February 12, 1999, the Gilmores paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of two years or less. On July 14, 1998, David M. Bobrow, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $700,000 on one form and $70,000 on another form, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction, on the same day, Mr. Bobrow paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 27, 1998, Cecilia and Harold Lopatin, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 30, 1998, Ada R. Davis, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Income Plan. Her total yield, including monthly payments of $246.50 for three years, is 29.6 percent. In a second transaction, on the same day, Ms. Davis paid $30,000 for the Income Plan on the same terms as the first purchase. On July 27, 1998, Joseph F. and Adelaide A. O'Keefe, Florida residents with a net worth of $300,000, paid $12,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 5, 1998, Thurley E. Margeson, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 19, 1998, Stephanie Segaria, a Florida resident, paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 26, 1998, Roy and Glenda Raines, Florida residents, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of 30 months or less. In a second transaction, on the same day, the Raineses paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy, although, again, the New Business Transmittal notes the life expectancy of 30 months or less. On November 24, 1998, Dan W. Lipford, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan in two transactions. In a third transaction, on January 13, 1999, Mr. Lipford paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 1, 1998, Mary E. Friebes, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 4, 1998, Allan Hidalgo, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 17, 1998, Paul E. and Rose E. Frechette, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including monthly payments of $205.41 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 26, 1998, Theodore and Tillie F. Friedman, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 19, 1999, Robert S. and Karen M. Devos, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Arthur Hecker, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $410.83 for 36 months, is 29.6 percent. On February 11, 1999, Michael Galotola, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on the same day, Michael and Anna Galotola paid $12,500 for the Growth Plan. On November 3, 1998, Lee Chamberlain, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 23, 1998, Herbert L. Pasqual, a Florida resident, paid $200,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $1643.33 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 1, 1998, Charles R. and Maryann Schuyler, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. Respondent and Empire Insurance were never aware of the fraud being perpetrated by FinFed and ABS at anytime during the 38 transactions mentioned above. Respondent attempted to verify with third parties the existence of the viaticated insurance policies. When ABS presented its program to 30-40 potential agents, including Respondent, ABS presented these persons an opinion letter from ABS's attorney, stating that the investment was not a security, under Florida law. Respondent also contacted Petitioner's predecessor agency and asked if these transactions involving viaticated life insurance policies constituted the sale of securities. An agency employee informed Respondent that these transactions did not constitute the sale of securities.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order: Finding James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., not guilty of violating Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes; Finding James A. Torchia guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; Finding Empire Insurance, Inc., guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes, except for transactions closed on or after December 1, 1998; Directing James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., to cease and desist from further violations of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $120,000 against James A. Torchia. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Fred H. Wilsen Senior Attorney Office of Financial Institutions and Securities Regulation South Tower, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1799 Barry S. Mittelberg Mittelberg & Nicosia, P.A. 8100 North University Drive, Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33321
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund from the State of Florida Group Health Self Insurance Plan of pre-tax supplemental insurance premiums in the amount of $47.46 or $47.45 a month that were deducted from his pay for the 2007 and 2008 insurance plan years.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Detrick Murray ("Petitioner" or "Mr. Murray") was, at all times relevant to this proceeding, employed by the Florida Department of Corrections. As a state employee, he was given the option to participate in a pre-tax supplemental accident/disability insurance plan. Benefits, including insurance plans, are administered by a private contractor, Convergys, through a project called "People First," operated on behalf of Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance ("Respondent or the Division"). During the 2005 open enrollment period for the 2006 plan year, Mr. Murray elected to participate in a state- sponsored supplemental/accidental policy offered by Colonial Insurance Company ("Colonial"). The reverse side of the enrollment provided the following information and instructions: The enrollment form must be used to enroll in or change coverages. No changes will be accepted by e-mail or letter. Enrolling in a supplemental insurance plan, or changing options, does not automatically stop other coverages you currently have. To stop an existing coverage, you must place an "S" in the box provided for that Plan on the front of this form (Part 1). Only complete Part 2 on the front of this form if you wish to stop plans currently not offered. The Supplemental Enrollment Form must be submitted to the People First Service Center. Enrollment changes will not occur if forms and/or applications and the Supplemental Company Application are submitted directly to the supplemental insurance company. If you cancel or do not enroll in supplemental insurance, you will not be able to enroll again until the next annual open enrollment period, unless you experience a Qualifying Status Change. Supplemental premiums are deducted on a pre- tax basis. It is your responsibility to ensure that your enrollment selections are in effect. Check your payroll warrants to ensure that your deductions properly reflect your selections. Contact the People First Service Center immediately if these deductions are not correct. I understand my enrollment and/or changes will be effective the first of the month following a full payroll deduction. I also understand my elections are IRREVOCABLE until the next annual open enrollment period, unless I have a Qualifying Status Change as defined by the Federal Internal Revenue Code and/or the Florida Administrative Code. I understand that I must request such changes within thirty-one (31) calendar days of the Qualifying Status Change. The open enrollment period for the next year, the 2007 plan year, began on September 19, 2006, and ended on October 18, 2006. On October 14, 2006, Mr. Murray notified Colonial that he wanted to cancel the supplemental insurance for the 2007 plan year. He used a Colonial Request for Services form and sent it to the Colonial Processing Center in Columbia, South Carolina. In a letter dated February 14, 2007, Colonial acknowledged receiving Mr. Murray's request to cancel the insurance during the 2006 enrollment period, and informed him of its receipt of an "overpayment" of $47.46 monthly beginning January 1, 2007. Colonial directed Mr. Murray to contact his personnel officer "which will then work through the Division to issue your refund." After the open enrollment period ended, Mr. Murray had also contacted People First on November 14, 2006, and gave notice of his attempt to cancel with Colonial. He was informed that Colonial had not informed People First of the cancellation. Mr. Murray contacted People First again on January 29, 2007, questioning the continued payroll deductions and requesting a refund, as Colonial had suggested. He was told that he would have to cancel with People First during the open enrollment period, but he could send a letter of appeal to try to get a refund of premiums and try to cancel sooner. Despite repeated contacts, requests for refunds, and appeals to People First during 2007, Mr. Murray continued to have premiums for supplemental insurance deducted from his pay check. Ultimately, the Division denied his appeal. Although Mr. Murray was trying to get a refund for 2007 payroll deductions, he again failed to notify People First to cancel the insurance during the open enrollment period between September 17, 2007, and October 19, 2007, for the 2008 plan year. There is no evidence that Mr. Murray had a qualifying status change, as required by federal and state law, that would have permitted him to cancel the insurance at any time other than during open enrollment periods for the 2007 and 2008 plan years. The enrollment period for the 2009 plan year began on September 22, 2008, and ended on October 17, 2008. On September 24, 2008, Mr. Murray cancelled the supplemental insurance for the 2009 plan year by making a telephone call to a People First representative. In a late-filed exhibit produced by a manager for Convergys at the request of Petitioner, the Division showed that payments were made to Colonial to insure Mr. Murray through November 24, 2008. Sandi Wade, the Division's benefits administrator, noted that Colonial should not have canceled Mr. Murray's insurance policy. Colonial had no authority to send the letter of February 14, 2007, incorrectly telling Mr. Murray he was entitled to a refund. Ms. Wade's observations prompted Mr. Murray to question what, if any, remedies he might have with regard to Colonial's error. That issue is not and cannot be considered in this proceeding. In the absence of evidence that the Division or its agents were notified to cancel the supplemental insurance during open enrollment periods for 2007 and 2008, or based on a qualifying status change, Petitioner's request for a refund of premiums must be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurnace, enter a final order denying Petitioner, Detrick Murray, a refund of his accident/disability insurance coverage premiums paid in 2007 and 2008. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Detrick Murray 4370 Northwest 187th Street Miami, Florida 33055 John Brenneis, General Counsel Division of State Group Insurance Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue This case concerns the issue of whether Respondent's license as an Ordinary Life including Disability agent should be suspended, revoked, or otherwise disciplined for making certain misrepresentations to a Mr. Roger L. Robert in connection with the sale of a life insurance policy to Mr. Robert. A second issue relating to such disciplinary action is whether the Respondent improperly applied to become an insured under a group insurance policy. At the formal hearing, the Petitioner called as witnesses John E. Riley, Roger L. Robert, Angela Stackler, Marie Ellena Mullins, Frederick P. Quinn. The Respondent called as witnesses Baron Kramer, and the Respondent, Stanford J. Sabarsky. The Petitioner offered and had admitted into evidence Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 7. Counsel for the Petitioner and counsel for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Hearing Officer for consideration. To the extent that the findings of fact herein are consistent with those proposed findings, the proposed findings were adopted by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that the findings herein are inconsistent with the proposed findings the proposed findings were considered by the Hearing Officer and rejected as having been unsupported by the evidence or as being unnecessary to the resolution of this cause.
Findings Of Fact COUNT I As to Count I of the Administrative Complaint, the parties stipulated to certain facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and those facts are found as facts in Paragraphs 1 through 9 below: Respondent, Stanford J. Sabarsky, at all times material herein, represented the All American Life Insurance Company as a licensed Ordinary Life, including Disability Agent. Stanford J. Sabarsky did on or about September 16, 1980, contact one Roger L. Robert, President of Freight Sales Centers, Inc. of Tampa, Florida for the purpose of soliciting an application for life insurance from Mr. Robert. At that time and place, Respondent represented to Mr. Robert that he could purchase a seven hundred fifty thousand dollar ($750,000.00) life insurance policy to be issued by the All American Life Insurance Company with an initial annual premium payment of fourteen thousand two hundred and eighty-five dollars ($14,285.00) As a result of said application, the All American Life Insurance Company subsequently issued to Mr. Robert policy number L1124920 effective November 11, 1980, in the face amount of seven hundred fifty thousand dollars ($750,000.00). Premium payments on policy number L1124920 were made by Mr. Robert on a monthly basis from October, 1980, to November, 1981. On or about November, 1981, Mr. Robert received notice from the All American Life Insurance Company that the second annual renewal premium on policy number L1124920 was due. On or about December 4, 1981, Mr. Robert requested that the renewal premium be paid from the cash value of his policy. As a result of the request, the second year annual renewal premium on policy number L1124920 was paid for by a policy loan against said policy, thereby reducing the net insurance protection of that policy. That Respondent, Stanford J. Sabarsky, earned a sales commission due to the issuance of policy L1124920. Prior to purchasing policy L1124920, Mr. Robert was given a sales presentation in his office by the Respondent. It was represented to Mr. Robert, by Mr. Sabarsky, that after the first year's premium was paid, the premium would thereafter be paid by the cash value and he would not have to make any more premium payments. Mr. Sabarsky also explained to him that the cash value could be borrowed out of the policy at approximately seven percent interest. It was Mr. Robert's understanding that after he paid the first year's premium, he would never have to pay out any more money for the life insurance coverage. He expressed this understanding to Angela Stackler, an employee, in the presence of Respondent, and Respondent did not inform him that his understanding was incorrect. In approximately November, 1981, Mr. Sabarsky returned to Mr. Robert's office. At that time, Mr. Sabarsky was questioned by Mr. Robert and his employee Ellena Mullins about the fact that they had received a bill for the next year's premium. In response to the inquiry, Mr. Sabarsky related that the first year's premium would carry the policy and that Mr. Robert wouldn't have to pay any more money. Mr. Sabarsky did not explain to Mr. Robert in November, 1980, or in November, 1981, the out-of-pocket expense which Mr. Robert would have to pay each year in order to borrow the cash value to pay the premium. In order to obtain those loans annually, Mr. Robert, within six years of the policy, would have out-of-pocket interest expense of $3,779.00, and in ten years, would pay interest of $10,163.00 in order to maintain the policy in effect. On April 1, 1982, Mr. Robert, after making inquiry to All American Life Insurance Company, received a letter setting forth the out-of-pocket expenses which would be required of him in order to maintain the life insurance policy in effect. COUNT II As to the allegations of Count II of the Administrative Complaint, the parties stipulated to those facts found in Paragraphs 14 through 16 below. That at all times pertinent to the dates and occurrences referred to in this Administrative Complaint, Respondent, Stanford J. Sabarsky, was qualified and licensed as an insurance agent in this state. On or about January 29, 1979, Stanford J. Sabarsky, while licensed as an insurance agent for Home Security Life Insurance Company, did solicit and sell to Roger L. Robert, President of Freight Sales Center, Inc. of Tampa, Florida, a group disability insurance plan for the employees of Freight Sales Center, Inc. That on or about February 12, 1981, Stanford J. Sabarsky, signed an application to Home Security Life Insurance Company to have his name added to said group disability insurance plan and indicated on said application that he was an employee of Freight Sales Center, Inc. Prior to signing the application on February 12, 1981, the Respondent had asked Roger L. Robert to allow him to add his name to the group disability insurance plan of Freight Sales Center, Inc. As a result of the February 12, 1981, application, the Respondent was, in fact, added as an insured to the group disability insurance policy. He remained as an insured under the policy until approximately May, 1981. In March, 1981, the Respondent submitted a claim to Home Security Life Insurance Company. The claim was paid. The application signed by the Respondent (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) on February 12, 1981, reflected that he worked a minimum of 30 hours per week for Freight Sales Center, Inc, that his date of employment was 1/30/81, and that his base earnings was $600 per week. These facts were not true. At no time from January 30, 1981, to May, 1981, was the Respondent an employee of Freight Sales Center, Inc. The Respondent was aware at the time that he signed the application that he was not an employee of Freight Sales Center, Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order suspending Respondent's license as an Ordinary Life including Disability agent for a period of one (1) year. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George W. Greer, Esquire 302 South Garden Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516 Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner, Amjad Shamim, is eligible for continuation coverage of health insurance and reimbursement, under the State of Florida Employees Group Insurance Plan, for medical care expenses he incurred after he left state employment.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Shamim became a full-time employee of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) in September, 1986, and worked at the Palm Beach County Health Department. Effective August 1, 1987, Mr. Shamim was insured with family coverage under the State of Florida, Employee Group Health Insurance Program. His enrollment continued until his insurance termination effective date of January 1, 1989. On November 15, 1988, Mr. Shamim met with Martina L. Walker, Personnel Technician I for HRS at the Palm Beach County Health Department, in connection with his decision to leave the Department's employ on November 18, 1988. At that meeting he executed the documents required by HRS to discontinue his health insurance coverage. As part of that November 15, 1988, conference, Martina Walker informed Mr. Shamim of his rights to continued health insurance coverage after his termination of employment. Mr. Shamim advised Ms. Walker that he no longer needed the State coverage because his new employer offered a health insurance plan to its employees. Ms. Walker, nonetheless, cautioned Mr. Shamim that any pre-existing conditions are usually not covered by new employer policies. Ms. Walker's notification of Mr. Shamim's right to continued health insurance coverage for up to 18 months was not in writing. Mrs. Walker never told Mr. Shamim orally the specifics of continuation coverage, i.e., that he had 60 days to elect continuation coverage from the coverage effective date of January 1, 1989, that his application and premium were required to be postmarked by March 1, 1989; or that he could continue his family coverage for 18 months at monthly premium of $273.01 per month. In addition to disclosures when an employee leaves, all employees of the Palm Beach County Health Department are advised of their opportunity to elect continuation coverage under the State Plan at the time of their employment, by means of a notice furnished by HRS. Mr. Shamim received a general notice of benefits, including the availability of post employment continuation coverage, at the time of his employment. The termination form completed by Ms. Walker was processed routinely, and caused the Division of State Employee Insurance to mail Mr. Shamim written notification by first class mail of the availability of continuation coverage in a letter dated December 1, 1988. Due to the appearance of the handwritten address on the notice mailed to Mr. Shamim, it is more likely than not that this notice failed to arrive at Mr. Shamim's home address. The portion of the address for the apartment number could be read as D201 or 2201, which would account for misdirection of the notice in the mail. Mr. Shamim's claim that he did not receive the notification is accepted. Had the notice been properly addressed and had he received it, Mr. Shamim would have had the opportunity to decide whether to exercise his legal right to continue his health insurance. On January 27, 1989, Mr. Shamim had surgery to his hand. He had been treated for that condition while he was employed with the Palm Beach County Health Department. Because it was deemed to be a pre-existing condition, the expense he incurred of almost $4,000 was not covered under the health insurance policy of his new employer. There is no evidence of the length of time the pre- existing condition exclusion in the policy offered by Mr. Shamim's new employer lasts. Mr. Shamim first notified HRS of his desire for post termination health insurance coverage on September 19, 1989. A second request was made on November 7, 1989. Finding no success with HRS, Mr. Shamim contacted the Respondent on December 29, 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered accepting the request of Mr. Shamim for continuation coverage, accepting his premiums and processing his claim. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of November, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of November, 1990.
Findings Of Fact Edward Berk, Respondent, was at all times here relevant licensed as an ordinary life, including disability, insurance agent to represent Founders Life Assurance Company, Standard Security Life Insurance Company of New York, American Variable Annuity Life Assurance Company, Wisconsin Life Insurance Company, Columbian Mutual Life Insurance Company, and Lone Star Life Insurance Company. He is licensed as a disability insurance (2-40) agent to represent American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus and an ordinary life (2-16) agent to represent Estate Life Insurance Company of America. (Exhibit 1). On April 12, 1979 Respondent pleaded guilty in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York of violation of 18 USC 1341 and 1342 to wit: unlawfully, willfully and knowingly devising and intending to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money from The Travelers Insurance Company by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations , and promises. He was found guilty and sentenced to two years imprisonment on each of five counts, the sentences to run concurrently. The execution of the sentence was suspended and Respondent was placed on probation for a period of two years (Exhibits 2)
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent Michael Quintana is currently licensed as a general lines agent in Florida. On or about January 18, 1983, respondent went to the home of Shirley W. McLaughlin for the purpose of soliciting insurance. Mrs. McLaughlin agreed to purchase a homeowners insurance policy and "mortgage" insurance was also discussed. She supplied the necessary information and signed the applications for both the homeowner insurance and the "mortgage" insurance. While she did not desire to purchase what she understood to be strictly "life" insurance, she did understand that what she "was getting at that particular time was protection for the house, period." (TR. 32) She further understood that she was applying for coverage that would pay something if either she or her husband died, and that such would be payable to the beneficiaries. While she was given the opportunity to review all the papers she signed on January 18, 1983, Mrs. McLaughlin apparently did not understand that the premium payments for the "mortgage" insurance would be automatically withdrawn from her bank account. Sometime after her application for homeowners insurance was refused because of a space heater in her home, Mrs. McLaughlin learned from her bank of the automatic withdrawal of premium payments for the "mortgage" insurance. She thereafter cancelled such insurance and all monies were refunded to her. The cover sheet for the "mortgage" insurance policy identifies the policy as a "joint reducing term life insurance policy." The inserted printout setting forth the costs and benefits describes the basic policy as "joint reducing term life (20-year mortgage term) with disability waiver benefit." Agents within the company with which respondent was employed on January 18, 1983, typically refer to such a policy as a "mortgage insurance policy" or a "mortgage cancellation policy," as opposed to a "life insurance policy." The term "mortgage" is used to delineate that a specific policy has been purchased for a specific loss. The beneficiary of such a policy has the option of either paying off the mortgage or using the money for any other purpose.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed on June 11, 1984, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: William W. Tharpe, Jr. 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Fla. 32301 Timothy G. Anderson 620 E. Twigg Street Tampa, Fla. 33602 Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Fla. 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Insurance should discipline the Respondent for alleged violations of provisions of the Insurance Code governing agents.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Frank Lefler, Jr., is licensed in the State of Florida as a life and variable annuity contracts salesman, as a life insurance agent, and as a general lines insurance agent. During 1991 and 1992, he was employed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife). In the summer of 1991, a woman named Theresa Novovesky, a registered professional nurse living in New Orleans, Louisiana, received a telephone solicitation regarding a "Nurses Insured Retirement Plan." At the time, she was engaged to be married later in the summer to an Air Force pilot named David Russell. Not wanting to deal with the matter over the telephone, she asked the caller to mail her the information. She later received in the mail a brochure advertising for a "Nurses Insured Retirement Plan" being offered by "Metropolitan Life and Affiliated Companies." The Plan was advertised as "a convenient way for you to accumulate cash for the future you deserve." The plan's five "important benefits" included: CONTROL If you should leave your present nursing position, your retirement benefits can stay with you. FLEXIBILITY Accessibility of cash. TAX BENEFITS Tax deferred accumulation while providing a life insurance benefit. SECURITY Can be used to provide life time income. DISABILITY Your monthly contribution can continue to be deposited by Metropolitan should you become disabled. Novovesky was interested in the program described in the brochure and telephoned the toll-free number on the brochure for more information. Her call was received at the Tampa, Florida, offices of MetLife, and she used the descriptions contained in the advertising brochure to attempt to describe the reason for her call and the area of her interest. She left her telephone number so that she could be contacted at her residence in New Orleans. Not long afterwards, the Respondent telephoned Novovesky in New Orleans. She again used the descriptions contained in the advertising brochure to attempt to describe the reason for her call and the area of her interest. The Respondent made an appointment to visit Novovesky at her apartment complex in New Orleans to show her the MetLife products that were consistent with her area of interest. He mentioned at the time that he was new and in training with the company and that he would have his supervisor, Rick Urso, with him to assist. Urso and the Respondent met with Novovesky on July 25, 1991. They discussed aspects of Novovesky's career, personal and financial goals and ascertained that she was interested in a retirement savings plan. The Respondent presented a MetLife product that actually was a whole life insurance policy. He described the tax-free accumulation of cash value from contributions of $100 a month, and he estimated the cash value at age 59 as in the neighborhood of $600,000. It is unclear whether the Respondent orally explained to Novovesky in so many words during the July 25, 1991, meeting that the product being presented was in fact a whole life insurance policy. She testified that he did not, and the product could have been explained in terms that did not clarify to her that it was in fact a life insurance policy. But Novovesky also testified that she did not understand life insurance or investment terminology and knew little about either. It is conceivable that the Respondent explained the true nature of insurance product in terms that she should have been able to understand but that she did not understand what he was telling her. In his testimony, her husband (then fiance) confirmed that possibility. In addition, by Novovesky's own testimony, the Respondent asked her to verify the accuracy of information the Respondent took from her during the meeting and wrote on a form entitled, "Application for Life Insurance." Among other things, the form included a section on "Medical Data" "TO BE COMPLETED FOR ALL PERSONS TO BE INSURED." Although Novovesky denies that she read or understood the form, she clearly signed it. Although she testified that she did not recall, Novovesky also apparently was required to undergo a physical examination, including blood sampling and testing, to qualify for the insurance for which she had applied. When applying for the insurance she ultimately bought, Novovesky post- dated the check for the initial premium until after her fiance's scheduled return to the United States in August, 1991, for a brief period of leave from active Air Force duty in England. She reasoned that, in addition to helping her make final arrangements for their imminent wedding, he could advise her on whether to go through with the application she had signed. During the hustle and bustle of the prenuptial arrangements, her fiance telephoned the Respondent to assure himself and his fiancee that she had made reasonable retirement plans. From what she had told him, he assumed that she had purchased an annuity-type of retirement investment. He previously had made it clear to her that he did not think it was smart for her to buy life insurance. For whatever reason--perhaps because she preoccupied with planning their imminent wedding, or perhaps because she was afraid to tell him that she had applied for life insurance against his advice, or perhaps because she truly did not comprehend that she had in fact applied for a life insurance policy--she apparently did not tell him that she had applied for life insurance. Working from the incorrect assumption that his fiancee had purchased annuity-type of retirement investment, he asked the Respondent certain questions regarding guaranteed and anticipated performance and was given certain answers that did not alert him that the Respondent was referring to a life insurance policy. Satisfied with the answers he had gotten, Novovesky's fiance told her that it looked "OK" to him, and they got on with their busy lives. It appears that, on or about August 30, 1991, someone with MetLife delivered to Novovesky her whole life insurance policy, as well as a typical written illustration of predicted performance of the whole life insurance policy, given certain assumptions. The illustration included references to: life paid up at 95; total, initial annual, and initial semi-annual premium; annual dividend; a guaranteed death benefit; additional insurance purchased by dividends; illustrative death benefit; guaranteed cash value; cash value of additional insurance; illustrative cash value; life insurance surrender cost index; and life insurance net payment cost index. It is difficult to understand how, but Novovesky testified that, even after receipt of the policy and illustration, she still did not understand that she had applied for and purchased life insurance. She testified that she did not read the material when she received it and that, after the wedding, Novovesky (now Mrs. Russell) moved with her husband to England. The policy and other papers she relating to her dealings with the Respondent were packed away in boxes and were relatively inaccessible until after their return to the United States. Notwithstanding her testimony at final hearing and her prior hearsay statements to Insurance Department regulators, not only were the words "life insurance" mentioned in written statements she received from MetLife, she herself wrote a letter to the Respondent on November 4, 1991, advising that, while she was living in England with her husband, she would be unable to utilize the "Check-O-Matic" payment plan the Respondent had set up for her and that personal checks would be "my only means of paying my life insurance monthly." When the Mrs. Russell did not receive monthly or even quarterly statements from MetLife, and MetLife responded to inquiries by saying that only an annual statement was due her, Mr. Russell especially became concerned about exactly what his wife had purchased. Still, the policies and information was inaccessible, and they decided it could wait until after their return to the United States. When they returned and Mrs. Russell received her first Anniversary Statement in the mail, Mr. Russell could tell that his wife had not purchased an annuity-type investment, and he decided it was time to find the policy and related MetLife information to determine just what was going on. When he located and inspected the documentation, an incredulous Mr. Russell realized for the first time that his wife had purchased a life insurance policy, which was precisely what he told her not to buy. His reaction was that he could not understand how she could have been so foolish, and he told her so. She blamed it on the Respondent and MetLife. Approximately a year later, in summer of 1993, the Russells read a newspaper article indicating that many MetLife policyholders were registering similar complaints and that state insurance regulators were investigating. Mr. Russell became persuaded that, after all, perhaps MetLife, and not his wife, was to blame for the mistake. They successfully pursued their desire to rescind the life insurance policy, get a full refund from MetLife, and reinvest the refund in another investment vehicle. (Initially, they invested in an annuity; they later changed to a stock mutual fund.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in this case. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2210 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-6. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 7. The visit was on July 25, 1991; otherwise, first sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected as not proven exactly what the Respondent said. 8.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that life insurance was not discussed. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven that she did not read any of the application. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 12.-13. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven: (1) that Russell formed any opinion about what the Respondent "was soliciting" (he was concerned only about what his fiancee was buying); or (2) that life insurance was discussed. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the documents were "numerous" or that she did not "review" them. Accepted, but not proven that the Respondent knew about them or sent them, and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that she did not know she had purchased a life insurance policy. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted, technically, but unnecessary. First sentence, rejected as not proven; second sentence, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 20.-21. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (However, implication that they were informed for the first time is rejected as not proven.) First sentence, rejected as not proven; second sentence, accepted and incorporated. "Unknowingly" is rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Second and third sentences, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. The rest is rejected as not proven. "Understandingly unhappy" is rejected as not proven. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as being conclusion of law. Accepted and incorporated. The year 1990 is rejected as being contrary to facts found. (The meeting was in 1991.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, not clear from the evidence. Otherwise, accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as being argument. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 9.-10. Accepted and incorporated. 11.-12. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 13.-14. Accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 15.-17. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 23.-24. Accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. As to last sentence of the first paragraph, rejected as contrary to the evidence that "any misperception stemming from the brochure" "could not be due to" the Respondent (although not proven that it was). Otherwise, the first paragraph is accepted and incorporated. The second paragraph is argument and a transcript excerpt that is subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 27.-28. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 29. Accepted but argument, subordinate, and unnecessary. 30.-31. Cumulative. (Also, subordinate and argument.) Rejected as contrary to facts found that Lefler was not identified. Otherwise, largely accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. Argument and subordinate. 34.-35. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Argument, subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as being argument and as being subordinate to facts contrary to those found. Otherwise, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. 38.-40. Largely accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 41. First sentence, accepted but subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary. Second sentence, rejected as argument, as subordinate and as unnecessary. 42.-44. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Argument, subordinate and unnecessary. Largely, accepted and incorporated to the extent not argument, subordinate or unnecessary. Cumulative. First sentence, accepted but subordinate to facts found. Second sentence, cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: James B. Bossart, Esquire Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Jonathan L. Alpert, Esquire David Ferrentino, Esquire Alpert, Josey & Hughes First Union Center 100 S. Ashley Drive, Suite 2000 Tampa, Florida 33602 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Should Respondent's license as an insurance agent in the State of Florida be disciplined for the alleged violation of certain provisions of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency of the State of Florida vested with the statutory authority to administer the disciplinary provisions of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. Respondent, at all times relevant to this proceeding, was licensed as an insurance agent in the State of Florida. Respondent is also currently licensed in the State of Florida as a life and life and health insurance agent. Sometime around May 30, 2000, Patricia I. Coburn and her husband, Kevin L. Coburn received a postcard from Guarantee Reserve Life Insurance Company (Reserve Life) indicating that the Coburns may want to consider life insurance since Social Security only paid $250.00 in death benefits. Kevin Coburn was no longer employed, and the life insurance coverage with his former employer was no longer in force. Therefore, the Coburns, in response to the postcard, made contact with Respondent by telephone. Patricia Coburn testified that Respondent came to the Coburn's home on May 30, 2000, in response to the telephone call. However, Respondent was in the Coburns' home on only one occasion and that was when the application was completed and signed, which was May 31, 2000. The Coburns were looking for an insurance policy that would cover "final" expenses. The Coburns settled on a joint whole life policy with Reserve Life, which carried death benefits of $18,000.00, with an $18,000.00 accidental death coverage and a $5,000.00 child rider. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Kevin Coburn suffered from impaired vision (due to diabetic retinopathy), heart problems (by-pass surgery and congestive heart failure), and kidney problems (in renal failure and currently receiving dialysis three times a week). However, Kevin Coburn's health condition was not readily apparent to Respondent at the time he was in the Coburns' home around May 31, 2000. The application for the insurance policy required that Respondent ask both Kevin Coburn and Patricia Coburn a series of health questions, which required a yes or no answer. The application also required Respondent to mark each of the Coburn's responses in the appropriate place on the application. Respondent asked both Kevin Coburn and Patricia Coburn the required health questions. Other than question number 7 and question number 12, which did not require an answer due to the Coburns' age, each answered the questions with a "no" answer, notwithstanding Patricia Coburn's testimony to the contrary, which lacks credibility in this regard. Based on the Coburns' responses, Respondent marked "no" to the appropriate questions on application. Questions 3(A) and (F), 6.(3), and 9. of the Application provide in pertinent part as follows: Have your ever been diagnosed or treated by a member of the medical profession as having, or have you ever taken medication for: (1) Chronic Kidney Disease; or (2) any kidney disorder for which you are currently receiving dialysis? * * * F. Congestive Heart Failure? * * * 6. During the last 1 year, have you had a . . .(3) heart or by-pass surgery . . .? * * * 9. During the last 5 years, have you had Heart-By-Pass surgery? Respondent marked the answer "no" to these questions for both Kevin Coburn and Patricia Coburn. The application inquired as to whether either of the applicants was disabled. The Coburns responded that they were not disabled but employed, and Respondent so marked the application. After Respondent completed the application, he handed the application to the Coburns for them to review and sign. While it may be questionable as to whether Kevin Coburn reviewed the application, including the answers to the health questions, due to his failing eyesight, Patricia Coburn certainly had the opportunity to review the application, including the answers to the health questions. Neither Patricia Coburn nor Kevin Coburn discussed or revealed Kevin Coburn's current medical condition with Respondent prior to, or during the time, Respondent was filling out the application, including the responses to the health questions, notwithstanding Patricia Coburn's testimony to the contrary, which lacks credibility in this regard. Had Respondent been made aware of Kevin Coburn's medical problems, he could have placed the Coburns' insurance with another insurance company (Cotton State Life Insurance Company or Americo Financial Life and Annuity Insurance Company), notwithstanding Kevin Coburn's medical problems. Admittedly, the policies would not have been at the standard issue rates and there would have been graded death benefits or limited death benefits. Furthermore, Respondent's commission on this type policy would be higher than on a regular death policy. Reserve Life acted favorably on the Coburns' application and in June 2000, issued Policy No. OJ11976 to the Coburns with the Basic Death Coverage as set out in the Application. Kevin Coburn died on September 19, 2000, from a staph infection as a result of his leg being amputated in August 2000, due to the diabetes. Shortly thereafter, Patricia Coburn filed a death claim with Reserve Life. Because Kevin Coburn died within two years of the issuance of the insurance policy, Reserve life, in accordance with company policy, requested Kevin Coburn's medical records so that it could review his health history in order to determine if the health questions had been answered correctly. Upon review of Kevin Coburn's health records, Reserve Life discovered that Kevin Coburn, at the time of the application, was diabetic, underwent dialysis, had undergone heart by-pass surgery, had other health problems, and was disabled. Because of his health problems and disability, Kevin Coburn was not eligible to purchase this particular insurance policy, and had Reserve Life been made aware of Kevin Coburn's health problems and disability, Reserve Life would not have issued this particular policy. In response to Reserve Life's inquiry concerning Kevin Coburn's health history, Patricia Coburn wrote a letter to Reserve Life asserting that she and Kevin Coburn had advised Respondent of Kevin Coburn's health problems, and that Respondent had apparently marked the "no" block instead of the "yes" block concerning the health questions without their knowledge. Without giving Respondent an opportunity to refute Patricia Coburn's allegations, Reserve Life offered Patricia Coburn $9,000.00 as a settlement, which she accepted. The reason for the offer of settlement by Reserve Life was that it would be Patricia Coburn's "word" against Respondent's "word." There is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent knew, or should have known, of Kevin Coburn's medical condition at the time the Coburn's applied for the insurance with Reserve Life.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Respondent, Jerry Lee Surratt not guilty of violating Subsections 626.611(4),(5),(7),(8),(9), and (13), Subsections 626.621(2),(3), and (6), and Subsections 626.9541(1)(a)1., and (e)1., Florida Statutes, and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Jerry Lee Surratt. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street, Room 612 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Jerry Lee Surratt 926 Lake Deeson Pointe Lakeland, Florida 33805 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
