The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, James Robert Stiffler, knowingly made untrue statements of material facts to induce Frank Galasso to purchase two viatical settlement agreements. Essentially, the charges are that Respondent, in his solicitations and negotiations with Frank Galasso, stated that viatical settlement agreements were, "guaranteed," "no risk," "fully secured," "risk free," "non-speculative," and promised a "fixed rate of return;" and that Respondent provided viatical settlement agreement literature containing one or more the above the prohibited phrases, for the purpose of inducing Frank Galasso to purchase, and Frank Galasso did purchase, two viatical settlement agreements for money paid.
Findings Of Fact The background activities pertinent to the dates and occurrences between Respondent and Mr. Galasso are presented. Simultaneous activities by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter FBI) investigating other companies, including principals of American Benefits Services, Inc. (hereinafter "ABS") involved in the sale of viatical agreement in Florida are summarized. FRANK GALASSO and RESPONDENT At an unspecified time in mid 1998, Frank Galasso, a retired licensed real estate and casualty insurance agent, had his first exposure to viatical purchases while watching "60 Minutes" on television. In October of 1998, Frank Galasso, in response to a newspaper advertisement, called Respondent's listed phone number and left a message expressing his interest in viatical and requested a return phone call. In a January 1999 return phone call to Mr. Galasso, Mr. Galasso advised Respondent that he was not quite ready and needed more time to consider the purchase. A subsequent follow-up phone call in April 1999, resulted in Respondent and Mr. Galasso discussing diversifying Mrs. Galasso's portfolio with the possibility of investing in a viatical settlement agreement purchase. In May of 1999, Respondent met with Mr. Galasso at Mr. Galasso's residence and explained the viatical purchase agreement "from start to finish." Respondent gave Mr. Galasso a package of literature and other information provided Respondent by ABS. After a two-and-one-half-hours of discussion Mr. Galasso purchased a $13,429.93 viatical agreement for Mrs. Galasso's Individual Retirement Account. A receipt of purchase and the agreement of purchase were given to Mr. Galasso. On June 11, 1999, Respondent met again with Mr. Galasso for discussion of and consummation of a second purchase of a viatical settlement agreement. Respondent assured Mr. Galasso that he would receive interest payments of 9.85 percent, per annum, paid monthly for 36 months and when the viator died, he, Mr. Galasso, would receive his principal investment of $25,000 back. Respondent further assured Mr. Galasso that after one year he could rescind the viatical purchase agreement, retain all interest paid, and get his principal back by sending a written request at least 30 days prior to the anniversary date of purchase. In June 1999, ABS informed Mr. Galasso that the State of Florida, Department of Banking and Finance, filed an administrative complaint alleging violations by ABS of the state's "Securities Act" and that a stipulation and consent to Final Order Agreement was entered, effective August 10, 1999. In July of 1999, Mr. Galasso, reading the Herald Tribune, became aware that ABS and Financial Federated were under investigation by the FBI. In August of 1999, Mr. Galasso made several written attempts to exercise his option to rescind his viatical purchase agreements without success. FBI AGENT, ANTHONY YANKETIS, and VIATICAL SALES ENTITIES Unknown to Respondent and Mr. Galasso, in May/June of 1998, Anthony Yanketis, FBI special agent of the economic crimes division, initiated an investigation regarding a viatical settlement as a result of information received from an investor in a viatical purchase agreement situation. In January 1999, the FBI confirmed that Ray Levy was the owner of ABS, a viatical settlement brokerage company that raised funds for the purchase of viatical settlements, that generated approximately six million ($6M) of investors funds each month. In June 1999, Jeffery Paine, Esquire, escrow agent for ABS, admitted that he merely rubber-stamped written representations from Financial Federated that insurance policies had been purchased and actual medical overviews conducted and released money held in escrow. In August 1999, FBI investigations revealed that approximately 90 percent of money obtained from investors were used for the purchase of personal benefits and the purchase of real estate; and that lulling letters were sent to insurance agents, attorneys, and viatical investors. FEDERAL GRAND JURY and VIATICAL SALES ENTITIES In September 2000, the Federal Grand Jury, Southern District of Florida, West Palm Beach Division, returned a True Bill Indictment. The indictment introductory allegation states: At all times relevant and material to this indictment: Viatical settlements are the purchase of life insurance policies or their benefits at a discounted rate from a terminally ill person. The beneficial interest in the insurance policies purchase is sold or reassigned to an investor. A viatical investor receives the full benefits when the ill person dies. Count 9. From at least as early February, 1996, Viatical Asset Management, Asset Base Management, and later ABS operated as viatical settlement brokerage companies engaged in the business of locating investors who would purchase interests in viatical settlements. ABS obtained investors' funds through a network of independent insurance agents and financial consultants. Count 10. In connection with its viatical settlement brokerage business ABS used one or more participation disclosure documents that described the viatical settlement program it was offering for sale to investors. OBJECT OF THE SCHEME AND ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD The object of the scheme and artifice to defraud was that defendants, together with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, would unlawfully enrich themselves by knowingly and willfully making false and fraudulent representations and promises, and . . . concealing material facts from prospective investors, inducing them to send personal checks, bank checks, wire transfers or money orders to Financial Federated, Viatical Asset Management, Asset Base Management, American Benefits Services, Inc, and the escrow agent. . . MANNER & MEANS OF EXECUTING THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD "Under false and fraudulent pretenses defendants, FREDRICK C. BRANDAU, and MARY ANNE BILLINGHURST, together with other persons . . . participated in recruiting insurance agents to solicit investors in viaticated insurance policies . . ." (a) . . . investor funds obtained by American Benefits Services . . . would be used to purchase viaticated insurance benefits; (b). . . investors was guaranteed a 42% rate of return within 36 months on his or her investment if the insured party died. (a) While over $115 million in investors funds were transferred to Financial Federated for the primary purpose of purchasing insurance policies, less then $6 million was actually used to purchase policies . . . the vast majority of such monies was used to fun commissions for ABS and Financial Federated employees, and to purchase real and personal property around the United States that had nothing to do with viatical business. (f) the defendants knew that the irrevocable assignment of trust benefits was not a "guaranteed receivable from the insurance company." The defendants knew that 90% of the investors funds had been used to buy real and personal property, and not insurance policies. Accordingly, the defendants knew that the vast majority of the assigned "trust benefits" were worthless, and not a "guaranteed receivable" since most investors had no underlying insurance policy securing their investment. OVERT ACTS (t) In or about June 1998 . . . FREDRICK C. BRANDAU, and MARY ANN BILLINGHURST attended a meeting with numerous insurance agents for the purpose of promoting the activities of FINANCIAL FEDERATED. (Respondent's Exhibit "C") James Robert Stiffler, at all times pertinent and material hereto, was licensed in Florida as a life insurance agent, therefore authorized by Section 626.992(4), Florida Statutes, to perform the functions of a viatical settlement agent. At all times pertinent and material hereto, James Robert Stiffler, d/b/a/ "James Financial Inc.," worked for ABS through U.S. Investors Group and Seniors Financial Resources. At all times pertinent and material hereto, Rafael Levy, a/k/a Ray Levy, was the principal of ABS. Fred Brandau, convicted on 42 counts of fraud in United States District Court and awaiting sentencing, was the head of Financial Federated. ABS sales agents would procure investors to provide money to Financial Federated. Financial Federated provided the viaticals to ABS, which were in turn sold by Respondent to Frank Galasso. Respondent, in May of 1999, solicited and sold a viatical settlement agreement to Frank Galasso for Mrs. Galasso's IRA. During solicitation and sale Respondent represented and made untrue statements of material fact to Frank Galasso that the viatical were "secure," "had no risk," and "was safe." Respondent, in October 1998, gave to Frank Galasso literature provided by ABS containing statements and assertions, which were untrue, deceptive, and misleading. On June 11, 1999, Respondent solicited and sold a viatical settlement purchase agreement to Frank Galasso for $25,000. During the solicitation and sale Respondent represented and made the following untrue statements of material fact: (a) that Frank Galasso would receive his principal back when the viator died; (b) that if the viator did not die within 36 months, Frank Galasso would be able to get his principal back; (c) that before expiration of one year from the purchase date, Frank Galasso would be able to rescind the purchase agreement, retain monthly interest paid, and get full refund of his principal; (d) that the investment was safe, and had no risk and until the viatical had been purchased he could receive his money back; and (e) that the $25,000.00 purchase price would go to an attorney, in trust, to be used to purchase a viatical. Respondent, on two separate occasions during the sales of viatical purchases agreements, presented literature provided by ABS to Mr. Galasso containing written assertions, to wit: (a) an investment with a "fixed 42 percent return"; (b) "Guaranteed"; (c) "no risk investment"; and (d) the principal is "safe." Respondent's defense that Frank Galasso was an experienced investor and therefore could not be persuaded into an investment he did not want is without merit. Respondent's defense that Frank Galasso's reliance upon ABS printed literature absolved him from liability is without merit. Respondent's defense that Frank Galasso purchased two viatical agreements based upon the representations made in the disclosure documents provided by ABS and presented by Respondent to Mr. Galasso is without merit. Respondent's defense that his inquiries and phone calls to the Department of Insurance resulted in no negative information concerning ABS is without merit. Respondent's defense that once the Department of Insurance became aware of problems with the business practices of ABS it had a duty to communicate that information to licensed agents, such as Respondent, is without merit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the agency enter its final order finding Respondent, James Robert Stiffler, guilty of violations of Sections 626.611(1),(7) and (8); 626.99275(2)(b) and (c); 626.99277(6); 626.9541(1)(b); 626.99235(1), and 626.621.(2) and (6) Florida Statutes, and that Respondent, James Robert Stiffler's, license as an insurance agent in this State be suspended for a period of (91) days. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2000.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents offered and sold securities in Florida, in violation of the registration requirements of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes; offered and sold securities in Florida while Respondents were unregistered, in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; or committed fraud in the offer, sale, or purchase of securities in Florida, in violation of Section 517.301(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is the penalty to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent James A. Torchia (Respondent) held a valid life and health insurance license. Respondent was the president and owner of Respondent Empire Insurance, Inc. (Empire Insurance), a now-dissolved Florida corporation. Empire Insurance was in the insurance business, and Respondent was its sole registered insurance agent. At no material time has Respondent or Empire Insurance held any license or registration to engage in the sale or offer for sale of securities in Florida. At no material time were the investments described below sold and offered for sale by Respondent or Empire Insurance registered as securities in Florida. These cases involve viaticated life insurance policies. A life insurance policy is viaticated when the policy owner, also known as the viator, enters into a viatical settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the viator sells the policy and death benefits to the purchaser for an amount less than the death benefit--the closer the viator is perceived to be to death, the greater the discount from the face amount of the death benefit. The viatical industry emerged to provide dying insureds, prior to death, a means by which to sell their life insurance policies to obtain cash to enjoy during their remaining lives. As this industry matured, brokers and dealers, respectively, arranged for the sale of, and bought and resold, life insurance policies of dying insureds. Prior to the death of the viator, these viaticated life insurance policies, or interests in such policies, may be sold and resold several times. In these cases, viators sold their life insurance policies to Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. (FinFed). Having raised money from investors, American Benefit Services (ABS) then paid FinFed, which assigned viaticated policies, or interests in the policies, to various trusts. The trusts held the legal title to the policies, and the trust beneficiaries, who are the investors from whom ABS had obtained the funds to pay FinFed, held equitable title to the policies. Sometimes in these cases, a broker or dealer, such as William Page and Associates, intervened between the viator and FinFed. At some point, though, ABS obtained money from investors to acquire policies, but did not pay the money to FinFed to purchase viaticated life insurance policies. The FinFed and ABS investment program eventually became a Ponzi scheme, in which investor payouts were derived largely, if not exclusively, from the investments of other investors. ABS typically acquired funds through the promotional efforts of insurance agents, such as Respondent and Empire Insurance. Using literature provided by ABS, these agents often sold these investments to insurance clients. As was typical, Respondent and Empire Insurance advertised the types of claims described below by publishing large display ads that ran in Florida newspapers. Among the ABS literature is a Participation Disclosure (Disclosure), which describes the investment. The Disclosure addresses the investor as a "Participant" and the investment as a "Participation." The Disclosure contains a Participation Agreement (Agreement), which provides that the parties agree to the Disclosure and states whether the investor has chosen the Growth Plan or Income Plan, which are described below; a Disbursement Letter of Instruction, which is described below; and a Letter of Instruction to Trust, which is described below. The agent obtains the investor's signature to all three of these documents when the investor delivers his check, payable to the escrow agent, to purchase the investment. The Disclosure states that the investments offer a “High Return”: “Guaranteed Return on Participation 42% at Maturity.” The Disclosure adds that the investments are “Low Risk”: “Secured by a Guaranteed Insurance Industry Receivable”; “Secured by $300,000 State Insurance Guarantee Fund”; “Short Term Participation (Maturity Expectation 36 Months)”; “Principal Liquid After One Year With No Surrender Charge”; “State Regulated Participation”; “All Transactions By Independent Trust & Escrow Agents”; and “If policy fails to mature at 36 months, participant may elect full return of principal plus 15% simple interest.” The Disclosure describes two alternative investments: the Growth Plan and Income Plan. For the Growth Plan, the Disclosure states: “At maturity, Participant receives principal plus 42%, creating maximum growth of funds.” For the Income Plan, the Disclosure states: “If income is desired, participation can be structured with monthly income plans.” Different rates of return for the Growth and Income plans are set forth below. For investors choosing the Income Plan, ABS applied only 70 percent of the investment to the purchase of viaticated life insurance policies. ABS reserved the remaining 30 percent as the source of money to "repay" the investor the income that he was due to receive under the Income Plan, which, as noted below, paid a total yield of 29.6 percent over three years. The Disclosure states that ABS places all investor funds in attorneys’ trust accounts, pursuant to arrangements with two “bonded and insured” “financial escrow agents.” At another point in the document, the Disclosure states that the investor funds are deposited “directly” with a “financial escrow agent,” pursuant to the participant’s Disbursement Letter of Instruction. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction identifies a Florida attorney as the “financial escrow agent,” who receives the investor’s funds and disburses them, “to the order of [FinFed) or to the source of the [viaticated insurance] benefits and/or its designees.” This disbursement takes place only after the attorney receives “[a] copy of the irrevocable, absolute assignment, executed in favor of Participant and recorded with the trust account as indicated on the assignment of [viaticated insurance] benefits, and setting out the ownership percentage of said [viaticated insurance] benefits”; a “medical overview” of the insured indicative of not more than 36 months’ life expectancy; confirmation that the policy is in full force and effect and has been in force beyond the period during which the insurer may contest coverage; and a copy of the shipping airbill confirming that the assignment was sent to the investor. The Disclosure states that the investor will direct a trust company to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. When the life insurance policy matures on the death of the viator, the insurer pays the death benefits to the trust company, which pays these proceeds to the investor, in accordance with his interest in the trust. Accordingly, the Letter of Instruction to Trust directs FinFed, as the trust company, to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. The Letter of Instruction to Trust provides that the viaticated insurance benefits obtained with the investor's investment shall be assigned to this trust, and, at maturity, FinFed shall pay the investor a specified sum upon the death of the viator and the trustee's receipt of the death benefit from the insurer. The Disclosure provides that, at anytime from 12 to 36 months after the execution of the Disclosure, the investor has the option to request ABS to return his investment, without interest. At 36 months, if the viator has not yet died, the investor has the right to receive the return of his investment, plus 15 percent (five percent annually). The Disclosure states that ABS will pay all costs and fees to maintain the policy and that all policies are based on a life expectancy for the viator of no more than 36 months. Also, the Disclosure assures that ABS will invest only in policies that are issued by insurers that are rated "A" or better by A.M. Best "at the time that the Participant's deposit is confirmed." The Disclosure mentions that the trust company will name the investor as an irrevocable assignee of the policy benefits. The irrevocable assignment of policy benefits mentioned in the Disclosure and the Disbursement Letter of Instruction is an anomaly because it does not conform to the documentary scheme described above. After the investor pays the escrow agent and executes the documents described above, FinFed executes the “Irrevocable Absolute Assignment of Viaticated Insurance Benefits.” This assignment is from the trustee, as grantor, to the investor, as grantee, and applies to a specified percentage of a specific life insurance policy, whose death benefit is disclosed on the assignment. The assignment includes the "right to receive any viaticated insurance benefit payable under the Trusts [sic] guaranteed receivables of assigned viaticated insurance benefits from the noted insurance company; [and the] right to assign any and all rights received under this Trust irrevocable absolute assignment." On its face, the assignment assigns the trust corpus-- i.e., the insurance policy or an interest in an insurance policy--to the trust beneficiary. Doing so would dissolve the trust and defeat the purpose of the other documents, which provide for the trust to hold the policy and, upon the death of the viator, to pay the policy proceeds in accordance with the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The assignment bears an ornate border and the corporate seal of FinFed. Probably, FinFed intended the assignment to impress the investors with the "reality" of their investment, as the decorated intangible of an "irrevocable" interest in an actual insurance policy may seem more impressive than the unadorned intangible of a beneficial interest in a trust that holds an insurance policy. Or possibly, the FinFed/ABS principals and professionals elected not to invest much time or effort in the details of the transactional documentation of a Ponzi scheme. What was true then is truer now. Obviously, in those cases in which no policy existed, the investor paid his money before any policy had been selected for him. However, this appears to have been the process contemplated by the ABS literature, even in those cases in which a policy did exist. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction and correspondence from Respondent, Empire Insurance, or Empire Financial Consultant to ABS reveal that FinFed did not assign a policy, or part of a policy, to an investor until after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In some cases, Respondent or Empire Insurance requested ABS to obtain for an investor a policy whose insured had special characteristics or a investment plan with a maturity shorter than 36 months. FinFed and ABS undertook other tasks after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In addition to matching a viator with an investor, based on the investor's expressed investment objectives, FinFed paid the premiums on the viaticated policies until the viator died and checked on the health of the viator. Also, if the viator did not die within three years and the investor elected to obtain a return of his investment, plus 15 percent, ABS, as a broker, resold the investor's investment to generate the 15 percent return that had been guaranteed to the investor. Similarly, ABS would sell the investment of investors who wanted their money back prior to three years. The escrow agent also assumed an important duty--in retrospect, the most important duty--after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents; the escrow agent was to verify the existence of the viaticated policy. Respondent and Empire Insurance sold beneficial interests in trusts holding viaticated life insurance policies in 50 separate transactions. These investors invested a total of $1.5 million, nearly all of which has been lost. Respondent and Empire Insurance earned commissions of about $120,000 on these sales. Petitioner proved that Respondent and Empire Insurance made the following sales. Net worths appear for those investors for whom Respondent recorded net worths; for most, he just wrote "sufficient" on the form. Unless otherwise indicated, the yield was 42 percent for the Growth Plan. In all cases, investors paid money for their investments. In all cases, FinFed and ABS assigned parts of policies to the trusts, even of investors investing relatively large amounts. On March 21, 1998, Phillip A. Allan, a Florida resident, paid $69,247.53 for the Growth Plan. On March 26, 1998, Monica Bracone, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $900,000, paid $8000 for the Growth Plan. On April 2, 1998, Alan G. and Judy LeFort, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on June 8, 1998, the LeForts paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In the second transaction, the yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement notes a 36-month life expectancy of the viator. The different yields based on life expectancies are set forth below, but, as noted above, the standard yield was 42 percent, and, as noted below, this was based on a 36-month life expectancy, so Respondent miscalculated the investment return or misdocumented the investment on the LeForts' second transaction. On April 29, 1998, Doron and Barbara Sterling, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on August 14, 1998, the Sterlings paid $100,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield for the second transaction is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement notes that the Sterlings were seeking a viator with a life expectancy of only 30 months. When transmitting the closing documents for the second Sterling transaction, Respondent, writing ABS on Empire Insurance letterhead, stated in part: This guy has already invested with us (15,000) [sic]. He gave me this application but wants a 30 month term. Since he has invested, he did some research and has asked that he be put on a low T-cell count and the viator to be an IV drug user. I know it is another favor but this guy is a close friend and has the potential to put at least another 500,000 [sic]. If you can not [sic] do it, then I understand. You have done a lot for me and I always try to bring in good quality business. If this inventory is not available, the client has requested that we return the funds . . . In a third transaction, on February 24, 1999, the Sterlings paid $71,973 for the Growth Plan. The yield is only 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects the typical 36-month life expectancy for the viator. Although the investors would not have received this document, Respondent completed an ABS form entitled, "New Business Transmittal," and checked the box, "Life Expectancy 2 years or less (28%). The other boxes are: "Life Expectancy 2 1/2 years or less (35%)" and "Life Expectancy 3 years or less (42%)." On May 4, 1998, Hector Alvero and Idelma Guillen, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $6000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on October 29, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a third transaction, on November 30, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. For this investment, Ms. Guillen requested an "IV drug user," according to Respondent in a letter dated December 1, 1998, on Empire Financial Consultants letterhead. This is the first use of the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants, not Empire Insurance, and all letters after that date are on the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants. In a fourth transaction, on January 29, 1999, Ms. Guillen paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On April 23, 1998, Bonnie P. Jensen, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $120,000, paid $65,884.14 for the Growth Plan. Her yield was 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 20, 1998, Michael J. Mosack, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $70,600 for the Income Plan. He was to receive monthly distributions of $580.10 for three years. The total yield, including monthly distributions, is $20,883.48, which is about 29.6 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 27, 1998, Lewis and Fernande G. Iachance, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On June 3, 1998, Sidney Yospe, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $1,500,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 30-month life expectancy. On June 12, 1998, Bernard Aptheker, with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 10, 1998, Irene M. and Herman Kutschenreuter, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 9, 1998, Daniel and Mary Spinosa, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 5, 1998, Pauline J. and Anthony Torchia, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000 and the parents of Respondent, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 29, 1998, Christopher D. Bailey, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction on the same day, Mr. Bailey paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. Petitioner submitted documents concerning a purported purchase by Lauren W. Kramer on July 21, 1998, but they were marked "VOID" and do not appear to be valid. On July 22, 1998, Laura M. and Kenneth D. Braun, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $150,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan, as Respondent completed the Participation Agreement. However, the agreement calls for them to receive $205.42 monthly for 36 months and receive a total yield, including monthly payments, of 29.6 percent, so it appears that the Brauns bought the Income Plan. In a second transaction, also on July 22, 1998, the Brauns paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Roy R. Worrall, a Florida resident, paid $100,000 for the Income Plan. The Participation Agreement provides that he will receive monthly payments of $821.66 and a total yield of 29.6 percent. On July 16, 1998, Earl and Rosemary Gilmore, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on February 12, 1999, the Gilmores paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of two years or less. On July 14, 1998, David M. Bobrow, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $700,000 on one form and $70,000 on another form, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction, on the same day, Mr. Bobrow paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 27, 1998, Cecilia and Harold Lopatin, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 30, 1998, Ada R. Davis, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Income Plan. Her total yield, including monthly payments of $246.50 for three years, is 29.6 percent. In a second transaction, on the same day, Ms. Davis paid $30,000 for the Income Plan on the same terms as the first purchase. On July 27, 1998, Joseph F. and Adelaide A. O'Keefe, Florida residents with a net worth of $300,000, paid $12,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 5, 1998, Thurley E. Margeson, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 19, 1998, Stephanie Segaria, a Florida resident, paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 26, 1998, Roy and Glenda Raines, Florida residents, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of 30 months or less. In a second transaction, on the same day, the Raineses paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy, although, again, the New Business Transmittal notes the life expectancy of 30 months or less. On November 24, 1998, Dan W. Lipford, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan in two transactions. In a third transaction, on January 13, 1999, Mr. Lipford paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 1, 1998, Mary E. Friebes, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 4, 1998, Allan Hidalgo, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 17, 1998, Paul E. and Rose E. Frechette, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including monthly payments of $205.41 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 26, 1998, Theodore and Tillie F. Friedman, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 19, 1999, Robert S. and Karen M. Devos, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Arthur Hecker, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $410.83 for 36 months, is 29.6 percent. On February 11, 1999, Michael Galotola, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on the same day, Michael and Anna Galotola paid $12,500 for the Growth Plan. On November 3, 1998, Lee Chamberlain, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 23, 1998, Herbert L. Pasqual, a Florida resident, paid $200,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $1643.33 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 1, 1998, Charles R. and Maryann Schuyler, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. Respondent and Empire Insurance were never aware of the fraud being perpetrated by FinFed and ABS at anytime during the 38 transactions mentioned above. Respondent attempted to verify with third parties the existence of the viaticated insurance policies. When ABS presented its program to 30-40 potential agents, including Respondent, ABS presented these persons an opinion letter from ABS's attorney, stating that the investment was not a security, under Florida law. Respondent also contacted Petitioner's predecessor agency and asked if these transactions involving viaticated life insurance policies constituted the sale of securities. An agency employee informed Respondent that these transactions did not constitute the sale of securities.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order: Finding James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., not guilty of violating Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes; Finding James A. Torchia guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; Finding Empire Insurance, Inc., guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes, except for transactions closed on or after December 1, 1998; Directing James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., to cease and desist from further violations of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $120,000 against James A. Torchia. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Fred H. Wilsen Senior Attorney Office of Financial Institutions and Securities Regulation South Tower, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1799 Barry S. Mittelberg Mittelberg & Nicosia, P.A. 8100 North University Drive, Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33321
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent's Licensure and Work History Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, licensed by Petitioner as a general lines (property and casualty) insurance agent. At no time material to the instant case has he been licensed as a surplus lines agent. In the 30 plus years that he has been in the insurance business, no licensing agency has taken any disciplinary action against him. From January of 1997 until July of 1997 (which includes the entire period during which the events described in the Administrative Complaint took place), Respondent worked as an insurance agent for Braishfield of Florida, Inc. (Braishfield), an insurance agency/brokerage firm. (In July of 1997, he started his own insurance agency/brokerage firm, Bandel and Associates, which he still operates.) The Saxony Condominium Association The Saxony Condominium Association (Association) consists of the owners of the 672 units (located in 14 buildings) in the "Saxony" section of the Kings Point condominium development in Delray Beach. The development is approximately seven to ten miles from the Atlantic Ocean. For the past six years, Elinor Lichten has been the president of the Association. The Association's Insurance Committee In August of 1992, before Ms. Lichten became president of the Association, Hurricane Andrew made landfall in the South Florida area and caused extensive property damage. In the years that followed, the premiums that the Association paid for insurance increased dramatically. In February of 1996, in an effort to contain these escalating insurance costs, the Association formed an insurance committee. Ms. Lichten named Dan Miller to serve as the chairman of the committee. Mr. Miller appointed the remaining members on the committee. Ed Greenbaum was among those Mr. Miller appointed to the committee. Ms. Lichten was not a voting member of the committee, although she did attend some (but not all) of the committee's meetings. The Association's Fireman's Fund Policies At the time the insurance committee was formed, the Association was insured by Fireman's Fund. It obtained this insurance coverage through Sedgwick James of Florida, Inc. (Sedgwick). The insurance agent who represented Sedgwick in its dealings with the Association was J. Simione. In October of 1996, the Association received a notice that the Fireman's Fund policies would not be renewed. Upon receiving the notice, Ms. Lichten telephoned Mr. Simione, who advised her that he was "negotiating to reinstate that policy and that in all probability it would be reinstated." Mr. Simione subsequently contacted Ms. Lichten and advised her that the negotiations had been successful. The Fireman's Fund policies were thereafter renewed. The renewed policies had an effective date of December 1, 1996, and an expiration date of December 1, 1997. The Association agreed to the renewal notwithstanding the renewed policies' high premiums and deductibles. Members of the insurance committee, who had met with Mr. Simione "between three to five times" prior to the renewal of the policies, had advised the committee members that there were no better options available and that they should "be absolutely delighted [to] have the coverage [they] had since insurance companies were not renewing policies." When they asked Mr. Simione to "find [a] layered program [for the Association, like those other condominium associations in the area had] where the [risk] is divided so that the premiums are reduced," Mr. Simione told them that it "wasn't possible," explaining that "all of the layering programs [they] had referred to had since fallen apart." The Insurance Committee's Discussions with Respondent Following the renewal of the Fireman's Fund policies, members of insurance committee, at the direction Mr. Miller, "start[ed] to interview" other insurance agents "to see whether or not Mr. Simione's comment to [them concerning the unavailability of a layered program for the Association] had any validity." Respondent was the second agent to be "interview[ed]." He was initially contacted by Ed Greenbaum, who told him that the insurance committee "was very upset by the current coverage package they had" and wanted to see if "there was something better." Respondent spoke subsequently with both Mr. Greenbaum and Mr. Miller. Following this conversation, he sent Mr. Greenbaum the following letter, dated February 23, 1997: It was pleasure talking to you and Dan Miller and I appreciate your candor. Based on the information you provided on the phone, it appears the premiums and deductibles that are currently in force are excessive. My comment is based on what is available in the marketplace today. It appears that the earliest I can sit down and discuss this with the board is in May. My recommendation is that we move our meeting up to March or April. This will enable us to obtain the best possible terms and conditions as we will have ample time prior to the beginning of the hurricane season. The association has nothing to lose and potentially a lot to gain. My evaluation requires a minimum amount of time. After our meeting and a review of the current program and losses, I will be in a position to confirm in writing what improvements can be made. I look forward to hearing from you. Respondent provided the "marketing person" at Braishfield with the information he had been provided by Mr. Greenbaum and Mr. Miller concerning the Association's insurance needs and loss history. The "marketing person" thereupon canvassed the market to determine if there were any alternatives to the Fireman's Fund policies. Such canvassing revealed that there did exist an alternative to the Fireman's Fund policies, in the form of a layered program in which three of the participating insurers were not "authorized insurers," as that term is used in Florida's "Surplus Lines Law." The "marketing person" prepared the following "Statement of Diligent Effort" for Respondent's signature as the "producing agent": Pursuant to [sic] Section 626.914(4), Florida Statutes, requires producing agents to document that a diligent effort has been made to place a risk with at least three (3) authorized insurers prior to contacting a surplus lines agent to export the risk in the surplus lines market. The following form, prescribed by the Department, must be completed IN FULL for each risk. Name of person contacted and telephone number are MANDATORY. COUNTY OF RISK: Palm Beach County NAME OF INSURED: Saxony A-N Condominium Association TYPE OF COVERAGE: Property AUTHORIZED INSURER #1 NAME- Hartford Insurance TELEPHONE NUMBER- 800-824-1732 PERSON CONTACTED- Ben Wilson DATE OF CONTACT- March 21, 1997 REASON FOR DECLINATION- Type of Risk/Property Location AUTHORIZED INSURER #2 NAME- General Accident Ins. TELEPHONE NUMBER- 407-660-1985 PERSON CONTACTED- Bob Rayser DATE OF CONTACT- March 21, 1997 REASON FOR DECLINATION- Type of Risk/Property Location AUTHORIZED INSURER #2 NAME- RISCORP TELEPHONE NUMBER- 800-226-7472 PERSON CONTACTED- Bryan Flowers DATE OF CONTACT- March 21, 1997 REASON FOR DECLINATION- Risk does not qualify for program Respondent signed this "Statement of Diligent Effort" on the line provided for the "[s]ignature of [p]roducing [a]gent." He did so in good faith based upon the representations made to him by the "marketing person." In April of 1997, Respondent met with members of the insurance committee and Ms. Lichten at Mr. Miller's residence to discuss the possibility of the Association obtaining, through Braishfield, the layered program of insurance described above to replace the Fireman's Fund policies that were then in effect. Respondent, on behalf of Braishfield, made a "conceptual" proposal at the meeting. After the meeting, Respondent sent the following letter, dated April 16, 1997, to Dan Miller: It was a pleasure meeting with you and the committee and again I want to apologize for arriving late. Per our discussions, we will provide our final proposal after receiving written confirmation regarding the three year loss history for property and liability. Our proposal will be effective June 1, however we will use whatever date is acceptable to the committee. We anticipate, it will take us approximately two weeks from the time we go into the marketplace until everything is finalized. It appears, there is minimal exposure for equipment, such as heating, cooling and electrical systems. Consequently, we will not include machinery and equipment breakdown in our final proposal. I strongly recommend that you obtain an updated appraisal on your buildings as it is extremely important that your replacement cost reflect today's cost. This will eliminate any potential coinsurance or under insurance problem in the event of a loss. I look forward to working with you and the committee and being appointed as your broker to assist you in all your insurance needs. In May of 1997, Respondent, on behalf of Braishfield, presented a detailed formal written proposal (Braishfield's Written Proposal) to the Association. Braishfield's Written Proposal contained an "Executive Summary" which read as follows: Executive Summary Per our conceptual proposal and correspondence of April 16, we are pleased to present our final program including terms and conditions. Our proposal is based on information provided by the Insurance Committee on policies that are currently in force. Our comparison of coverages incorporates this information. The differences are what we believe to be the key or salient features of each program. The bottom line is, we are offering a substantial premium savings, significantly lower deductibles with comparable coverage. Our recommendation is to appoint Braishfield of Florida as your broker to place all coverage in effect as soon as possible. The "final program" referenced in the "Executive Summary" was a layered program. The "[p]articipating [c]arriers" in the program and their "Best's Ratings" were listed as follows in Braishfield's Written Proposal: PARTICIPATING CARRIERS Property Insurance Carriers Best's Rating Lexington Insurance A++15 General Star Insurance A++7 Royal Surplus Lines A-7 General Liability/Crime New Hampshire Insurance A++15 Directors & Officers Liability Chubb Insurance Group A++15 Umbrella Liability Great American Insurance A+11 The three "carriers" providing "property insurance" coverage were not "authorized insurers," within the meaning of the "Surplus Lines Law." The "[b]enefits of the Braishfield [p]roposed [p]rogram [o]ver [c]urrent [p]rogram" were described in Braishfield's Written Proposal as follows: A Premium Savings of $42,529 Annually.* No Coinsurance Penalty. A 2% Deductible per building as respect to the perils of wind and hail. A $5,000,000 limit for Excess Liability A $5,000 AOP Deductible * Our premium savings is based on the following: Company Coverage Premiums Fireman's Fund Package $144,071 Fireman's Fund Umbrella $2,168 TOTAL $146,239 $ 12,966 (Agent's Fee) TOTAL $159,205 Proposal Cancellation Date June 1, 1997 Pro Rata Return Premium- $79,761 Short Rate Return Premium- $71,801 NOTE: A $1,000,000 Umbrella would produce a further savings of $3,395 Braishfield's Written Proposal also contained a "Program Comparison," which provided as follows: Coverage Current Proposed Program Program $20,454,000 Blanket As Per Limit on Schedule Real and Personal Property Coinsurance Yes No Demolition $250,000 Cost Law & $5,000,000 $500,000 Ordinance Deductible -Wind 3% of $20,454,00 2% Per Building -AOP $10,000 $5,000 Valuation Replacement Cost Re- Placement Cost Unnamed Yes See Note Storm Deductible Umbrella $1,000,00 $5,000,000 Limit NOTE: Our comparison does not include unnamed storm wind coverage. This will be discussed during the presentation. Respondent met with the committee members and Ms. Lichten for about eight hours on or about May 6, 1997. At the meeting, he explained Braishfield's Written Proposal in detail and answered questions. On or about May 9, 1997, Respondent sent the following letter to Mr. Miller for the insurance committee's consideration: The benefits to the association under Braishfield's proposal are: A $5,000 AOP deductible Significantly lower premium No co-insurance penalty A superior wind deductible in the event of a catastrophe such a hurricane. The elimination of any rate increase in 1997 even if this is a bad year for the insurance industry. Outstanding insurance service will include a renewal strategy meeting 120 days prior to expiration. This meeting will disclose options, market conditions and pricing projections. This will allow the committee to act proactively instead of reactively in the best interest of the association. -$5,000,000 Umbrella. One other point to consider involves the payment of premium. If you cancel the Fireman's Fund Package policy on June 1, the earned premium is estimated to be $72,035. If you include a short rate penalty this increases to $79,239. Including the May installment the association has paid $96,165. The difference or the return premium due the association is $24,130 which should be refunded within 60 days. Since you have paid more premium than is earned no payment should be made for June. This enables the association to apply June's payment of $12,015 toward the down payment under Braishfield's program of $26,557.16. The net amount the association has to come up with is $14,542.16. I trust this will be helpful to the committee. It has not been shown that that Respondent at any time knowingly provided the Association (through its officers and representatives) with any false or misleading information or that he knowingly, with the intent to deceive, hid any information from the Association. He disclosed, among other things, that Braishfield's proposed layered program, unlike the Fireman's Fund policies, included "unauthorized insurers" and explained the differences between "unauthorized" and "authorized" insurers. In explaining these differences, he talked about the Florida Insurance Guaranty Act, which protects those insured by "authorized insurers" in the event of insurer insolvency, but does not offer similar protection to those insured by "unauthorized insurers." Respondent also advised that the mid- term cancellation of the Fireman's Fund policies would result in a "short rate" penalty and, in addition, he discussed how Braishfield's proposed layered program would be financed and the interest rates that would be charged. The Association's Acceptance of Braishfield's Written Proposal The insurance committee brought Braishfield's Written Proposal before the Association's board of directors, which voted 15 to 14 in favor of accepting the proposal and replacing the Fireman's Fund policies with the layered program proposed by Braishfield. Post-Acceptance Activities After learning of the results of the vote, Respondent sent the following letter, dated May 27, 1997, to Mr. Miller: I was delighted to hear that the board has made their decision in favor of Braishfield. If we are looking at a May 31, 1997, effective date it is essential that the following matters be addressed immediately: The original finance agreement signed in the appropriate places indicated by "x." A check in the amount of $26,557.67 should be made payable to Braishfield of Florida for the down payment. Both the finance agreement and the check must be available to be picked up by me prior to May 31, 1997. A broker of record letter naming Braishfield on the Director's and Officer's liability policy must be executed and signed. The specific policy number should be included in the caption. A sample letter was included in our final proposal. We will be sending you a completed statement of values form which will require signature of a board or insurance committee member. I have taken the liberty of drafting a letter advising the agent to cancel all coverages effective May 31, 1997. Included is a request to confirm the return premium due the association as well as any unearned fee that will be returned. This letter should be written on Saxony letterhead and signed by you or the President of the association. In accordance with Respondent's suggestion, Ms. Lichten sent the following letter, dated May 28, 1997, to Mr. Simione: Re: Fireman's Commercial Insurance Pkg. Policy #S15MZX80662013 Fireman's Umbrella Insurance Policy #XSC 00074217738 Dear Mr. Simione: Effective May 31, 1997, please cancel above captioned policies. The Saxony Board of Directors at a Special Meeting held on May 27, 1997 voted to appoint a new agent. Please acknowledge the above cancellation in writing and also confirm the return premium due under each policy, including any penalty. Confirmation of any unearned brokerage fee should also be included. All calculations should be based on a May 31, 1997 cancellation date. Thank you for your cooperation and consideration you have given Saxony over the past few years. The following day, May 29, 1997, Ms. Lichten sent the following letter, with the described enclosures, to Respondent: Enclosed herewith please find the following: Duly signed Finance Agreement for our Insurance as agreed upon. Check #001 payable to Braishfield of Florida date May 28, 1997 drawn on Sun Trust in the amount of $26,557.67, which represents our down payment. Please send us [a] letter acknowledging receipt of the above together with [a] letter indicating that we will indeed have insurance as we agreed to commencing May 31, 1997. Looking forward to working with you. That same day, May 29, 1997, Respondent sent Ms. Lichten "copies of binders confirming coverage effective May 31, 1997 as per [Braishfield's] May 6th proposal." On June 5, 1997, Ms. Lichten sent Mr. Simione a signed (by Ms. Lichten) and dated (May 29, 1997) "Cancellation Request/Policy Release" form formally requesting cancellation of the Fireman's Fund policies, effective May 31, 1997. On or about June 20, 1997, Ms. Lichten was sent a Certificate of Insurance "certify[ing] that the policies listed [which had been described in Braishfield's Written Proposal] ha[d] been issued to the [Association] for the policy period indicated [May 31, 1997, to May 31, 1998]." On or about June 30, 1997, the appraiser that the Association had hired (Allied Appraisal Service) completed the "updated appraisal on [the Association's] buildings" that Respondent had recommended. Respondent reviewed the appraisal report and prepared a written analysis of the report, which he subsequently discussed with the members of the insurance committee and Ms. Lichten. In his written analysis, Respondent stated, among other things, the following: This proposal analyzes the appraisal made by Allied Appraisal Service on June 30, covering the building and surrounding improvements at Saxony "E," Delray Beach, Florida 33446. The purpose is two fold. To ascertain if the values being reported to the insurance companies reflect as closely as possible the exposure at risk. This includes the impact on coverages such as limits and deductibles. The other area is the premium which includes various options. The property coverage is underwritten in a layered program using three companies. The total limit of coverage is $20,454,000, which is subject to a sublimit per building of $1,461,000. Based on the updated appraisal, the 100% replacement cost on buildings and improvements is $24,561,978 which breaks down to $1,754,427 per building. These amounts were arrived at by eliminating and or reducing those items that were not the responsibility of the association. Other adjustments were made regarding contingencies and contractor's profit which should be discussed. The breakdown is provided on Exhibit I attached. The difference or the amount of increase required to comply with the appraisal is $4,107,978. The change in values increases the wind deductible from $29,220 to $35,088 per building. On or about July 18, 1997, Respondent (who, by this time, had left the employ of Braishfield and had started his own insurance agency/brokerage firm) sent Ms. Lichten a letter, which read as follows: Per our meeting with the insurance committee on Wednesday, July 16, it was recommended the building values be amended based on the property appraisal made by Allied Appraisal Service[] on June 30, 1997. The 100% replacement value including improvements is $24,561,978. The total amount of insurance in force is $20,454,000. The net result is a[n] increase of $4,107,978. Also included in the appraisal is the cost to change certain items revised by current building codes. This is known as law or ordinance coverage. We recommend an increase in the limit by $850,000 to $1,350,000 to cover the additional exposure. Both of the above increases place the property insurance in compliance with the appraisal. The underwriter has agreed to provide blanket coverage using 90% coinsurance. The blanket amount excluding law or ordinance coverage is $22,105,760. This is an improvement over the existing program as the blanket amount would apply to any one loss and the basis for determining the premium would be significantly less. Using an effective date of July 31, the additional premium including taxes and fees is $8,446.20. In addition to the improvement in coverage and key deductibles, our program provides a net savings in excess of $34,000 a year over the Fireman's Fund policy. The changes that Respondent had recommended based upon the "updated Appraisal" were "bound," as Respondent advised Ms. Lichten by the following letter dated August 12, 1997: This will confirm that effective July 31, the following changes have been bound: The total insurable value increased to $22,105,780. The Law or Ordinance coverage increased to $1,350,000. Coverage is on a blanket basis. The coinsurance clause has been amended to 90%. The 2% wind deductible per building is increased to $31,580. All of these changes were based on the property appraisal made by Allied Appraisal Service on June 30, with some exceptions, such as Misc. & Contingencies and Overhead/Profits. It was agreed by the insurance committee not to include these items. Attached is our invoice amount of $8,446.20 representing the additional premium due hereunder. Please make your check payable to Braishfield of Florida and send it to me. In October of 1997, Respondent submitted a renewal proposal to the Association. The proposal was accepted and renewed coverage was bound, effective December 1, 1997, for a period of three years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2000.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent has violated various provisions of the Florida Insurance Code as alleged in an Amended Order to Show Cause and, if so, what penalty, if any, is warranted.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating viatical settlement providers in the State of Florida. The Respondent, Future First Financial Group, Inc., is licensed by the State of Florida as a viatical settlement provider. Its President and Chief Executive Officer is Mr. Randy Stelk. A viatical settlement contract involves the sale of a life insurance policy's benefits in exchange for an immediate discounted cash settlement to the original policy holder. A Florida resident "viator" (the insured) desiring to enter into a viatical settlement contract, acts through a Florida licensed broker, who provides the policy information to licensed viatical settlement providers like the Respondent, for subsequent re-sale of policy benefits to purchasers. Future First was initially licensed as a viatical settlement provider on December 26, 1997. The initial regulation of viatical settlement providers in the State of Florida by the Petitioner began at approximately the time Future First initially became licensed. Consolidated findings concerning Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 20, 22, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44, and 45: Future First was a licensee of and regulated by the Department of Insurance at all times pertinent hereto. The health status representations on the exhibits (referenced in the Department's Proposed Recommended Order) concerning each of these counts, which are the insurance policy applications in question in these counts, are materially inconsistent with the health status representations related to the later viatical settlement agreements contained in the other exhibits so referenced as to each of the above-enumerated counts. These latter exhibits constitute the showing of actual medical condition to the Respondent by the insureds or viators in each transaction referenced in these counts. The overall effect of this showing is to indicate to the Respondent that the viators in question in these counts were HIV positive or had the disease AIDS, along with related diseases and medical conditions, contrary to the representations initially made to the insurance companies issuing the subject policies, in the insurance policy applications referenced in these counts, wherein the viators represented that they suffered from none of the medical diseases or conditions referenced in those application forms, including AIDS. All the exhibits referenced in these counts came from the business files of Future First and were supplied to the Department by Future First upon the Department's request during the investigation process. These material inconsistencies should have caused Future First to be on notice or to know or believe that the viators in question in these counts had made or indeed may have made fraudulent or material misrepresentations on their insurance policy applications. Subsection 626.989(6), Florida Statutes, requires Department licensees to report to the Department any knowledge or belief that a fraudulent insurance practice, as defined in Section 817.234, Florida Statutes, had been or was being committed. Subsection 817.234(3), Florida Statutes, specifically prohibits the presentation of false, incomplete or misleading information in support of an insurance application or the concealing of any fact material to the application. Thus Subsection 817.234(3), supra, specifically prohibits the very act strongly suggested by the evidence presented in the exhibits supportive of the above-referenced counts of the Amended Order. Future First made no reports to the Department concerning these matters until it contends it first became aware of these inconsistencies in health status representations upon receipt of the Order to Show Cause and later the Amended Order to Show Cause. Consolidated Findings of Fact Concerning Counts 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, and 42: The facts established as to these counts are much the same as those referenced above. The health status representations on the insurance policy applications in question and in evidence (exhibit numbers cited in the Proposed Findings as to these counts in the Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order) are materially inconsistent with the health status representation on the other exhibits which consist generally of the various documents of health or medical information provided to the Respondent by the viators in question, when the transactions leading to the viatical settlement agreements at issue were being entered into and finalized. The commonality among all of these counts as well as the counts in the above Findings of Fact (Part A above) consist of the viator's having been diagnosed with HIV or AIDS and/or related medical conditions sometime in the past prior to executing the insurance policy applications at issue and then responding in the negative on relevant questions on those policy applications, the overall effect of which was to deny the HIV positive test result, the HIV infection and the diagnosis of AIDS and related medical conditions. The viators at issue then openly revealed these conditions and the dates of the relevant diagnoses, all of which pre-dated the insurance policy applications, in the medical status representations they made to the Respondent and which were also revealed in the medical records provided to the Respondent at some point prior to the issuance of the Order to Show Cause and Amended Order. The health status representations made by the viators at these two different, germane points in time are materially inconsistent. Those material inconsistencies reasonably should have caused Future First and its operating officers to be on notice, to know or to believe that the viators made or may have made fraudulent or material misrepresentations on their insurance policy applications. Moreover, the evidence, as to these counts delineated in Part B above, shows that Future First was actually informed specifically that the policies in question had been rescinded by the insurers because the viators had made material misrepresentations on their policy applications. Exhibits such as the Future First policy summary forms show that Future First had been informed of the policy recisions as to the Counts referenced in Part B above. All of the documents constituting the Department's exhibits supportive of these findings, and the policy summary forms included, were found within the business files of Future First and were supplied to the Department by Future First upon its request during the investigative phase of this prosecution. Subsection 626.989(6), Florida Statutes, requires Department licensees to report to the Department any knowledge or belief that a fraudulent insurance practice as defined in Section 817.234, Florida Statutes, had been or was being committed. Subsection 817.234(3), Florida Statutes, specifically prohibits the presentation of false, incomplete or misleading information in support of an insurance application or the concealing of any fact material to the application. Thus, Subsection 817.234(3), supra, specifically prohibits the acts suggested by the documentary evidence presented by the Department, which supports the Findings of Fact herein. Future First made no report on these matters concerning the viators and policies to the Department, prior to the investigatory audit. Additional Findings of Fact Concerning Counts 2, 5, 41, 42, 43, and 44: Concerning Count 2, Exhibits 15 through 17 are viatical settlement purchase agreements entered into between Future First and various viatical settlement purchasers. These agreements represent to those purchasers that the policies, which are the subject of the agreements, are beyond the contestability period (typically two years) during which an insurer company may rescind its policy. The settlement purchase agreements specify that the "contestability period" runs for two years from the date of policy issuance. Exhibit 2 shows, however, that the policy in question was issued on January 22, 1998, and Exhibits 15 through 17, the agreements, were entered into in February, March and April of 1998, well before the January 22, 2000, conclusion of the contestability period. Future First thus had within its possession, in its files, the documents and information to show that the policies were not beyond contestability when the interests in those policies were sold to the investors or viatical settlement purchasers. The purchasers, by initialing the relevant portion of their purchase agreements had indicated and contracted for the purchase of non-contestable policies or policies which had survived the two-year contestable period before being purchased by these investors or viatical settlement purchasers. The vice-president in charge of underwriting, Mr. Sweeney, under the business practices of Future First, essentially made all the calculations and decisions involved in negotiating and effecting the settlement purchase agreements with the investors and the viatical settlement agreements with the original viators or insureds. As an experienced insurance executive and underwriter who had all of the relevant documents available to him, he is chargeable with knowledge that the policies he and Future First were conveying to the settlement purchasers were still within the contestability period, despite his being on documentary notice that the investors had contracted to purchase only non-contestable policies. The officers and directors of the Respondent allowed him to have this independence of action, freedom of conduct and bargaining power on behalf of Future First and therefore, Future First, the corporation, is chargeable with the conduct it allowed him to engage in, even assuming, arguendo, that no other officer, director or employee of the company knew of the relevant details of these transactions. Thus Future First misrepresented to its investors that the policies were beyond contestability when in fact they were not. It thus is chargeable with knowingly selling interests in contestable policies to investors, who had specifically contracted for the purchase for non-contestable policies. This misrepresentation was material to the purchases because the insurers' ability to rescind the policies during contestability, thereby destroying the very instrument securing the purchasers' investment, was not made known to those purchasers. The potential destruction of that instrument and the consequent loss of the investment to the purchaser is material to any reasoned decision to invest. CEO Randy Stelk's testimony at hearing to the effect that computer input error had caused contestable policies to be inadvertently sold to purchasers who contractually specified a non-contestable policy is rebutted by Future First's own documents from its records which correctly and explicitly identify the policy as contestable. See Exhibits 11a and 11f, at pages 1 and 4, and Exhibit 24, all of which correctly identify the policy as contestable. Exhibit 24 specifically notes the dates at which the policy was projected to emerge from its contestability period. Thus this documented evidence, together with the evidence of Mr. Sweeney's close and direct involvement with arranging for the transactions and making decisions as to which policies to sell to which investors belies Mr. Stelk's testimony in this regard. Concerning Count 5, Exhibits 50, 54, 55, 56 and 57, are viatical settlement purchase agreements which inter alia represented to the respective viatical settlement purchasers that the policy in question was beyond the contestability period during which an insurer may rescind the policy. The "contestability period" runs for two years from the date of policy issuance. However, Exhibit 39, shows that the policy in question was issued on February 3, 1998, and Exhibits 50, 54, 55, 56 and 57, were respectively entered into in February of 1998, well prior to the February 3, 2000, end of the contestability period. Here again, Future First's own records, which correctly and explicitly identify this policy as contestable also specifically note, at Exhibits 42d and 46, the date at which the policy was projected to emerge from the contestability period. The purchase agreements referenced above clearly show that the investors contemplated and contracted to purchase a non-contestable policy. These documents clearly were available to Mr. Sweeney and to Future First at the time Mr. Sweeney was making the underwriting decisions and entering into the agreements with the investors, and consequently this knowledge is chargeable to him and to Future First. Again Mr. Stelks' testimony that computer input error had caused inadvertent sale of contestable policies to purchasers who had contractually specified non-contestable policies is rebutted by Future First's own records, the evidence concerning Future First business practices and specifically Mr. Sweeney's underwriting methods and conduct. Thus, Mr. Stelk's testimony in this regard is not credited. Thus, it is inferred that Future First, through Mr. Sweeney, knowingly represented to investors that the policies were beyond contestability when they were not and such a representation was material to the purchase because the insurers' ability to rescind a policy during contestability and destroy the very instrument securing the investment was not made known to the purchaser. The potential destruction of that instrument and the consequent loss of investment is material to any reasoned decision to invest. Concerning Count 41, the fifth page of Exhibit 428, contains a paragraph entitled "Incontestability" which establishes that the life insurance policy in question was subject to a two-year contestability period, during which the insurer could rescind the policy. Exhibits 446, 447, 448, 449, 450 and 451, are all viatical settlement purchase agreements through which the viatical settlement investors purchased an interest in the death benefit of the life insurance policy in question. Each of those purchase agreements contains a standard section entitled "Minimum Criteria" which is initialed by the purchaser, thereby indicating the purchaser's decision to purchase an interest only in a policy which was beyond contestability. Future First nonetheless placed all of those investors' monies into the policy in question (See Exhibit 428) while it was still within the two-year contestability period without informing the purchasers of that fact. Future First had the policy in its possession and necessarily had to have a copy of it in possession in order to purchase the policy from the viator, which it did in July of 1998. It thus knew the policy was still within its contestability period when interest in it were sold to the purchasers in question. The same reasons found with regard to Counts 2 and 5 prevail here with regard to Mr. Sweeney's involvement. The documents were in Future First's possession and within its knowledge such that the circumstantial evidence clearly shows that Future First is chargeable with knowledge or belief that it sold contestable policies to investors who had no reason to believe they were purchasing contestable policies. Concerning Count 42, Exhibit 453 is dated March 24, 1998, and is a viatical settlement purchase agreement between Future First and the viatical settlement purchaser named therein. The agreement contains the same initialed provision found with regard to the agreements in Counts 2, 5 and 41, indicating the purchasers' decision to invest only in a policy which was beyond the two-year contestability period. The agreement bears the designation "PRA 58075" in the lower left hand corner of the first page (purchaser number). Exhibit 459 is a letter dated May 21, 1998, authorizing Charles R. Sussman, Trustee for the Fidelity Trust (identified in numerous exhibits, including 454 in this count, as the escrow agent used by Future First for viatical settlement contract transactions), to wire funds from that trust to Compass Bank for the purchase of an interest in the death benefits of the Farmers New World Life Insurance policy on the viator named therein, which purchase was accomplished through the execution of Exhibit 454 on June 6, 1998. Among the PRA numbers identified in Exhibit 459, is 58075, corresponding to Exhibit 453, the above-referenced purchase contract. Exhibit 455 is an internally prepared Future First document that clearly states that the life insurance policy in question was still well within its contestability period on May 21, 1998. The exhibits thus establish that Future First represented to the investor that the policy it would purchase with his funds was beyond contestability when, because of the unequivocal documents in its possession, Future First had to have known, through Mr. Sweeney, that it was not. Indeed all of those exhibits were found within the business files of Future First and Future First stipulated that included in those exhibits are its purchase request agreements that contain the contestability provision in question. Exhibits 462 and 463 establish that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy referenced in those exhibits was issued on March 28, 1998. Exhibit 465, establishes that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy was purchased by Future First on June 22, 1998. Exhibit 468, establishes that on July 1, 1998, purchaser 58075's funds were used to purchase an interest in that Manhattan National Life Insurance policy obviously well within the two-year contestability period since the policy was only issued on March 28, 1998. This was despite an express representation otherwise in the viatical settlement purchase agreement. Exhibits 471 and 472, show that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy was rescinded during the contestability period in September 1998. Exhibit 473 establishes that Future First decided to switch the viatical settlement purchaser's funds out of the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy into a John Hancock Life Insurance Company policy. However, it did not inform the purchaser that the Manhattan National Life Insurance policy had been rescinded during its contestability period. Exhibits 485 and 486, establish that the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy referenced therein was issued on January 23, 1998. Exhibit 487 establishes that the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy was purchased by Future First in November of 1998, using the purchaser's funds referenced in Exhibits 488 and 489. Among those purchaser's funds were those of Purchaser 58075. Thus, Purchaser 58075's monies were used to purchase an interest in the death benefit of the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy in question. Despite the "beyond contestability" representation made in the viatical settlement purchase agreement between Purchaser 58075 and Future First, Future First placed that purchaser's money into the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy while it was still in its contestability period. Future First's own records refute Mr. Stelk's testimony that computer input error caused inadvertent sales of contestable policies to purchasers who had specified, contractually, their desire for non-contestable policies. The documents from Future First's own records in evidence, explicitly identify this policy as contestable and that the purchasers involved had desired non- contestable policies. In light of the foregoing reasons found as fact as to Counts 2, 5 and 41, which are adopted as to Count 42, Future First is chargeable with knowledge that it was selling contestable policies to purchasers who had specified contractually their wish and intent to purchase non-contestable policies. Count 43 involves the sale by Future First of interests in the death benefits of J.C. Penny Life Insurance Company Policy No. 25184/74L40L3762 in January of 1998, to three different viatical settlement purchasers. This is evidenced by Exhibits 498, 499 and 500, the respective settlement purchase agreements. Each of those purchase agreements includes a provision that required the purchase of an interest only in a policy which was beyond contestability. Exhibits 494, 496, 498, 499 and 500, together however, show that the interest in the policy sold to those purchasers were sold while the policy was still contestable, without informing the purchasers. All of these exhibits came from the business files or records of Future First and Future First stipulated that included in those exhibits are the purchase request agreements that contain the provisions restricting purchases to policies which were beyond the two-year contestability period. In light of the findings made as to Counts 2, 5, 41 and 42, next above, it is determined that Future First, the Respondent, is charged with knowledge that it, and specifically its vice-president in charge of underwriting, Mr. Sweeney, sold those policies which were still contestable to the relevant purchasers; that those purchasers had specified in their purchase agreements their intent to purchase only policies which were uncontestable and that it had not so informed those purchasers. Count 44, concerns a viatical settlement purchase agreement entered into by Future First on March 24, 1998, relating to the sale and purchase of an interest in the death benefit of an insurance policy. See Exhibit 510, in evidence. That agreement represented to the purchaser that the interest to be purchased was to be from a policy which was beyond the two- year contestability period. See Exhibits 508 and 510. However, the policy selected for investment for that purchaser by Future First was not beyond contestability. Exhibit 506, obtained from Future First's own files, clearly shows that the issuance date of the policy was May 6, 1998, and Exhibits 504, 508 and 510 considered together, indicate that the policy was sold to that purchaser while it was still contestable. Future First thus subjected the purchaser's investment to the undisclosed risk of rescission of the policy. The existence of such a risk would certainly be material to that investor's decision about whether to so invest. Thus by investing the purchaser's funds in a contestable policy instead of an uncontestable policy, without advising that investor of such a deviation from their contractual agreement, is, in effect, a material misrepresentation in that transaction. For the reasons found as to Counts 2, 5, 41, 42 and 43 above, Future First is chargeable with knowledge that the policy was contestable and that it had invested the purchaser's funds in a contestable policy when it was contractually bound to only invest that purchaser's funds in an uncontestable policy, as established by the terms of the viatical settlement purchase agreement. Future First's business practices. Future First conducts its business in various states through representatives resident in such states known as viatical settlement brokers. Viatical settlement brokers gather all relevant information, including available medical information and usually provide it to various viatical settlement providers in order to solicit multiple bids on a particular policy. Future First does not solicit viators itself. During the time period relevant to the allegation in the Amended Order, when Future First initially received a package from a broker, it was divided into its insurance and medical components. The insurance component was provided to Mr. William Sweeney, Future First's Vice-President of Underwriting. The medical component was provided to a nurse on the staff with Future First for initial medical review and then forwarded to Future First's independent medical consultant, Dr. Michael Duffy. During the time period relevant to the Amended Order, Future First offered a one, two or three-year viatical purchase program. That is, viators must have a certified life expectancy of one, two or three years in order to qualify with Future First. After Dr. Duffy reviewed a particular file and the viator was deemed qualified as to one of the three available programs, Dr. Duffy would certify and assign a life expectancy to the viator and return the file to Mr. Sweeney. Life expectancy estimates are inherently subject to many variables, are unpredictable and constitute a risk to the purchaser. Mr. Sweeney's responsibilities included verification that the insurance information provided with any particular file was correct and complete (including insurance policy applications), that the policy actually existed and was in force, that premiums were paid up to date, that the insurance company had the appropriate rating, as well as conducting other verifications. Before a policy was approved for purchase, it was Mr. Sweeney's ultimate responsibility, pursuant to Future First's existing corporate policy, to compare the date of initial diagnosis of a potential viator's medical condition to the insurance policy application to look for any inconsistencies. Mr. Sweeney next completed a "file summary cover sheet" referencing certain information and verifications and attached it to the file. Mr. Sweeney was essentially a "one-man operation" in exclusive control of Future First's underwriting department and was ultimately responsible for deciding whether or not Future First would offer to bid on a particular policy. Future First's business operations in effect at the time relevant to the Amended Order were so compartmentalized that other officers or employees at Future First might not know any details associated with Mr. Sweeney's activities. After Mr. Sweeney authorized Future First to bid on a particular policy, the file was transferred to the bidding department. The bidding department did not re-visit or otherwise question Mr. Sweeney's decision to bid on a particular policy, but only reviewed the cover sheet to establish a bid price. If documentation was missing from any file, it was Mr. Sweeney's responsibility to contact the broker to request the missing documents. All viatical settlement brokers with whom Future First did business in Florida were required to be licensed by the Petitioner. Future First currently no longer conducts business with the broker "Funds For Life" because that particular broker dealt solely in "contestable" policies and Future First no longer purchases such policies, at least since the Petitioner's audit. Future First no longer has a business relationship with the Texas-based broker "Southwest Viatical," in part because Southwest Viatical routinely failed to provide complete documentation to Future First, including the insurance applications of viators. Southwest Viatical was specifically requested to provide insurance policy applications regarding the relevant policies referred to in the Amended Order but refused to do so. Most of the Southwest Viatical files purchased by Future First did not include insurance applications at the time of purchase. The insurance applications were ultimately obtained by Future First, however, at some point prior to the 1999 audit by the Petitioner. Future First became concerned about the character of individuals associated with Southwest Viatical and when requested by Southwest Viatical to forward commission funds to an offshore account, Future First declined to do so and immediately ceased doing business with Southwest Viatical. Future First cooperated thoroughly with Texas authorities in their investigation of Southwest Viatical, ultimately culminating, as a direct result of Future First's assistance, with the apprehension and subsequent incarceration of two principals of Southwest Viatical. During the period of time alleged in the Amended Order Future First received, on the average, between 400 and 600 policies per month from brokers requesting a bid. Future First rejected and never bid on the majority of policies referred to it by Southwest Viatical. On the average, Future First ultimately purchased approximately 25 percent of the policies submitted to it for a bid. Mr. Sweeney was primarily responsible for communicating with brokers as to all aspects of a potential viatical settlement transaction and to request all required documentation, including insurance policy applications. During the course of Mr. Stelk's affiliation with Future First he personally became familiar with the handwriting of William F. Sweeney. It is Mr. Sweeney's initials which appear on the cover sheets entered into evidence by the Petitioner, exemplified by Petitioner's Exhibit 4a. All the remaining "cover sheet" exhibits of the Petitioner contain the initials "WFS" on the top right hand corner which are Mr. Sweeney's initials. Mr. Sweeney is not currently an officer, director or employee of Future First because he was removed from any position with the Respondent corporation by order of the Petitioner. No other officers, directors or employees of the Respondent have been subject to a similar removal order, nor has Future First itself. The criminal proceedings currently pending against the Respondent are the direct result of Mr. Sweeney's activities while employed by Future First. The Petitioner's lead investigator reviewing Future First's business activities recommended that individual charges only be brought against Mr. Sweeney and against no other individual employed by or affiliated with the Respondent. Future First has a business relationship with licensed life insurance agents and/or securities brokers throughout the United States to solicit funds from individuals for ultimate purchase of viatical settlements. Those licensed individuals present an approved Purchase Request Agreement (PRA) to a potential purchaser to discuss the various Future First programs available and to help the purchaser finalize a PRA. Depending on what state the purchaser resided in, the purchaser would then issue a check either to Future First directly or to the Fidelity Trust (Future First's escrow agent), to be held until such time as Future First could purchase from a viator a policy matching the program desired by that purchaser. Thereafter, a formal "closing" would occur when the purchaser was, where appropriate, made a beneficiary on one or more insurance policies; all verifications and notifications to the insurance company and other entities were completed; an attorney and the trustee, would approve all aspects of the transaction within their purview, and a copy of the closing package would be sent to the purchaser for his or her records. After the closing, Future First would engage Life Watch Services, Inc., an unaffiliated company, to monitor the health status of the viator on a monthly basis in order that all appropriate actions may be taken at the time of the viator's death, so that the policy benefits may be promptly paid to the purchaser. Future First initially engaged in the purchase of contestable policies only after being approached by groups of agents with potential purchasers willing to assume the risk associated with contestable policies. Understanding the risk associated with such policies, Future First reserved 20 percent of its potential profit from such transactions and placed those funds in trust in a "Guaranty Fund" in the event that an insurance company rescinded a policy within the contestable period. In the event an insurer rescinded a contestable policy, Future First purchased a new policy for its customer out of the Guaranty Fund, at no additional cost to the customer. No purchaser ever lost any "investment time" if a policy was rescinded by an insurance company because that purchaser would be provided a new policy involving a viator with the same ultimate remaining life expectancy. Thus, without any prompting by a governmental authority, Future First made the business decision to voluntarily exceed the protections of Florida law by establishing the Guaranty Fund in order to purchase replacement policies for its customers if the initial policy was rescinded by the insurer. The Guaranty Fund was also utilized to make the purchaser whole even when an insurance company cancelled or non- renewed an insurance policy on an entire group, or if a new insurance carrier for a particular group later reduced the benefit level assigned to the purchaser. The Guaranty Fund was also used for the benefit of purchasers if a viator as a member of an employer group, quit his or her job and the viator exercised a statutory right to have the group policy benefits converted to an individual policy. Because benefit levels on such individual policies are typically lower, the Guaranty Fund was used to purchase additional insurance benefits to assign to the purchaser. Additionally, if a policy lapsed for any reason, the Guaranty Fund was used to procure a new policy or policies in order that the purchaser would be fully protected according to the terms of the PRA. No policy purchased by Future First has ever lapsed for failure of Future First to pay the premium. Funds from the Guaranty Fund have been used to purchase new policies when a viator committed suicide and the insurance company later rescinded the policy, as well. The Guaranty Fund maintained by Future First existed to cover other contingencies beyond just the possible recession of insurance policies because of the misrepresentation of the viator discovered by the insurer within the contestable period. Future First, through use of the Guaranty Fund, has replaced approximately 17 million dollars in face value of insurance policies, equating to about 12.4 million dollars in direct cost to Future First and, as a result, no Future First purchaser has ever been harmed. The 12.4 million dollars used to purchase replacement policies would otherwise have been retained by Future First as profit. Today Future First does not purchase contestable policies in the regular course of its business. The only exception to that occurs when an insured group undergoes a carrier change and a new contestable period is automatically instituted by the new carrier. There is no prohibition in Florida either presently or during the times relevant to the Amended Order, against the purchase of contestable policies by a viatical settlement provider. The recission of the contestable policies at issue in fact immediately followed an inquiry from the Department of Insurance to the insurers, which alerted them that the Department suspected fraud in the inception of the policies. That is, it suspected fraud on the part of the viators or insureds on those policies, not Future First. Future First immediately utilized the Guaranty Fund and began replacing the policies. None of the rescinding insurers have accused Future First of any complicity in any alleged fraud with respect to the policies referenced in the Amended Order, nor has the Department of Insurance alleged any such fraud against Future First. All but one or two of the rescinded policies have been replaced and the purchasers made whole, pursuant to the terms of their original PRA. One of the two policies not fully replaced as of the date of the hearing was being contested by Future First as to the legality of the insurance company's rescission, and Future First will replace the policy, if needed, at such time as that legal issue is resolved. Of all the policies at issue in the Amended Order, including, as well, any replacement policy subsequently purchased by Future First with money from the Guaranty Fund, only one or two contestable periods had not expired as of the date of the hearing. Those contestable periods were to expire thirty to sixty days after the date of the final hearing in this matter. Future First regularly monitors and verifies the status of all policies assigned to its purchasers, including the status of all replacement policies. The direct costs to Future First to purchase replacement policies for the rescinded policies referenced in the amended order was approximately $1.5 million dollars paid out of the Guaranty Fund. Since its initial licensure in the State of Florida, Future First has cooperated with the Petitioner concerning pending legislation, rule development and other contacts with the Petitioner agency. It has cooperated fully with the Petitioner when the audit of Future First occurred in February of 1999, provided all requested information and documentation and made all personnel available to confer with examiners in a full and frank manner. In the course of the four-week on-site audit, Mr. Stelk personally met with the Petitioner's examiners once or twice a week to discuss the Petitioner's suggestions for improving compliance. The Petitioner issued a draft "Report of Examination" as a result of its audit on August 5, 1999. It contained suggestions, comments and recommendations which had been discussed during Future First's staff meetings with the examiners. Future First addressed many of the Petitioner's concerns raised in the Report of Examination (report) and implemented certain suggested changes in its business practices. Mr. Stelk directed that a formal response to the report be filed, addressing the specific points raised by the Petitioner and explaining any corrective action taken where applicable. Future First viewed certain of the findings and suggestions made at the earlier meetings and later contained in the draft report as potentially helpful to its business. It therefore implemented those suggestions even before receiving the draft of the report. Certain suggestions in the report of such as a request to formalize a refund policy, were not strictly required by a controlling statute. However, Future First nonetheless voluntarily implemented such a refund policy. Future First has cooperated with all governmental agencies interested in reviewing its files at all times during the course of its licensure as a viatical settlement provider and during the course of the relevant investigations. There has been no allegation or suggestion that it has in any way altered any documents, tampered with its files or that any information was purposely missing. The Respondent contends that the Petitioner had no knowledge as to when any particular documents were received into Future First's files, including insurance applications, medical diagnosis information or other documents and has conceded that some policy applications or medical documentations may not have been received until after the bid process and viatical transactions in some cases were actually closed. Thus, Future First would not have been able to compare documents to detect possible fraud as to those situations. Therefore, Future First could not have been guilty of fraud or misrepresentation to its purchasers as to such transactions and files if it had no documentation at the point of the transaction being closed to indicate to it that possible insurance fraud in the inducement, by a viator, had occurred. In point of fact the Petitioner is not accusing Future First of fraud. However, as of the time of the audit in February 1999, because of the discussions and information it received at meetings with Department agents and employees, and certainly as to formal notification on August 5, 1999 in the Department's report, the Respondent knew that many insurance applications in its files had medical diagnosis information or disclosures by viators which were at odds with the medical information it obtained in the viatical settlement and contracting process. It still failed to report that knowledge (and indeed circumstantial evidence clearly indicates that at least Mr. Sweeney had that knowledge even before the February 1999 audit, as to many of the files). Future First still did not report potential fraud on the part of viators to the Department that it obviously had knowledge of until it began to actually report it in a formal way, after the first Show Cause Order was served (January 2000). It is also clear that the Department knew about this inconsistent medical information and probable insurance fraud by the time of its February 1999 audit. In November of 2000, as part of its efforts to cooperate with the requirements of the Department and the relevant statutes and rules, Future First filed an Anti-Fraud Education and Training Plan (Plan) with the Department, Division of Insurance Fraud. Neither Future First nor any of its representatives received any notice from the Department that the Plan was in any way deficient or otherwise non-compliant with Florida law. It has implemented that Plan and adherence to it has had a positive effect on Future First's business. The Anti-Fraud Plan stresses that Future First will not bid on a policy for purposes of viatical settlement unless the viator's insurance application is present in the file at or before the time of the bid. Future First's corporate policy, even prior to the implementation of the Anti-Fraud Plan has been that the insurance application must be reviewed and compared with available medical documentation for any inconsistencies prior to bidding on a policy. It is also apparent, however, that Mr. Sweeney and those under his direction and control apparently did not do so in many cases. During the course of the investigation, the "free- form" stage of this proceeding and the formal stage of this proceeding, Future First has made numerous form and other filings with the Petitioner seeking approval in connection with a new PRA and various other purchaser disclosures required by recent amendments to Florida Statutes. After comments and questions from the Department, resulting in some revisions to such documents, the new PRA and disclosure documents were approved by the Department, approval of the last document being obtained in April 2001. The Respondent, by its involvement through Mr. Stelk with the Viatical Life Settlement Association of American and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, has made a bonafide effort to gain knowledge of specific, appropriate business practices of other viatical settlement providers doing business in the United States as well as in Florida. Unlike certain other viatical settlement providers operating in Florida and elsewhere, Future First has never made premium payments on insurance policies out of the personal checking accounts of officers, directors or employees, has never instructed viators not to contact insurance companies and has never required viators to sign undated, change-of-ownership forms for filing with the insurer after the contestability period expired for any reason whatever, including as part of an effort to conceal from an insurance company the fact that an insurance policy was subject to viatical settlement. No such activity or effort to conceal has been alleged. (Compare, Accelerated Benefits Corporation documents in evidence pursuant to the Petitioner's Motion for Official Recognition). On March 19, 2000, February 8, 2001, and March 6, 2001, Future First filed with the Department identifying information and documents pursuant to the requirements of Subsection 626.989(6), Florida Statutes, to the effect that fraud may have been involved in the procurement of all of the rescinded insurance policies referenced in the Show Cause Order and the Amended Order. The three separate fraud notifications constitute the Respondent's Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 and correspond to the time period shortly after service of the initial Show Cause Order and the Amended Show Cause Order.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application of January 11, 1991, for examination as a general lines agent should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Paul L. Kornya was licensed in 1974 as a general lines insurance agent in the State of Florida. Prior to 1984, Respondent Department of Insurance had taken no formal disciplinary action against the Petitioner. In 1983, while licensed as an insurance agent and employed in the capacity of office manager for the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency, Petitioner established a demand deposit account in the name of "Atlantic Association Insurance" and listed himself as the sole signatory and beneficiary on the account. Petitioner thereafter wrote four unauthorized checks on the Milton Carpenter Agency Account totaling $47,132.14 made payable to Atlantic Association Insurance and deposited them into his demand deposit account. In order to conceal his activity, the Petitioner altered the payee of the checks. In a prior administrative case (Case No. 84-L-4085F), Petitioner admitted misappropriating and converting the funds. In 1983, while licensed as an insurance agent and employed in the capacity of office manager for the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency, Petitioner wrote two unauthorized checks on the Milton Carpenter Agency Account totaling $3,455 made payable to Blinder, Robinson and Co., Inc., Investment Bankers. In order to conceal his activity, the Petitioner listed an agency account code designated for miscellaneous companies on said checks. In a prior administrative case (Case No. 84-L- 4085F), Petitioner admitted misappropriating and converting the funds which were used for Petitioner's personal stock purchases. In 1984, a judgement in the amount of $52,013.35 was entered against Petitioner in the case styled Milton Carpenter Insurance, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and Cincinnati Insurance Company vs. Paul L. Kornya, Case No. 84-3235 CA(L)A, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, Florida. On October 31, 1985, the Department entered a Final Order revoking Petitioner's license qualifications and eligibility for licensure for a period of two years, based upon the misappropriation and conversion of said funds. By application signed December 16, 1987 and filed December 28, 1987, Petitioner submitted an application for examination as a general lines insurance agent. By Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter's letter to the Petitioner of February 29, 1988, the Department requested that the Petitioner submit certain certificates of employment to verify his prior experience. The letter stated that, "[t]o qualify for this examination through experience you must have completed within the past 4 years, at least 1 year of substantially full-time responsible duties as the bona fide employee of an agent or insurer. Your duties during this time must have been in all lines of property, casualty, surety, health and marine insurance. ... One certificate should be completed by you and the other by your employer." The Petitioner claims to have submitted said employment certificates shortly following the Department's request. However, the Department's files do not contain the documents or any other response to the letter, and there is no evidence beyond Petitioner's testimony to support the claim. By letter of March 17, 1988, Department representative Franklin Thompson again requested the experience information cited in the February 29 letter or in the alternative, that Petitioner submit proof that a course of education had been completed. The letter further stated that "we will need a statement from Milton Carpenter Insurance Inc. Agency of Belle Glade, Florida stating that any and all indebtedness you may have had relative to their firm has been satisfied". Both the February 29 and March 17 letters provided that failure to file the information within 30 days from the date of each letter is grounds for denial of the application. Three months passed following the March 17 letter to the Petitioner. According to the records of the Department, no response to either letter was received. On June 17, 1988, the Petitioner's December 1987 application was closed by the Department based upon the failure of Petitioner to submit the previously requested information. By letter of June 23, 1988, the Petitioner advised the Department that the indebtedness was not to the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency, but was to Cincinnati Insurance Company, which had insured the Carpenter agency against such losses. The letter further stated that approximately $5,000 had been repaid to the Cincinnati Insurance Company. By letter of August 3, 1988, Department representative Thompson wrote, "[t]he information you have furnished has been thoroughly reviewed. It appears that your indebtedness with Milton Carpenter Insurance has been assigned to Cincinnati Insurance Company. Please request that Cincinnati Insurance Company furnish us with a statement indicating that all of your indebtedness to their company has been satisfied". The letter stated that failure to respond within 30 days from the date of the letter was grounds for denial of the application. The evidence does not explain the reason for Mr. Thompson's letter of August 3, 1988. Given the June 17 closure of the pending application based upon the Petitioner's failure to supply additional information, the information furnished apparently consisted of the Petitioner's untimely filed letter of June 23. As of August 3, no pending application existed. In any event, the Petitioner did not respond to the August 3 request. By second application signed October 31, 1989, and filed November 3, 1989, Petitioner submitted an application for examination as a general lines insurance agent. By undated letter, Department representative Thompson again requested Petitioner to submit either certificates of employment to verify his prior experience or proof of completion of certain educational requirements, and further requested a reply to the letter of August 3, 1988 seeking statement from Cincinnati Insurance Company indicating that "all of your indebtedness to their company has been satisfied". Again the letter provides that failure to furnish the requested information within 30 days would result in the file being closed. 1/ The Petitioner, subsequent to the undated letter and prior to February 2, 1990, submitted said certificates of employment. Early in 1990, the Petitioner's application file was assigned to Department representative, Patricia Lehman. On February 2, 1990, Ms. Lehman informed that Petitioner that his certificates of employment were not acceptable, and that he would be required to complete a 240 hour educational requirement. Further, Ms. Lehman's letter provided that, "[i]n addition, you will need to furnish us with a certified letter from Cincinnati Insurance Company that you have made full restitution or a certified copy of the written agreement between you and the party(s) involved that you are making restitution satisfactory to all parties concerned. The information you sent to us is not certified and reflects no signatures". Beginning February 26, 1990, Mr. Kornya took and completed the 240 hour insurance course as identified in the Department's previous communications. The $595 course met for six weeks, five days each week, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On September 17, 1990, the pending application was closed by the Respondent based upon the failure of Petitioner to submit the previously requested information. There is no evidence that Petitioner submitted evidence of completing the educational requirement. On or about January 8, 1991, Petitioner entered into an restitution agreement with Cincinnati Insurance Company setting forth a payment schedule which requires that Petitioner make a payment of $300 each month to the Cincinnati Insurance Company in order to eventually satisfy the entire $52,013.35 judgement against him. By application signed January 11, 1991, and filed January 16, 1991, Petitioner submitted an application for examination as a general lines agent. By memorandum of February 18, 1991, to her superior, Bob Stewart, Ms. Lehman recommended that the Petitioner's application be denied. Specifically, her memo provides as follows: Mr. Kornya's license qualification and eligibility for licensure were revoked by the Department in 1985 for the mishandling of funds in a fiduciary capacity. It does not appear Mr. Kornya attempted to make restitution until the signed Agreement in 1991. He has demonstrated lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Therefore pursuant to Sections 626.611(1) (7) , [sic] 626.641(2) and 626.731(1), I recommend his application be denied. Although Ms. Lehman's memo states that "[i]t does not appear Mr. Kornya attempted to make restitution until the signed Agreement in 1991", prior to the January 8, 1991 execution of the restitution agreement, the Petitioner had paid $12,237.94 to Cincinnati Insurance Company realized from the sale of vehicles and real estate. The executed copy of the restitution agreement reflects that such funds were paid, although the agreement fails to indicate when the payment was made. The payment was applied towards interest which had accumulated on the judgement, not towards the $52,013.35 principle judgement amount. At the time of the hearing, the restitution payments were current (although Petitioner did not make the $300 payment due in April, but paid $600 in May.) As of the date of hearing, approximately $49,913 remained to be paid to Cincinnati Insurance Company to satisfy the judgement. Although at the time of the hearing, a letter allegedly from Cincinnati Insurance Company indicated that they had not received documentation of Petitioner's compliance with paragraph five of the restitution agreement (a requirement that Petitioner purchase a life insurance policy naming the insurer as irrevocable beneficiary), said policy was purchased on January 9, 1991. By letter of March 1, 1991, the Department denied the application, based on an application of the statutory sections cited in Ms. Lehman's memo. On June 21, 1991, the Department issued an amended letter of denial. 2/ In the amended letter of denial, the Department cites the prior misappropriation of funds, the unsatisfied judgement, and the 1985 revocation of licensure and eligibility for licensure, which "circumstances surrounding that revocation still exist". The letter cites Sections 626.611(1), (4), (7), (9), (10) and (13), section 626.641(2), and section 626.731(1) Florida Statutes, as the statutory basis for the denial. The evidence fails to establish that any representative of the Department of Insurance, at any time, informed or assured the Petitioner that, upon his completion of the course of education and upon the execution of the restitution agreement between Cincinnati Insurance Company and the Petitioner, his application for examination for licensure as a general lines insurance agent would be approved. The Petitioner has been acquainted with his current employer, Samuel Jokich, for approximately six years. Mr. Jokich employs the Petitioner as a "Colorado Prime" freezer beef salesman. According to Mr. Jokich, the Petitioner is "extremely trustworthy" and of good character. The Petitioner had not disclosed to Mr. Jokich, and Mr. Jokich was not otherwise aware, that the Petitioner had taken approximately $52,000 from the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency. Mr. Jeffrey Hooker, an independent insurance agent in Belle Glade and childhood friend of the Petitioner's, is aware of the Petitioner's misappropriation and conversion of approximately $52,000 from the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency. However, Mr. Hooker stated that he would trust the Petitioner and "try to help him any way I could". Mr. Hooker desires to become partners with the Petitioner in a proposed insurance agency in Ft. Myers. Mr. Kenneth Snyder, a field representative for CNA Insurance Company, has known the Petitioner for approximately eight years. He believes the Petitioner to be of "good character" with "solid morals". Although Mr. Snyder was aware that the Petitioner had taken some funds from the Milton Carpenter Insurance Agency, he was unaware of the amount of said funds. Mr. Snyder stated that he would be willing to enter into a business relationship were the Petitioner to become licensed as a general lines agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order denying the application of Paul L. Kornya to sit for examination for licensure as a general lines insurance agent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1992.
The Issue This issue in this case is whether Petitioner has jurisdiction to prosecute a viatical settlement sales agent for conduct relating to transactions involving viatical settlement purchase agreements, which Petitioner contends were “investment contracts”——and hence securities——subject to regulation under the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Department of Financial Services, Office of Financial Institutions and Securities Regulation (the “Office”), as successor to the Division, is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act, Chapter 517, Sections 517.011-517.32, Florida Statutes. Respondent David H. Kligfeld (“Kligfeld”) was, at all relevant times, a Florida-licensed life and health agent subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Department of Insurance. Respondent Dhalco Financial Services, Inc. (“Dhalco”) was, at all relevant times, a Florida corporation of which Kligfeld was a director. The evidence does not establish that Dhalco engaged in any conduct distinct from Kligfeld’s in connection with the transactions at issue. Therefore, Respondents will be referred to collectively as “Kligfeld.” During a period of about one year, from early 1998 through early 1999, Kligfeld arranged for some of his clients to purchase equitable interests in life insurance policies that had been the subject of viatical settlement contracts. The following explanation of the viatical settlement business will put these deals in proper context. A traditional viatical settlement occurs when a person who is terminally ill, known as a “viator,” sells to an investor the right to receive death benefits under his life insurance policy. The investor pays a discount off the face value of the policy that reflects the viator’s life expectancy. For example, if the viator were expected to live for three more years, the investor might pay $.40 on the dollar (e.g. $40,000 for a $100,000 policy), whereas he might pay $.60 on the dollar for a policy insuring a person whose life expectancy is one year.1 Typically, the investor is responsible for paying any premiums that come due under the policy, which is known as a “viaticated policy” after the sale. His return——the death benefits less the total amount invested in the policy——is realized when the viator dies, the sooner the better. Under Florida law, a person who invests in a viatical settlement as just described is called a “viatical settlement provider.” In the instant case, one party to the subject transactions was a viatical settlement provider called American Benefits Services, Inc. (“ABS”). As a viatical settlement provider, ABS acquired——or purported to acquire——an inventory of viaticated policies. ABS in turn sold “interests” in these viaticated policies to other investors. The evidence shows that these investors——who are known under Florida law as “viatical settlement purchasers”—— bought death benefit dollars at a discounted price reflecting the viator’s life expectancy. Before going into greater detail about the viatical settlement purchase transactions that are at the heart of this case, it is important to note that viatical settlement purchasers do not enter into a traditional viatical settlement because they do not deal directly, or even indirectly, with the viator. In effect, viatical settlement purchasers buy at “retail” a product (death benefit dollars) that the viatical settlement provider has acquired in the “wholesale” market. To make money, the viatical settlement provider, like any retailer, must charge more per dollar of coverage (its product) than it paid for that dollar. In the instant case, the Office established that Kligfeld arranged for ten investors (hereafter, the “Investors”) to purchase death benefit dollars from ABS in 18 separate transactions.2 What follows is a general description of these transactions. ABS offered viatical settlement purchasers the option of investing in either a “growth” plan or an “income” plan. Because all but one of the 18 transactions at issue involved the growth plan, it will be discussed first. The growth plan offered an investor a choice between three levels of risk based on life expectancy. These were: Life Expectancy 2 years or less (28%) Life Expectancy 2½ years or less (35%) Life Expectancy 3 years or less (42%) The percentages in the parentheses reflect the discounted price per dollar of death benefit in each category of risk. To explain, for the “three-year” growth plan, an investor would pay $1.00 for $1.42 worth of death benefits, or a bit more than $.70 on the dollar——roughly a 30% discount.3 Thus, an investment of $100,000 would purchase $142,000 in death benefits, resulting in a net return to the investor, when the underlying policy matured, of $42,000 ($142,000 - $100,000)——a 42% increase in his money. The actual yield upon such an investment naturally would depend on the viator’s lifespan. For example, if the viator lived for 10 more years instead of three, thereby deferring the $142,000 payoff for 10 years, the net return of $42,000 would be worth far less, due to the time-value of money, than if the viator passed away within a year. The income plan, in contrast, offered only one level of risk, namely, the “three years or less” life expectancy. As well, the price per benefit dollar under the income plan was much higher than under the corresponding “three-year” growth plan: approximately $.77 per dollar for “income” versus about $.70 per dollar for “growth.” The income investor, however, was entitled to receive from ABS up to (but no more than) 36 monthly payments, calculated to return 9.86% simple interest annually on his investment, making a net return, at the end of three years, equal to 29.58% of the amount invested. At that point, he would receive no further payments until the viator’s death caused the underlying policy to mature, triggering a distribution of the death benefits. (As with the growth plan, the actual yield upon the income investor’s investment would not be known until the underlying policy matured and his equity was returned. Also, keep in mind that an investor would not “make money” unless and until he got back all of this original capital, which would not happen until the policy matured.) If the policy in which the income investor held an interest happened to mature before the end of three years, then he would be paid the amount of death benefits he had purchased, less the monthly distributions already paid. Thus, for example, an investment of $100,000 in the income plan would purchase $129,580 worth of death benefits. The investor would be entitled to receive up to 36 monthly payments of $821.66. If he received all 36 payments, then at the time the policy matured he would receive a final payment of $100,000 (returning his equity), producing a yield upon investment that would depend on the length of time he had waited for the payoff. If, on the other hand, the policy matured after, say, only two years, he would receive a final payment of $109,860——which, together with the previous distributions totaling $19,720, would make a net return on his investment of $29,580, producing a relatively high yield. Although not described as such in any of the documents or testimony in evidence, the income plan, in economic substance, called for ABS to lend money to the investor as an advance against the anticipated payout under the viaticated policy. This meant that ABS retained some of the risk that the policy would mature outside the projected timeframe4——a risk that, in contrast, ABS passed along in full to the growth investors.5 The element of risk to ABS coupled with the concomitantly reduced risk to the investor explains why the income plan was quite a bit more expensive. Whether the Investor chose the growth plan or the investment plan, the deal was structured the same way, using the same basic transaction documents. The core instrument was the Participation Agreement, to which the parties were ABS and the individual Investor.6 The Participation Agreement provided in pertinent part: Whereas, AMERICAN BENEFITS SERVICES, INC. (hereinafter ABS) is in the business, on behalf of other individuals, of finding and securing Viaticated Insurance Benefits (hereinafter VI Benefits); and, Whereas, PARTICIPANT [i.e. the investor] wants to have ABS make available VI Benefits that have been assigned to an independent third-party escrow company. All VI Benefits must meet the criteria set forth herein. Now then, in consideration of the foregoing, it is agreed by the parties: TERMS OF PARTICIPATION PARTICIPANT and ABS agree to the terms of this PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT, as expressed herein. This agreement incorporates by reference, as if set forth fully herein, pages 10 and 11, of the VIATICATED INSURANCE BENEFITS PARTICIPATION DISCLOSURE, entitled DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTICIPATION.[7] * * * ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES PARTICIPANT warrants and represents that PARTICIPANT has read this agreement and understands it, along with the 13 page VIATICATED INSURANCE BENEFITS PARTICIPATION DISCLOSURE, and, specifically, the DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTICIPATION. PARTICIPANT warrants and represents that PARTICIPANT understands that PARTICIPANT will not receive his or her principal and interest until the maturity of the policy (which occurs at the death of the insured) and, therefore, the PARTICIPANT may not receive his or her VI Benefits within the 36 month life expectancy. For this reason, PARTICIPANT will not be able to liquidate this participation except as set forth in the PARTICIPATION DISCLOSURE under DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTICIPATION.[8] PARTICIPANT warrants and represents that, in reaching his or her decision regarding this participation, PARTICIPANT has not relied on any statement of AMERICAN BENEFITS SERVICES, INC. or its agents, except for those statements which are made in this Participation Agreement or in the VIATICATED INSURANCE BENEFITS PARTICIPATION DISCLOSURE. GENERAL PARTICIPATION PROVISIONS A. ENTIRE UNDERSTANDING OF PARTICIPATION: This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding of the parties and there are no representations, warranties, covenants, or undertakings other than those expressly set forth herein. In addition to the Participation Agreement, each Investor also executed a Disbursement Letter of Instruction and a Letter of Instruction to Trust. The former directed the escrow agent, to whom the Investor’s funds were remitted, to disburse the invested funds to Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. (“FinFed”) upon his receipt of certain documents (e.g. proof that the viaticated policy was in full force and effect). The latter instructed FinFed——which evidently held legal title to the viaticated policy, in the capacity of trustee——to establish a trust, or “fractionalized interest” in a trust, for the benefit of the Investor.9 The Participation Agreement, Disbursement Letter of Instruction, and Letter of Instruction to Trust will hereafter be referred to collectively as the “Contract.” It is undisputed that the Investors lost all or most of the money they had invested under the Contracts. They did not lose their money as a direct and proximate result of anything that Kligfeld had done or failed to do, however, but rather because, as it turned out, ABS was perpetrating a massive fraud on its victims, including the Investors and Kligfeld, who had also purchased death benefits from ABS.10 It should be stressed, too, that the Office did not charge Kligfeld with fraud of any kind. Despite this, the Office has argued, or at least insinuated, in its Proposed Recommended Order that Kligfeld misrepresented the nature of the transaction, or the terms of the deal, when soliciting the Investors. Given the specific violations alleged, however, no findings in this regard are required. Along the same line, some of the Investors who testified at the final hearing described representations and promises that they believed were part of the deal, but which are not contained in, and indeed contradict the unambiguous provisions of, the Contract. It is difficult to tell whether such representations were really made——or whether the testimony simply reflects fading memories, a lack of understanding on a given Investor’s part regarding the actual details of the deal, or some combination thereof. Since fraud was not charged, however, and because each Contract speaks for itself as to the terms and conditions of the deal, it is not necessary to make any findings of fact concerning whether extra-contractual promises were made.11
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office enter a final order dismissing all charges against Respondents. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2003.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents have violated provisions of Section 627.837, Florida Statutes, through payment of alleged monetary inducements to insurance agents for the purpose of securing contracts which finance insurance premiums.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department). Respondents are Puritan Budget Plan, Inc., and Gibraltar Budget Plan, Inc., (Respondents). Findings contained in paragraphs 3- 23, were stipulated to by the parties. Stipulated Facts Common shares in Respondents' corporations were sold to insurance agent/shareholders for between $500.00 and $2,500.00 per share, depending on date purchased. Presently, and for the purposes of this litigation, marketing and/or administrative fees paid by Respondents to agent/shareholders range from $1.00 to $13.00 per contract produced, depending on the number of payments made, and the amount of the down payment. Each per contract marketing and/or administrative fee paid by Respondents to agent/shareholders is completely unrelated to the number of contracts produced by that agent/shareholder, and is based upon the characteristics of each contract, pursuant to the terms of the shareholder purchase agreement. Perry & Co., pursuant to a written agreement, manages the day to day activities of Respondents, including solicitation of new shareholder/agents. Alex Campos is currently President of Perry & Co. Perry & Co., Dick Perry or Alex Campos have no equity ownership, either direct or indirect, in Respondents corporations. No shareholder of Perry & Co. is also a shareholder in either Respondent, and no shareholder of the Respondents is a shareholder in Perry & Co. No officer or director of Perry & Co. is an officer or director of either Respondent, and no officer or director of either Respondent is an officer or director of Perry & Co. The individual management agreements between Perry & Co. and Respondents are terminable with proper notice by either party. Respondent Puritan Budget Plan, Inc., was originally licensed by the Department as a premium finance company in 1984, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 627, Part XV, Florida Statutes. Puritans' principle office is located at 2635 Century Parkway, Suite 1000, Atlanta, Georgia 30345. Respondent Gibraltar Budget Plan, Inc., was originally licensed by the Department as a premium finance company in 1984, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 627, Part XV, Florida Statutes. Gibraltar's principle office is located at 2635 Century Parkway, Suite 1000, Atlanta, Georgia 30345. Customers of Respondents are typically financing automobile insurance premiums. There is little if any variation among licensed premium finance companies in the State of Florida as to the interest rate charged to customers. In 1988, the Department inquired of Respondents' activities in relation to agent/shareholder compensation arrangements. After several meetings with representatives from Respondents, the Department closed the matter without taking any action. Also in 1988, the Department proposed the adoption of Rule 4-18.009, which in part would have explicitly made payment of processing fees or stock dividends a violation of Section 627.837, Florida Statutes, but later withdrew the proposed rule. Again in 1994, the Department proposed a rule which would have explicitly made payment of processing fees or stock dividends a violation of Section 627.837, Florida Statutes. After a hearing and adverse ruling by the hearing officer, the Department withdrew proposed Rule 4-196.030(8). Financial consideration paid to insurance agents in exchange for the production of premium finance contracts may result in the unnecessary financing of contracts, and the Department believes Section 627.837, Florida Statutes, was intended to make such conduct illegal. Financial consideration paid to insurance agents in exchange for the production of premium finance contracts may result in insurance agents adding or sliding unnecessary products to make the total cost of insurance more expensive and induce the financing of additional contracts, and the Department believes Section 627.837, Florida Statutes, was intended to make such conduct illegal. An "inducement" is presently defined as "an incentive which motivates an insurance purchaser to finance the premium payment or which motivates any person to lead or influence an insured into financing the insurance coverage being purchased; or any compensation or consideration presented to a person based upon specific business performance whether under written agreement or otherwise." Rule 4-196.030(4), Florida Administrative Code (July 27, 1995). This rule is currently effective but presently on appeal. There is no evidence that Respondents unnecessarily financed any premium finance contracts or engaged in any "sliding" of unnecessary products to induce the unnecessary financing of contracts. Section 627.837, Florida Statutes, does not prohibit the payment of corporate dividends based on stock ownership to shareholders who are also insurance agents. According to the Final Bill Analysis for H.B. 2471, in 1995 the Legislature amended Section 627.837, Florida Statutes, relating to rebates and inducements. This section was amended to clarify that this statute does not prohibit an insurance agent or agents from owning a premium finance company. The statute, as amended, is silent on the issue of how owner-agents may be compensated. Other Facts Approximately 80 percent of Respondents' insureds will turn to the shareholder/agent to handle premium mailing and collection. When a shareholder/agent provides these valuable services and labor to Respondents through the servicing of the premium finance contract with an insured, payment for those services and/or recoupment of the expenses involved with their provision is made, at least in part, in the form of the marketing and administrative fees paid by Respondents to the shareholder/agent. The marketing and administrative fee payment by Respondents to shareholder/agents is made from the net profit of the corporation and represents payment of ownership interest (dividends) to shareholder/agents in addition to payment for shareholder/agent services or expenses. Respondents generally finance "non-standard" private passenger automobile insurance. Such insurance generally covers younger drivers and drivers with infraction points against their license. The average non-standard premium is $500 per year. Thirty percent of non-standard insureds will cancel their insurance prior to the renewal date. Cancellation of policies and financing arrangements by non-standard insurers require the agent to return unearned commissions, about $30 generally. In contrast, payment of an insurance premium in cash guarantees an agent his/her entire commission, an average of $90 per non-standard policy. Consequently, the financial interest of most agents is best served by cash sale of auto insurance as opposed to financing the insurance. The average amount generated by 95 percent of all premium finance contracts executed in Florida would yield an agent/shareholder approximately six dollars per contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaints. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida, this 28th day of November, 1995. DON W. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX In accordance with provisions of Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-11. Accepted to extent included within stipulated facts, otherwise rejected for lack of citation to the record. 12. First sentence is rejected as not substantially dispositive of the issues presented. Remainder rejected for lack of record citation if not included within stipulated facts. 13.-15. Rejected to extent not included within stipulation, no citation to record. Incorporated by reference. Rejected, no record citation, legal conclusion. 18.-19. Rejected, not materially dispositive. 20. Rejected, no record citation. 21.-23. Rejected, not materially dispositive. Rejected, record citation and relevancy. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Incorporated by reference. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. Rejected, unnecessary to result. 2.-3. Accepted, not verbatim. 4. Rejected, unnecessary. 5.-7. Accepted, not verbatim. 8.-9. Rejected, unnecessary. 10. Accepted per stipulation. 11.-12. Rejected, unnecessary. 13. Accepted per stipulation. 14.-16. Accepted, not verbatim. Rejected, hearsay. Rejected, relevance. Rejected, unnecessary. 20.-22. Accepted per stipulation. 23. Rejected, unnecessary. 24.-57. Incorporated by reference. 58.-60. Rejected, unnecessary. 61.-62. Rejected, subordinate and not materially dispositive. 63.-67. Rejected as unnecessary to extent not included in stipulated facts. Accepted per stipulation. Rejected, unnecessary. Accepted per stipulation. 72.-76. Rejected, unnecessary. 77. Accepted per stipulation. 78.-79. Incorporated by reference. 80.-87. Accepted per stipulation. 88. Incorporated by reference. 89.-90. Accepted per stipulation. 91.-95. Rejected, subordinate. 96. Accepted. 97.-101. Rejected, unnecessary. 102. Incorporated by reference. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan Liefer, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0333 Steven M. Malono, Esquire Cobb, Cole & Bell 131 N. Gadsden St. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
