Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Willie A. Owens, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on April 27, 1984, and was issued Certificate Number 02-84-002-01. In February, 1985, the Respondent was employed in a training position as a Highway Patrol Officer and had been in that position for about twelve months in February, 1985. T. 64. On the evening of February 10, 1985, the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Officer initiated an investigation into a complaint of involuntary sexual battery alleged to have been committed by the Respondent on February 9, 1985. T. 9-10, 24, 13. (The Respondent has not been charged with this offense in this case.) Pursuant to that investigation, between the hours of 12:30 and 1:30 A.M. on February 11, 1985, Detective David Gee, Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, accompanied by Lieutenant P. E. Dixon, Florida Highway Patrol, Lieutenant Maxwell, and others, drove to the residence of the Respondent. T. 10, 25. The Respondent came to the door fully dressed and was reasonably alert. T. 18-19. The Respondent was asked if the group could come inside his residence, and he invited them in. T. 25. After the group was inside, Detective Gee stated that the Respondent was a suspect in a sexual battery case. T. 25, 65, 11. Detective Gee then advised the Respondent of his rights pursuant to the Miranda requirements. T. 25, 11-12. The Respondent signed a waiver of rights form and consented to be questioned at that time, and did not ask to have a lawyer present. T. 11-12. During the interview inside, the Respondent and Detective Gee were sitting on a couch. T. 15. The Respondent said that he had had a female companion (the alleged victim) in his home on the night of February 9, 1985, (he was not on-duty) and that she had produced some marijuana that she had brought with her to the Respondent's home. T. 14-15. The Respondent said that he and she smoked two marijuana cigarettes, characterized in this record by one law enforcement witness as a small amount of marijuana. T. 14-15, 29. Detective Gee then looked into an ashtray that was directly in front of him on a coffee table in front of the couch and saw the end of one used marijuana cigarette. T. 15. He asked the Respondent if that were part of the marijuana and the Respondent said yes, it was. T. 15. The used bit of marijuana was very small, the cigarette having been burned all the way to the end of the paper. T. 16-17. There was only one used marijuana cigarette in the ashtray. T. 15. (There is a conflict of testimony as to whether there were one or two remains of marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray. Detective Gee is credited with the more reliable memory of what was in the ashtray since he was the one who took the substance into custody.) Detective Gee then seized the bit of marijuana, which was in his plain view. T. 17. He did not have a search warrant. T. 33. The bit of substance seized by Detective Gee was cannabis or marijuana. T. 15, 16-17, 26-29. Detective Gee had permission to search the residence of the Respondent, but there is no evidence that the Respondent had any other marijuana or any other controlled substance in his possession. T. 34-35, 36-37, 66-67. Detective Gee did not have the substance analyzed to determine chemically if it was cannabis because he did not intend to charge the Respondent with a crime. T. 22. The authorities did not charge the Respondent with any crime connected with the substance found in the ashtray. T. 19-20. The Respondent had possession of the bit of marijuana seized by Detective Gee because he knew what it was and it was under his control and possession in his home, and his female companion was no longer there. Additionally, the Respondent possessed and consumed some small portion of marijuana provided to him by his female companion on February 9, 1985. The record does not contain precise evidence as to the amount, but it may be inferred from the visual evidence and testimony that the amount was substantially less than 20 grams. A law enforcement officer has a duty to enforce laws forbidding the possession and use of controlled substances. T. 30. A Highway Patrol Officer normally is assigned alone in a car, without direct supervision. T. 30-31. Such an officer may, on occasion, have a duty to seize controlled substances and destroy the same if a charge of illegal possession or use is not to be filed. T. 32. Saving the controlled substance for personal use would be a violation of that duty. Id. In such event, it is likely that there would be little complaint from the motorist from whom the controlled substance was seized. There have been no complaints concerning the work performed by the Respondent while employed by the Highway Patrol. T. 33. He is considered to be honest and trustworthy by reputation. T. 59-60.
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter its final order finding that the charge of a lack of good moral character has not been proven, that the law enforcement certificate issued to the Respondent, Willie A. Owens, not be revoked, and that the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 27th day of April, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. HEARING OFFICER Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4141 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact; by number, which have been rejected in this recommended order. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: 4-5. It appears that the Respondent was advised of the purpose of the visit after the group had entered, but the fact is not important to the result in the case. 8-9. It is true that both Detective Gee and Lieutenant Dixson have had significant experience in the identification of cannabis, but the proposed finding is subordinate. 9. The testimony of Detective Gee, that the remains of only one cigarette was in the ashtray, is adopted in this recommended order. 11. Rejected as not credible. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: Two cigarettes were involved initially. While possession originated with the Respondent's companion, the Respondent then also possessed the cannabis. Rejected as not credible and contrary to the evidence. 8-9. The testimony of the Respondent (admission), Lieutenant Dixson, and Detective Gee was sufficient to establish the character of the substance as cannabis. 10. The evidence cited to support this proposed finding concerning an act of bravery has been ruled inadmissible. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Janet E. Ferris, Esquire General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Marvin P. Jackson, Esquire 400 East Buffalo Avenue, Suite 110 Tampa, Florida 33603 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application for registration as a septic tank contractor on the ground that Petitioner lacks good moral character within the meaning of Section 489.553(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for the registration and regulation of septic tank contractors in the state. Petitioner was registered as a septic tank contractor from March 29, 1991, to February 22, 1994, when Respondent's predecessor, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (the "Department"), revoked Petitioner's registration. The revocation of Petitioner's registration in 1994 was based on various violations that began in 1991. In October 1991, the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER", now the Department of Environmental Protection, or "DEP") charged Petitioner's company with pumping untreated septage into a manhole in Bonita Springs, Florida. Petitioner entered into a Consent Order in which Petitioner agreed to pay an administrative fine of $3,900 and to file prescribed reports and protocols with DER. Petitioner did not pay the fine or complete the filing requirements. DER filed an action in circuit court in Collier County, Florida to enforce the Consent Order against Petitioner. Petitioner entered into a Stipulation and Consent Final Judgment dated April 24, 1993. Pursuant to the Stipulation and Consent Final Judgment, the court imposed a fine of $5,000. Petitioner did not pay the $5,000 fine or comply with any of the other terms of the consent judgment. DER received information that on October 21, 1993, Petitioner's company again dumped untreated septage into the utility system of Collier County, Florida. DER filed a motion for contempt for Petitioner's failure to comply with the terms of the Stipulation and Consent Final Judgment. The circuit court in Collier County ordered Petitioner to pay Collier County $2,417 for the cost of repairing and cleaning wastewater lines required by the dumping of septage sludge into the county utility system. The court permanently enjoined Petitioner from ever hauling septage or sludge and required Petitioner to make monthly payments until the $5,000 penalty was paid in full. Petitioner has not paid any portion of the $5,000 penalty ordered by the court. Petitioner has not paid the $2,417 in costs incurred by Collier County. By Final Order dated May 26, 1993, the Department imposed a $500 fine and six-month probation upon Petitioner because Petitioner's company illegally dumped septage grease into a collection system at Gulf Coast Camping Resort in Fort Myers. Petitioner consented to the fine and probation. During the probation, Petitioner's employees engaged in six separate illegal dumpings into the Collier County Utility System. Petitioner's company illegally spread unstabilized septage on another occasion. On February 22, 1994, the Department revoked Petitioner's registration and imposed a fine of $4,000. Petitioner violated the revocation order by performing four septic system repairs between September and November in 1994. The aggregate cost of the repairs to the customers was $4,150, and the repairs were performed negligently. On January 20, 1995, the Department filed a Petition for Enforcement of Agency Action and Complaint for Injunctive Relief in circuit court in Lee County, Florida. Petitioner did not respond and defaulted. On April 24, 1995, the circuit court in Lee County enjoined Petitioner from engaging in any service related to septic tank systems without the direct supervision of a registered contractor. The court imposed an additional fine of $1,000 and ordered Petitioner to pay the $4,000 fine that had been imposed previously. On May 31, 1995, Petitioner signed a promissory note with the Department to evidence his obligation to pay the $5,000 in fines. Petitioner did not make the scheduled payments required under the note. In January 1996, the circuit court in Lee County issued an Order to Show Cause why the court should not hold Petitioner in contempt of court on two grounds. One ground was for repairing septic tanks without the direct supervision of a registered septic tank contractor and the other was for failing to pay the $5,000 in fines previously ordered by the court. On August 7, 1996, the court found Petitioner in contempt on both grounds. The court ordered Petitioner to pay a minimum of $100 each month until he paid the $5,000 in fines. The first payment was due on August 1, 1996. In April 1998, Petitioner filed a motion with the circuit court in Lee County seeking to modify the injunction against Petitioner. The parties settled the matter. Petitioner agreed to pay the balance of $4,000 due on his fine, and the Department agreed to delete the requirement for direct supervision by a registered septic tank contractor. The court adopted the stipulation of the parties on April 22, 1998. Petitioner paid the remaining $4,000. On October 26, 1999, Petitioner applied for registration as a septic tank contractor. On November 24, 1999, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for registration. The sole ground for denial was that Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirement in Section 489.553(4)(a) for good moral character. In determining whether an applicant has good moral character, Section 489.553(4)(a) authorizes Respondent to consider: . . . any matter that has a substantial connection between the good moral character of the applicant and the professional responsibilities of a registered contractor, including, but not limited to: the applicant being convicted or found guilty of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction which directly relates to the practice of contracting or the ability to practice contracting; and previous disciplinary action involving septic tank contracting, where all judicial reviews have been completed. (emphasis supplied) It is uncontroverted that the prior disciplinary history of Petitioner did not involve any criminal charges or convictions. Section 489.553(4)(a) authorizes Respondent to consider any non-criminal matter in determining Petitioner's good moral character if the non-criminal matter satisfies two conjunctive criteria in the statute. First, the non-criminal matter must have a connection between both Petitioner's good moral character and Petitioner's professional responsibilities. Second, any such connection must be substantial. It is uncontroverted that the non-criminal matters considered by Respondent in determining if Petitioner possesses good moral character are substantially connected to Petitioner's professional responsibilities. The issue for determination is whether there is a substantial connection between the non- criminal matters considered by Respondent and Petitioner's good moral character. Neither party offered any evidence of the meaning of the statutory criteria for a "substantial connection." Respondent's expert did not define "substantial connection" but opined that Petitioner's prior disciplinary history demonstrated the requisite connection. That testimony is neither credible nor persuasive. It is substantially equivalent to the circuitous definition of obscenity offered by one who can't define the term but knows it when he sees it. It is inherently subjective and invites abuse of agency discretion. If Petitioner had offered no explanation for the non- criminal matters in his disciplinary history, the nature and extent of Petitioner's disciplinary history might be sufficient to "infer" a substantial connection between the non-criminal matters and Petitioner's good moral character if such an inference were authorized by statute. However, Petitioner did offer an explanation for his disciplinary history. Petitioner's explanation was credible and persuasive and successfully rebutted any inference of a substantial connection between Petitioner's past disciplinary history and Petitioner's good moral character. Petitioner was 21 in 1991 and the sole owner of his business. Petitioner did not personally dump untreated septage into the Collier County Utility System. Nor did Petitioner direct his employees to do so. Petitioner's employees carried out the dumpings without Petitioner's knowledge. When Petitioner learned of the violations, Petitioner accepted responsibility for the actions of his employees and entered into consent orders with the state agency. Petitioner did not intentionally disregard any fines, costs, or other requirements imposed by state agencies or courts. Petitioner was unable to comply with the orders or to pay fines and costs imposed in the orders because of circumstances beyond Petitioner's control that began with the birth of his son. In 1992, Petitioner's son who was born immune deficient. Two or three times a week, Petitioner and his wife took their son for treatment at the hospital in St. Petersburg, Florida and at Shands Teaching Hospital at the University of Florida. Petitioner and his wife devoted all of their time, attention, and financial resources to the care and treatment of their son. The cost of medical care for Petitioner's son exceeded $3 million and exhausted the $2 million coverage available in Petitioner's personal health insurance policy. All of Petitioner's financial resources went into the care of his son. Petitioner's wife could not work because she devoted all of her time to the care of her son. Although the state eventually paid the amount of medical costs that exceeded Petitioner's $2 million health coverage, there was substantial delay between the time Petitioner incurred the medical bills and payment by the state. Petitioner completely neglected his business between 1992 and 1996 but allowed his employees to assume operating control in an effort to maintain his business income for his family. During that time, Petitioner's company was charged with additional violations. Petitioner had no personal knowledge of the dumping and spraying violations that occurred between 1993 and 1994. Petitioner did not direct his employees to commit those acts. When Petitioner learned of those violations, Petitioner accepted responsibility and attempted to resolve the matters with the respective state agencies. Petitioner had no money for an attorney and attempted to resolve these matters without the benefit of legal representation. Between September and November in 1994, Petitioner was personally responsible for negligently performing septic tank services on four occasions in violation of the order revoking his license. However, no evidence demonstrates a substantial connection between the negligent performance of septic tank repairs in 1994 and Petitioner's good moral character. Negligence lacks the culpable intent inherent in bad moral character. No evidence demonstrates a substantial connection between Petitioner's violation of the revocation order and Petitioner's good moral character. Petitioner testified that he made those repairs under the supervision of, and as an employee of, his father or brother who are both registered septic tank contractors. When Petitioner made the septic tank repairs, Petitioner was facing substantial medical expenses for a severely ill child and arguably had a moral duty to satisfy those responsibilities. Petitioner has a high school education. He has no other vocational training except in performing septic tank services. He began working for his father and brother immediately after high school and later began his own business. Petitioner testified that between 1992 and 1995, Petitioner had no intention of doing anything except taking care of his son. Petitioner relinquished operating control of his business to his employees, relied completely on his employees to run his business, and attempted to preserve his business income because he needed money for his son. Petitioner's testimony was credible and persuasive. Petitioner's prior disciplinary history does not include an act of environmental harm by Petitioner's employees after February 22, 1994, when the Department revoked Petitioner's registration as a septic tank contractor. The most egregious of the violations by Petitioner's employees required them to haul septage. If Respondent grants Petitioner's application for registration, Petitioner cannot haul septage because he is permanently enjoined from doing so by the circuit court in Collier County. Petitioner's prior disciplinary history does not include a violation by Petitioner after the last septic tank repair completed by Petitioner in November 1994. Since that time, Petitioner has paid outstanding fines of $5,000, and Respondent has agreed to allow Petitioner to provide septic tank services without the direct supervision of a registered septic tank contractor. Petitioner has not paid all of the fines and costs assessed against him. However, the evidence submitted by Petitioner refutes any arguable inference that a substantial connection exists between Petitioner's good moral character and his failure to pay the outstanding fines and costs. The evidence shows a substantial connection between Petitioner's failure to make payment and circumstances beyond Petitioner's control. Respondent's determination of Petitioner's good moral character, including the testimony of Respondent's expert, was based solely on a review of the documents contained in Respondent's agency file. When Respondent determined there was a substantial connection between Petitioner's prior disciplinary history and Petitioner's good moral character, neither Respondent nor Respondent's witnesses made any attempt to contact Petitioner to obtain an explanation of Petitioner's prior disciplinary history or to independently investigate the connection between Petitioner's disciplinary history and his good moral character and the substantiality of the connection. Petitioner's explanation showed a substantial connection between Petitioner's prior disciplinary history and circumstances beyond Petitioner's control. Respondent failed to refute Petitioner's explanation with credible and persuasive evidence of a substantial connection between Petitioner's prior disciplinary history and his good moral character. After hearing Petitioner's explanation for his prior disciplinary history, Respondent's expert testified that the evidence did not alter his opinion that Petitioner lacked good moral character because Petitioner still owed fines and costs and because Petitioner had not yet said he was sorry.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner possesses good moral character within the meaning of Section 489.533(4)(a) and granting Petitioner's application for registration as a septic tank contractor. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Robert G. Brooks, Secretary Department of Health Bin A00 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capitol Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Bin A02 2020 Capitol Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Susan Mastin Scott Chief Legal Counsel Department of Health Post Office Box 9309 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-9309 Michael F. Kayusa, Esquire 1922 Victoria Avenue, Suite A Post Office Box 6096 Fort Myers, Florida 33911
Findings Of Fact On December 6, 1985, Petitioner, Johnnie J. Williams, filed an application with Respondent, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Department), for a Class "G" armed guard license. By letter of April 30, 1986, the Department advised Petitioner that his application had been denied. Petitioner filed a timely request for formal hearing. The basis of the Department's denial was predicated on its conclusion that Petitioner (a) had failed to list alias names on his application, (b) had, under an alias name of Hubert Jackson, been convicted of aggravated assault, (c) had, under an alias name of Harry Hill, been convicted of carrying a concealed firearm, unlawful possession of central nervous system stimulant, unlawful possession of narcotic drug, and unlawful possession of implements for central nervous system stimulant, (d) had failed to submit a sufficient Firearms Proficiency Certificate, and (e) did not possess a valid Class "D" license. The Department's conclusions were, however, ill founded. Petitioner is not the same person as Hubert Jackson or Harry Hill, and has never been known by a name other than his own. At hearing, the Department agreed to stipulate that it had erred in attributing the offenses committed by Jackson and Hill to the Petitioner, and further agreed that Petitioner possessed a valid and current Class "D" license. With respect to the only other basis for denial, possession of a sufficient Firearms Proficiency Certificate, Petitioner's application facially complied with the Department's requirements and was not shown to be lacking in any particular. Although the reasons advanced by the Department for denial in its April 30, 1986, letter were ill founded, evidence was presented at hearing concerning three events involving Petitioner which could affect his qualification for licensure. Petitioner has at various times driven a taxi cab for a living, and routinely carried a registered, but unlicensed gun in his cab for personal protection. In 1966, Petitioner was found guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, and fined $100 for producing his gun in response to a threat to his person. While its possession in a concealed manner was not legal, the proof established that Petitioner's response was motivated by a well grounded fear that his antagonist was about to assault him with a firearm. In 1970 Petitioner was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed firearm in his taxi cab. Petitioner was found guilty of the charge, adjudication was withheld, and he was placed on one year probation with the restriction that he not carry any weapons. Petitioner successfully completed his probation, and is currently possessed of his full civil rights. The final event which could bear on Petitioner's qualifications concerns a domestic disturbance which occurred between him and his wife in March or April 1986. Although Petitioner was arrested as a result of that disturbance, there is no evidence that any physical force was used upon his wife or that Petitioner possessed or exhibited any weapon during the dispute. Subsequently, what ever charges had been made against Petitioner were withdrawn, and no further action was taken. While Petitioner's possession of a weapon, without proper licensure cannot be condoned, his concern for his personal safety can be appreciated. Consequently, the events detailed in paragraph 4 supra, much less the events detailed in paragraph 5 supra, do not detract from the evidence of good moral character Petitioner has been demonstrated to possess, nor his satisfaction of the licensure requirements established by Chapter 493, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application be approved, and that he be issued a Class "G", armed guard, license. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of October 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Jay M. Kolsky, Esquire 239 Northeast 20th Street Miami, Florida 33137 James V. Antista, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of State The Capitol, Lower Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas G. Tomasello, Esquire General Counsel Department of State 1801 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether respondent's certification as a correctional officer should be revoked for having pled nolo contendere to a felony.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Leland M. Large (Large), was certified by petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), on July 1, 1974, and was issued certificate number A-2364. Currently, Large is employed as a correctional officer by Metropolitan Dade County, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (County), and has been so employed for 16 years. On October 15, 1985, Large entered a plea of nolo contendere to the felony offense of arson, Section 806.01, Florida Statutes, before the Circuit Court, in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. The court accepted the plea, withheld an adjudication of guilt, and placed Large on a 12-month period of probation. On May 15, 1986, the court granted a motion for early termination of Large's probation. Regarding the crime with which he was charged, the proof demonstrates that in September 1985, Large owned a Toyota Corolla automobile which, because of an accident, was not road worthy. At that time, Large did not have the money to repair the car, was unable to sell it, and was having problems maintaining the payments on the vehicle. Accordingly, to relieve himself from the car payments, Large took the car to a secluded location and burned it. At hearing, Large testified that although he did take the car to a secluded location with the intention of burning it, and in furtherance of such intent smashed a window in the car and poured gasoline at its rear, that the actual burning of the car was an accident. According to Large, after having poured gasoline at the rear of the car, "I got disgusted with myself and I was going to change my mind and I threw a cigarette down and that is what started the fire." Large's testimony that the burning of the car was accidental is not credited, and it is found that he did intentionally burn the subject vehicle to relieve himself of the obligation to make further payments on it. To mitigate the gravamen of his offense, Large offered proof at hearing that at the time he burned the car he was an alcoholic who was not fully cognizant of his actions, but has since recovered. Regarding his rehabilitation, the proof demonstrates that following the entry of his plea of nolo contendere to the crime of arson, Large was suspended by the County for 28 days. During this period, Large was an inpatient at an alcohol rehabilitation center and successfully completed the program. Since such time, Large has remained sober and current in his financial obligations. To date, Large, who is currently 38 years of age, has been employed by the County as a correctional officer for 16 years, and his annual evaluations have ranged from satisfactory to outstanding. By those who know of him, he is considered an excellent employee, observant of the rules, honest, fair, respectful of the rights of others, and otherwise of good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which revokes the certification of respondent, Leland M. Large. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of July 1989. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraph 2. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1-4. Addressed in paragraphs 1 and 6 to the extent pertinent. 5. Addressed in paragraph 5. 6-13 and 15-39. These proposed findings are not relevant to the disposition of this case, but have been addressed in paragraphs 3-5 so that respondent's position could at least be depicted. 14. Addressed in paragraph 2, otherwise rejected as not shown to be relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James C. Casey, Esquire 10630 N.W. 25th Street Miami, Florida 33172 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Daryl McLaughlin Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been repeatedly convicted of offenses against the criminal law, from vagrancy on December 31, 1958, to gambling on May 3, 1976. He has been convicted in the courts of three states on various charges, including assault and battery, aggravated assault and battery, carrying a concealed weapon, destroying city property, disturbing the peace, resisting arrest, battery on a police officer, non-support, possession of dangerous drugs and possession of marijuana. In addition, he was arrested for and charged with assignation and vagrancy; and posted bonds which were forfeited. According to a personal questionnaire petitioner filled out on March 16, 1978, petitioner is single; he has been employed at the same place since 1976; and he has lived at the same address since 1974.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer.
Findings Of Fact On December 11, 1995, Petitioner, GEORGE S. BARNES, filed an application for licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer with Respondent, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING. Petitioner has been employed in the security business since 1988. Petitioner is also an ordained minister and works with Earth Mission, Inc., a community organization assisting troubled juveniles. Petitioner currently resides in St. Petersburg, Florida. Petitioner's application was filed with the Respondent's Tampa Regional Office. Respondent, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING, is the agency of the State of Florida having statutory authority for the administration of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, including the licensure of Class "D" Security Officers. Petitioner's application reflected that in October of 1993, Petitioner had previously been issued a license as a Security Officer in the State of Florida. The application stated that Petitioner was employed by Weisser Security beginning in 1993. Petitioner's application further reflected that Petitioner had been convicted of possession of marijuana in 1987 in Pinellas County, that Petitioner had been convicted of battery in 1994 in Pinellas County, and that Petitioner was currently on probation. Petitioner signed the application affirming that the information contained in the application was true and correct to the best of his knowledge. Petitioner's signature was notarized by Cyndi Lynn Cutchall, a Notary Public of the State of Florida, Commission No. CC511419. Petitioner has a criminal record evidencing three misdemeanor convictions. On February 15, 1988 Petitioner pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Case No. CTC 87- 27269, County Court, Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner was ordered to pay a $250 fine. On May 25, 1995, Petitioner pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of misdemeanor battery. Case No. 94-33011MMF, County Court, Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner was placed on probation for one year, ordered to participate in the Family Violence Program, pay a fine of $150, and to have no contact with the victim, or with his step-daughter Starleetha Williams. On December 6, 1995, Petitioner pled nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of misdemeanor battery. Case No. CRC-95-021199CFANO-K, County Court, Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner was placed on probation for one year, ordered to undergo mental health counseling, successfully complete all treatment, and to have no further contact with his step-daughter, Starleetha Williams. Petitioner was at the time of the filing of his application for licensure, and is currently, on probation. On December 11, 1995, Petitioner went to Tampa, Florida for the purpose of filing an application for licensure as a security officer with Respondent. Petitioner had obtained a computer printout of his criminal record from Pinellas County. The computer printout reflected his prior convictions for possession of marijuana and his first conviction for misdemeanor battery. The printout did not at that time reflect Petitioner's second conviction for misdemeanor battery which had occurred only five days earlier on December 6, 1995. Petitioner sought the assistance of Cyndi Lynn Cutchall in completing the application. The record indicates that Cyndi Lynn Cutchall was a Notary Public in the State of Florida. Petitioner assumed that Ms. Cutchall, who was located in the state office building, was employed by the Respondent; however, Ms. Cutchall was not called as a witness, and there is no evidence indicating that she was an employee of Respondent. Petitioner partially completed the application himself; however Section V of the application was completed by Ms. Cutchall. Section V indicates that Petitioner was convicted of possession of marijuana in 1987, and battery in 1994. Petitioner testified that he informed Ms. Cutchall of his second conviction for battery, but that she instructed him that because his second battery conviction was not yet on the computer printout, it was not necessary to include the second battery conviction on his application. Petitioner knew that his application was inaccurate, but nonetheless signed his application affirming the truth and correctness of the information contained therein. Ms. Cutchall notarized Petitioner's signature. Petitioner's misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana occurred in 1988. This conviction resulted from an incident in which Petitioner was stopped while driving a relative's car in which a marijuana cigarette was discovered. Petitioner paid the fine imposed by the court. It appears that Petitioner obtained a license as a security officer in October 1993, subsequent to this offense. Petitioner's two convictions for misdemeanor battery in 1995 arose from family problems. The first incident resulted from a domestic dispute between Petitioner and his wife in which his wife slipped and fell on their kitchen floor during the dispute. The second incident initially involved very serious felony child sexual abuse charges; however, during Petitioner's trial, the charges were reduced to misdemeanor battery to which Petitioner pled nolo contendere. Petitioner denies both battery charges, and specifically denies any inappropriate contact with the child in question. Petitioner and his wife are currently separated, and Petitioner has no contact with the child involved in the second battery case. Although it appears that Petitioner may have had previous contact with the victim of the second battery, it now appears that Petitioner is complying with the terms of his probation in accordance with the order of the court. There is no evidence that Petitioner's probation was ever revoked for a violation. Petitioner is not employed as a security officer, pending resolution of these proceedings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer with leave for Petitioner to reapply for licensure upon successful completion of Petitioner's current probation. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. RICHARD HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Ted J. Starr, Esquire Post Office Box 12827 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Michelle Guy, Esquire Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station No. 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Sandra B. Wortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact On February 6, 1992, Respondent received Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer License. In processing the application, Respondent conducted a criminal background check on Petitioner and received his criminal history as compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). By letter dated July 24, 1992, Respondent informed Petitioner of its intent to deny his application for licensure based upon grounds cited in the letter. On August 17, 1992, Respondent received Petitioner's request for a formal hearing and his explanation for the various arrests cited in the denial letter. On August 14, 1992, Respondent mailed Petitioner an amended denial letter citing additional grounds for the denial of his application. Respondent asserts that it is within its discretion to deny Petitioner's application because his criminal history reflects a lack of good moral character. All other grounds for denial of licensure of Petitioner were abandoned by Respondent at the formal hearing. The following arrests are cited by Respondent as justifying its denial of licensure to Petitioner. CHARGE ONE On August 21, 1968, Petitioner was arrested on charges of aggravated assault and forgery in Dyersburg, Tennessee. In 1968, Petitioner was discharged from the Army after having served in Viet Nam. He accompanied a friend he had met in the Army to Dyersburg, Tennessee, where he became involved in an altercation with someone who tried to run him off the road while he was riding his motorcycle. The person who tried to run Petitioner off the road stopped and attempted, without success, to hit Petitioner with a tire iron. Petitioner took the tire iron away from this person and hit the person on the head with the tire iron. Petitioner was arrested for aggravated assault and placed in the county jail. At the same time, he and two companions were charged with forgery for purchasing beer with worthless bank checks. Petitioner was told that he would not be tried until after the grand jury convened, and that he would have to wait in the county jail in the interim, a period of four months. Petitioner escaped from the county jail with the help of two other inmates and made his way to Chicago, Illinois. He was subsequently arrested and returned to Tennessee after he waived extradition. Petitioner was thereafter tried and convicted of aggravated assault, forgery, and grand theft and sentenced to three years imprisonment. On January 30, 1970, Petitioner's grand larceny conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor charge of attempt to commit a felony. His three year sentence was commuted and he was granted parole and immediately released after having served eighteen months in jail. Petitioner received a pardon from the governor of Tennessee for the felony convictions resulting from the 1968 arrests. CHARGE TWO In 1973, Petitioner was arrested and convicted of drunk driving in California and placed on probation. On August 2, 1974, in Palm Springs, California, Petitioner was arrested and charged with suspicion of burglary, a violation of California Penal Code 459. His probation from the 1973 conviction was violated, and he was sentenced to sixty days in jail and given two years of probation. The charge of suspicion of burglary was reduced to trespassing. Petitioner was intoxicated and was trespassing when arrested in August 1974. Petitioner testified without contradiction that he was not attempting to steal anything. CHARGE THREE In September 1980 in Riverside, California, Petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of a device for arson. Petitioner had been threatened by a gang after he identified a gang member as having stabbed a member of another gang. When three carloads of gang members came to his place of residence to threaten him, Petitioner made a Molotov cocktail and threw it in the street to disperse the gang members and to get the attention of the police. This charge was subsequently dismissed. CHARGES FOUR AND FIVE On May 13, 1988, Petitioner was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, and charged with unlawful use of a weapon and aggravated assault. On July 26, 1988, he was charged with aggravated assault; unlawful use of a weapon/gun; unlawful use of a weapon/tear gas; unlawful use of a weapon/blackjack; and failure to register a firearm. These arrests resulted from Petitioner's attempts to reduce drugs and prostitution in his neighborhood as a pro-active vigilante. On May 13, he fired two warning shots from a .25 caliber pistol into the ground to discourage three would-be attackers. Though the assailants left, an eyewitness filed a complaint with the police which resulted in Petitioner's arrest. On July 26, 1988, Petitioner was arrested while again acting as a vigilante by the same officer who had arrested him on May 13. He had on his person at the time of his arrest an unregistered firearm, a blackjack, and mace. These charges were dismissed when the arresting officer failed to appear in court. CHARGE SIX Petitioner heard threats against himself and his family because of his efforts to cleanup his neighborhood. On February 3, 1989, Petitioner went to a bar which the people who had been threatening him frequented. He confronted these persons and fired four shots from a .357 firearm into the ceiling. Petitioner was charged with criminal damage to property, reckless conduct, and unlawful use of a weapon. The charge of criminal damage to property was dismissed, but he was found guilty on the other two charges. Petitioner was given a conditional discharge and ordered to pay $264.00. The conditional discharge was revoked in June 1990. CHARGE SEVEN On May 18, 1989, Petitioner was arrested in Chicago on a traffic violation and charged with resisting or eluding an officer. Petitioner was intoxicated and was driving around setting off firecrackers in the street when the police attempted to pull him over. Because he could not find a place to stop, he circled the block a few times before stopping the car. He was adjudicated guilty and had his driver's license revoked for three years. REHABILITATION Petitioner is an alcoholic, and his arrests can be attributable, in part, to the influence of alcohol. Petitioner has been an active participant in the Miami, Florida, Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center Substance Abuse Clinic since October 11, 1989, and has consistently abstained from alcohol since September 7, 1989. Since 1989, Petitioner has lived and worked in Florida. Petitioner has no criminal record since moving to Florida in 1989 and enrolling in the VA substance abuse program. Petitioner has worked for Kent Security since January of 1991, and his employer considers Petitioner to be an outstanding employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which grants Petitioner's application for licensure as a Class D Security Officer. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Division of Licensing The Capitol MS 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. James J. Killacky #206 1660 Northeast 150th Street North Miami, Florida 33181 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified as a corrections officer in 1972 and was so certified at all times here relevant. Respondent was a season ticket holder to the Tampa Bay Buccaneers 1983 football games. He attended the game on September 25, 1983, with four friends. Before arriving at the game the group bought a fifth of whiskey. Respondent contends he had only one drink prior to the incident with the police officers but three police officers opined that Respondent was intoxicated. During the second half of the game, with the Bucs woefully behind and some spectators leaving the stadium, Respondent was yelling disparaging remarks about the Bucs and their performance on that day. Occasionally, Respondent was standing on his seat when he yelled the remarks. Respondent was more noisy than others in the section in which his seat was located and drew the attention of Jennifer Frye, a City of Tampa police officer serving as a uniformed off-duty policewoman paid the owners of the stadium to maintain crowd control. Officer Frye motioned for Respondent to come to the platform where she was standing, some four rows above Respondent's seat. Respondent did so, climbing between the people and seats behind him as he responded to Frye's summons. When Respondent reached Frye's position, she smelled alcohol on his breath and he appeared to her to be intoxicated. Respondent was somewhat annoyed in being called up by the policewoman and wanted to know why she had beckoned him from his seat. He was gesturing with his arms and asking what he had done wrong. Officer Lois Morraro, another off-duty member of the Tampa police force, was also working in uniform at the stadium. She observed Respondent respond to Frye's request and saw Respondent arguing. Morraro approached the two and positioned herself behind Respondent. Respondent told Frye he was a season ticket holder and was entitled to be upset when the Bucs were losing. Frye and Morraro decided to evict Respondent from the stadium and when Frye initially grabbed his hand Respondent pulled away. She then told him he was under arrest and grabbed his left arm and hand with a come-along grip. Morraro grabbed Respondent's right arm, twisted it behind his back, and moved the hand up toward the shoulders. They proceeded to propel the struggling Respondent down the steps to a holding area. When they reached the holding area they were joined by Sergeant Peter Ambraz, the off- duty Tampa police officer in charge of the stadium detail. Ambraz took Respondent's right arm while Morraro handcuffed Respondent. During this time Respondent was trying to keep from being handcuffed and in the process his elbow accidentally hit Morraro in the throat while she was standing behind him putting handcuffs on him. After Respondent had been handcuffed and taken to the police station, he revealed that he was a certified corrections officer. Respondent was subsequently tried for disorderly intoxication and fired from his job with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violation alleged in the administrative complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations of the parties, the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Commission on January 21, 1975, and was issued certificate No. 02-13392. On November 29, 1987, the Respondent was arrested by Officer Carl Matrone of the Opa Locka Police Department. During the course of this arrest, Officer Matrone seized a plastic bag which contained in fact 1.0 grams of cannabis, as the term is defined and used in Sections 893.02(3) and 893.03(1)(c)4, Florida Statutes. This amount would yield approximately one marijuana cigarette in volume. As a result of this arrest, the Office of the State Attorney in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit charged the Respondent by affidavit with a violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes, by unlawful possession of less than twenty grams of cannabis. The affidavit was filed in the County Court in and for Dade County. On February 26, 1988, the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge as set forth in the charging document. The Court accepted the plea, withheld an adjudication of guilt, and placed the Respondent on a six month period of reporting probation. Furthermore, on October 3, 1988, the Court ordered that the records in this misdemeanor case be sealed. The underlying facts which gave rise to this criminal misdemeanor follow. On November 29, 1987, Officer Matrone observed a Dodge van which was being driven by Respondent at approximately 11:45 a.m. The van was traveling north toward 130th Street on N.W. 30th Avenue when it crossed the median strip and parked in front of an apartment building. This apartment building is known to the police as a narcotics location since numerous arrests have been conducted in the area. As soon as the van pulled over, Officer Matrone observed an unidentified black male approach the van and exchange a small package for an unknown amount of paper money. Respondent received the package and, as Officer Matrone approached, the black male fled on foot. Respondent pulled away from the stop and proceeded to the corner traffic light with Officer Matrone following. When Officer Matrone turned on his siren, the Respondent immediately made a left turn and pulled into the first available parking place. Officer Matrone then asked Respondent to exit his vehicle which he did. Officer Matrone observed Respondent throw a small plastic bag to the ground as he exited the van. The contents of this bag were later tested and were found to contain cannabis. Respondent was not on duty on November 29, 1987. He was, at that time, employed by the Miami Police Department. Lt. Blom, who supervised all of the street officers on the day shift for the Miami Police Department, was notified that Respondent was being held in connection with the incident described in paragraphs 5-9. Lt. Blom went to the Opa Locka Police station and relieved Respondent of duty. Respondent told Lt. Blom "I made a mistake." During the time Lt. Blom talked with Respondent, it did not appear to Blom that Respondent was under the influence of drugs nor did Respondent admit that he had used drugs. Arthur G. DeNunzio, Sr. has known Respondent for over fourteen years. According to Mr. DeNunzio, Respondent has a good reputation in his church and in the community for honesty and integrity. Respondent's moral character is known by Mr. DeNunzio to be good. James Robinson has known Respondent for approximately ten years. Respondent has been employed by Mr. Robinson for approximately five months. According to Mr. Robinson, Respondent has a reputation as a good worker, a man of his word, and a man who gets things done timely and properly. Respondent is thought to be honest, having integrity, and of good moral character. Mr. Robinson entrusts large amounts of money to Respondent's care and has no reservations regarding his judgment or moral character. Emerenciano Soles has known Respondent for approximately sixteen years. According to Mr. Soles, Respondent has a high reputation in his community for honesty and for good moral character. On November 30, 1987, Respondent resigned from the Miami Police Department. During his tenure with the department, Respondent had received good work evaluations and several commendations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint against Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2Oth day of January, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Richard E. Lober, Esquire 10680 Northwest 25th Street Suite 202 Miami, Florida 33172-2108 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses of malicious harassment, unlawful battery (two counts), and unlawful entry of a structure (two counts) as set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated October 17, 1997. Whether Respondent has failed to maintain good moral character, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his correctional officer's certification.
Findings Of Fact Christopher Horne (Respondent), was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on September 29, 1989, as a correctional officer, and was issued Correctional Certificate Number 70581. Respondent was employed by the Orange County Sheriff's Office, Department of Corrections, as a correctional officer during the period of October 1, 1990, until his termination on November 14, 1997. Patricia Johnson is currently employed with the Orange County Sheriff's Department of Corrections as a correctional officer and has been employed as such for the past twelve years. She is certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer. Johnson first met Respondent in the summer of 1993 at work. They became friends and eventually began dating each other in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. This relationship continued for approximately two and a half years, until Johnson made the decision to end it. Johnson told Respondent on New Year's Eve 1995 that their relationship was over. Johnson began dating another man. When Respondent found out that she was dating someone else, he began calling her repeatedly at work and at home. Respondent continued to harass Johnson by calling her late at night and by driving repeatedly past her home at night. This behavior began in January 1996 and continued through August 1996. The Respondent used abusive language when speaking with Johnson. He threatened harm to her date, if he found her with someone. Johnson was afraid of Respondent and was afraid that he might harm her. On July 21, 1996, Respondent went to Johnson's home unannounced and knocked on her door. When Johnson opened the door and saw who it was, she told Respondent to leave. He did not; instead he pushed his way into her home, physically struggled with her, and eventually pushed her onto her bed. Respondent pinned her down with his knees and threatened her. Johnson repeatedly told him to leave her home. Respondent eventually left the house. Johnson reported Respondent's actions to the police. They documented the incident in a report. She told the police that she did not want to press charges against Respondent, but did want someone to talk to him about his actions. The police contacted Respondent and discussed the incident with him, but did not arrest him. On November 10, 1996, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Johnson received a phone call at her house from a person she believed to be her brother. The person told her that he had forgot his keys and asked to be let into the house. A short time later, there was a knock at the door. When Johnson opened the door, Respondent was standing there. He said, "Bitch let me in" and proceeded to push his way into her home. He then grabbed her hair and hit her head against the wall several times. He continued to pull her hair and push her up against the wall. She begged him to leave and told him to stop hitting her. She broke free and ran to her brother's room and started banging on the door. Her bother, Bobby Hunter, came out. Johnson told him that she wanted Respondent out of her house. Her brother asked Respondent to leave. Eventually, Respondent did leave without further physical confrontation. Johnson reported the incident to the police. After investigating the incident, the police completed a report and arrested the Respondent. Respondent was charged with burglary, battery, and aggravated stalking. Respondent pled in circuit court to the misdemeanor charge of trespass to an occupied dwelling and was placed on one- year probation. Respondent was suspended for 10 days from his employment with the Orange County Sheriff's Department of Corrections as a result of his actions involving Johnson. He was later terminated from his employment on November 14, 1997. Respondent is currently not employed as a correctional officer. Respondent's description of the events from January 1996 through August 1996 and on the night of November 10, 1996 is not credible. On December 11, 1992, the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issued an official Letter of Guidance to the Respondent. This prior action by the Commission is an aggravating factor in this case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission find Respondent guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and it is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's certification be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Martin Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Warren Turner, Esquire 609 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32802 A. Leon Lowry, II, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
